

# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

### S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL  
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND  
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
RELATING THERETO

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#### PART 35

#### CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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Printed for the use of the  
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



UNITED STATES  
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WASHINGTON : 1946



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK

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COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*  
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*  
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*  
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JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*  
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LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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**XI**

[illegible]



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## JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 148

[1]

[TOP SECRET]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD,  
FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE  
ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

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## TOP SECRET

[2]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 14 September 1945.

## Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

Subject: Report of investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War, I have conducted the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, mentioned in the public statements of the Secretary of War on 1 December 1944 and 29 August 1945. Copies of these statements and of my orders and some related documents are attached as Exhibit "A".

In the course of this investigation, I travelled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian personnel at the following places:

|                            |                    |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| Berlin, Germany            | London, England    |
| Blanchley Park, England    | Luzon, P. I.       |
| Boston, Massachusetts      | Manila, P. I.      |
| Cannes, France             | Neuenahr, Germany  |
| Casserta, Italy            | New York, New York |
| Frankfurt on Main, Germany | Paris, France      |
| Guam                       | Potsdam, Germany   |
| Honolulu, T. H.            | Saipan             |
| Langley Field, Virginia    | Versaille, France  |
| Leyte, P. I.               | Washington, D. C.  |

Some of these persons were interviewed where they were engaged in combat in active theaters of operation, as the Secretary of War stated in his public statement of 1 December 1944 would be necessary.

<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.



Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I recorded their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are attached as Exhibit "B":

General George C. Marshall  
General Douglas MacArthur  
[3] Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland  
Major General John R. Deane  
Major General Charles D. Herron  
Major General Sherman Miles  
Major General C. A. Willoughby  
Major General Ralph C. Smith  
Brig. General Thomas J. Betts  
Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder  
Brig. General Morrill W. Marston  
Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop  
Brig. General Charles K. Galley  
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton  
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft  
Colonel George W. Bicknell  
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen  
Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury  
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew  
Colonel Joseph K. Evans  
Colonel Edward F. French  
Colonel Edward W. Raley

Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow  
Lt. General Walter B. Smith  
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler  
Colonel Rex W. Minkler  
Colonel Harold Doud  
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN  
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN  
Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN  
Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN  
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett  
Major Edward B. Anderson  
Captain Howard W. Martin  
Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane  
Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN  
Miss Mary J. Dunning  
Miss Margaret McKenney  
Miss Louise Prather  
Miss Mary L. Ross  
Mr. George W. Renchard  
Rr. Robert L. Shivers  
Mr. John F. Stone

The following persons gave me signed statements which, with some records of my interviews, are also included in Exhibit "B":

Brigadier General C. A. Powell  
Colonel O. H. Thompson  
Lt. Colonel Byron M. Muerlott  
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN

Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USN  
Mr. Harry L. Dawson  
Mr. John E. Russell

I also obtained a great deal of additional documentary evidence. A list of this is attached as Exhibit "C" and the documents are presented herewith.

Periodic oral and written reports were heretofore made. The written reports are attached as Exhibit "D".

There are attached as Exhibits "E" and "F" memoranda of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation.

6 Incls

1. Ex. "A"
2. Ex. "B"
3. Ex. "C"
4. Ex. "D"
5. Ex. "E"
6. Ex. "F"

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[4]

**EXHIBIT A**

**INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR; SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD**

1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to conduct investigations of Pearl Harbor.
2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster, 1 December 1944.
3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation.
4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944, concerning unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.
5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army personnel concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10 February 1945, in reply to letter 6 February 1945.
8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March 1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen.
9. Movement Orders for Major C. Clausen, 14 March 1945.
10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
12. Memorandum to Major Duckett, ASF, P&O, 24 March 1945, requesting change in movement orders.
13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding Officer, 1504 AAFBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in movement orders of Major Henry C. Clausen.
- [5] 14. Memorandum of Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 24 May 1945, requesting travel orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen.
15. Movement orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 25 May 1945.
16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1945, concerning investigation.
17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7 August 1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen.
18. Amendment of movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 11 August 1945.
19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, 29 August 1945.

[6]

[PUBLIC LAW 339—78TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 247—2D SESSION]

[S. J. Res. 133]

**JOINT RESOLUTION**

To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor

catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

Approved June 13, 1944.

[7] WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

PRESS BRANCH

Tel. —RE 6700, Brs. 3425 and 4860

DECEMBER 1, 1944.

Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR

The following is the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War:

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary [8] directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based.

STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS

I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of the evidence now recorded not to institute further proceedings against any officer of the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a report of June 14, 1944, called attention to certain relationships of Hans Wilhelm Rohl to military construction in Hawaii under the direction of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that this may have contributed to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly, the phases of the Committee report bearing thereon were referred to the Army Pearl Harbor Board for further investigation.

I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy.

As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate General.

Distribution: Aa, Af, B, Da, Dd, Dm, N.

5:00 P. M.

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SECRET

[9]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, 23 November 1944.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information to your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries.

In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary notwithstanding.

HENRY L. STIMSON,  
Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

## TOP SECRET

[10]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Washington 25, D. C.

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can be investigated:

a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order.

b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.

c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington.

d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor.

e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired back for its meaning.

f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies thereof.

g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation.

h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department.

i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of 7 February 1941.

[11] j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3.

k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britian and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement or discovered its existence.

1. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan (Rep. 41).

3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain:

a. The exact date and time of first translation.

b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some of the most vital messages.

c. Who got each message, when and in what form.

d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.

e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept.

4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored:

a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.

b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the transmission was received.

[12] c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britian" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britian" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief

of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept?

f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating "Winds" message?

g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine?

h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "Winds" message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.

Myron C. Cramer,  
MYRON C. CRAMER,  
Major General, USA,  
The Judge Advocate General.

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SECRET

[13]

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, 6 February 1945.

Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned:

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him.

HENRY L. STIMSON,  
Secretary of War.

---

SECRET

[14]

6 FEBRUARY 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Some of the additional information which seems to be material is believed to be available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I have instructed Major Clausen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

I will appreciate it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to all pertinent Navy records and information and afford him the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it being understood that he will comply strictly with the instructions I have stated above.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,  
Secretary of War.

Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy.

MO'B.

HON. JAMES V. FORRESTAL,  
Secretary of the Navy,  
Washington, D. C.

hbb/mob

A True Copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

SECRET

[15]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington, 10 Feb. 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of 6 February 1945 advising that Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and requesting that he be given access to all pertinent Navy records and information and be afforded the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as necessary, it being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which directed that we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, authorize us to make available to each other information in our respective Departments relevant to our separate investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to comply with your request, and suggest that Major Clausen communicate with Lt. Commander John F. Sonnett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to furnish the specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL.

Hon. HENRY L. STIMSON,  
Secretary of War,  
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

[16]

3 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.  
Subject: Request for Orders.

1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War, dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the investigation by Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of Secretary of War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to proceed on or about 12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b) then to Honolulu, T. H., and (c) then return to Washington, D. C., and (d) authority to make such successive trips from Washington, D. C., and to travel to such other place or places, and to make such changes in said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said mission.

3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, rail or any other means of transportation be authorized as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75 pounds be authorized for travel by aircraft.

4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of \$7.00 be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while away from Washington, D. C. required to complete this mission. Reference is made to the determination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August 1944, that the thirty day limitation prescribed in War Department Circular 260, 1944, is not applicable in connection with temporary duty enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Officers on duty therewith.

/s/ H. C. Clausen,  
H. C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

Approved:

/s/ Harvey H. Bundy,  
HARVEY H. BUNDY, for the Secretary of War.

/s/ Myron C. Cramer,  
MYRON C. CRAMER.

The Judge Advocate General.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

[17]

RESTRICTED

AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C.  
(12 Mar 45)

EAD/bls/2231 Mu  
Br. 76520

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington 25, D. C., 14 March 1945.

Subject: Movement Orders.

To: Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD  
4731 Munitions Building  
Washington, D. C.

1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20 March 1945 from Washington, D. C., to San Francisco, California, on temporary duty of approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Fairfield, California, reporting not later than 28 March 1945, to the Commanding Officer, 1504th AAF Base Unit for air transportation to Fort Shafter, T. H. Upon arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-3 P 432-02, 03, 212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes no. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APR-2-331158-ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, (official documents), is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 260, 1944 apply; outside continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply.

3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the theater as may be necessary for the performance of this mission.

4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the port of aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions.

5. Special instructions: Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic plague inoculations will be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated as special official courier.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

E. A. DAVIS, *Adjutant General.*

[18] 3 Incls.

AG Ltr 4 July 1944

AG Form 43

Travel Book

Distribution:

Officer (10)

Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO

Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu.

Lt. Stump, 1C-931, The Pentagon.

APS, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2)

Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort Mason, Calif.

Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD, WDGS, 3B-354, The Pentagon

Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E-747, The Pentagon

P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va.

CG, USAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California

Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Calif. (3)



SECRET

[19]

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days.

It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON,  
Secretary of War.

hcc/es

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

SECRET

[20]

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater.

Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days.

It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON,  
Secretary of War.

hcc/es

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[21]

WAR DEPARTMENT

ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum: ASF P&amp;O (Maj. Duckett)

1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy attached) as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 28 Mar. 45, be amended to extend said dates respectively to leave Washington, D. C. on or about 26 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4 April 45. Also, if advisable, amend said orders to designate my correct rank.

2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to await certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.

Rm. 4741 Munitions  
Ex. 78922

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

11

[22]

EAD/ED/ ed/2381 Mu

27 MARCH 1945.  
77723AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C  
(27 Mar 45)AGO Personnel  
Room 2323 Munitions

Officers

Assignment SPXPO-A

CO

1504 AAFBU

PP

FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF

FAIRFIELD, CALIFORNIA

Orders dated 14 March 1945 pertaining to Major Henry C. Clausen 0907618 JAGD by order SW are amended to direct him proceed on or about 28 March 45 from Washington, DC, and report to CO 1504 AAFBU FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF, Fairfield, Calif., not later than 4 April 45 end SPXPO-A ULIO TAG.

Official:

\_\_\_\_\_, *Adjutant General.*

SECRET

[23]

24 MAY 1945.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.

Subject: Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

1. Reference is made to movement Orders, dated 14 March 1945, to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and request therefor dated 3 March 1945.

2. Request is made for additional movement Orders to Colonel Clausen directing him to proceed on or about 30 May 1945 to Headquarters, SHAEF, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary for the purpose of conducting investigation in accordance with Secret Instructions of the Secretary of War.

3. It is requested that the provisions of said prior request for Orders, dated 3 March 1945, be considered applicable hereto and that a one priority be assigned for air travel.

HARVEY H. BUNDY,  
*For the Secretary of War.*

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

RESTRICTED

EAD/1af/fcs/2323 Mun  
Br. 76520

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington 25, D. C., 25 May 1945

[24]

AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C  
(24 May 45)

Subject: Movement Orders

To: #Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD

1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. C. to Headquarters, SHAEF, European Theater of Operations, Versailles, France, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary on temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purposes of conducting an investigation in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of War. He will report to the Commanding Officer, 503d Army Air Forces Base Unit, Air Annex #1, Room 1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for processing and air transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from Washington, D. C. to Versailles, France, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03 212/50425. Travel by air (APR-1-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emerg-

12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ency war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35-4820, 19 April 1945 apply: outside the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 35-4820, 19 April 1945, apply.

3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the accomplishment of this mission.

4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List." One (1) Pistol, caliber .45 will be issued at the aerial port of embarkation.

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4295, % Postmaster, New York, New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

CAPT. E. A. DAVIS, AGO,  
*Adjutant General.*

Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec

[25] 3 Incls:  
AG Ltr 4 Jul 44  
AG Form #43  
Travel Book

Distribution:

Officer (10)  
Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun  
APS, 4A-514, Pentagon  
OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)  
Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon  
CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3)  
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun

Destination Commander:

SECRET

[26]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I wish to thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and interviewed certain Navy personnel.

I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization or action may have had in the disaster.

Sincerely yours,

\_\_\_\_\_, *Secretary of War.*

Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL,

*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

hhb/mob

[27]

7 AUGUST 1945.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General:

Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, dated 25 May 1945.

It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth period of temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read "four months."

HARVEY H. BUNDY,  
*Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.*

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

## RESTRICTED

[28]

RHO/laf/mm/2323 Mun  
Br. 76520WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE*Washington, D. C., 11 August 1945.*AGPO-A 201—Clausen, Henry C.  
(7 Aug. 45.)

Subject: Amendment of Movement Orders,

To: Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD.

So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. (24 May 45. Subject: Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD as reads: "Temporary Duty of approximately two (2) months" be amended to read: "Temporary Duty of approximately four (4) months".

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

E. A. DAVIS, *Adjutant General.*

## Distribution:

Officer (10)

Offs' Br Rec Sec AGO, Rm 1528 Mun

APS, Rm 4-A 514, Pentagon

OIC, Emb APO 464 Lexington Ave, NY, NY (2)

Lt. Stump, 1C 931, Pentagon

CO, 503D AAFBU, WPAE, Rm 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Ptd, DC (3)

Judge Advocate General, Rm 2734, Mun.

Destination Commander:

[29] OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR  
DISASTER

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

On December 1, 1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter as follows:

"This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

"I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

"The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

"So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

"Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

"In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [30] every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

"Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based."

Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to be taken was correct.

Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I., and others. From these same sources there came to the Government additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan.

The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress the full reports and the record of the testimony.

My conclusions are as follows:

# I

The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation. Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local [31] situation and conditions. Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion

demand. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese attack.

I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until the latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that he was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared for the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.

I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would have modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan.

I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his anti-aircraft defenses sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded.

This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz: the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.

[32] The underlying cause of this error of judgment was General Short's confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him it must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.

Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27, 1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this

should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others.

But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility of such an attack was his own definite responsibility.

To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.

To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack on that outpost to the opinion of another service.

Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater commander.

I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my statement of December 1, 1944, and in my judgment the additional investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been taken.

## II

[33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had specially assigned duties.

The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders.

I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation; that he was warned that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures—the all-important measure to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated, I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty.

There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate.

The information available to the War Department on or before December 7, 1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following: information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by November 25, 1941, later extended to November 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no further; and information available the morning of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1:00 P. M., December 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, was that the War Department had information through secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that General Short had been [34] fully advised by the War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any time.

The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible.

Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9:00 A. M. on the morning of December 7.

When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Government at 1:00 P. M. and the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message, which in the case of General Short, did not arrive until after the attack.

Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about November 20, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed.



With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department [35] functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event.

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage *only* and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more inclusive comparison of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division.

Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

### III

The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for [36] and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hope-

lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts.

It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such situation in this case. The scattered and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.

#### IV

The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts Commission in their report of January 23, 1942\* and the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.

#### V

In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have prolonged the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.

#### VI

There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed on December 1, 1944, were as follows:

[57] "I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy."

The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.

I also stated on December 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General." Until those officials are ready to report, I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman.

\*This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts; Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney.

[38]

**EXHIBIT B**

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY  
OF WAR

**SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD**

1. Statement of interview of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, 24 January 1945, at Washington, D. C.
2. Proposed affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
4. Affidavit of Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
6. Affidavit of Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, AC, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
7. Affidavit of Margaret McKenney, GSC, G-2, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
8. Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 25 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
11. Affidavit of Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop, AGO, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
12. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
13. Affidavit of Major General Ralph C. Smith, GSC, G-2, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
14. Affidavit of Mary L. Ross, GSC, G-2, 1 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
15. Affidavit of Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Virginia.
16. Affidavit of General Charles K. Gailey, OPD, GSC, 21 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
17. Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French, 8C, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
- [39] 18. Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, GSC, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
19. Statement of Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H., 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H., also statement of Harry L. Dawson, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
24. Affidavit of Brig. General Morrill W. Marston, GSC, 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
26. Statement of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam.
28. Statement of Brig. General C. A. Powell, SC, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.

30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
31. Affidavit of Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, C/S, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas, 6 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
32. Affidavit of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
33. Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas, 8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
34. Affidavit of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
36. Affidavit of Lt. General Walter B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF, 15 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
- [40] 37. Affidavit of Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow, CG, 15th Army, 20 June 1945, at Cannes, France.
38. Affidavit of Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at Casserta, Italy.
39. Affidavit of George W. Renchard, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
40. Affidavit of John F. Stone, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Denne, USA, 24 July 1945, at Potsdam, Germany.
42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris, France.
43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at Boston, Massachusetts.
46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, 21 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
47. Affidavit of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
51. Affidavit of Miss Mary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.

[41]

**HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,  
Washington 25, D. C., 24 January 1945.**

Memorandum for the files.

Subject: Interview of General Fielder.

Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General Bissell on 8 January 1945, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4D852, Pentagon, on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission and the clearances with General Bissell which permitted General Fielder to answer all my questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was already sworn as a witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the necessity for secrecy with respect to my examination. To many of my questions he answered that it would be necessary for me to review the records at Hawaii and that this would entail considerable research. He gave the following information or answers to the specific points indicated.

1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from Washington since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated that he referred solely to counterintelligence matters and that had "nothing to do with combat."

2. He stated he was not very well acquainted with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did not know of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and Colonel Edward Railey. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "U" (called R1.)

3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25 October 1941, he stated it was his understanding that these were circulated to the Chief of Staff and General Short.

4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the Washington G-2, 27 November 1941, warning.

5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1 December 1941.

6. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information (Bratton D. 289-291) and that it was "circulated" as something he "used to get."

7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attache message of 5-6 December 1941.

[42] 8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance.

9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington G-2 message to the Hawaiian Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message, he said he "didn't remember" the message but that it "might have come in as routine."

10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he knew that the Navy was intercepting such information, he stated at first that he knew of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and that on this basis he knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes.

Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry were asked.

General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given without recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification already referred to obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and information.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

H. C. C.,

Major, JAGD.

Assistant Recorder, APHB.

TOP SECRET

[43] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily radio intelligence under assignments from the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My unit consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor.

My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of intelligence information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters, and with him and Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my headquarters. Thereafter, including the period to 7 December 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally and frequently, and carried out these arrangements.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was then being done mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of the Navy. On occasions I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It

was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and [44] and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.

[Written:] NOTE.—This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in accordance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort.

Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this regard is distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning these items of intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT,  
*Captain, USN.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this      day of February 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Major, JAGD.*

TOP SECRET

[45]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL MOSES W. PETTIGREW, MIS

Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says:

From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington; that from November 1939 to August 1941 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the Far Eastern Unit, G-2, War Department;

That while performing said duties in G-2, he read various intercepts of diplomatic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies; that these intercepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level Diplomatic, and J19;

That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November 1941, while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by Major Clausen have been identified by affiant with his initials and date, and which are now commonly referred to as the "Winds Code";

That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or about 5 December 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger; that in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now recall, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached.

That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in possession of the same information he had received in Washington; that he reached this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel, whom he does not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had; and, that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving these intercepts and breaking and translating the codes, as well as Washington, in the

interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a subsequent exchange of intercept translations as a check one against the another.

[46] That on 5 December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the secret telegram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information; that affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram he prepared and has affixed his initials and date on the reverse side thereof; that the initials "RSB" written thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, were written thereon by affiant on 5 December 1941 and affiant also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner; that affiant believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initialed by Lt. Colonel C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room for dispatch;

That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the message was dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing message number which was given only in the ordinary course of procedure when a message was dispatched;

Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of said message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian Department;

That prior to affiant's aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was from May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; that while in the performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he had been informed that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that time; that the Army had a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the development of this phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to obtain certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel Morrill W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in turn was succeeded by Colonel Fielder;

Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview with Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2D841, Pentagon, Extension 5851, questioning of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and interviews and checking records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal Corps there, especially Colonel Powell. Also, interviews with Colonel C. C. Duisenbury, MID, former assistant to Colonel Bratton and with General Marston.

Moses W. Pettigrew,  
MOSES W. PETTIGREW,  
Colonel, MIS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

SECRET

[47] Standard Form No. 14A  
Approved by the President  
March 10, 1926

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,  
G2, Hawaiian Department,  
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

RALPH C. SMITH,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram  
las

TOP SECRET

[49]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington.

## AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY, GSC

Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, Assistant Director of Intelligence, Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon, on temporary duty in Washington, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his right to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says;

To the best of my recollection I prepared the initial draft of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram reading:

"Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,  
G2 Hawaiian Department,  
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES."

I have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on the reverse side thereof. This was prepared either of my volition or following consultation with Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, G-2, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS. For several months prior to and following 7 December 1941 Colonel Pettigrew was on duty as Executive Officer, Intelligence Group, MID, and was not an active member of the Far Eastern Section when the message of 5 December originated. His duties were administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving outgoing messages. The reason which I recollect for sending the secret cablegram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been received by G-2, especially the "Winds Code", indicated danger to the United States and also, because there was believed to be lack of confidence by Edwin T. Layton, Navy Intelligence Officer as to Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department.

It was believed by me that Commander Rochefort had these intercepts, including the "Winds Code" and similar information, available at Hawaii, which had been received either at Hawaii or from the Navy Department in Washington. I understood the Navy had about four or five hundred Naval personnel in Hawaii doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the Japanese diplomatic codes.

[50] During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having reported to him in August 1940, and continued as his assistant until and after 7 December 1941. For the four or five months immediately following August 1940, Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps the translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, Aide of the Secretary of War; John Stone, secretary to Secretary of State Hull; Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Bedell Smith and Colonel Thomas T. Handy or Colonel Bundy in OPD. The procedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received except such as were thus distributed, and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who receipted for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be and the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercepts which was retained by G-2. At the expiration of the four or five months period referred to following August 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about 7 December 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2 to my knowledge of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top secrecy requirements. While I cannot recollect specifically each message which I delivered I believe that this information can be obtained elsewhere than in the War Department. For example, the State Department may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be sorted to about twenty-five for distribution.



I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities.

It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army.

[51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December 1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m.

Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury,  
CARLISLE CLYDE DUSENBURY,  
Colonel, G. S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[52] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY  
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer.

My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained more cordial and close relations, meeting informally.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have

written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.

[53] Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shiver, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

Joseph J. Rochefort,  
JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT,  
*Captain, U. S. Navy.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Major, JAGD.*

at Washington, D. C.

[54] AFFIDAVIT OF CLARENCE G. JENSEN, COLONEL, AIR CORPS, AUS

Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (0475864), presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to instructions, I made diligent search of all War Department pertinent files, and especially those in the possession of Operational Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and its predecessor, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, covering the period 1 July, 1941, to 7 December, 1941, to ascertain whether a Standing Operating Procedure, dated 5 November 1941, of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had been received in the War Department before 7 December, 1941; that among other things I personally searched or supervised a search of the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating Procedure, including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, Office of The Adjutant General, and Miss Alice Miller, civilian in charge of the Registered Document Section of Operational Plans Division, WDGS; that this search indicated that no such Standing Operating Procedure was received by the War Department at Washington, D. C., until March of 1942; that I questioned General Dunlop as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing Operating Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941, and he stated that he had no recollection on the subject; that I also questioned General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in Washington with respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division, WDGS, during the months immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would have been likely to remember, whether he had any recollection and he stated he did not; that the net result of my search, therefore, indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Procedure was first received at Washington, D. C., in March, 1942, at the time it was receipted for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy of receipt; that the reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound volume, Register No. 45, Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which contains Standing Operat-

ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and identifies said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941; that a letter dated 5 November 1941, attached to said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, directs the collection and destruction of all copies of the said Tentative Standing Operating Procedure; that said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, provides, among other things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Section II, as follows:

[55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 (8) below.

"14. *ALERT NO. 1.*—*a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without.

"15. *ALERT NO. 2.*—*a.* This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

16. *ALERT NO. 3.*—*a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

Signed: CLARENCE G. JENSEN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

SECRET

[56] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January 1942.

In reply refer to:  
AG 311.5—OHD-41.

WPD-381—Haw Dept (1-29-42)  
Auth: CG, Haw Dept  
Initials OMM A. G.  
Date: 29 Jan 1942

Subject: Operation Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941.  
To: War Plans Division, War Department General Staff,  
Washington, D. C.

Herewith Register Nos 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941.  
Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below.

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

Incls: Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41.  
March 10, 1942.

J. L. McKee,  
J. L. McKee,  
Col., G. S. C.

TOP SECRET

[57] AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET MCKENNEY

Margaret McKenney, civilian clerk in charge, Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff.

G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., which section collects and delivers incoming and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I have read the affidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth appear to my best information and belief to be accurate; that from my experience and knowledge of the customary practice during December, 1941, I believe the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram from General Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, was sent because (1) the yellow copy of the cablegram, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross was returned in the condition as shown on said copy only if the message was sent, (2) the notations of the number 519 thereon indicates that the message was assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it was received from G-2; that the message was then incoded and sent and that then the notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, (3) that the stamp on the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew indicates that it was received in the code room of the Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the numeral "4" in the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates that it is the fourth message that went from G-2 that day and as typed into the outgoing cables receipt book, the page of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, (5) that the said G-2 receipt book, 5 December 1941, shows the outgoing cable messages for that day and that with respect to the cable in question the customary procedure was followed; that in accordance with this procedure the daily serial number 4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the designation, classification, time received in the Cable Section, number 32 being Mary L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating officer and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the page from the receipt book shows that the message was receipted for in the Signal Corps code room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that written on the page of the receipt book is the number 519, being the number assigned the message by the Signal Corps under a system to indicate that the message was sent and received by the addressee; (6) that the system indicated by the number 519 tied in with a system of the Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Department in receiving messages must account for the sequence by numbers and if a number were missing would check back with Washington to locate the missing message; that since no check backs were received with respect to number 519, the system shows that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and (7) that I have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [58] of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I assisted in the collection of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts prior to Pearl Harbor and at subsequent intervals and for that reason my memory is clear on the points in which I herein state I have knowledge.

Signed: MARGARET MCKENNEY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.

Major, J. A. G. D.

at Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

[59]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington, 25 February 1945.

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, M. I.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I., presently assigned to G-2, MIS, Washington, D. C., having been duly sworn and informed of the investigation of Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and informed that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counterintelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Colonel Kendall J. Fleider. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General Nolan.

Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th Naval District; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet; the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands.

Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part of November, 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which I was looking.

[60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War Department, Washington, D. C., in substance as follows:

"DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,  
G2, Hawaiian Department,  
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen  
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES."

On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was monitoring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers, then FBI Agent In Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which had been given me.

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G-2, Hawaiian Department; G-2, Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G-3, Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth

between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying the pertinent information to interested parties.

In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, and references to "hibisqus" and "poinsettias." My G-2 sense told me that there was something very significant about the message. I know the intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind the other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in execution of the "Winds" code.

I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6 December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I thought it was too important to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in ten minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in ten minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong."

On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action.

As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning the warning [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection then Lt. Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned.

George W. Bicknell,  
 GEORGE W. BICKNELL.  
*Colonel, M. I.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
 HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Major, JAGD.*

At Washington, D. C.

## [63] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL

Colonel George W. Bicknell, heretofore examined by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, makes the following amendment to his affidavit of 25 February 1945, concerning the Pearl Harbor investigation:

I wish to state further that prior to 7 December 1941, namely about October 1941, I made and practised, in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elaborate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of war with Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called "A", "B" and "C". They are specifically set forth in memoranda I prepared which should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan "C" was put into execution immediately on the proclamation of martial law.

In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates given to General Short and his Staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October 1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October, 1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian Islands with the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which Gerald Wilkinson of the British Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this file which are marked for me, were received by me on or about the dates set forth on the documents. Included in this group are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 November and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of each document by putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides.

The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941, as well as any pertinent information I received in connection with my G-2 activities, I gave to General Short, promptly, in one form or another. Reference is made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 1941.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of August, 1945

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.*

at Washington, D. C.

[64]

## WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

## AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR EDWARD B. ANDERSON, T. C.

Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C., presently on duty with the Office of the Transportation Corps, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

My attention has been called to a photostatic copy of a secret telegram dated 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. On the date of this message I was assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department. My immediate superior was the then Major McDole. The customary and usual practice with respect to such messages was for them to be sent from the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, to the office in which I was assigned, Office of The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, and by our office to the addressee. Normally the Signal Officer sent two copies to our office. One of these was sent by our office to the action addressee, and if it was returned it was filed in a subject file. The other copy was retained in our office and used for the purpose of checking against the sequence of numbers which was a system in use at the time for assuring that we received all

messages. If a number was missing we would check back with the Signal Office and ascertain the reason why. I cannot recall specifically having seen the message in question dated 5 December 1941, but I do not recall either having occasion at the time to have indications of a missing number.

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel McDole, Chief Warrant Officer Lane, Warrant Officer Knapp, and personnel of the Signal Office, Hawaiian Department. The records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Office, Hawaiian Department, should indicate whether the message was received.

Edward B. Anderson,  
EDWARD B. ANDERSON,  
Major, T. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[65]

#### WAR DEPARTMENT

#### WASHINGTON

#### AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT H. DUNLOP

Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, presently assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I was Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department from June 1941 to and including December 1941 and thereafter.

I recall the all-out alert which was ordered by General Herron in 1940. So far as I observed, this alert and the action of the Army in pursuance thereof did not materially alarm the civilian population.

My attention has been invited to the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department dated 5 November 1941, a copy of which Major Clausen has shown me, contained in a bound volume, register No. 45, Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, which also contains a copy of a letter dated 5 November 1941, over my signature. I have no recollection of sending any copy of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, or the Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, to Washington, D. C., or having these sent to Washington, D. C., before 7 December 1941.

On 27 November 1941, I was in the office of Lt. General Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, when Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, at about 2:30 p. m. entered the room, excused himself for the interruption, and said that he had come in to show the Commanding General a very important message from General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C., which he had just received. General Short read this message and said in effect that it certainly was a very important message, and, it is my impression that, directing himself to Colonel Phillips told him to put into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941. At that time the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941 was in effect for the Hawaiian Department. I ascertained then or later that the message from Washington read in general as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be constructed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and [66] other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."



At 4 p. m. the afternoon of 27 November 1941 I was present at the staff meeting to which I had been called. The message was read to us and Colonel Phillips stated that the Commanding General had ordered into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure. He asked for questions and as I recollect there was only one question put. It concerned the message from General Marshall, but the details of which I cannot now recall. There was no further discussion. There was no mention then or thereafter, to my knowledge up to 7 December 1941, as to what had been the effect upon the civilian population of the alert ordered by General Herron the preceding year to which I have referred. The staff meeting did not last longer than about fifteen minutes.

I have no recollection of having seen the message dated 5 December 1941, the one showed me by Major Clausen, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, but I suggest that a search of the records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, be made since the receipt or non-receipt should have been recorded and the record thereof preserved.

Robert H. Dunlop,  
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
*Brigadier General.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Major, JAGD.*

At Washington, D. C.

[67]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 28 February 1945.

AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, S. C.

Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, Signal Corps, presently Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, OCSigO, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941 and during the immediately preceding month, I was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytical Unit Signal Intelligence Service, OCSigO, War Department, Washington, D. C. My immediate superior was Major Harold S. Doud who was assistant to Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Chief of the Signal Intelligence Service, who in turn was under Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service, and whose superior was the Chief Signal Officer. Colonel Eric Svensson was in charge of the Japanese Diplomatic Solution Activities.

I recall in general the tenor of the various Japanese diplomatic intercepts which had been deciphered and translated, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen. Pursuant to the request of Major Clausen I have attempted to compile from original records presently in the possession of the Signal Corps information concerning the intercepts in said Exhibit "B" as to (1) sources of interception; (2) dates of the messages; (3) dates of interception; (4) dates of translations; (5) whether Honolulu had copies; (6) whether the activating message in pursuance of the "Winds" code message is available in places to which I now have access. Attached hereto is a summary I prepared which refers to various of the intercepts by the Signal Intelligence Service number and gives some of the requested information which I have been able to obtain. My search has not disclosed any "Winds" code activating message, although at the time it was supposed to have been intercepted shortly before 7 December 1941. I recall comments to the effect that it had been intercepted.

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel Doud, Colonel Minckler, Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Svensson, Miss Prather, and Mr. Friedman, among others.

Frank B. Rowlett,  
FRANK B. ROWLETT,  
*Lt. Col., S. C.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Major, JAGD.*

At Washington, D. C.

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

35

| [68]    | SIS No. | Sources*      | Date Msg | Date Int   | Date translated | Honolulu |
|---------|---------|---------------|----------|------------|-----------------|----------|
| 23260   |         | S             | 24 Sept. | 24 Sept.   | 9 Oct.          | No       |
| 23570   |         | 7             | 14 Oct.  | 15 Oct.    | 16 Oct.         | No       |
| 23516   |         | 2, S, 7, M, 3 | 14 Oct.  | 14 Oct.    | 15 Oct.         | No       |
| 23631   |         | 1             | 16 Oct.  | 16 Oct.    | 17 Oct.         | No       |
| 23859   |         | 2, 7, 1       | 22 Oct.  | 22/23 Oct. | 23 Oct.         | No       |
| 24373   |         | S (teletype)  | 5 Nov.   | 5 Nov.     | 5 Nov.          | No       |
| 25322   |         | Navy Radio    | 14 Nov.  | ?          | 26 Nov.         | No       |
| 25644   |         | S             | 15 Nov.  | ?          | 3 Dec.          | No       |
| 24878   |         | S             | 16 Nov.  | 17 Nov.    | 17 Nov.         | No       |
| 25773   |         | S             | 18 Nov.  | 18 Nov.    | 5 Dec.          | No       |
| 25817   |         | 1, 2          | 18 Nov.  | 18/19 Nov. | 6 Dec.          | No       |
| 25392   |         | S             | 19 Nov.  | ?          | 26 Nov.         | No       |
| 25823   |         | S, 2          | 29 Nov.  | ?          | 5 Dec.          | No       |
| 25040   |         | S (teletype)  | 19 Nov.  | ?          | 20 Nov.         | No       |
| 25432   |         | S (teletype)  | 19 Nov.  | ?          | 28 Nov.         | No       |
| 25138   |         | S             | 22 Nov.  | 22 Nov.    | 22 Nov.         | No       |
| 25435   |         | 1, 6          | 26 Nov.  | 26 Nov.    | 28 Nov.         | No       |
| 25344   |         | S             | 26 Nov.  | 26 Nov.    | 26 Nov.         | No       |
| 25349   |         | ?             | 26 Nov.  | 26 Nov.    | 26 Nov.         | No       |
| 25444   |         | 1, 2          | 26 Nov.  | 27 Nov.    | 28 Nov.         | No       |
| 25480   |         | 1, 2          | 26 Nov.  | 26/27 Nov. | 29 Nov.         | No       |
| 25436   |         | 1             | 26 Nov.  | 26 Nov.    | 28 Nov.         | No       |
| 25445   |         | S, 6          | 28 Nov.  | 28 Nov.    | 28 Nov.         | No       |
| 25496   |         | S (teletype)  | 29 Nov.  | 29 Nov.    | 30 Nov.         | No       |
| 25554   |         | Navy Radio    | 30 Nov.  | 30 Nov.    | 1 Dec.          | No       |
| 25553   |         | J, Navy Rad   | 30 Nov.  | 1 Dec.     | 1 Dec.          | No       |
| 25552   |         | J, Navy Rad   | 30 Nov.  | 1 Dec.     | 1 Dec.          | No       |
| 25497   |         | ?             | 30 Nov.  | 30 Nov.    | 30 Nov.         | No       |
| 25555   |         | Navy Radio    | 30 Nov.  | 30 Nov.    | 1 Dec.          | No       |
| 25787   |         | British       | 1 Dec.   | ?          | 5 Dec.          | No       |
| 25605   |         | S (teletype)  | 1 Dec.   | 1 Dec.     | 1 Dec.          | No       |
| 25545   |         | S (teletype)  | 1 Dec.   | 1 Dec.     | 1 Dec.          | No       |
| 25727   |         | S, 1          | 1 Dec.   | ?          | 4 Dec.          | No       |
| 25783   |         | S, Navy Radio | 1 Dec.   | ?          | 4 Dec.          | No       |
| 25699-B |         | 1, 2, 7       | 2 Dec.   | 2 Dec.     | 3 Dec.          | No       |
| 25660   |         | 7             | 2 Dec.   | 2 Dec.     | 3 Dec.          | No       |
| 25640   |         | X, 2          | 2 Dec.   | 2 Dec.     | 3 Dec.          | No       |
| 25785   |         | 7             | 3 Dec.   | ?          | 5 Dec.          | No       |
| 25807   |         | W             | 4 Dec.   | 5 Dec.     | 6 Dec.          | No       |
| 27065   |         | S, 5          | 2 Dec.   | 2 Dec.     | 30 Dec.         | Yes      |
| 25843   |         | S (teletype)  | 4 Dec.   | ?          | 7 Dec.          | No       |
| 25836   |         | S (teletype)  | 5 Dec.   | ?          | 6 Dec.          | No       |
| 25838   |         | S             | 6 Dec.   | 6 Dec.     | 6 Dec.          | No       |
| 25843   |         | S             | 6 Dec.   | 6 Dec.     | 6 Dec.          | No       |
| 26158   |         | 1, 5          | 6 Dec.   | ?          | 12 Dec.         | Yes      |
| 25846   |         | 2 (teletype)  | 6 Dec.   | 6 Dec.     | 7 Dec.          | No       |
| 25854   |         | S             | 7 Dec.   | 7 Dec.     | 7 Dec.          | No       |
| 25850   |         | S             | 7 Dec.   | 7 Dec.     | 7 Dec.          | No       |
| 25856   |         | S (teletype)  | 7 Dec.   | 7 Dec.     | 7 Dec.          | No       |
| 25866   |         | 2, Navy Rad   | 7 Dec.   | 7 Dec.     | 7 Dec.          | No       |

\*Navy: J=Jupiter, Fla. S=Bainbridge Island, Wash. W=Winter Harbor, Me. Navy Radio-Navy Overseas Intercept or British, X-photographs of original messages

Army: 1=Ft. Hancock, 2=San Francisco, 3=San Antonio, 4=Panama, 5=Honolulu, 6=Manila, 7=Fort Hunt, Va.

[69]

## WAR DEPARTMENT

## WASHINGTON

## AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL RALPH C. SMITH

Major General Ralph C. Smith, presently on duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, D. C. Several months immediately before 7 December 1941, Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury was assistant to Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Branch, G-2. Up to a few weeks before 7 December 1941, it was customary for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury to bring to me, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Japanese diplomatic messages which had been intercepted, deciphered, and translated, in a locked pouch to which I had a key. During this time I would open the pouch, glance over the intercepts and then give them to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. A few weeks before 7 December 1941, pursuant to instructions I relinquished my key to the pouch, gave it to the Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-2, General Miles. Thereafter, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury would bring me the locked pouches but I then did not read the intercepts and gave the locked pouches directly to General Miles. During the period when I was reading the intercepts, or handed the locked pouch to General Miles, as stated, the pouches containing the intercepts were almost always delivered to me by Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recollect specifically whether Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury alternated in bringing me the pouches, I do recall clearly that as a customary practice it was either one or the other.

I did not receive any such intercepts or pouches after about noon on 6 December 1941. This is clearly fixed in my mind because I entrained at about 6 p. m., for Fort Benning preparatory to a refresher course at the Infantry School which I then commenced. I recall as being on the train with me en route to Fort Benning, the evening of 6 December 1941, Colonel C. R. Huebner. I did not, therefore, following the time stated, namely about noon on 6 December 1941, receive any pouch containing intercepts or any intercepts for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or any other person.

Ralph C. Smith.  
RALPH C. SMITH,  
Major General.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

Washington, D. C.

[70]

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY L. ROSS

Mary L. Ross, presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a clerk in the Cable Branch in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington; that in said month of December, 1941, in connection with my duties I was assigned the number "32" and said number was used in said office to designate me.

That my attention has been called to a secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, a photostatic copy of which is hereto annexed; that I recall the circumstances and my actions with respect to said cablegram; that the yellow copy of said cablegram, of which the attached exhibit is a photostatic copy, was brought to me with a "buck-slip", a photostatic copy of which is attached, and on which at the bottom is written a message in the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I recall that the person who brought me the cablegram also orally informed me that the message was important and its immediate dispatch was urgent; that on receiving the yellow copy and said buck-slip I made the customary entry in the office outgoing cables receipt book, a photostatic copy of the pertinent page of which is also attached hereto; that the entry shown therein as Ser. No. 4 was typed therein by myself as indicated by my number 32 in the column for the clerk; that I put a red priority tag on the copy of the cablegram and took it to the Signal Corps code room, handed it to the clerk who receipted for it by the initials "DG" written on the page of said receipt book as is indicated by the attached photostatic copy; that thereafter, probably the next day, the yellow copy was returned with the notation thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5"; that the said number 519 was assigned the message by the Signal Corps and was then written on a page of our receipt book as is indicated on the attached photostatic copy; that the procedure in the Signal Corps code room was to assign a number and then after the message was sent to write on the yellow copy that it was sent as was done on the yellow copy of the message in question as heretofore indicated.

That also attached hereto is a photostatic copy of the paraphrase kept in the G-2 office and which has thereon "MAILED G/2 W.D.G.S. DEC 5 1941 32"; that this latter notation on said photostatic copy was placed thereon by me to

indicate that it had been transmitted by the Signal Corps; that the initials in the lower right hand corner thereof, "RSB WP" are in the handwriting of Colonel Pettigrew.

That my memory with respect to the foregoing is clear because soon [71] after Pearl Harbor and at intervals thereafter I was questioned concerning the foregoing and the Office of G-2 assembled pertinent papers among which were the documents, photostatic copies of which there are attached; that I assisted in the assembly of these papers.

*Signed:* MARY L. ROSS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 1st day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[72]

Standard Form No. 14A  
Approved by the President  
March 10, 1926

SECRET

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Sent No. 519; 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,  
Headquarters G2 Hawaiian Department,  
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

RALPH C. SMITH,  
Colonel, G.S.O.  
Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram

[73]

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH—MISV—WDGS

FROM:

TO:

The A. C. of S., G-2  
Executive Officer, G-2  
Chief, Intelligence Branch  
Executive, Intelligence Branch  
Administrative  
Field Personnel  
Drafting and Reproduction  
Stenographic Pool  
Asst. Chief, Intelligence Branch  
Situation  
Contact  
Dissemination  
Air Section  
British Empire Section  
Central European Section  
Eastern European Section  
Southern European Section  
Western European Section  
Far Eastern Section  
Latin American Section

**ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH**

Military Attache Section  
 Foreign Liaison Section  
 Coordinating Section  
 Finance Section  
 Personnel Section  
 Record Section  
 Translation Section  
 Mimeograph Room  
 Chief Clerk

**COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH****SPECIAL STUDY GROUP****PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH****INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH****W. D. MAP COLLECTION****FOR Necessary Action**

Preparation of reply  
 Recommendation or remark  
 Information and guidance  
 Note and return  
 Number and return

[Written:] Important—Please put priority tag on Re Service Japanese WD

(The page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables mentioned in the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

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**SECRET**

[75] Paraphrase of an outgoing.  
 Secret XX  
 Cablegram XX

Drafting Section: Far Eastern G2/I.  
 Drafting Officer: RSB.  
 No. 519 Sent out Dec. 5, 1941

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES.

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[76] Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, presently CO, Langley Field, Va., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:

On 7 Dec 1941 and for about one year preceeding I was G2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Comdr. Layton, USN. I told Comdr. Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations with Comdr. Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Comdr. Layton before 7 Dec 1941 was about October 1941.

The information given me by Comdr. Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 Dec. 1941.



[77] Any information I received from Comdr. Layton, I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin.

On 1 Oct 1941 I conferred with Comdr. Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was then Asst. G2, Hawaiian Dept. concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to Gen. Martin. Attached are portions of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 Oct 1941, concerning this conference.

I recall the Gen. Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian population.

EDWARD W. RALEY, Col. AC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Va.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

[78]

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, 2 OCTOBER, 1941.

Last night mother and I had a few people for dinner at the club. We had Commander Layton, who is Fleet intelligence officer; Col. Bicknell, who is on intelligence duty down town; and Major Meehan from the post—and their wives, of course. Wednesday evening is a supper dance evening at the club. We assembled at the house, and the drinking members lifted a few and then we adjourned to the club where we had dinner and danced a bit. We thought a good time was had by all and in your immortal phrase, it "was a good party."

The reason I was anxious to have these people together was that I was anxious to get Bicknell's and Layton's opinion regarding the Far Eastern situation. You might gather from the public prints that United States—Japanese relations had been improving of late, but somehow, I didn't think so. It seems to me that Japanese—U. S. relations never were in a more critical state than they are at this moment. I don't say [79] there necessarily will be a war between the two countries right now, but I do say that never in the past has there been a time when it would be easier to have one.

I thought I'd better speak to the boss about the matter, so I did, and he made me feel extremely foolish. He agreed with the general conclusion and then, in the fewest number of words possible, he summed up the situation in a fashion that was just about perfect. I would have been very proud of myself if I had had the situation as well ordered in my mind and was capable of expressing it as well as he did. I've never heard anything so concisely and comprehensively expressed.

DADDY.

[Hand written :] Letter returned by Joyce Nov. 3, 1942.

EWR.

[80]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL CHARLES K. GALEY

General Charles K. Gailey, presently on duty in the Office of the Operations Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Washington, D. C. With respect to intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been deciphered and translated it was the customary practice for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury, G-2, to bring these to me for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Gerow. They would be given me and I would get them to General Gerow as soon as practicable. I recall that these intercepts were brought to me by either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recall whether they alternated in bringing them I do remember that it was either one or the other as a customary practice.

Specifically, with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941, I do not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other source. In the event General Gerow did not receive any particular intercepts the evening of 6 December 1941, I am certain that they were not delivered to me as, if they had been, I would have given them to him.

Chas. K. Gailey,  
CHARLES K. GAILEY,  
*Brigadier General.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Major, JAGD.*

at Washington, D. C.

[81]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL EDWARD F. FRENCH

Colonel Edward F. French, presently on duty with the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division and Signal Center, Washington, D. C.

I have been shown the photostatic copy of the secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. Based on customary practice and procedure, it is my opinion that the message was sent to the addressee for the following reasons: The notations thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" indicate that the message was brought to the Signal Corps code room and was assigned the "#519" and that the message was then encoded with the code room sequence number as the first word in the text of message. The coded text message, original and carbon copy, was then sent to the message center. The carbon copy bearing the time stamp of the message center acknowledging receipt was then returned to the code room and checked with the original clear text message. The Signal Center time stamp date was then placed on the original clear text message, which was returned the following morning to the office of origin.

In the Signal Center the original coded text, on receipt after time stamped, was given a Signal Center sequence number (black number) and then the message was word counted and placed at the operating position, where it received a channel sequence number at the time of transmission which was checked off the operators number sheet. After transmission of the message the operator put his initials and time of transmission on the face of the message, which was later collected by a clerk who verified the "black number" by a check off sheet before sending the message to file. This was a further guard to assure the transmission of the message. At midnight these sequence channel numbers were and still are verified with the distant end of the circuit to assure that all messages as transmitted were received. This sequence check was and is known as a "good night service."

Further, had this message been not received, a check would also have been made by the code room of the addressee, as there would be a break in the sequence numbers of the code message numbers. This system of checking sequence numbers of messages was a long time practice to assure and guard against lost messages.

[82] The loss of a coded message is possible but highly improbable. In fact, on recent questioning of personnel in the code room and Signal Center, and from my own experience prior to 7 December 1941, the loss of a coded message could not be recalled.

I have seen the yellow copy of the message "519" in question, now in possession of G-2, and it is the yellow copy of which a photostatic copy is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Pettigrew.

I have also seen the photostatic copy of the G-2 Office outgoing cable receipts book page for 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross. The entry shown thereon bearing serial No. 4 indicates that the clerk in the Signal Corps code room receipted for the message by the initials "DG", which I recognize as the handwriting of Dorothy Glaves who was employed as a clerk in the Signal Corps code room on 5 December 1941, and whose duties included receipting for such messages.

Edward F. French,  
EDWARD F. FRENCH,  
Colonel, S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[83]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL JOSEPH K. EVANS

Colonel Joseph K. Evans, presently on duty in G-2, War Department, as the Pacific Ocean Area Japanese Specialist, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2, Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was Assistant G-2, Philippine Department.

There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between the Army and the Navy at Manila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each Service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted at Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and designated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The customary practice of the Army or Navy at Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii of intelligence on Japanese information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to particular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander "Rosie" Mason, USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For example, see Lt. Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Room 3501, 630 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center.

I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States by Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I received information, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret Intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent and that large Japanese Naval forces were concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the convoy of which the "H. L. Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through the Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2 matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr. Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of these discussions I told Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information [84] I had received and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received this information and at the same time.

Joseph K. Evans,  
JOSEPH K. EVANS,  
Colonel, GSC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.



[85] Memorandum to: Lieut. Col. Henry Christian Clausen.  
 From: Mr. John E. Russell, President  
 Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H.

You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment to that Territory.

My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. C. V. Bennett, Manager of our San Francisco office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands and to endeavor to stop shipments that were en route there.

I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw a copy of a message dispatched by Col. G. H. Wilkinson (then working secretly for the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorandum, and states that after showing this message to me a copy of it was left with Col. Bicknell, Capt. Mayfield and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records of this incident were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941.

On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders. It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precautions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one gets at times."

I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating in the light of diplomatic exchanges then taking place. I do not believe that the message said that trouble would begin on December 7th; but as I told you today the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines.

I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw [86] light on this subject; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr. Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject; but I can say that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I have given you herein.

Jer-m.

JOHN E. RUSSELL,  
 President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.

April 10, 1945.  
 At Honolulu.

CONFIDENTIAL

[87A] URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 1941

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

- A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
- B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
- C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

cc. Col. Bicknell

. Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

[87B] On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message referred to in memorandum to Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945, which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941.

Honolulu, T. H.  
 April 16, 1945.

HARRY L. DAWSON.  
 JOHN E. RUSSELL.

[88]

## AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS

Robert L. Shivers, presently Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:

On 7 Dec. 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu, T. H.

During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort, Res., USN, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet. Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Capt. Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell, MID, Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept. This liaison with the foregoing persons continued down to 7 Dec. 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings with Colonel Bicknell and Capt. Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes be present.

I knew on 7 Dec. 1941 and for months preceding that date that Comdr. Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted [89] of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. Comdr. Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 Dec. 1941.

Before 7 Dec. 1941, about 1 Dec. 1941, Capt. Mayfield told me he was aware of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements and break in diplomatic relations; and said to me if I suddenly call you and say I am moving to the East side of the Island (Oahu) or north, south, or west sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in those directions from Japan. I passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell, on that date. At no time did Capt. Mayfield give me the code indicating such movement.

On 3 Dec. 1941 Capt. Mayfield called me, asking if I could verify his information that the Japanese Consul [90] General at Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveillance of the Consulate had disclosed this fact, but after 7 Dec 1941 I learned he was referring to information intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and London. This latter information was given me by Comdr. Rochefort after 7 Dec. 1941. About 2 hours after my conversation with Capt. Mayfield on 3 Dec 1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate & a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. This was about noon on 3 Dec 1941 & I immediately gave this information to Capt. Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Capt. Mayfield what use he made of it. Col. Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this information to Gen. Short's Staff at the Staff meeting on 6 Dec. 1941.

On or about 28 Nov. 1941 I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the US & Japan were breaking down & to be on the alert at all [91] times as anything could happen. On the same day I gave this information to Capt. Mayfield & Col. Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information from their respective headquarters in Washington, D. C.

About the period 8 Dec to 12 Dec 1941, Col. Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 Dec 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul General, through which the movement of the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu & Maui.

ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Honolulu

## [92] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS

Concerning the paraphrase dispatch to C. G. Haw. Dept., signed Marshall, dated 12 Dec. 1941, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept. I received this information from Col. Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to which it relates. Comdr. Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the Japanese Consulate on 7 Dec. 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on 7 Dec. 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message, we got the original from the Mackay Radio Co.

Concerning the Gen. Herron alert [93] of 1940, the civilian population of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way, because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give the impression it created.

Concerning the Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, dated 22 Mar. 1945, I talked with Col. Evans, in company of Col. Bicknell, when Col. Evans arrived in Honolulu from Manila in December, 1941. I do not recall the details of our conversation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the information set forth in paragraph 3 of his affidavit.

ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 16th day of March, 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

## [94] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS, WHO STATES FURTHER:

Gerald Wilkinson, then manager for the Theo. H. Davies Co., Manila, P. I., called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British government, reporting direct to the British Foreign Office at London; that he had established Mr. Harry Dawson, an English citizen and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as the operative representative of the said SIS in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands, but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertaining to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to Hawaii from Japan; that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, information, thru Dawson, of information received from other SIS operatives in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affecting Japan; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were made for the receipt of such information [95] by the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as proposed during the period from July to and including December, 1941; that the files of the information so furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon which appear my initial;

Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascertained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate, did not in fact cover one line to the cook's quarters; I therefore covered this line, which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified; that I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December 1941, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December, 1941, at the order of the District [96] Intelligence Officer; that had I known such ONI coverage had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement.

Robert L. Shivers.  
ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, 20 April 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

[97] Telegram  
Gov Jus  
Hoover  
FBI Justice  
Washington, D. C.

RLS: PB

HONOLULU, T. H., December 5, 1945.

Japanese Activities Honolulu T. H. Espionage confile J. Japanese consul general Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.

SHIVERS.

Official Business.

[98]

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

16 APRIL 1945.

Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

Subject: Action taken on W. D. information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lt.) C. W. Stevenson, met in conference with Lt. Col. E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area, on 29 November 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with information contained in a Secret Radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department, from the War Department, dated 27 November 1941, which advised that negotiations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activities might be expected.

2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430, 29 November 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the context of the above-referred to radio message, and it was suggested to them that all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage of Air Force installations and equipment.

Byron M. Meurlott,  
BYRON M. MEURLOTT,  
Lt. Colonel, M. I.,  
Assist. A. C. of S., G-2 (CID).

At Honolulu

[99]

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC AREAS

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 958

In reply refer to:

17 APRIL 1945.

Memorandum:

Subject: Search for WD Radiogram No. 519, 5 Dec 1941.

On April 10, 1945, Lt. Col. Clausen of The Judge Advocate General's Office requested the assistance of this office in locating a copy, or record of receipt, of secret War Department radio No. 519, dated 5 December 1941. The undersigned instructed Capt. Bosworth, officer in charge of the AG Classified Records Division, to make the search and assist Col. Clausen in every manner possible.

The following is a brief account of the search made:

a. Master files of incoming radio traffic were inspected and it was determined that no master files of radios were kept by the AG until on or about 25 January 1942. This was corroborated by C. W. O. Knapp who was on duty in the division at that time.

b. A search was made of the AG decimal files and no record was found of the subject radio.

c. A check was made with Capt. Stockberger, officer in charge of the Signal Cryptographic Section, to determine whether any permanent record was kept of incoming radio traffic. No such record was kept.

d. As the radio in question originated in G-2, War Department, it was assumed that distribution in this headquarters would be made to G-2. Capt. Bosworth, accompanied by Col. Clausen, went to G-2 and contacted Major Maresh of that section. A thorough search was made of the G-2 Files by Major Maresh, in the presence of Capt. Bosworth, and no record was found of the radio.

e. Col. Clausen was given the telephone numbers of three men who were on duty in the AG CRD at the time.

As a matter of information, it is believed that a thorough search of this headquarters was made for this radio at the time of the Pearl Harbor Investigation Board's visit and no record was found at that time.

O. N. Thompson,  
O. N. THOMPSON,  
Colonel, AGD,  
Adjutant General.

at Honolulu.

[100] AFFIDAVITS OF CAPTAIN THOMAS A. HUCKINS, USN, AND CAPTAIN WILFRED J. HOLMES, USN.

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS, USN, presently on duty with FRUPAC, Pearl Harbor, and Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES, USN, (ret.) presently on duty with JICPOA, Pearl Harbor, each being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Naval personnel and records, and that top secrecy is required, do depose as follows:

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS states that on 7 December 1941 and for several months immediately prior thereto he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT, and was in charge of the radio traffic analysis under Captain ROCHEFORT; that his duties included the daily preparation of radio intelligence summaries for distribution by Captain ROCHEFORT; that copies of the said radio traffic analysis summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941, taken from the file of FRUPAC entitled "Communication Intelligence Daily Summary", are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof; that he did not maintain or conduct any liaison with any Army officer, or exchange any information pertaining to his functions or duties, prior to 7 December 1941, and, that in this regard, he did not maintain or conduct any liaison, or exchange any information with Kendell J. FIELDER, G-2, Hawaiian Department.

Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES states that on 7 December 1941, and for several weeks immediately prior thereto, he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the scope and extent of his duties during said period included only the preparation of plots of positions of U. S. combat and merchant vessels, flights of U. S. trans-Pacific planes and positions of Japanese ships based on call analysis; that these plots were disseminated only to CinCPac. Commander Jack S. HOLTWICK, Jr., USN, on 7 December 1941, and several months immediately prior thereto, was assigned to the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, and has today stated to Captain HOLMES and Lt. Col. CLAUSEN as follows:

That he, Commander HOLTWICK, on 7 December 1941, and for several months immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the I. B. M. machine room, was assistant to the principle cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, referred to in the affidavit of Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT given Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN and dated 20 February 1945, consists of a dispatch dated 28 November 1941 from CinCAF to CinCPac concerning monitoring by British and ComSIXTEEN for a certain Japanese broadcast and, dispatch 29 November 1941 from OpNav [101] to CinCPac concerning Japanese broadcast schedules and, dispatch 1 December 1941 from ComSIXTEEN to CinCPac concerning certain important Japanese news broadcasts which dispatches have been microfilmed and are contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640 and SIS 25787, mentioned in said affidavit

of Captain ROCHEFORT, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OpNav to CinCPac concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Washington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and by London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila of purple machines, which dispatch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in Outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 26 November 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 November 1941, from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of British consul information that Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941 and, dispatch 6 December 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of opinion that Japanese consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system; that the Communication Intelligence Daily Summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941 are included in Exhibit "A" herewith attached and made a part hereof, and consist of a résumé or evaluation showing the results of traffic analysis based upon intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications only, and were prepared for Captain ROCHEFORT with copies thereof disseminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit "A", only to Captain Edwin T. LAYTON, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer; that on 7 December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said Unit supervised by Captain ROCHEFORT did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic radio messages which required the use of a machine and the USN decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the only machine available was one designed by Commander HOLTWICK and covered a Japanese code which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time.

Thomas A. Huckins,  
THOMAS A. HUCKINS,  
*Captain, USN.*  
Wilfred J. Holmes,  
WILFRED J. HOLMES,  
*Captain, USN.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Col., J/A/G/D.*

at Honolulu, T. H.

Read and approved.

J. S. Holtwick,  
J. S. HOLTWICK,  
*Cdr. U. S. N.*

[102] Morrill W. Marston, O7626, Brig. Gen., presently G-4, POA, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, reposes and says:

My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated 15 Feb. 45; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2, Hawaiian Department; and had information, that the Navy had a cryptanalytic unit; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the local (MWM) development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occasions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received (MWM) by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings;

Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observations there was no alarm of the civilian population.

MORRILL W. MARSTON,  
*Brig. Gen. U. S. A.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Col. JAGD.*

at Honolulu.

[103] Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, presently stationed South Pacific Base Command, A. G. Office, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD for the SW, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning secret message 519, 5 December 1941, I searched for a record of this message by looking carefully through the classified files and journals of incoming messages covering said date; said files and journals being available this date at Hq., POA, Ft. Shafter and consisting, among others, of the following:

Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 370.2 Battles & Reports of;  
 Classified, A G Binder 1; 091 Japan;  
 Classified, A G Binder 1; 283.4 Espionage;  
 Classified, A G Binder 2; 350.05 Military Information;  
 Classified, A G Journals (microfilmed) (2) 297 and 298;

no record of the receipt by the Hawaiian Department of this message could be found, although it was the practice to [104] set forth in said journals the War Department numbers of the messages. Such pertinent number in this case, 519, could not be found as having been entered, but the preceding numbers 517 and 518 were found, and the succeeding numbers 520 and 521, pertaining to messages dated during the time in question.

I suggest that inquiry be made of RCA, since I believe from reading the file copy shown me by Colonel Clausen that it came commercial.

LOUIS R. LANE,  
 CWO USA.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
 Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Honolulu.

[105]

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,  
 SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,  
 Honolulu, Hawaii, 22 April, 1945.

*Secret*

#### STATEMENT FOR PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE U. S. ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago, and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement.

The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintained by the District Intelligence Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received almost daily transcripts and translations of conversations monitored.

About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO, began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breeched by the DIO's having been given information concerning an FBI tap.

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being con-

ducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the [106] morning of 7 December 1941, following the Japanese attack.

It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District Intelligence Office were in any way aware that such surveillances were being conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from gaining any currency in the organization.

Donald Woodrum, Jr.,  
DONALD WOODRUM, Jr.,  
*Lieutenant, USNR.*

[107] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, USN

25 APRIL 1945.

[108] Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation being conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941 and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive, correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to designated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet; to provide Plans and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of current estimates; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the U. S. Pacific Fleet; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of Fleets of potential Allies; to supervise projects concerning aerial photographic reconnaissance.

Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally be effected through established channels, i. e., the Naval shore liaison or representative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the Combat Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Rochefort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Captain Mayfield): Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer and responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-espionage and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communications Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example, I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District, there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies through that officer.

About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Australian Mandated Territories, and any other Pacific Ocean airports and airways information. I furnished him with [109] all the information was possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Airways Guide" and Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he, or his assistant Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency.

By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from various sources, including Dutch, British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular Reports, Attache and Agent Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of



Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-China and South China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Raley and we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every other day.

During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I imparted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret" intelligence from sources that had previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only to his Commanding General, Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro-Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North Mayana, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand, the pro-Japanese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand and an invasion of Malaya.

To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" information that we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic relations or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely, America or Britain or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or received at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic Officials were destroying their Purple Machines.

[110] In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to informing Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battle-ships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. I distinctly recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the special searches being conducted in late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very strict secret.

Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise.

I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied: "We cannot do anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until tomorrow morning."

In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands: Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently, I made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Japanese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very apparent. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Surface and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations.

When the U. S. Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain of the Japanese Mandates in late November 1941, I held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin

(#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and Commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not carried in aircraft. Colonel Raley also requested, and I acquiesced, to sit in on all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This reconnaissance did no materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands. Exhibit "B" is one copy of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin #45-41.

[111] I do not specifically recall the term "A, B, C Block" or discussions with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have been conversations concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could not permit Jap penetration.

My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters pertaining to shore-side business.

From time to time prior to 7 December 1941 when Task Force Commanders returned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's office to give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question. I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them. During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location and activity of the Japanese Fleet and Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was known or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated Islands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with particular emphasis on the Marshalls.

I had no official liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison that he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate Command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers of the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the War Plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Officer Lt. Burr USN from Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, permanently attached to the Headquarters, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any of the information that I gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941.

I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to at all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts Commission in December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Boards in 1944), I am unable to make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda.

[112] I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen, marked TOP SECRET, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of these prior to 7 December 1941 except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 on which I have written my initials and today's date.

E. T. Layton,  
E. T. LAYTON, Captain, USN,  
Combat Intelligence Officer,  
Staff, Commander U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subscribed and sworn before me on this 26th day of April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
Colonel HENRY C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D.

At Guam.

[113]  
Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 28, 1941.

Memorandum for: Admiral.

Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands.

1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon at 1430.

2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not be carried in any aircraft.

3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the MARSHALLS, TRUK and PONAPE was stressed with particular reference to JALUIT, ENIWETOK, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP, WOTJE and MALOELAP.

4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference and is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnaissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective.

5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive armament and photographic equipment from WAKE on the selected day, departures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installations in the MANDATES it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of the planes JALUIT and TRUK respectively. The JALUIT plane returning via MALOELAP, WOTJE, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP and POKAANKU. The TRUK plane returning via UJELANG and ENIWETOK. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time.

6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over PONAPE enroute to Port Moresby was assigned UJELANG, PONAPE and KAPINGAMARANGI (Greenwich Island).

7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the MANDATES prior to their takeoff.

/s/ E. T. LAYTON.

Exhibit "A"

[114]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
AA/FF1/(25)  
Serial 01954

HRK

PEARL HARBOR,  
November 27, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.

2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the present National Emergency.

P. C. Crosley  
P. C. CROSLY,  
By direction.

**DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41)**

List I, Case 3; P., X.  
Atlantic Fleet A1;  
Asiatic Fleet A1;  
One copy each to:  
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,  
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.

*Exhibit "B"*

[115]

TOP SECRET

*Confidential*

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 45-41

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[116]

TOP SECRET

(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941.  
(10574)

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.

## MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

- |                                     |                              |                                          |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| I. Combined Fleet                   |                              |                                          |
| 1. First Fleet                      | (Battle Force)               | 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons           |
| 2. Second Fleet                     | (Scouting Force)             | 4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc.               |
| 3. Third Fleet                      | (Blockade & Transport Force) | Small craft.                             |
| 4. Fourth Fleet                     | (Mandate Defense Force)      | 1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units. |
| 5. Fifth Fleet                      | ?                            | ?                                        |
| 6. Sixth Fleet                      | (Submarine Fleet)            | 6 Subrons                                |
| 7. Carrier Fleet                    | (Aircraft Carriers)          | 5 Cardivs                                |
| 8. Combined Air Force               | (Seaplane tenders, etc.)     | 4 Airrons, & shore based planes.         |
| II. Japanese Naval Forces in China. |                              | 1 PG and 3 DD's                          |
| 1. First China Exped. Fleet.        | (Central China)              | Gunboats                                 |
| 2. Second China Exped. Fleet.       | (South China)                | 1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.              |
| 3. Third China Exped. Fleet.        | (North China)                | Torpedo Boats, etc.                      |
| 4. Southern Exped. Fleet.           | (Saigon)                     | 1 CL, transports and mine craft.         |

[117] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing.

## COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

MAGATO, Flagship

## FIRST FLEET

*Batdiv One*  
NAGATO (F)  
MUTSU  
YAMASHIRO

*Batdiv Two*  
FUSO (F)  
ISE  
HYUGA

*Batdiv Three*  
HIYEI (F)  
KONGO  
KIRISHIMA  
\*HARUNA

*Crudiv Six*  
KAKO (F)  
FURUTAKA  
AOBA  
KINUGASA

*Desron One*  
ABUKUMA (F)

*Desdiv 6*  
IKAZUCHI (F)  
INAZUMA  
SAZANAMI  
HIBIKI

*Desdiv 21*  
NENOHI (F)  
HATSUHARU  
HATSUSHIMO  
WAKABA

*Desron One (Cont'd)*

*Desdiv 27*  
SHIRATSUYU (F)  
ARIAKE  
YUGURE  
SHIGURE

*Desron Three*  
SENDAI (F)

*Desdiv 11*  
FUBUKI (F)  
SHIRAYUKI  
HATSUYUKI

*Desdiv 12*  
SHIRAKUMO (F)  
SHINONOME  
USUGOMO  
MURAKUMO

*Desdiv 19*  
ISONAMI (F)  
SHIKINAMI  
AYANAMI  
URANAMI

*Desdiv 20*  
AMAGIRI (F)  
ASAGIRI  
YUGIRI  
SAGIRI

Total: 10 BB, 4 CA, 2 CL, 27 DD.

\*Note: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs.

[118]

## COMBINED FLEET

## SECOND FLEET

## TAKAO, Flagship

*Crudiv Four*

TAKAO (F)  
 ATAGO  
 CHOKAI  
 MAYA

*Crudiv Five\**

MYOKO (F)  
 NACHI  
 HAGURO

*Crudiv Seven*

KUMANO (F)  
 MOGAMI  
 MIKUMA  
 SUZUYA

*Crudiv Eight*

TONE (F) -  
 CHIKUMA

*Desron Two*

JINTSU (F)

*Desdiv 8*

ASASHIO (F)  
 ARASHIO  
 OSHIO

*Desdiv 15*

MICHISHIO  
 KUROSHIO  
 OYASHIO  
 NATSUSHIO  
 HAYASHIO

*Desron Two (Cont'd)**Desdiv 16*

HATSUKAZE  
 YUKIKAZE  
 AMATSUKAZE  
 TOKITSUKAZE

*Desdiv 18*

KASUMI  
 ARARE  
 KAGERO  
 SHIRANUHI

*Desron Four*

NAKA (F)

*Desdiv 2*

YUDACHI (F)  
 MURASAME  
 HARUSAME  
 SAMIDARE

*Desdiv 9*

ASAGUMO  
 YAMAGUMO  
 MINEGUMO  
 NATSUGUMO

*Desdiv 24*

KAWAKAZE (F)  
 YAMAKAZE  
 SUZUKAZE  
 UMIKAZE

Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.

\*Note: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5.

[119]

## THIRD FLEET

## TAKAHASHI Ibo—Vice Admiral

## NAGARA, Flagship

## NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE

CHOGEI (F)

Subdiv-----  
 -----  
 -----  
 -----

Subdiv-----  
 -----  
 -----  
 -----

## 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE

*Desron Five*

NATORI (F)

*Desdiv 5*

ASAKAZE  
 HARUKAZE  
 MATSUKAZE  
 HATAKAZE

*Desdiv 12*

SATSUKI  
 FUMITSUKI  
 MINATSUKI  
 NAGATSUKI

## 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE—Con.

*Desron Five**Desdiv 34*

HAKAZE  
 AKIKAZE  
 YUKAZE  
 TACHIKAZE

## 1st BASE FORCE

Maru (F)

*Minelayer Division*

ITSUKUSHIMA  
 AOTAKA  
 HATSUTAKA

*Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21*

AM-1 AM-7  
 AM-2 AM-8  
 AM-3 AM-9  
 AM-4 AM-10  
 AM-5 AM-11  
 AM-6 AM-12

*Gunboat Division 1*

6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing  
 Vessels)

## THIRD FLEET—Continued

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE—Con.  
SUBCHASER SQUADRON

(F)  
*Subchaser Division 1 and 11*  
 PC-1 PC-7  
 PC-2 PC-8  
 PC-3 PC-9  
*Subchaser Division 21 and 31*  
 PC-4 PC-10  
 PC-5 PC-11  
 PC-6 PC-12  
 27 AP—Names Unknown

## 2nd BASE FORCE

Maru, (F)  
*Minelayer Division 17*

SHIRTAKA  
 YAEYAMA  
 KUNAJIRI

At least 5 other men of war, and 17 merchant ships.

Total: 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6SS, 6CM,  
 12 AM, 6 XPG 12 PC, 46, AP.

[120]

## FOURTH FLEET

HIRATA—Vice Admiral

KASHIMA, Flagship

*Crudiv Eighteen*  
 TENRYU (F)  
 TATSUTA  
 KASHIMA

*Desron Six*  
 YUBARI (F)

*Desdiv 29*  
 OITE  
 HAYATE  
 ASANAGI  
 YUNAGI

*Desdiv 36*  
 MUTSUKI (F)  
 KISARAGI  
 YAYOI  
 MOCHITSUKI

*Subron Seven*

JINGEI  
*Subdiv 26*  
 RO-60  
 RO-61  
 RO-62

*Subdiv 27*  
 RO-65  
 RO-66  
 RO-67

*Subdiv 33*  
 RO-63  
 RO-64  
 RO-68

*Subdiv* ———

—————

—————

—————

8 XPG

[121] 4th BASE FORCE

Truk, Headquarters

————— Maru (F)

*Guard Division 4*

————— Maru (F)

—————

—————

4 AP or AK

## FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-TRUK)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #17 and Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Kusale Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Olol Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Greenwich Detachment 4th Def. Force, Mortlock Detachment 4th Def. Force, Pingelap Detachment 4th Def. Force, Puluwat Detachment 4th Def. Force, Lamortek Detachment ——— (Hall ?) of 4th Def. Force.

## 5th BASE FORCE

Saipan, Headquarters  
 SHOEI MARU (F)

*Guard Division 5*  
 Composition unknown

*Minelayer Division 19*  
 OKINOSHIMA (F)  
 TOKIWA

*Subchapter Division 56*  
 KASHI (F)

XPG 561 (?)

XPG 562 (?)

XPG 563 (?)

*Gunboat Division 8*

Composition unknown

9 AP or AK

## FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-SAI-PAN)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #18.

Tenian Detachment, 5th Defense Force

PAGAN Detachment, 5th Defense Force

*Survey and Patrol Division*

KOSHU

KATSURIKI (CM)

KOMABASHI (AS)

## FOURTH FLEET—Continued

## FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE—Con.

## Repair and Salvage Division

MATSUEI MARU

NAGAURA (MARU)

## 3rd BASE FORCE

Palao, Headquarters

----- Maru (F)

## Guard Division 3

----- Maru

-----

-----

-----

-----

## Subdiv 6

RO-56

RO-57

RO-58

RO-59

## Subchaser Division 55

----- Maru (F)

XPG 551 (?)

XPG 552 (?)

XPG 553 (?)

XPG 554 (?)

## THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ PALAO)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #16 and TOBI detachment of 4th Defence Force

----- Detach. 4th Def. Force

----- " " " "

----- " " " "

----- " " " "

----- " " " "

Estimate these unknown locations to be SOROI, HELEN REEF, ULITHI, YAP and ANGUAR).

## 6th BASE FORCE

Jaluit, Headquarters

TAKUHAN MARU (F)

## 6th BASE FORCE—Continued

## Mine Sweeper Division 16

NAGATA MARU (F)

CHOKAI MARU

DAIDO MARU

IKUTA MARU

?

|            |                                                                                  |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| -----      | { (This may<br>be the<br>SALVAGE<br>Unit known<br>to be in<br>6th Base<br>Force) |
| ----- Maru |                                                                                  |
| ----- Maru |                                                                                  |
| ----- Maru |                                                                                  |

## Subchaser Division 5

PC-51

PC-52

PC-53

## SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-JALUIT)

KAIKEI Maru

#5 FUKU Maru

----- Maru

Miscellaneous Forces ashore including AIR GROUP #19 at IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and probable Air Groups at WOTJE and KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is. (Kwajalein Atoll). Detachment 6th Defence Force KWAJALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll), TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll), ENIWETOK Is. (Eniwetok Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE Atoll—Detach. of 6th Def. Force, UTIK Atoll—Detach. of 6th Def. Force.

Total: 4 CL 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS, 1 Survey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM, 41 AP or AK.

[122]

## FIFTH FLEET

CL----- (F)

The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru.

## SIXTH FLEET

(Submarine Fleet)

KATORI, Flagship

## Subron One

TAIGEI (F)

## Subdiv 1

I-9

I-15

I-16

I-17

## Subdiv 2

I-18

I-19

I-20

## Subron Two

KITAGANI (F)

## Subdiv 7

I-1

I-2

I-3

I-7

## Subdiv 8

I-4

I-5

I-6



## FIFTH FLEET—Continued

|                     |                                 |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| Subron Three        | Subron Six                      |
| NAGOYA MARU (F)     | KINU (F)                        |
| <i>Subdiv 11</i>    | <i>Subdiv 9</i>                 |
| I-74                | I-123                           |
| I-75                | I-124                           |
| <i>Subdiv 12</i>    | <i>Subdiv 13</i>                |
| I-8                 | I-121                           |
| I-63                | I-122                           |
| I-69                |                                 |
| I-70                | Subron Ten                      |
| <i>Subdiv 20</i>    | KARASAKI (F) *                  |
| I-71                | <i>Subdiv 18</i>                |
| I-72                | I-53                            |
| I-73                | I-54                            |
| Supbron Five        | <i>Subdiv 19</i>                |
| YURA (F)            | I-56                            |
| <i>Subdiv 28</i>    | I-57                            |
| I-59                | I-58                            |
| I-60                | <i>Subdiv 21</i>                |
| <i>Subdiv 29</i>    | RO-33                           |
| I-61 (Sank 10-2-41) | RO-34                           |
| I-62                | Total: 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS. |
| I-64                |                                 |
| <i>Subdiv 30</i>    |                                 |
| I-65                |                                 |
| I-66                |                                 |

\*NOTE: The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.

## [123] CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)

## CV KAGA Flagship

|                  |                      |
|------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Cardiv 1</i>  | <i>Cardiv 4</i>      |
| AKAGI            | ZUIKAKU              |
| KAGA (F)         | SHOKANU              |
| <i>Desdiv 7</i>  | <i>Desdiv 3</i>      |
| OBORO (F)        | HOKAZE               |
| USHIO            | SHIOKAZE             |
| AKEBONO          | NAMIKAZE             |
| AKATSUKI         | NUMAKAZE             |
| <i>Cardiv 2</i>  | <i>Cardiv -----</i>  |
| SORYU (F)        | CV KORYU             |
| HIRYU            | CV KASUGA (MARU)     |
| <i>Desdiv 23</i> | Total: 10 CV, 16 DD. |
| UZUKI            |                      |
| KIKUTSUKI        |                      |
| MIKATSUKI        |                      |
| YUZUKI           |                      |
| <i>Cardiv -</i>  |                      |
| RYUJO (F)        |                      |
| HOSHU            |                      |
| <i>Desdiv 17</i> |                      |
| ISOKAZE          |                      |
| URAKAZE          |                      |
| HAMAKAZE         |                      |

## [124] COMBINED AIR FORCE

## Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.

Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups (e. g the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.

Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.

## SHIP-BASED SQUADRONS

## SHORE-BASED AIR GROUPS

|                                       |                           |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Air Ron 6</i>                      | 8th Air Group             |
| KAMIKAWA MARU (F)                     | 10th Air Group            |
| FUJIKAWA MARU                         | 11th Air Group            |
| KENJO MARU                            | 12th Air Group            |
| (Has been working with the 3rd Fleet) | 14th Air Group            |
| <i>Air Ron 7</i>                      | 16th Air Group            |
| CHITOSE (F)                           | 17th Air Group            |
| CHIYODA                               | 18th Air Group            |
| MIZUHO                                | 19th Air Group            |
| (Has been working with the 1st Fleet) | 23rd Air Group            |
| <i>Air Ron 24</i>                     | Chichijima                |
| KAMOI (F)                             | Chinkai                   |
| 1 XAV                                 | Genzan                    |
| Yokohama Air Group                    | Hyakurihara (or Moribara) |
| Chitose Air Group                     | Iwakuni                   |
| (Has been working with the 4th Fleet) | Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)          |
| <i>Patrol Squadron 2</i>              | Kashima                   |
| NOTORO                                | Kasumigaura               |
| (Formerly with Air Ron 6)             | Kisarazu                  |
|                                       | Kure                      |
|                                       | Maizuru                   |
|                                       | Oita                      |
|                                       | Ominato                   |
|                                       | Omura                     |
|                                       | Saeki                     |
|                                       | Sasebo                    |
|                                       | Suzuka                    |
|                                       | Takao                     |
|                                       | Tateyama                  |
|                                       | Tsukuba                   |
|                                       | Usa                       |
|                                       | Yatabe                    |
|                                       | Yokosuka                  |

TOTAL: 5 AV, 3XAV, 35 Air Groups.

[125]

## TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

|           |          |         |
|-----------|----------|---------|
| SHIRETOKO | ONDO     | AKASHI  |
| SATA      | HAYATOMO | MUROTO  |
| TSURUMI   | NARUTO   | OTOMARU |
| SHIRTYA   | MAMIYA   | SETTSU  |
| IRO       | ASAHI    |         |

Total: 8 AC, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.

[126]

## JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

KOGA, Mineichi—Vice Admiral

## IZUMO, Flagship

## SHANGHAI BASE FORCE

## Patrol Division 11—Continued

ASUGA  
TSUGA

KURI  
HASU

HIRA  
HOZU  
TOBA  
ATAMI  
FUTAMI  
FUSHIMI  
SUMIDA  
HASHIDATE

*Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section*  
*Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai*  
*Nanking Base Force*  
*Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking*

CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OR FIRST  
EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

*Air Group 10*  
*Hankow Base Force*  
*Kiukiang Base Force*  
*Gunboat Division ? ?*  
SHINFUKU MARU (F)  
HITONOSE  
CHIKUBU  
Total: 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.

KOMATSU, Teruhisa—Vice Admiral  
UJI, Flagship  
*Patrol Division 11*  
ATAKA  
SETA  
KATADA

## JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA—Continued

| SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND<br>EXPEDITIONARY FLEET | [127] NORTH CHINA FLEET, or<br>THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET |
|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| NIIMI, Wasaichi, Vice Admiral<br>ISUZU, Flagship    | SUGIYAWA, Rokoza, Vice Admiral<br>IWATE, Flagship        |
| <i>Cruidiv 15</i>                                   | <i>Patrol Division 12</i>                                |
| ISUZU (F)                                           | IWATE (F)                                                |
| ASHIGARA                                            | MANRI MARU                                               |
| <i>Patrol Division 14</i>                           | <i>Torpedo Boat Division 11</i>                          |
| SAGA                                                | HATO                                                     |
| AM-17                                               | SAGI                                                     |
| AM-18                                               | KARI                                                     |
| <i>Torpedo Boat Division 1</i>                      | KIJI                                                     |
| OTORI                                               | <i>Torpedo Boat Division 21</i>                          |
| HAYASUSA                                            | CHIDORI                                                  |
| HIYOBORI                                            | MANAZURI                                                 |
| KASASAGI                                            | TOMOZURU                                                 |
| <i>Guard Division 15</i>                            | HATSUKARI                                                |
| <i>Guard Division 16</i>                            | KARUKAYA                                                 |
| <i>Canton Base Force</i>                            | <i>Gunboat Division 1</i>                                |
| <i>Amoy Base Force</i>                              | <i>Gunboat Division 2</i>                                |
| <i>Hainan Is. Base Force</i>                        | <i>Gunboat Division 13</i>                               |
| <i>13 Special Service Ships</i>                     | <i>Gunboat Division 14</i>                               |
| Total: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 2 AM,                | <i>Tsingtao Base Force</i>                               |
| 13 Misc.                                            | SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET                             |
|                                                     | KASHII (F) (CL)                                          |
|                                                     | SHIMBUSHU (CM)                                           |
|                                                     | AP                                                       |
|                                                     | Total: 1 OCA, 1 DD, 8 TB, 1 AP.                          |

## [128] (B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS.

1. **FOURTH FLEET**, which may be termed the **MANDATE FLEET**, apparently administers, the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base.

2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defense Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels.

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ—YOKOSUKA) Naval District.

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flag-

ship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENSE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.

[129] 6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and Patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA; BUTARI-TARI, and BERU).

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:

| <i>Identification</i>        | <i>Location</i>           | <i>Includes</i>                                                                     |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Airron 24                    | Marshall Area             | (AV) KAMOI<br>(AV?) . . . . . Maru<br>ex-CHITOSE Air Group<br>ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group |
| 11th Air Group               | PALAO Area                |                                                                                     |
| 16th Air Group               | PALAO Area                |                                                                                     |
| 17th Air Group               | TRUK                      |                                                                                     |
| 18th Air Group               | SAIPAN                    |                                                                                     |
| 19th Air Group               | IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll) |                                                                                     |
| Air Station (and Air Group?) | WOTJE                     |                                                                                     |
| Air Station (and Air Group?) | KWAJALEIN                 |                                                                                     |
| ? AIR GROUP                  | TRUK                      |                                                                                     |

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62-268 planes.

Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

(Pages 130, 131, 132, and 133 of Exhibit B consist of Table A showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates, a sketch of Palao, and a sketch of Malakal Harbor. These pages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

[134]

#### NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT

1. *Aviation Facilities.*—Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June 1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is.

2. *Headquarters.*—Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bituman and powdered coral roads.

3. *Radio towers*.—Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).

4. *Shore Batteries*.—Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile waterfront street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).

*Mobile Batteries*.—Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).

5. *Government Pier*.—600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940).

6. *Mole*.—150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW. corner of JABOR (1933).

7. *Conspicuous red building* (may be red-roofed building) (1936).

8. South Seas Trading Co. *PIER* (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).

9. *Two buildings* (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear?—small marine railway?). A gasoline storage located near the two buildings. (1936.)

(Page 135 of Exhibit B is a sketch of Jaluit Harbor which will be found reproduced as Item No. 6, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

[136]

#### Exhibit "A"

#### U. S. PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT

Box 103—Navy Yard, Navy Number 128 One Two Eight, % Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

18 APRIL 1945.

Received from Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 42 pages covering daily communication intelligence summaries for the period 1 November 1941 through 6 December 1941.

[137]

#### Communication intelligence summary, 1 November 1941

*General*.—Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

*Combined Fleet*.—The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

*Carriers*.—The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

*Submarines*.—Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

*Third Fleet*.—This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy with Tokyo.

*China*.—The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

[138] *Communication intelligence summary, 2 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic despatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

[139] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

**Combined Fleet.**—Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

**Third Fleet.**—Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by RATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

**Air.**—A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

[140] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

**Air.**—High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDiv Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

**Mandates.**—The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

**Submarines.**—No activity noted.

[141] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA 44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many despatches passing between the two.

*Third Fleet.*—Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section ?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

[142] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

*Takao-Bako Area.*—It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now en route BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.

*Combined Fleet.*—A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

*Mandates.*—The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units.

[143] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November, 1941*

*General.*—Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which at-

tached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bona fide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill." Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.

*Air.*—Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

*Fleet.*—Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

[144] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 1941*

*General.*—Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a despatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

*Fleet.*—Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

*Air.*—Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of CarDivs, Combined Air Force, First [145] Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.



[146] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval Stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

[147] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

*Combined Fleet.*—Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of Batdiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC. Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

*Third Fleet.*—The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit.

*Fifth Fleet.*—One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.

*Air.*—The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

[148] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

*Combined fleet.*—The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

**Air.**—CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

**Fifth fleet.**—Nothing to report.

**Fourth fleet.**—The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

**China.**—The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

[149] *Communication Intelligence Summary 13 November 1941.*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

**Combined Fleet.**—The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

**Third Fleet.**—Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location.

**Fourth Fleet.**—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with the Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several message were exchanged. He appears to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.

[150] **Air.**—Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

**China.**—The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

[151] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AINav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.

2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to AN1758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

*Combined Fleet.*—Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area in near future.

*Third Fleet.*—Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

*Fourth Fleet.*—No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

*Submarines.*—No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

*Air.*—One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

[152] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U. E. 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv Three flagship.

*Combined Fleet.*—Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

*Third Fleet.*—Inactive.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

*Submarine Force.*—Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer

Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.

[153] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941*

*Air.*—Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

[154] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 1941*

*GENERAL.*—Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers—(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives—Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."

*First and Second Fleets.*—Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)  
Carrier Division Four  
Destroyer Squadron Seven  
Destroyer Squadron Three  
Battleship Division Three  
Cruiser Division Seven.

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates. [155] It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakun Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

*Third Fleet.*—Believed inactive in Sasebo—Kure area.

*Fourth Fleet.*—FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC. Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the com-

position of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.

*Submarines.*—Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet Commands continues.

[156] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.

*Combined Fleet.*—No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

*Third Fleet.*—Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

*Air.*—The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

*China.*—Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

[157] *Communications intelligence summary, 18 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

*Combined Fleet.*—CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC. Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKAWIWI dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches

to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

**Third Fleet.**—The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.

[158] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There was been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AINavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

**Combined Fleet.**—The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

**Third Fleet.**—Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

**Fifth Fleet.**—Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

[159] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

*Combined Fleet.*—Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

|                                 |                        |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) | ENO 7 (Unidentified)   |
| TAE 1 (Airron 7)                | AKU 8 (Air Unit)       |
| KAME 5 (Airron 6)               | KUSU 7 (Unidentified)  |
| YAWI (Crudiv 5)                 | SATU 88 (Unidentified) |
| KENU 8 (Crudiv 7)               | KUNI 88 (Unidentified) |
| RESE 4 (Desron 3)               | OYU 9 (Unidentified)   |
| AKI 0 (Desron 4)                | KONA 0 (Unidentified)  |
| TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For)    | NOTU 6 (Unidentified)  |
| SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For)    | NETE 5 (Unidentified)  |
| YOMO 9 (Desron 5)               | NSI 3 (Unidentified)   |
| REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps)      | SUTE 1 (Unidentified)  |
| KUNO 9 (Erimo)                  | YAYU 1 (Unidentified)  |
| MIMO 3 (Air Unit?)              | MARE 5 (Unidentified)  |
| TUE 7 (Unidentified)            | Plus 11 Marus.         |

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out—so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

[160] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941*

*Mandates and Fourth Fleet.*—The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

[161] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several A1Navs and sent two other messages, one to CinC, Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section At Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Drection Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

**Combined Fleet.**—CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE5 (Crudiv?), KOO2 (Subrons5) TIYU 06 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1(?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 0 (AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU2 (?), NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

**Third Fleet.**—CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SAN-BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC. Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

**Fourth Fleet.**—CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

**China.**—The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

[162] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Southern Expeditionary Force.

*Precedence*

NIKA-WIWI

2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff.

NIKA

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.

WIWI

4. SUIFITE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NWA 2, Information Tadlo Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship.

NIKA

5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure, Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.

KIU

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI."

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

KENU 3—CruDiv 7 Flagship?

HOWI 2—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.

EKE 8—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.

MUSE 5—Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

**Combined Fleet.**—CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter-



cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway [163] in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

*Air.*—Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

*China.*—CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.

[164] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

- (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
- (b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
- (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

*First and Second Fleets.*—Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet; Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

*Third Fleet.*—Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

*Fourth Fleet and Mandates.*—Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

*Submarines.*—Comparatively little activity.

*China.*—Comparatively quiet.

*Carriers.*—No definite indications of location.

*Combined Air Force.*—Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.

[165]      *Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

*Combined Fleet.*—Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

*Air.*—Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

*Fourth Fleet.*—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

[166]      *Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AINavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

*Combined Fleet.*—Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at its high level.

*Fourth Fleet.*—No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Salpan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

*Fifth Fleet.*—The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

*Submarines.*—As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

*China.*—Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

*Third Fleet.*—Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

[167] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.

*COMBINED FLEET.*—No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

*THIRD FLEET.*—Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)

"KOROKUKITISIKI"

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO)

"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

*FOURTH FLEET.*—CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

*AIR.*—An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

*SUBMARINES.*—Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

[168] *Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NREØ (the TOKYO D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and *IS GETTING RESULTS.*

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chiefs of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The HUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

*Combined Fleet.*—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and

DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).

*Third Fleet.*—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.

*South China.*—SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

*Submarines.*—Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two despatches there was no submarine activity today.

[169] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Hokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AINavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

*Combined Fleet.*—The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE  
SUBRON FIVE  
SUBRON SIX  
CRUDIV FIVE  
CRUDIV SEVEN

DESRON TWO  
DESRON FOUR  
THIRD FLEET  
FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.

*Third Fleet.*—Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

[170] *Submarines.*—Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

*South China.*—CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

[171] *Communication Intelligence Summary, November 30, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

*Combined Fleet.*—The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).

*Third Fleet.*—Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

*South China.*—BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

[172] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941*

*General.*—All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of despatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting

more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

**First Fleet.**—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has ceased to operate in a prominent role.

**Second Fleet.**—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

**Third Fleet.**—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets, and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

**Fourth Fleet.**—No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

**Fifth Fleet.**—Nothing to report.

**Submarines.**—Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere in this general area.

**Carriers.**—No change.

**Combined Air Force.**—No change.

[173] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941*

**General.**—The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

**First Fleet.**—Despite the lack of positive identification, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets.

**Second Fleet.**—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

[174] *Third Fleet.*—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

*Mandates.*—Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

*Carriers.*—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

*Combined Air Force.*—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

[175] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Toyko Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same addresses.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on submarines or Carriers.

[176] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

*Combined Fleet.*—The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).

*South China.*—Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

[177] *Communication Intelligence Summary, December 5, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that "In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

**Combined Fleet.**—Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.

**Third Fleet.**—In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army abroad RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUNSATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CINC. Third Fleet.

**Fourth Fleet.**—The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio and the RNO TAIHOKU and the Commander Second Fleet.

**South China.**—SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

[178] *Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

**Combined Fleet.**—Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

**Fourth Fleet.**—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio, addressed the PALAO weather observer.

**Fifth Fleet.**—This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

**Submarines.**—The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

**South China.**—Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force.



[179]

TOP SECRET

## HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES

## PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

APO 958

In reply to:

POSIG-483

27 APRIL 1945

Memorandum: To Lt. Col Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

1. With reference to the message sent #519 December 5, 1941, which you handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief there are no copies of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the Signal Center, Fort Shafter. In fact there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the Signal Center prior to 1 July 1944. All coded traffic prior to 1 July 1944 and all clear traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are no records, including the logs, in the Signal Center which would give us any information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter. Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center as to whether this message had been received and they have been negative.

2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to said intercept at the time stated was as follows:

Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they were intercepted, I have this to report:

There are at this time, no records in the Hawaiian Department to show whether or not these intercepts were made by MS-5. The fact that Washington gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an indication to the contrary.

As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report:

Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via air-mail were handled as follows; On the day following the date of intercept each message was given a logsheet number and entered on an index sheet. The entire lot of air-mail traffic for that particular date was then fastened together to await the next scheduled departure of the Clipper. Upon notification of the impending departure of the Clipper all accumulated air-mail traffic together with a letter of transmittal and a classified document receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files section of the Department AGO.

[180] The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately once each week, but this schedule was frequently interrupted because of weather conditions. It is known that this traffic was at times forwarded by ship because of the long delayed departure of a Clipper. The only messages transmitted to Washington by radio were those specially selected in accordance with instructions from the Chief Signal Officer. The message in question was not within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been included in the special instructions.

My search in this regard included:

A search of all Signal Intelligence files including Communication Service, Central Pacific Base Command and Monitor Station #5. Such records as have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station #5 at the time in question show that this station was intercepting traffic between Japan, Asia and Europe.

In this connection I inquired of Washington on 14 April 1945 concerning the originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington, and received this information.

"Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet number 014037 appears on traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Intercept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941".

A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic forwarded are available previous to 1943.

3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did

not monitor the commercial radiotelephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters were used on the Trans-Pacific radiophones circuit between Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. In December 1937 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much more complicated and furnished much more secrecy than the previous old inverters. The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.

Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able to understand the conversation.

[181] Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had just been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell Laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone circuit.

C. A. Powell,  
C. A. POWELL,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Signal Officer.

At Honolulu

TOP SECRET

[182]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
RADIO UNIT  
COMMANDANT, NAVY 128  
% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

JSH/rec  
EF37/A6(1)  
Serial Z-4225  
Top Secret

27 APRIL 1945.

*Memorandum to Lieut. Colonel H. C. Clausen.*

Subject: Information.

1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing.

2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) Comdr. F. R. Biard, USN, Comdr. J. R. Bromley, USN, Comdr. A. Cole, USN, and Comdr. G. M. Slonim, USN. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieutenant Lankford

3. Comdr. Cole is the only officer currently present and available for questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases, split-phone watches were used.

4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to those scheduled on the hour and half hour, which usually contained weather information.

5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from this monitoring at any time during the period under consideration. The monitoring watch was naturally secured immediately after it became obviously redundant.

J. S. Holtwick, Jr.,  
J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr.,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
By Direction.

At Honolulu

[183]

## AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE EMANUEL, USN

Theodore Emanuel, USN, presently under orders to CNO, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, deposes and says:

Prior to 7 Dec. 1941, and for over 4 years, I was assigned to the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with Col. George W. Bicknell. When Col. Bicknell was called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941 (TE), I discussed with him and Lt. Col. Muerlott (TE) matters of mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my understanding that [184] Col. Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and activities. These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originating in and going to (TE) the Japanese Consulate and persons therein (TE) at Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some 5 or 6 lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The translator was Comdr. (TE) Denzel Carr, USNR.

THEODORE EMANUEL  
Chief Ships Clerk, U. S. N.

Subscribed & sworn to before me, 17 April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[185]

AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
RICHARD K. SUTHERLAND

Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, presently Chief of Staff, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Areas, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those relating to the negotiations at Washington, D. C., of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and, as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, ACofS, G-2.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE.

Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor.

Hq. USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels.

R. K. SUTHERLAND.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD

at Manila, P. I.

## TOP SECRET

[186] AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of May, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.

*Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.*

at Manila, P. I.

[187] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL C. A. WILLOUGHBY

Major General C. A. Willoughby, presently Assistant Chief of Staff, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS. G-2, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before, except isolated fragments of the Kurusu diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any activating or implementing message, nor any notice that such a message had been transmitted or received.

Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appears to have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Major, British Army, who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq. USAFFE, and as such had contact with me and my predecessors, in 1941. (See Appendix A).

Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a "purple" machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. (See Appendix B). Those which were shown me before 7 December 1941 were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was the Army liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was exclusively a Navy function.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8th day of May 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lieut. Colonel, J. A. G. D.*

at Manila, P. I.

2 Encls:

Appendix "A"—Re Col G. Wilkinson.

Appendix "B"—Re Navy Crypto-analysis Service.

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TOP SECRET

[188]

APPENDIX "A"

AFFIDAVIT

8 MAY 1945.

The British SIA messages, their purport and evolution and the curious role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this investigation, in my opinion.

The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of information and a sort of E. Philipps Oppenheim international intrigue.

Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-law, in Manila, as a sugar broker, for many years; hence, the casual reference to a "Colonel Wilkinson", that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U. S. Law, he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the intelligence material he desired to file with me; they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide; it is still in operation; I employ both SIA and SOE, British, and find them loyal to no one but themselves and the Empire.

My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high—a horse-trading proposition, pure and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents not all of the messages sent; the commercial deductions are obvious: Davies cancelled sugar shipments in the nick of time.

Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His Government gave him a military status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the outbreak of the War, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration.

We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to Wavell and Singapore; he continued to report "home" though his stuff was severely edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell's Headquarters, as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system; he then made his way deviously to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his "status" with GHQ, USAFFE; he was "promoted" to Colonel and attempted to return to our Headquarters, as a "liaison"; he even had the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side, except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly demoted and attached to duty with the British Office of Information at Washington-New York.

C. A. Willoughby,  
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,  
Major General, G. S. C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2,  
General Headquarters, SWPA.

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TOP SECRET

AFFIDAVIT

[189]

Appendix "B"

8 MAY 1945.

In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient crypto-analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed on almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue; as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via 7th Fleet D. N. I.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select, and when it suits them. The possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.

The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, interlocking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation.

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

C. A. Willoughby,  
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,  
Major General, G. S. C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2,  
General Headquarters, SWPA.

[190]

STATEMENT

Kendall J. Fielder, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen,

Judge Advocate General Department, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organization of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows: a small administrative section of one officer, two clerks; a public relations section of two officers and three clerks; a combat intelligence section of two officers and several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency; a counter-intelligence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt Col George Bicknell and located in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 Section was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the section was small and the duties varied.

2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest of the world on the War Department, on the local Navy Command, and on interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese communications.

3. While the principle mission of the G-2 Section was to safeguard against internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was customary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office where summaries and estimates were prepared. Prior to December 7, 1941, the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department was mostly concerned with subversive matters since there were 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory of Hawaii of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week of November and first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by other Department Staff officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complications should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about friction between local Filipinos and Japanese.

[191] 4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned somewhat as a special staff section: the Contact Officer, Lt. Col Bicknell, had direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this subsection of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section". I refer to attempting to obtain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat.

5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings, usually on Saturday morning: at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of information to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 December 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at headquarters and were in contact many times each day.

6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii.

7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated 5 December 1941, sent by G-2 in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broadcast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as, "The Winds" message. I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt Col Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with

Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. The contents and details of "The Winds" message were never made known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferred with Commander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not tell me if he did.

8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which [192] I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt Col Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt Col Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the war started.

9. I have been shown by Lt Col Clausen a file containing information received by Lt Col Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a responsive chord in my memory but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my attention.

10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given to me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt Col Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct.

11. Col Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit "B" which are intercepted Japanese dispatches. I had never seen any of them before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to December 7, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and papers which was related by Col Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 1941. I gave this latter information to General Short the same day. With respect to Top Secret Exhibit "B", had I been given this series of messages prior to December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of No. 1. It is my opinion that if General Short had seen these messages prior to December 7, 1941, he would have ordered Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Commanding General Ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff.

KENDALL J. FIELDER.

[193] Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of May, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.

At Honolulu, T. H.

[194]

TOP SECRET

#### AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS J. BETTS

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, presently Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:



During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the major intelligence problems confronting the Military Intelligence Division and with a reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the War Department.

In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code". I further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been received. I do not recall that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would have remembered it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an implementing message had been received.

THOMAS J. BETTS.

Subscribed and Sworn Before Me This 13th Day of June 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

Frankfort on Main, Germany.

[195]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

15 JUNE 1945

#### AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH

Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, presently Chief of Staff, SHAEF, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret information which I later learned included various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff. I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to him at his home when the A. C. of S., G-2, considered the contents urgent. The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters connected with these intercepts, but I do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall specific details.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect:

1. On 5 Dec 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving information from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic [196] relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give the Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, "I think they have had plenty of notification." Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me, and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division had acted I did not want to discuss the matter further;

2. Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there, he delivered the pouches to me for delivery to the Chief of Staff;

3. During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown the Chief of Staff without delay;

4. On Dec 6, 1941, before Midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it "may have been one of others.")

My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows:

1. I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of [197] my rather minor province.

2. Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2 delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty Officer.

3. Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of Staff's office as indicated above.

4. To the best of my recollection, I left the office at the usual time on the evening of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7 PM, turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 PM. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which I have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as "Ultra". If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

W. B. Smith,  
W. B. SMITH,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Col., JAGD.  
at Frankfort on Main, Germany.

[198]

## AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUT. GENERAL LEONARD T. GEROW

Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief, War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C., some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form of intelligence.

Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, designated Top Secret Exhibit "B". I recall the general substance of some of these messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate dates of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to reports to Tokio on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to the Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coordination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC., informed General Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.

3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843.

[199] My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:

1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.

2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive,

prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any sources of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.

3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me.

In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by the Axis powers.

I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle plans and estimates [200] with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for that purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established military practise. I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two commanders at Hawaii.

So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November 1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my understanding that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B."

Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only

a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not the policy of the War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas commanders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible defeats.

L. T. GEROW,  
*Lieut. Gen. U. S. Army.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.*

at Cannes, France.

TOP SECRET

[201]

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, SC

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, presently Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence Service, Signal Section, MTOUSA, AFHQ, Caserta, Italy, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and decoded and translated.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about the time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B", numbered 25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Francisco intercept station to intercept all plain text Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and reports in to me. To the best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up. I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in Top Secret Exhibit "B" numbered 25349 and 25497, but in which the person at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating breach of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. I think this message also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy." I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2.

As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of my former superior Colonel Minckler; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams.

ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of June, 1945, at Caserta, Italy.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.*

[202] George W. Reuchard, presently on duty at the American Embassy to the Netherlands Government, London, England, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I have read the attached sworn statement of Mr. John F. Stone dated July 7, 1945 given to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and incorporate herein the allegations thereof as my statement in response to similar questioning.

GEORGE W. REUCHARD.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at London, 7 July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

[203] John F. Stone, presently on duty at the American Embassy, London, England, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, DEPOSES AND SAYS:

During the months of November and December, 1941, and for some time therefore, I was a Foreign Service Officer and a personal assistant to the Secretary of State at Washington, D. C. As such, I received during this period from two United States Army officers named Bratton and Dusenbury, who were then I believe Majors or Lieutenant Colonels, allegedly representing the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., various intercepts of official Japanese messages which had been decrypted and translated, and which were handed to me for submission to the Secretary of State. These messages were also handed occasionally for the same purpose to Mr. C. W. Gray and Mr. George W. Renchard, who performed similar duties for the Secretary of State, and were at some times handed direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of G-2. The intercepts were, to the best of my recollection, complete translations of the deciphered code texts. I do not recollect that except for possibly a few instances receipts were required when they were of course always given. If, however, delivery was made direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of [204] G-2 written record of the visit to the Secretary of State was normally made in his engagement book. I do not remember that any copies were ever made of the intercepts, which were either read and returned while the alleged representative of G-2 waited or returned to him at the time of a subsequent delivery or call. The irregularity in the delivery of and the volume of the intercepts were such as to prevent my recollection of any specific details regarding any one or several deliveries; I thus cannot state the exact time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when any intercept indicating the possibility of a breach in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States or Great Britain might have been received or called to my attention.

Prior to the servicing of the Secretary of State with the intercepts in question by the alleged representatives of G-2 as mentioned, the function was performed periodically by officers of the United States Navy, presumably of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and it is my recollection that on one or more occasions information of this type was brought to the Office of the Secretary of State by a Naval officer subsequent to the date when as requested United States Army officers undertook the continuous servicing of the Secretary of State. I recollect no statement made to me by any United States Navy Officer prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which I interpreted as indicating the possibility of said attack.

JOHN F. STONE.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 7th day of July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

at London, England.

TOP SECRET

## [205] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE

John R. Deane, Major General, USA, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General Staff;

On 6 December 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch for the Chief of Staff;

On 7 December, 1941, I arrived at the Munitions Building for duty at the same time as Colonel Bratton, which to the best of my recollection, was between 9 and 9:30 a. m.

JOHN R. DEANE,  
Major General, USA,  
*Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission with U. S. S. R.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.  
at Potsdam, Germany.

TOP SECRET

## [206] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL RUFUS S. BRATTON

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, O-3726, GSC, presently A. C. OF S. G-2, U. S. HQ., BERLIN DISTRICT, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board; and on statements and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, GSC; Moses W. Pettigrew, Colonel; Ralph C. Smith, Major General; Charles K. Gailey, Brig. General; Thomas J. Betts, Brig. General; Walter B. Smith, Lieut. General; Leonard T. Gerow, Lieut. General; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel; John F. Stone and George W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned.

During the month of December, 1941, and for several years prior thereto, as Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, War Department G-2, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C. various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic radio messages for the purpose of screening and distributing to authorized officials such of these intercepts as were matters of military intelligence value. In the period of about October to December, 1941, the volume of these intercepts increased to such an extent that with the permission of General Miles, A. C. of S. G-2, I utilized several of my assistants, such as then Major or Lieut. Colonel Dusenbury, then Major Moore, then Lieutenant Schindel, in processing, assembling and distributing this material. These were distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. This arrangement and method of presentation to the Chief of Staff and other authorized recipients had been prescribed by the Chief of Staff. These recipients during October to December, 1941, authorized by the Chief of Staff, were, so far as G-2 distribution was concerned, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief, War Plans Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By agreement between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the President was served by representatives of the Navy. The normal procedure was to secure receipts by SIS document numbers from the Aide to the Secretary of War, the confidential secretaries of the Secretary of State, and the Executive Officer of the War Plans Division. The material distributed and thus covered by receipts were usually taken from the recipients by the representatives of G-2 mentioned the following day, and were then burned with the

corresponding receipts, which were given to assure the ultimate destruction of the material. During the period October to November, 1941, the G-2 received daily about fifty to seventy five of these intercepts which were sorted to about twenty per cent for distribution, and which twenty per cent represented such of the documents as had intelligence value.

It was necessary to have help in the distribution of this material so that the various recipients would receive their copies simultaneously. I am unable to recall at this time except as may be hereinafter [207] mentioned, and there are no records to show, who delivered what to whom during this period, with any degree of accuracy.

Concerning the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall a meeting about 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, at which Colonel Sadtler presented information he had received from Admiral Noyes of a possible implementation. There had been several "false alarm" reports to this same effect. In view of an intercept which had already been received and translated, being an order from Tokyo to the embassy of Japan at Washington to destroy their codes, in my opinion an implementation message to the "Winds Code" was superfluous and no longer of importance, since the purpose would be to effect a destruction of the codes. Following receipt of the order mentioned, I verified that the Japanese Embassy at Washington were burning what appeared to be important papers. Colonel Sadtler was, however, directed at the meeting mentioned, to get from Admiral Noyes verification of the purported implementation message in the form of a clear text and in the original Japanese. Colonel Sadtler never, to my knowledge, returned to G-2 with this or any additional information on the subject. I have no knowledge as to whether Colonel Sadtler, after getting the purported implementation message mentioned, went to Walter B. Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, or to Leonard T. Gerow, then Chief of the War Plans Division, and in effect asked that the Hawaiian Department be given more warning. I did not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler's report, nor do I know that any one else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by reason of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message to the "Winds Code" indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

At no time prior to 7 December 1941, although a thorough alert in this regard was in effect, did I ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code". In connection with testimony of Captain Safford on this subject to the effect that two copies of such a message was sent by the Navy to the Army, it was the customary practice for the Navy when sending the Army material of this character, to send six copies. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with me several "false alarms", but no one in the Navy had discussed with me, nor to my knowledge with any one else in G-2, the message supposed to have been received according to the testimony of Captain Safford.

The intercept mentioned from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington, to destroy their codes and ciphers, was processed for distribution to the authorized recipients.

The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office. We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock p. m. After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients. [208] I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. This was about ten o'clock p. m. The sets of these thirteen parts for the ACoS, G-2, the Chief WPD, and the Secretary of War were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered the next morning, 7 December 1941, with the fourteenth part. They were not given to General Walter B. Smith, General Leonard T. Gerow, General Galley or General Ralph C. Smith the night of 6 December 1941, nor were they given that night to General Sherman Miles. When I saw the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, he then had the fourteen part message, which I had not given him. About ten o'clock p. m. on 6 December 1941, I took the thirteen parts destined for the



Secretary of State and between ten and eleven p. m. delivered them to the night duty officer at the State Department. I cannot recall who the night duty officer was. I told this officer that it was of the greatest importance that the papers be placed in the hand of the Secretary of State at once. He assured me that this would be done. This was the only delivery I made that night. I then went home to bed and returned to the office the following morning between 7:30 and 8 a. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteenth part of the message came to my desk about the time I reached my office. It was processed at once and about 8:30 a. m. it was sent to be delivered to the authorized recipients. I did not deliver any material that morning except the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver at 1 p. m., 1941, Japan's reply to the United States, and which intercept I gave to the Chief of Staff between ten thirty and eleven thirty that morning. The last mentioned message was sent to the Secretary of State for delivery by either Colonel Dusenbury or Lieutenant Schindel. In my opinion the fourteen part message mentioned was relatively unimportant, in view of the other messages which preceded it, especially the one ordering the destruction of the Japanese codes and ciphers and the one ordering the delivery of the fourteen part message at one p. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteen part message was merely the formal announcement couched in diplomatic language of a break which, from the evidence, seemed inevitable. I do not recall having discussed the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message with General Sherman Miles the night of 6 December 1941. In further reference to my seeing the fourteen parts on the desk or in the possession of the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, I do not know for certain how they came into his possession.

Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to my statements here, including among other things as to the processing and delivery of material, and to whom and when, should be modified and considered changed in accordance with my statements herein. This affidavit now represents my best recollection of the matters and events set forth, and a better recollection than when I previously testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and is made after having my memory refreshed in several ways and respects.

RUFUS S. BEATON,  
Col., G. S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of July, 1945, at Paris, France.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

[209]

#### AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL OTIS K. SADTLER

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, assigned to the Army Ground Forces and on duty at Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board pursuant to Joint Resolution of Congress, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Referring to my testimony on 6 October 1944 before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to information of a possible "Winds Code" execute message given me on 5 December 1941 by Admiral Noyes, I wish to add further that following my second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that day, as set forth on page 252, Top Secret Volume D, transcript of proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or any other person the exact wording of the intercept or information which he had conveyed to me, and as far as I know nothing further was done to get further information from Admiral Noyes. I assumed that the basis of the information before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned me was an intercept which would, according to the standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the Army.

I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript mentioned, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2. I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which

Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building, and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory:

"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is now and I made no copy at the time. After I had typed this message I conferred with General Gerow and General Smith, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not [210] show them the warning message I had typed.

I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

*General Gerow.*—"I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially so since so many major events have intervened."

*General Smith.*—"I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province."

I had seen no intercepts and no information came to my attention which pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to 7 December 1941. The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to me. I thought that the Panama Canal would be the surprise attack target.

[Hand written: Other than the persons mentioned, namely Gen. Miles Col. Bratton, Genl. Gerow, Col. Smith, and whoever may have been in Gen. Miles' office at the time, to the best of my recollection, prior to Dec. 7, 1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.]

[211] I did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department.

I had no time urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders, and I deny the testimony in that regard of Mr. Friedman given to General Carter W. Clarke on 13 July 1945.

I also deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and reiterate that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes.

I further deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the effect that I had collected and had material in a safe deposit box concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster. I have not collected any such material in a safe-deposit box although I thought I had done so. I do have possession of the testimony given by me before General Carter W. Clarke on two occasions, 16 September 1944 and 14 July 1945, which was given to me by General Clarke, and is now in a private box in my home.

Otis K. Sadtler,  
OTIS K. SADTLER,  
Colonel, S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.  
At Washington, D. C.

[212]

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES D. HERRON

Major General Charles D. Herron, presently assigned to the Office Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, desposes and says:

Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August 1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General Short to relieve me as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which command I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material relating to the command, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco but that he had not given them much time while en route.

I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This included my giving him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated 17 June 1940, reading as follows:

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnish you shortly. Acknowledge."

[213] I also told him of the relations and cooperation which had existed with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island.

Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii, he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the subject of command and related problems.

Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in 1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise a

War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commander may and should take whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the War Department at the earliest possible moment.

Charles D. Herron,  
CHARLES D. HERRON,  
Major General, U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[214]

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES

MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES, presently Commanding General, First Service Command, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "Magic", or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

My testimony mentioned above should be considered in that light, therefore. In the months preceding 7 December 1941, there was available to the War and Navy Departments in Washington, D. C., intercepts of Japanese radio messages to their diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world. These were intercepted, decrypted, decoded and translated by the two services in Washington, D. C., under arrangements for mutual assistance in this regard and for their dissemination. So far as the Army was concerned, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who was the head of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, when I was G-2, War Department, received and reviewed the material received daily from this source. He and his assistants, Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel, screened the material, picking out that which contained information valuable from a military intelligence standpoint. The latter was then distributed by these officers to various officers and persons who had theretofore been authorized to receive them. Those on this authorized list, in the several months immediately preceding 7 December 1941, and to whom deliveries were made by the officers mentioned, included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD. The material was delivered in locked brief cases. The brief cases contained receipts for purposes of assuring the ultimate destruction of the material thus delivered. The cases were returned to Colonel Bratton's office when they had been read, the receipts they contained having been initialed by the authorized officers. The material and the receipts were then destroyed by burning. This intelligence was distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. I do not believe there are any records which would show what intercepts were delivered to whom, nor the dates of delivery, so far as any particular intercepts are concerned. I do not think that any such records were made at the time.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file of such intercepts, called Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At this late date I am unable to recall having seen, prior to 7 December 1941, any particular messages translated prior to that date, except those bearing Army serial numbers 23570, 23859, 24373, 25322, 24878, 25432, 25138, 25435, 25445, 25496, 25552, 25553, 25554, 25555, 25727, 25545, 25640, 25785, 25836 and 25838. In the latter cases, each of the messages contain something that I recall knowing or seeing at the time. The remainder of the series do not. I do not recall the intercepts, Army serial numbers 25874 and 25877, summaries of which were shown me by Colonel Clausen, nor do I know how these two happened to be omitted from the Top Secret Exhibit "B", in the

preparation of which I was not in any way concerned. I must add, however, that I believe I saw, prior to 7 December [215] 1941, all the messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", which were translated prior to that date except number 25843. My belief is based on the fact that they were of such importance that my officers would have assured themselves that I had seen them. Those which I do not recall simply do not register in my mind after nearly four years.

Concerning such of the intercepts mentioned as relate to reports by the Japanese consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and inquiries from Tokyo as to ship movements in Pearl Harbor, and the division of Pearl Harbor into districts for such reporting, I would like to point out that such messages were primarily of Naval interest and what might have been expected. Of course the Japanese were following the movements of our major ships, as best they could, as we were doing with regard to their ships. Since I knew that the Navy was getting the messages mentioned also, they did not leave any impression on my mind which has endured four years.

Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", and those which related to joint action by the ABCD Bloc, or members thereof, I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement.

The general contents of the first thirteen parts of the intercepts in the Top Secret Exhibit "B", number 25843, consisting of fourteen parts, were known to me on the evening of 6 December 1941. This came about because I was dining at the home of my opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Bearsdall the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to me.

Concerning the intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my belief in the period preceding 7 December 1941, that the Navy was intercepting, decrypting, decoding and translating this material, consisting of Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, at Hawaii, for use in connection with the fleet. I was given so to understand by Naval sources, but I do not recall who told me.

Referring to testimony as to a meeting I am said to have had with Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler, on 5 December 1941, concerning information received by Colonel Sadtler from Admiral Noyes of a possible "Winds Code" execute message, I cannot specifically recall any such meeting, nor having received the information stated. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of the receipt of such a message, I was prepared to transmit it immediately to the Chief of Staff and to WPD. The Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for this message since receiving information of the "Winds Code" set-up. It was considered most important and of vital concern. I have some recollection that there were several messages intercepted which, while thought at first to be the execute message, proved on analysis not to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite acceptance as such. It is my belief that the meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, if it occurred, concerned such a message. It may have resulted in the message to Hawaii about Commander Rochefort, on that date.

As to the meeting the morning of 7 December 1941, with the Chief of Staff, according to my best recollection, refreshed from notes made shortly thereafter, I conferred with the Chief of Staff in his office at the Munitions Building at about 11 a. m.

On the general subject of my being alive to the danger of a possible surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, I would like to refer to my service in the Hawaiian Detachment, during 1929-1932, as Department G-3. It was while so assigned that I [216] prepared and disseminated a General Staff study, afterwards disseminated further by General Wells, on the defense of Oahu. This study emphasized the advantages which an attack on Oahu, particularly by surprise, might give Japan. The usual assumption in war planning during my assignment was that of a surprise attack made with little warning in the nature of strained relations internationally, what was called "out of the blue". I remember one situation we war-gamed, that of an attack "out of the blue" on a Sunday morning.

During my service as G-2, War Department, I caused Colonel Warren J. Clear to be sent to the Far East for undercover work for G-2. He made reports to G-2, War Department, using the name of Knight, through Colonel Brink at Singapore.

My attention has been called to the testimony of William F. Friedman, given to Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, as conducting for the Secretary of the Navy the type of investigation being conducted for the Secretary of War by Colonel Clausen. To my knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department, pertinent to Pearl

Harbor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other person. Specifically, to my knowledge, General Marshall did not ever order destroyed any copies of a possible "Winds Code" execute message. Nor, to my knowledge, were any records of G-2, pertinent to Pearl Harbor and derogatory to the War Department, destroyed. While serving as G-2, I would have known of any destruction of records ordered by any competent authority.

Concerning the question as to whether correct military practise, current in 1941, would have justified a Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, to act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, such as were contained in War Department messages prior to 7 December 1941, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commanding General was responsible for the successful execution of his mission; he could act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, but at his own risk; and that custom and doctrine of command would require him to report his action and the reasons therefore promptly to his superiors.

In my opinion the messages sent by the War Department to General Short, prior to 7 December 1941, especially the ones dated 27 November 1941, were definitive directives that a war alert was required by the situation, and that there was an immediate threat from without as well as danger from sabotage.

SHERMAN MILES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1945, at Boston, Mass.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.*

[217]

**AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL REX W. MINCKLER, SC**

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, presently director of training, Camp Crowder, Mo., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to joint resolution of the Congress, and that TOP SECRET is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was my superior. My duties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio messages which had been decrypted and translated.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were one or two "false alarms", one of which I think discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message had been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me.

The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies.

Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial numbers 25874 and 25877, which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the intercepts [218] were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and

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translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination.

Rex W. Minckler,  
REX W. MINCKLER,  
Colonel, SC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[219]

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, presently Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the voting members of that Board, namely, Lt. General Grunert, Major General Henry D. Russell, and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session with me from 11:10 A. M. to 12:07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indicated on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of information which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called "Magic". I told them, among other things, that the source of this information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which were decrypted, decoded and translated under the supervision of the Signal Corps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source. This [220] would have meant that our enemies concerned would certainly have changed their systems of communication and would thus have terminated this most vital source of information which has continued to be available up to the present hour. Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised.

I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with "Magic", prior to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the "Magic" papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding "Magic" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. On my second appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at length the general problem concerning the method of including "Magic" in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret "Magic" phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the Top Secret Transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose.

[221] Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my understanding in the period preceding 7 December 1941 that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this information from facilities available in his command.

Concerning information sent to General Short or his command prior to 7 December 1941, I find that Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2 at the time for General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen that he was shown, about 3 December 1941, a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, to the Navy at Pearl Harbor, in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume "C" Transcript

of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN, which reads as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

It is customary and expected that information of this character would be exchanged between the respective Services at Hawaii.

Concerning correspondence which was exchanged between General Short and myself before 7 December 1941, I gave him my estimates in my letters to him dated 7 February 1941 and 5 March 1941 as follows:

[222] "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority."

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority."

Estimates to the same general effect were sent to General Short by the War Department. General Short answered these estimates prior to 7 December 1941 with replies and sent communications to the War Department which indicated that he was then alive to the danger of the possible surprise attack by air against Pearl Harbor. He participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. At no time did General Short inform me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the War Department that he was not in full agreement with these War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan.

The doctrine of military command required that the Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, must not act contrary to War Department estimates of the character mentioned, unless he believed such action to be dictated by necessity and unless he immediately reported and gave full details and reasons to the War Department.

George C. Marshall  
GEORGE C. MARSHALL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

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TOP SECRET

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL HAROLD DOUD

COLONEL HAROLD DOUD, presently with the Allied Translator and Intelligence Service, GHQ, AFPAC, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese messages which had been intercepted.



Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" I recall seeing at about the time of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432. I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Stafford, USN, to the effect that I may have some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this testimony of Captain Stafford as I did not have any information of an execute message.

[224] My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6 December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall.

Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the of the Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average time required was at least two days.

I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The translation dates indicated thereon were not always the dates of receipt. Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to show the time required between the dates of receipt and the actual solutions and disseminations.

Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any current Japanese military codes.

Harold Doud,  
HAROLD DOUD,  
Colonel.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[225]

#### AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT

LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

The average length of time required for processing the messages in the Japanese system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which were actually published were included in the data on which the average was calculated.

No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military Attaches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military system.

a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building. My recollection is that the first call to initiate the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed sometime after six o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by teletype.

[226] This preparation required some time because tapes had to be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco.

b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the prelimi-

nary discussions in which traffic was requested and also in receipting for the traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and this also tended to impress the matter on my memory.

Frank B. Rowlett,  
FRANK B. ROWLETT,  
*Lt. Colonel, SC.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

At Washington, D. C.

[227]

AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN

CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

To the best of my knowledge and remembrance the following facts are true:

At approximately 8:00 p. m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other personnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained copy, as the original traffic had been air-mailed to Washington at approximately 4:00 p. m. on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and the hours as given are approximately correct.

[228] I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time.

Howard W. Martin  
HOWARD W. MARTIN  
*Captain, SC*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

At Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

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AFFIDAVIT OF MARY J. DUNNING

MARY J. DUNNING, presently with Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 6 December 1941, I left the Munitions Building around 1:00 p. m., the regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 that afternoon, I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office, requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I fix the hour by the length of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by 3:00 p. m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5:00 p. m. instead, since I had made plans to spend the day out of town.

I can't recall being told why we were called back to work, but the general assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japanese Ambassador was in conference with the President.

I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was processed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance) where I had not worked for some time. [230] I think that as I entered the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation of the machine. After that we spent some time practicing.

It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because we joked about my teaching him to operate the teletype. To the best of my knowledge, we were in communication with our intercept station in S. F. not later than 7:00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any traffic for us at that time.

I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a. m. and I recall processing some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, however, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had been asked to deliver [231] traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.

I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941.

Mary J. Dunning  
MARY J. DUNNING.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.  
At Washington, D. C.

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#### AFFIDAVIT OF LOUISE PRATHER

Louise Prather, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941.

This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for work at 7:00 a. m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This further served to impress the event on my memory.

Louise Prather.  
LOUISE PRATHER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.  
At Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

## EXHIBIT C

[233]

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The documents referred to in the Report are listed on the inclosed cover sheets to Exhibits "1" through "8".

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*Exhibit "1"*

- a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of sheets 2 and 55, showing that on 7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 December", which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time.  
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise noted.
  - b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941.
  - c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 29 May 1941.
  - d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japanese War Policy".
  - e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is initialed by General Short.
  - f. Memorandum re "Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August 1941.
  - g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report of Sir George Paisn.
  - h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C., dated 6 September 1941.
  - i. Photostated copy of reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel in *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* dated 18 September 1941, obtained from Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.
  - j. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 1941, initialed by General Short.
  - k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo, dated 17 October 1941.
  - l. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of *Tairiku*, Japanese magazine, for May 1941.
  - m. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 1941, re "Estimate of Japanese Situation".
  - n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreign policy.
- [235] o. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 25 October 1941, initialed by General Short.
- p. Letter from Brig General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding memorandum containing information received from Orient.
  - q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
  - r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of certain information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable.
  - s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Commander (I. C.), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from British.
  - t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November 1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
  - u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from Navy.
  - v. Transcript of telephone conversation, 1 December 1941, obtained from Navy.

- w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from Navy.
- x. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI.
- y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian department, 27 November 1941.
- z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 29 November 1941.
- aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., Hawaiian Department, 27 December 1941.
- dd. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 December 1941.
- cc. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.
- dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941.
- ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 7 December 1941.
- ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
- gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 December 1941, "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by Carrier".
- [236] hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529.
- ii. Statement of Captain William B. Cobb, JAGD, 10 December 1941.
- jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
- kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 8 December 1941.
- ll. Cable from "Colton Acting" to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.
- mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
- nn. Cable from General Short to Major General H. H. Arnold, War Department, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
- oo. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
- pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to "Radio—Merle Smith".
- qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941.
- rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
- ss. Paper relating to "WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and destruction of their code machine".
- tt. Reports by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, Special Inspector, Hqs. Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 9 July 1941, and related papers.

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*Exhibit "2"*

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.

- a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
- b. G-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.
- c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum, 7 September 1944, to C. G., POA, re Documentary Evidence.
- d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Domestic Conditions, 1 December 1941 (2 copies).
- e. Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
- f. Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.
- g. Hawaiian Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 a. m., 7 December 1941, dated 22 December 1941.
- h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.
- i. Radio from War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese negotiations, 27 November 1941.

- j. Informal report re Thailand.
- k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asma Maru and conditions in Japan.
- l. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 13 November 1941.
- m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.
- n. Army Contact Office memorandum, 2 May 1941, re Comments on observations of a missionary.
- o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.
- p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941.
- q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.
- [238] r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Assistant Naval Attache Shanghai.
- s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.
- t. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department transmitting letter from F. B. I. re information on Japan's entry into war dated 28 July 1941.
- u. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dated 3 November 1941.
- v. G-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dated 17 October 1941 re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiichi Tojo.
- w. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).
- x. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and M. A. report attached.)
- y. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 re Japanese Residents of T. H.—Loyalty of—ONI report dated 28 November 1941 (attached).
- z. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George Parish (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies).
- aa. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re French Indo-China.
- bb. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re Formosa.
- cc. M. A. Report dated 18 November 1941 re Japan, Military Agents.
- dd. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).
- ee. M. A. Report dated 28 October 1941 re Japan.
- ff. M. A. Report dated 23 October 1941 re Formosa.
- gg. M. A. Report dated 2 October 1941 re Japan.
- hh. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re French Indo-China.
- ii. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re Thailand.
- jj. M. A. Report dated 10 September 1941 re Japan and Japanese Relations.
- kk. M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australasia.
- ll. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
- [239] mm. M. A. Report dated 14 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
- nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 February 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, T. H.
- oo. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Japanese Spy Activities.
- pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
- qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate Activities.
- rr. Copy of radio "638 12th."
- ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND Report dated 9 February 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at.
- tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
- uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities, Maui, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.).
- vv. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.

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- ww. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and Kalama to observe unusual activities.
- xx. Memorandum date 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John Waterhouse house at Kailua.
- yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.
- zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939—"The Spy Game".
- aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Rlyoji.

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### *Exhibit "3"*

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K.

- a. Army Contact Office memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 7 October 1941 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru:
- b. M. I. D., Washington, Letter of transmittal dated 28 August 1941, w/letter dated 3 August 1941 from George Paisn to President Roosevelt re Japanese in Hawaii; summary of information dated 30 September 1941 re letter, and H. H. D. letter dated 30 September 1941 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply thereto attached).
- c. M. I. D., Washington, letter of transmittal dated 16 September 1941, w/letter from M. I. D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.
- d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1941, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to General Short dated 25 July 1941.
- e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, w/note attached.
- f. Inter-staff routing slip dated July 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Molokai, w/G-2, H. H. D. letter of transmittal dated 25 July 1941 re Activities of Foreigners in Country—Mexico.
- g. F. B. I. report dated 6 November 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
- h. F. B. I. report dated 9 October 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
- i. 14ND report dated 15 February 1943 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.
- j. 14ND report dated 15 June 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.
- k. 14ND report dated 14 February 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.
- l. F. B. I. report to F. B. I., Washington, 28 March 1942, re notes found on desk pad at Japanese Consulate.
- m. F. B. I. letter, 19 March 1942, re translations made of coded and confidential material from Japanese Consulate.
- n. Inter-staff routing slip dated 14 March 1942 re Translation of a Register of Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter of transmittal dated 13 March 1942 and report same subject attached.

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### *Exhibit "4"*

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheet L and M.

- a. G-2 H. H. D., letter of transmittal to G-2, Washington, dated 7 March 1942 re translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Inter-staff routing slip dated 7 March 1942 and F. B. I. report dated 2 March 1942 re same subject.
- b. Inter-staff routing slip dated 2 April 1942 re Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter dated 2 April 1942, same subject.

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### *Exhibit "5"*

The following documents were obtained from the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District, Honolulu.

- a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cablegrams from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and numbers of cablegrams in date order: 363, 3 December 1941; 364, 4 December 1941; 365, 4 December 1941; 221, 5 December 1941; 368, 6 December 1941; and 369, 6 December 1941.

- b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November 1941 to the following addresses: Shagro, San Francisco; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu; Growsumida, Honolulu; and Shokin, Honolulu.
  - c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November 1941 to the following addresses: Rev. Hiro Higuchi, Waipahu Community Church, Waipau, Oahu, T. H.; American Consul, Papeete; Y. Watanabe, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.; and Shokin, Honolulu.
  - d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 November 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae.
  - e. Four confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities, dated: 9 February 1942, 14 February 1942, 15 June 1942, and 15 February 1943.
  - f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941, Japanese time.
  - g. An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands prepared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND, dated 20 April 1943.
  - h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg) T. W. Joyce.
- hl-h35. Various evaluations and related papers from 14ND, Honolulu.

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*Exhibit "6"*

The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me 1 through 165, from the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonel Gerald Wilkinson) at Manila to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Honolulu, and were obtained from their respective files.

They comprise reports during the period from June to December 1941.

[244]

*Exhibit "7"*

- a. The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941 of radio messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and which were not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

- b. The documents following those mentioned in *a* above are the intercepts which comprise Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred to in their affidavits.

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*"Exhibit "8"*

The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources.

They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to 22 December 1941.



TOP SECRET

EXHIBIT D

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

1. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 17 February 1945, concerning investigation of Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
2. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 3 March 1945, concerning investigation of Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
3. Receipt from the District Intelligence Office 14ND of designated material, 19 April 1945.
4. List of Photostated copies of C. I. D. files furnished to Lt. Colonel Clausen, 19 April 1945.
5. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 23 May 1945, concerning investigation of Lt. Colonel Clausen supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
6. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 1 August 1945, fourth progress report of Colonel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
7. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 12 September 1945, fifth progress report of Colonel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

TOP SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 12 September 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.

Subject: Fifth progress report of Lt. Colonel Clausen's investigations supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. Since 1 August 1945 I have concluded the investigations of the following::
  - a. *Army Personnel interviewed:*
    - General George C. Marshall
    - Major General Charles D. Herron
    - Major General Sherman Miles
    - Colonel Otis K. Sadtler
    - Colonel George W. Bicknell
    - Colonel Rex W. Minckler
    - Colonel Harold Doud
    - Colonel Harold G. Hayes
    - Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
  - b. *British Army personnel interviewed:*
    - Colonel Gerald Wilkinson
  - c. *Civilians interviewed:*
    - Miss Mary J. Dunning
    - Miss Louise Prather
  - d. *Related conferences:*
    - Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
    - Major General Myron C. Cramer
    - Commodore Inglis, ONI
    - Brig. General Carter W. Clarke
    - Brig. General Thomas North
    - Colonel Ernest W. Gibson
    - [248] Colonel William J. Hughes
    - Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USN
    - Mr. John F. Sonnett
    - Mr. A. T. Klotz

e. *Affidavit evidence obtained:*

General George C. Marshall  
 Major General Sherman Miles  
 Major General Charles D. Herron  
 Colonel Otis K. Sadtler  
 Colonel Rex W. Minckler  
 Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett  
 Captain Howard W. Martin  
 Miss Mary J. Dunning  
 Miss Louise Prather

Henry C. Clausen,  
**HENRY C. CLAUSEN,**  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

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TOP SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
 Washington, 1 August 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.

Subject: Fourth Progress Report of Colonel Clausen's Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities Reported:* Investigations at Blandford, Blenchley Park, London, England; Cannes, Marseille, Paris, Versailles, France; Casserta, Italy; Berlin, Frankfurt on Main, Potsdam, Germany; and Washington, D. C., were conducted during 15 May to 1 August 1945.

a. *Army Personnel Interviewed:*

Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow  
 Lt. General W. B. Smith  
 Maj. General John R. Deane  
 Brig. General Thomas J. Betts  
 Colonel George W. Bicknell  
 Colonel Rufus S. Bratton  
 Colonel Warren J. Clear  
 Colonel Robert E. Schukraft  
 Major Louis Stone

b. *British Navy Personnel Interviewed:*

Captain Edward Hastings

c. *Civilians Interviewed:*

Dr. Stanley Hornbeck  
 George W. Renchard  
 John F. Stone

d. *Related Conferences:*

Harvey H. Bundy  
 General Thomas T. Handy  
 Maj. General Myron C. Cramer  
 Maj. General Otto Nelson  
 Brig. General Carter Clarke  
 [250] Brig. General Thomas North  
 Brig. General G. Bryan Conrad  
 Brig. General Marion Van Voorst  
 Colonel C. W. Christenberry  
 Colonel R. W. Hauenstein  
 Colonel F. W. Hilles  
 Captain Wm. T. Carnahan  
 Captain Edmund H. Kellogg  
 John F. Sonnett  
 Admiral Henry K. Hewitt

e. *Affidavit Evidence Obtained:*

Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow  
 Lt. General W. B. Smith  
 Maj. General John R. Deane  
 Colonel George W. Bicknell  
 Colonel Rufus S. Bratton  
 Colonel Robert E. Schukraft  
 George W. Renchard  
 John F. Stone  
 Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts

*1. Documentary Evidence Obtained:*

British radio intelligence material

*2. Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed:*

(a) *Colonel Bratton's Testimony Before APHB:* Colonel Bratton admitted to me that his testimony given to the APHB was incorrect on some very important subjects, and should be revised accordingly. These changes include the following points:

1. He previously testified that the top secret radio intelligence material, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

But, in his affidavit to me made when his memory was more refreshed, he admitted that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy, and that there were no records to show who delivered what to whom during the period in question.

[251] 2. He previously testified that he personally delivered the top secret radio intelligence material to the officers concerned.

In his affidavit to me, however, he admitted that in addition to himself, deliveries were made by Major or Lt. Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

3. He previously testified that on the evening of 6 December 1941 he delivered to the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the office of the Secretary of State, the thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese reply to the settlement conditions which the Secretary of State had given the Japs on 26 November 1941. He had also testified that he put the thirteen parts of this message on the desk of the Chief of Staff. He had further testified that on 6 December 1941 he had given sets of the thirteen parts to Lt. General W. B. Smith for the Chief of Staff, to Brig. General Gailey for Lt. General Gerow, and to Maj. General Miles as G-2, and that it was his recollection that these officers received these sets that night. He had also testified that on 6 December 1941 he discussed the thirteen part message with General Miles.

But in his affidavit to me he admitted that the only set of the thirteen parts message he delivered on 6 December 1941 was to the duty officer of the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December 1941 to General Smith, General Gerow or General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December 1941; that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession, although he claimed that he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver it on 6 December 1941 to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury admitted in his affidavit to me that he received the messages on 6 December 1941, but that he did not deliver any until after 9:00 A. M. on the morning of 7 December 1941.

[252] 4. He previously testified that on the morning of 7 December 1941 he arrived at his office about 7:00 or 8:00 A. M. and telephoned the home of the Chief of Staff at about 9:00 A. M., and that the Chief of Staff arrived at his office at 11:25 A. M.

In his affidavit to me, he fixed the time at which the Chief of Staff was in his office on 7 December 1941 as being between 10:30 and 11:30 A. M.

The affidavit of Maj. General Deane fixed the time at which Colonel Bratton arrived at his office on 7 December 1941 as between 9:00 and 9:30 A. M., which also agrees more nearly with the recollection of Colonel Dusenbury.

Affidavits mentioned in previous reports, as well as the new affidavits of Generals Gerow, Smith, Deane, and Messrs. Stone and Renchard, tend to support the revised testimony of Colonel Bratton.

(b) *"Winds Code" Message:* Investigation at British sources failed to reveal that the British ever intercepted an implementation message. Apparently, the evidence to date of the existence of such an implementation depends primarily on the recollection of certain Navy witnesses, and among whom there is a conflict. Colonel Schukraft claimed to have seen an implementation in a form different from that testified to by the Navy witnesses. On this subject it should be recalled that the action to be taken by the Jap Consular and diplomatic agents on receipt of an implementing message, namely, destruction of codes, actually was ordered by Tokyo in a radio which was intercepted about 4 December 1941. As I previously reported, this information was given to Short prior to 7 December 1941, according to his G-2 and Assistant G-2. Short testified before the Navy Court of

Inquiry, however, that he did not get this information, and that to him it would have been the only important part of the message which the Chief of Staff sent him by radio on 7 December 1941. Assuming that the recollections of Short's two members of his Staff are correct, then Short had received prior to 7 December 1941 the ultimate in available information according to his own statement of what should have been given him for a different alert than that which he had ordered on 27 November 1941.

[253] (c) *Sufficiency of War Department Warnings to Short*: General Gerow in his affidavit to me sets forth detailed reasons why in his opinion the overseas commanders were given adequate information of impending events. Also why the radio intelligence messages were not sent to the commanders. In this regard, testimony should be recalled to the effect that, for security reasons, the Army was restricted by the Navy from sending these messages, and that representatives of the Navy had stated that the Navy unit at Honolulu was getting the messages from their own facilities.

(d) *Conflicts in Testimony*: Many of the points heretofore in doubt and hereinbefore mentioned have been sufficiently developed to reach appropriate conclusions. A number of conflicts remain, however, which it is planned to resolve by completion of the investigation.

3. *Progress and Objectives*: The investigation will be concluded by exploration of the remaining leads and the making of a final and comprehensive report. This will involve:

(a) Interviews with Generals Marshall, Herron and Miles, Colonels Bicknell, Doud, Minkler and Sadtler, Major Bash, Messrs. Roberts, Hoover, Friedman, and Wilkinson, and Misses Adams, Cave, and Prather.

(b) Examinations of the testimony given Admiral Hewitt by Admiral Mayfield Captain McCollum, Commanders Kramer and Mason, and other Navy witnesses if necessary; the engagement book of former Secretary of State Hull; the statement by General Smith; and the recent G-2 examination involving Mr. Friedman, resulting from Navy disclosures.

(c) It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me to send or give me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation, any copies of affidavits made before me and any incidental and related notes or papers which may be in their possession or under their control, they to advise me in writing that this has been done or that there are no such records, and that they be advised that these records will be available in the War Department in the event access thereto is ever required.

Henry C. Clausen.  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.  
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[254]

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 23 May 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Investigation of Colonel Clausen

Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities Reported*: Investigations at Honolulu, Guam, Saipan, Leyte, and Luzon were conducted during the period 26 March to 12 May, 1945.

a. *Army Personnel Interviewed*:

General Douglas MacArthur  
Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland  
Major Gen. C. A. Willoughby  
Major Gen. Spencer B. Aiken  
Major Gen. C. L. Ruffner  
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder  
Brig. Gen. C. A. Powell  
Brig. Gen. J. J. Twitty  
Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston  
Colonel O. N. Thompson  
Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott  
Major H. H. Henderson  
Major Maresh  
Chief Warrant Officer Louis B. Lane

**b. Navy Personnel Interviewed:**

Captain E. T. Layton  
 Captain Harper  
 Captain W. J. Holmes  
 Captain T. A. Huckins  
 Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.  
 Commander Burr  
 Commander Carr  
 Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.  
 Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel

**[255] c. Civilians Interviewed:**

D. R. Dawson  
 Robert L. Shivers  
 Harry L. Dawson  
 John E. Russell

**d. Related Conferences:**

General Richardson  
 Admiral Nimitz  
 Admiral McMorris  
 Admiral Towers  
 Mr. H. H. Bundy  
 Gen. Carter W. Clarke  
 Gen. Myron C. Cramer  
 Commander John F. Sonnett

**e. Affidavits and Statements Obtained:**

General Douglas MacArthur  
 Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland  
 Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby  
 Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder  
 Brig. C. A. Powell  
 Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston  
 Colonel O. N. Thompson  
 Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott  
 Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane  
 Captain E. T. Layton  
 Captain W. J. Holmes  
 Captain T. A. Huckins  
 Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.  
 Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.  
 Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel  
 Mr. John E. Russell  
 Mr. Robert L. Shivers

**f. Documentary Evidence Obtained:**

1. British Intelligence material (SIS) consisting of more than 200 reports from Gerald Wilkinson at Manila to Honolulu, from July 1941 to and including December 1941.

2. Files of the Hawaiian Department, G-2, Army Contact Office. These are set forth on the attached receipt dated 19 April 1945.

[256] 3. Navy District Intelligence Office files, set forth on the attached receipt dated 19 April 1945.

4. Files of the Hawaiian Department, AG. These include photostats of file copies of pertinent communications received before 7 December 1941.

5. FBI records of telephone intercepts and British SIS reports.

**2. Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed:**

a. *Short's Defenses:* Assumption that Navy knew the whereabouts of the Jap fleet: Actually, as could have been ascertained from plots prepared by Captain Holmes, USN, and daily Communication Intelligence Summaries prepared by Captain Rochefort (see affidavit of Captain Huckins), the Navy did not have such information.

Claim that War Department acquiesced in reply of Short to radio of 27 November 1941 signed "Marshall", and thereafter did not give him additional information: The reply of Short also stated "liaison with Navy." Attention is invited to new evidence of items of intelligence possessed or available to Short.

Claim that a more effective alert would have interfered with training and would have alarmed the civilian population: Evidence shows there was no civilian alarm when the Herron all-out alert of 1940 was ordered and Short did not order

the radar into 24 hours operation and did not order any visual lookouts or sound detectors against a possible air attack (See notes on Navy court testimony).

b. *Intelligence and Information available to Short:* Short and his G-2 testified in effect that they were almost wholly dependent on the War Department for information and that they actually received very little. New evidence indicates that the Hawaiian Department received a great deal more military and diplomatic information than has been previously developed. For example, the British SIS reports (See Russell & Shivers affidavits), the intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Emanuel, Shivers and Woodrum affidavits), some commercial radio traffic in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Mars-ton and Shivers affidavits), information from the Navy District Intelligence Office and the Fleet Intelligence Officer (See files and affidavit of Captain Layton). Much material was gathered from observers, travellers, and Washington sources, and evaluated and disseminated by the Army contact office.

[257] Various papers dealing with this intelligence were initialed by Short. For example, see the Inter-Staff Routing Slip, 11 September 1941, concerning information from the Tokyo Naval Attache as to Japan's intentions; the Slip, 6 November 1941; the War Department Military Attache Report, 3 November 1941; the Special Intelligence Report, 17 October 1941; the memo of Colonel Bicknell, 21 November 1941; the War Department G-2 Report, June 1941, regarding the lurking of small submarines in Hawaiian waters preparatory to attacks on Pearl Harbor; the War Department G-2 Report, 28 August 1941, of a warning by one George Falsin; the Contact Office Report and Estimate, 25 October 1941; the report 19 June 1941 of Japanese books.

A detailed study of the foregoing and other items of intelligence, in relation to testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, will be made on completion of the investigation.

Incidentally, a special investigation by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, 9 July 1941, reported to General Short many deficiencies of his Command. Among other things, the report set forth that the attitude of mind in the Hawaiian Department, the Hawaiian Air Force and Hickman Field was deficient as to "the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage," and further "it is found that a considerable portion of the Command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theaters of war and our local sphere of action." The report further stated that the Command was not alert to:

"(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away. \* \* \*

"(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia."

The report found the cause for this attitude of mind was, among other things, traceable:

"(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.

"(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces. \* \* \*

"(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions. \* \* \*

[258] "(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the above first needs. \* \* \*

"(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.

"(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future."

The report concluded:

"(a) That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities."

Under Appreciations, the report stated:

"(a) Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of Investigation."

c. *Imminence of War with Japan:* Short testified that if this had been known to him he would have ordered a different alert. The affidavit of Fielder and the documentary evidence mentioned shows that Short was so informed. For instance, see the estimates dates 17 October 1941 and 25 October 1941 by Colonel

Bicknell, initialed by Short; the memo of Bicknell, dated 21 November 1941; and the speeches of Short and Kimmel, reported in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 18 September 1941, a copy of which is attached.

d. *"Winds Code" Message*: Contrary to Short's testimony and the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, this information was given the Army at Honolulu. See the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell. It should be noted that in the documentary evidence is a translation of the Jap Consul's desk pad. He had written thereon several wave lengths of Jap broadcasts on the date the Winds Code was broadcast. No evidence was found however, that the code was implemented (see statement of Holtwick), other than the 3 December 1941 British SIS report to Honolulu, copy of which went to Colonel Bicknell, reading in part:

[259] "(C) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."

Significantly, the date 3 December 1941 agrees with the testimony of Captain Safford as to when he saw an implementing message to the code in similar terms.

e. *5 December 1941, War Department G-2 Message*: See affidavits of Fielder, Powell, Thompson and Lane. In view of previous statements recently obtained from Colonel Bicknell and personnel of G-2, it is a reasonable certainty that the message was received by the Army in Hawaii on 5 December 1941.

f. *Destruction by Japs of Codes*: Short denied receiving this information and claimed that he would have considered it most important, calling for a different alert order. But Fielder states in his affidavit that he gave his information to Short on 6 December 1941. See also the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell.

g. *Pearl Harbor as attack target*: If the Jap Consul commercial radio traffic, which was available at Hawaii to the Navy especially from the latter part of November 1941, included the reports as to ships in the harbor, then it was similar to that received at Washington. Several messages are contained in the documentary evidence above which are indicative that some such traffic was available at Hawaii before 7 December 1941. Further details are being explored in conjunction with the Navy. The availability of these messages is confirmed by the affidavits of Shivers, Marston, and testimony of Captain Rochefort.

It should be noted that the Jap inquiries as to ships movements included reports at many other places, such as Manila, Seattle, etc. Also, so far as Hawaii specifically was concerned, intercepts of telephone conversations at the Jap Consulate revealed that in 1940 a Jap agent was collecting information on ship movements.

Another item of intelligence which pointed to Pearl Harbor was the 3 December 1941 message from the Jap Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, giving the visual signals devised by Otto Kuhn to report ship movements. This message falls into the category stated as requiring further exploration as to its availability before 7 December 1941.

[260] As to the Army Signal Intelligence Service activities at Hawaii, see the Powell affidavit. Two of the most vital messages, intercepted before 7 December 1941, were sent in to Washington by Hawaii. General Powell, however, states he was not aware of the contents.

In the documentary evidence mentioned there is correspondence from War Department to Hawaii in June 1941 concerning a report of the Military Attache at Mexico City as to the Jap intentions to strike Pearl Harbor with midget submarines at the outbreak of hostilities.

h. *Jap Navy Task Force in Marshalls*: Short testified that he did not have this information. But, the contrary might well be true in view of the affidavits of Layton, Huckins and Shivers, in addition to the proof previously reported.

i. *Sufficiency of War Department warnings*: General MacArthur, who received information similar to that received by Short, stated in his affidavit, after reviewing the intercepts, that the War Department warnings were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his Command for war.

Colonel Bicknell told Shivers the Army had been alerted when Shivers mentioned the alert he received from Hoover on 28 November 1941. (Shivers affidavit).

j. *Possible alarm to civilian population*: The affidavits of Marston and Shivers confirm the lack of ground for Short to fear any such alarm, in view of the experience of the all-out Herron alert of 1940.

3. *Miscellaneous*: Many rumors relating to Pearl Harbor had been circulated concerning information available to General MacArthur, reports by him to Hawaii, and the War Department warnings to him. These are set at rest by the affidavits of MacArthur, Sutherland and Willoughby.

4. *Wyman-Rohl investigation*: Concurrent with the foregoing, evidence was obtained at Hawaii and Leyte in exploration of certain leads.

5. *Progress and objectives*: I propose to complete the interviews of overseas witnesses by going to the ETO to develop some very important and promising leads. Those to be questioned on the Pearl Harbor phases include, among others, General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General T. J. Betts, Colonel Rufus Bratton, Colonel Harold S. Doud, Colonel R. E. Schukraft and Colonel W. H. Tetley. This would include an investigation of new matters as well as of [261] those items previously discussed. It is felt desirable to leave as soon as possible in order that interrogation be done before the witnesses are further scattered or are perhaps unavailable later.

Certain overseas witnesses pertinent to the Wyman-Rohl investigation would also be interviewed, thus completing the overseas phase of that investigation also.

I am keeping in touch and cooperating in a reciprocal manner with the Navy on additional investigation.

When my investigation is completed I shall make a comprehensive critique and report of all the new evidence then developed in relation to the Army Pearl Harbor Board Secret and Top Secret Reports.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAG.

[262]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

19 APRIL 1945.

Memorandum:

Subject: Photostated copies of C. I. D. files.

1. The following photostated copies of C. I. D. files were furnished to Col. Clausen as directed by the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, CPBC:

G-2, Hawn Dept. list Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.

G-2, CID memo dtd 9/12/44 re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.

War Dept., Hq Army Pearl Harbor Board memo dtd 9/7/44 to CG, POA re Documentary Evidence.

G-2, Hawn Dept report re Japan, Foreign Relations & Domestic Conditions. (2 copies) (1 Dec 41)

Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.

Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.

Hawn Dept. Summary of the Situation As of 7:30 A. M., 7 December 1941, dtd 12/22/41.

Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.

\*Radio from War Dept to G-2, Hawn Dept re Japanese negotiations, 11/27/41.

Informal report re Thailand.

Army Contact Office memo dtd 8/1/41 re Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.

Radio from Short to AG, Wash. dtd 11/13/41.

Brief re Japanese Magazine Translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.



Army Contact Office memo dtd 5/2/41 re Comments on observations of a missionary.

Memo for Col. Bicknell dated 8/1/41 re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.

Copy of radio received 11/27/41.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.

Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Asst Naval Attache Shanghai.

[263] Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.

War Dept ltr dtd 8/5/41 to G-2, Hawn Dept transmitting ltr from F. B. I. re Info on Japan's entry into war dtd 7/28/41.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Nov. 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dtd 11/3/41.

G-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dtd 10/17/41 re New Japanese Premier Hideki or Eiki Tojo.

Army Contact Office memo dtd 11/21/41 re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Jan. 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico." (Distribution list and M. A. report attached).

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 re Japanese Residents of T. H.—Loyalty of—ONI report dtd 1/26/42 (attached).

Ltr from Hq. Second Corps Area dtd 11/28/41 re George Palsh (Palsh). w/FBI report same Subject attached. (2 copies.)

M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re French Indo-China.

M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re Formosa.

M. A. Report dtd 8/14/41 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re General Report, Japan and China.

M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australia.

M. A. Report dtd 9/10/41 re Japan and Japanese Relations.

M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re Thailand.

M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re French Indo-China.

M. A. Report dtd 10/2/41 re Japan.

M. A. Report dtd 10/23/41 re Formosa.

M. A. Report dtd 10/28/41 re Japan.

M. A. Report dtd 11/3/41 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).

M. A. Report dtd 11/18/41 re Japan, Military Agents.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 w/14MD report dtd 2/9/42 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Cable re movements of fleet and return to Japan of members of diplomatic staff.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio #628, 12/12/41 re Japanese Spy Activities.

Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dormer windowed houses in Kalamia.

14ND report dtd 2/9/42 re Espionage Activities at Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.

FBI memo to ONI dtd 1/4/42 re Japanese Consulate Activities.

Ltr dtd 12/3/41 from Kita to Foreign Minister. Tokyo.

Extract from ONI report dtd 12/9/41 re Activities on Maui, Uanai & Molokai, since 7 December 1941.

[264] Report dtd 12/12/41 by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.

Memo re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai & Kalama to observe unusual activities.

Memo dtd 12/17/41 from R. A. Cooke Jr. re John Waterhouse House at Kailua.

Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.

Extract from Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39—The Spy Game.

Four coded messages from Togo to Rijoji.

Army Contact Office memo for Col. Bicknell dtd 10/7/41 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure From Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.

M.I.D., Wash. ltr of transmittal dtd 8/28/41, w/ltr dtd 8/3/41 from George Palsh to Pres. Roosevelt re Japanese in Hawaii, Summary of Information dtd 9/30/41 re ltr, and H. H. D. ltr dtd 9/30/41 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply thereto attached).

M. I. D., Wash. ltr of transmittal dtd 9/16/41, w/M. I. D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/ltr from Admiral Bloch to Gen. Short dtd 7/25/41.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book Entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, w/note attached.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Jul 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Malokai, w/G-2, H. H. D. ltr of transmittal dtd 7/25/41 re Activities of Foreigners in Country-Mexico.

F. B. I. report dtd 10/9/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.

F. B. I. report dtd 11/6/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.

F. B. I. ltr dtd 3/19/42 re translations made of coded & confidential material from Japanese Consulate.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/14/42 re Translation of a Register of Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. ltr of transmittal dtd 3/13/42 and report same subject attached.

F. B. I. report to F. B. I., Wash. 3/28/42 re notes found on desk pad at Japanese Consulate.

14ND report dtd 2/14/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

14ND report dtd 6/15/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

14ND report dtd 2/15/43 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

G-2, H. H. D. ltr of transmittal to G-2, Wash. dtd 3/7/42 re Translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/7/42 and F. B. I. report dtd 3/2/42 re same subject.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 4/2/42 re Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. ltr dtd 4/2/42 same subject.

[265] The aforementioned files were furnished to-----  
----- on the -----th day of -----1945.

M. H. Sheward  
M. H. SHEWARD  
2nd Lt., M. I.

Receipt acknowledged.

SECRET

[266]

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,  
Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 April 1945.

RECEIPT FROM THE DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE 14ND IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED  
FOR THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL:

1. Five (5) Secret Photostats (one positive and one negative of decoded cablegrams, from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo.

Listed are the dates and numbers of the above cablegrams in date order.

| Date of Cablegram | Number of Cablegram |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| (a) 12/3/41       | #363                |
| (b) 12/4/41       | #365                |
| (c) 12/4/41       | #364                |
| (d) 12/5/41       | #221                |
| (e) 12/6/41       | #368                |
| (f) 12/6/41       | #369                |

2. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 11/27/41, to the following addressees:

(a) SHAGRO, San Francisco  
(b) Dr. HOLMES, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu  
(c) GROWSUMIDA, Honolulu  
(d) SHOKIN, Honolulu

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3. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 11/25/41, to the following addressees.

- (a) Rev. Hiro HIGUCHI, Waipahu Community Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.
- (b) AMERICAN CONSUL, Papeete
- (c) Y. WATANABE, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.
- (d) SHOKIN, Honolulu

4. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 11/19/41, addressed to Inosuke HACHIYAE.

5. Four (4) Confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities, dated as follows:

- (a) 9 February 1942
- (b) 14 February 1942
- (c) 15 June 1942
- (d) 15 February 1943

6. One PHOTOSTAT (positive and negative) of each of the following SECRET intercepts:

- (a) 1-540; 11/30/41 & 12/1/41
- (b) NYK-38; 12/2/41
- (c) 6-1; 10/11/41

[267] 7. One Photostat (Positive and Negative) of the following: (Page numbers indicate DIO file page.)

- (1) Wilkinson report dated 18 October 1941—(No. DIO file page number.)
- (2) Wilkinson report dated 10/6/41, pg. 174.
- (3) Wilkinson report dated 9/16/41, pg. 173.
- (4) Wilkinson report dated 10/22/41, pg. 172.
- (5) Wilkinson report dated 10/17/41, pg. 171.
- (6) Cable received from Wellington, 11/25/41, regard Pacific Raider Intelligence, pg. 168A.
- (7) Memo for the files, dated 12/3/41, in reference to Wilkinson report dated 10/6/41, pg. 168.
- (8) Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 168.
- (9) Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 162.
- (10) Confidential letter to DNI from Com14, dated 10/14/41, Ser. #0965916, Subj.: "Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Agent in Manila—Information received from), pgs. 160-159.
- (11) Wilkinson report dated 9/3/41, pg. 158.
- (12) Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 157.
- (13) Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 156.
- (14) Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 155.
- (15) Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 154.
- (16) Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 153.
- (17) Wilkinson report dated 10/11/41, pg. 152.
- (18) Wilkinson report dated 10/2/41, pg. 151.
- (19) Wilkinson report dated 9/29/41, pg. 150.
- (20) Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 149.
- (21) Wilkinson report dated 9/26/41, pgs. 148-147.
- (22) Wilkinson report dated 9/24/41, pg. 145.
- (23) Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 144.
- (24) Wilkinson report dated 9/23/41, pgs. 143-142.
- (25) Wilkinson report dated 9/14/41, pg. 140.
- (26) Wilkinson report dated 9/10/41, pg. 139.
- (27) Wilkinson report dated 8/28/41, pg. 134.
- (28) Wilkinson report dated 8/25/41, pg. 133.
- (29) Wilkinson report dated 8/23/41, pg. 132.
- (30) Wilkinson report dated 8/21/41, pg. 131.
- (31) Memo by T. W. Joyce, dated 11/5/41. (Notes & Comments), pg. 130.
- (32) Wilkinson report dated 10/4/41, pg. 129.
- (33) 14ND card #1536, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French Concession—Japanese Designs on", pg. 121.
- (34) 14ND card #1534, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Thai—Japanese Activities in", pg. 120.

- [268] (35) 14ND card #1535, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Helto Airdrome", pg. 120.
- (36) 14ND card #1533, dated 9/31/41, Subj.: "Japan—General Intelligence", pg. 119.
- (37) 14ND card #1531, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese Fleet Organization", pg. 118.
- (38) 14ND card #1532, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Indo-China—Japanese Moves in", pg. 118.
- (39) 14ND card #1528, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japan—Ordnance Production", pg. 117.
- (40) 14ND card #1530, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Far East Exports to Germany", pg. 117.
- (41) 14ND card #1526, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "China Blockade—Smuggling", pg. 116.
- (42) 14ND card #1527, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Coastal Defenses", pg. 116.
- (43) 14ND card #1525, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa (Takao)—General Military Intelligence", pg. 115.
- (44) 14ND card #1523, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Conscription", pg. 114.
- (45) 14ND card #1524, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Troop Movements", pg. 114.
- (46) 14ND card #1520, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese—Troop Movements", pg. 113.
- (47) 14ND card #1521, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 113.
- (48) 14ND card #1522, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Supplies", pg. 113.
- (49) 14ND card #1518, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Travel Restrictions", pg. 112.
- (50) 14ND card #1519, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Censorship", pg. 112.
- (51) 14ND card #1516, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Mobilization", pg. 111.
- (52) 14ND card #1517, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Construction", pg. 111.
- (53) 14ND card #1482, dated 9/12/41, Subj.: "Hongkong—Prospective Disorders", pg. 97.
- (54) 14 ND card #1468, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy", pg. 95.
- (55) 14ND card #1470, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese—Siamese Relations", pg. 95.
- (56) 14ND card #1466, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 94.
- (57) 14ND card #1467, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy", pg. 94.
- (58) 14ND card #1465, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Railways, Buildings, etc.", pg. 93.
- [269] (59) 14ND card #1463, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French Concession—Japanese Designs On", pg. 92.
- (60) 14ND card #1456, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa-Japanese Airplane Movements", pg. 90.
- (61) 14ND card #1457, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa-Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 90.
- (62) 14NR card #1453, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Naval Ordnance", pg. 89.
- (63) 14ND card #1454, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Factory", pg. 89.
- (64) 14ND card #1455, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troops in Indo China", pg. 89.
- (65) 14ND card #1450, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troop Movement", pg. 88.
- (66) 14ND card #1451, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Naval Construction", pg. 88.
- (67) 14ND card #1452, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Naval Construction", pg. 88.

- (68) 14ND card # (?), dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Aircraft Factory", pg. 87.
- (69) 14ND card #1448, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Spratley Island—Japanese Construction", pg. 87.
- (70) 14ND card #1449, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "German Raiders in Pacific", pg. 87.
- (71) 14ND card #1444, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—Kobe Navy Yard", pg. 86.
- (72) 14ND card #1445, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Submarine Construction", pg. 86.
- (73) 14ND card #1446, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Aerial Bomb Factory", pg. 86.
- (74) 14ND card #1442, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", pg. 85.
- (75) 14ND card #1443, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—Airdrome at Kama-kura", pg. 85.
- (76) 14ND card #1440, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—General Military and Naval Information", pg. 84.
- (77) 14ND card #1441, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—Underground Airdrome at Takarazuka", pg. 84.
- (78) 14ND card #1438, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", pg. 83.
- (79) 14ND card #1439, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Philippine—Japanese Propaganda In", pg. 83.
- (80) 14ND card #1435, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Dutch East Indies—Japanese Propaganda In", pg. 82.
- (81) 14ND card #1436, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Saigon", pg. 82.
- [270] (82) 14ND card #1437, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Philippine-Japanese Business In", pg. 82.
- (83) 14ND card #1434, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", pg. 81.
- (84) 14ND card #1433, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Anti-American Measures by Japanese in Occupied China", pg. 80.
- (85) 14ND card #1431, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Indo-China", pg. 79.
- (86) 14ND card #1432, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa", pg. 79.
- (87) Conf. Ltr. to DNI from DIO, 14ND, dated 9/20/41, Subj.: "British Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with", pg. 78.
- (88) Extract #61 for Honolulu, dated 8/8/41, pg. 71.
- (89) Extract #59 for Honolulu, dated 8/10/41, pg. 69.
- (90) Extract #57 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 67.
- (91) Extract #54 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 64.
- (92) Extract #52 for Honolulu, dated 8/21/41, pg. 61.
- (93) Extract #35 for Honolulu, dated 8/18/41, pg. 42.
- (94) Extract #33 for Honolulu, dated 8/16/41, pg. 40.
- (95) Extract #27 for Honolulu, dated 8/12/41, pg. 34.
- (96) 14ND card #1420, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "Japanese Repatriation", pg. 30.
- (97) 14ND card #1421, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr.", pg. 30.
- (98) 14ND card #1417, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "DAKAR—Military Exercises", pg. 29.
- (99) 14ND card #1418, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "DAKAR—Attitude of Natives", pg. 29.
- (100) 14ND card #1419, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "MOROCCO—Outgoing visas from", pg. 29.
- (101) Conf. Ltr. to Hd. of Domestic Intell. Branch, ONI, from DIO, 14ND, dated 8/22/41, Subj.: "British Secret Agent in Manila; information received from", pg. 27-28.
- (102) Extract #24, Subj.: "HULL, Amos Tyler", pg. 21.
- (103) Extract #20, dated 8/1/41, Subj.: "German S/S RAMSES", pg. 19.
- (104) 14ND card #1333, dated 8/15/41, Subj.: "JAPANESE MILITARY ARMOR", pg. 14.
- (105) Japan Military Body Armour, pg. 13.
- (106) 14ND card #1334, dated (?), Subj.: "Japanese Industrial Management", pg. 12.
- (107) Extract from letter from Manila, dated 7/12/41, pg. 10.

(108) Factual Information regarding Japanese Professions, pgs. 9-7.

(109) Extract #9 for Honolulu, dated 7/3/41, pg. 6.

(110) Extract #10 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 5.

(111) Extract #11 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 4.

[271] (112) Extract #12 for Honolulu, dated (?), pg. 3.

(113) Extract #13 for Honolulu, dated (?), pg. 2.

(114) Extract #14 for Honolulu, dated (?), pg. 1.

B. One (1) Photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9635 Kc), dated 12/8/41 (Japanese time).

HENRY C. CLAUSEN

*Lt. Col., JAGD, U. S. Army*

*For Army Pearl Harbor Board.*

TOP SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, 3 March 1945.*

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities reported:* Report is made of my investigation for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, during the period 17 February-3 March 1945, as follows:

a. *Army personnel interviewed as leads:*

Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C.  
Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I.  
General Robert H. Dunlop, A. G.  
Colonel Edward F. French, S. C.  
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C.  
Lt. Ann Long, S. C.  
Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2.  
General Thomas North, OPD  
Miss Mary L. Ross, G-2  
Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.  
Mr. Smith, S. C.  
General Ralph C. Smith, G-2

b. *Navy personnel interviewed as leads:*

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort

c. *Affidavits obtained:*

Major Anderson  
Colonel Bicknell  
General Dunlop  
Colonel Jensen  
Miss McKenney  
Captain Rochefort  
Miss Ross  
Lt Colonel Rowlett  
General Smith

[273] d. *Conferences additional to foregoing:*

Mr. Harvey H. Bundy  
General Carter W. Clarke, G-2  
General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD  
Mrs. Foley, OPD  
Commander John F. Sonnett, USN

2. *Significant features of additional evidence developed:*

a. *"Winds" code message:* General Short contended and the Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that no information concerning this intelligence was available to General Short in the Hawaiian Department. For example, General Short stated in a letter to the Secretary of War: "Such information was not made available to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islands." But it now appears probable that before 7 December 1941, both his G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, received information of the "Winds"

code, and that his Assistant G-2 took action for the purpose of intercepting an execution message. If it is a fact that General Short did have available in his Hawaiian Department the information from the Navy as to intercepts of the "Winds" code message, this confirms the impression of General Marshall and Admiral Turner.

b. *Destruction by Japanese of codes:* General Short also contended that this information was not available to him. He attached more importance to this than almost any other intelligence. He testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry that had he received this information he would not have been led to attach much importance to not alarming the civilian population. In response to a question as to whether he would have gone into a different alert if he had received by telephone the 7 December 1941 message from General Marshall, he testified:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me.* But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine would have been very significant, *the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me.* I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. \* \* \*

I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously."

It now appears probable that both General Short's G-2 and his Assistant G-2 were informed before 7 December 1941 of the destruction by the Japanese of their secret codes and papers at Washington, London, [274] Hongkong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, and his Assistant G-2 saw the Navy Department message which so informed the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It will be recalled that this Assistant G-2 reported to Short's staff on the morning of 8 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls were destroying their secret papers. He, also, in the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, brought to the attention of General Short and his G-2 the fact that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between a Japanese agent in Honolulu and a purported newspaper correspondent in Tokyo referring to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, "hibiscus" and "poinsettias" in the Hawaiian Islands. This information was not given to the War Department. It should be observed that the "Winds" code was to be implemented by a false weather broadcast as a signal for the Japanese Consuls and diplomatic agents to destroy codes and papers. Hence, knowledge of the "Winds" code arrangement, coupled with later information that the Japanese were destroying their codes and papers, would indicate that the "Winds" code had been implemented. Colonel Bratton sent the 5 December 1941 warning wire to the Hawaiian Department because he had received information of the destruction by the Japanese of their codes. This was an inferential notice of implementation of the "Winds" code. Since it now appears probable, subject to additional investigation, that Short's G-2 and his Assistant G-2 knew of the "Winds" message and of the destruction by the Japanese of their codes, it follows that there may have been available in the Hawaiian Department the same information possessed by the War Department.

c. *Inquiries and Reports on Ships in Pearl Harbor:* These were perhaps the most telling indications of the Japanese intentions. Two, which were very suspicious, dated 2 and 6 December 1941, were intercepted or received by the Army Signal Corps at Honolulu and mailed to Washington. The message dated 2 December 1941 was not received at Washington until 23 December 1941. Translations of these were therefore not available in time to be of any use as forewarning to Washington. Inquiry will be made at Honolulu as to all the circumstances, and whether anyone in the Hawaiian Department had prior knowledge of the tenor of these or similar messages. In this connection, I have discovered evidence that more than a week before 7 December 1941 the Navy arranged to receive and did receive copies of some commercial cables from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, which tied into the radio intercepts. Some were decrypted and translated before 7 December. Others, supposed to be the more suspicious ones, were not decrypted and translated until later. Copies of these are supposed to be at Honolulu. Short's Assistant G-2 was aware before 7 December 1941 that the Navy had made arrangements for receiving these copies.

d. *5 December 1941 message from G-2, War Department:* Colonel Fielder denied receiving this message. But it now appears probable that it was sent by Washington and received in Honolulu on 5 December 1941. The importance of this fact is that it was the War Department method of informing the Hawaiian Department of the "Magic" messages.

[275] e. *Alarm to civilian population*: General Short contended that this caution had been urged upon him by the War Department and was one of his reasons for his No. 1 alert. It now appears that General Short did not inquire of his staff, and ascertain in the experience of those on duty in 1940, as to what effect the Herron alert of 1940 had on the civilian population. Had he done so, he would have learned that the Herron all-out alert did not materially alarm the civilian population.

1. *Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November 1941*: General Short testified that the War Department had this in Washington when he sent his reply to the 27 November 1941 message from General Marshall. It now appears that the Standing Operating Procedure was not received in Washington until March 1942, and hence the War Department cannot be charged with prior knowledge thereof.

3. *Miscellaneous items*: Several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl Harbor Board have been coordinated.

4. *Wyman-Rohl activities*: Exploration of further leads has been held in abeyance pending completion of Washington matters.

5. *Progress and objectives*: I shall develop some very important and promising leads in Hawaii and elsewhere when the studies in Washington have been completed, which is expected to be within the next two weeks.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,  
Washington 25, D. C., 17 February 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary  
to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities reported*: During the period 3-17 February 1945, in pursuance of directives, I conducted for the Secretary of War investigations at Washington, D. C., supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as follows:

a. *Army personnel interviewed as leads*:

General Carter W. Clarke, G-2  
Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, G-2  
General Charles K. Gailey, Jr., OPD  
General Thomas T. Handy, D. C. S.  
General Thomas North, OPD  
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, G-2  
Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.  
Colonel Eric H. F. Svensson, G-2  
Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2

b. *Navy personnel interviewed as leads*:

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort

c. *Affidavits obtained*:

Colonel Dusenbury  
Colonel Pettigrew  
Captain Rochefort (being completed)

d. *Conferences*:

Mr. Harvey H. Bundy  
Major Henry A. Correa, IADB  
General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD  
Colonel William J. Hughes, Jr., JAGD  
General H. I. Hodges, G. S. C.  
Commander John F. Sonnett, USN

[277] e. *Studies of Navy Court of Inquiry and Army Pearl Harbor Board records, reports, and exhibits*.

2. *Significant features of additional evidence developed*:

a. Colonel Bratton had testified that he delivered decrypted and translated intercepts to various distributees immediately preceding 7 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit that it was he who, almost exclusively, delivered the intercepts immediately preceding 7 December 1941.



b. Colonel Bratton had testified that he wrote the 5 December 1941 message from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, requesting that Commander Rochefort be contacted regarding a "Winds" broadcast. Colonel Dusenbury and Colonel Pettigrew stated in affidavits that this message was written by them.

c. Colonel Bratton testified that the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to Hull, called by some witnesses a Japanese declaration of war, intercepted 6 December 1941, were delivered by him to the usual distributees on the evening of 6 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in an affidavit that he was on duty and waited that night for the receipt of the parts of this message and that when about half of it had come in, Colonel Bratton left for his home. Colonel Dusenbury further stated that none of the parts were delivered that night and that he, Colonel Dusenbury, delivered them the following morning, 7 December 1941.

d. Colonel Bratton testified that the Japanese message to deliver the Japanese reply to Hull at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by him between 8:30 and 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941, and that he then called the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit his impression that this message was received by Colonel Bratton between 9 and 10 a. m., 7 December 1941. This confirms the recollection of the Chief of Staff as to when Colonel Bratton made the telephone call to his quarters. This latter time element is also supported by testimony of Navy witnesses.

e. Colonel Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, stated he had no recollection of receiving the 5 December 1941 message from Washington asking him to communicate with Commander Rochefort regarding the "Winds" message. He stated he did not have any knowledge of the "Winds" message. Commander Rochefort stated to me, and an affidavit to this effect has been prepared and submitted to him for execution, that since the Fall of 1941 he had very close liaison with his opposite number, Colonel Fielder; that he, Commander Rochefort, was monitoring at Hawaii for the implementation of the "Winds" message before 7 December 1941; that since this was of interest to the Army he did, before 7 December 1941, discuss with Colonel Fielder the "Winds" message as well as the destruction by the Japanese of their code and cipher machines in London and in Washington, and of secret papers in Honolulu, and any other important information of that character.

[278] *3. Miscellaneous items:*

I have coordinated several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl Harbor Board

Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 6 February 1945 to the Secretary of the Navy requested a copy of the record of the Navy Court of Inquiry and an examination of the record of the Army Board of Investigation. The Secretary of the Navy replied by letter dated 12 February 1945 that the request so far as the Navy Court of Inquiry is concerned should be denied because courts of inquiry and other investigative bodies are convened for the purpose of informing the convening authority or higher authority of facts attending the matter inquired into, and furthermore, that the investigation has not been completed. So far as the Army Board of Investigation is concerned, the Secretary stated that this is a matter over which the Navy Department has no authority.

*4 Wyman-Rohl activities:*

In conjunction with the foregoing, investigations and conferences have been conducted and held by me on phases involving Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. These do not pertain to responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, but some of the persons to be interrogated are in the same locations as those to be questioned in connection with the foregoing unexplored leads. The Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General have directed that I conduct the appropriate additional investigation, including the development of leads suggested by the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

*5. Progress and objectives:*

It is intended to complete the examination of the Navy Board of Inquiry proceedings, to interview and confer with such other persons as are available locally, and then to gather such information elsewhere as is essential. When concluded, I shall correlate, digest, and, interpret the additional facts in relation to the Army Pearl Harbor Secret and Top Secret Reports.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

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## EXHIBIT E

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY  
OF WAR

## SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the  
Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of my investiga-  
tion.

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,  
Washington 25, D. C., 14 September 1945.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classified as top secret and consisted of one volume.

I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top Secret Report require modification.

In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and one page 16:

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the 'Do-Don't' message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3.

"This was not done.

"Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and [281] this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert.

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it." (Pp 1 & 2)

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack." (P 16)

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence. These revisions include the following:

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on page 2:

*"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941.* The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86)"

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document as follows:

TOP SECRET

[282] "On the 24th day of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June, 1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things are automatically going to happen."

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian Department.

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our minds."

The Board further found:

"On November 28 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. (R. 87)" (P 2)

"\* \* \* On November 28th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. R. 123-124) \* \* \*" (P 5)

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123-124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of the information which he mentioned in his testimony to Admiral Hart. He stated he could not then recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" message.

[283] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information reached Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November 1941.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese "Winds Code." He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the execute message. He further testified that his attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December 1941, asking that the G-2 Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously refers to the "Winds Code." Colonel Bicknell further testified that he also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message.

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he gave General Fielder such information as he had received concerning intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties. The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept.

**The Board found:**

"\* \* \* War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action." (PP 2 & 3)

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents" which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as follows:

"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands." (P 87)

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December 1941.

[284] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Commander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence attached to Col. Clausen's Report.)

**The Board found:**

"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)" (P 3)

This, again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral Hart Examination. General Russell read from this while questioning Colonel Bratton, as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

"Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. \* \* \*"

(P 88)

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code" message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and

another message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since 1936."

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States.

[285] The Board stated:

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) \* \* \* (P 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department, dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, and gave this information to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came to his attention.

The Board further stated:

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months." (R. 243-244)" (P 3)

[286] " \* \* \* All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297)" (P 3)

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen, however, Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying before Colonel Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as were made, the deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be

revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:

"All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he asked [287] General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders and that General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of Staff, in a matter of such importance.

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington during November and December 1941. This included the information already mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any possibility of the United States considering the "proposal" *in toto*, and that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, negotiations would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be called so, and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but would be followed by military occupation of the Netherland's Indies by the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the "Winds Code."

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of 29 August 1945, analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the information which the War Department sent to General Short.

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional information was available initially to General Short in the Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and the United States and warnings of war.

The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [288] which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. Once such dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4 December 1941, set forth prophetically:

"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese execute message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Japanese Con-

sulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's report.

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers, travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are initialed by General Short.

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the probable moves of Japan.

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6)

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent."

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before Colonel [289] Clausen that this type of information and its source, of necessity, had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short but also all the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the information into too many hands. There has been considerable evidence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified before Colonel Clausen,

"... Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised."

The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen,

"Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941."

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the War Department, which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December, were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of 3.5 days.

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attack target in the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [290] that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial traffic sources

shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just what commercial traffic was decrypted and translated by the Navy at Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor.

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony of Colonel Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercepts which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.

Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese "Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from London to Manila and, in turn, from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report.

[291] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel Sadtler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

"General Gerow:—'I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's



memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.'

"General Smith:—'I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province.'" (P 2 - Affidavit of Colonel O. K. Sadtler)

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [292] of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The Board, also on page 7, referring to the C-2 warning message of 5 December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony Colonel Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:

"\* \* \* I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. \* \* \*

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on or about 5 December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds Code."

It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes:

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p. m., December 6, as follows:

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see the contents. (R. 307)

"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R. 239-241.) He stated that [293] General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General Miles.

"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Galley, General Gerow's executives in the War Plans Division. (R. 238)

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p. m. (R. 234, 239)

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning." (Pp. 11, 12)

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely

known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Galley, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.

"General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows." (P 16)

These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith or [294] General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home to the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any until after 9:00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely received.

On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General Miles. From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to General Miles.

The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. the morning of 7 December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1:00 p. m., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his office until 11:25 a. m.

These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which would be in the office of the Chief of Staff "between 10:30 and 11:30 that morning." Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and 9:30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office at about 11:00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel Bratton until "after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a. m."

The Board further found:

"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was [295] clear-cut and definite." (P. 15)

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7

December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States, but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6 December of significance, in addition to what had already been transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be delivered at 1:00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would occur at that time.

The Board further found:

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor." (P 18)

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a statement.

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General Short has since testified was information he should have received. General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7 December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall had given him this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me.*" (Underscoring supplied).

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the Japanese Government held sent orders to various diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain of its codes and important papers.

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Marshall included in his message which read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

*My Conclusion:*

The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views expressed herein.

MYRON C. CRAMER,  
Myron C. Cramer,  
Major General,  
The Judge Advocate General.

TOP SECRET

## EXHIBIT F

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY  
OF WAR

## SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War, dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation.

The previous memorandum mentioned is attached at the end of Exhibit "F."

TOP SECRET

[297]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,  
Washington 25, 14 September 1945

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation.

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some respects.

*The "Winds" Message:*

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive, the so-called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)', a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

- '(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:  
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
- '(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:  
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
- '(3) Japan-British relations:  
NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)' "

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around 20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [298] Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds" message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of the testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division, to the same effect (my Memo. p. 25).

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941, stated:

"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department." (Affid., Col. Harold Doud)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Commander Rochefort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect. (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence Service at the time, stated:

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent." (Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms'", which he discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford.

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time, did not recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24) General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were several [299] messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2)

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 1941, stated that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning as follows:

"C. G-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1). Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadtler was "purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination and interpretation of 'Magic' messages (Affid., Gen. Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise had no recollection of Colonel Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been impossible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him. (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)

[300] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message (probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the "Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 3)

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter, denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several "false alarm" reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith. Colonel Bratton never brought Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code." As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but six copies of any such message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several "false alarms" relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the Army according to Captain Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton)

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original "Winds" message, [301] he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft)

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from Admiral Noyes has already been discussed (See affidavits, Gen. Gerow, p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic") messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the "Winds Code." He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" message prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 November 1944, pp. 19-23). He never got the "Winds Code" nor any activating or implementing message. He believed he had seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect. (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)

Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C., at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an

activating "Winds" message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett.)

[302] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the "Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25 November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the War Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony will be recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received by the Navy." (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, p. 38)

*The Rochefort Message:*

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4 December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a radiogram was sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram, signed "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather"

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short's G-2, and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2)

As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder testified:

[303] "My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2)

General Fielder further said:

"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Haley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the war started." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8, p. 2)

General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included the "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23) (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very close [304] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General Miles to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the Rochefort message, contains heresay statements to the effect that "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had" (including the "Winds" message), the source of which was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Commander Rochefort's crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently, however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

Mr. Shivers testified:

"Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 December." (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell.

[305] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:

"I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct." (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort message. Whether Short received equivalent information will now be considered.

#### *Other Information Possessed by General Short:*

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board, testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert, he said:



"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me.* But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, *the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me.* I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. \* \* \* I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously." (Italics supplied)

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30), I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was [306] "destroying its codes and burning its papers," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944, p. 19).

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 23 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already received similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6 December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850, dated 3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval District, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents." (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183)

[307] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2)

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent information which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect. (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684-3685) Colonel Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI

on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11). Their reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 'intelligence conscious' and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

"Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, 'Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong.'" (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl Harbor Day by General, Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell, or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people, this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it, judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul was [308] burning his "codes and papers." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying his codes, as distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese-American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme significance.

#### *The Manila Warning Message:*

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies & Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu. Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and was secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila. The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3 December read as follows:

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

- A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
- B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
- C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

[309] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to Colonel

Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit)

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2 of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell)

In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short, in one form or another. (Amend. affd., Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory, but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:

"Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore."

A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend. affd., Col. George W. Bicknell)

**[310] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:**

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situation, which he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell)

**Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:**

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the "Winds Code" message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, he was called to present the intelligence picture to them. (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USN) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him over the entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain Layton and Colonel Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment. This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)

*Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:*

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I said:

"\* \* \* while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations." (P. 30)

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on this subject.

**[311] Short's SOP Against Attack:**

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I stated:

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands 'with no particular threat from without.' It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for '*a surprise hostile attack.*'" (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics supplied)

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. 5). Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5 November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Department until March, 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)

*Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:*

**[312]** Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this place.

**Conclusion:**

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall, General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's

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investigation. I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions. The statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present memorandum.

**Myron C. Cramer,**  
**MYRON C. CRAMER,**  
*Major General*  
*The Judge Advocate General.*

1 Incl

Copy memo from TJAG  
to S/W, "Top Secret  
Report, Army Pearl  
Harbor Board."

[313]

**EXHIBIT G**

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY  
OF WAR

**SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD**

Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War dated 25  
November 1944

**TOP SECRET**

[314] Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.

You have referred to me for opinion on the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944.

***Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:***

No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information.

***Board's Conclusions in General:***

The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure of General Short adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations.

It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report is to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions later.

[315] ***Board's Conclusion As to General Short:***

Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed in his duties in the following particulars:

"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

"(d) To replace inefficient staff officers." (Rep. 300)

*Short's Defenses:*

General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked: it is a question of the validity of his defenses.

Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 262, 395)

He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297, 4442)

[316] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr., Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) His failure to provide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong." (Tr., Short 4440)

Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 268; Herron 238; King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381)

Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55; Tr., 299, 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286, 287, 306); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 1, p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54-57)

These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotage, or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the civilian population, or interference with his training program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible air attack.

Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54-56; Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427)

The Board in its conclusion stated:

"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected." (Rep. 300)

[317] General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a *surprise attack* upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor." (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied)

Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned \* \* \*." The letter proceeded:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire." (Roberts Report, p. 5)

The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5) Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing Secretary Knox's letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369)

On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter containing the following statement:

"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us *during the first six hours of known hostilities*, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a *surprise raid by Air* and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority." (Tr., Marshall 17) (Italics supplied)

On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from *air attack*. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of *first priority*." (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied)

[318] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation at length and stating:

"The most serious situation with reference to an *air attack* is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack." (Tr., Marshall 21) (Italics supplied)

Short further stated:

"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland." (Tr., Marshall 24)

On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark:

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the *anti-aircraft* defense." (Tr., Marshall 27) (Italics supplied)

General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job." (Tr., Marshall 27)

On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055)

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for prep-



aration for "*a surprise hostile attack.*" (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics supplied)

[319] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, that all such data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)

On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grave situation, that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack those two powers. The radio concluded:

"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan." (Tr., Short 279)

Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278)

Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055)

On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers

"\* \* \* cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed." (Tr. 3688)

[320] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short:

"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent." (Tr., Short 412-413, Main 3307, Gerow 4256, 4264)

Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694)

On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that

"\* \* \* War with the United States would best begin in December or in February. \* \* \* The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty days. \* \* \*" (Tr., Bratton D. 289-291)

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that

"\* \* \* from all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring." (Tr., Bicknell 1439-1440)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in

Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041)

[321] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that:

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines of Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch." (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch 1503-C)

This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059) Short said, "I do not think I ever got the message. \* \* \* I might have seen it, \* \* \* and I might have forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414)

On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval vessels including submarines \* \* \* before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (Tr., Gerow 4259)

The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows:

"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 280-281)

[322] This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 as follows:

"Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possible that hostilities may begin.*" (Tr., Gerow 4260) (Italics supplied)

The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy Department, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 40X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spanavo informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." (Tr., Gerow 4262)

Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469)

The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27

November. (Tr., Short 422) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage (Tr., Short 294-296)

[323] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8) Short also received Admiral Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short's G-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) There were two Navy messages on 4 December 1941, the first an information copy to Kimmel of advice to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1614), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187) Another Navy message of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential papers." (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514)

In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broadcasts from Tokyo, "that you must obtain" and stating categorically "contact him at once." This had reference to the important "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton B. 62, D. 283) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986)

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-2 based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507) Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512) The message in question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509) The record does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.

[324] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code words). This message evidently had "military significance" as Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416)

Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of "air surprise." (Tr., Short 387-388) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:

"(d) \* \* \* It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. \* \* \*

"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start \* \* \*."

General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388)

General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1920), testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963) Short had at least one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 20 November 1941. (Tr., DeLany 1727)

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance \* \* \*." (Tr., Short 4442)

[325] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these messages.

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr. 279-281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 261) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294) As Short testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage \* \* \*." (Tr., Short 437)

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during the attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471)

Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr., Short 453)

The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300)

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows:

[326] " \* \* \* This policy should not, repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defenses. \* \* \* " (Tr., Short 280-281)

Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert against threats both from within and from without.

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Short, Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286)

As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred

before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962) Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."

He testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it." (Tr., Short 437)

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:

"General SHORT. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.

"General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

[327] "General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff." (Tr., Short 380)

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message expressly stated:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. . . . Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. . . ." (Tr., Gerow 4262)

The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)

On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (i) of the Plan which provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr., Kimmel 1745)

Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only becomes a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676. Short 4437, 4441)

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:

". . . A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District." (Tr., Gerow, 4283-4284)

[328] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that.

"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic Plan. . . ." (Tr., Gerow 4289)

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect *in toto*. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders." (Tr., Bellinger 1584)

It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his re-examination of his decision.

*Reconnaissance; Means Available:*

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiving the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469-470) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Rawailan Department did not have sufficient aircraft for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 470)

[329] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch 1527; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 1725; Kimmel 1773, 1794-1796; 1802; McMorris 2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, \* \* \* It was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time \* \* \*." (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel stated:

"\* \* \* I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about 84 planes, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. \* \* \*" (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)

How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:

"\* \* \* It was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told. Of these approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. \* \* \* and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet \* \* \*." (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)

[330] According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance, "flying at an interval of five degrees." (Tr., Martin 1872)

"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. \* \* \* This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180." (Tr., Martin 1873)

Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available in Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598, 1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of those could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A-20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as General Martin says,

"\* \* \* They could be used for reconnaissance, but \* \* \* were always recognized as not being a combat ship." (Tr., Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress.

Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be taken with some qualifications.

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):

[331] "Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, constituted but small areas of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles.

"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack.

"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy."

#### *Information Not Received By Short; In General:*

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to those commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr., Short 499-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War Department was not informed.

[332] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was that it had possession of information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G-2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr., Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)

The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of these various messages:

24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose.

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.

[333] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October, Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three-Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the above.

22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved.

5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.

14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and American power in China.

15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week."

16 November, translated 17 November, Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations with the U. S.



18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of eight destroyers entering harbor.

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off."

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.

22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

[334] 26 November, translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering "the proposal" *in toto*, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no progress.

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations"; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements."

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

[335] 30 November, translated 1 December, Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured—broken" and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the most absolute secrecy."

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested, but in Washington only.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for that purpose.

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders then those lower down.

1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and American Consular rights would not be recognized.

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of 26th. Japs convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American proposals.

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and destroy all secret documents.

[336] 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty.

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.

5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine.

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare to present it when directed.

6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap-American war.

7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Japan to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents.

7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th."

The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

#### [337] *The Winds Message:*

The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:

KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

"(3) Japan-British relations:

NISHINO KAZE KARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S. I. S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 125-126)

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25432) The Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S., G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253) Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied, "I think they have had plenty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254)

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252) According to [338] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36-38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251-252) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy.

The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132) According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr., Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr., Safford C. 133, 136-138, 172) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138); the same is true as to its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr., Safford C. 139-140, 152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top

Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S. I. S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167)

[339] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages to be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of various witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:

"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:

'On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.'

"Now, this is on the 4th day of December:

'Admiral Wilkinson approved this message'—

which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely,

—'and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man."

and so forth." (Tr., Russell A. 33-34)

[340] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows:

"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District, has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D. 283)

In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:

"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general *intelligence* broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations

'HIGASHI'

"(2) Japan Russia relations

'KITA'

"(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) 'NISHI' " (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr., [341] Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See also Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this. (Tr., Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4061)

There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit "B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:

"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. . . . The officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division." (Tr., Bratton D. 297)

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted—relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions—cannot be regarded as fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209-211)

#### *Discussion of Foregoing Information:*

It is obvious that those Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October, from Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu, requesting that the "ships in harbor" [342] report be made twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December, from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in harbor" report even where there were no movements. The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting of 25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November,

translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29 November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3 December; 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines, and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely, the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with anti-mine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex "B", S. I. S. 27065)

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25350 instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., he sent along a [343] note stating "This means a sunrise attack at Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford of C. 167). Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department.

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received as to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia.

As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get.

As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was the testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep. pp. 18-21)

#### *Comment on Short's Defenses:*

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect was a surprise air attack, he cannot now

[344] be heard to say that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious that General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise air attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount to a communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which excluded a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.

As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short continually stressed the possible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from without. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming the civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities of an experienced commander.

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified except in so far as it holds the information which Short had was incomplete and confusing.

I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

[345] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones, not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.

*Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers:*

The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep. 74)

A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain witnesses were asked as to their opinion of Phillips as Chief of Staff. Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr., Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified. (Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips "one of General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to confer with subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise—the average, run-of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief

of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he did not "feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-1978)

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this finding is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interference with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, of an air attack, [346] what Phillips considered to be his duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr., Phillips 1134-1144)

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as a Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November 1941, (Tr., Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having him present at important Navy Conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3, or G-4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese Consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about these matters.

The Board also stated that

"While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short." (Rep. 74)

The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7." (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not justified.

#### [347] *Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall*

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.



"(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war." (Rep. 298-299)

*Adequacy of General Marshall's 27 November Warning Message:*

The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197)

The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) overlooks the fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pictured the Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared from the information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggests the possibility that they may have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of a peaceful settlement.

[348] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B")

Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised, the Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he stated they were doing their best and that negotiations were to continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington, suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated:

"Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233." (Top Secret Ex. "B")

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of war:

"\* \* \* If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be the result of war. \* \* \* Now the question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war." (Tr., Grew 4213-4214)

When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. Grew replied:

[349] "I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it; and, not being a defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable, up to the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable." (Tr., Grew 4199)

With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there were "two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister.

"I think it is perfectly possible that the cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is—well, I won't say confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that

Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces me personally that he didn't know. \* \* \* (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated:

"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far East. They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have relaxed some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it didn't happen." (Tr., Grew 4218)

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November, General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5) It was first thought that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti-Comintern pact. When the time was extended to 29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4) "November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December without anything happening other than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5)

[350] In the light of all information possessed by the War Department at that time the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the Japanese representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it is my opinion that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" was an accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.

#### *General Marshall's Views on Warning:*

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that "very remarkable things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic relations while still evading an actual act of war." (Tr. Marshall A. 45-46) With respect to other information of the Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and influenced his thinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that while it may have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise. (Tr., Marshall A. 46) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what has happened, \* \* \* the situation might well have been helped by translating that information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of his decision at the time, however, he stated:

"In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later Army Alert, (messages to Short from War Department and Navy Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great responsibility; and in addition to that you must remember that we were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could look at that without realizing that something very critical was in the wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way we were—the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii—without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.

"Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a certain period of time, it would be too late: we would have gained the necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for them to act.

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[351] "All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commercial shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet's resources in providing convoys. Everything was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how—I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous

communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don't know what the explanation of it is, and I myself have never discussed it." (Tr., Marshall A. 46-47)

As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 27) He also was under the belief in late November and early December of 1941 that Short had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance. In this regard, he testified:

"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel." (Tr., Marshall A. 27)

The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A. 26)

The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places on the Japanese front and that "it was by far the best prepared that we had." (Tr., Marshall A. 25) He stated:

"\* \* \* if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and matériel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible." (Tr., Marshall A. 23)

The Chief of Staff continued:

"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, \* \* \*" (Tr., Marshall A. 26)

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the over-all supervision which was required of him from a global perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal Department:

[352] "\* \* \* we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii." (Tr., Marshall A 13-14)

*General Marshall's 7 December Message:*

Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December of an almost immediate break with Japan, the Chief of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated such a break until about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr., Marshall A. 6) He then immediately conferred with appropriate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a message to be transmitted to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew that the time required for coding was "a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to the procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could be expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr., Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr., Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that moment. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of Staff as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply confirmed that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall A. 14)

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the nonoperation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu

it was given to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

[353] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because, in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) The Chief of Staff testified:

"\* \* \* I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, \* \* \*. And from our own experience, my own experience, even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. \* \* \* we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone." (Tr., Marshall A. 13-14)

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message for delivery to the Message Center:

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, \* \* \*. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a. m." (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80) (This would be 6:20 a. m. Honolulu time)

Colonel French testified that:

"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination." (Tr., French 196)

Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff is pertinent:

"General Russell. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders a message which would have told them of these recent developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly as to the substance of this message of December [354] 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines?

"General Marshall. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff was here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware of this and of the possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to answer, because you are inevitably involved in hindsight regarding a great catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way." (Tr., Marshall C. 211-212)

*Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:*

As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of which information he had an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to Short of 27 November, considered along with the other messages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military commander was required to take the information contained in this radio from his Chief of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further information or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in the position of carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a subordinate what the situation was for his guidance. The Board's conclusion reduces itself to a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length and in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that there was only a bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment.

So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's Conclusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately pictured

the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity that Short be on the alert against threats from within and from without. The most that can be said is that the War Department did not transmit to Short the Top Secret messages, but these were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the messages actually sent Short over a period of months, hereinbefore referred to. While the War Department was possessed of more information than Short received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the *qui vive*. That Hawaii had already been sufficiently alerted was [355] the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78; Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of General Miles (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253).

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772) The Navy messages of 24 and 27 November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36, D. 306; Short 358, 363) Captain Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed with General Short in person the message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059)

Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear instructions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momentarily expected.

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not alerted his command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a *non sequitur*. But, in addition, there was no testimony before the Board that General Marshall ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though "the presumption would be that I had seen it." (Tr., Marshall 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201) It is significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not initialed by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the corresponding radio from General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39) The reply itself was indicative that Short had taken precautions against sabotage and in stating "liaison with the Navy" was susceptible of the interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that distant reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply, was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." (Tr., Short 380) He also stated that this phrase indicated he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380) General Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan, \* \* \*". (Tr., Gerow 4289) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no preparations against an outside threat.

[356] In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate by a communication to the Chief of Staff.

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would be a most anomalous situation if a theater commander could be heard to say that because he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had replied with a fragmentary report that *ipso facto* he was relieved of his responsibilities and that these responsibilities were then fastened upon the Chief of Staff.

Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772), the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both those from within and those from without.

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in-Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Department, with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which occurred.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concerning the over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to the stated fundamental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in preparation for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid his responsibility in the event his organization is ineffective. There is a distinction, however, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the performance of duties by members of his staff.

[357] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt of Short's reply, is not justified.

As to Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan "though there was ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes entirely clear that General Marshall personally did not receive this information until late in the morning of 7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately but failed because of circumstances beyond his control.

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formulated over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander in accordance with the traditional American military policy. General Marshall had seen General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29)

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).

#### *Board's Conclusions as to General Gerow:*

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements.

"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to take corrective action.

"(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the services in the manner contemplated." (Rep. 290)

[358] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commander General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy beachhead to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of Staff during the time question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This Division of the General Staff was charged with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff.

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the situation with the Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under no circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in the messages jeopardize his defense. He also ordered to establish reconnaissance.

But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues that had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed a lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship movements. (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to Short.

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear and concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers to the radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In my opinion this is an erroneous characterization of the message. I fail to take into account the very essence of the situation which then presented itself. [359] The authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted at that moment with a most difficult and delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations which had been taking place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese emissaries had practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the Japanese might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month of delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day, 27 November 1941—the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United States urging him to postpone any action that might precipitate war as long as possible because we were not ready. Confronted with this situation, those in authority in the War Department, including the Secretary of War, participated in the preparation of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express as accurately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of the possibility of an attack at any moment and that nothing must be omitted which would jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that would precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into the language. There was no other course except to present this problem just

it was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate situation conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because it requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men supposedly qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning "This is a war warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent. (Tr., Gerow 4281-5282)

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short's reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer ground, General Gerow admitted that while it was physically impossible for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered the War Department gave Short adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by assuming that the reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant General of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow 4290-4291) This being so, it follows that he failed also to follow up on the demand in the radiogram of 27 November signed "Marshall", for a report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified:

"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through." (Tr., Gerow 4290)

[360] In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge of the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291)

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that would have made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans Division is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although its functions are not comparable to those of a commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with specific responsibilities.

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440) General Gerow assumed and had the right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile attack contained in the 27 November message, the two commanders would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., Gerow 4289) or at least such portions thereof as would assure adequate reconnaissance.

On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by G-2 is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified. (Rep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board's conclusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in failing to check on Short's reply to the November 27 message signed "Marshall." I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General Gerow in approving the 27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately and adequately picture the situation as it existed and gave definite instructions. I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two commanders would themselves put these plans into effect.

#### *Miscellaneous Statements of Board:*

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating my agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider such irrelevant matters in arriving at my conclusions.

#### [361] *Unexplored Leads:*

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.



I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

*Recommendations:*

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did, and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking Short's reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a) above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered the various alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper alert. The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into consideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other factors such as possible alarm of the civil population does not remove the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. Those mistakes simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert. The fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision to establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the concept of a neglect of duty.

[362] As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of being a terrible offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now of record, this question is answered by what has been said above. Short's failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment on his part.

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such reconnaissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I believe the truer picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly what was apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, that there was literally no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted messages were sent and that information of great military value continues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous witnesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is out of the question.

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his

various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 16, p. 21) There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand.

[363] As, on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by a trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a recurrent public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.

MYRON C. CRAMER,  
*Major General, The Judge Advocate General.*

EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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## EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

### CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 1

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

- a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of sheets 2 and 55, showing that on 7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 December", which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time.  
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise noted.
- b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941.
- c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 29 May 1941.
- d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japanese War Policy".
- e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is initialed by General Short.
- f. Memorandum re "Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August 1941.
- g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report of Sir George Paisn.
- h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C., dated 6 September 1941.
- i. Photostated copy of reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel in *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* dated 18 September 1941, obtained from Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.
- j. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 1941, initialed by General Short.
- k. Special Intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo, dated 17 October 1941.
- l. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of *Tairiku*, Japanese magazine, for May 1941.
- m. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 1941, re "Estimate of Japanese Situation".
- n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreign policy.
- o. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25 October 1941, initialed by General Short.
- p. Letter from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding memorandum containing information received from Orient.
- q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
- r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of certain information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable.
- s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Commander (I. C.), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from British.
- t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November 1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
- u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from Navy.
- v. Transcript of telephone conversation, 1 December 1941, obtained from Navy.

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- w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from Navy.
- x. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI.
- y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941.
- z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 29 November 1941.
- aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., 27 November 1941.
- bb. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 December 1941.
- cc. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.
- dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941.
- ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 7 December 1941.
- ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
- gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 December 1941, "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by Carrier".
- hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529.
- ii. Statement of Captain William B. Cobb, JAGD, 10 December 1941.
- jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
- kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 8 December 1941.
- ll. Cable from "Colton Acting" to C. G. Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.
- mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
- nn. Cable from General Short to Major General H. H. Arnold, War Department, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
- oo. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
- pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to "Radio—Merle Smith."
- qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941.
- rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
- ss. Paper relating to "WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and destruction of their code machine".
- tt. Reports by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, Special Inspector, Hqs. Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 9 July 1941, and related papers.

SECRET

278/242/10/des/13/j

Affixed to 2/1:

### *Caution on Handling*

1. This book will be handled by staff officers, the commanding officers concerned and higher officers.
2. For the benefit of persons directly responsible for communications, supply and related matters, these subjects have been treated.
3. As in the case of code books, care must be taken that the publication does not fall into enemy hands should the ship sink or be damaged.

5 Nov 41

Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet

Page 2/1: COMBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 1

Flagship NAGATO (\*1), SAEKI (\*2) WAN (TN Bay.)

5 Nov 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku (\*3)

Commander in Chief,

Combined Fleet

145 of 700 copies

## COMBINED FLEET ORDER

*Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS* will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume.

SECRET

278/242/mab

Page 2/120-124:

Editor's Note: Document pages 2/120-124 inclusive comprise the errata indicated throughout the text in translator's notes. Document pages 2/125-150 duplicate 2/84-94 (G, Supply) and are omitted. Document page 2/151 (Appended Table 5, Organization of Supply Forces of Combined Fleet) follows 2/94.

## COMBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 2

Page 2/152:

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN 7 Nov 41

7 Nov 41  
YAMAMOTO, Osoroku  
Commander in Chief,  
Combined Fleet

145 of 600 copies

## COMBINED FLEET ORDER

First preparations for war  
Y Day 8 December

## COMBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 7

Page 2/154 2/155:

Flagship NAGATO, off HASHIRA SHIMA (\*1)

22 Dec 41  
YAMAMOTO, Osoroku  
Commander in Chief,  
Combined Fleet

CONFIDENTIAL

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT SERVICE COMMAND,  
KAUAI DISTRICT,  
Lihue, T. H., 29 March 1941.

Subject: Japanese attitude on Kauai.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Enclosed is a copy of the English translation of a speech delivered by the Rev. Hiseki Miyasaki, Buddhist Priest of Lihue, Kauai during a send-off reception for selectees of the Lihue district on March 27, 1941.

2. The sentence inclosed in red brackets has been expurgated in press reports, since it was felt that reactionary Japanese groups would attack Mr. Miyasaki for such a statement.

3. The speech was given first in Japanese and then the English translation was read.

4. The words of Mr. Miyasaki express very well the attitude taken now by the majority of first and second generation Japanese on this Island.

5. It is becoming more and more apparent that as long as the local Japanese population is not antagonized by fools of other races, it will as a whole be loyal and peaceful.

6. The peace in the community and the loyalty of the Japanese are only endangered by persons like Mr. Cedric Baldwin, Manager of McBryde plantation—to mention only the worst offender—who delight in insulting the Japanese people without the slightest provocation.

1. Incl.: Copy of speech

EUGENE J. FITZGERALD,  
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,  
D. S. C.

10 JULY 1941.

G-2: ? 2 Exec.

Assistant G-2: ?.

Subject: Japanese War Policy.

File: To be filed in #2 safe and noted in "Current Estimate" Japan—in Record Room.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 MAY 1941.

Admiral C. C. BLOCH, U. S. N.,  
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In order that you may be acquainted with the steps taken by my command relative to the sabotage matter which you discussed with Colonel Throckmorton this morning I desire to inform you that during the holiday and week-end I have increased the guard over important installations, and have arranged for more detailed inspections of the guard during this period. Every attempt will be made not to bring this action into the limelight so that the community as a whole will not be aware of the increased surveillance.

I believe this will be sufficient to handle the situation as far as the Army is concerned.

With kindest personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B & LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements herein will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

AG 091/2

## STATEMENT A.—World tank-ship fleet, Dec. 31, 1945, versus Sept. 1, 1930

| No. of Ind.<br>From and Date | To       | Subject: W. D. Radio #924, 8 July 41<br>"Japanese War Policy"                                                  | 1989                                |
|------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1st Ind. AG 9 July 41...     | C/S..... | 1 Incl. File—Dept. Comdr. informed.<br>Paraphrased copy furnished Dist.<br>Intell. B. 14 N.D. Mura 10 July 41. | 1989 R. H. D. 9 July<br>1941. A. G. |

## SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

WASHINGTON DC 152A July 8 1941

Secret

94 WAR BC 207 WD

CG Hawn Dept Fort Shafter TH:

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future

policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups Period. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia Period Opinion is that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out Period Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated Period They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August Period Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

ADAMS.  
334P/720P/8

Received as a secret communication.  
(Strike out two)  
Decoded by:

CAPT C J HARRISON SC  
818A JULY 9, 1941

# HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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| No. of Ind. From and Date         | To       | Subject: Traffic on Burma Road                                                                |                   |
|-----------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1st Ind. Contact Office, 7-18-41. | G-2..... | To note and return. Subject matter will be included in next foreign intelligence report.      | By G. W. B.       |
| 2nd G-2, 7-18-41.....             | CS.....  | Please note. The increase in traffic and the high freight rates are of considerable interest. | Mum.              |
| 3rd Ind. C/S, 7-21-41....         | G-2..... | Noted. Incls; n/c. Contact office.....                                                        | W. D. T.<br>H. E. |

PHILIP HAYES,  
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

1740 FORT STREET, VICTORIA, B. C.

DEAR MR. ANDREW: Herewith a few notes on the arrival of Burma Road trucks. The salt trucks arriving at Kunming originate in China a short distance down the Burma Road, but the figures for the trucks exclusive of salt represent imports from Burma & the steady increase in the average daily arrivals is interesting. Tonnage arriving at Chunking is negligible.

I also enclose a few figures on freight rates which I hope you will be able to follow.

Yours sincerely,

J. K. GORESFIELD.



## BUREAU ROAD TAXES

1) *Central Government Yunnan highways tax (payable each trip):*

N\$0.12 per ton/km. based on 960 kms. Wanting/Kunming i. e.:

|    |                    |           |        |        |
|----|--------------------|-----------|--------|--------|
| 1  | ton truck outwards | N\$115.20 | return | 230.40 |
| 1½ | " " "              | 172.80    | "      | 345.60 |
| 2  | " " "              | 230.40    | "      | 460.80 |
| 2½ | " " "              | 288.00    | "      | 576.00 |
| 3  | " " "              | 345.60    | "      | 691.00 |

2) *Yunnan Provincial Government Highways tax:*

N\$0.10 per ton/km based on 975 kms. Wanting/Kunming

|              |          |           |        |        |
|--------------|----------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Up to 2 tons | Outwards | N\$195.00 | return | 390.00 |
| 2½ to 3      | "        | 292.50    | "      | 585.00 |
| 3½ to 4      | "        | 390.00    | "      | 780.00 |

(N. B. Fractions of a ton are regarded as 1 ton)

3) *C. M. Customs duty—5% ad valorem—plus 5% Consular fee*4) *Number plates and seasonal tax (quarterly):*

2 Plates N\$50.00 and N\$28.00 per quarter

5) *Yunnan consumption tax (payable once only):*

N\$802.50 per truck

1 &amp; 2 for Shippers account—if trucks overloaded weight of cargo is used as basis for calculating tax.

*Weight rates Lashio/Wanting/Kunming/Chungking*

|                         | Distance       | Rate                                      | Approx. exchange | US\$ per ton |
|-------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------|--------------|
| Lashio/Wanting.....     | 119 miles..... | \$39 per ton, \$2 fee to Truck Control... | 334              | 12.28        |
| Wanting/Kunming.....    | 959 Km.....    | NC\$2.92 per ton/Km.....                  | 25               | 112.61       |
| Kunming/Chungking.....  | 1150 Km.....   | NC\$2.42 per ton/Km.....                  | 25               | 111.32       |
| Chungking/Kweiyang..... | 488 Km.....    | NC\$2.06 per ton/Km.....                  | 25               | 40.21        |
| Kweiyang/Kunming.....   | 662 Km.....    | NC\$0.87 per ton/Km.....                  | 25               | 23.04        |

Note: 1) Rate Wanting/Kunming recently increased from NC\$2.12 to NC\$2.92

2) Rate Kunming/Chungking recently increased from NC\$2.12 to NC\$2.42

3) Where no return cargo Kunming/Wanting Government rate for "empty despatch" allowance NC\$1.62 per ton/Km @ Exchange 25=US\$62.14 per ton.

4) Above rates include Highway Taxes shown on separate list.

5) No recent information regarding rates from Chungking available and rates vary with different types of cargo.

6) Rates shown from Lashio onwards are now paid for 1st class cargo e. g., gasoline.

HONG KONG, 19th June 1941.

*Burma Road*

| Period                | Truck arrivals at Kunming |                 |                    |                |                 |                    | Arrivals at Chungking |                 |                    |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
|                       | Including salt            |                 |                    | Excluding salt |                 |                    | No. of trucks         |                 |                    |
|                       | No. of trucks             |                 | Total tons carried | No. of trucks  |                 | Total tons carried | Total                 |                 | Total tons carried |
|                       | Total                     | Average per day |                    | Total          | Average per day |                    | Total                 | Average per day |                    |
| 9/10/40-17/11/40..... | 3360                      | 112             | 9756               | 1740           | 58              | 5220               | 456                   | 15              | 1368               |
| 8/11/40-17/12/40..... | 3112                      | 104             | 9529               | 1720           | 57              | 5677               | 464                   | 15              | 1392               |
| 8/12/40-17/1/41.....  | 3815                      | 123             | 11762              | 2448           | 79              | 7849               | 439                   | 14              | 1317               |
| 8/1/41-17/2/41.....   | 4226                      | 136             | 12843              | 2914           | 94              | 9100               | 459                   | 15              | 1377               |
| 8/2/41-17/3/41.....   | 3958                      | 141             | 12130              | 2855           | 102             | 8981               | 438                   | 16              | 1314               |
| 8/3/41-17/4/41.....   | 5802                      | 187             | 18189              | 4519           | 146             | 14195              | 505                   | 16              | 1515               |
| 8/4/41-17/5/41.....   | 5858                      | 195             | 18172              | 4794           | 160             | 15065              | 421                   | 14              | 1263               |
| 8/5/41-12/6/41.....   | 5074                      | 195             | 15604              | 4207           | 162             | 13071              |                       |                 |                    |
| 8/5/41-7/6/41.....    |                           |                 |                    |                |                 |                    | 266                   | 13              | 798                |
| Total.....            | 35205                     | 148             | 107985             | 25197          | 106             | 79158              | 3448                  | 15              | 10344              |

## NUMBER OF TRUCKS PASSING FRONTIER AT WANTING .

|               | To China | From China |
|---------------|----------|------------|
| December..... | 4203     | 3619       |
| January.....  | 5090     | 4629       |
| February..... | 5052     | 5009       |
| March.....    | 6282     | 6207       |
| April.....    | 6194     | 5658       |

Hongkong, 19th June, 1941.

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,  
FEDERAL BUILDING,  
Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941.

**Memorandum : Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.**

The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2:00 P. M., and docked at Pier #8 at 3:30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles at 9:00 A. M., 1 August 1941.

Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route were as follows: From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them; they were also prevented by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23 July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the 180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog banks; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu; then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours. In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued on into this port.

It is interesting to note that the ship began its actions before the action was taken freezing credits.

Reliable business men report that Japan is very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other items reported to be short are high stable cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anesthetics.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but with a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were [sic]

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201 (Paisn, George)

CI  
WAH

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
Washington, D. C., August 28, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosures:

201—Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in Hawaii: dtd 8/3/41.

CONFIDENTIAL

MID 201 (Paisn, George)  
Strictly private and  
confidential.

THE BOREAS,  
BLUE RIDGE,  
New York State.

Aug 3 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ GEORGE PAISN.

The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

8/21/41.

Copies to:

G-3

Haw.

VSR/lge

CONFIDENTIAL

EHG/td

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA,  
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
Governors Island, New York, November 28, 1941.

Subject: George Paish (Paisn).

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941, there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.

2. This is transmitted for your information and records.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

F. J. Pearson,  
F. J. PEARSON,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
Executive Officer, G-2.

1 Incl.—(dupl.)  
cpy FBI rept.

CONFIDENTIAL

## COPY OF FBI REPORT

An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact Mr. PAISN at the address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD G. PAISH, that his true name is SIR GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was interviewed, at which time he furnished the following information:

SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay, he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire Goddess" danced and otherwise entertained the gathering.

SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and during the course of the evening he turned the trend of conversation to any spirit of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this that the possibility exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a Japanese promise of "liberation".

SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened due to the astute diplomacy of the United States State Department.

SIR GEORGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's Unlimited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining his publications and ability as a lecturer.

It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that

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he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference to pre-World War associations, characters and historical events.

I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 30 September 1941.

In reply refer to:

336.8—(Japanese).

Subject: Letter from George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, New York.

1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your identification, with the request that Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess concerning the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the Japanese Government, and the native Hawaiians.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,  
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

M. I. D.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, CONTACT OFFICE,  
215 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,  
Honolulu, T. H., 30 September 1941.

Subject: Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

Summary of Information:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health.

Very sincerely yours,  
The Honorable F. D. ROOSEVELT.

/s/ GEORGE PAISN.

Evaluation  
- of source - of information  
X Undetermined X

## CONFIDENTIAL

WCG/cjo

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA,  
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
Governors Island, New York, October 15, 1941.

Subject: Letter From George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

1. Reference is made to your communication of 30th, September, with above subject title.

2. Before this office can comply with request contained therein to interview the subject, it is requested that this office be supply with Mr. PAISN'S address, inasmuch as there is nothing contained in your communication which would indicate that he is a resident of this Corps Area.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

F. J. PEARSON,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
Executive Officer, G-2.

1st Ind.

336.8(ACO).

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, CONTACT OFFICER,  
214 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,  
Honolulu, T. H., 5 November 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs. 2d Corps Area, Governors Island, N. Y.

1. Mr. Paisn's address as shown on his letter to the President was "The Boreas, Blue Ridge, New York State". This address was inadvertently omitted in S/I of 30 September 1941.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,  
Contact Officer.

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 6 September 1941.

In reply refer to:

350.05 (G-2).

Subject: Summaries of Information.

To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Kendall J. Fielder,  
KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,  
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

(Item I of Exhibit 1 being pages 28E and 29E is a photostatic copy of a portion of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* dated 18 September 1941, relating to reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel. This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 7 and 8, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen Investigation.)

## CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.  
Army Contact Office  
Honolulu, T.H.

Date: 17 October 1941.—1200

## G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION

*1. Summary of Situation*

a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiation between America and Japan, and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist elements in Japan as a result of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of Japan by the ABCD group.

8. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is available as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the attitude of the cabinet as a whole will be.

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

*2. Conclusions*

According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary reasons for such a move or moves are believed to be as follows:

*d. Capabilities*

1. Desperate economic conditions internally—making it perhaps preferable to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution.

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the Axis—for the time being.

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance—that is, when the strength of the Axis is at it maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized.

4. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block.

*b. Probable Moves.*—The most likely moves which Japan may make in the near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows:

1. Attack Russia from the east.

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way of military, naval, and air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation.

3. Attack British possessions in the Far East.

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.

5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at whichever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economic advantages.

*c. Reasons Justifying These Moves.*—The basis for each of the above possible moves are considered to be as follows:

1. *Attack on Russia.*—(a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power.

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control eastward to the Pacific).

(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known to be in Siberia.

(d) To secure effective control over, or perhaps stamp out, communism in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine.

(e) A possibility that an attack on Russia at this time can be undertaken with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States; and that even the British might not resort to active military action in support of Russia in the Pacific, due to the fact that both the Americans and British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither power has any genuine desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again plague the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism.

(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coordination and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against other Pacific powers.

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the south.

2. *Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand.*—Pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions of military, naval, or air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia, in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the north is being achieved; and to afford her more and better strategic bases from which she can operate against Chungking's lines of communication, and/or American and British lines of communications in case it becomes necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also, to secure additional raw materials, food, etc.

3. *Attack on British Possessions in the Far East.*—Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler—it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possession, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

4. *Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.*—While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

### 3. In Conclusion

Barring unforeseen and untoward incidents, which might set off a conflict in any quarter and invite measures and countermeasures never contemplated, it is believed that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take and the probable sequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will be, as generally predicted, "strongly military" and will support the present demands of the "rightists" elements which were largely responsible for the fall of the Third Konoye cabinet.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.  
Contact Officer.

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## CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.  
 Army Contact Office  
 Honolulu, T. H.  
 Date: 17 October 1941.

## SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Subjects: New Japanese Premier  
 Hldeki or Eiki Tojo

Lieutenant General; Director General of Military Aviation. Born December 1884, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1915; instructor Military Staff College, 1922; Chief of Mobilization Section; Commander Infantry 1st Regiment; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer; Commander Infantry Brigade, 1934-35; Commander Gendarmerie Headquarters and Police Affairs Department of Kwantung Army, 1937; War Vice-Minister, 1938-December 1938; Minister of War since December 1938.

Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.

An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Kasuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conservative among the members of the army clique".

Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article states that he is a conservative.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
 Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
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## JAPANESE POLICY FOR EAST ASIA

An enlightening statement of Japanese policy is contained in an article entitled "The present stage of our great continental policy," written by Takehiko Okuma, an instructor in Keijo Imperial University and published in Tairiku ("The Continent") Magazine for May, 1941. A summary of the English translation of this article is as follows:

1. The great continental policy of Japan originated with the Korean problem of 1898. It has been consistent from beginning to end and has been guided by the spirit of universal concord. But it is based on the defensive point of view of without any menace from the outside to our national defense.

The continental debouchment of Japan's economic power was first started in Korea. Then it was extended into China. But it was after the Russo-German war that it made its great progress and came to hold an important position in our great continental policy. It has taken a natural course, differing essentially from the aggressions of the Western European countries.

It was necessary for Japan to conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy, countries which are facing similar critical situations, due to the political upheavals in the world, and both of whom possess a common world view.

Our great continental policy in the present stage is also our world policy and is based on the world view harbored by us. For not only does it aim at the expansion and development of our national power, but also signifies our preparation for a world administration.

2. Japan's policy aims at the creation of a new world order and the establishment of a greater East Asia mutual prosperity sphere. It has entered a new stage through the conclusion of the tripartite alliance. These three nations, which occupied opposite seats at the Paris Peace conference, have come to harbor

same historical mission, the same economic circumstances, and the same political aim. They have banded together against the serious opposition of the nations advocating the maintenance of the *status quo*. The creation of new orders in Europe and Asia are not only their war aims, but also the guiding principle of the creation of a new world.

The principle acting as the support for the creation of a new world order has been provided by the words, "to regard the acquisition of appropriate territories by each of the nations as the *sine qua non* (necessity) for lasting peace." This principle is the correct basis for world partition, rather than the recognition of possession as legal from the fact that a nation got there first. The principle advocates the acquisition of appropriate territories by every nation of the world to enable it to exist on earth and not be shut off from space. It sets forth an idea of systematized order in place of the anarchical world order and world partition of today.

Another fundamental support for the creation of a new world order is the mutual recognition of the right of leadership for nations. Leadership as an ideology of order has definitely taken the place of the old idea of balance of power. In Europe, Germany and Italy are carrying on a war to wipe away the influence of Great Britain and put an end to her traditional policy of balance of power. Japan, who is the stabilizing power in East Asia, is showing a resolute determination and power to wipe away America's interference in the changing of the political situation. Their aims are the same.

3. The great continental policy and the Pacific policy are inseparable. It was hoped that America would understand this; but America gradually took over the receding British interests, and after the conclusion of the Tripartite alliance, America denounced the Axis as aggressors and strengthened her aid to Britain. She has been rushing headlong toward war. An agreement has been concluded between Great Britain and America for America to oppose Japan's navy, with quotations from Prof. Fieldhouse of Canada and Prof. Whitney Griswold to prove it. This has brought Japan's sea supremacy to the front. Japan's great continental policy aims to wipe away the intervention of third powers aiming to encircle Japan, dominate the China Seas, and also to terminate the clashes between the races of East Asia and their conquest by Europeans.

4. The Sipo-Japanese treaty of Oct. 30, 1940, concluded at Nanking, for the readjustment of relations, failed to bring about complete peace despite the efforts of Wang Ching-Wei. But, as the manifestation of the pro-Japanese centralized government's collaboration toward the establishment of a new order in China, it unfolded a new phase in East Asia. The treaty does not discriminate between the winner and the loser and is based upon equality between Japan and China. It has furthered the formation of the East Asia bloc and strengthened the axis connecting Japan, Manchukuo and China, expanding their defense industries, building up their economy by acquiring and developing natural resources, and formed a union between Japan and China just short of military alliance. During the past half year the Chinese government has made progress by solving her financial problems, monetary system, peace and order problem, cultural problem (establishment of Nanking Central University), and is making great strides toward the resurrection of a new China. There are many obstacles in the path of the Chinese government: to overcome the feeling of dependence upon Britain and America. But the penetration of the great Asiatic principle, proclaimed by Wang Ching-Wei, and the withdrawal of British and American influences, which actually can be seen, will make the people of China realize that they are the descendants of a great and free people.

Chungking has been continuing her resistance, hoping for America's support. But President Roosevelt's special envoy, Carey, must have detected that conditions in Chungking are very different from propaganda sent to America. Her economic power is exhausted, transportation routes are deficient, is in conflict with Chinese Red Army, and estranged from her emigrants abroad. She is being made to dance to the tune of the dying embers of the mistaken nationalism of the intellectual class and America's political expediency of regarding her as a stone of the anti-Japanese cordon.

5. In August of last autumn, the landing of our troops in French Indo-China wrote a new page in the annals of the history of Asia. Loss of French influence led to demands by Thailand for the return of Laos and Cambodia territory. Behind the scene of Thailand and French Indo-China were Britain and America, with threats and warnings, siding with French Indo-China. Their attempts at reconciliation were rejected and America stopped the shipment of airplanes ordered by Thailand. A friendly neutrality agreement was signed between Japan and

Thailand, since which relations have drawn closer, with the opening up of an airway, trade agreements, and use of Japanese technicians. Our country, which is determined to maintain the peace and tranquility of the greater East Asia sphere at all cost, proposed to arbitrate and mediate the clash between Thailand and French Indo-China, and when this was accepted, held the peace conference at Tokyo. After about a month, this resulted in the acceptance of an impartial peace on March 11. This had profound significance, strengthening the tie among the three nations and making Japan's position of leadership in greater East Asia firmer and unshakable. Moreover, it enhanced the racial consciousness of the oppressed races of Southern Asia and installed in them hope. Thailand was able to push aside Britain's influence. Thailand is the spear to stab at Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, which are embraced within Japan's greater East Asia policy, and to the north of Thailand lies Burma, which is the gateway of India, while to the east lies Indo-China, which is an undeveloped treasurehouse and embraces Camranh Bay. All of the races of southern Asia have been robbed of their real eyes by the propaganda of Britain and America. But since they commonly entertain a righteous indignation against the conquerors and oppressors, it is expected that a time will come when they eventually will revolt.

6. The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement and mediation of the Thailand-French Indo-China border clash, which occurred during the past half year, after the conclusion of the tripartite agreement, have made a great stride toward the creation of a new world order. Our relations with the Dutch East Indies are still being negotiated. Our country has decided to break with the status quo of Britain and America and fight resolutely against their antagonistic interference. The most urgent matter for us is to pay strictest attention to changing phases of the International situation and not take our eyes away from the political, economic, and military attacks against the Axis nations. America's anti-Japanese policy is of an unprecedented positive nature, and is changing from economic oppression to military coercion. Our continental policy should be made the core of our national defense. So long as the execution of our peaceful southward expansion is not threatened, our country will leave their military bases (such as Singapore) alone. More important than anything else is making the western Pacific and the South China sea "our waters", impregnable to the enemies. We should be aware of the fact that not only does the supremacy of the seas depend upon the actual strength of our fleet, but upon the number of naval bases and their position, our merchant fleet, our production power, and our strategic raw materials. Since that which would likely happen in the event of an emergency is protracted blockade warfare, it is an urgent matter to include the south in the generalized economy plan of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. The first work should be to awaken within the races of East Asia, who are suffering from the exploitation and oppression of the American and Englishman, their racial consciousness as Asiatics and encourage them to combine and unite.

The consummation of the Sino-Japanese treaty is to Wang Ching-wei like the discovery of a lighthouse. He is advancing along these brilliant rays toward lasting peace. But there are several hundred million people of Asia still wandering about in darkness. But their eyes are fixed on our moves to bring about the creation of a new order in East Asia, even through the smoke screen spread by the Englishman and the American. If a light to which they can really turn is not hung out today, our mission of resurrection of East Asia will become exceedingly difficult. Foreign Minister Komura's diplomatic plan embraced the resurrection of the races of East Asia. I think the arousing into action of a leader burning with the spirit of an adventurer from the races under bonds is not far away, and I cannot help but look forward to the glorious day of welcoming him.

SECRET

#### HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

##### INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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| No. of Ind. From and Date    | To       | Subject: WD Radio, 20 October 1941, "Estimate of Japanese Situation". |          |
|------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1st Ind. AG 20 Oct 41.....   | C/S..... | 1 Incl.....                                                           | R. H. D. |
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## SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

8 WVY BC 47 WD WASHIN DC 1234P OCT 20 1941

20th Following War Dept estimate of Japanese situation for your information stop tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent

ADAMS.

1937A

Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: LT G E HAVEN 1150A OCT 20 1941

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 20th."

To: Contact office noted by General Short & Col Phillips, new Acting C of S.

C/S HHD

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.

Army Contact Office,

Honolulu, T. H.

Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941.

## G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION

1. *Summary of Situation.* Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the International (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no fundamental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the time mentioned; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with contemporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are known to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation. However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this time:

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightist" elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and was almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression"; definitely places Japan in a hostile position to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America to a state of constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

2. *Conclusions.* No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct.

However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

b. The decision of Premier Tojo to continue his predecessor's order to permit Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid American ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivostok as a port of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.

f. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new cabinet.

3. *Justifications for conclusions.* The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as conclusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:

a. *New Cabinet.* Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only one considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus to hold off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

b. *Japanese vessels to America.* The Japanese government's decision to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals from America and American territories.

c. *Rapprochement Negotiations.* Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely against the enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously considered.

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*f. Nomura's report to New Cabinet.* This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

*Remarks.* Everyone is interested in the answer to the question, When will Japan move?—a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worthy of mentioning:

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month are:

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(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new cabinet.

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.

(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

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George W. Bicknell,  
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*Lt. Col., G. S. C.,*  
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Subject G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation

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C/I DBL

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File C/S &amp; G-3 Dept. direct.

Remarks Nothing re Hawaii.

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Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.,

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Honolulu, T. H.

Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941

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**Distribution:**

C/S H. H. D.  
G-2 H. H. D.  
G-3 H. H. D.  
G-2 Schofield Barracks  
G-2 24th Div.  
G-2 25th Div.  
F. B. I. (2)  
O. N. I. (2)  
Capt. Bryan, Trans. Sect.

George W. Bicknell  
GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
LT. COL., G. S. C.,  
ASST. A. C. OF S., G-2,  
Contact Office

MID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941

Subject: Letter of transmittal.  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1 Enclosures:  
336. 1903-41)—MID Summ. of info. re Information received from Orient: dtd. FMH

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT  
M. I. D.

NOVEMBER 3, 1941

Subject: Information Received from the Orient.

**Summary of Information:**

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, is considered reliable:

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) for complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific.

All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Distribution:

All Corps Areas  
All Departments  
Alaska

FBI

ONI

STATE

File

Source: Dr. Cho

Date of original paper 10/28/41

p. m. s.

I. B. Cognizant

Evaluation—

of source: X Reliable

of information: Credible X

URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 1941

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

cc. Col. Bicknell

Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

TOP SECRET ULTRA

From London, 31st August 1945

ULTRA

GOR 682 from GOCs 11279

IMPORTANT

Following from C. S. S. for Jones.

A. Colonel Wilkinson who was stationed at Manila and is now with 48000 and temporarily in U. K., was recently approached by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen, of Judge Advocate General's Department U. S. Army, in connection with investigation of General Short and Admiral Kimmel for Pearl Harbour disaster. He carried credentials from Secretary of War.

B. He brought copies of 2 telegrams from Manila to Honolulu, of November 26th and December 2nd, which were as follows:

1. "November 26th, 1941. Most Immediate. Secret Source (usually reliable) reports:

(a) Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on December 1st without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

(b) Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area valuation for above is number 3 repeat 3 (i. e., only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy). American military and naval intelligence Manila informed."

2. "December 3rd, 1941. Most Immediate.

(a) We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

(I) Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.

(II) Arrival since November 10th of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters medium bombers tanks and guns (75 mm).

(b) Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed to Washington November 21st by American Military Intelligence here.

(c) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and United States. Japan does not repeat not intend attack Russia at present but will act in south. You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

C. Colonel C. anxious to know basic source of para. C. of telegram of December 2nd, and in particular, whether this was in "special" category. In point of fact, *para C. was based on a B. J. Wilkinson* was unaware of source and passed information to Honolulu as he appreciated that I possessed no direct communications.

D. As far as can be judged, the earlier information was based on agent's reports, but Clausen only pressing for origin of para C.

E. You should consult with G-2, as security Ultra at stake if this evidence made public.

Wt 55959/7940 30m 3/45 Wa & Co 51/3

REFERENCE SHEET

Personal  
Admiralty  
TOP SECRET

From: Commander (I. C.), Admiralty, Dated: 16th July, 1945.  
S. W. I. To: Captain Hastings.

A/2277

Herewith copies of both messages referred to on the telephone this morning, Monday.

Commander (I. C.)

Secret

MESSAGE

IN

From: C. O. I. S. Singapore.

Date 8.12.41.  
Received: 0113

Naval Cypher (D) by W/T -

Addressed Admiralty (for D. of N. I.) Navy Board Melbourne. Navy Board Wellington, S. O. (I) Hong Kong. N. S. H. Q. Ottawa.

AIDA0

Information received at 2010Z 7th by Hong Kong that severence of Japanese relations ? admitted imminent.

2312Z/7

D. N. I. (4)  
O. I. C. (3)  
D. S. D. 9  
File X

Most Secret

MESSAGE

IN

From: C. O. I. S. Singapore

1746Z/7th December.  
Date 7.12.41.  
Recd. 2112

Naval Cypher O. T. T. by W/T

Addressed Admiralty (D. N. I.)

Immediate

Personal from Consular Special Intelligence dated 7th December. Tokyo inform all Consulates that relations between Japan and Great Britain and United

States are critical. Comment. Message from codeword from table for warning telegram.

1746Z/7

Advance copy sent O. I. C.

D. N. I. (4) Personal  
O. I. C. (3) "  
D. S. D. 9 "

COPY OF CABLE RECEIVED NOV. 27, 1941

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 percent probable accuracy).

American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila, informed.

Copies to: Mr. Shivers  
Capt. Mayfield  
Col. Bicknell.

SECRET

6-1

SATURDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1941

2325 1 /To KIMURA at P. Hotel, on private line:/ K. and girl. /reception poor/ They are apparently very good friends. Their conversation is about the dispatch of ships to the U. S. K says that X has received a cable re these ships. The Sumitomo Bank and certain other firms will send staff members back. Perhaps TAKAGISHI will go, too. K. goes on to say in English that it may happen "at any moment". /She says goodbye and hangs up. He waits quite some time before hanging up. It is apparent that K. is drunk and not in full possession of whatever faculties he possesses. There was no lovey-dovey talk, however, as in the case of TAKAGISHI. K. is convinced that he may be recalled at any moment and is very sad about it./

END

SECRET

1-540

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30

No activity

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

1000 o to RCA, for messenger

1045 o to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. \$45.82. They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation but SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation is. (Doubt if S does either!)

1115 1 Inc. to XX. NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi dispatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent. First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not had any information from Tokyo to prepare for possible closing (he says). He saw "a few lines" in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self.

1150 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday. This morning /it was set ?/ at 9:30—no 10. At X? Yes. /This conversation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./

206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling.  
 1326 o YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of  
 office. /Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front  
 1330 o for NAKASHIMA. Date with her.  
 1352 o to a girl. NI  
 1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out. When back? 3 or 4. Well then p  
 /have him call me? First part was missing/.

—END—

SECRET

NYK-38

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941

0830 ? Discussion of the difficult situation resulting from the suspension  
 trade?/ Seems to shift to boats or planes. One says something a  
 "doing it on the 14th" and the other says the Matson sailings of the  
 and the 19th are out. Also the airways present a financial problem.  
 next Matson sailing after is in January. There are no \$110 rooms. I  
 more talk, most of which I can't get, but I think they are talking s  
 what to do with special reference to getting away. Part with the a  
 nition by one "not to talk too much about war."  
 0950 i His girl to YOSHIOKA. Stolen sweets are the best, but the boss  
 back in the midst!  
 1052 i YOSHI. Gives girl number 98471 and name Shizuto NISHI /Mrs. N  
 husband).  
 1119 i YOSHI from pal /to play something or do something/ "Not too  
 Tomorrow? OK/  
 1155 o to girl. This is NYK. Can you come to the office.  
 1158 o ordering oyako dombun and other food.  
 1435 o to FUKUDA from YOSHIOKA. Not in /He was!/  
 1436 i to YOSHIOKA from FUKUDA about insurance. Personal.  
 1457 i Mr. Lee calling for Mr. Nishi.

At 4 p.m. Honolulu time in the 1941st year of Our Lord, December  
 inst. I bade my adieu to you my friend of 22 months standing. Da  
 I won't miss you!!

Requiescat in Peace.

Y-1 J-1

20 APR

FBI files

65-414 phone intercepts 19 Aug-2 Dec. 41.  
 65-414 " " 18 Aug-1 May 41.  
 65-414 " " 30 Apr 41-2 Dec 40.

2-291—

Monday, November 17, 1941

0945 i KAWAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse  
 actions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K./ K. says /I th  
 that previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas pr  
 ganda. But this time no such statements have come in. No, none h  
 Not in Japanese either.  
 1117 i FPM. Fragment  
 1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. \$10,000, \$12,000 /the amount  
 have on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for  
 figure the taxes, the bond, and all.  
 1317 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and  
 brief.

—END—

NYK-32

Monday, November 24, 1941

0847 o YOSHIOKA for ? NYK has received a confidential dispatch. Dictates. Translation of the dispatch was made with further details eked out from the NJ for 11-24-41 as follows.

As soon as preparations are completed, the government has decided to dispatch the Tatsuta Maru to Los Angeles, Balboa and the southern regions, the exact time of departure and other details to be announced later, but the Jiji story says she will sail from Yokohama by the end of the month. The Jiji story mentions the 380 Japanese of Panama who are the "victims" of the shut out policy of the government. Anyway, it is clear that a boat will be sent.

0902 o To RCA from YOSHIOKA—NYK. Mrs. NISHI has left, so if there is any wire after hours, please call Mr. T. YOSHIOKA, 75055. If not home, call T. TAKEI, Makiki Hotel 67692 (private line).

0908 o To Commercial Pacific Cable Co. from YOSHIOKA explaining same thing as above.

0933 o YOSHIOKA to girl in Togawa's office. Mostly friendly chatter, but he tells her that a boat is going to L. A. and Balboa. She says she cannot talk too much /probably the boss is around!/ What's he going to do? Oh he'll work around. Y. thinks things are going to be all right now since the Tatsuta is coming.

END

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

P1 WAR PRTY WASHN DC 611PM NOV 27 1941

CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

472 27th Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL.

116P/27

Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock, SC, 222P Nov 27, 1941.

Received as Secret communication.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 472 27TH."

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 November 1941

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

Thomas H. Green,  
THOMAS H. GREEN,  
Lt. Col., J. A. G. D.,  
Department Judge Advocate

Sent as Radiogram No. 986—29th.

Approved for Transmission:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON D C

Re your secret radio four eight two AG 383.4/13 twenty eighth comm. precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paragraph three n. thirty dash forty-five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June Nineteen teen Forty One requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad power vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June Two confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordinance which limits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such necessary in the interest of national defense stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been maintained on all pertinent matters.

SH

ENC SEC BY  
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC  
2:45P 29 NOV 41

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 27 November 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
Colonel G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

Sent as Radiogram, No. 950—27th.

CHIEF OF STAFF  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON DC

Reurad four seven two to C/S 27 Nov 41 twentyseventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage Period Liaison with Navy

SHORT.

ENC SEC BY  
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC  
5:40P 27 NOV 41

Secret Ronting 4 December 1941.

#1033-4th

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in Agwar four eight four dash twenty eighth colon instructions contained in subject radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received comma and continues to receive detailed and comprehensive attention as result of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July forty one Stop Para

Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram substantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of stations and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December stop Increase in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress Stop This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para

Secrecy discipline being given all emphases practicable through official and quasi official agencies Stop Work has actually begun on essential protective fencing and flood lighting projects Stop Para

With reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possible in form of development and expansion of foreword to soldier's handbook comma FM twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citizen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government comma structure of Government comma place of military establishment in the structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to Democratic form Stop Signed Martin End

SHORT.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P

CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities this communication

MARSHAL

Decoded by : Lt J H Babcock, 251P, Dec. 7, 1941.

Received as a secret communication.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th."

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 7 December 1941

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the code or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

C. A. POWELL,  
Lt. Col.,  
Dept. Sig. O

Sent as Radiogram No. 1057—7th.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON D C

Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop Extensive damage to at least three hangars Wheeler Field three hangars Hickam Field and to planes caught on ground Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over one hour Unconfirmed report that three ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged Marine airfield EWA also badly damaged Stop More details later. End  
SHOR

ENC SECRET URGENT BY  
LT G LENNOX SC  
950A 7 DEC 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 7 December 1941

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the code or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

EARNEST MOORE,  
Major, A. C.,  
Actng., Chief of Staff

Sent as Radiogram No. 1068—7th.

CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON DC

Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor attacked simultaneously by Japanese dive bombers for one hour beginning eight o'clock seventh December damage severe Stop Have left seven repeat seven B dash seventeen comma six repeat six B dash eighteen comma eight repeat eight A dash twenty comma forty repeat forty pursuit Stop Main part airport destroyed but limited repair and supply facilities remaining Stop Runways Hickam not damaged Stop Request possible reinforcement heavy bombardment fully equipped Stop Planes to arrive here during hours of darkness Stop Additional ground personnel will be needed as large part of Air Corps troops are being used in close in defense against sabotage guards Stop Additional fighters should be immediately patched by carrier together with such dive bombers as can be made available Stop Spare parts should be furnished for all types as there are no stock on hand Stop Signed Martin.

SHOR

ENC SEC BY  
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC  
6:50P 7 DEC 41

## SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

P 10 WAR HS 70 WD PRIORITY WASHINGTON DC 110p SEC 8 1941.  
 COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FT SHAFTER T H  
 543 8th TO SHORT FROM ARNOLD ALL REPORTS SHOW THAT IN  
 JAPANESE ATTACKS NUMBERS OF OUR PLANES HAVE BEEN DE-  
 STROYED ON THE GROUND STOP TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS AT  
 ONCE TO AVOID SUCH LOSSES IN YOUR AREA INCLUDING PROMPT  
 TAKEOFF ON WARNING COMMA DISPERSION TO MAXIMUM POSSIBLE  
 EXTENT COMMA AND CONSTRUCTION OF PARAPETS

ADAMS.  
 930P/8/3

[Written:] Ans to the radio delivered to M/C CP 11:55 am Dec 10th. for  
 dispatch.

Rie

Decoded by: LT. G. E. Haven, 1005P Dec 8 1941.

Received as a secret communication.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 543 8th"

## SECRET

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. From<br>and Date                       | To                    | Subject: WD Radio #541, 8 Dec 41<br>"Ground Personnel needed & re<br>impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft<br>by Carrier" |                                              |
|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| 1st Ind.: AG, 9 Dec 41                             | C/S.....              | Radio referred to attached. 2 Incl.:<br>WD Radio #541-8, HHD Radio<br>#1068-7.                                              | 4773, R. H. D. R. H. D.<br>6 Dec 1941. A. G. |
| 2d Ind.:<br>C/S, 12/9/41.....<br>A/O, 12/9/41..... | Air O.....<br>CS..... | Information.....<br>Noted.....                                                                                              | W. C. P.<br>J. A. M.                         |

Radio WD529 Received Filed at Wash D C 12:18 P M Washington time  
 (or 6:48A Haw time) (ac RCA 1549WS)

Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A M

Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A M not marked priority. Other priority  
 messages handled first

Delivered to decoding officer 2:40 P M decoded and delivered to Col Dunlop  
 2:50 P M

Delivered to Capt Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P M

Re your five four nine.

Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general HqHawDept two fifty eight, afternoon seventh (received by Chief of Staff HqHawDept three o'clock afternoon seventh all Hawaiian)

SHORT.

10 DEC 1941.

STATEMENT OF WM. B. COBB, CAPT. J. A. G. D.

On the evening of Sat. Dec. 6th, 1941, Mrs. Cobb and I had returned from Schofield Bks., about midnight, and were invited to spend the night at Hickam Field, with some friends, Lt. F. O. Brown, and his sister, at their quarters in that post. We were awakened at 7:55 the following morning by the attack by enemy planes on Pearl Harbor and Hickman Field. The attacks continued intermittently thruout the morning, and we assisted in such ways as we could, to care for the dead and wounded, until about noon. At that time, I left Hickam Field and proceeded to Ft. Shafter, reporting upon arrival, to my superior, Col. T. H. Green, Dept. Judge Advocate. Volunteer nurses were needed at Tripler General Hospital, and Col. Green made the arrangements for Mrs. Cobb to help there in that work. After taking her to the hospital, I was directed to report to the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., at Ft Shafter, for duty, which I did at 1:20 P. M., Dec. 7th, 1941.

Upon assuming my duties in the office of the Chief of Staff, I immediately began to keep a personal record of the activities in the office, pursuant to my instructions, and as a matter of ordinary office routine, which record I now have. The telephone system was explained to me, and I was occupied for some time, becoming familiar with the office. The situation was of course, very intense, and numerous officers were calling on the Chief of Staff throughout the afternoon. Col. Green, accompanied by Maj. Hanley, of the Judge Advocate's office were in about 2 P M, and shortly thereafter, left to go to the Crater, to confer with Gen. Short. Col. Phillips was busy with long distance phone calls to Washington, at least one of which I understood to be completed. Some officer, whose name I do not know, called in person to report to the Chief of Staff on the situation at Hickam Field. At about 3 P. M., a secret radio message was received by the Chief of Staff, which was shown to me, and which referred to the fact that the Japanese were serving what amounted to an ultimatum, *at one o'clock P. M. that day*. We were unable to understand the message, inasmuch as the Japahese had made and concluded their assault on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, approximately seven hours previously. In discussing the message with Col. Phillips, he remarked that this "must be the message to which Gen. Marshall was referring, and which he asked me if I had received." As I recall, the message was dated and stamped as having been sent from Washington at 12:18 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941. I am positive that the message was not received by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department before 2:55 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941, at the earliest. Shortly thereafter, I heard the Chief of Staff phone the contents of the message to Gen. Short at the Crater, near Ft. Shafter.

An additional message was prepaed by Col. Phillips, the contents of which I do not know, and I was directed to proceed to Pearl Harbor with the secret message and the second message, and deliver both to Admiral Kimmel. I left Ft. Shafter in an official car at 5:42 P. M. and rushed to Admiral Kimmel's headquarters, where I delivered both messages to his Chief of Staff, Capt. Davis, with whom I conversed for some time. There was more discussion about the time of the secret message and we attempted to account for the delay in transmittal. Thereafter, Admiral Kimmel wrote, in longhand, a message to Gen. Short, consisting of three pages of notepaper about 5 by 7 inches in size, the last of the three being about one half filled with the writing. This message he showed to two other Admirals who were conferring with him, sealed the same, and delivered to me with instructions to deliver it to Gen. Short at once. Before I left Pearl Harbor, an officer whose name is Delaney, but whose rank I do not

know, as he was in civilian clothes, gave me a message concerning the naval vessels which were to enter the harbor that night, so that our coastal batteries would not fire on them. I then returned, with the three messages—the pink secret message, the Admiral's note, and Delaney's advice, to Ft. Shafter, where I arrived at 4:16 P. M. I delivered the messages to Col. Phillips, who opened the Admiral's note, and after reading it, again sealed it with sealing wax, with the assistance of Mr. Emmons in the office, and directed me to take it to the General in the Crater at once, which I did. After reading the message, Gen. Short called Col. Phillips and told him in substance, "I've read the Admiral's note, and will keep it in my personal possession." He then asked me my name, which I gave him, and he directed me to return to Ft. Shafter. The time of my arrival there was 4:40 P. M., after which my attention was occupied by other matters.

WM. M. CORB,  
Capt. JAGD., Ft. Shafter.

#### SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

Secret

103 WAR HS 144 WD WASHIN DC 1128P DEC 8 1941  
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

541 8th Attention General Fred Martin Stop Clarify ground personnel needed as requested in secret radio one zero six eight dated December seven Stop The Commanding General Hawaiian Department has been informed of status of ground reinforcements Stop Close in defense and antisabotage guard should be supplied by Commanding General Hawaiian Department Stop State whether personnel requested is Air Corps or ground personnel Stop It is impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by carrier Stop Additional P dash forty and P dash thirty nine types of aircraft are crated for shipment Stop Final decision reference heavy bombardment for Hawaii is being made this date Stop Notification later.

ADAMS.  
955P/8/8

Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: S Sgt D L Smith, S Cl 115A 9 December 1941.

Answer should be marked "Answer to Code Message No. 541 8th."

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

E. Moore,  
E. MOORE,  
E. MOORE,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1078—8th.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,  
Washington, D. C.:

More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold semicolon command alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dispersion Stop All planes now dispersed comma pursuit in bunkers comma bombers can not be bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint agreement places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for help when thought necessary Stop Of planes in ferry flight all landed Oahu two landed small fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gun fire and one badly damaged Stop Attack was a perfectly executed surprise attack in strict accord with our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bombing was highly

214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

accurate Stop Every effort made with few bombers left to locate carriers  
success Stop Casualties dead six officers two hundred seven enlisted  
wounded some seriously three sixty seven enlisted Stop Morale high  
Martin.

81

Enc Sec by  
Lt J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B.  
528P Dec 8 1941.  
Note:

(Handwritten:) RCA-1549 WS. Delivered to Sig Office 11:45 not mark  
ority to decoding Officer 240P.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code:

Secret

Confidential

Res

P 3 WAR L 54 WD 1 EXTRA URGENT WASHINGTON DC 219P DEC  
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER T H

*Five four nine ninth* Please advise immediately exact time of receipt  
number five two nine Repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu  
time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to Staff and by wh  
office received.

COLTON, Ac

(Handwritten:) 529 delivered to C/S 300 PM 7 Dec—receipted for b  
Trueman delivered by Mr Hough; 2:58 PM Col Dunlop) 733A Honolulu, 1  
Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910 AM Dec 9 1941. (Handwritten:)

(Handwritten:) Filed 12:18 PM Wash or 6:48 Hon time. Received  
Honolulu 7:33 A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following Secret—Extra Urgent official radiogram be  
This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message,  
in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
2

Sent as Radiogram No. 1087—9th.

Approved for transmission:

U. M. McDole,  
U. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G.  
Assistant Adjutant Gen

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,  
Washington, D. C.:

Re your five four nine radio five two nine received Honolulu by RCA  
thirty three morning seventh Stop. This message delivered signal office  
Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximat  
within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by ad  
general Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh.

SH

Enc. Sec. Extra Urgent by  
(Handwritten:) L G F  
Lt L G Forbes SC  
315P Dec. 9 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS, Col., GSC.  
Chief of Staff.

Sent as radiogram No. 1094—9th.

Major General H. H. ARNOLD,  
War Department, Washington, D. C.:

Re telephone conversation today with Phillips am satisfied.

SHORT.

Enc Sec by  
Lt G Lennox, S O,  
730 p 9 Dec. 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 11 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS, Col., GSC.  
Chief of Staff.

Sent as radiogram No. 1112—11th.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
War Department, Washington, D. C.:

Reference is made to employment of troops at Christmas comma Canton comma Fiji and New Caledonia Stop. Is the prohibition in Public Resolution number ninety six forbidding the use of units and individuals outside the limits of the United States and possessions thereof rescinded by the declaration of war End.

SHORT.

Enc Sec by D. E. G.  
(Handwritten:) Lt De George SC  
1930 11 Dec 41

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon

# 216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. From and Date | To       | Subject: Radio—Merle Smith                      |                 |
|---------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1st Ind., AO, 12/11/41... | C/S..... | 1. The attached radio recd thru HAF facilities. | R. L. M., W. G. |
| 2d Ind., C/S, 12/11/41... | AG.....  | File.....                                       | W. C. P.        |

SECRET

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

A-64

11 DEC. 11

1 F8U2 PY IMPORTANT GR231

To: Commanding General Honolulu.

From: Merle Smith 18 11th December.

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Nav and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to Kota Baru. Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south Kota Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri Sarawak order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop I bombed Tobl Helen Reef Stop Nauru bombed again contact lost Kure (Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief combined air at Saigon comma same of southern expedition force probably Saigon sai combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama same of South China Fleet near Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop

Slightly garbled

One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw K 130 miles South Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE M Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown r MILID as my 31 MERLE SMITH (garble).

0845

130A

Slightly garbled.

Decoded by AB. Time 815A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 11 December 11

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This me does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter G. Phillips,  
WALTER G. PHILLIPS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of St

Sent as radiogram No. 1110—11th.

Message center No. 21.

Time filed 1110.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Washington, D. C.:

Following is Paraphrase of Paper #23 this file radio eleven December one received Quote

A-64

1F8U PY IMPORTANT GR231

To: Commanding General Honolulu.

From: Merle Smith 18 11th December.

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except loss and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to the Kota Baru, Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles Kota Baru, Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Sarawak by order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop RAAF bombed Tobl Helen Reef Stop Naru bombed again cc

lost Kure (Ocean Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief combined air force at Saigon Comma same of southern expedition force probably Saigon same of combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama Same of South China Fleet near Hong Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop

Slightly garbled

One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor 130 miles south Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat MILID as my 31 Merle Smith (Garble)

0845 Z/11

130A

Slightly garbled

Unquote end of message.

SHORT.

Enc sec by

Lt. J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B.

150P Dec 11 1951

# HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

### SECRET

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This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. Form and Date  | To      | Subject: WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and destruction of their code machine. |                                                    |
|----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| 1st Ind. C/S 14 Dec 41.... | AG..... | For file. Incl: Subject radio.....                                                            | Walter Phillips, Colonel G. S. C., Chief of Staff. |

### CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H. 9 July 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Special Report.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted pursuant to contents of letter AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War Department, Washington, D C., to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated March 26, 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installation", and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Department Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently declared unlimited emergency.

#### 2. Estimate of the Situation:

a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and installations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field,



that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the priority and expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.

b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickman Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has *as yet been ordered*, or contrawise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered.

[2] c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war With Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.

(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa, of quick movement of all heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such incipient events as;

(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.

(b) Or, of a final break with the German-Italian Axis.

(c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting interests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.

(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia.

(e) Or a repercussion in consequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.

(f) Or an occupation of the Galipagos Islands as a result of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador.

(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from which to reinforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the mainland or from which to reinforce Manila with B-19's and the belief that Hickam will be fully spot-lighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.

(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents acting jointly in support of her tri-parte pact.

(4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution of secretly prepared plan for sabotage.

[3] (5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reinforcing our far-flung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the the narrow seas that can be employed en mass within tactical times over strategical theatres of 2500 miles extent. (As an illustration of the precept in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 9, 1941.)

d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be preconceived now and receive *first* consideration over all other types of military field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, air-borne infantry transports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize an immediate state of air readiness and seek *first*, by any and all means, to destroy the opposing state of air-readiness.

**3. General Findings:**

a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to successful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, organization and management which are now required to master the present borderline war situation.

b. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without disrupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city as Hickam Field.

c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due:

(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.

(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces.

(3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peace-time occupancy instead of war-time security.

[4] (4) To the relative inattention accorded in peacetime to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.

(5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for information.

(6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily increased routine administration.

(7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air Force.

(8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland to construct buildings and grounds.

(9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning reserve officers to activate new units.

(10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.

(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the above first needs.

(12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily post duties.

(13) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for reliability of all civil service employees.

(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.

(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future.

(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of labor and materials required to meet the needs of all arms and services.

[5] d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons, departments, and daily mass details, due in turn:

(1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodically to the mainland.

(2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve officers within the past year.

(3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead growth of higher echelons.

(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.

(5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical school courses at Wheeler and Hickam Fields.

(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill and ground security missions.

(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of a thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks

(8) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying lands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments in the Department.

(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized activities

(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned with proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary recruit and technical school training.

(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained specialists from the Service Departments and Tactical Squadrons to guard, drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain command that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 specialized divisions, departments, and sections.

(12) To the culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the, over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and an over-complicated administration of it.

[6] 4 *Special Findings:*

a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom that the effect that every basic unit such as the Air-Squadron must possess a practical working knowledge of each and every man under its immediate legal jurisdiction—this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience, "trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the present set-up:

(1) Five or more different applications of the War Department prescribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration centers exist in the Department.

1st—At Schofield, one regiment centralizes separate comparison of personnel units in regimental headquarters.

2nd—Another regiment centralizes composite battalion units in regimental headquarters.

3rd—Another regiment centralizes the separate specialized functions that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.

4th—Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in Wing Headquarters.

5th—Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in Group Headquarters (i. e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th Air Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units in Wing are attached.

(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service record rolls, reports of changes, etc.

(3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.

(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees.

(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.

[7] (6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts of men during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in the numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in roster who report to Squadron Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters requires reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters—but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments the changes or exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the emergency dictates.

(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is physically dissembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.

(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel functions.

(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security.

(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and the front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the timing of the mass of personnel, operations, materiel, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Department to the Squadron and the Squadron to the [8] Department, the undersigned finds that a *standard* system of systematic daily coordination throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a necessity.

(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simplified by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uniformly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rearrange existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "operations control office" and "grand security troops" as a basis.

(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which the lower echelons have no direct control.

##### **5. Detailed Findings:**

a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conjunction with the Inspector General's report.

##### **b. Command Division:**

(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the personal attention of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.

(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one necessitating a formal regard for the serious legal consequences involved.

(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, (3) operations intelligence, (4) material intelligence and (5) flight intelligence.

[9] (4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection and report.

(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, under the direct control of the Wing Commander.

(6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged

especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies personnel, operations, and matériel divisions.

(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be made to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and low morale of the junior officer and private soldier; this in order to separate the effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subagents.

*c. Personnel Division:*

(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized with Hawaiian Air Force.

(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic department similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.

(3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized as a semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers' messes, grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.

(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed for the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the recurrence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.

(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "trait" analysis and report.

(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the mess hall, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing project with estimated dates of completion.

[10] (7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian Division, and that he give special attention to such items as the acquisition of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts in use, etc.

(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily placement of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.

(9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of the Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purpose to the Hawaiian Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center.

(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, be established for each service division, department and section of the Base which constitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station where one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.

(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the combat service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency report and the recommendation of the operating departments.

(12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created by the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the station.

(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard duty in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably of infantrymen.

(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison Officer at Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation of type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered, also, that officers assigned to ground defense and security wear side arms.

(15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically record the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.

[11] (16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by either sex when on duty.

(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shop be furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station.

(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or materiel is permitted to remain over-night on the station.

(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of principal departments be issued pistols.

(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may be taking civilian flying instruction.

(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge carefully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, cane or small fires at a distance beyond quick recall.

(22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young officers for autos and uniforms be re-checked.

(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Exchange and Non-commissioned Officers' Club be re-checked.

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records be returned to the mainland.

(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive increasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be re-checked.

(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.

(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal distribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made the subject of a special study and report with the view of creating a more uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital specialties [12] such as squadron mess, communications, armament, maintenance, without adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for first priority of flying pay.

(28) That S-1 offices, officers and functions be separated organically from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.

(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married non-commissioned officers and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.

#### *d. Operations Division:*

(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be re-checked and numbered.

(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked and numbered.

(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to recheck the proposed use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and defense plans to prevent conflict.

(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be re-checked in connection with Plans for Ground Security, Alert Plans and Plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.

(5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally responsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted higher commanders.

(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft be expedited.

(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio operators be reduced to writing.

(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ordnance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at outlying fields and for the safe-guarding [13] of bombsights on over-night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.

(9). That the storage and shortage of water, and exposed pipelines at outlying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a ground security viewpoint.

(10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and vaults.

(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires between Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and frequent practice.

(12) That the question of developing an auxiliary mobile message center in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, wire and repair men, be considered.

(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal Officer in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-submitted and receive favorable action.

(14) That additional measures, such as voice code, be prescribed and tested to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and that private soldiers be excluded from duty of transmitting important verbal orders of serious purport.

*e. Materiel Division:*

(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system, to include periodic chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in writing as a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooperation and technical advice, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Hawaiian Air Depot, be solicited.

(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickman Field dock at the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under the dock.

(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man-holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and communications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.

[14] (4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and prepared by Wing S-4, of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are considered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main control cables, the connection of control cables with the servo drums of the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuselage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.

(5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include such a selected list of "critical" items.

(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required of the Engineer Corps in the Wing Plan for screening, lighting and fencing of Hickam Field be prescribed, particularly, by special order.

(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of maintenance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been available to the Engineers for several months, be put on a prescribed priority list by the Department.

(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.

(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective consideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons.

(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unobstructed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of the Depot.

(11) That all plats and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.

[15] (12) That copies of the detailed findings of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.

(13) That additional measures for night-time security be prescribed to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the shops, hangars and dead-line.

(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, Supply, Fire Department, etc. who control nearly all utilities that can tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance social morale.

(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited.

*f. Flight Division:*

(1) That flight and airplane commanders, especially of B-17 type of bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility of a commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in Army Regulations.

(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally responsible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in flight.

(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally responsible for the related functions of his flight plan, the coordination of flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, dress, discipline, and tactical reports.

*6. Conclusions:*

a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias, or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities.

b. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is required for the Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organization for the Air Base Group.

[16] c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects for Hickam Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Department Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to insure compliance within prescribed time limits.

*7. Recommendations:*

That the Department Commander authorize a board of general officers of the Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing emergency.

*8. Appreciations:*

a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and Major A. W. Meehan, G-3, is acknowledged.

c. The spirit of open honesty and helpfulness displayed by Brigadier General J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the necessary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition, is considered worthy of commendation.

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above, it is appreciated that the present status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense of responsibility is at issue.

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 18th Wing, with a request that he register any difference of facts or opinion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. Burwell,  
H. S. BURWELL,  
Colonel, A. C.,  
Special Inspector.



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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect to see if air-planes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

By courier, 1 May 1941.

CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G. D.  
Assistant Adjutant General.

1st. Ind.

AG 383.4 (7-15-41)

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HQ. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., July 17, 1941.—To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a verbal reply.

For the Commanding General:

Edward Jenkins,  
EDWARD JENKINS,  
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,  
Acting Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 August 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, and follow-up letter 15 July 1941, request that reply be expedited.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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## SECRET

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department of Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communications.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. From and Date    | To       | Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |          |
|------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1st Ind. AG 18 Nov 41.       | C/S..... | Herewith reports from major echelon Commanders in compliance with 3rd R/S Indorsement C/S to AG, 29 April 41, in file marked "HERE".<br>6 Incls:<br>#1—Report General Murray.<br>#2— " Colonel Walsh.<br>#3— " Colonel Capron.<br>#4— " General Gardner.<br>#5— " General Martin.<br>#6—AG file 383.4 (Secret). | R. U. D. |
| 2d Ind. C/S. 11/18/41, #117. | G-2..... | Study & Report.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | W. D.    |
| 3d Ind. G-2 16 Jn 42.        | AG.....  | For file. No report made.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |          |

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## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

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| No. of Ind. From and Date    | To          | Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 4250                 |
|------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1st Ind. Air O. 11/17/41..   | C/S.....    | There is attached special report on Hickam Field together with comments thereon by the Hawaiian Air Force Staff and General Martin.<br>1 Incl.: Chart showing Burwell Report, General Martin's Comments and Staff Comments. For the Air Officer: Study and report. | M.<br>J. A. M. 02792 |
| 2nd Ind. C/S 11/18/41, #118. | G-2.....    | Study and report.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | N. CO.               |
| 3 Ind. G-20 16 Jn 42....     | A. G. 1.... | For file—no report made.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | KJF.                 |

CONFIDENTIAL

## Comments on Burwell Report

| Burwell's Report                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Staff comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | General Martin's comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
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| <p>Subject: Special Report.</p> <p>To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.</p> <p>1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted pursuant to contents of letter A.G. 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War Department, Washington, D. C., to the Commanding General, dated March 26, 1941, subject: "Provisions for security of Installations", and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Department Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently declared unlimited emergency.</p> <p>2. <i>Estimate of the Situation:</i></p> <p>a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and installations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.</p> <p>b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickam Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the [§] controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has as yet been ordered, or contrived, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered.</p> <p>c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war with Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.</p> | <p>Concur. However, it is believed the condition will be corrected as experience is gained and discipline is improved.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>So far as the majority of the command is concerned this probably is true, however it is believed that responsible command and staff officers of all echelons are cognizant of the situation as it may affect the Hawaiian Air Force.</p> | <p>While this may have been true at the time, this survey was started during the elapsed time since, the lower echelon commanders have become impressed with the need for increased precautions to prevent acts of sabotage.</p> <p>This will always be difficult to prevent but is becoming increasingly more difficult of accomplishment due to the fact that all concerned are indoctrinated with the need for constant vigilance.</p> <p>As many intelligent men throughout the United States fail to understand the significance of international events, it can not be expected that all members of this command can properly evaluate these events, nor is that necessary. Command and staff officers keep informed as to the situation as it affects the Hawaiian Air Force.</p> |

(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa of quick movement of all heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such incipient events as:

[§] (a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.

(b) Or, of a final break with the German Italian Axis.  
 (c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting interests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.  
 (d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia.  
 (e) Or, a repercussion in sequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.  
 (f) Or an occupation of the Galapagos Islands as a result of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador.

(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from which to re-force the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the mainland or from which to re-force Manila with -19's and the belief that Hickam will be fully spotlighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.

(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents acting jointly in support of her tri-partite pact.

[4] (4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution of secretly prepared plan for sabotage.

(5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reinforcing our farflung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the narrow seas that can be employed en masse within tactical times over strategic theatres of 2,500 miles extent. (As an illustration of the precept in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 7, 1941.)

d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be pre-conceived now and receive first consideration over all other types of military field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, airborne infantry transports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize an immediate state of air readiness and seek first, by any and all means, to destroy the opposing state of air-readiness.

### 3. General Findings:

a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to [5] successful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, organization and management which are now required to master the present border-line war situation.

b. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without disrupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city at Hickam Field.

Strongly concur. It is believed that the development of a strong striking force of heavy bombardment aviation in the Hawaiian Department is imperative to the safety of the Hawaiian Islands. It is further believed that a collision of air forces will occur prior to and independent of any activities of defending ground forces.

Concur. However it is pointed out that the component parts of the H. A. F. are organized in the same way as are those of the Air Force as a whole. Any change made must of necessity apply not only here but to all Air Force organizations. It is believed the present A. C. squadrons should be reorganized and given an internal organization structurally similar to that of a battalion. G-3 does not concur with the foregoing so far as battalion organization is concerned.

It is impossible for any wing to function to the maximum capabilities with the numerous diversions of personnel to duties not provided for in any existing tables of organization.

Concur. The long range bomber is the only offensive weapon available to the Department Commander, it will be first into action and will so remain as long as available. The importance of this weapon dictates every possible protection from all available sources that it may be immune from sabotage.

This statement infers that a change in organization is necessary to meet changed conditions. It is held that the present organization is satisfactory to cope with the existing circumstances.

Concur with Staff Comments.

# CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due:</p> <p>(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.</p> <p>(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces.</p> <p>(3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peace-time instead of war-time security.</p> <p>(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.</p> <p>(5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for information.</p> <p>(6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily increased administration.</p> <p>(7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air Force.</p> <p>(8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland to construct buildings and grounds.</p> <p>(9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning reserve officers to activate new units.</p> <p>(10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.</p> <p>(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequence of the above first needs.</p> | <p>A minor contributing factor.</p> <p>Not concurred in.</p>                                                                                                                               | <p>Concur in all Staff Comments pertaining to paragraph c.</p>                                      |
| <p>(12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily post duties.</p> <p>(13) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for reliability of all civil service employees.</p> <p>(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.</p> <p>(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | <p>Concur.</p> <p>In the fact that the sabotage potentialities are great but the assumption that the Department or the H. A. F. is not cognizant of the situation is not concurred in.</p> | <p>Unavoidable in processing and assigning recruits to old organizations and creating new ones.</p> |
| <p>(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of labor and materials required to meet the need of all arms and services.</p> <p>d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons, departments, and daily mass details, due in turn:</p> <p>(1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodically to the mainland.</p> <p>(2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve officers within the last year.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | <p>Unavoidable.</p> <p>Unavoidable.</p> <p>Unavoidable.</p>                                                                                                                                | <p>Unavoidable in processing and assigning recruits to old organizations and creating new ones.</p> |
| <p>(3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead growth of higher echelons.</p> <p>(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <p>Corrected by establishment of recruit casual camp at Bellows Field.</p>                                                                                                                 | <p>Unavoidable in processing and assigning recruits to old organizations and creating new ones.</p> |

(5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical school courses at Wheeler Field and Hickam Field.

(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in Infantry drill and ground security missions.

(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of several thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks.

[9] (8) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying islands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments in the Department.

(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics.

(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary recruit and technical school training.

(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained specialists from the Service Department and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police, drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a command that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 separate specialized divisions, departments, and sections.

(12) To the culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and an over-complicated administration of it.

#### 4. Special Findings:

a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to the effect that every basic [10] unit such as the Air-Squadron must mediate legal jurisdiction—this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience and "trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the present setup.

(1) Five or more different applications of the war Department's prescribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration centers exist in the Department.

1st—At Schofield, on regiment centralized separate company personnel units in regimental headquarters.

2nd—Another regiment centralized composite battalion units in regimental headquarters.

3rd—Another regiment centralized the separate specialized function that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.

The only duplication is in the clerical course. This duplication is considered necessary in view of the large number of additional clerks required by the expansion.

The requirements for furnishing men for ground defense and security measures has been responsible for this dislocation more than any other factor.

It is believed this condition could be and should be corrected by the establishment of organization messes in mobilization type buildings.

The detachment of any A. C. personnel for other than A. C. duties is objectionable and will reflect on the efficiency of the Air Force.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Absolute uniformity is not regarded as essential.

**Infantry instruction in the School of the Soldier is centralized in the Recruit Casual Camps.**

A central mess conceived in the interests of economy has, to my knowledge, always been destruction of morale. Separate messes would remove this source of dissatisfaction but the established general mess cannot now be changed. It is a continuing menace to moral the affects of which can be ameliorated by most careful supervision.

Participation in centralized athletics has a decided value as a moral builder and development of "Esprit de Corps." Mass athletics should be encouraged for the development of healthy bodies and minds of the command as a whole.



# CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

| Burwell's Report                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Staff comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | General Martin's comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
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| <p>4th—Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the Wing Headquarters.</p> <p>5th—Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three Group Headquarters (1. e., 17th Air Base Group and the 8th and 11th Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the Wing are attached.</p> <p>(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, payrolls, reports of changes, etc.</p> <p>(11) (3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.</p> <p>(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees.</p> <p>(3) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.</p> <p>(6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and who report to Squadron Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for the changes or [12] exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily emergency dictates.</p> <p>(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is physically dissembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.</p> <p>(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel functions.</p> <p>(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated, regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security.</p> <p>(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the [13] timing of the</p> | <p>No comment.</p> <p>No comment.</p> <p>No comment.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur. Under the present organization there will always be this conflict between daily emergencies and the training and control of the tactical units.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>This paragraph is apparently an introduction to paragraph 11.</p> | <p>The solution of this problem lies with the respective squadron commanders. Squadrons must maintain a positive record by name of all men on each detail, regular or special, those on sick report or absent for any cause. Record of changes in status of this personnel is a function of the Personnel Section for the Squadron.</p> |

mass of personnel, operations, material, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Department to the Squadron and the Squadron to the Department, the undersigned finds that a standard system of systematic daily coordination throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a necessity.

(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simplified by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uniformly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rearrange existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "operations control office" and "ground security troops" as a basis.

(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which the lower echelons have no direct control.

#### 5. Detailed Findings:

a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conjunction with the Inspector General's report.

##### (14) b. Command Divisions:

(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the personal attention of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.

(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one necessitating a formal regard for the serious legal consequences involved.

(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, (3) operations intelligence, (4) materiel intelligence and (5) flight intelligence.

(4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection and report.

(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, under the direct control of the Wing Commander.

(6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in personnel, operations, and materiel divisions.

(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered morale of the junior officer and private soldier; this in order to separate the effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subversive agents.

##### c. Personnel Division:

This paragraph implies a fundamental change in the military establishment which should only be considered after a more thorough and exacting study has been made of the ramifications of such reorganization.

It is not believed that a system involving formal daily reports is required. As stated above, any basic change in the theory of staff organization requires further study.

No comments.

It is believed that the question of priorities is being handled in a manner as satisfactory as can be expected under existing conditions.

It is being so regarded.

The subdivision of the entire military function into the 5 classifications noted is a subject requiring further study.

It is not believed that the combining of administration and technical inspections into a single agency would serve a useful purpose. As to each of the present inspection branches the statement under discussion substantially describes existing procedure.

The recommendation that Plans & Intelligence be combined is not concurred in. A Wing, when it constitutes a component part of [16] a larger unit, is not regarded as a planning echelon.

The necessity for close staff coordination requires no comment.

It is the unanimous opinion of the staff officers working on this report that the morale condition at Hickam Field is unsatisfactory.



# CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

| Burwell's Report                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Staff comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | General Martin's comments                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the Hawaiian Air Force.</p> <p>(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detachment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.</p> <p>(3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men, grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | <p>Inasmuch as these units are practically standardized now and will be completely standardized in the near future, this recommendation is taken care of.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>As previously stated it is recommended that the consolidated mess be discontinued as soon as practicable.</p>                                                                                                                                                                              | <p>Under existing circumstances it is physically impossible to organize separate messes in the existing building. The consolidated mess is now operating as a general mess in accordance with existing Army Regulations.</p> |
| <p>(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the recurrence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.</p> <p>(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "trait" analysis and report to S-2.</p> <p>(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swimming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program with estimated dates of completion.</p> <p>(7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale, Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian Division, and that the give special attention to such items as the acquisition of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now in use, etc.</p> <p>(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.</p> | <p>Equipment has been or is being purchased and improvements are now under way.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>This has been done.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <p>Concur. This can be accomplished by making separate lists containing names of men on specific details. These lists to be prepared from a complete roster of men in the organization.</p>                                  |
| <p>[17] (9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purpose to the Hawaiian Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | <p>All concur except G-2. G-2 thinks it is entirely useless and invariably inaccurate paper work.</p> <p>Concur. Recruit training is now centralized at Bellows but it is considered impracticable to combine the technical schools with that organization due to lack of suitable housing and buildings. It is further believed that replacements for Hawaii as well as all foreign stations should be graduates of technical schools on the mainland.</p> <p>Concur.</p> |                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <p>(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, be set-up for each service division, department and section of the Base which constitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station whether or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |

(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command, service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency report and the recommendation of the operating departments.

[18] (12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of tours of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the station.

(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably of infantrymen.

[14] That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison Officer, Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered; also, that officers assigned to ground defense and security wear side-arms.

[19] (15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.

(16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people of either sex when on duty.

(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station.

(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or materiel is permitted to remain overnight on the station.

(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of Principal Departments be issued pistols.

(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may be taking civilian flying instructions.

(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge carefully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, cane or small fires at a distance beyond recall.

[30] (22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young officers for autos and uniforms be re-checked.

(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Exchange and Non-commissioned Officers' Club be re-checked.

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records be returned to the mainland.

(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive increasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be rechecked.

A standard promotion system is now under study in this Headquarters for the Hawaiian Air Force. It is believed that representation should be made to the Chief of the Army Air Forces looking to an established system throughout.

It is fully recognized that a large number of activities have to function at night. It is not believed that this condition has created any erroneous impression.

The tables of organization provide an entirely inadequate force for security and guard. It is strongly recommended that a form of security organization which is capable of providing close-in defense against all forms of attack should be an integral part of all A. C. stations. G-2 concurs except the word units should be substituted for stations.

Recommendations of Infantry Liaison Officer should be considered on their merits when they are submitted.

Recommend this or some other similar system be adopted.

This is covered in the General Orders of all guards.

Concur.

Concur.

Guards should be present at all times on critical points.

Concur.

Concur.

This is being investigated.

Concur.

Concur.

The character of the local population makes this an extremely difficult question to deal with and we believe that the seriousness can not be over emphasized.

Concur in Staff Comments. The security organization be authorized for each station to meet the requirements of that station. This means that there can be no uniformity as to strength and grades and ratings for this organization. A security detachment within units could not properly serve this purpose.

They are not supposed to be enlisted with such a record.

## Comments on Burwell Report—Continued

| Burwell's Report                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Staff comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | General Martin's comments |
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| <p>(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <p>This and the following paragraph discuss conditions common to the Air Corps at large and should be studied from the viewpoint of the Air Corps at large.</p>                                                                                                                                                                 |                           |
| <p>(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal distribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made the subject of a special study and report with the view of creating a more uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital specialties such as squadron mess, communications, armament, maintenance, without [21] adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for first priority of flying pay.</p> | <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <p>Concur.</p>            |
| <p>(28) That S-1 offices, officers and functions be separated organically from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <p>Concur. They should be separated down to and including the wing.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                           |
| <p>(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married noncommissioned officers and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                           |
| <p><i>d. Operations Division:</i></p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | <p>This is being done.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                           |
| <p>(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be re-checked now and numbered.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                           |
| <p>(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked and numbered.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                           |
| <p>(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to re-check the proposed use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and defense plan to prevent conflict.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | <p>Concur. It is also to be noted that "Standing Operating Procedure" is now being revised.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                           |
| <p>(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be re-checked in connection with plans for Ground Security, alert plans and plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                           |
| <p>[24] (5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally responsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted higher commanders.</p>                                                                        | <p>This project is now under-way.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                           |
| <p>(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft be expedited.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                           |
| <p>(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio operators be reduced to writing.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <p>This condition is under continuous review. No provision is being made for storage of bombsights at outlying fields. Bombsights are under constant guard when the airplane crew is absent. It is believed that the responsible commanders concerned are fully aware of the critical situation in regards to water supply.</p> |                           |
| <p>(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ordnance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at outlying fields and for the safeguarding of bombsights on over-night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                           |
| <p>(9) That the storage and shortage of water and exposed pipelines at outlying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a ground security viewpoint.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                           |

[25] (10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and vaults.  
(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires between Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and frequent practice.

(12) That the question of developing an auxiliary mobile message center in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, wire and repair men, be considered.

(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal Officer in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-submitted and receive favorable action.

(14) That additional measures, such as a voice code, be prescribed and tested to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and the private soldiers be excluded from the duty of transmitting important verbal orders of serious purport.  
*e. Materiel Division:*

(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system to include periodic chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in [24] writing as a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooperation and technical advice, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Hawaiian Air Depot, be solicited.

(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickam Field dock at the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under the dock.

(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man-holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and communications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.

(4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and prepared by Wing S-4 of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are considered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main control cables, the connection of control cables with the servo drums of the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuselage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.

[26] (5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include such a selected list of "critical" items.

(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required of the Engineer Corps in the Wing plan for screening, lighting and fencing of Hickam Field be prescribed particularly by special order.

(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of maintenance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been available to the Engineers for several months, be put on a prescribed priority list by the Department.

(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.

Concur.

It is considered that the possibility of tapping exposed wires is an ever-present danger.

Concur.

The Air Force Signal Officer will be called upon to re-submit any recommendations he may have made and they will be given such consideration as they deserve.

Concur.

It is believed that this should be covered by instructions to the guard supplemented by such standing orders that will insure periodic inspections by the department head concerned.

Concur.

This project is underway.

Concur.

Concur.

This project is under way and appropriations have been made for the accomplishment of same.

Concur.

Concur.

This is being cared for by the temporary organization, Maintenance Command.

This paragraph is not understood. It seems to be contradictory. A certain amount of rotation of technical workers is desired that they may acquire knowledge which will permit flexibility in assignment. Such flexibility should operate to prevent interruptions in completion of work orders.

*Comments on Burwell Report—Continued*

| Burwell's Report                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Staff comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | General Martin's comments                                                                                                                                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective consideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons.</p> <p>(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unobstructed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of the Depot.</p> <p>(11) That all plats and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.</p> <p>(12) That copies of the detailed findings of Hawaiian Air Depot and Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.</p> <p>(13) That additional measures for nighttime security be prescribed to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the shops, hangars and dead-line.</p> | <p>Concur.<br/>Concur.<br/>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Not concurred in.<br/>Considered unnecessary.</p> <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <p>(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, supply, fire department, etc. who control nearly all utilities [§7] that can tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance social morale.</p> <p>(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <p>Recommend that personnel concerned be interviewed or otherwise questioned to determine whether or not any dissatisfaction exists with a view to correction thereof.</p> <p>Concur.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <p><i>f. Flight Division:</i></p> <p>(1) That flight and airplane commanders especially of B-17 type of bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility of a commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in Army Regulations.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | <p>It is considered that this is now in effect but that the allusion to a train commander is hardly pertinent.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <p>Existing regulations from the War Department make the pilot of army airplanes fully responsible for handling and safe-guarding his airplane at all times while in his control.</p> |
| <p>(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally responsible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in flight.</p> <p>(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally responsible for the related function of his flight plan, the coordination of flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, dress, discipline and tactical reports.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | <p>This is in effect.</p> <p>This is in effect.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <p><i>6. Conclusions:</i></p> <p>a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities [§8] within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <p>Morale is satisfactory but it is agreed that morale is questionable however it is felt that it is occasioned by the lack of proper recreational and athletic facilities coupled with numerous small irritating regulations and restrictions which in themselves seem minor but accumulate to a point which defeats their intended purposes. Other contributing factors are the present method of promotion, exten-</p> |                                                                                                                                                                                       |

H. S. BURWELL, Colonel, A. C.,  
Special Inspector.

sion from two to three year tour of service for enlisted men, and the consolidated mess. It is believed that immediate steps should be taken to provide any or all of the following recreational and cultural facilities: bowling alleys, soft-ball diamonds, swimming pools, theatres, boxing and wrestling arenas, football, amateur theatricals, paid vaudeville acts, vocational and academic schools (night), tennis courts, outdoor handball courts, skating rinks, libraries, and service clubs. Any or all of these to be under the supervision of officer personnel particularly qualified in these activities.

The organization for units of the H. A. F. is now standard. It is agreed there is room for improvements in the organization of Air Base Units.

It is presumed that the Department Commander requires such reports and records as he considers necessary.

No comment.

b. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is required for the [29] Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organization for the Air Base Group.

c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects of Hickam Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Department Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to insure compliance within prescribed time limits.

7. *Recommendations:*

That the Department Commander authorize a board of general officers of the Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing emergency.

8. *Appreciation:*

a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and Major A. W. Meehan, G-3 is acknowledged.

c. The spirit of open honest helpfulness [30] displayed by Brigadier General J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the necessary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition, is considered worthy of commendation.

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above, it is appreciated that the present status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense of responsibility is at issue.

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 18th Wing, with a request that he register any difference of facts or opinion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.



(AG-1)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 17 November 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter AG 383.4/6, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installations", there are inclosed special reports on Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and the Hawaiian Air Depot.

2. These reports have been carefully studied by this headquarters and those deficiencies susceptible of correction have been corrected. Many of the opinions expressed by the inspecting officer are in conflict with established policies and Army organization and as such cannot receive remedial action by local commanders.

3. The vital installations on all Air Force stations are believed to be adequately guarded and all commanders are fully cognizant of their responsibilities.

F. L. Martin,  
F. L. MARTIN,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

3 Incls.

- #1—Report on Hickam Field
- #2—Report on Wheeler Field
- #3—Report on Hawaiian Air Depot

HEADQUARTERS 14TH PURSUIT WING,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 29 July 1941.

Refer to:

Subject: Special Report On Wheeler Field, T. H.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. *Authority:*

a. See paragraph 1, attached copy of Special Report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, 9 July 1941.

2. *Estimate of the Situation:*

a. See attached report, paragraph 2 a, b, c, and d.

(Due to the recent freezing of Japanese credits, it is estimated that security measures for pursuit aviation have increased in importance to the extent that Wheeler Field, as an Advanced Depot, should now be prepared to take up the shock in case the Hawaiian Air Depot is incapacitated.)

3. *General Findings:*

a. See attached report, paragraph 3 a, b, c, also copy of memorandum to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, 10 July 1941.

(Reference the verbal authority of the Department Commander to create and test an experimental maintenance command in the Hawaiian Air Force, it is believed that the uniform and common grouping of responsibilities now in effect at Wheeler Field may be used as a guide in stabilizing the control of personnel.)

4. *Special Findings:*

a. See attached report, paragraph 4 a (1).

(Wheeler Field has centralized all squadron units in a Wing Headquarters Personnel Administration Center. Investigation indicates that this set-up may be well employed as a standard.)

5. *Detailed Findings:*

a. The following detailed findings contained in attached report apply constructively to the 14th Wing: Paragraph 5 a, paragraph 5 b (1), (2), and (3), paragraph 5 c (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (29); paragraph 5 d (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 e (1), (3), (4) (re P-40s), (5), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 f (1), (2), and (3).

(In order to instill an adequate attitude of mind throughout the lower echelons of the command on the subject of intelligence, the undersigned finds that all squadron intelligence officers need an intelligence manual composed of specific details

such as those contained in paragraph 5, attached report. The Commanding General and Staff of the 14th Pursuit Wing fully appreciate the desire of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Hawaiian Air Force to effect, quickly, a change from the previous peace-time status to the present borderline war-time status, and have fully cooperated by preparing a detailed plan of action.)

(Special attention is invited to the need for continued and increasing daily coordination between the Corps of Engineers at Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.)

(It is believed that there is an urgent security need for "satellite" fields adjacent to or in the near vicinity of Wheeler Field.)

**6. Conclusions:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 6 b, c.

(Special attention is invited to the need for an organic maintenance command.)

(Special attention is invited to the needs of Wheeler Field for priority consideration and early action on the recommendations of the Commanding General, 14th Wing, in reference to fencing, lighting, facilities at Wright Gate, further military control of the public highway through Wheeler Field, and to required safeguarding of all paint, oil, and gas dumps.

**7. Recommendations:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 7 a.

**8. Appreciation:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 8 a, b, d, e.

(The spirit of helpfulness extended by the Commanding General and Staff, 14th Wing, to the undersigned, in the preparation of the required changes from a peace-time status to a critical borderline condition, is considered worthy of commendation.)

b. A copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 14th Wing, with a request that he register his concurrence or his difference of opinion, and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. Burwell,

H. S. BURWELL,

Colonel, Air Corps, Special Inspector.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941.

In reply refer to:

AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,

Major, A. G. D.,

Assistant Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 June 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Special Report.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Pursuant to instructions contained in attached War Department letter the following special report on the Hawaiian Air Depot is submitted:

**1. General Comments:**

a. Officers of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force and of the F. B. I. were previously interviewed reference general policy.



b. All commissioned officers and foremen of the Depot were personally interviewed reference their knowledge and familiarity with the names, faces, and reputation of all employees.

c. Headquarters personnel records are inspected for upkeep and statistical data. All warehouses, storerooms, shops and grounds were inspected personally.

d. Critical locations were examined carefully.

2. Judged by standards required in peace time, conditions were found as follows:

*a. Airplanes:*

- (1) Officers, superior.
- (2) Crews, competent and trustworthy.
- (3) Planes, excellent condition, locked at night, spot lighted.
- (4) Guards, trustworthy.
- (5) History of aircraft evidenced in Form #41 reveals no evidence of previous untoward instances.
- (6) Technical inspections, complete.
- (7) No cases of carelessness noted.

*b. Buildings and Grounds:*

- (1) Offices, superior.
- (2) Chief clerk and superintendent, especially intelligent.
- (3) Foremen, competent and trustworthy.
- (4) Technicians, skilled and conscientious.
- (5) Workers, industrious.
- (6) Shop inspection, thorough.
- (7) Equipment, good condition.
- (8) Buildings, carefully locked at night.
- (9) Guards, trustworthy.
- (10) Machinery, clean.
- (11) Supplies, stored orderly.
- (12) Fire apparatus, good condition.
- (13) No cases of carelessness noted.

*c. Related Factors:*

Badges are being worn. Action being initiated on photo badges. Employees are being check in and out at the main gate. Foremen and workers wear separate, distinctive uniforms. The Depot Commander, the Supply Officer and Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Colonels Hurd, Montgomery and Lewis, respectively, are giving intelligent and commendable attention to local responsibilities concerned on the subject of this survey.

*2. Conclusions:*

Based on standards required in time of an unlimited emergency:

a. That the general opinion of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Hawaiian Air Force, to the effect that the requirements prescribed for guards at the gate, the interior watchman system and the inspection of identification badges, should be progressively increased during the present unlimited emergency and that this conclusion is appreciated by subordinate officers in the Depot who are initiating a plan of action to effect a compliance.

b. That progressive and increasing attention be given by every foreman to insure a more intimate knowledge of every employee's name, face and characteristics and to this end that his intelligence test, physical test, trade test, experience test and, most importantly, his "trait" test data be systematically compiled and maintained.

c. That the vital G-2 aspects of the above test-data be increasingly coordinated with the S-1 office.

d. That the present degree of cooperation between the Depot and the Civil Service, also between the Depot and the F. B. I. are considered to be excellent.

e. That existing conflicts between the communications plan of organization and operation as contained in the Hawaiian Air Force Field Orders and prescribed degrees of readiness in the security, alert and local defense plans be made the subject of a special survey by a Signal specialist or a technical communications expert, in order to insure a coordinated execution of the plan.

f. That all anti-sabotage plans carefully separate requirements that are actually on hand and issued, from plans which deal with future or projected needs; or, in other words, that anti-sabotage plans emphasize the need for an organization "in being" with material "on hand" for instant utility at any time.

g. That increasingly systematic inspection of the aqua system throughout, to include a chemical analysis of both gas and oil, be further intensified.

h. That, during the period of the present unlimited emergency, all employees be further indoctrinated with a semi-military spirit of morale and discipline and to this end that further stress upon social gatherings, restaurant facilities, personal medical attention, and picnics be encouraged. Also that periodical and orderly assemblies such as roll calls, fire calls, etc., be further encouraged.

i. That critical attention be given to selecting critical items.

(1) The electrical fuel pumps on the B-17's may be considered as a critical item.

(2) The aqua system and the fire hazard incident to the storage or leakage of gas and oil in the warehouses and storerooms may be considered as critical items in the supply department.

(3) The power, compressed air, water, and sewage lines or connections may be considered as critical items in the engineering shops; also the pollution of lubricating machine oil be considered as critical.

(4) The main highway through the Depot, the isolated engine test stands, the engineer lumber dumps adjacent to the runway and food in the restaurant be considered as critical items in general.

#### 6. Recommendations:

a. That a regularly assigned Depot S-2 and Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed.

b. That a Depot Inspector and an Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed and directed to prepare a combined inspection, security, alert and defense plan for the Depot and that two administrative reserve officers be assigned to the Depot.

c. That a travelling nurse, qualified as a psychologist, be assigned to the Depot and be authorized to attend employees' families.

d. That the lumber stacked at the end of the main runway be removed on the grounds that it constitutes a flying hazard and furnishes a close-up screen to the edge of the Depot as well as a concealed position from which a saboteur without detection could easily shoot up and hit a plane during its glide, especially at night.

e. That the interior watchman and guard system be increased progressively from the present strength of 21 men to a strength of 42 men and that patrols be instructed to work in units of two men or to keep in regular and frequent contact with each other.

f. That employees in the various shops and warehouses of the new buildings, when completed, be furnished distinctive arm bands, or colored shoulder straps, or caps, to aid in controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel between separate buildings and between separate sections within buildings.

g. That priority of screening, as recommended by the Depot, be approved and that this priority be considered as urgent, especially as it refers to the screening of the motor test stand and a high man-proof screen required between the main depot road and the depot warehouse that contains highly inflammable stores such as gas, oil and chemicals.

h. That written instructions be issued to the guard verifying the present parking plan and verbal orders reference the daily inspection of all cars entering and leaving the Depot, this to insure that no unauthorized personnel or material is hidden in the back of cars, and also to insure that no unauthorized personnel remain hidden overnight in the shops.

i. That the subject of locks and keys which may have been in use for a long time be made the subject of a special survey with the purpose of requiring all locks and keys to be changed periodically, and that all men possessing keys to vital installations be listed and systematically checked.

j. That, in the absence of daytime guards, the civilian chief clerks, superintendents and foremen be issued pistols.

k. That all plats or diagrams of water, electrical, sewage and gasoline systems be checked and numbered.

l. That the Depot Commander maintain a list of all employees who may be taking civilian flying instruction.

m. That a confidential general directive be issued by the Hawaiian Air Force to subordinate commanders to the effect that higher authority reposes special trust and confidence in their employees; that the present "unlimited emergency" requires a quick appreciation of the difference between "peace" and "emergency" conditions; that hostile saboteurs prepare most ingenious plans of fire and destruction and effect them with bold and ruthless determination; that our previous habitual sense of peace and security must be realistically tempered; that local commanders are directly responsible for the preparation and super-

vision of internal security plans which now should be based on the premise that at least a hundred saboteurs might act by criminal intention and stealth at any time, at any hour, even today or tonight; that no matter how far-fetched such a basic premise may seem in peace time or how much it may stretch peace-time credulity, that nevertheless the command responsibility for intelligence requires such a day by day sense of prevention.

H. S. Burwell,  
H. S. BURWELL,  
Colonel, A. C., *Special Inspector.*

1 Incl.  
Ltr. TAG, 3/26/41  
"Provisions for Security  
of Installations"

1st Ind.

(A-1)

Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 June 1941.  
To: Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. For careful consideration and recommendation on putting into being each item of paragraph 6 of this report.

2. Paragraph 6 *h.* to be interpreted that parked cars of employees be maintained under constant surveillance that nothing detrimental to security be removed therefrom or placed therein while these cars are in their parking areas.

By command of Major General MARTIN:

Cheney L. Bertholf,  
CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,  
*Adjutant General.*

1 Incl. n/c

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to:

AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Fulton Q. C. Gardner, U. S. A., Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Fort De Russy, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect your installations to see if they are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

Carl Grosse,  
CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, March 26, 1941.*

AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M.

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps Areas, and Air Forces; Chief of the Air Corps; Chief of Ordnance; and The Quartermaster General.

1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic, attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more acute.

2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide adequate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be maintained. The effective functioning of counter-subversive measures pursuant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in the accomplishment of security.

4. Necessary counter-subversive measures are a responsibility of command and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Department and Corps Area Commanders are responsible for the coordination of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.

By order of the Secretary of War:

S/ E. S. ADAMS,  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H. 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to:  
AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, AG 383.4/6, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installations.")

383.4

1st Ind.

HQ. H. S. O. A. BRIGADE, Ft. DeRussy, T. H., June 28, 1941.

To OG Haw. Dept.

1. As the result of a personal inspection of the installations of this command, the following comments are submitted:

a. In general the nature and the extent of these installations are such as to preclude the practicability of maintaining continuously sufficient guards to assure the protection of all such installations against determined and well organized saboteurs.

b. In my inspection special attention was devoted to the matter of the storage of directors and height finders for antiaircraft artillery batteries. Where fixed seacoast battery emplacements with protected magazines are available (at Fort Kamehameha, Fort DeRussy and Fort Ruger) these instruments are kept stored in the magazines. At Fort Weaver they are stored in one of the concrete magazines. At Fort Barrette they are stored in the protected plotting room. In the case of the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) they are stored in one of the concrete storehouses at the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. At Camp Malakole and at Sand Island, where no protected or fireproof storage is available, they are stored in the barracks.

2. Plans recently submitted in connection with the construction required for the augmentation of the antiaircraft artillery garrison include provision for concrete storehouses for the storage of directors and height finders at Schofield Barracks, Fort Weaver, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Fort DeRussy, Ulupau, Fort Barrette and at Camp Malakole. Recommendations will be submitted in the near future for the construction of a similar storehouse at Sand Island.

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3. In general all fixed batteries and all vital installations are guarded either by sentinels or by local guards quartered at these installations.

4. It is believed that, upon the completion of the concrete store houses referred to in paragraph 2 above reasonably effective security will be provided for all important installations of this command.

Fulton Q. C. Gardner,  
FULTON Q. C. GARDNER,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

1st Ind.

QM 383.4/6-A

Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.,  
8 August 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. I have personally inspected the warehouse area of this depot and in order to provide a greater degree of protection I have fenced the entire area with a 9 ft. cyclone fence and increased the lights in this area.

2. Return of this paper has been delayed pending a thorough study of the requirements of the guard detachment of this depot. Recommendations for an adequate guard detachment were submitted August 7, 1941. Favorable action on this request is considered imperative for the proper protection of this installation.

ROLAND WALSH,  
Colonel, Q. M. C.,  
Commanding.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

DOO 600.96/13

| No. of Ind.<br>From and<br>Date | To | Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |          |
|---------------------------------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1st Ind.<br>DOO<br>5 Jul '41    | AG | 1. A report was presented in person by the undersigned to the Commanding General, 2 May 1941. As a result an Infantry Company has been detailed as a permanent guard for the Ammunition Storage Area. This question was reviewed by the Inspector General who concurred in my recommendations, and the actual change was effected May 9. |          |
|                                 |    | 2. A project has been submitted to the Chief of Ordnance and approved, covering an interior lighting installation. Funds for the consummation of this work have been promised us shortly after the beginning of the present new fiscal year.                                                                                             |          |
|                                 |    | 3. A detailed estimate is under preparation covering the lighting of the peripheral fence around the Crater. This project will be submitted to the proper authorities when it has been drawn up in complete detail.                                                                                                                      |          |
|                                 |    | 4. It is regretted that no formal written report was submitted on this matter but it was felt that having presented the report in person to the Department Commander, and having taken prompt Radio action where indicated, no such written report was necessary.                                                                        | W. A. C. |

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 19411941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

Carl Grosse  
CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 13 June 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Judged by the new situation and standards required in consequence of the recently declared unlimited national emergency, it is considered that the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Inspector are necessary and cover the question constructively. In this respect and in concurrence with the Commanding General's desires, every effort was made by this Headquarters to assist the Inspector by suggestions and cooperation.

2. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of basic communication are concurred in.

*Re para. a and b:* Priority action is requested on the assignment of two administrative officers to the Depot for assignment as Intelligence Plans Officer and Depot Inspector, as recommended in paragraph 6 b, basic report. These administrative and supervisory duties are being handled at the present time by Depot officers in addition to a large number of other executive type of duties.

*Re para c:* The Depot First Aid Station has been expanded with the employment of an additional Nurse in order to allow the former Nurse to act as a Traveling Nurse and thus keep in more intimate and helpful contact with employees and their families.

*Re para, d:* The lumber stacked at the end of the main run-way #4 has been removed by the District Engineer, which action has removed one of the more serious flying and sabotage hazards.

*Re para. e:* Due to the lack of available civilian guards and consequent difficulty in employing additional civilian guards of trustworthy character, the Depot has called upon Hickam Field for enlisted guards. It is believed that the Guard Roster may have to be materially increased, even beyond 42 men.

*Re para. f:* Full compliance with this recommendation will, of necessity, be progressive and will be completed when the Depot is moved into its new buildings. In the meantime, this Headquarters has initiated action on making badges and distinctive colors, which are in the process of procurement and issue.

*Re para. g:* Prepared plans include the screen fences mentioned in the Inspector's recommendation.

*Re para. h:* Detailed guard duties governing the parking plan have been prescribed in writing to insure that no unauthorized material is brought into or removed from the shops, also to insure that all personnel, other than the authorized guards, are required to leave the shops and parking area promptly after working hours. This special problem will be simplified upon completion of the proposed fence. Then all personnel en route to and from the parking lot, which will be located outside the fence, will be checked in and out of the new gate, recommended hereinafter in paragraph 3 b.

*Re para. i:* Survey has been initiated.

*Re para. j:* Pistols have been issued to Section offices for use in case of internal riot or disorder.

*Re para. k:* Action has been initiated.

*Re para. l:* Action has been initiated.

*Re para. m:* Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional administrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is recommended.

3. *Conclusions:* a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in this respect.

b. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-employed common laborers.

e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the Inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the Inspector.

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.

Leland C. Hurd  
LELAND C. HURD,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Commanding.

1st Ind.

AG 383.4 (7-15-41)

24

Hq. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H.,  
July 17, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a verbal reply.

For the Commanding General:

EDWARD JENKINS,  
*Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,*  
*Acting Adjutant General.*

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CONFIDENTIAL

Commanding General Hawaiian Department.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, March 26, 1941.

AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M

Subject: Provisions for security of installations.

To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps Areas, and Air Forces;  
Chief of the Air Corps;  
Chief of Ordnance; and  
The Quartermaster General.

1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic, attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more acute.

2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide adequate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be maintained. The effective functioning of countersubversive measures pursuant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in the accomplishment of security.

4. Necessary countersubversive measures are a responsibility of command and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Department and Corp Areas Commanders are responsible for the coordination of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,  
*Major General*  
*The Adjutant General.*

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CONFIDENTIALHEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
*Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General.*



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1st Ind.

AG 383.4/6

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN QUARTERMASTER DEPOT,  
*Fort Armstrong, T. H., 16 July 1941.*

To: Major O. M. McDole, Asst. Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.  
Information pertaining to the above subject may be expected on 25 July 1941.  
For the Commanding Officer:

B. F. Modisett,  
B. F. MODISETT,  
*Major, Infantry, Executive Officer.*

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.
2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded.
3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,  
*Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General.*

By Courier 1 May 1941 CG

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be sent to subordinate commanders.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

AG 383.4/6

|                                 |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |          |
|---------------------------------|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| No. of Ind.<br>From and<br>Date | To   | Subject: Ltr WD TAG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, 26 March 1941, "Provisions for security of installations."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 971      |
| 1st Ind.<br>AG<br>26 April 41   | G-2  | Two (2) copies received, one copy retained in AG files.<br>1 Incl.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | C. G.    |
| W-76                            |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |          |
| 2d Ind.<br>G-2<br>22 APR 41     | C/S  | 1. For your information.<br>2. I propose to send ditto copies of this communication to all G-2 and S-2 officers, Hawaiian Department, for information and necessary action, and to check with Commanding Officers of Posts especially with regard to paragraph 4, and report to this office.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |          |
|                                 |      | Incl. No change.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | M. W. M. |
| 3d Ind<br>C/S<br>4/29/41        | AG   | The Department Commander desires that copies of this letter be furnished to General Martin, General Murray, Lt. Colonel Walsh, Q. M. C., General Gardner, and Colonel Capron, O. D.; a wrapper letter to General Martin, directing him to personally inspect to see if airplanes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to General Murray, directing him to personally inspect the warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Lt. Colonel Walsh directing him to personally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to General Gardner directing him to personally inspect his installations to see if they are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Colonel Capron, directing him to make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded—all to make a report to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department as to the results of their inspections.<br>Incl: N/C |          |
| 4th Ind<br>AG<br>1 May 41       | G-2  | For notation of action taken and return.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |          |
| W-80                            |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |          |
| 5th Ind.<br>G-2<br>2 May 41     | A.G. | Noted.<br>Incl: N/C.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | M. W. M. |

CONFIDENTIAL

ACW/amh

AG 383.4 (3-15-41)M-B

MARCH 19, 1941.

Subject: Investigation of Subversive Activities in the Civilian Conservation Corps.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the inclosed copy of an agreement between the War Department and the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps relative to the responsibility for investigations dealing with espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities within the CCC.

2. The Counter-Subversive system, including the selection and designation of informants within the ranks of the CCC, is being made the subject of further study and will not be placed into effect at this time.

3. Correspondence and reports relative to CCC investigations will be accomplished and distributed in the same manner as currently prescribed for military activities.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_, Adjutant General.

1 Incl.

Cy., CCC agreement,  
2-26-41.

## 252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

1st Ind. AG 3 April 41 G-2

AG 383.4/5

Ltr. WD AGO 383.4 (3-15-41) M-B, 19 March 1941, "Investigation of Subversive Activities in the Civilian Conservation Corps."

Basic communication received in duplicate, inclosure in single copy, one copy of basic retained in AG files.

C. G.

1 Incl.

### *Re para m:*

Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional administrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is recommended.

### 3. Conclusions:

a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in this respect.

b. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-employed common laborers.

2nd Ind. to CG HAF 6/13/41

e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the inspector.

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.

Leland C. Hurd  
LELAND C. HURD,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Commanding

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 2

## INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD—FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR—SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.

- a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
- b. G-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.
- c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum, 7 September 1944, to C. G., POA, re Documentary Evidence.
- d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Domestic Conditions, 1 December 1942 (2 copies).
- e. Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
- f. Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.
- g. Hawaiian Department Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 a. m., 7 December 1941, dated 22 December 1941.
- h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.
- i. Radio from War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese negotiations, 27 November 1941.
- j. Informal report re Thailand.
- k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asama Maru and conditions in Japan.
- l. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 13 November 1941.
- m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.
- n. Army Contact Office memorandum, 2 May 1941, re Comments on observations of a missionary.
- o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.
- p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941.
- q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.
- r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Assistant Naval Attache Shanghai.
- s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.
- bb. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department transmitting letter from F. B. I. re information on Japan's entry into war dated 28 July 1941.
- t. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dated 3 November 1941.
- u. G-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dated 17 October 1941 re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Elki Tojo.
- v. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).
- w. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and M. A. report attached.)
- y. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 re Japanese Residents of T. H.—Loyalty of—ONI report dated 28 November 1941 (attached).
- aa. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George Paish (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies).
- z. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re French Indo-China.
- dd. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re Formosa.
- cc. M. A. Report dated 18 November 1941 re Japan, Military Agents.
- x. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).
- ee. M. A. Report dated 28 October 1941 re Japan.
- ff. M. A. Report dated 23 October 1941 re Formosa.
- gg. M. A. Report dated 2 October 1941 re Japan.
- hh. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re French Indo-China.

## 254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- ii. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re Thailand.
- jj. M. A. Report dated 10 September 1941 re Japan and Japanese Relations.
- kk. M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australasia.
- ll. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
- mm. M. A. Report dated 14 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
- nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 February 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, T. H.
- oo. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Japanese Spy Activities.
- pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
- qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate Activities.
- rr. Copy of radio "638 12th".
- ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND Report dated 9 February 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at.
- tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
- uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities, Maui, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.).
- vv. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.
- ww. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and Kalama to observe unusual activities.
- xx. Memorandum dated 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John Waterhouse house at Kallua.
- yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.
- zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939—"The Spy Game".
- aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Rlyojl.

CONFIDENTIAL

A

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

Private File—Lieutenant Col. B. M. Meurlott—No File Number

G-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports

Prepared at Army Contact Office, Honolulu

| No. | Date                | General Nature of Contents                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1   | 24 June 1941.....   | General for Pacific area: Burma Road, New Caledonia mining, New Zealand troop training, Thailand Japanese merchants, Australia propaganda, economic and troop training, Japanese economic pressure in N. E. I., petroleum, agriculture, banking in N. E. I., Japan propaganda, economic warfare, petroleum, agriculture, banking, harbor defense, airways. |
| 2   | 14 August 1941..... | General for Pacific area: Japan propaganda, general economic, harbors, mandated islands; Australia petroleum; N. E. I., petroleum, airports; Burma Road.                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 3   | 19 August 1941..... | China, general economic; Formosa harbor defense.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 4   | 19 August 1941..... | Airports in S. W. Pacific: Canton I., Fiji, New Caledonia, Australia, New Guinea, N. E. I.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 5   | 25 August 1941..... | Spratsly and Adjacent Islands and reefs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 6   | 5 September 1941... | Burma Road.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 7   | 10 September 1941.. | Japan and Japanese relations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 8   | 25 September 1941.. | Thailand: Japan attempting to dominate Thai thought, business and government.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 9   | 25 September 1941.. | French Indo-China: Gloomy picture of present conditions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 10  | 25 September 1941.. | China: Shanghai economic conditions, Burma Road, Suggling, casualties, air alarm system, raids.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 11  | 25 September 1941.. | Japan: foreign relations, economic conditions coal, iron, ironworks, foreign advisors, mobilization, conscription in Formosa, Palau, Yap, Manchurian frontier, troop movement, naval organization, construction, movement, mine laying, airways, air movement.                                                                                             |

*G-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports—Continued*

| No. | Date                 | General Nature of Contents                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|-----|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12  | 25 September 1941..  | Dakar.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 13  | 29 September 1941..  | Japan: aerodromes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 14  | 29 September 1941..  | Japan: movement northward, profits at Shanghai, intelligence services, war policies.                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 15  | 2 October 1941.....  | Japan: treatment of foreigners, petroleum, troop movements, troops in French Indo-China.                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 16  | 3 October 1941.....  | Fiji: summary from South Seas Weekly re RAF selectees, military training, military hospital.                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 17  | 3 October 1941.....  | New Guinea Mandate: capital removed from Rabaul to Lae. (Summary from P. I. M.)                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 18  | 9 October 1941.....  | China: oil fields near Suchow, transportation, airways, inhabitants.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 19  | 11 October 1941..... | Dutch East Indies: political conditions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 20  | 23 October 1941..... | Formosa: foreign relations, volunteers to army, loyalty to Japan, fortifications, war planes, air raid precautions.                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 21  | 28 October 1941..... | Japan: foreign relations, raw materials and manufacture, oil, gasoline, iron, tungsten, rice, rubber, lampblack, steel, motor cars, rubber products, motorcycles, concrete, war morale of civil population, troop mobilization, embarkation points, airports, anti-aircraft, para-troops. |
| 22  | 1 November 1941....  | French Oceania: political situation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 23  | 3 November 1941....  | Japan: aerodromes and aircraft factories, types of aircraft.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 24  | 6 November 1941....  | French Indo-China: airfields.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 25  | 18 November 1941...  | Japan: Japanese agents and military activities abroad; German agents and advisers in Japan; German raiders.                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 26  | 19 November 1941...  | Japan: aerodromes, aircraft factories, types and movements of aircraft, para-troop training.                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 27  | 26 November 1941...  | Australian air force and repair facilities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 28  | 1 December 1941....  | Japan: foreign relations and domestic conditions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 29  | 9 January 1942.....  | Japan: vital points in Nagasaki city.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 30  | 14 January 1942..... | Japan: Island of Kyushu, vital points in communication system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 31  | 23 February 1942.... | Trans-Pacific air route suggested.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 32  | 1 June 1942.....     | Korea: large factory at Honan.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 33  | 26 June 1942.....    | Japan: Aluminum plant at Shimizu.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|     | 3 January 1942.....  | Memorandum on the Loo Choo Islands as a possible point of allied attack. (Spencer.)                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

*Reports produced by Army Contact Office, Hq. Haw. Dept., Honolulu*  
 Digest of Contemporary opinions on current topics in the Japanese Press.  
 (Biweekly up to Nov. 5, 1941; final issue, Nov. 29, 1941, covered period Nov. 6-25, 1941.)

## Distribution:

- G-2 WD, 3.
- S-2 Scho. Bks. 1.
- G-2 24th Div. 1.
- G-2 25th Div. 1.
- F. B. I. (Hon.) 2.
- O. N. I. (Hon.) 2.
- File.

*G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation.*

Last estimates produced were: 17 October 1941, 25 October 1941.

Distribution: same as for Digest, above.

(Extracts from the above are given in Exhibit herewith.)

*Military Intelligence Reports (periodic).*

(See list and sample copy herewith.)

*Counter-Intelligence Estimates. 350.05 at Shafter 1941 to 1942.*

No. 7 was issued for period 16 to 30 November 1941.

Distributed to all M. I. Sections of Hawaiian Dept., 10 copies to ONI and 5 to FBI.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

## Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence

## Counter Intelligence Division

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

12 SEPTEMBER 1944.

*Memorandum for Major Meurlott:*

Total Shinto Shrines—55 (about 12 of these are independent shrines)  
OK per Capt. Iwai.

|                      |           |                                                                             |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Total Shinto Priests | 49        | (about 15 of these individuals were connected with the independent shrines) |
| " " Priestesses      | 9         | OK per Capt. Iwai.                                                          |
| " " Asst. Priests    | 24        |                                                                             |
|                      | <u>82</u> |                                                                             |

|                              |           |
|------------------------------|-----------|
| Total in Custodial Detention | <u>38</u> |
|------------------------------|-----------|

*Priests*

|                                  |          |
|----------------------------------|----------|
| CD on mainland                   | 20       |
| Paroled on mainland              | 3        |
| Paroled in T. H.                 | 2        |
| CD and then repatriated to Japan | <u>4</u> |

29

*Priestesses*

|                                  |          |
|----------------------------------|----------|
| CD on mainland                   | 3        |
| Paroled in T. H.                 | 1        |
| CD and then repatriated to Japan | 1        |
| Released                         | <u>2</u> |

7

*Assistant Priests*

|                  |          |
|------------------|----------|
| CD on mainland   | 1        |
| Paroled in T. H. | <u>1</u> |

2

|                |                            |
|----------------|----------------------------|
| Total deceased | } Prior to 7 December 1941 |
| Total in Japan |                            |

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,  
7 September 1944.

*Memorandum:*

To: Commanding General, USAFPOA.

Subject: Documentary Evidence.

1. It is requested that you make available to the Board, named by War Department, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following documents, to wit:

a. All data in whatever form, relating to the Japanese-American relations received by the Hawaiian Department from the War Department during the period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941; including movements of the Japanese armed forces and probable Japanese actions.

b. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period from and through the Navy.

c. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

d. All reports relating to Japanese activities, both military and civil, made by G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or others for said period, including G-2 summaries.

e. All messages take from the Japanese Consulate on December 7, 1941, or subsequent to said date.

f. Documents captured from Japanese invading forces on or about December 7, 1941.

g. All correspondence or other writings relative to the alert of June 17, 1940.

h. All orders for close-in reconnaissance by aircraft or other agencies for the period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941.

i. Secret report of Colonel Capron describing damage to structures in Honolulu on December 7, 1941.

j. Letter of transmittal to War Department of SOP of November 5, 1941.

k. Report of Colonel Berquist upon his return from school in 1941 in which he discussed air warning service, stations and information centers, and generally the employment of Radar.

l. Memorandum of General Staff asking study of air situation in Hawaii.

m. Pattern of bombings by Japanese.

n. Copy of record of trial against Kuhn in Hawaii.

o. Herron's Field Order #1.

p. Complete file of O. N. I. of message taken by F. B. I. from Hawaii R. C. A. file.

q. Army's A—B lists in 1941.

r. Navy's estimates based on presence of carriers in the Marshalls.

2. It has come to the attention of the Board that an exchange of information by the O. N. I. and G-2, Hawaiian Department was made during said period by means of teletype. Are there any records of these exchanges?

3. Procedure for obtaining the described documents desired to be used as evidence by the Board can be agreed upon.

/s/ George Grunert,  
GEORGE GRUNERT,  
*Lieutenant General,  
President.*

Classification: Confidential

Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

### Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS & DOMESTIC CONDITIONS.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Business men, journalists, and missionaries returning from Far East.

Reliability believed good except as indicated.

Summarization of Report

When required:

1. Japan's relationship with Dutch East Indies, China, U. S. S. R., and New Caledonia.

2. Japan's internal conditions: Tojo cabinet, conditions in Korea, conditions in Japan.

#### 1. FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. *With Dutch East Indies.* A. D. E. I. officials, en route from Singapore to Dutch West Indies, stated on 26 November that there is a strong feeling against Japanese in D. E. I. and that the attitude on the part of the Japanese has been to "clear out" as quickly as possible. Source is certain that there were about 7,000 Japanese in D. E. I. in October 1941. Early in November 2,000 Japanese were evacuated, principally from Java. In mid-November 1,500 more were preparing to leave. Practically all of the Japanese were "business men", no laborers.

B. *With China.* American journalist, returning from Far East, reports that there are many military leaders of the Japanese army in China who do not want the "China incident" to end. They are making big money, and this war in China has developed into "the biggest racket the world has ever seen". On the other hand, the navy resents the army's opportunity for graft and is attempting to plug the smuggling holes.



C. *With U. S. S. R.* Vladivostok is a more important base than Singapore or Manila from which to launch an attack on Japan, according to an American journalist. The Soviets have 110 submarines there. Estimates made in Tokyo gave the Russian forces east of Lake Baikal as about 600,000 men before the start of the Russo-German war. Since then this eastern front steadily has been reinforced until now the number is estimated to exceed one million. Some of these may be recruits replacing withdrawn veterans. But it was believed in Japan that an actual withdrawal of men and planes would have to be made before a Japanese invasion would be practicable. Source believed that the establishment of an American expeditionary force at Vladivostok could change the whole situation.

D. *With New Caledonia.* Evidence is accumulating to indicate an offer on the part of Japanese to gain a "peaceful" footing in New Caledonia. A Japanese line of freighters is said to be carrying unmelted nickel ore to Japan in spite of a Franco-British agreement that the entire output be sold to Britain. The Japanese consulate in Noumea is believed to be primarily a "listening post". TOKITARO KUROKI in Consul. He is said to have asked the N.Y.N. agent in Honolulu to interest Vuric in Hawaii to move to New Caledonia. In July, 1941, Georges Peloea, chief engineer of a new Caledonia nickel mine, stated that there were about 2,000 Japanese "businessmen" in New Caledonia. Most of them had come as contract laborers, but now were small merchants, etc. "Le Bulletin de Commerce", Noumea, 7 August 1941, estimated the Japanese in New Caledonia to number 1074 men and 52 women. Of these 316 men and 31 women lived in Noumea. It is believed that Free French authorities in New Caledonia dare not make reprisals or economic discrimination against Japan because lack of military or naval protection leaves the island open to Japanese attack and occupation.

## 2. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

A. *The Tojo Cabinet.* An American journalist from Japan states that the fact that General TOJO did not resign from the army before accepting the premiership is noteworthy. It tends to bring the army out into the open as the real rulers of the government. Now the army itself must be responsible to the people for governmental activities. The problem now is what can TOJO do with the army group. Only a ranking army officer would be able to keep the extremists in hand. TOJO is believed to be more anti-Russian than anti-British and American.

Premier Konoye's admission of "blame" for the China incident was thought to be a well understood hypocritical statement, pointing the finger of blame directly at the army group. Hence, the "tears in the eyes" of the War and Navy ministers.

B. *Conditions in Korea.* An American missionary, resident of Seoul since 1917, gives the following information:

The attitude of Koreans toward the Japanese is one of hopeless acquiescence. They are afraid to talk, even among themselves, as they do not know who may be spies. Japanese surveillance of the schools is very rigid. Once or twice a day an under-cover official would come to the schools to inquire about various matters. Japanese language was stressed as a cultural subject. Teachers were made to reprimand children talking Korean, even on the athletic field. In August 1940, all school children had to have Japanese names. Any meeting that is held must be reported to the police and a permit obtained for even the smallest gathering in a private home. Police representatives always are present.

The position of missionaries has been harder and harder. The pressure is not direct, but upon anyone associating with them. This has made the missionaries realize that they were doing more harm than good to the people they are trying to help. In November, 1941, there were only 12 missionaries left out of several hundred. Permits to missionaries are for one year only, and are not subject to renewal if they do not "play ball" with the Japanese. At times direct pressure has been brought to bear on missionaries. In one instance a woman missionary was "detained" for questioning for about a month in a dark cell. Physical punishment has been occasional, but it is uncommon for Japanese to give punishments which leave marks of any kind.

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Strict censorship with the outside world prevents word of true conditions from getting through. Source states that it takes mail about three months to get out.

Present conscription by Japan of Korean youths is called "voluntary", but is far from it. In the summer of 1940 the Japanese called for a volunteer regiment, but obtained a bare 200 enlistments.

Source stated that many of the poorer class of Koreans were selling everything they had and were moving north into Manchukuo where they hoped to enjoy a better status as Japanese subjects. From this group the Japanese have been enlisting men to do their "dirty work", such as smuggling, spying, dope peddling, etc.

Source recommended that organization engaged in collecting money in the United States for Korean nationalist programs should be watched carefully, as he believed that the funds fell into private hands and were not being used for purposes for which intended.

### C. CONDITIONS IN JAPAN

(1) An American missionary who lived many years in Japan up to last August, reports as follows:

The government does not like to have Japanese soldiers return from China, being afraid they will talk. The few who come back do not talk about the war. None of the seriously wounded soldiers are sent back to Japan. They are sent to Formosa. No casualty lists are posted in Japan. Parents are informed after about three months of the death of a son. Source believes that only about one-third of the parents are so informed. Source stated that many returning soldiers are intolerable and are unable to settle down to normal life. Many of them are diseased.

All telephone calls from city to city have to be carried on in Japanese. One English word would cause the operator to cut in on the line and remind you of the regulations. Even on the streets, if a Japanese person speaks to you in English it is likely that some other person will tell your friend that his language is good enough. Source believed that Germans are handling the censorship, especially of mails.

The average Japanese is said to feel more friendly toward Americans than toward any other foreigners. They dislike the British very much. Germans also are much disliked, especially as they make no pretense of covering up their contempt for the Japanese.

Source believes that food restrictions are handled very well by the government. At such times as New Years, restrictions are eased, so that people forget their hardships and praise the Government. Such relaxing of restrictions builds up morale in the people when it is most needed. Last July no food could be taken from one province to another.

Travel was restricted the latter part of last July. Special permits had to be obtained to get railroad tickets to go from one province to another on business.

The government first gave advice in regard to limiting amusements. When this was not taken seriously, the government issued bans on various amusements, such as dancing, and curtailed the movies. Students at high schools and universities were made to wear their school uniforms at all times. They could attend movies only on Saturdays and Sundays. They were forbidden to go into certain parts of the city, principally armament areas.

In Osaka (residence of source) blackouts were staged about twice a year and lasted about two weeks. The city was divided into about ten zones, each further subdivided into smaller units, the smallest being a group of ten houses. Meetings were held frequently amongst the members of this smallest group, the chairman being chosen by representatives of the ten houses. Each house had a bucket of water and box of sand on hand at all times. Each house paid dues, according to their means, to buy fire-fighting equipment. The next larger division, about one or two city blocks, purchased the equipment. Each house has three flags to be hung out in front: a red flag warns that enemy raiders are overhead, red and white that the raid is lessening, and yellow, all clear. This —(copy illegible)—word from house to house if communications break down.

(2) A returning American business man states that Indo-China rice is distasteful to the people of Japan; but the supply is adequate to meet all their needs. The people are willing to let the army have the best food and other supplies, because the army has the popular reputation of being made up of patriots. The people of Japan have little knowledge as to the graft and corruption which exists among Japanese army officers in China.

There have been no new motor cars in Japan since the start of the China incident. Gasoline is so closely guarded that sampan owners are unable to get enough to go fishing, hence, a shortage of fish.

(3) *Shortage of gasoline indicated.* Master of a tanker reports the conspicuous absence of Japanese fishing vessels, in October, from waters near the

Marshall Islands where on previous voyages he had seen numerous fishing sampans. He believed that it was caused by lack of fuel.

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[1] EXHIBIT I.—A STUDY OF THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS BEFORE, ON, AND AFTER DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. ESPIONAGE

*a. Agents and Agencies.*—In an examination of documents and confidential publications of various government departments, there appears the common declaration that Japanese espionage activities have largely been centralized in the Consular Offices, in addition to the more specialized Army and Navy intelligence functions. There were more than two hundred Japanese Consular Agents strategically located throughout the islands. Potential assistants, agencies, etc., are discussed hereafter in detail.

*b. Sources of Information.*—Obtaining of information was done mainly through multitudes of observations, reports and studies of thousands of commercial travelers, students, tourists, purchasing commissions, as well as agents in the guise of "priests", hundreds of thousands of photographs, a most comprehensive and minute analysis of practically any subject, and by Japanese Language School principals.

*c. Transmission of Information.*—Apparently all information of an urgent character was handled through the local Consulate, and transmitted by coded radio to Japan up to and including the evening of December 6, 1941; and it somewhat significant that local Japanese who might have had desirable information were apparently contacted at their homes or places of business by members of the Consulate staff.

[2] *d. Analysis of principal sources and type of information.*—An analysis of the information available to agents of Japan and which was largely used in the December 7th attack, was obtained through casual observation, publications and periodicals, as well as from various Territorial and Federal published reports. Maps and circulars issued by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, the Chamber of Commerce, Territorial Planning Commission and other similar bodies, furnished accurate and complete details as to roads, public utilities such as water mains, electric power networks, telephone cables, and other such vital data.

High level vantage points on the surrounding hills offered ideal spots for photography which would show, in completed detail, the layout of Pearl Harbor, in complete detail, with the complete berthing arrangements of vessels when the Fleet was in port. Layouts of the principal airfields were equally accessible to photography and sketching operations.

A drive around the island of Oahu afforded full details of beaches, possible landing points, some of the coast defense installations, and landmarks such as prominent buildings, churches and chimneys and other such data.

In summation—other than for details as to technical description of equipment, war plans, and other classified data—an espionage system, as such, was not required to fulfill their needs under existing local conditions.

[3] From all of the foregoing, it can be assumed that any trained espionage group, other than that made up of various members of the consulate staff and visiting Japanese officials need not have been organized because of its non-necessity. There was the usual chain of Consular Agents, Shinto priests, language school principals and outstanding alien business leaders upon whom the Consulate could call for such meager details required to fill any gaps in each analysis of geographic, economic, political, or strategic subjects.

The seizure and holding in custody of the group outlined in the foregoing paragraph, in addition to other individuals who were suspected of subversive activities would logically appear to include the majority of possible leaders for such an espionage system. This action has been taken.

## 2. SABOTAGE AND FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES

As regards the question of planned sabotage or Fifth Column activities, it is significant to note that no local investigational agency has been able to determine any single fact which would definitely indicate that such activities have been planned or existed.

While we see definite, long-term activities and plans in such localities as the Dutch East Indies, which date back to 1915, none of these can be found in similar form here in Honolulu.

There have been but few purely Japanese businesses solely dependent upon the Japanese Government for support here in Honolulu as was the case in the Dutch East Indies. The N. Y. K. [4] had a most legitimate reason to exist here from a commercial transportation angle, the Sumitomo Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank were also maintained on a somewhat logical economic reason due to the large Japanese population and the heavy trade with Japan. While other alien companies did exist, with some degree of Japanese control through stock ownership, they were relatively unimportant and did not involve large spheres of influence.

Small merchants, businesses and professions were largely of Japanese nature but purely economic in their endeavor. Due to local patronage and the maintenance of large stocks of Japanese foodstuffs and supplies, these did a profitable business.

It is quite true that the Japanese aliens held a large portion of the economic control of such endeavors, but this was largely due to local conditions, their liberties under American ideas of free trade and not through any exercise of control or endeavor on the part of the Japanese government. There was a certain amount of resentment and jealousy directed toward these successful aliens by certain white elements of the business community, but largely because they were successful, knew their rights under American laws and customs and insisted upon exercising them. It is but natural that a white distributor would resent being taken to task by an Oriental retailer, but usually the retailer was right and could force the distributor to acquiesce to his demand. This has resulted in the building up of a certain amount of anti-Japanese feeling [5] but this should not be interpreted as being caused by any disloyal or subversive acts on the part of the Japanese individuals concerned.

There are also certain distasteful businesses which did not attract the local white population but which were profitable and lucrative. To the objectionable features the Japanese took no exception inasmuch as their sense of thrift could see the advantage. An example of this is the hog raising industry. The Japanese saw all of the possibilities and went in to the venture encouraged by the white population. As an adjunct the garbage collection system, to feed the hogs, was built up. The citizens were glad to receive small monthly payments for this waste material, and the City and County was greatly relieved in not having to maintain a large garbage collection department. In a comparatively short time these endeavors became a Japanese monopoly including collection of garbage from Army Posts and Camps. This was a most profitable business but it was not motivated by a Japanese nationalistic plot to obtain military information, as some would have it believed; and because these individuals amassed money and property is no indication of Imperial Government subsidy to cover espionage activities carried on by ignorant, non-English speaking aliens. The possibilities of such, however, is not to be overlooked. It is recognized that the very nature of their work provided potentially good fields for gaining military information.

[6] These presumably law abiding and legitimate business structures may be sharply contrasted to the activities of the Japanese Oceanic Bonito and Tunny Fishing Company and other similar Japanese government controlled and operated organizations which arrogantly and openly defied the authorities of the Dutch East Indies. (Attached hereto as Appendix — are copies of reports made by several organizations to the local Japanese Consulate.)

There has been abundant evidence that visiting Japanese vessels have brought individual officials who openly did all possible to maintain nationalistic and cultural ties between the local Japanese and their homeland. Japanese Language

Schools were allowed to flourish with their constant endeavor to impress on the second and third generation their fealty to the Fatherland. Many societies have been expected to aid in Japanese national endeavors, furnish comfort kits to the Army and offer financial aid to the Imperial Government in specific projects. While it is true that all of these activities have had their very objectionable features there appears no likelihood that any such endeavors have been directed toward the organization of Fifth Column elements or sabotage organizations.

[7] *a. Japanese Press.*—So far as this office has been able to determine, no attempt has ever been made by the Japanese Government to control, financially or through any channels, the publication of local newspapers. No campaigns have been initiated in the local Japanese language papers which would tend to unite the Japanese population against any other portion of the citizenry.

There have been expressions of pro-Japanese sentiments and pro-Axis sentiments, as well as some destructive criticisms and anti-American comments, but not in a manner or degree which could be termed a general anti-American attitude.

In specific local cases when it appeared that Japanese nationals or descendants were being discriminated against by proposed laws, regulations or rules these same papers did carry editorials and other comments in protest in much the same manner as would be true with any of the American press organizations.

Speaking generally the attitude of the local Japanese press has been normal, with a considerable amount of pro-Japanese expression as regards the war with China, but this may have been largely due to economic reasons such as the maintaining of a high level of circulation and the sale of advertising space to alien individuals and firms. Their has been no indication however that their policy was controlled financially or otherwise by the Japanese government.

[8] *b. Political Control.*—There is no substantial evidence of any Japanese attempts to control the local political situation other than such activities which were directed by white politicians and their Japanese or Japanese-descendent henchmen. It is true that legislators, supervisors and other officials in office have been elected by the Japanese-descendent citizen vote but the actual control of any legislation or selection of officials solely by a Japanese bloc has not been observed during the past years. Election of Japanese candidates solely by their own nationals vote has never occurred and no such candidate running on purely racial lines has ever been elected. In fact the contrary seems the case when Dr. Kurisaki ran for the position of supervisor and solicited the Japanese vote, even to the extent of having the priests speak in Japanese over the radio. He was defeated by a huge vote, losing his own district.

So far, the Japanese citizens have usually preferred to elect a white candidate as they apparently considered him to be "more suitable" as a political leader. Legislators claim that no single Japanese leader or member of the Legislature can obtain enough control to sway legislation even should they make an attempt (which they have never done).

In recent sessions of the legislature, the Japanese opposed the Wages and Hours Act. This was for economic reasons due to its effect through the establishment of a minimum wage which would greatly affect the small merchant, restaurant keeper, etc. They were unable to swing this opposition successfully, [9] hence traded their opposition to the Pier 15 Bill to the Dillingham interests who in return supported their bloc of the Wages and Hours Act.

It is regrettable to state, in connection with this phase of the discussion, that the Japanese vote has in the past greatly influenced the statements, actions and practices of many of the white politicians. While such an undesirable feature, as the continuation of the Japanese language schools, has been a subject of much investigation and proposed legislation, the matter has always been handled most gingerly and with a view toward the effect upon the individual's political future. It is believed that both protective and advisable precautionary measures have been, in the past, fogged and tabled because of such considerations.

In conclusion, it might be pointed out, that despite the fact that so far there has been no evidence of establishment of Japan's political bloc control, and no indications of any political influence having been wielded by the Japanese people or officials which was motivated or dictated by the Japanese government, there is a distinct possibility that such may eventuate should Japanese cultural efforts be permitted to thrive without proper American supervision. The economic, political, and social subjugation of these islands could eventually be achieved by first providing an appropriate cultural foundation; and is certainly within the realm of possible long-ranged Japanese planning.

[10] At present we must ~~reckon~~ reckon with the fact that there is a certain amount of leadership exercised by the Japanese-descendent political leader over his particular group or supporters, hence they are potential "leaders". Whether such leadership would be subversive or detrimental to the defense of these islands in the event of an invasion is problematic, but a list of these individuals is prepared and they can all be seized immediately if such action would appear desirable to the Department Commander.

*c. Japanese Propaganda and Local Japanese.*—This office is of the opinion that it is highly significant to note that Japanese official radio propaganda programs, which have been directed solely toward the Japanese in Hawaii, have been free from any actively dangerous propaganda both prior to and since December 7, 1941.

We have observed the "softening" processes effected by this means of propaganda directed toward French Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Burma, India and even Australia. In these instances there has been a definite attempt to drive wedges between the governments of those countries, the Japanese and the local inhabitants. Propaganda directed toward Australia has been designed to create dissention between the Australians and the British by showing how the Australian soldiers were victimized by the Home Government.

[11] Programs directed toward Hawaii have not contained such propaganda. There have been the constant reminders, to the children, of their loyalty to parents and the Emperor, the recitations of Japanese customs and culture, but no attempt to bring any anti-American feeling or active support to Japan. Appreciation of the Japanese soldiers for the comfort kits and letters from the Japanese children of Hawaii has been frequently expressed.

It would seem that no one in Tokyo has thought of the amount of trouble which could be caused by calling the attention of the local-born Japanese to the lack of confidence which his adopted home (Hawaii) has toward him. There is every reason to believe that the war measures which have been put in effect and directed against these local people could form the subject of a radio program which would bring doubt, discord and mistrust more prominently into their minds. The reasons for such an ineffective policy are obscure and may be the result of several logical deductions:

(a) Distrust of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese elements by the Japanese government itself.

(b) Hawaii considered to be outside of the present sphere of the "Greater East Asia" control plans.

(c) That other more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been completed.

(d) The assumption that any such programs would be useless due to restrictions imposed on local short-wave reception.

[12] (e) The knowledge or belief on the part of the Japanese government that the inciting of any dissention, sabotage or subversive activity would immediately result in the seizure and internment of Japanese and Japanese descendant residents of Hawaii.

It seems that the first-mentioned deduction, (distrust of the local Japanese) should be given first consideration. It is most noteworthy to learn that the Japanese government has shown a marked suspicious attitude toward second-generation Japanese who have gone to Japan for a visit. Many of these have returned to Hawaii with stories of surveillance; and their inability to properly speak the homeland tongue, unfamiliarity with customs and irksome practices, have resulted in a loss of any desire to ever again return to Japan.

It must also be realized, by the Japanese government as well as it is by us, that many of the old aliens have no further interests in their land of birth, other than spiritually. Their children have been brought up under American ideals, culture and in association with white children, having only a small portion of their time spent in the language schools and under home influence. Their daily routine has brought them closer to American ways of life, freedom of thought, exposure to the American press and motion pictures, while their sports and recreations have been shared with other American children, hence the preponderance of influence is contrary to the Japanese scheme of life. They have also intermingled freely [13] with young people of the various races common to Hawaii, and thus become far more cosmopolitan and democratic than their parents could ever become.

There is much evidence to show that these old aliens have, in many cases, a genuine desire to provide for the safety and future welfare of their children here in Hawaii and hence have lost all idea of returning to Japan. For many years they have lived under American freedom, they have prospered, their rela-

tives in Japan have died and the only future remaining for them is to see their children secure, and then pass out of the picture themselves. Any subversive action or act of sabotage on their part would bring discredit and disgrace, not to themselves necessarily, but to their children who have the interest of the United States more keenly at heart.

All of the foregoing factors and considerations are quite contrary to those found in French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Burma, where they consider themselves a superior race rather than inferior.

It is therefore quite possible that the Japanese government could, with all propriety, question the 100% loyalty of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese. In other words, perhaps both governments find themselves in the same quandary when attempting to establish probability and degree of loyalty of these subjects.

[14] It can therefore be easily assumed that Japan has little use for Hawaii, at present, in her "Asia for the Asiatics" policy other than that dictated by a purely military or naval point of view.

There is nothing to be found here as compared to the oil and minerals of the Dutch East Indies, or the rubber plantations of Malaya and Burma. Hence, her ideas of domination of Hawaii could be discarded for the present save for its strategic value, which in the military control of the Pacific, is high. Whether this value is rated high enough, at this stage of affairs, to warrant another very costly attack is a question to be decided by the strategists but, from the propaganda point of view, this has not made any strong appearance.

Considering the third reason for the lack of attention to the radio (that other more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been completed), no evidence has been found which conclusively indicates any such plan; and to evaluate the possible existence of any such plans, we must first consider what their objective might be.

Since the start of the war, the Japanese Government has fully realized that no large, alien radio audience would be allowed to listen to language programs enamating in Japan, [15] hence a great portion of the propaganda value of such programs would be wasted. Restrictions as to radio reception, which have been placed upon residents of Japan, have been reported as being severe and rigidly enforced; and it is presumed that the Japanese would anticipate equally stringent regulations to be instituted by the government of the United States.

Current programs from Japan indicate that the Japanese have anticipated a large proportion of their expected audience would be American, as they have been rendered in English with special emphasis on spreading confusion, doubt and misinformation in regard to the efforts made which are in contradiction to the policies of the United States government. The inclusion of personal messages from prisoners of war has been interspersed in an attempt to keep Americans listening to the entire program in order to be sure of hearing a message from a member of the family. There has not been any similar or substitute method for attracting the attention of the alien Japanese, or the American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

[16] It is known that the radio broadcasting channels were to be used to transmit definite indications of decisive actions to come, prior to December 7, but this information was to be picked up only by the Consular staff and there is no reason to believe that any other persons, aliens or citizen, were aware of this secret code arrangement. This would tend to strengthen the supposition that the espionage system was built along lines to cover the situation up to the time when the attack was made but that no elaborate plans had been worked out for the continuation of such acts after the war had definitely begun.

From the point of possible espionage, sabotage or subversive organization, there is no reason to believe that the Japanese government could anticipate the protective action which we might initiate. There has been an abundance of open talk in that respect for many years past of which the entire Japanese population was well aware. Those rumored plans ranged from incarcerating all such citizens on one of the outside islands to evacuation camps located in various valleys of the island of Oahu.

In other words, there always has been great apprehension as to the drastic steps which would be taken against the Japanese in case of war. On this trend of thought we must be sure that the Japanese government was fully informed and therefore would be somewhat in doubt as to the effectiveness of any subversive organization after the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, there are the racial characteristics [17] involved, and no Japanese agent could carry on extensive secret, undercover, activities. With the entire population aroused as to potential sabotage and fifth column activities, the use of Japanese

nationals or descendants would appear to be quite a hazardous undertaking. Because of this line of reasoning we have assumed, at all times, that any great amount of continuing sabotage or espionage activities would involve the use of low-class unprincipled, or traitorous individuals of either American or European antecedents. It is for this reason that especial attention has been directed toward the German, Italian and communistic elements of the local population. Concrete results have been obtained in the case of Otto Kuhn who definitely contacted the Japanese Consulate with subversive intent.

These endeavors are subject to present and future close examination and investigation with a view to ascertaining any connection between the Japanese government and local paid agents.

With regard to the fifth reason for the non-existence of any direct, dangerous radio propaganda, we may safely assume that the Japanese government believes that swift retribution would follow should any revolutionary or concerted subversive action be undertaken by the local Japanese population. This could quite possibly be contrary to the plan of Japanese strategy, as it would seem entirely preferable from the military point of view, especially the Japanese version, to have as many potential assistants, fifth columnists and guerillas available to assist in a landing operation rather than have them inaccessible in concentration or detention camps.

[18] *d. Furthermore*, the confusion of moving large numbers of Japanese citizens, the inability of troops to differentiate between local Japanese and landed Japanese troops not uniformed would be momentous. Aid and assistance granted to the invaders would be of enormous value and far greater than any organized sabotage efforts made prior to such an invasion. We therefore do not discount this very possible angle and believe it may be one of the principal reasons why the radio propaganda has not been more actively dangerous up to the present time.

*Some effects of Japanese Radio Propaganda.*—The effect to date of the radio propaganda which has dealt with the Japanese war effort as directed against the Hawaiian Islands has resulted in greatly nullifying its value on local residents of Japanese origin. For example, the Japanese story of the great damage done by the submarine attack on Hilo, Hawaii, was clearly false and the Japanese residents of that city knew this to be a fact. In a comparatively short time these facts also became known to all the residents of other islands of the Hawaiian group. This was also true in the case of the single plane night raid against the island of Oahu, March 4, 1942, when the Tokyo Broadcast falsely claimed extensive damage done at Pearl Harbor. Instances of this type have resulted in causing the local Japanese to greatly discredit propaganda emanating from that source. Hence, it is quite possible that they would seriously consider the authenticity of any effort put forth to initiate a program of subversion in these islands.

[19] *e. Japanese Families Divided in Thought.*—A further argument against the possible existence of any subversive or sabotage ring among the Japanese, consideration must be turned again toward the second and third generation.

It has been outlined heretofore that these younger members of the race are subjected to strong American influences. There have been large numbers of cases where it is known that open conflict exists within the families due to the fact that the younger members refused to see eye to eye with their parents on matters of Japanese loyalty. A great number of cases are recorded where the second-generation youth refused to file his claim for deferment of military service with the Japanese Consul and the father, or head of the family, has executed this act without the knowledge of the subject. We have also found numerous cases where the parents, or head of the family, have protested when the second-generation son has filed request for expiration of Japanese citizenship.

In other words, we do know of many instances where the second-generation son has thrown his loyalty to the side of the United States, and even tried to sway the older member of the family to invest in American securities, follow American customs and disregard the established Japanese customs and ways of life. It would therefore be necessary that any plots or plans on the part of the older aliens be kept entirely secret from the younger generation which would be relatively quite a problem.

[20] *f. Miscellaneous Reasons—Why no Sabotage?*—Much argument has been indulged in as to the significance of there having been no single authenticated report of sabotage or subversive activity on the part of the local Japanese on December 7, 1941, or since that time.



While rumors ran rampant and stories of such actions were sidely circulated, nothing has ever been substantiated by any investigative agency. To analyse this particular problem, it is necessary to scan the record of known facts, to piece this out with logical assumptions and apply the positive results of recent investigations.

First of all, we can safely state that the objective of the attack was to cripple the naval and air arms in such manner as to prevent United States interference with Japan's program of attack in the Orient. The success of such a mission depended solely upon the element of surprise which enjoined absolute secrecy on the part of the enemy. Any one individual, Japanese or of any other nationality, who was made cognizant of these plans introduced a serious chance of exposure. Assuming such a case, it would first be necessary to convey the information to such a hypothetical person. Radio, telephone, mail, or cable communication could never be trusted for such an important message (again assuming the fact that the Japanese government would never believe that we were naive enough to allow these channels of communications to continue without surveillance during a period of extremely strained relations). [21] It is most probable that such a message would have to be divulged only by veiled insinuation, special courier or coded data in commercial radio broadcasts emanating in Japan.

We do know that there were messages received in the Japanese consulate which carried thinly veiled warnings that the situation was fast approaching the breaking point but no definite dates were mentioned. It was also apparent that the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu, on November 12, 1941, enroute to Washington held possibilities of personal instructions being conveyed. His progressive engagements, held on the night of his presence in Honolulu, at various locations such as the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the Japanese Consulate, the Sunchoro Tea House, indicate that there was ample opportunity for important matters to be discussed with the Consul; and his constant moving about gave rise to the thought that these matters were being carefully guarded.

The only concrete evidence to the effect that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu had any idea as to when hostilities would begin was to be found in a notation on his private desk calendar under date of December 1, 1941, when he had written in Japanese "within the predictable future". We believe that it is thus safe to assume that he did not know exactly when operations would begin. It was quite possible that he was verbally informed of the general plan of the government but we seriously doubt that he had specific information that the attack on Pearl Harbor would be made at 7:55 a. m. on December 7, 1941. If such were the case, with the highest ranking and [22] most confidential agent of the Japanese government in Hawaii, stories of maids, garbage collectors, small merchants and laborers being aware of this fact can be dismissed as idle talk and the product of fantastic imagination on the part of individuals who knew nothing of all the facts involved.

Many of the above-mentioned facts are a result of investigations made since December 7, 1941. We know from examination of records that the Consulate was fully informed of fleet movements, names of ships, berthing positions and such similar data, and that this information was forwarded promptly by radio to Tokyo. This data was obtained, personally, by a member of the Japanese Consulate staff who visited vantage points on Pearl City peninsula to make the necessary observations.

There is also the Mori case where vital military information was exchanged with Tokyo on December 5, 1941, under the guise of a press interview. It is particularly significant that this was via radio telephone. Both radio telephone telegraph and radio telephone traffic could logically have been intercepted by ships of the Japanese fleet between Hawaii and Japan.

The fact that the Japanese Consulate was interested in getting information to ships laying off the Hawaiian Islands by radio, commercial broadcast advertisements, visual signals such as sheets, lights and fires has been made a matter of record through the evidence developed in the Kuhn case. Here we find our suspect German involved with the Consulate espionage system bearing out our previous suspicion of the use of some [23] of these means.

g. Investigation of captured maps and other data bears out the contention that no extensive espionage system, other than that definitely centered in the Consulate staff and Consular agents, as heretofore outlined, was needed to obtain the material required for their compilation.

Thus far we can see that the tactical plan was complete with no necessity for use of the weapon of sabotage to carry out the objective of the mission. Further-

more, the attack was such a complete surprise, to the Japanese residents themselves, that they were stunned and incoherent for a few days to follow. Casualties included a number of Japanese, property destroyed was not exclusive of that of Japanese ownership. There was no individual act, even fanatical, to indicate the slightest suspicion of any plans to carry out further acts of confusion or sabotage.

The absence of sabotage on December 7, 1941, is not proof that plans for such could not exist but it is evident that there was neither necessity or intention to use this weapon for the objective in view by that particular operation.

*Japanese Leadership—Individual initiative Lacking.*—In the consideration of any organizations with subversive policy, we invariably come back to the point of leadership. It has been found that the local Japanese inherently look for leadership to some single individual before any marked success is achieved even in peaceful pursuits. Japanese business partnerships hardly ever are successful when the corporations [23] stand much better chance of survival. Here again we find that leadership is required as it is practically impossible for the partners to agree long enough to produce any practicable results.

These fundamentals go back still further in the demonstrated regimentation and control of the lives, fortunes and existence of the millions of poorly educated people in Japan. A fundamental respect for law and authority exists in the minds of every individual Japanese alien. An order issued by the appropriate authority finds more complete and blind acceptance among the alien Japanese than is the case with the other elements of the population of Hawaii. For this reason alone it is necessary to properly explain, translate and interpret any regulations published or issued by the Military Governor.

This characteristic has been exemplified in their choice of white political leaders as mentioned heretofore, where the many Japanese feel that they are better qualified, more experienced and more able to successfully carry on political issues.

An interesting consideration of this element of obedience in the mind of the alien Japanese can be found in the Hirada case on the island of Niihau, where a Japanese officer pilot, who was forced down, armed and equipped, informed Harada, a U. S. citizen Japanese, that he had taken that island, as Japan and the United States were at war. Harada knew nothing of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the final outcome of the engagement [25] and had nothing to indicate to his simple mind any other fact than that the Japanese had landed on Niihau. There was probably no mental reaction, in his mind, of being loyal or disloyal to the United States because of his blind acceptance of the aviator's story and his complete obedience to his commands. There was no fighting, no conflict between forces of the United States and Japan, as far as he could see, hence it can only be said that he was immediately bound to obey Japanese leadership and domination in the form of the Japanese officer, but perhaps no question of loyalty to the United States entered his thoughts.

*h. Local Japanese between two fires.*—The Japanese, in general, here in the Hawaiian Islands, cannot be said to desire Japanese domination and control of the territory. They have been free in their businesses, life and customs and many have prospered far beyond their expectations. Most of them are fully aware that should the control of the islands pass to the Japanese, all of those freedoms, successes and customs would disappear and they would be as fully controlled and regimented as are the Japanese in Japan. Their fear of personal safety, the safety of their families and children is the predominant feature at present. Some feeling exists that they are between two fires and will suffer either one way or the other in case of an invasion. If they are not harmed by the United States forces, in such an action, they feel very [26] uncertain as to the treatment which they may receive in the hands of the Japanese invading forces. It is also very apparent that such apprehension is rapidly spreading through the Japanese population, hence it is greatly doubted that any organized sabotage system could thrive in such an atmosphere.

### 3. SOME OF THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN

The daily drive and steady pressure being applied on the local Japanese community, since the war began, also lessens any possible organization of subversive elements. None know exactly when they will be picked up for questioning, their premises searched and careful examination made of the entire family background. Many are questioned and released who are required to return at stated intervals for check and recitation of their experiences, contacts and employment. Others

are placed in custodial detention on the results of these examinations. As a result of this relentless activity there is a wave of doubt growing up among the Japanese as to the loyalty of their neighbors and associates.

When one Japanese is placed in custodial detention, the neighbors remark that the army has caught up with another man whom they did not know was at all dangerous. With this thought in mind they wonder as to the reliability of the man next door, and the one living further down the street. In this manner there is an ever increasing apprehension, among the loyal Japanese citizens, as to how many and where the disloyal ones are located.

[1] EXHIBIT II—DECEMBER SEVENTH AND BEFORE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PRESS

*a. Prior to December 7, 1941.*—For several months prior to the treacherous Japanese attack on the Island of Oahu, there was an almost continuous fluxation in both public opinion and official circles on the gravity of the international situation, with specific reference to Pacific relations.

While public opinion varied from a fair state of optimism to a low degree of pessimism, as reflected in the local press, official observers seem to have definitely looked upon the rapidly changing situation as growing extremely grave for a very considerable period, as may now be revealed from official files.

As early as June 24, 1941, an understanding had been reached by the local intelligencies, agencies, the M. I. D., O. N. I., and F. B. I., to accept the Digest of Opinion, prepared by the Military Intelligence Office in Honolulu, as the official digest for the three services. This was designed to avoid duplication of efforts.

There isn't anything that can now be said which will throw more light on the situation in question and at the same time illustrate the accuracy with which the trend of events were being viewed than by the following extracts taken from the "Digest of Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics in the Japanese Press", and other documents, prepared by this office:

[2] *Extracts from Digest of Japanese Press*

*June 9, 1941.*

"There has been a pronounced pessimism as to the international outlook, during the period 15-31 May. . . . The feeling is general that Japanese-American relations are precarious and that they may even become worse; that the leaders of both countries, are fully aware of the futility of war. . . . and that important leaders on both sides are working feverishly to avoid an open break—with slight hope of success.

"The course of action being adopted by the local Japanese seems to be strictly dictated by expediency; and that of the Japanese government, by opportunity."

*June 16, 1941.*

"The period, June 1 to 10, has been marked by a rapidly worsening of relations between the United States and the Axis elements of Europe. . . . On the other hand, during the same period, there was an ironical complex to local opinion which offered a faint hope for improved understanding between the United States and Japan. That is, despite the increase tension between the two countries, there developed a conviction that diplomatic efforts would triumph and head off any immediate crisis.

"The local situation, which may be affected by the above-mentioned trend, has been distinguished by patriotic declarations and movements by second-generation Japanese for the support of American policies; and, ostensibly, a better attitude shown by other Japanese elements.

"However, these many, and perhaps mostly, sincere patriotic utterances were largely offset by other statements which were definitely destructive criticism of our leaders and policies, and obviously inimical to national interests under present emergency conditions."

*June 24, 1941.*

"Pro-American, loyalty, and patriotic expressions continue strong from second-generation Japanese in particular, and a favorable attitude of other elements in general. . . .

"The idea of the Japanese remaining here 'irrespective of what might happen between Japan and America', seems to be growing into a fixed policy. There

appears to be a movement to instill in the minds of the Japanese that 'this is *their* country' as against the idea that they are merely 'hangers-on.'  
*July 2, 1941.*

"Best opinion as expressed in the local press seems to indicate that Japan will continue a watchful-waiting policy until a definite decision has been reached on the outcome of the Russo-German war. . . . The local Japanese press was obviously bewildered for several days following the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia. . . . According to some . . . , it is believed that Japan is now confronted with new and serious problems, and that she must soon make decisions of far-reaching importance, possibly involving fundamental changes in her foreign policy. It is further thought by many that these changes will be at least temporarily and perhaps permanently to the advantage of the United States.

[3] *July 21, 1941.*

"The international situation during the last twenty days has grown gradually more tense, with a deep undercurrent of uneasiness. This is due principally to a feeling in many quarters that a decisive phase in the Russo-German war is about to be reached, and that the immediate results will be a deciding factor as to whether or not—and in what direction—the Japanese will move in the Orient.

"The Local Japanese press, in general, is still decidedly pro-German.

"The movement to encourage Japanese loyalty and cooperation with America in case of an emergency, of whatsoever nature, is being given outward support by most all elements of the Japanese community. The situation is such, however, that a show of anything but loyalty at this time would hardly be logical."

*August 7, 1941.*

"As reflected in the local Japanese press, the international situation in the Pacific area is extremely tense, delicate, and highly inflammable . . . Only a spark is required to cause an explosion that would set off the long-dreaded War in the Pacific.

"The local Japanese are still being encouraged to be loyal to America, no matter what may happen, and to cooperate in every way in support of the national policy of the United States."

*August 21, 1941.*

"International relations in the Pacific area have now reached their most critical point in history—where an explosion may be easily set off either by a false diplomatic step or by the rash act of an individual. Major interests, policies, and ideals have now been brought near to the point of physical conflict, gravely threatening the peace of the Pacific. Feeling is growing more bitter day by day as economic and other forms of pressure are being exerted by both sides. An open clash appears inevitable unless pressure is immediately relieved, or one of the opposing forces make some major concessions, or institute major changes in their basic national policies. Little hope is being entertained anywhere for better relations between Japan and other Pacific powers. Local Japanese, both alien and Hawaiian-born, in general, are determined to remain here, and throw themselves on the mercy of the American government and people, and do nothing that might prejudice their standing in the community as desirable residents and good citizens.

"In case of war between Japan and America, trouble with the local Japanese may be either little or great, depending largely on which country is able to dominate the local situation in the course of events, and in what degree; and, while United States domination remains unquestionable, a continuous campaign for tolerance and restraint on the part of all elements, civil and military, seems the best guarantee against local disorders so long as the Japanese are in the present state of mind."

[4] *September 5, 1941.*

"International relations in the Pacific area, which have continued extremely acute, have now reached the 'turning point'—in which direction, depending upon momentous decisions now in the making. Both Japan and America appear adamant in their determination to pursue their respective basic national policies to a successful conclusion; and each nation feels that it could not turn away from its set course or goal without catastrophic results in the end.

"There is a flurry of opinion in the Japanese press supporting the idea that Japan and America are about to reach an amicable settlement . . . but, while

this is not beyond the realm of possibility, as yet there is very little tangible evidence to justify such an assumption.

"The local press and influential elements of the Japanese community continue outwardly to encourage and advise both alien and non-alien Japanese to be loyal and give their fullest support to the American government and its national policies, and to strive for racial harmony and unity of purpose in dealing with the present emergency. Local American military and civil officials are also giving very active support to the foregoing with a view to minimizing racial and other disturbances here in case of actual war.

"While the local press shows little evidence of definite propaganda, the tempo of such Japanese radio programs from Tokyo, has been stepped up noticeably. The most flagrant statement recently being 'the reminder to all Japanese that children born to Japanese parents are to be considered as children of the Emperor entrusted to their care'."

*September 20, 1941.*

"Japan's basic policy of establishing complete hegemony over the greater part of East Asia and adjacent areas of the South Pacific, remains immutable and her course, irrevocable. . . . Japan still continues toward 'total mobilization', and the combined forces which she may ultimately muster will constitute a continual menace to the United States and other democracies so long as said forces are *not actively* committed against our enemies. Japan has been and still is staunchly sticking to the role of an 'aggressive opportunist.' The future employment of her forces will be governed by the tide of the internecine struggle now being waged among people of the white race.

"Another Japanese cabinet crisis was apparently avoided as a result of the Emperor making the military directly responsible to His Highness. . . . Tension among local Japanese has been greatly relieved, and there is considerable optimism for some form of adjustment of differences between Japan and America.

"Protestations of loyalty by local Japanese cannot, from the military standpoint, be accepted as being actuated by 'sentiment' because of too many extenuating and compelling circumstances which might be forcing most of them along a course of 'expediency.' Only an acid test will reveal the truth."

[5] *October 5, 1941.*

"During the last two weeks, the Japanese government has been doing a superb job of fence-sitting and ring-side betting in the arena of international diplomacy—keeping contemporary observers in the dark, confused, and nervously speculative as to which way she might eventually be forced to fall, or choose to jump, in order to safeguard her present winnings or, perhaps, undertake to achieve new prodigious gains. . . . She has been assuming the unique role of 'serving two masters' while 'designing their mutual destruction.' . . . She may be expected to continue to exercise her present balance of power in the Far East to the disadvantage of the democracies, with no good intention toward the Axis, just as long as possible.

*October 23, 1941.*

"A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. . . . Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies with 'further, intensified aggression'; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democratic states; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham; and forces us into a state of constant vigilance . . .

"The local Japanese continue to outwardly display a determination to support American policies by the purchase of defense bonds and saving stamps, by organizing units to support the major disaster council, and by assisting the drive to collect scrap aluminum."

*November 12, 1941.*

"Most veteran observers who are in close contact with the situation seem to agree that:

"a. In view of the fact that all diplomatic efforts toward a settlement of outstanding vital issues on the Far East, between America and Japan, now appear to be doomed to failure, both countries have been rushing military and naval preparations to completion to meet what is considered to be an imminent showdown.

"b. Japan's special envoy, Saburo Kurusu, is going to Washington for the purpose of submitting the least and final terms upon which Japan is willing to remain at peace with the American government, and that our government will be expected to accept those terms with no more than nominal modifications. The United States government likewise is presumed to have a set of counter proposals, representing the minimum conditions under which it is ready to reestablish normal relations with Japan, and the Japanese government will be expected to harmonize its policies therewith. . . . Each country . . . is manifesting a most favorable disposition for war unless the other country is prepared to sacrifice some major, fundamental policies affecting matters in the Far East. Each state appears SO ADAMANT with regard to its own established basic policies, which are diametrically opposite to, and irreconcilable with, the policies of the other state, that very few observers now dare to venture an opinion that a successful compromise of differences is at all feasible.

[6] "The local Japanese in general continue to cooperate in the furtherance of the American national policies, and declare their loyalty to the Stars and Stripes. However, there has been recent evidence developed by the questioning of evacuees returning to Japan which plainly shows that the true sentiment of many Japanese here still definitely lie with the mother country. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that unfavorable reactions are likely to flare up occasionally under circumstances attending an American-Japanese conflict."

*November 29, 1941. (The last issue of the Digest.)*

"While the international situation centering in the Pacific and directly affecting the United States has been somewhat stabilized near the point of explosion during this period (Nov. 6-25), the situation in several other contiguous areas—Thailand, Indo-China, and Eastern Siberia—of strong indirect concern to the United States, has continued to deteriorate.

"The Japanese government announced on Nov. 5 the appointment of Saburo Kurusu as Special Envoy to Washington for the avowed purpose of making a final diplomatic effort towards a solution of American-Japanese problems and effect an easement of tension in the Pacific. While a certain amount of optimism was expressed in local quarters for the success of the Kurusu mission, the general opinion was indeed pessimistic.

"The consensus of veteran observers seem to be that Japan had taken such a strong aggressive stand that she could not back down without incurring serious internal trouble; and that the United States, on the other hand, had even less reason to compromise its well-known demands which were diametrically opposite to those of Japan, hence the impending diplomatic talks were doomed to failure before they started. This opinion moreover appears to have been well-founded as subsequent events began to unfold.

"Concurrent with the conversations in Washington came reports of extensive Japanese military movements in Indo-China, toward Thailand, and elsewhere. The Japanese home press intensified its anti-American attitude. The Japanese Imperial Diet passed a supplementary extraordinary military budget of almost four billion yen with unprecedented speed. Japanese nationals continued to evacuate from potential danger areas (including Hawaii). Total mobilization in Japan proceeded unabated and with an ever increasing tempo—involving even boys and girls down to 14 years of age.

"The foregoing together with many other reported actions immediately aroused grave doubts as to the sincerity of the Japanese government, and led many to believe that the Japanese were merely aping Hitler's favorite strategem of utilizing peaceful gestures to confuse, disarm, weaken, and otherwise destroy effective opposition to an early contemplated military move.

[7] "There is no marked change in the local situation. The very nature of the plight of the local Japanese dictates an extreme desire for peace. And while local Japanese commentators keep striking a tune of optimism, their statements are frequently spiked with a note of despair. They appear to feel that an acid test of their attitude is near at hand.

"It may be well again to emphasize that extreme and eternal vigilance is the only and safest course here in Hawaii."

Let us now turn to a few statements in official documents which represent definite action of this office, taken as a result of the foregoing conclusions backed by certain other information at hand.

From the G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, H. H. D., Army Contact Office, Honolulu, 17 Oct. 1941—1200:

"1. *a.* With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. . . .

"*b.* The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed. . . .

"*c.* Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

## "2. CONCLUSIONS.

"*c. 4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.*—While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above (the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler), it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed. An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents."

From a G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, this office, 1200 25 Oct. 1941:

"1. *a.* A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. *b.* Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's [8] policies with 'intensified aggression'; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or object of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

## "2. CONCLUSIONS

"*c. Rapprochement Negotiations.*—Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely our enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies.

"*f. . . . Remarks. b. . . .* It seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring."

As it too well know, the great break did come on Dec. 7, 1941, but as clearly shown in the above quotations from the Digest dated Nov. 29, that this office was thoroughly alive to the possibility, but only lacked the tangible evidence which might have been easily obtained by intelligence personnel had they not been handicapped by existing legal restrictions. Had those restrictions not been in existence, it is reasonable to assume that, "tangible" evidence would almost certainly have been obtained that would in all probability changed, if not entirely prevented, the great tragedy of Pearl Harbor.

[1] *b. December 7, 1942.*—In brief, Army Alert No. 1 was in effect, which provided "a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without."

The Navy had made certain disposition of fleet units, in accordance with warning instructions previously received from the secretary of navy, which was considered appropriate to meet a threat no greater than could normally be expected from a power with which avowed friendly diplomatic relations were being maintained.

Neither of the armed forces were, however, prepared for a murderous, treacherous attack from a country whose high diplomats were making profound protestations of peace to the heads of our government.

There are many confirmed instances where both service personnel and civilians stood for minutes and even hours, watching the attack without being convinced of its reality—such was the deed which led President to state in bitter scorn:

"There is the record for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and disgust."

So much for the immediate military, diplomatic, and political aspects. However, the local situation as regard the state of civil preparations for war should be mentioned.

As previously stated under paragraph 1 *a*, the civilians in general had been thoroughly alive to the tensity of the situation for some time; and several groups of civilians were preparing for actual war. Some of the more important were:

[2] The nursing Association; a group of business men who had volunteered for police duty; another group who had been working on air raid warning plans; the Hawaiian Medical Society; and the Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross.

All of the foregoing played an important part in rendering prompt and courageous assistance on the day of the attack.

The combined forces of the M. I. D., O. N. I., and the G. B. I., although woefully inadequate in numbers and equipment, pooled their efforts and endeavored to meet the situation with all possible means and energy.

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 22 December 1941.*

1. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AS OF 7:30 A. M. 7 DECEMBER 1941

A. NAVAL OPERATIONS

No knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther East than the China sea, although it was known that they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27th and December 7th, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.

B. AIR OPERATIONS

No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the Asiatic mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approximately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base.

C. LOCAL SITUATION

Instructions from the War Department announced that the international situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive acts.

(1) **DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES.**—On Saturday, December 6th, it was learned through local investigative agencies that papers at the Japanese consulate were being destroyed by burning.

(2) **CONCENTRATION & MOVEMENTS OF LOCAL ALIENS.**—None. The entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.

(3) **SABOTAGE.**—Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were impending but no action on the part of the residents of the Territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 P. M., a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entity appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.



## D. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN

Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 Office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

## CONCLUSION

## A. CAPABILITIES

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

#69512

Copy

## TRANS-PACIFIC TELEPHONE CALL TO DR. MOTOKAZU MORI

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes.

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to [2] newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in ---?--- of late. That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various

sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

[3] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

[4] (J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

†(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

†(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herringroe for this year's New Year celebration.

[5] (J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the Army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) off phone.

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SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

2834

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SECRET

P 2 WAR WD PRTY

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 27, 1941.

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

*Ft Shafter, T. H.:*

473-27TH

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate Stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only

MILES

144 PM

Received as a SECRET communication.

Decoded by LT. JOS ENGELBERTZ, SC. 4:00 PM 27 Nov 41.

Answer should be marked ANSWER to Code Message No. 473-27th.

Note: See AR 330-5 and and 330-6 for handling messages of this classification.

21 APRIL 1945.

The War Department secret radio reproduced on the reverse side hereof is that referred to in my memorandum of 16 April 1945, to Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, subject: Action taken on WD information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

Byron M. Meurlott,  
BYRON M. MEURLOTT,  
Lt. Colonel, M. I.  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2 (CID)

CONFIDENTIAL

B

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

*Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.*

File 336—Foreign & International Affairs & Relations—G-2 Estimate of Inter-  
nation (Japan) Situation

SONGKHLA is another name for SINGORA, Sri Tamarat district, southern Thailand, Latitude 7° 12' N., 100° 36' W. longitude. It has a seaplane anchorage, Government aerodrome, radio station. It is located at the mouth of the "Inland Sea" Dhale Sap. It is connected by a short branch railway with the main railway which runs from Singapore to Bangkok. It is also the seat of government for the Viceroy of that district.

[Penned notation: 336—Foreign & International Affairs. X336.31—Foreign Vessels.

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,  
FEDERAL BUILDING,  
Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941.

MEMORANDUM: Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.

The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2:00 P. M., and docked at Pier #8 at 3:30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles at 9:00 A. M., 1 August 1941.

Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route were as follows: From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them; they were also prevented by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23 July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the 180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog banks; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu; then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours. In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued on into this port.

It is interesting to note that the ship began its actions before the action was taken freezing credits.

Reliable business men report that Japan is very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other

items reported to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anesthetics.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but with a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored to be from South America; the business men who saw these vessels could not give a description of them, but stated that the Captain of the "Frederick Lykes" could give a full and accurate description.

The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly toward citizens of the United States, has recently developed a hatred for all Americans. The public has also developed a spy phobia as a result of continuous warning from the Government, with almost all advertising, such as on matches, billboards, etc., carrying warnings against spies.

During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men working in factories in Japan, regardless of age, have lately been required to take part time military training.

For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimoniseki instead of through Kobe, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of bombers have been flown to China and Manchukuo via Kobe, with planes from other parts of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse mountain about six miles due west of Kobe.

On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army officers, in order to force a change in the cabinet; at the time of the incident no one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were suspended, including local telephone service.

All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese only. Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls to Germany may be made in German, but no other language is allowed in communications within Japan.

13 NOVEMBER 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C.:

(Attention G-2.)

Information furnished by W G Keswick formerly Singapore British courier now en route San Francisco comma Washington comma and London in same plane with Saburo Kurusu indicates mission of Ambassador is primarily to confirm Nomura reports that United States Government is not bluffing stop If he sees any indication of weakness in attitude of the United States then Japan may move toward other hostilities Stop Should he observe only attitude of strength and determination great possibility no such hostile acts would take place Stop Keswick information and opinions hitherto fairly accurate End

SHORT.

[Penned notation: 336—Foreign & International Affairs X 201—Kurusu, Saburo]

Subject: Japanese Magazine Translation from the "Gendai", July, 1941.

ADVOCATING THE CREATION OF A GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF THE SOUTH SEAS

(By Tetsu Nakamura)

#### BRIEF

Japan's overseas development policy has been stressed as the Great Continental Development Policy. Involved in said policy, was a North Advance Theory, considered a content thereof; and a South Advance Theory, often thought of as an opposite theory to that of the North Advance Theory.

However, the South Advance Theory is now considered as inseparable to the Great Continental Development Policy.

The South Advance Theory was also often checked as an Oceanic Theory (on account of encompassing mostly islands; and being principally a Naval job).

The reason why the South Advance Theory and the North Advance Theory were not taken up simultaneously as related policies heretofore is said to be due to limited national power.

Now it seems that, as a result of circumstances and developments of the China Incident, it has now become necessary to combine the heretofore separate theories as to direction of expansion, into a single theory or plan.

Mr. Takegoshi Sansa, advocating the southward development of the Japanese race, stated in part as follows:

"Besides those receiving the culture of England and France, many among the 100,000,000 Malaysians are looking forward to our country, for although the Europeans have been exploring the waters of Malaya for several hundred years, there has been no change. Consequently, it is waiting to be developed. If the Japanese race is capable of developing this great treasure house, it can be said that the noble project of a great nation has been accomplished. Our future does not lie in the north, but in the south; not on the continent, but in the sea. The Pacific should be made our country's lake."

Mr. Sansa gave us our first European conception of colonial settlement.

The new slogan "East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere", adopted by the 2nd Konoye Cabinet, is merely a progressive conception of the New Order in East Asia, adopted by Konoye's 1st Cabinet, and due to its expansive nature requires the fusion of the New Order in East Asia with the Southward Policy.

It is a great mistake to immediately consider that the New Order in East Asia has been realized and that the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere has been accomplished. This is because the political and economic reality of East Asia must be reconstructed and revived for this ideal aim.

The East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere is being stressed as the ideal aim. This new aim or idea is considered more realistic—it is more economical and material (in the sense of natural resources). While the New Order in East Asia conception was more political and less realistic—hence the new aim or ideal.

It is needless to mention that the problems of East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere, which now includes a southern political sphere, must be taken up. Herein lies the reason why the plan of a Southern Government-General System as a political pivot of the Southern Political Sphere must be considered, although it may be a very idealistic plan.

The southern political sphere, which can be considered a part of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere, must be said to include a very complex political structure and cannot be thought of as a single political block.

Within the Southern Political Sphere of East Asia are to be found our country's possessions—namely, Formosa, the Mandate South Sea Islands and the Spratley Islands and the Philippines, the Republic of China in South China, the French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and the Hainan Island. Their political control relations are multifarious; their racial structure, culture and customs are diversified; and the only thing in common are the blood-relations of the natives as races of East Asia. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the conceptions of New Order in East Asia and East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere have as their guiding idea the autonomy and independence of the races of East Asia, this blood-relation element of the races must be most seriously considered.

Now, the task assigned to the races of East Asia is that the southern political sphere must be formed as a part of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere based on the blood-relation characteristics of the races of East Asia in the south.

Speaking of the Southern Political Sphere, although the relations between our country and such countries as the Dutch East Indies, the French Indo-China and the Philippines are *not only not similar*, but also *do not* appear to have the hopeful possibility of creating the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere today. It is therefore necessary to have some sort of close connection as races of East Asia, and is only proper for our country to have some sort of powerful southern political system as a local organ of the south for the consummation of such friendly relations. This is why the southern government-general system is being considered as one of the methods. Hence the necessity of a southern political system to control the southern policy is being keenly felt, in contrast to the northern political system of Manchoukuo and North China.

The Southern Government-General Theory is a contention stressing the strengthening of a local organ as its political pivot to correspond to the south-

ern new order of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere. It is wholly connected with requests of outside territories advocating the strengthening of the Formosan Government-General. However, if the *ideal condition* of the southern political sphere is realized, it is *doubtful* that *Formosa* would be the pivot. (Note: the center would probably move farther south)

There is at present conflict between the Formosan Government-General with the East Asia Bureau. There must be a close connection among the East Asia Bureau, the Foreign Ministry, the Formosan Government-General and the South Seas Office, and a powerful political system to unify the southern administration must be considered. Whether the southern government-general should be an expansion of the Formosan Government-General or separate, is a question.

Now, if Formosa, which presently has only man power and economic strength, were to be made the center of the southern political sphere and a southern government-general were to be created there, the question as to whether Formosa has the administrative and economic ability to discharge such a great task should be considered.

Firstly, if Formosa is not able to become the industrial and economic center of the southern political sphere, the independence of the southern political sphere cannot be expected.

For example, even if the South Seas Government were to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Formosan Government-General under the present economic condition due to its geographical relations, it would still be impossible to manufacture the raw materials of the South Seas into finished goods in Formosa. Hence, considering the fact that the raw materials must be sent to Japan proper to be made into finished goods, it would be more significant for the South Seas to be directly connected to Japan proper.

This is applicable to the products of Hainan Islands as well as those of French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, but if the products of these places could be manufactured into finished goods in Formosa, Formosa probably would be able to perform her role as the pivot of the Southern Political Sphere.

In this respect, the industrialization of Formosa is being regarded as the urgent matter of the present. However, the industrialization of Formosa cannot necessarily be regarded optimistically, for in as much as all products are being sent through Formosa to Japan proper, today, no material value, probably, can be seen even in the purpose of creating a southern government-general.

After all, it must be said that the possibility of the Southern Government-General System depends upon the possibility of the industrialization of Formosa. An administrative center, which is not an economic center as well, is meaningless. If Formosa, as the center of the new order of the Mutual Prosperity Sphere in the south, cannot be industrialized and be made into the industrial center, then it should not be the administrative center, except for possibly the reason of administrative necessity.

Judging from the problem of the quantity of electric power possessed and labor power of the natives, not only can the industrialization of Formosa not be regarded optimistically, but, also, is a very difficult matter.

However, instead of stressing the meaninglessness of the southern government-general system from such economic aspects, the significance of the system should be recognized from the point of view of administrative necessity for the establishment of the southern political sphere and our southern policy should, preferably, be turned toward the industrialization of Formosa and the development of the natural resources of the south.

(Note—I think the above covers all the things of immediate interest contained in the article.)

GMV

[Penned Notation: 336. Foreign & International Affairs & Relations.]

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,  
FEDERAL BUILDING,  
Honolulu, T. H., 2 May 1941.

MEMORANDUM: G-2.

Subject: Comments on observations of a missionary.

1. The observations set forth in the attached memorandum reflect the viewpoint of most Christian missionaries in Japan. Being religious teachers, they are by nature idealistic and their feelings toward the Japanese are often influenced by

wishful thinking. During many years contact with them in the Far East, I found most of them pro-Japanese and often critical of our own people and actions of our officials stationed there. In this they were sincere, but in evaluating their statements regarding Japanese, these factors should be considered.

2. Paragraphs 2 and 3—The transition from feudalism to a more or less modern industrial nation, of necessity, made the Japanese imitators. They have contributed little in the field of modern inventions and research. Almost everything has been taken "as is" from western nations. Since they had not gone through the trial and error period of the western nations, they employed foreign advisors and sent investigators abroad to copy—to the letter—things other nations were doing. The Osaka Street Railway is outstanding in Japan but not superior to similar ones in western countries.

The Japanese merchant marine is very good. The white glove incident is typical of the people who are thoroughly disciplined by the Shinto system. However, this high standard of cleanliness is not standard throughout Japan.

3. Paragraph 4—I was present when the Emperor reviewed the entire fleet, on the occasion of his enthronement, and it presented a splendid appearance. Most of our naval officers I have talked to think the Japanese navy very good.

4. Paragraph 5—The Ministers of War and Navy are not accountable to the Premier, but have direct access to the throne; therefore it is not necessary to refuse to name these ministers. The usual method is to name the ministers and force the others to resign if they do not support the policies of War and Navy.

The Emperor undoubtedly approves many things after they have been accomplished, although he is all powerful (in theory).

5. Paragraph 6—Shinto is not a religion in the western sense, but is usually referred to as such. It is a form of ancestor worship and its control extends to every Japanese during every moment of his life. A person is [76] born into Shintoism if he is born a Japanese. When the Buddhists went to Japan they found that they could not change Shintoism, and altered their teachings so that they would not conflict. The consequence is that the Japanese are both Shintos and Buddhists and, in my opinion, Shintoism has far more influence over the lives and actions of the Japanese people than Buddhism. A Japanese may believe in Buddhism or not, just as he pleases, but is born into the Shinto system. The Japanese "conscience" is motivated by moral teachings of Shinto just as the Christian conscience is motivated by the Ten Commandments. A Shinto is constantly striving to make face for his ancestors' spirits and the elaborate code of conduct which has been built up controls every member of every family during his every breathing moment.

I have talked to Japanese who professed Christianity after attending mission schools. Some admitted that they could not throw off Shinto, as it is a national system of life. Most Japanese admire the idealism of the Christian religions and no doubt the second and third generations in Hawaii are turning more and more to Christianity as the old home ties are broken.

Few educated Japanese, even in Japan, will contend that the Emperor is descended from the Sun Goddess—they know it comes from their mythology, but one must also remember that there is a difference of opinion among Christians regarding the origin of man. Many good Christians contend that Adam and Eve were mythological persons.

6. Paragraph 7—I visited Japan three times before going there for a 4-year detail at the U. S. Embassy, and found that being followed by secret police is the rule, not the exception, in peace or war.

7. Paragraph 8—The "black-out" drill in Tokyo was described in an illustrated article in one of the Japanese publications during the past year, probably the Japan-America Review published in New York. Undoubtedly the drill was carried out efficiently. The rules and regulations were probably copied from the British and the people *ordered* to comply—they do not *ask* people to cooperate in Japan. In my opinion, it has never occurred to the Japanese people to deliberately evade or cut corners in regulations due to Shinto "Conscience." He is probably right about the neutrality pact, as each will honor it only so long as they profit thereby.

8. Paragraph 9—Probably true.

9. Paragraph 10—I am inclined to believe that very little information of value can be obtained from the women. They are as a rule more clever than the men, although they hold an inferior position in the family. They would not willingly jeopardize the safety of any relative in Japan by telling anything of importance that slipped through the censors. They are also reluctant to do anything that might displease the husband or his family, and any disloyalty reflects discredit



on her own parents and their ancestors for failure to give her proper moral training. However, in Hawaii, this strong Shinto influence is weakening gradually.

10. Paragraph 11—I concur in general with these statements, but I am not quite so optimistic. They do want to be Americans but reserve the right to define that status. However, I believe that the citizens will remain loyal and the aliens will be quiet and law-abiding through any emergency if they are kept informed as to what is expected of them at all times and if they clearly understand that their treatment will depend upon their behavior.

11. Paragraph 12—No responsible person could doubt this. It is most important that this be done.

12. Paragraph 13—The language schools retard the progress of Americanization, not because Japanese is taught, but because the children are kept in an alien atmosphere all afternoon when other American children are mixing on the playground learning to speak and think American. It is true that the students learn a very poor grade of Japanese, if any, but due to the fact that they come into contact with other American children only during public school hours, they also learn a very poor grade of English. The "culture" taught in the language schools seems to be stressed more than language, judging from the results I have seen. This "culture" extols the superiority and virtues of the Yamato Race. It includes moral lessons based on the Shinto system and an alien philosophy opposed to our own way of life. They are told that in order to become good Americans they must retain the virtues of the Japanese and combine them with the virtues of the Americans, thereby making a superior citizen. Incidentally, all Japanese characteristics are virtues to be retained.

The Consular Agents constitute an excellent semi-official network of communication and control for all who desire to do business with Japan or to aid its government.

13. Paragraph 14—These statements confirm my opinions on the same subjects. However, it must be kept in mind that "good Japanese contacts" are rare. Japanese are sensitive people, and family and racial ties are strong. It is almost impossible to find one who will say anything reflecting discredit on the race or any member thereof, and a contact will not bring discredit on his race by his disloyalty to it.

RICHARD W. COOKSEY,  
Lieut. Col. G. S. C.,  
Contact Officer.

1 AUGUST 1941.

Memorandum For: Col. Bicknell.

Subject: Local Japanese Situation During The Period 26-31 July 1941.

Local Japanese situation changed momentarily during this period, becoming more critical than ever before. This change was due to the proclamation by President Roosevelt freezing all Japanese assets in the United States on July 25th. Up to that time, in spite of the tense America-Japan relations, the Japanese here manifested very slight excitement and apprehension and remained practically unmoved because they have been imbued by local Japanese press with the idea that the international situation between these two powers was getting better and that it is certain to become better and hostility between them will never come and because they have been given assurances frequently that they will be treated fairly by the constituted authorities if they act properly. However, they lost this optimistic view when the freeze order was announced and started to harbor the feeling that a clash between America and Japan is imminent. Consequently, excitement and apprehension became strikingly evident among them. But, their apprehension was of financial nature more than anything else. The fact that about \$300,000 from the Sumitomo Bank, and about \$40,000 from both the Pacific Bank and the Yokohama Bank was withdrawn on the 26th and the fact that many Japanese have tried to transfer land titles and bank deposits to their children ably support this view. Spiritual apprehension also prevailed to a slight extent. That is, some Japanese were reported to have worried as to their future status regardless of their strong trust they have built in themselves that the American government will accord them fair treatment at all times.

Local Japanese newspapers persistently maintained a calm and advising policy, cautioning local Japanese to remain calm and cooperate with the United States government and have confidence in the government of their residence at all times, both in their editorials and columnists' columns. They also refrained from

publishing articles that might excite or cause controversy in the community and gave big publicity on items that might calm the people.

The Japanese shipping situation was acute here during this period. The NYK ship Asama Maru which was scheduled to arrive here on the 26th failed to come until the afternoon of the 31st. This delay caused local Japanese merchants and Japanese people whose relatives were aboard the vessel considerable worry.

Local Japanese radio stations carried on as usual during this trying period, excepting a noticeable decrease in the store advertisements on Monday, the 28th, having been decreased to about half their normal number.

Practically all local Japanese importing firms have been closed by the freeze order and the Japanese retailers stopped selling freely, some even going as far as to hide their stocks. Shortages of Japanese goods became more and more acute and prices soared. Many people were reported as having rushed to the stores to purchase all available goods, but were unsuccessful in many instances.

Local Japanese educational institutions remained quiet. Authorities and people connected with them made no statement and held no known meetings.

The religious groups remained practically quiet, excepting that a convention of the delegates of various temples of West Buddhist sect was held in Honolulu on the 28th and at which time Bishop Kuchiba asked the gathering to build good American citizens of Japanese ancestry, cooperate with the United States national policy, comply with the American principles, repay gratitude, and remain calm.

The American Legion held a conference at Hilo on the 26th and passed a resolution calling for abolishment of Japanese language schools here. Local Japanese newspapers have given considerable publicity on this matter and aroused considerable interest among the Japanese.

More Japanese are now buying or advocating purchase of United States national defense bonds. For instance, Honolulu Japanese Contractors' Ass'n. cancelled its picnic and members have agreed to buy the bonds at a meeting held on the 27th.

Conclusion: Excitement and apprehension ran high at the beginning of this period, but gradually subsided and was practically normal at the end.

President Roosevelt has proclaimed an embargo against oil and gasoline export to Japan and it is expected the Japanese situation here will change.

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SECRET

*Copy of cable received Nov. 27, 1941*

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1. without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy)

American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.

Copies to:

Mr. Shivers.

Capt. Mayfield.

Col. Bicknell.

[Hand written: distributed by me to those names shown on Nov. 27, 1941.]

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be sent to subordinate commanders.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will

# 284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. From and Date     | #249—To   | Subject: Information re Japanese Situation                                                                                                     |          |
|-------------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1st Ind. Cont. O 9 Sept. 41.  | G-2 C/S.  | Attached hereto for information is a report received 8 Sept. 1941 relative to the Japanese Situation.                                          | G. W. B. |
| 2d Ind. G-2 11 Sept. 41.....  | C/S.....  | For information. My personal belief is that conditions are better since this report from H. B. Incl: Data from Naval Attache—Tokyo. (Undated). | R. J. F. |
| 3d C/S.....                   | C/S.....  | Noted.....                                                                                                                                     | V. S.    |
| 4th Ind. G-20 1 Sept. 41..... | C/S.....  | Office.....                                                                                                                                    | G. S. C. |
|                               | Cont..... |                                                                                                                                                | MMM      |

COPY

INFO; CINCPAC, CINCAF, NAVATTACHE CHUNGKING, COM16, NAVATTACHE PEIPING. Z MOTH 030730 MUSK Q DART F5L F5Q OPE PLUG WIFE D

From: NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO.

To: OPNAV.

Info: ASST NAVATTACHE SHANGHAI.

Influential semi official East Asia Development League headed by Expremier General Senjuro Hayashi has issued following advise to Government X Adhere to Axis Pact X Carry out Greater East Asia policy X Repudiate aid to ChungkingX invoke right of self defense in seas near Japan X Stated reasons for (50) advice are that Japan desires speedy restoration peace to enable nations find proper place in world X Keynotes Japans policy are early settlement China incident establishment co-prosperity sphere X Japan cannot tolerate American policy of assisting China opposing Japans peaceful southern policy exerting economic pressure on Japan and aiding nations (100) Hostile to Japans Allies X Japan cannot understand American policy of shamelessly illegally occupying Greenland Iceland violating laws governing neutral nations at same time remaining silent toward outrageous invasion Iran by Britain USSR X Japan must break encircling ring of hostile powers

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In recent speeches military naval officials urge entire population to unite and serve Empire faithfully to meet greater crisis in history X War Minister desires closest contact between Army which is driving force of national and civilian population X Army trying carry out greatest mission must have nations support X (50) Colonel Mabuchi, Chief Army Press Section, in speech bitterly criticizing America states Japan must establish strong internal defense structure to break encirclement by ABCD powers X If favorable settlement Japans problems cannot be reached through diplomatic negotiations Japan must use force X All Japanese must be prepared sacrafice themselves for (100) state X Lt. Comdr. Tominaga of Navy Press Section states Japan must be vigilant since anti Japanese nations under American leadership have greatly increased military forces in Far East.

[Penned Notation: 336—Foreign and International Affairs and Relations X091—Japan.]

MID-2801-510

CONFIDENTIAL

C-I  
WAR

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
Washington, D. C., August 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs. Hawaiian Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

## 2. Enclosures:

MID/2023-1026/1—Cpy of Ltr. Fr. F. B. I. re Info. on Japan's entry into war: atd 7/28/41.

OR/10524-4032—Cpy of MID Setm. re Subversion statistics—War Department personnel: dtd 8/4/41.

[Panned Notation: 336—Foreign and International Affairs.]

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

MID/2023-1026/1

G-2  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
Washington, D. C., July 28, 1941.

## PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable ADOLF A. BERLE, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. BERLE: As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source, the reliability of which has not been determined, to the effect that if Great Britain were to suffer a major military setback, the Japanese military party would force Japan's entry into the war, in which case Shanghai and Tientsin would be immediately occupied by the Japanese Army and would be completely blockaded by them.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. E. HOOVER.

cc—Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

cc—Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Further Distribution:

9th C. A.

Haw. Dept.

Phil. Dept.

File

Source: Reliable.

Info: Undetermined.

fm 8-4-41.

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C

HEADQUARTERS CPBC USAFICPA

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

350.05—Information on Foreign Countries—Binder #1 Through 1941

(HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT)

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## Inter-Staff Routing Slip

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| No. of Ind. From and Date  | To              | Subject: Military attache report                                                                                                                                                           |               |
|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| 1st Ind. G-2 6 Nov 41..... | Chief of Staff. | For information. This report pertains wholly to aviation and a copy has been furnished H. A. F. 1 Incl.: Military Attache Report No. 23. Dated 3 Nov 1941. Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft. | K.J.F. K.J.E. |
| 2nd Ind. Of G-2 11/6/..... | .....           | Noted.....                                                                                                                                                                                 | A. C. J.      |

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.

Army Contact Office  
Honolulu, T. H.

Date: 17 October 1941.

## SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Subject: *New Japanese Premier Hideki or Eiki Tojo.*

Lieutenant General; Director General of Military Aviation. Born December 1884, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1919; instructor Military Staff College, 1922; Chief of Mobilization Section; Commander Infantry 1st Regiment; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer; Commander 24th Infantry Brigade, 1934-35; Commander Gendarmerie Headquarters and Chief Police Affairs Department of Kwantung Army, 1937; War Vice-Minister, May 1938-December 1938; Minister of War since December 1938.

Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-time cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.

An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Miss Kazuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs who returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conservative among the members of the army clique."

Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article stated that he is a conservative.

George W. Bicknell,  
 GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
*Lt. Colonel, C. S. C.*  
*Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,*  
*Contact Officer.*  
 G-2, Schofield Barracks (3 copies).  
 G-1, H. H. D.  
 F. B. I., Honolulu.  
 O. N. I., Honolulu (2 copies).

Distribution  
 C/S H. H. D.  
 G-2, H. H. D.  
 G-2, H. A. F.

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D

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

*Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.*

Private File—Lt. Col. B. M. Meurlott—No File Number

SECRET

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,  
 OLD DILLINGHAM BLDG.,  
*Honolulu, T. H., 21 November 1941.*

**MEMORANDUM: Seisure and Detention Plan (Japanese).**

1. It is quite possible that war may develop with Japan with or without a formal declaration, in the near future. Advice of such action to the Hawaiian Department, may be a single notification of the breaking off of relations between Japan and the United States; a declaration that the safety of the nation is imperiled; or definite instructions as to detailed action to be taken prior to such formal declarations. It may take place before the promulgation of the Presidential Proclamation, or it may not happen until such a final document has been prepared and a copy furnished this Headquarters.

2. In any event this question does involve the matter of policy to be adopted by the Department Commander, and this outline of procedure is suggested to meet these possible future requirements. They cannot be considered as either absolute or final but simply as a guide to actions, any of which may be changed by the then existing conditions and factors.

3. The total number of alien Japanese and Japanese Nationals in the Territory of Hawaii registered in compliance with the Allen Registration Act of 1940 is 41,346. American citizens, of Japanese ancestry, in the Territory on the same date are estimated to be 123,410. It is obvious that it would be both impracticable and ill advised to consider the question of seizure, detention, and possible internment of 37.3% of the total population of those Islands, or even any sizeable proportion thereof. For this reason the situation has been studied and broken down into three major plans; known hereafter as Plan I, Plan II, and Plan III.

4. Plan I envisions the action necessary under conditions which would prevail if war with Japan existed, or was indicated to be imminent, and which would involve military action in the vicinity of Singapore, the Philippine Islands or the Southwest Pacific area alone with no immediate threat toward the Hawaiian Area.

5. Plan II considers the situation which would exist in a general Pacific war with the United States fleet (or a considerable portion thereof) in Hawaiian waters but with threats of surprise raids (by air or surface craft) against the Hawaiian Islands.

6. Plan III considers a general Pacific war with the United States fleet absent from the Hawaiian area and with the immediate threat of a large scale attack upon the Hawaiian Islands.

7. It is assumed, in the consideration of all these plans, that the exercise of power of arrest, detention, and internment of alien enemies in the Hawaiian Islands shall be under the jurisdiction of the Military Commander acting under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War. It is further assumed that the Secretary of War, in carrying out such regulations, is authorized to use such agents, agencies, officers and departments of the United States and of the territory and municipalities thereof as he may select for the purpose and that they all are granted full authority for all acts done by them in carrying out these regulations when acting by direction of the Secretary of War.

8. Full consideration has also been given to the established policy that all enemy aliens will be enjoined to preserve the peace, to refrain from crimes against the public safety, from violating the laws of the United States and the Territory and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid, or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply with regulations promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States.

9. It must be understood that all lists of individuals which are mentioned and referred to in these plans will be in a constant state of revision and review. There may be additions made, names removed or transferred to lists of varying priority as future investigations are made and further information received. The lists quoted, at the time of the preparation of those plans, are based on current information and the reports of subsequent investigations will cause changes to be made at frequent intervals.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,  
Contact Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

E

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 336.8—Activities of Foreigners in U. S.—Japanese—Binder #3: From  
1 November 1941 to 31 January 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Department Staff inter-communication.

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| No. of Ind. From and Date          | To                    | Subject: M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country, Mexico"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |          |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1st Ind. Contact O,<br>30 Jan. 42. | G-2 F. E. ....        | 1. The appended report is forwarded for re-evaluation in the light of developments since December 6, 1941. This matter formed the basis for requests to Commanding Officers of the outlying districts for close surveillance of near off-shore waters soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This is like a Rube Goldberg cartoon, hence, is of interest to read. No particular significance. Believe informer got a tip on pigmy submarine and let his imagination run wild. Navy does not attach importance to theory. Searching could have been continued to extent of personnel available anyway. Return for file after anyone interested has read it. Noted--THD..... | G. W. B. |
| 2d Ind. G-2 FWD<br>ECH 1 Feb. 42.  | Contact officer. .... |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | T. H. D. |

(Page 92 of Exhibit 2 is a routing slip of Latin American Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department dated June 30, 1941, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 9, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen Investigation.)

79716

Classification: Confidential.  
Enclosures: 1  
Copy No. 6-5G

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report—Mexico

Source and Degree of Reliability: As stated:

I. G. No. 5940.

Source and Degree of Reliability: As stated:

1. The following information was received from the same source who has, from time to time, submitted information of a startling and fantastic nature, and which has seldom been proved to be reliable:

"GENTLEMEN: Related with my recent report on activities at Honolulu Pearl Harbor Hawaii Naval Base and the use of the word Molokai I have run across the following vital information bearing on that subject and related features. From different contacts and two especially one being the Naval I. S. agent Wagner Schioferle, who has recently been here from Managua Nicaragua, I am glad to be able to hand you two rough pencil drawings with inserted explanatory data of a new type of light draft short radius submarine that is now being built in quantities at the Japanese Navy shipyards at Japan.

"This submarine has a surface displacement of only 350 tons, carries four torpedo tubes has a maximum radius of action of 600 miles and carries a crew of ten men. This submarine is fitted with German N. A. M. engines made in Augsburg, Germany and shipped direct to Siberia on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and from there to Japan.

"Actual time of construction to build one of these small submarines is 5 months and their mission is what I find is as follows:

"These subs are so fitted with remote control electric magnetically actuated diving valves and air valves that they are susceptible of being operated from small 3 centimeter lead covered under water cables attached to the deck of said submarine and extended in the water along the floor of the beach to the shore line at which point you will observe from my rough



drawings as near as I can remember all the details of the different attachments that the submarine can be made to rise and sink simply by operating magnetic electric valves in the inside of the submarine by the mere opening and closing of the electric control circuits, the wires of which run to the shore and are concealed under the surface of the water.

"The only object of being outfitted with this remote control system of diving and elevating mechanism without requiring any man being on board is to slowly bring into the region of this Molokai Island in the Hawaiiis at which point the American government have established a large Leper Colony for people afflicted with Leprosy. These small subs it is planned to bring on to the number of about 12. Then they will be conveniently sunk in the shallow waters surrounding this Island in depths not to exceed 40 feet of water. Procedure so far followed in test experiments show that these subs can be sunk and will remain under water for perhaps of as long as 30 days without being compelled to raise them for charging of batteries.

"Plan consists in arriving at point of submergence where the exact depth of water is tested with a depth indicator on board. All men are removed from the interior of the ship the conning tower door is clamped down tight to prevent the entrance of water then the Three outer control cables are unwound and attached to the connection on deck after which a small boat carried on board leaves for the shore carefully unreeling these three cables until the Low Tide water level at shore is reached at which point the cables are tied down to the shore or else buried under the sand.

"All crew members of the submarine are then removed to shore in this rubber boat the submarine having been anchored fore and aft with light weight anchors to prevent it from drifting. Crew which is Japanese goes ashore and are met there or along side the craft by Japanese sampan Fishing vessels that take them to the other Islands where there are large colonies of Japanese working in the sugar fields and pine apple plantations and there are definitely absorbed with no chance of possible detection.

"Before crew is taken on board other vessels or given refuge in the other islands the control cable running ashore that controls the magnetic diving valve is made to charged using the direct current from the submarines stored batteries the circuit is closed stored valves inside the submarine respond to the flow of current coming from the Control Cable ashore the sinking tank start to fill with water and the submarines sink in a very few minutes.

[Handwritten: "If and when war comes between Germany and the U— S— or Japan and the U— S— the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attacks on the U— S— Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor."]

"After once sinking this submarine can remain sunken on the ocean floor for 30 days. In the meantime, another cable shown on my drawing containing six wires and also anchored at the shore has a very ingenious air pressure gauge for indicating the air pressure of the air contained in the submarine tanks with a scale of I think five pressures so that if, for any reason this air pressure in the sub tanks leaks out or suffers any drop in pressure which would render the next raising of the submarine impossible the Japanese spies who are charged with the supervision of this submerged submarine fleet and working unobtrusively in their sampan vessels makes trips from time to time to check the air pressure in these tanks by simply uncovering this electric air pressure gauge and taking note of the reading.

"I also invite your attention to the existence of a special five Centimeter steel reinforced rubber hose all coiled and tied down to the deck of the submarine with its corresponding wooden float or buoy. This hose is attached to the main air tanks through the medium of the pipe attachment on deck. In case then if the gauge on shore indicates that the Submarine is losing pressure the word is given to bring in at night one of the aforesaid fishing craft run by the Japanese and which you will find is provided with a modern High Pressure Air Compressor specially provided to recharge these tanks in case of exhaustion. On board this simple fishing craft there is equipment for a deep sea diver who can descend at once to the deck of the submarine, untie rubber hose and its wooden float and the hose rises at once to the surface due to the action of this float. After the hose is on the surface of the water the small fishing vessel at once makes attachment to it and the air in the submarine tank is immediately recharged. It takes 35 minutes to recharge these tanks using this fishing vessel.

"After tanks are fully charged the air compressor still continues to charge the tanks inside; however, the use of a Safety Valve inside the submarine to prevent excess air pressure from bursting the tanks starts to function and this excess air is accordingly blown out inside the interior of the submarine. This continues until the air pressure inside the submarine is slightly in excess of the pressure of the water surrounding the submarine at which time it starts to purge and finds its escape through the Low Pressure Purge Valve that I have indicated on my pencil drawing.

"This performs the function of driving out the foul air in the sub and prevents corrosion due to the foul gas that comes from the submarine's electric storage batteries. At the time of wishing to cause this sub to rise the operation is very simple consisting simply in training one man to close the shore cable circuit this causing the air to be admitted to the diving tanks, the water is immediately expelled and the sub comes to the surface without any other manipulation.

"Going back to the primary function of this submarine fleet I find that about 10 of these small craft will be brought in to the vicinity of these Hawaiian Islands sunken and the crew members secreted ashore. If and when war comes between Germany and the United States or Japan and the United States the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attack on the United States Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor.

"Both high commands feel that a surprise attack of this kind would cause the loss of all United States Airplane Carriers which is the principal objective of the Japanese High Command.

"Due to the fact that these small subs have such small cruising radius it has been necessary for them to be towed and I find that the Japanese tanker called Kenwo Maru conducted an experiment recently on her way to Los Angeles, California, by taking one of those small subs from the Marshall Islands to a base where a base has been established to the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands at which point those subs were again taken back to the Marshall Islands in tow by another Japanese tanker for the object of giving the members of the sub crew experience in the deep sea towing of these vessels, also the tanker accompanying these sub supplies them with fuel for the expenditure of the fuel that they have to take for battery charging and the operations of their propulsions, appears during the day when practically all navigation is done under water to prevent any detection by other vessels of the fact that these subs are being towed by this tanker.

"I repeat a base is now established at the Marshall Islands and this submarine fleet will slowly be increased until such time as at least 11 or more of these small crafts are safely sunk near Pearl Harbor.

"I will have more this next week on further use of these small units. I beg to remain,

"Sincerely,

"Yours truly,

\_\_\_\_\_."

2. On June 15, the following further information was received by the same source.

"Gentlemen:

"Confirmatory to telephonic advices given to Sr. D M at his residence at 1:25 a. m., yesterday morning I wish to inform that I secured data just a short time before to the effect that 3 under sea boats dealt with in my last letter have been brought in and sunk either with the object of making tests or for the purpose of starting a definite establishment of a group of these boats off the coast of Molokai Island.

"Information here indicated in a vague way that these subs were successfully sunk and that definite locations have been found on shore line for these boats but information is not entirely clear as to whether ships have been submerged permanently or just by way of experimental test. More data will be prepared.

"Respectfully,

"Yours truly,

\_\_\_\_\_."

## 292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Handwritten: "From: M. A. Mexico City Report No. 9899 June 17, 1941."]

3. The military attaché is unable to place an evaluation on this information. It was obtained by Mr. Lockett, commercial attaché of this Embassy, by Senor Villaseñor, President of the Bank of Mexico, who during the Cardenas regime was sub-Secretary of Recferio. It was given Senor Villaseñor by one of his agents. Numerous requests have been made for information regarding the identity of the agent and circumstances connected with his reports, but Sr. Villaseñor refuses to divulge with it. For this reason no evaluation is attempted.

The agent is believed sincere and he reports what he gathers from subversive individuals. These individuals may or may not be telling the truth. Their purpose may be propaganda or a form of war of nerves, or it may contain an element of fact.

On account of the serious nature of the information, it is submitted without other comment. The Navy Department may be able to determine the practicality of this scheme, and if it warrants investigation. If it can be used in Hawaii, it can be used in Santiago, Panama, and other Naval bases. A copy of the information quoted above has been given the office of the Naval Attaché in this Embassy.

GORDON R. \_\_\_\_\_  
Colonel G. S. O.  
Military attaché.

G-2 Distribution: 4, ONI.  
Classification: Confidential.  
From: M. W. Mexico City.  
Report No. 2899.  
June 17, 1941.

### HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.

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| No. of Ind. from and Date   | To        | Subject: Japanese Residents of T. H.—<br>Loyalty of—ONI Report                     |             |
|-----------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1st Ind. Cont. O. 3 Feb. 42 | G-2 ..... | Forwarded for your information. (1 Incl: ONI Report dated 1/26/42, above Subject). | B. G. W. B. |
| 2nd Ind. G-2 RE 4 Feb. 42   | CO .....  | Noted .....                                                                        | K. J. F.    |

Form NN1-119

745-C—S/M Base. PH.—11-16-41—6M.

### UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

#### INVESTIGATION REPORT

*Confidential*

Date: 26 Jan. 1942

Subject: JAPANESE RESIDENTS OF T. H.—LOYALTY OF

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H.

Report made by: C. B. Baldwin, Lt., I-V (S), USNR; R. W. Breed, End., I-V (S), USNR.

USNR.

Period covered: 16 Dec., 1941; 26 Jan., 1942.

Status of Case: Closed.

Origin of Case: Fourteenth Naval District.

Character of Investigation: Report on specific incident as illustrative of Subject.  
Enclosures: None.

Copy to:

|             |               |
|-------------|---------------|
| ONI (2)     | 13ND (2)      |
| CincPac (2) | 14ND (2)      |
| Com14 (2)   | MID-HD (2)    |
| 11ND (2)    | BIO-Kauai (1) |
| 12ND (2)    | FBI-Hon (2)   |

Source File No.: 14ND #1798.

ONI File No.:

**SYNOPSIS:** Report predicated upon Japanese plane crash on 7 December, 1941, and events subsequent thereto, on Island of Niihau, T. H. Niihau is one of smallest Hawaiian Islands, its meager population consisting mostly of Hawaiians and a few Japanese engaged in cattle raising, and communications with other islands are nil except by boat. Thus the residents of Niihau had no cognizance of the Japanese attack, or its extent and effect, until several days after it took place. Pilot of this plane survived and was taken prisoner by local Hawaiians, who confiscated his sidearm and flight papers. Among guards of the aviator were an American-born Japanese named Harada and an alien Japanese named Shintani, neither of whom had ever been considered disloyal to the United States. Shintani attempted unsuccessfully to secure possession of the pilot's papers by bribery, stating it was a matter of life and death, and that Japan had forced him to take this action. Shintani, however, later repented and re-joined the Hawaiians. With the aid of Harada, the pilot recovered his pistol and a shotgun, set up two machine guns from his plane, and dominated the island. Pilot was finally killed by an audacious Hawliian couple, and Harada committed suicide. Shintani is now in custodial detention.

**DEDUCTIONS:** The fact that the two Niihau Japanese who had previously shown no anti-American tendencies went to the aid of pilot when Japanese domination of the island seemed possible, indicates likelihood that Japanese residents previously believed loyal to the United States, may aid Japan if further Japanese attacks appear successful.

**CLOSED.**

RWB/zw

**APPROVED:**

MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.

*Confidential*

26 JANUARY, 1942.

**Subject:** Japanese residents of T. H.—Loyalty of.

On Sunday, 7 December, 1941, a Japanese fighter plane crashed on the island of Niihau, T. H. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was seized by the local Hawaiians and his pistol and papers were taken from him. He surrendered and at first was peaceable and friendly, speaking English fluently. At the time of the landing, SHINTANI, a Japanese alien resident on Niihau, held a brief conversation in Japanese with the pilot, the subject of which was not understood by the Hawaiians. SHINTANI had at this time no record of any subversive activities or tendencies.

Niihau is one of the smaller islands, being seventh in size in the Hawaiian group, and its meager population consists mostly of Hawaiians and a few Japanese. The people of Niihau have very few weapons, and had no means of communication, by radio or otherwise, with the Mainland or the other islands during the week from 7 December, 1941, to 14 December, 1941, which is the period to which this report pertains. Thus it is conceivable that the presence of the Japanese plane gave the inhabitants the impression that the other islands of the Hawaiian group had been invaded and captured by the Japanese; and the actions of the inhabitants with respect to the enemy pilot may be noted in the light of such possible belief, which also may have been fostered by the pilot.

The aviator was kept under guard pending his dispatch to Kauai, nearest of the more important islands. When, on Wednesday, 10 December, the islanders found themselves unable to send the pilot to Kauai, due to the failure of a motor launch to arrive at Niihau, the aviator was quartered at the home of YOSHI HARADA, American of Japanese descent. Several Hawaiians remained

to keep guard at the house of HARADA, who up to this time had shown no sign of disloyalty and took his regular turn at guarding the pilot.

On Thursday, 11 December, HARADA sent a messenger to SHINTANI to come and assist him in guarding the pilot, stating that he, HARADA, did not desire the responsibility of being the only Japanese in charge of the pilot. SHINTANI replied that he would join HARADA on the following day, Friday. He did so and a conversation in Japanese was held between HARADA, SHINTANI, and the pilot. The nature of the conversation is unknown.

On the afternoon of this same day, Friday, 12 December, SHINTANI attempted to secure the pilot's papers and pistol from the Hawaiian who has possession of them, by offering the Hawaiian a bribe of two hundred dollars. SHINTANI said excitedly, in the course of the attempted bribery, that it was a matter of life and death and that Japan had forced him to take this action. The attempt at bribery failed, and SHINTANI took no further action on the pilot's behalf. SHINTANI has since been placed in custody, however.

On the same afternoon, HARADA and the pilot succeeded in obtaining HARADA's shotgun from a building near HARADA's house. With the shotgun the pilot captured the Hawaiian guard and locked him in a warehouse. About 1730 that afternoon HARADA and the pilot broke into the house of the Hawaiian who had custody of the pilot's papers and pistol. HARADA was carrying the shotgun and covering a Hawaiian prisoner at the time. The pilot recovered only his pistol at this time. The owner of the house had been in hiding during the burglary; and, after the Japanese left, he removed the papers and secreted them elsewhere, after which he warned the community of the pilot's escape.

The pilot and HARADA then secured two machine guns from the plane and set them up in the village. HARADA, brandishing a gun, seized a wagon and horses from some Hawaiians and forced a captive to load machine-gun cartridges from the plane into the wagon. HARADA told a Hawaiian that the cartridges were enough to kill off every man, woman, and child on the island.

That night HARADA and the pilot broke into SHINTANI's house in search of the flight papers. They failed to find them and became furious; and late when they saw SHINTANI in the village, they pursued him, but he escaped and joined the Hawaiians, who had scattered to the mountains and beaches. Thereupon the pilot and HARADA took as prisoners the few Hawaiians who happened to be in the village at the time, and bound them.

About midnight the pilot attempted to send a radio message from his plane to Japanese. A few Hawaiians heard him, although they did not understand the message; and the residents, now assuming that a war must be going on, were alarmed at the thought that the pilot had sent for aid from the enemy. While the pilot and HARADA were absent from the wagon containing ammunition, the Hawaiians recovered the machine-gun bullets and secreted them. At 3:00 a. m. on 13 December, the aviator burned his plane and the House of the Hawaiians who had custody of the papers. However, the Hawaiians had already sent the pilot's papers to Kauai, via a small boat, under cover of darkness. The pilot and HARADA told the Hawaiian prisoners that they would be released if they disclosed the location of the papers.

On 13 December an audacious Hawaiian couple succeeded in killing the pilot whereupon HARADA committed suicide. Both men were buried at Niihau. An expedition squad of twelve armed soldiers arrived from Kauai at 1350 that day having been apprised of the situation by the Hawaiians arriving in the small boat which had left Niihau with the pilot's papers the night before.

**CONCLUSIONS:** It is worthy of note that neither SHINTANI nor HARADA had previously exhibited un-American tendencies, living docilely so long as the American Government was the established one. Attention is also invited to the fact that the Island of Niihau was isolated as to communication, so it is conceivable that the presence of the Japanese plane induced a belief among the residents that the Hawaiian Islands were under Japanese domination; and the residents were in fact alarmed about the possibility of further Japanese aid for the pilot. The facts indicate a strong possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, and Americans of Japanese descent, who previously have shown no un-American tendencies and are apparently loyal to the United States, may give valuable aid to Japanese invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of Japan and where it appears to the residents that control of the district may shift from the United States to Japan.

CLOSED.

## CONFIDENTIAL

EHG/td

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA  
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
*Governors Island, New York, November 28, 1941.*

Subject: GEORGE PAISH (PAISN).

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarter Hawaiian Department,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941, there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.

2. This is transmitted for your information and records.  
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2:

F. J. Pearson,  
F. J. PEARSON,  
*Lt. Col., G. S. C.,*  
*Executive Officer, G-2.*

1 Incl—(dupli) cpy FBI rept.  
[Penned notation: 336.8—Japanese.]

## CONFIDENTIAL

## COPY OF FBI REPORT

An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact MR. PAISN at the address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD C. PAISN, that his true name is SIR GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was interviewed, at which time he furnished the following information:

SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay, he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire Goddess" danced and otherwise entertained the gathering.

SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and during the course of the evening he turned the trend of conversation to any spirit of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this, that the possibility exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a Japanese promise of "liberation".

SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened due to the astute diplomacy of the United States State Department.

SIR GEORGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's Unlimited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining his publications and ability as a lecturer.

It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference to pre-World War associations, characters and historical events.  
I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.

CONFIDENTIAL

F

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

336. 2—Foreign Armies

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
M. I. D.,  
18 August 1941.

Subject: FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

Summary of Information:

Following information received:

"----- reports July 25th.

A. July 18th 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon.

B. July 21st Lieutenant General HOMMA (GOK ITA) commander-in-chief Formosan army and Major General SUMIDA (IPB JYS) arrived Saigon with 30 German and Italian advisers.

C. On mornings of both July 20th and July 21st air reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft.

D. July 20th one cruiser, one destroyer, one unidentified auxiliary and four repeat four transports packed with troops arrived CAMRANH BAY.

Message ends."

Distribution:

Evaluation  
-of source -of information  
X Reliable X

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
M. I. D.,  
18 August 1941

Subject: FORMOSA.

Summary of Information:

Following information received:

"A. June 16 150 infantry transferred from TAICHU to KOGO for parachute training and on June 18th 200 paratroops were transferred from KOGO to ROKKO.

B. KOGO area now under martial law and entry near-impossible.

C. Recruiting for army and labour corps still being maintained."

[Penned notation: 336.2—Foreign Armies.]

Distribution:

Evaluation  
-of source -of information  
X Reliable X

## CONFIDENTIAL

## G

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

GX2 [CID]

*Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.*

350.05—Foreign Intelligence—General Reports No's 1 to 34

Classification: Confidential.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, MILITARY AGENTS.

## Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: B. F. See separate communication.

Believed reliable, except as indicated.

## Summarization of Report

## When required:

1. Japanese agents and military activities abroad. (5935)
2. German agents and advisers in Japan. (5940)
3. German raiders. (7020)

## 1. (5935) JAPANESE AGENTS AND ACTIVITIES ABROAD

*a. Military attache to Rio de Janeiro.* On 12 September it was reported that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of the Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai had been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro, in which capacity he will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.

*b. Suspected agent in Netherlands East Indies.* In October the Japanese political agent OKANO TETSUO returned to N. E. I. on the KT ANO MARU. Having lived in N. E. I. since 1915, OKANO possessed a settlement permit and did not need a visa. According to a police report OKANO was employed by a high Japanese official during his stay in Japan. During his former stay in N. E. I. OKANO was in close contact with many suspected Japanese.

*c. Code expert to N. E. I.* Reported in September that Japanese courier, NOMOTO TATSUO, would be attached to Consulate at Batavia for two months after his return from Singapore. Consul General ISHIZAWA said he was a cipher expert attached to give instructions on use of new complicated Japanese code. NOMOTO told immigration authorities that he would hold conferences at various Japanese consulates. KAWASAKI YOSHIKI also a code expert in service of Japanese Navy. He is registered as a secretary to Consulate General; sailed from Japan 11 September. (Reliability excellent.)

*d. Japanese and German intelligence in S. E. Asia.* On 12th September it was reported that German and Japanese S. I. S. reached an agreement whereby the Germans will operate in all far eastern countries not occupied by the Japanese except Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, N. E. I., and the Philippines, which are operated by the Japanese. In spite of this agreement, Germans intend to operate in all far eastern countries under cover of the D. N. B. In Indo-China the D. N. B. and Domei will operate private W. T. stations! In Shanghai the Germans are operating Gestapo type of organization for political information. (Fairly reliable.)

*e. Japanese Recruiting Chinese Agents.* In September, the head of a department in the Nanking War Ministry reported having been approached secretly by General Ochita HATA, who requested his cooperation in enlisting Chinese agents



for work in Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure Fukinese or Chinese speaking the dialect of that province. Source stated that a certain number of men were recruited and dispatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated Chinese. Those chosen in all cases, had some previous military knowledge gained through service with Chinese troops. CHEN KUANG was said to be responsible directly to Japanese Military H. Q. at Nanking. (Reliability fair.)

## 2. (5940) GERMAN AGENTS AND ADVISERS IN JAPAN

### *a German advisers. (Dated 7 October 1941)*

- (1) KURE, 5 working in shell factory and 4 in shipbuilding yard.
- (2) YOKOSUKA, 18 working in munitions factory, 28 in shipyard, 6 at aerodrome.
- (3) MAIZURU, 5 working on A. R. P. (air raid protection).
- (4) TOTSUKA, 18 aviation and parachute instructors, 2 constructional engineers.
- (5) SHIIPUAKA, 8 working on aerodrome.
- (6) NAKAMITA, 10 working at aerodrome.
- (7) NAGOYA, 4 working at Aichi aircraft factory.
- (8) HIMEJI, 5 working at chemical warfare factory.
- (9) Three Germans, living at OSAKA, pay periodic visits to Nankai Heavy Industries Corporation to superintend parachute manufacture.
- (10) Source was told that 125 Germans, en route for Japan, were detained by U. S. S. R. on outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.
- (11) Source also told that 11 German aviation and parachute instructors were stationed at Nanking, and a total of 84 were attached to Japanese forces at Shanghai, Hankow, and Nanchang. (Numbers given with reserve.)
- (12) Movement of 30 German personnel from Japan to Indo-China was previously noted.

*b. Activities of German agents. Information from a German source, reported to have good connections in Japan, states:—*

(1) German ambassador in Tokyo is concentrating (a) on breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the heads of the Japanese Fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America; (b) on destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis, and Right army groups into a united front; and (c) encouraging higher officers in the KWANTUNG and KOREAN armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.

(2) German ambassador has considerable influence over General SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOSO NAKAMURA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among such civilians as SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURU TOYAMA, and KENSO ADACHI. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.

(3) In KOREAN and KWANTUNG forces, the following are known to be influenced by the German ambassador: Lt-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-General MITSUNAMI, and Lt-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in the Far East on the basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. S. R. government resulting in a guarantee of the inviolability of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers and, in consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby the Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from the East. (Moderately reliable.)

*c. Agent obtaining raw materials for Germany. Head of OTTO WOLFF informed source that, acting under instructions from Hamburg headquarters, he was buying up materials of which Germany is or will be in great need, such as wolfram, rubber, tin, etc. In particular they are interested in the purchase of supplies of these in Siam, where it is proposed that they shall be stored under innocuous names until such time as they can be delivered to Germany. (Reliability believed good; dated 6 October 1941).*

## 3. (7020) GERMAN RAIDERS

It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North China to proceed to Japan under Japanese flag. They will be armed to operate against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok. (Reliability uncertain; dated 10 October 1941.)

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.  
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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Classification: Confidential.

Report No. 25.

Date: 18 November 1941.

[Penned notation: 350.05. Info on foreign countries.]

Classification: Confidential.

Enclosures: No.

## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

## WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

## Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Various observers.

Reliability: Good unless otherwise indicated.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Continuation of G-2, Haw'n. Dept. Report No. 13, 29 Sept. 1941.

1. (9185) Aerodromes.
2. (9505) Aircraft factories.
3. (9570) Types of aircraft.

## 1. (9185) AERODROMES IN JAPAN

a. KASUMIGAURA aerodrome, located on shore close to western corner of LAKE KASUMIGAURA, east of and adjacent to AMI village. Lat. 36° 02' N., Long. 140° 14' E. Roughly rectangular, total area, inclusive of buildings, about 1200 x 2000 yards. Source informed that south edge of landing field has been extended about 300 yards. Surface sand and grass. On east side 26 buildings provide accommodation for headquarters, offices, barracks. These are two story buildings painted in camouflage patches of brown and green. Two steel hangars with workshops, about 200 by 90 feet high, on north edge. Source told that aircraft were stored in three layers in these hangars. New, large, circular hangar, about 250 yards in diameter was completed at end of 1939, in southeast corner. This hangar only protrudes about 20 feet above ground at its highest point and is believed to extend some distance below ground level. It is built of reinforced concrete, covered with earth and grass. There are 8 doors to this hangar. The W/T station is situated on the south edge. Seaplane and flying boat facilities are believed provided by two hangars on north edge. A number of mooring buoys were seen off shore. What appeared to be three catapults were seen on water's edge, north of aerodrome. Source was informed that there is an aviation school here with 600 students. Total of 2,600 aviation personnel is stationed here. Two high towers for parachute training were seen on the south edge. Source was told that 1,000 troops were being trained as parachutists, but it was believed that this large number was being tested out as to suitability and only a small proportion would be retained for training. Ten Germans were attached to this aerodrome and to the neighboring UDA aircraft factory. Source saw about 20 aircraft along south edge, including 6 or 7 Messerschmitts Me 110.

b. **SUNOSAKI** (1GD EAB) naval aerodrome and seaplane base, 45° 58' N., 139° 49' E., 6 km. east of promontory of same name and 4 km. west of town of JOJE (VHA HAL). Area about 100 acres. Possibly identical with **TATEYAMA** aerodrome.

c. **FUNAHASHI** (OJL HOP) Military aerodrome, 35° 42' N., 139° 56' E., west of and adjacent to railway station of same name. Area about 106 acres. Four hangars, also barracks. 300 paratroops from Eastern Section Army headquarters undergoing training here under German supervision. Source states "there is an aircraft factory in vicinity with German technicians attached." Perhaps identical with **SHINOSAKI** aerodrome.

d. **AKITSU** (LTA IFX) military aerodrome, 35° 49' N., 139° 29' E., one and a half km. north of railway station of same name. Area about 170 acres. Total of 3,000 personnel stationed here, of which a very small proportion are believed to be paratroops being trained by German instructors. Perhaps identical with **SAYAMA** aerodrome.

e. **SHINAGAWA** (RGU ECB) aerodrome and seaplane base, approx. 35° 38' N., 139° 44' 30" E., one and a half km. southeast of railway station of same name. Area about 80 acres. Possibly identical with **SHIBATA** aerodrome.

f. **YOKAIDO** (BYO, PON, SIR) military aerodrome, 35° 40' N., 140° 09' E., one km. northwest of railway station of same name. Area 75 acres.

g. **MIO** (AAF AHU) military aerodrome, 35° 00' N., 38° 31' E.; small number of paratroops from **SHIDZUOKA** military formations are under training here.

h. **SUMA** (UHN LIL) naval aerodrome, still under construction, about 5 km. west of **KOBE**. Area about 325 acres.

i. **KANOYA** (UZH DUW) military aerodrome, 31° 25' N., 130° 51' E., locally known as **KASANOHARA** (MEN TAK AYO) aerodrome; area about 325 acres. Parachute unit being trained by German instructors. Aircraft factory in vicinity employing several thousand workmen. Possibly identical with **KANOYA** naval aerodrome.

j. **TSUDANUMA** (IFX, JYS, IEC) military aerodrome, area 75 acres; paratroops of first division under training here.

k. **YOKAICHI** (BYO, GAZ, ECK) military aerodrome, locally known as **KAWAI** (ECB, BAC) aerodrome, area 125 acres.

l. **OKAYAMA** aerodrome has underground hangars similar in construction to that of **KASUMIGAURA** aerodrome (a, above), with capacity for 50 aircraft.

m. New aerodrome has been constructed at **TOKO**. This is said to be the largest in Japan.

## 2. (9505) AIRCRAFT FACTORIES

a. **UDA** (NYI JYS) aircraft factory, located 3 km. south of **KASUMIGAURA** aerodrome (see 1. a.), 35° 59' N., 140° 14' E. (Note: this disagrees with another report which states that it is in **TOKYO**, but **KASUMIGAURA** might loosely be called "near Tokyo".) This factory has been producing aircraft for the past 3 years. Labor force, 3,500. Production: 45 aircraft a month. (It is believed that this factory is used only for assembling aircraft.) The German **Messerschmidt Me 110** is under production here. On 20 May, source saw 6 or 7 **Messerschmidt**s on the adjacent **KASUMIGAURA** aerodrome.

b. **HANEDA** (NYI, JYS) aircraft factory, Tokyo, recently has produced 100 Italian 3-engine midwing monoplane bombers. These aircraft have been delivered to army and have been seen in the air over Tokyo. (Note: Source gave above characters for name of factory, but gave romanization as **UDA**, characters for this are (**UCO**, **JYS**) which resemble those given by him.)

## 3. (9570) AIRCRAFT

a. On 28 May, at a naval air demonstration at **MISAKI** near **YOKOHAMA**, source saw two 3-engine monoplanes and 18 twin-engine monoplanes. The three-engine aircraft were Italian "Piaggio P. XI. RC 40" bombers, manufactured in Japan. Engines are 14 cylinder, 1000 horsepower. Load capacity: 4,200 kilograms. Camouflage on under wings was light blue, gray and pale green in large irregular patches. It has been suggested that these aircraft were so-named because they are fitted with Italian engines. The twin-engine aircraft were German **Messerschmidt Me 110** fighters, manufactured in the **UDA** factory. These aircraft gave a demonstration of low level dive bombing. Source noted that both these types of aircraft had single rudders, and stuck to this statement even when shown pictures in *Jane's*. Both these types of aircraft are based on

the SUNOSAKI naval aerodrome, near the promontory of the same name on the southwest tip of CHIBA peninsula.

b. Under the supervision of German engineers, the SHIBATA aircraft factory has produced a 2-engine monoplane fighter. Armament: 2 fixed machine guns (cannon guns?) and 4 movable machine guns. Tests have proved very satisfactory. The Germans refer to this as Messerschmidt and the Japanese as the "16th Year of Showa" (1941) type. (Casual observation, without definite reliability.)

c. A new type of high altitude bomber, built in Germany, has been reported in South China area. Described as Heinkel-land (IHA OMR GYH OYK) type 98. Its special function is "silent approach" bombing.

#### 4. (9905) AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

On 25 August, 22 twin-engine bombers, commanded by Colonel MORIYAMA (HDU DYA) arrived at KIUNG SHAN aerodrome (HAINAN ISLAND) from Formosa. They are stated to be dive bombers, but this is to be accepted with reserve. According to air force gossip, it has been decided that with the advent of foggy season at CHUNGKING aircraft at HANKOW will be transferred to the southern area and that after September 500 bombers are to be based in Indo China.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

Report No. 23.

Date: 3 November 1941.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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Classification: Confidential.

Pennd notation: 350.05—Info. on foreign countries.]  
Classification: Confidential.

#### MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Businessman, resident of Japan.

Reliability: Believed good.

Summarization of Report, When Required:

Foreign relations; raw materials and manufacture; war morale of civil population; troop mobilization; troop embarkation points; airports; anti-aircraft; para-troops.

1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS. The Italian influence in Japan is negligible; the German very strong. There are several thousand German citizens in Japan and many are giving their technical services to the army and bringing strong political pressure to bear on the government. German successes or defeats in Russia have a marked effect upon political negotiations now going on between America and Japan. A Russian collapse may precipitate a Japanese move against Siberia. The Japanese desire not only to remove the threat of Vladivostock, but to occupy all of the Maritime Provinces. There seems to be doubt in Japanese minds as to whether or not the U. S. fleet would oppose them in the Pacific if they move against the Soviets. Their aggression will continue unless the U. S. makes up its mind to fight. Meantime, while the Japanese people are going through many hardships with unquestioning loyalty, the war machine is not breaking down, their war industries are becoming adjusted to the blockade, and their navy being augmented. Apart from Japan's determination to liquidate the China affair, they are prepared to take advantage of any weakness that may

encourage them to move either north or south. The fact that their plans for expansion are boundless is a reality and not an idle dream. The military still believe that the Germans can win, and that between them they can cause the collapse of the Soviets. A lining up of their armies, supplies, etc. will prove fatal to the cause of the democracies.

2. (4000) **ECONOMIC.**

a. (4020) *National Mobilization* is at its maximum and fully supported by the entire nation. Children from the age of 14 up to old men and women of sixty are engaged in munitions in defense industries. The war program has the full support of the people despite their many sacrifices.

b. (4115) *Oil and Gasoline.* There is an extensive storage of gasoline, under rows of temporary wooden buildings, at YOKOHAMA, at the west end of the harbor, near the Yokohama Yacht Club. At TSURUMI, across the harbor from Yokohama, there are Japanese oil installations, next to those of the Rising Sun and Standard Oil Company.

c. (4120) *Iron Ore.* Large, high grade deposits of iron ore have been uncovered in Manchukuo, making possible delivery to army and navy of important supplies of special high grade steel (see 4310, below.). The ore itself runs to 54% pure iron, producing 99.4% sponge steel. It is claimed that 100,000,000 tons of ore are near the surface, with at least 200,000,000 tons lying below the surface. The mine is located a short distance east of MUKDEN, with a broad gauge railroad leading to the main line between MUKDEN and DAIREN. Large stocks of crushed ore already have been stored at the steel works and they are being augmented steadily.

d. (4120) *Tungsten.* Japan is said to be obtaining tungsten and other special metals required in the manufacture of high test steel, from North China and Korea. Source believes that it would be a great mistake to underestimate Japanese capacity to mobilize in the future vast stocks of such raw materials for war purposes.

e. (4200) *Rice.* The domestic Japanese rice crop this year is estimated to be 10% below normal. However, this shortage will be made up and excessed by supplies from Indo-China. Only the shortage of shipping bottoms can possibly interfere with adequate rice supplied for the Japanese populace and army.

f. (4240) *Rubber.* Up until recent months there has been a severe shortage of rubber, but this gradually is being relieved since Japan's occupation of Indo-China. Now sufficient supplies are being received to care for military requirements.

g. (4240) *Lamp black.* There is a severe shortage of lamp black. Japan urgently requires 9,000 tons for their tire industry. This is being partially met by a very limited domestic production.

h. (4300) *Manufactures, general.* S. K. F. have for some years supplied Japan with major ball bearing requirements. These supplies have been stopped completely since the Soviet-German war interrupted rail shipments across Siberia. Despite the production of high grade steel in Manchukuo, Japan does not have facilities for manufacturing ball bearings, and unquestionably they are facing a serious shortage. Japan has been dependent on foreign equipment for their heavy industries, but they are working on a comprehensive plan to switch over from light to heavy industries. Sufficient time will enable them to realize this program. They are also concentrating on the tool industry to become independent of foreign countries. At TOTSUKA station, near YAKOSUKA naval base, there are several large, three-storied, wooden military establishments for manufacturing light military equipment, such as clothes, belts, etc. There are two plants adjoining the Bridgestone tire plant at KURUME, Kyushu (see 4360) and a large one on the rail line at FUKUOKA, all supplying various military supplies to the army, such as shoes, clothing, helmets, etc.

i. (4310) *Manufacture, iron and steel.*

(1) In JAPAN proper, the great iron and steel foundries are located at KOHURA on the railway running between JOJI and FUKUOKA. They cover a narrow area nine miles long, running parallel to the railroad. This is the heart of Japan's iron and steel industry, and if destroyed would gravely cripple the army and navy.

(2) *Manchukuo sponge steel.* Large quantities of steel, said to be equal to high grade Swedish steel for tools and armor, are being produced in Manchukuo. The plant is located just outside of the port of DAIREN, on a railroad spur leading directly to the DAIREN-MUKDEN railroad. The grounds cover about 80,000 tsubo (66% acres). In March, 1940, two furnaces were in operation, producing 40,000 tons, and a new 30,000 ton plant was just being put in operation. A plant of similar type, capacity 100,000 tons, was being constructed. It was hoped that

this would be completed before the end of 1940, but construction was held up by shortage of building materials. It is believed that priority rights have been granted by army authorities so that it will be completed before the end of 1941. The combined production, upon completion of this, will be over 180,000 tons of this special steel, with twelve sets of electric furnaces in operation. Continuous additions to the plant are being contemplated with a final goal of 1,000,000 tons. It is stated reliably that they are using an entirely new and secret process, requiring neither water, charcoal, coke, nor high grade coal. Only a low grade of ash coal is required, and ample supplies of this are available from their own coal mines in Manchukuo. (Regarding the iron ore, see 4120, above.)

(3) Extensive "heavy industries" operate at FUSHAN, near MUKDEN, independent of Japan, but supported to a large extent by the Japanese armies in Manchukuo.

j. (4330) *Motor car manufacture.* For years, Ford at TSURUMI, near YOKOHAMA, and General Motors, outside of OSAKA, have dominated the passenger and truck markets of Japan. Today they have shut down entirely. They refuse to bring in parts for assembly, as no dollar exchange is available. Also, the Japanese Government passed the National Automobile Industry law some five years ago to protect and enable them to develop their own industries. During these last five years, they have made considerable progress, especially with trucks, military six-wheelers, and tanks.

The four most prominent factories are as follows:

|                            |               |
|----------------------------|---------------|
| Nissan Auto Co.....        | Near TSURRUMI |
| T. E. G.....               | " TOKYO       |
| Nakajima Iron Foundry..... | " "           |
| Toyoda Auto Co.....        | " NAGOYA      |

All of these plants easily may be detected from the air. Production figures are unknown, but source estimates that total number of trucks produced monthly exceed 1000 units. They are copied after old American models, inferior in quality. They are 4th class compared to American army units, requiring much service, and with very short life, say six months to one year in the field.

The Nissan Automobile Company, leading Japanese auto company, is located at TSURRUMI, east of the Ford Motor Company's assembly plant. They turn out several hundred trucks monthly, modeled after the old 1934 Paige. This plant easily covers two acres of ground, and is the backbone of the army's truck production. Its destruction would seriously cripple the army. It can be located readily from its size and the fact that it lies between the YOKO-HAMA-TOKYO highway and the bay. Originally commercial, it has been taken over by the army.

The T. E. G. and Nakajima factories, located in the suburbs of Tokyo, turn out special military trucks (and presumably light tanks), such as large 6 wheelers and scout cars. These are slow, lumbering jobs, but stand up better in the field than the Nissan-Toyoda units. Capacity of the plants unknown, but these two companies and the Nissan-Toyoda supply virtually all requirements.

Toyoda is located on the main railroad between TOKYO and KOBE, near the city of NAGOYA or just east of the city. Covers perhaps 200 acres and also is just east of five high aerial towers. Its trucks are copied after old Chevrolet models, and are considered inferior to the Nissan units. Production about 300 units monthly. Financially bankrupt, but now financed by the army.

k. (4330) *Motorcycle manufacture.* Within recent years many new military establishments have been erected along the water front between HIROSHIMA and KURE at UJINA, a small village on a short spur railroad out of HIROSHIMA. Here a large military establishment makes motorcycles and important naval equipment. Motorcycle capacity, 400 monthly. Another motorcycle factory is located near SHIMAGAWA (Tokyo). Formerly controlled by Harley Davidson, it now is 100% Japanese. Capacity of factory, 200 motorcycles monthly.

l. (4360) *Rubber products.* The Yokohama Rubber Co. is located at TSURUMI, east of the Nissan factory. It produces 800 truck tires daily, and manufactures miscellaneous military equipment for the army and navy, such as hose, etc. Goodrich formerly owned controlling interest, but have withdrawn, except possibly holding a royalty interest. This company, along with Dunlop, KOBE, and Bridgestone, KURUME, supply all military tires to the army and navy.

Dunlop is on the main railway line as you approach KOBE from OSAKA. It now is controlled by a Japanese Board of Directors, and thus the army. Source, however, believes that Dunlop, England, still controls a large share of the company. They endeavored to sell out, but Japanese were unable to pay in Sterling. They can supply 1200 truck tires daily.

Bridgestone is located at KURUME, KYUSHU, on the river front and also the main railway between FUKUOKA and KUMAMOTO. They can produce 1500 truck tires daily.

Bridgestone also has a factory at TSUIGTAO, China, producing 300 truck tires daily. They also have a new factory at LIAYANG, Manchukuo, about a half hour train journey south of MUKDEN on the main line to DAIREN. This is mainly a synthetic rubber plant, but also makes miscellaneous rubber equipment for the army.

m. (4380) *Concrete*. All concrete and structural steel building in Japan has ceased, unless they are for specific military projects. In some cases military plants are built of wood, owing to shortage of construction steel.

3. (5970) *WAR MORALE OF CIVIL POPULATION*. The masses in Japan are well informed by press and radio, which are filled with highly colored propaganda. Despite restrictions and hardships of all kinds, their unity and their remarkable national spirit drives them forward. No sacrifice is too great, and there is not a chance of revolution in Japan, so long as they continue forward as they are doing. Their blackouts are highly successful, but their ground defenses against bombing are very weak. Source believes that mass bombing attacks would have a devastating effect on the morale of the people.

4. (6545) *A TANK PROVING GROUND* is located at CHIBA, across the bay from TOKYO.

5. (6610) *TROOP MOBILIZATION* has continued throughout Japan (up to time of source's departure, Oct. 15, 1941), reportedly to reinforce central China units and to augment forces in Manchuria. Many reserve officers, known to have been held for any special Siberian developments, for which they have been trained for cold climate work in Manchukuo, in recent weeks have been called to the colors. Large forces are available on the Manchukuo border for a possible offensive against Russia should they collapse before the German offensive. Conscription is at its highest peak since the beginning of the China "incident".

A very large number of horses were mobilized all over Japan in June-July period, and reportedly sent to Manchuria for cavalry and horse-drawn units. Source observed many horse concentrations in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA districts as trainloads passed through these cities.

6. (6905) *TROOP EMBARKATION POINTS*. The principal troop embarkation points observed by source were:

a. SHINAGAWA, by train. This is the south Tokyo railway station.

b. NAGOYA, by sea.

c. KOBE, by sea.

d. MIABORA, by rail. This is an important rail junction on LAKE BIWA, between NAGOYA and KYOTO. Troops from north and central Japan destined for Manchukuo pass through this junction enroute to TSURUGU, one of the principal embarkation points on the Japan Sea for Manchukuo, SEI SHIN, and VLADIVOSTOK.

e. The other principal port on the Japan Sea is NIIGATA, with fast steamer service to SEI SHIN. A railway connects with Manchukuo and to the Soviet border. NIIGATA is only eight hours by rail from TOKYO.

f. Troops from the south embark at SHIMONOSEKI (opposite MOJI) for Fusan garrison enroute to Manchukuo via Korea.

g. Troops and supplies from KYUSHU island pass through MOJI to SHIMONOSEKI by ferry. A tunnel now is being built between MOJI and SHIMONOSEKI. The pilot tunnel has been completed and the main tunnel should be ready within two years.

h. There is some troop movement from KYUSHU out of the ports of NAGASAKI and SASEKO, the latter being an important naval base. There are military establishments in KYUSHU at KAGASHIMA, KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, and FUKUAHA.

7. (9185) *AIRPORTS*. There is a large naval aerodrome and seaplane base connected with the YAKOSUKA naval base. At this point, back of the hills and in the YAKOSUKA-YOKOHAMA highway large aeroplane machine shops are located. There are naval or military aerodromes reported at KAGASHIMA, KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, FUKUAHA, SASEKO, HIROSHIMA, and YOKOHAMA. The large aerodrome behind HIROSHIMA is shut off from view from the railroad by a high plateau.

8. (9840) ANTI-AIRCRAFT. Gradually all principal cities are being protected by anti-aircraft batteries as well as military and munition establishments. These batteries are reported to be limited and defenses relatively weak. Source believes that Japanese have manufacturing facilities for the Swiss gun, but not of the most recent design. Searchlights and listening devices also are being utilized.

9. (9960) PARA-TROOPS were used for the first time during the last of September and early October this year (1941) in the central China area. They particularly were used in the assault against CHANOSHA when plain clothes men were dropped from three different points over the city. The attack was not successful—the Chinese mopped up the para-troops. Hence the report, "Japanese evacuated Changsha".

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#### MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

#### WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

#### Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: FORMOSA

Sources and Degree of Reliability:

Diplomatic resident. Reliability good.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Foreign relations; volunteer recruiting of Formosans and their loyalty to Japan; fortifications; war planes; air raid precautions.

#### 1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS.

A. *South Formosa closed to foreigners.* Since April, 1941, the Province of TAKAO (South Formosa) has been closed to foreigners. Even resident Spanish missionaries have been required to leave. An Italian freighter, which had been at refuge in TAKAO since June, 1940, was ordered by Japanese naval authorities to move to KOBE.

B. *Japan's anti-white attitude.* The Japanese as a nation are not anti-British or anti-American—they are anti-white. They have no love racially for the Germans, but cannot help themselves. Their intention quite definitely is to try to throw the white man out of the Far East. Germans and Italians are included. Any temporary modification of their program is purely a matter of expedience—a marking time until the moment is ripe. The military will not and cannot give up the program upon which they have embarked.

C. *American citizens of Japanese ancestry.* Source believes that Canadian and American citizens of Japanese ancestry *cannot be trusted*. He has definite knowledge of their having betrayed the countries of their citizenship. When caught their excuse is that they were forced by Japanese authorities against their own desires—highly debatable!

2. 6240 VOLUNTEER RECRUITING FOR FORMOSANS. In (?) May, 1941, the Governor General introduced a volunteer system for Formosans. A similar system had been introduced into Korea in 1938 and had met with some success, the young Koreans having become saturated with the fervent nationalism taught in the Japanese army. The nebulous mysticism which is the core of this spirit is essentially Oriental in character and it is a mistake to suppose that a governed people like the Koreans and Formosans, in spite of the subordinate position in which they deliberately are held, regard it as alien and compulsory. In



the hands of the Japanese educationalists, as they have been for a quarter and a half a century respectively, their minds have been conditioned methodically to this doctrine, and the young generation now rising will be a tremendously powerful instrument in the hands of Japanese nationalists unless steps are taken now or very soon to break the Japanese military power and discredit their doctrines in the minds of the young. The jubilation and martial air of the Formosan children, when marching in procession to celebrate the opening of the army ranks to Formosan volunteers, was not assumed to order, although the processions themselves were, of course, organized. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the conditioning of the young for national expansion is older and more fanatical than anything Germany has known, as shown by their school text books and popular literature.

3. (6800) FORTIFICATIONS. The whole of the south half of Formosa has become a military garrison (strength of effectives not ascertainable). The beaches are fortified against possible attack. The harbor of TAKAO steadily has been improved for troop embarkations. The transports themselves are based at the PESCADORES, since TAKAO is open to heavy seas throughout the summer months and is not suitable for basing large numbers of transports.

4. (9000) MILITARY AVIATION. Up until the end of July Japanese war planes seen in the sky over North Formosa were of not very modern design and their speed seemed very moderate. From the end of July planes of more modern design and higher speed were seen. Planes based on the northern aerodrome at TAIHOKU were used for bombing the China coast of FUKIEN and CHEKIANG provinces. The main air defense and striking force are concentrated in the south of Formosa, opposite Hongkong. It is presumed that the authorities consider that any hostile air attack would come from the south and that it could be broken up before getting further north.

5. (9840) AIR DEFENSE. Throughout the island there has been almost continuous air raid drill. This consists largely of training the Formosan public to cooperate in extinguishing fires and controlling lights. Anti-aircraft guns have not been visible or audible on any of these occasions, and it is impossible to say if and where they exist. Searchlights have been of antique pattern. There are few air raid shelters in the principal towns, and much publicity has been given to the need for building more. Japanese householders in many cases have been canvassed and ordered to construct one for each group of houses, but these facilities (up to the end of July) were quite inadequate. Experiments were going on for the conversion of drainwater to drinking water in case of emergency. "Emergency" and "preparedness" were the constant cries of the newspapers and the armies.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN.  
Source and Degree of Reliability:

American shipping agent from Kobe enroute to San Francisco. Believed reliable.

1. (3500. *Treatment of foreigners.*) There is intense anti-American and anti-British feeling in both Kobe and Yokohama. Every obstacle is put in the way of these nationals trying to complete formalities to leave Japan. They have to

stand in line in the streets for hours awaiting their turn for examination by local police or prefecture officials, only to be told to come again next day. Detailed and annoying personal search is made, particularly of British, before they leave.

2. (4115. *Petroleum products*.) Supplies of lubrication oil and gasoline are stored in valleys at ITOZAKI, near the Naval base, off the Inland Sea. These valleys are dammed at either end with concrete blocks and the whole area covered with soil and planted with grass. A stevedore's superintendent told source that the Japanese navy had oil reserve for 2 years. The Maruzen Oil Co., Shanghai, is reported to be still importing gasoline and oil from the United States, which is then transshipped to Japan.

3. (6905. *Troop movements*.) Source reports that about 10 September, 800 trucks assembled in Sports ground and loaded soldiers. He could not state regiments since no civilians allowed near, but he had opportunity to count the trucks. Their destination was supposedly Dairen.

4. (6905. *Troops in French Indo-China*.) In early September a Frenchman from Saigon told source that the Japanese were bluffing regarding the number of troops in French Indo-China, to divert public attention from the huge numbers being sent to the Siberian front via Dairen. The Frenchman estimated Japanese troops in French Indo-China were only 35,000. Another source gives 40,000.

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#### MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

#### WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

#### Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Saigon business man, believed reliable.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Gloomy picture of present conditions in French Indo-China.

1. The Japanese advance party arrived at Saigon the latter part of July. They picked out and requisitioned both public buildings and private residences, giving occupants but 24 hours notice to vacate. The main body of Japanese troops arrived about August 8. They have continued to arrive, in numbers far in excess of what should be necessary to garrison and "protect" a country like Indo-China. This leads one to believe that invasion of Thailand is contemplated.

2. Business in Indo-China is at a standstill. Imports and exports, other than those controlled by Japanese, practically have ceased. Food materials are being requisitioned by the Japanese, so that it is very difficult for white residents to live. Even the rice and fish of the natives are being curtailed. Payment is made by the Japanese in paper yen, which have very little buying power in circulation.

3. With war supplies greatly diminished as a result of the trouble with Thailand, it was impossible for the government of French Indo-China to resist this invasion by Japan. Prior to the arrival of Japanese forces the sympathy of many Indo-Chinese had been with Japan. As a result of this taste of Japanese aggression, sentiment very largely has swung against Japan. The natives desire a return of previous conditions under the French. The sympathy of the majority of the French is with Britain. They believe that the only solution of their difficulties is the defeat of the Axis.

4. A report from Manila states that steps are being taken by Japanese:
- A. Completely to suppress all pro-Chungking elements in Indo-China.
  - B. To encourage Annamite independence movement, which definitely would be pro-Japanese and anti-French. Results would create internal domestic trouble throughout Indo-China, providing further excuse for expansion of Japanese control.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: THAILAND.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

News correspondent returning by clipper to U. S., fairly reliable; and other sources as indicated.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Japan attempting to dominate Thailand thought, business, and government.

1. (2900. *Propaganda*). Thailand is being overrun by Japanese and their propaganda. They control 3 of 16 newspapers, including the influential Bangkok Times. Domei news is furnished free of charge to all Thai papers, and its volume far exceeds Reuters and D. N. B. combined. Control of Thai thought is being attempted by the announcement in Tokio of Thai events and decisions, regardless of facts. For example, a trade agreement is under discussion. At a critical moment it is announced to the world from Tokio that Thailand has accepted, although such may not be the case. This has great nuisance value in embarrassing the Thailand government. Reading rooms in Thailand clubs are being flooded with Japanese publications. Italian journals of recent date also are available. But British and American publications are old or unavailable. Source recommended that "wavering countries", such as Thailand, should be copiously supplied with well-illustrated journals displaying the might and power of the United States. Persons in the Orient listen to Rome, Berlin, and Tokio broadcasts, he said. What he thought is needed is strong American propaganda "bursting out of Manila", instead of "canned music and innocuities." American news reels are accepted in Thailand, but British propaganda films are not accepted in northern Thailand. (This last from representative of M. G. M.)

2. (3850. *Foreign relations*). It is reported from Manila that on August 18 the Japanese Minister to Thailand handed the Prime Minister the following proposals:

- A. SATTAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.
- B. Six aerodromes in north, south, and west to be leased to Japan, who would undertake to improve them.
- C. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.
- D. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
- E. Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces.

3. (4000. *Economic*). Japanese penetration, begun five years ago, is seeking economic domination of Thailand. Source estimated that there are 3,000 Japanese in Thailand, some well supplied with funds and entertaining extensively.

Thai shops were full of Japanese, who were willing even to pay "upped prices." In 1939 Thailand's foreign trade was 4.7% with U. S., 23% with Hong Kong, and 15.4% with Singapore. Much of remaining trade is with Japan. If Thailand is unable to obtain machinery, electrical, and other equipment from America or Britain, the trade will be forced into Japanese hands. The only raw material exported by Thailand which Japan does not control is tin. Most of this comes from southern Thailand, which is pro-British.

4. (7500. *Navy auxiliary*.) Investigations were being carried out during August by Japanese Special Service Department agents, as to the number of lighters and their tonnage in the Gulf of Siam. (From Manila, believed reliable.)

5. (8220. *Airways*.) Dutch air lines continue to operate into Thailand, and there is a line operated by the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. There is daily Japanese plane service out of Bangkok. Passengers carried by this last are said to be Japanese, Germans, and others friendly to the Axis.

6. (9000. *Air*.) Japanese troops dominate the Thailand-French Indo-China frontier, with extensive air bases near the border and within 250 miles of the Burma Road. Danger of penetration of Thailand by Japanese parachute troops was stressed.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN AND JAPANESE RELATIONS.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Various, reliability as indicated.

#### 1. JAPANESE EXPANSION NORTHWARDS

Responsible British source reported that Itagaki favors expansion northwards, and that his appointment as C-in-C in Korea might be interpreted as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria, for which Korea would be the first reserve pool. A technically competent observer in Hong Kong, 21 August, confirmed this view and added that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C in South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of Japanese forces in China, is of same persuasion. He may be counted on not to neglect the north, however tempting easy gains in the south may be at the moment.

Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc. by a certain date, such as September 15, bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners. The Japanese in the past often have revealed their long term objectives, very seldom have talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them.

## 2. JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS NORTHWARD

Between July 10 and 17 about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden, proceeding north. They carried full war kit. (No means of checking numbers, which should be accepted with reserve.) During this period a total of 75 troop "specials" passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried [2] artillery and tanks. Japanese station master of South Manchurian railway, Mukden, on July 21 stated that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was short of cars, these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suiyuan, and Peking-Hankow lines.

On July 20, troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTEE on Peking-Mukden line. Source saw great activity at TANGKU TUN junction.

It was reported August 5 that mobilization and reequipping of troops in Korea, Kwantung, and Manchuria was quietly progressing in preparation for eventual movement against the Soviet.

There has been a "tug of war" between high ranking military officials as to when northward move should be launched, and that question was still unsettled, August 5. It was thought that the only event which would stop the move would be a decisive German defeat at hands of Soviet.

High Japanese official expressed some concern over Japanese anti-aircraft defense and lack of air raid protection, but no further details were mentioned.

## 3. MANCHURIAN MILITARY RAILWAYS

It was reported, August 8, that the following railways in Manchuria now are regarded as military lines on which the number of passenger trains has been reduced to a minimum:

- a. Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara, and to Korea via Tumen.
- b. Harbin-Peian-Heiho.
- c. Hsingehlang-Taonan.
- d. Taonan-Doekk-Arshan.
- e. Tsitsihar-Peian.
- f. Tsitsihar-Bukhedu-Mallar and Manchouli.
- g. Tumen-Mudadzian.
- h. Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi.
- i. All railways in Jehol.

Since end of June, 1941, steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingehlang-Harbin by constructing sidings and numerous small stations for storage.

In Kwangtung leased territories, since 1940, sand bag emplacements guarding bridges, stations, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures.

Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin, and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity demands.

## 4. JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND HAINAN

On June 8, 12,000 men left French Indo-China. It was rumored that they were bound for Manchuria, but this is given with great reserve. On June 14 the following units of the 11th Division, totalling 3,300 men, left Hainan for unknown destination:

- HIROSE (EGZ IRX) Infantry regiment
- NAKAMURA (AAW GPA) Medium Artillery battalion
- HIRAOKA (EED DYJ) Transport Company
- YOSHINO (BAD TAK) and KUNO (COP MZA) Cavalry Squadrons.

[3]

## 5. JAPANESE MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD

A. To SPRATLY ISLANDS. On April 19, two armed merchantmen arrived Kobe and unloaded scrap metal and 1,000 caskets of ashes. They were loaded with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components. The cases measure 8 x 6 feet. 400 men of a naval landing party and 130 coolies who had been segregated until going on board, embarked on April 21. The ships left for Spratly Island on April 21.

**B. FORCES IN SANCHO AND KUKOK ISLANDS.** Out August 2, 500 naval landing party left SANCHO ISLAND. Total remaining garrison strength, 400 naval landing party and 200 puppets. Stock on hand: 2,000 cases small arms ammunition, 900 cases shells.

At KUKOK ISLAND are 200 KATSIMURA (AUE GPA) naval landing party, 100 having left on July 22.

**C. IN FORMOSA AND VICINITY.** Between July 7 and 15, about 25 aircraft arrived at OKAYAMA aerodrome nightly from Japan. Aircraft based there July 19 were: 40 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers, 40 twin-engine monoplane medium bombers, 40 single-engine monoplane light bombers, 60 monoplane fighters, 20 reconnaissance, 4 four-engine transports. This is the largest aerodrome in Formosa, being about one mile square.

July 14, 6 fighters arrived at TAIHOKU from QUEMOY ISLAND.

July 10 to 11, 15 fighters arrived at KAGI from Japan.

July 15, 15 monoplane fighters arrived at HEITO from KWANGTUNG.

Aircraft reported at Quemoy Island, 12 fighters.

June 6, mines by naval units from Pescadores Islands.

July 11, 200 mines and 120 torpedoes landed at TAKAO from Japan.

July 25 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for HAINAN:

24 twin-engine monoplane heavy bombers.

15 monoplane fighters.

3 reconnaissance bombers.

July 28 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for Indo-China:

6 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers.

9 single-engine monoplane light bombers.

July 26, 27 aircraft, composed mainly of twin-engine monoplane heavy bombers, arrived KAGI from Japan and left July 29 for Indo-China.

August 1, 9 heavy bombers and 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-China.

**D. TO AND IN INDO-CHINA.** July 20, the following Japanese troops left KARENKO for Indo-China:

[4] 24,000 TAKAHASHI (URA HOP) infantry,

1,200 ISE (AES AUI) artillery

600 KONDO (SOY MRU) and FUKASE (IIU IRX) A.F.V. units, with:

16 armored cars, 15 light tanks, 40 motorcycles, 32 field guns.

Paratroops are being trained daily at TOGO aerodrome, 8 aircraft used.

Japanese strength in TONKIN area, August 1, approximately 25,000.

Japanese strength in southern Indo-China, Aug. 12, approx. 36,000.

Collaboration between French and Japanese authorities appears close and it is believed that French troops are to be sent to the YUNAN and KWANGSI borders.

Quantities of railway equipment are being sent to PNOM TENH for the construction of a railway to the THAI border.

July 28 a transport left TOSHIYEN for Indo-China after loading 20 launches, 120 mines, and a quantity of naval ammunition.

August 21, strength in southern Indo-China was about 80,000, composed of units of Guards, 28th Division, 38th Division, Formosan army corps, and naval landing party. (This is given with reserve pending confirmation.) High commands are:

Lt. General IIDA, Army

Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH), air

Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS), navy.

**6. TROOP MOVEMENT IN JAPAN.** There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI, and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMAKURA and TOYOHASHI.

Sources state that at end of June there was considerable movement of Japanese sailors from TOKIO to KOSHIRO and TAKAHACHI, and that between June 26 and 28 numerous trainloads of young men arrived at ZUSI. At NUMAZU source observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders and also several howitzers with camouflaged gun platforms, pushed by heavy trucks. At HAMAMOTO he observed 97th, 72d, and 8th Divisions. At WUSHIZU, 22d Division. At OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA, 2d and 4th Divisions. New oil tanks were in this district, which is very heavily industrialized.

All these observations made at end of June. Agent has had military training, but is newly recruited, and no opportunity to cross examine him.

**7. JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS.** A. *Aerodromes In Japan.*—A large aerodrome is under construction near KAMAKURA. (This is believed identical

with TOTSUKA aerodrome.) Overall dimensions: 3,500 by 3,500 yards. Labor force of 8,000, under supervision of 18 German engineers. Aerodrome expected to be completed in August. 3,000 parachute troops are under training there.

Polish refugee journalist in Japan, at end of June, said he had seen great earth-works, indicating underground aerodrome, with planes landing, at TAKARU-ZUKA. (Observation not considered very reliable.)

[5] Area between KOBE, AWAJI, and SAKAI is heavily fortified. (Creditable)

**B. Oil Tanks in Pescudores Islands.**—Ansan Naval Base has large surface tank, capacity 600 tons; small surface tank, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank at TAISHOKU FORT, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank at Keimo-U aerodrome, capacity 300 tons. Comment: Fairly reliable; reported August 20, 1941. It is regretted that source was unable to differentiate between types of oil fuel.

#### 8. JAPANESE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR.

**A. Naval.**—Floating dock at KOBE, capable of accommodating ships of 16,000 tons, is expected to be transferred to HAINAN. At end of May an "aircraft tender" was under repair in this dock. Total of 2,000 workmen, working day and night shifts, were engaged on aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock. (Casual observation).

In collaboration with German advisers, the construction of 75 submarines is projected in Japan. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 of these jobs, of which the Osaka Iron Works are to build 4. (Casual).

Twenty vessels are under construction at Harima shipyard, OSAKA, with 24-hour day work being done on the jobs in May. Vessels expected to be completed at end of July. Specifications: Displacement 100 tons; dimensions 200 feet x 28 feet x 5 feet (note that these dimensions give a displacement well over that reported, and therefore are given with utmost reservation); speed 30 knots; armament, 6 machine guns. Said that these ships are to be used as troop landing craft in southern expansion.

Hearsay information, given with utmost reserve, states that some old hulks have been emptied of machinery and equipment, and "pocket destroyers" are being constructed *within* them. As a further aid to secrecy, the position of these hulks are changed by towing from one place to another. This may be an exaggerated account of Japanese tendencies to secrecy, but there may be something in it, and the report is passed on for what it is worth.

**B. Ordnance Construction.**—Naval guns are being made a OSAKA arsenal under German supervision. May 8, warships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted with guns from this arsenal. (Casual observation.)

**C. Aircraft Construction.**—Beginning of April, three German engineers arrived at Aichi Aircraft Factory, NAGOYA, from the Dornier Works. Name of one is given as Andernich (DJI IZU DUN). They are supervising construction of a new type of fighter. This is described as K-22 type, twin-engine, two-seater. It is still in the experimental stage. Production aimed at is 50 a month. (Note, this production figure coincides with that given for dive bomber reported as being manufactured in this factory in January.) Labor force 2,600, working day and night.

[6] A shadow factory situated at KAWAGUCHI in Osaka in mid May started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the Aichi Factory, NAGOYA. Labor force: 2,600, working 10 hours a day. Estimated production: wings, etc. for about 100 fighters a month. Three German advisers are attached to this KAWAGUSHI factory.

Aerial bomb factory in HIMEJI, names Nakabe (AAW?SRY) Heavy Industrial Works. Labor force in mid May, 600. Monthly production: 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares. Four German engineers are attached.

**9. JAPANESE FOREIGN RELATIONS.** **A. With Great Britain and the United States.**—Admiral NOMURA has been instructed to work for a modification of American embargo policy and to offer readjustment of American-Japanese relations on basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined and recognized as spheres of influence of U. S. A. and British. (Reliability unknown, dated August 5, 1941.)

At a meeting held by High Command at CANTON on July 27 to discuss retaliatory measures on British and American freezing, the following steps were decided upon and forwarded to TOKIO for approval:

1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.

2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of their expulsion.

3. Banning of exports to HONG KONG and tightening of blockades. The ——— government to be forced to cooperate in this measure.

4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces.

5. Unifying of new territories of HONG KONG and KULANGSU to the Puppet Government.

It was reported (August 15, 1941) that as a retaliatory measure for British and American action against Japan, Japanese military authorities discussed with Nanking Government the desirability of blockading International Settlement on lines of TIENTSIN blockade of British concession. Japanese "Business" Shanghai strongly opposed this and sent delegation of four representatives to interview General KAGESA at NANKING. Latter assured delegation that if any steps were taken along lines suggested at any time, every effort would be made to safeguard Japanese interests operating in International Settlement. He further stated that they were not contemplated in the near future as there was no complete accord between Japanese naval and military authorities on these matters.

#### B. JAPANESE SPONSORED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AT HONG KONG.

(1) *Incitement of Disturbances and Riots.*—Plans are prepared for the creation of strikes, disturbances, and riots at Hong Kong, when and if Japan breaks with Britain. One of the principal agents for this is JOHN LUI, senior member of Shanghai Tai Fing Insurance Co. One of Lui's close associates is the son of Chief Detective of Amoy, CHENG SAI HOI. Lui also is believed to have been the founder of Tung Man Alumni Association.

[7] Japanese hope to recruit about 100,000 refugee street-sleepers to take part in sabotage and nuisance activities in Hong Kong on outbreak of hostilities between Japan and Britain. A large number of these already are receiving financial assistance from the Japanese.

It is believed that puppet officials of Chungshan area and Japanese agents are being permitted to enter Macao with arms, and that this is the channel through which large quantities of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hong Kong.

(2) *Japanese Agents.*—LAM FEI, representative of Wang Ching Wei in Hong Kong, with 45 senior agents, is mainly interested in collecting military intelligence and recruiting questionable characters for subversive activities.

TAKEDA, of Special Service Section, is now attached to Japanese Consulate, Hong Kong, to control the intelligence section there.

TAM KOWK-WA, acts as liaison between Special Service Sections in Macao and Hong Kong.

C. *RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES.* Japanese business men, including Manila heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank, appeared genuinely to believe, August 18, that present Japanese threats of further southward expansion were merely a "war of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight Great Britain or America. (Reasonably reliable.)

A recently selected Sakdal candidate for next political elections states that local (Manila) Japanese agents have been cultivating him closely and volunteering the following information:

1. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on FORMOSA.

2. Attack on PHILIPPINES and SINGAPORE simultaneously will take place about end of August. •

3. Campaign in Philippines to begin with uprising in MINDANAO and bombing of MANILA.

4. Attack on SINGAPORE to be overland through SIAM, where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.

4. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in HAINAN and SAIPAN.

(Source doubtfully reliable; this looks like a whispering campaign.)

August 9, Manila agents of N. Y. K. received telegram from N. Y. K. Tokio office, stating that all "overseas" service is now suspended. "Overseas" means all sailings except Japan-China ports. (Reliable.)

Manila agents, Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company, instructed by telegram, August 15, from Tokio Office:

1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.

2. To cancel Manila reinsured treaty.

3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.



This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds). (Reliable.)

[8] D. JAPANESE-THAILAND RELATIONS. Japanese Government reported "considerably perturbed by the insincerity" of the Siamese Government. Japanese Government stated that in spite of military "representations" by Japanese Minister to BANGKOK, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan, and that it is clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence.

Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter.

FEI WEN CHUAN stated Japanese Government, in carrying out its programme in French Indo-China, is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that unless latter changes its attitude toward Japan and her co-prosperity programme, Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into line.

Between July 25 and 29, 12,000 troops left BANGKOK for Indo-China frontier. This is partially confirmed by official Siamese communique which states that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary, and special mission units left for frontier at end of July.

An order has been placed by Thailand with Japanese for delivery in July, 1942, of two warships, probably torpedoboats, to replace three vessels sunk by French. 500,000 ticals have been paid on account of this order.

13 August, 1941. (Casual observation.)

E. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IN NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. It was reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I., the following was being said:—

1. In MENADO: Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be taken off in vessels from PALAU.

2. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from eastwards of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S. arrives.

3. Japanese will not be evacuated, as evacuation would give N. E. I. indication of pending attack.

F. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. *Blockade of Vladivostok*.—Two separate Chinese sources reported before July 7, that they understood Japan promised Germany, in return for recognition of WANG CHING WEI, to blockade Vladivostok, and that action was likely at an early date.

G. MADAGASCAR. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations, Japanese delegates expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic-Indian Ocean communications. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company of a million yen to start operations around island.

H. JAPANESE CONTROL OF NON-AXIS INTERESTS. It was reported that following the completion of Japanese military occupation in Indo-China, military have been considering possibilities of securing control of [9] TIENTSIN FRENCH CONCESSION through puppet North China administration.

Local (Manila) military circles consider that, if Tientsin venture is accomplished, similar action might be taken through WANG CHING WEI government at other points in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all non-Axis interests. (Aug. 10).

It is reported that paper plans for taking over French Concession in Shanghai have been completed and, provided future developments in the general situation in the Far East do not necessitate change in plans, Nanking Government is expected to assume control in concession before October 10. Committee studying this matter, under chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) and General KAGESA have forwarded their recommendations to Tokio for consideration.

I. RELATIONS WITH GERMANY. Admiral TOYODA has already informed German Ambassador that Japan is ready to readjust its political relations with Reich as prerequisite for closer economic accord upon which will be founded future economic relations between Asia and Europe, according to a report of unknown reliability, dated August 5.

On April 20, 2 of the German vessels lying at Kobe left for KURE. Guns were to be fitted, and the ships will be ready for sea again about the beginning of August.

On July 31, 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in PO ON area for "the German expeditionary engineer corps", and as soon as possible are being sent to Germany.

According to a high puppet official, further recruiting is being carried out.

10. **FRENCH INDO-CHINA.** The following is from Free French sailors who left SAIGON about August 8:

a. **S. S. FRANCOIS LOUIS DRAYFUS** is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo". Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Francisco."

b. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel **ADMIRAL CHARNER** and the submarine **PEGASE**.

c. **S. S. SAGITAIRE** has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
*Lt. Colonel, Inf.,*  
*Acting A. C. of C., G-2.*

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 7.

Date: 10 September 1941

Classification: Restricted.

Enclosures: No.

#### MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

#### WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

#### Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australasia.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Unusually reliable expert.

Land planes flying from Hawaii to the Dutch East Indies might make use of the following airfields:—

1. **CANTON ISLAND**, north rim, undeveloped, but already a possible emergency landing, 1630 sea miles or 1878 land miles from Honolulu. Might be developed at comparatively small expense. Alternate.

**HOWLAND ISLAND**, a partly developed airfield, 1650 sea miles or 1900 land miles from Honolulu.

(NOTE: Ulm planned to land on south rim of **BANNING ISLAND**, at Peao.

Conditions of this landing place not known.)

2. **FIJI**. There are two airports on **VITI LEVU** Island. One along the Rewa River, northeast of Suva, present condition not known. Another on the Nandi Plain, near Lautoka, N. W. side, present condition unknown. There is a flight of British patrol planes operating in Fiji at present. Definite information about present airfield conditions doubtless could be had from them through High Commissioner for Western Pacific, Suva. An emergency landing might be made at low water on Nasali Beach, near Suva, where a two mile stretch of compact sand over 100 yards wide is capable of holding up aircraft of medium weight.

3. **NEW CALEDONIA**. Within 9 months an airdrome will be completed about 30 miles northwest of Noumea. When completed it will have two metalled runways, each 2,000 meters long. It is believed that already work has progressed so that a landing could be made. Low clouds and rain in this vicinity might make landing difficult at times. No other landing place is known on this island.

4. **AUSTRALIA**. Either Sydney or Brisbane airports could be used for the next hop. At both cities good airfields are available, with adequate repair facilities. Sydney is considered better, because in wet weather the grassy runway at Brisbane might bog large, heavy planes.

5. **TRANS-AUSTRALIA**. There are several usable airfields on routes across Australia:

a. The shortest route is via Charleville (620 miles from Sydney) and Cloncurry (1200 miles from Sydney) to Darwin (2200 miles from Sydney). At Charleville, in wet weather, the ground is soft off the runways, which are about 50

feet wide. At Cloncurry there are long, well-surfaced runways, 1200-1500 yard in all directions. Fuel may be had at these two airfields, but no repair. In summer, flying conditions may be bad in this region; conditions to be expected at 5,000 feet being found on the ground, at 1000 feet. Darwin has an airfield with facilities for repair.

b. A southern, drier route is via Broken Hill, N. S. W., Oodnadatta, S. Austr. (with good field), Alice Springs and Daly Waters, N. Terr., at all of which air fields are available. There also are good fields at Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide and at cities in Western Australia. Wyndham, on Joseph Bonaparte Gulf, northern W. Austr., has airfield which can be used for heavy planes in dry weather.

6. DUTCH EAST INDIES. The best of several airports are at: Koepang Timor, with good field, fuel, but no repair facilities; Bali, on south coast, west of Denpasar (not the smaller abandoned airfield inland from Denpasar); Soerabaja, N. E. Java, with a modern, first class airport, with repair facilities; Batavia Java, with excellent, new airport; Palembang, Sumatra, good field, but no repair facilities; Makassar, Celebes; Kalikpapan, Borneo; and Tarakan, Borneo.

7. NEW GUINEA. There is a good airport at Port Moresby; and smaller ones at Salamanna and Lae. While these perhaps are too small for large bombers, they are being used by Lockheed "14's". There is an airport at Rabaul, New Britain.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,  
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.  
Copies furnished  
G-2 HAF  
ONI, 14th Nav. Dist.  
Classification: Restricted.  
Report No. 4.  
Date: 19 August 1941.

#### HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

##### INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. From and date | To               | Subject: General report, Japan and China                                                                                   |                          |
|---------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1st Ind. G-2 19 Aug 41.   | Chief of Staff.. | For information. This report was forwarded to G-2, War Department, this morning via air mail. 1 Incl. Mil. Attache Report. | K. J. F.                 |
| 2d Ind. G-2 8/27/41..     | -----            | -----                                                                                                                      | G. S. C. Chief of Staff. |

Classification: Restricted.  
Enclosures. No.

## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

## WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

## Military Attache Report—Japan and China

REPORTED BY G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: General Report, Japan and China.

I. G. No.: See below.

## Source and Degree of Reliability:

Various sources, all considered reliable.

1. *CHINA 4000* Following is text of order issued 28 July 1941 by K. Oyamada for administrative Commissioner Chinese Maritime Customs:

"Shipments of exportation and interport export for America and England and their colonies, Burma, French Indo China, Hongkong and unoccupied area of China of following goods are temporarily to be referred to me before release:

"Machinery, provisions, oils, chemicals, cereals and fodder, fertilizer, cotton piece goods and yarn:

"Except for Japan and North China:

(Signed) K. OYAMADA."

2. *JAPAN 6810* (Formosa) on 16 June 1941 150 infantry transferred from Taiohu to Kogo for parachute training, and on 18 June 1941 200 paratroops were transferred from Kogo to Rokko. Kogo area now under martial law and entry nearly impossible. Recruiting for army and labor corps still being maintained. (End Formosa).

On 8 June 1941 following units of 12th division total strength 6,000 left Hainan for Manchuria:

46th infantry regiment

48th infantry regiment

24th artillery regiment.

On 14 June 1941 "Hirose" infantry regiment of 11th division left Hainan; on 30 June 1941 this unit arrived Dairen and went on to Scheungkiang in Manchuria. On 24 June 1941 11th cavalry regiment of 11th division arrived Whampo from North River area and embarked for Manchuria.

18 July 1941 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon. 21 July 1941 Lieut. General Homma, commander-in-chief Formosan army, and Major General Sumida arrived Saigon with 30 German and Italian advisers. On mornings of 20 and 21 July 1941 air reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft. 20 July 1941 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 unidentified auxiliary, and 4 transports packed with troops arrived Camranh Bay.

G-2, HAWN DEPT.

Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 3.

Date: 19 August 1941.

Classification: Restricted.  
Enclosures: No.

## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

## WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

## Military Attaché Report—Various

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.

## Source and Degree of Reliability:

Business men of experience in the country regarding which they were interviewed. All believed to be fully reliable.

1. *JAPAN 2900* The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly toward citizens of the United States, has recently developed a hatred for all Americans. The public has also developed a spy phobia as a result of continuous warning from the Government, with almost all advertising, such as on matches, billboards, etc., carrying warnings against spies.

On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army officers, in order to force a change in the cabinet; at the time of the incident no one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were suspended, including local telephone service.

All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese only. Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls to Germany may be made in German, but no language other than Japanese is allowed in communications within Japan.

4000 Japan is reported to be very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other items reported to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anaesthetics.

Japanese Military Doctors have complained to American Doctors of being short on quinine, atebrian, and plasmochin; all of which are used in combating malaria. Malignant malaria and blackwater fever are prevalent in Hainan, in the marshes along the Burma Road in Yunnan Province, and on the Kwangsi Tonkin border. It was reported that 300,000 Japanese troops went from Hainan to Kwangsi, and that only 50,000 returned, the others being lost account malignant malaria on the Tonkin border.

6810 50,000 Troops were reported to have left Hainan in June 1941, leaving only 3,000 troops, in addition to Navy, at that point. Also reported that large numbers of Chinese guerillas are still active in Hainan.

During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men working in factories in Japan, regardless of age, have lately been required to take part time military training.

For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimoniseki instead of through Kobe, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of bombers have been flown to China and Manchukuo via Kobe, with planes from other parts of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse mountain about six miles due west of Kobe.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but wear a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Many regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored to be from South America; the businessmen who saw these vessels could not give a description of them, but stated Captain Solberg of the S. S. "Frederick Lykes" could give a full and accurate description.

9185 An airport capable of basing 200 planes is located at Hoihow (Haiko), concrete roads to the airport and a large barracks have recently been constructed at this point, and that approximately 1,000 new trucks arrived at this point during June 1941. It is also reported that there is an airport at Sama slightly larger than the one at Hoihow. Large amounts of food and ordnance supplies are reported coming into Hoihow and Sama. A large emergency airport has recently been built at Haulang Plain about 20 miles northeast of Nodda, and inland about 25 miles from the north coast of Hainan.

2. AUSTRALIA 4115 Australia uses about fourteen million barrels of oil per year, with none produced there; at the present time gasoline is being rationed at two gallons per month per car. A new oil field has been located recently at "Lakes Entrance", about 200 miles east of Melbourne; the field covers about five square miles, with the pool of oil at 1200 feet from the surface; a shaft will be sunk at a 30 degree slope, and it is believed production of 500 barrels per day can be realized within six months; this crude will be good for 70% lubricating oil only.

It is reported that there is a large gassy coal mine under Sydney, from which vapor gas (methane) of an octane rating of 115 can be extracted, with production equivalent of 20,000 gallons of gasoline per day possible. 140 cubic feet of this gas equals 1 gallon of gasoline, and it can be compressed in drums to equal 10 gallons of gasoline which can be carried on an automobile. There is a total of 10 mines in Australia which can be made to produce this gas within two months, and they are also locating additional mines in New Zealand.

Several large deposits of bauxite have been discovered in Australia, and are now being developed, but development is slow due to shortage of power.

3. **NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES 4115** 40,000 Barrel Refinery at Balek-papen, which is only refinery in area producing lubricating oil, mostly of crude from adjacent areas with small amount from Java, good harbor, 5,000 population, everything owned by Shell Petroleum Company. 45,000 Barrel Refinery at Pladjoe about 20 miles from Palembang, producing 100 octane aviation gasoline and all oil products except lubricating oil, sand bar across harbor limits draft of ships calling there to 18 feet. 45,000 Barrel Refinery operated by Sacony across Moesi river from Pladjoe. 15,000 Barrel Refinery named Pangkalan Branden in North Sumatra near Medan, limited to straight run distilling, no cracking, all crude from nearby areas by pipeline, export by sea. 7,000 Barrel Refinery in Tjepoe, Java, about 60 miles west of Sourabaya, only low quality gasoline produced, only Java supplied, crude from nearby areas by pipeline, delivery by tank car.

9185 Complete arrangements have been made for destruction of refineries, pipelines, and wells, with all wiring, switches, etc., in place; lacking only the placing of necessary explosives, which are kept near the points they would be placed.

Arrangements have been made to evacuate Balek-papen, with place already built in interior to care for all personnel. Plenty of underground protection for all persons at all other places.

It is reported that the N. E. I. Army is composed mostly of natives, and that these natives do not see any need for loyalty to the Dutch. Also reported that half castes in the Army are a possible source of trouble.

4. **BURMA. 4610** Number of trucks arriving at Kunming, exclusive of those carrying salt, increasing from an average of 58 per day carrying 5,220 tons freight in October 1940, to 162 per day carrying 13,071 tons in June 1941. Arrivals at Chungking during the period October 1940 to June 1941 remained about constant, with arrivals averaging 15 per day carrying 1377 tons. Numbers of trucks passing frontier at Wanting are as follows:

|                    | To China | From China |
|--------------------|----------|------------|
| December 1940----- | 4,203    | 3,619      |
| January 1941-----  | 5,090    | 4,629      |
| February 1941----- | 5,052    | 5,009      |
| March 1941-----    | 6,282    | 6,207      |
| April 1941-----    | 6,194    | 5,658      |

Freight rates are as follows:

|                         |         |                       |
|-------------------------|---------|-----------------------|
| Lashio-Wanting-----     | \$12.28 | per ton U. S. Dollars |
| Wanting-Kunming-----    | 112.01  | " " " "               |
| Kunming-Chungking-----  | 111.32  | " " " "               |
| Chungking-Kweiyang----- | 40.21   | " " " "               |
| Kweiyang-Kunming-----   | 23.04   | " " " "               |

Date: 14 August 1941.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

H

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 383.4—Spies, Espionage, Agents, Suspects, etc.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Date: 9 Feb., 1942.

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District.

Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.

## 320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Period covered : 5 Dec., 1941 to 9 Feb., 1942.

Status of Case: Pending in 14ND.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures and References: (See first page of details.)

Copy to:

- ONI (5)
- CinCPac (1)
- Com14 (1)
- FBI-Hon (2)
- MID-HD (2)
- 14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A.

ONI File No.:

**SYNOPSIS:** On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches and contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has been found that KUEHN's signal system ever was employed.

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

**DEDUCTIONS:** Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

APPROVED:

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/zv

[1]

9 FEBRUARY, 1942.

*Confidential*

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

References:

- (a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
- (b) Com14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
- (c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
- (d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 5-1-41.
- (e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (Copy to ONI), 5-31-41.
- (f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 7-17-41.
- (g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
- (j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

- (A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.

1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed very important.

[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

(Secret Military Message No. )

(By Chief of Consulate's Code)

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.

From: Fujii

Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows:

(1) Code (Following 3 section 8 line table)

Battle Force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
- [3] 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.

8.

(2) Signal

1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night—one light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time, indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

—When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until Noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen cloth indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 pm to 1 am every hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".

5. "KGMB want ads advertisements 9:45 am—(a) a Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6". (b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7". (c) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates "5" or "8".

In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located



between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala Road which can be watched from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated, for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6"; 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "4" or "7"; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8".

[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three Intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3 December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of his family.)

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the indicated markings.

- [5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a "Lanikai beach House"; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, Island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Walluku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by Agent McCarthy:

"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction

of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn's house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or to furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period.

[7] It was pointed out by many of the residents that had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlson. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office."

[8] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following pertinent incident:

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanatorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing

of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanitarium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMAI and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#1) have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).)

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regarding investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight—actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hanson, H. E. Anderson (Fire and Game Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fires which were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes. At 8:40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe fire signal seen.

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan—"Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island—where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan Mr. Baldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost

the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in part:

" . . . Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed.

[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 December, 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanatorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject light any matches."

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being prepared on FURUKAWA.

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships at sea.

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is Ichio FUJII.

[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.

17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu, from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at Mollili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1903. FUJII stated that he was taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been discovered.

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference to the surname FUJII (or HUZII and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case is continuing.

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:

Miss Kimie DOUE  
Takaichi SAKAI  
Katsukichi MURAOKA  
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO  
Kanaye SAHARA  
Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJI

22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasu MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival at Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [14] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and

KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Kokiichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.

30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, these men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss

DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".

[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and Allen, is submitted for information:

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April 1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kallua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes, one at Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, and his wife's beauty shop brought in only about \$80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which was usually was rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased it. [18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for \$40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was \$6,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was \$9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of \$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAMAKURA purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the \$40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an appointment with him.

portant message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely fictitious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m.



meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5, [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000 in the package, mostly in new \$100 bills, some \$20 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Maluniu Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Maluniu Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reappeared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very familiar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same photograph [25] also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.)

\*8. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the \$14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that any one, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designates the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original \$14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, \$5,000.00 in new \$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given \$2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following information appeared on the suspect card:

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                         |                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------|
| <p>"KUEHN, Otto<br/>Formerly (1918) officer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."</p> | <p>Kailua, Oahu<br/>None at present</p> | <p>(Occupation)</p> |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------|

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e) the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNs had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Government, through the Consulate.

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)

# 334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK •

PENDING—14ND

6 February, 1942.

Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

| Date       | Time | Type of ships |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |
|------------|------|---------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
|            |      | BBs           | CAs | CLs | CVs | SSs | DDs | DMs | AVDs | (#) |
| 11/22..... | 0800 | 3             | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 8   | 2    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 3             | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 8   | 2    | 32  |
| 11/23..... | 0800 | 3             | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 8   | 2    | 32  |
|            | 1800 | 3             | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 4   | 2    | 28  |
| 11/24..... | 0800 | 3             | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 4   | 1    | 26  |
|            | 1800 | 3             | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 4   | 2    | 27  |
| 11/25..... | 0800 | 3             | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 24  | 5   | 2    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 3             | 10  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 25  | 8   | 3    | 37  |
| 11/26..... | 0800 | 3             | 10  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 24  | 8   | 2    | 34  |
|            | 1800 | 3             | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 23  | 8   | 3    | 34  |
| 11/27..... | 0800 | 3             | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 23  | 8   | 3    | 34  |
|            | 1800 | 3             | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 23  | 8   | 3    | 30  |
| 11/28..... | 0800 | 1             | 8   | 0   | 2   | 4   | 11  | 4   | 3    | 18  |
|            | 1800 | 6             | 8   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |
| 11/29..... | 0800 | 6             | 7   | 6   | 1   | 2   | 24  | 4   | 3    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 6             | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |
| 11/30..... | 0800 | 5             | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 25  | 4   | 3    | 32  |
|            | 1800 | 5             | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |

Key: BB—battleship; CA—heavy cruiser; CL—light cruiser; CV—aircraft carrier; SS—submarine; DD—destroyer; DM—light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD—seaplane tender (destroyer type).

#Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

SECRET

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

### INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its endorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. From and Date             | To       | Subject: WD Radio #628, 12 December 1941<br>"Japanese Spy Activities" | 4837                                |
|---------------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1st Ind. AG 12 Dec 41.....            | G-2..... | 1 Incl.: Reply sent in Gen. Short's name....                          | R. H. N. 12<br>Dec 1941.<br>KJF EM. |
| 2 Ind. G2RE Cont., #362 19<br>Feb 42. | .....    | For information.....                                                  |                                     |

## SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

SECRET—CONFIDENTIAL—RESTRICTED

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SB OHU6 USG CDE WASHINGTON DC (VIA COMMERCIAL PACIFIC CABLE)

211/210

COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPT.

628 12th For your information and necessary action Colon One Ichiro Fuji on December third arranged following signal system for Japanese fleet upon closure normal means communication Stop Lanikai beach house to show lights between eight PM and midnight and between midnight and four AM with various meanings as to our naval dispositions depending on the hour of display Stop Similarly a star and a roman numeral three at the head of the sail of the quote star boat unquote In Lanikai Bay during daylight Stop Also lights in the attic window of Kalama house parenthesis beach village one mile north west of Lanikai close parenthesis Stop Also advertisements broadcast on KGMB re Chinese rug for sale comma Chic space space Co paren two letters missing end paren farm comma beauty operator and apply PO box One Four Seven Six Stop If above unworkable a signal bonfire to be located on Maui six miles north of Kula Sanitorium at point halfway between lower Kula road and Haleakala road.

(Signed) MARSHALL

Received as a SECRET communication.

Decoded by: Lt. G. Lennox SC 850A 12 Dec 1941 Lx.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 628."

NOTE. See A. R. 330-5 and 335-5 for handling messages of this classification.

DECEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum to SAC:

Re: Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.

In accordance with your instructions the district of Kalama was checked as thoroly as possible for houses with dormer windows. Three were found. These are the homes of Otto KUEHN, now in CD, John Waterhouse, and Ensign Bradley, USN, who has living with him a Lieutenant from Bellows Field.

A driving check was made in the district between Kalaheo Drive and the pine grove and none other than the KUEHN place were found here.

On the beach side of Kalaheo Drive we found the John Waterhouse home, which is the first residence encountered on the beach coming from Mokapu. This house has not been occupied, except on Sunday nite, 12-7-41, when John Waterhouse slept there. This was the first occupancy since the first of December. However, there are Japanese living there. These on interview I found to be Waichi Fukui, about 34; his wife, Hatsuko, 29, and their three children, the eldest 9. Also living with them are Miss Chiyoko TAO, 21, and Jotaro ONISHI, 32. The latter is a brother of Mrs. Fukui. W. Fukui was born in Japan and has lived in Hawaii most of his life. His wife is Hawaii born but did not regain citizenship. Miss TAO and ONISHI are Hawaii born. Also living there since the bombing are Isuke KIMURA, 49, his wife and 24 year old son who were machine-gunned on Sunday while on their farm at Mokapu. I learned from W. FUKUI that quite a few persons come about the place to fish and he complained that persons broke into the place frequently by means of the dormer windows. I was also informed by Norman Godbold Jr., Territorial Treasurer that while he lived there in that district, directly behind the quarters occupied by FUKUI that there were a number of persons visiting there at all times.

The house formerly occupied by Godbold is now occupied by Ensign BRADLEY, USN, camera party, and the Lieutenant from Bellows Field and is in the next lot to the WATERHOUSE property. The dormer windows of both places provide quite a good view of the ocean.

A walk along the beach from the Waterhouse property to the Kallua end of the beach failed to show any other houses with dormer windows.

Respectfully submitted.

J. A. BURNS.

HONOLULU, T. H., January 4, 1942.

## MEMORANDUM TO OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Attention: Captain I. H. Mayfield:

Re: Japanese Consulate activities—CONFIDENTIAL; ESPIONAGE—J.

During investigations which have been conducted by ONI, G-2 and the FBI, Special Agent F. G. TILMAN and Lt. GEORGE KIMBALL of ONI have developed the following information which it appears may be of immediate interest to you in defense of these islands.

During the course of an interview with RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHIRODA, a former clerk employed by the Japanese Consul-General at Honolulu, it was developed that TADASI MORIMURA, who is registered with the Secretary of State as the Chancellor of that Japanese Consulate, is without doubt the person charged by the Japanese Government with the collection of military information in the Territory of Hawaii. This is substantiated by the statements of other members of the clerical staff of the Consulate, and by MORIMURA's apparent activity.

KOTOSHIRODA is the only American-born Japanese employed at the Consulate in whom the Consulate staff placed any confidence in connection with other than routine matters. It has been learned from KOTOSHIRODA that he accompanied MORIMURA on numerous occasions to points on the islands of Hawaii, Maui and particularly in the vicinity of naval establishments on the island of Oahu. These trips were usually made in a Ford sedan owned by KOTOSHIRODA and a taxi owned and driven by an alien Japanese.

It was ascertained that MORIMURA showed unusual interest in the following points on the island of Oahu:

(1) Kailua Beach in the vicinity of the public park which was visited in May, 1941.

(2) Waimanalo Beach in the vicinity of the old sugar wharf which was visited on the same day as the above.

## MEMO FOR ONI

1-4-1942

(3) Haleiwa Bay in the vicinity of the public park which was visited three or four times, the last visit being in about the end of October, 1941.

In addition, the entire Consulate staff had picnics at the SAM WOODS' place, Lanikai, the first in January or February, 1941, and the second in March or April of the same year. These picnics appear to have been held in the absence of the owners of the property and by arrangements with the Japanese yardman who is presently being investigated. This place is less than two miles from the Kailua Beach park previously mentioned.

It has also been learned that MORIMURA has contacts at Pearl City; these individuals are now under investigation. He has also visited a point below the home of CHESTER CLARKE at Aiea Heights where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor may be obtained.

The above information is being submitted in the event that it may serve some immediate purpose. The results of this investigation will be outlined fully in a subsequent report.

Very truly yours,

R. L. SHIVERS,  
Special Agent in Charge.

RLS: mma  
cc: Lt. Col. BICKNELL

## SIGNALS

638 12th. Contents messages as follows quote one twenty five please turn over immediately both items which I requested one twenty eight please wire immediately re the latter part of my one twenty three the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth circular two four siqq one please keep the code list until the last moment and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you so please notify us of this fact immediately this message is a precaution circular two four siqq siqq we are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families therefore wait where you are until I wire you at a later date unquote.

# CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

337

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

### INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

| No. of Ind. From and Date       | To           | Subject: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Fifth Column Activities at                   |
|---------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1st Ind. Contact Office 2/12/42 | G-2 HHD..... | 1. For information and return. Encl.—(14ND report re subject dated 2/9/42). |
| 2 G-2 2/12/42.....              | C/O.....     | 1. Noted. 2. This is a good report and coincides with our beliefs.          |

[1]

### FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

District Intelligence Office

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel

Honolulu, T. H.

AJL/ab

14ND A8-5/P9-2/EF37

FEBRUARY 9, 1942.

Confidential

From: The District Intelligence Officer  
Fourteenth Naval District

To: The District Intelligence Officer  
Third Naval District

Subject: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Fifth Column Activities at

Reference: (a) Letter dated 3 January, 1942 from Commandant 3ND to Chief of Naval Operations, above Subject.

1. Reference (a) suggests that "there be conveyed to all District Intelligence Offices, such information of Fifth Column activities at Pearl Harbor, as may be useful in connection with the operations of all District Intelligence Office activities".

2. For the purpose of this letter, methods of fifth column activities will be considered to consist of the following:

(a) To conduct accurate espionage work and transmit the results to the enemy.

(b) To demoralize public opinion; to cause panic or confusion; to promote discord and dissatisfaction.

(c) To carry on actual physical sabotage.

(d) To render assistance to invading forces.

3. Referring to Paragraph 2 (a) above, there is no question but that the espionage work of our enemies was carried out in an extremely efficient, thorough and accurate manner. There is also no doubt but that this information was very successfully conveyed to our enemies. The collection of the information was very simple. The geography and topography of the area around Pearl Harbor are such that any one with good eyes (perhaps aided with a pair of field glasses) can observe accurately movements in and out of Pearl Harbor from several highways and roads near Pearl Harbor and also from a great many houses on the heights



back of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. There is no question but that the enemy did this in a very thorough and efficient manner. It is also true that they were able to transmit [2] this information very effectively and quickly to their forces at sea. This again is easily explained by the fact that there was no censorship of mail, cables or radio; sampans were operating regularly off shore; there may have been (and probable was) communication by private radio; and there may have been other signalling. Unfortunately, under a democratic form of government, it does not seem possible to take necessary action ahead of time to prevent this sort of thing.

4. Referring to Paragraph 2 (b) above, there were numerous rumors of cars zigzagging along highways to slow up traffic, of cars being parked across roads to tie up or block traffic, of shots being fired from ambush or from automobiles, etc., etc. None of these reports were substantiated.

5. Referring to Paragraph 2 (c) above, there were no real cases of actual physical sabotage. This is somewhat hard to understand as the utilities such as the Hawaiian Electric Company, the Honolulu Gas Company, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Company, the plants and storage tanks of the privately owned oil companies all of which are concentrated in a limited area, the City and Navy Yard water supply systems, etc., etc., were not adequately protected. As a matter of fact, a comparatively small group of well trained saboteurs could easily have put them all out of operation in a very short time. This leads to the query as to whether there were no well organized plans to wreck these utilities and services, or whether such plans were and are so well organized that one might assume that instructions had been passed that no action was to be taken at the time as there were no plans to follow up the attack of December 7 with attempts to land and invade the island. This latter assumption may seem to be far fetched, but is being carefully considered and studied. The only real basis for considering it seriously is that there was not a single attempt made to sabotage any of these essential utilities on the morning of December 7.

6. Referring to Paragraph 2 (d) above, there were many reports such as the one about swaths being cut in cane and pineapple fields pointing to important objectives; people signalling enemy planes; etc., etc. All such rumors and reports were checked as expeditiously as possible. None of the cases investigated proved to be authentic.

7. This Subject has been checked thoroughly with the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, whose findings coincide with the above.

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
A. J. LOWREY,  
A. J. LOWREY,  
By direction

CO: ONI (2)  
COM14 (1)  
DIOs in all NDs (1) (except 16ND)  
FBI-Hon (1)  
MID-HD (1)  
Plan (1) "B."

3 DECEMBER, 1941.

From: ———

To: ———, Tokyo

(Secret military message No. ———) (Chief of Consulate's Code).

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff

From: FUJII

Re: Signals: I wish to simplify communications as follows:

1. *Code* (following 3 section 8 line table) ——— battle force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle force has sailed 1st-3rd dates Inc.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
5. All battle force have sailed, 4th-6th dates Inc.
6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)

2. *Signal*

— light in Lanikal beach house at night ———.

One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1". From 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order to indicate 3 and 4. Two lights, according to the time, indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

When not in accordance with (lights) above 1 full automobile headlight and one half light indicate 1, 2, 3, 4. Two full lights indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour 1 piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates 1, 2, 3, 4. Two pieces linen cloth indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (Offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates 1, 2, 3, 4; a star and "III" indicates 5, 6, 7, 8.

4. Light in dormer window of ——— house from 7pm to 1 am every hour indicates 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

5. "KGMB Want Ads" advertisements 9.45 am

(A) A chinese rug etc., for sale—apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 3 or 6.

(B) A complete chicken farm etc., apply as above indicates 4 or 7.

(C) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates 5 or 8.

In the event that in accordance with one of 3 items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of KULA Sanatorium and Haleskala road which can be watch from the sea to the south west and south east of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak.

7 pm—8 pm indicates 3 or 6; 8 pm—9 pm indicates 4 or 7.

9 pm—10 pm indicates 5 or 8.

Extract from O. N. I. report dated 9 December 1941; Subject, Report of activities, Maui, Lanai and Molokai, since 7 December 1941.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanatorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanatorium occupied by SHIGEO FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

From Katsuro MIHO, attorney-at-law, it was learned that the subject is a respected surgeon and considered one of the best physicians in town even among the white doctors. He is also alleged to be a cancer specialist and radium expert.

The subject, MIHO stated has lived in the mainland and London and has been in the Territory for the past 20 years.

Subject has a son ISHIRO, an alien and an aviation engineer, who is now here. A daughter MARIKO, a student at the University of Hawaii is married to Daino SUMIDA'S adopted son and heir.

Dr. SAKAMAKI states that Sumida's son got married to avoid the draft. Subject's wife is now alleged to be in Japan.

RICHARD MILLER.

12-12-41.

ONI and FBI to send agents to Lanikai and Kalama to stay there and find out all possible information. Each to send two or more agents. No communication by phone, only by one man coming in by automobile. These groups to communicate with each other—How? How communicate with Army?

MID watch for (1) display of lights, (2) display of cloths (3) Star sail boat.

Army to send plane to Maui with the information. Get Adelson and Hansen on job with Army about house on Haleakala.

## MEMO TO SAC

11:30 a. m., December 17, 1941

Re: John Waterhouse House at Kallua

Mr. George Moody, of Grossman-Moody, reports that on returning from horse-back rides almost any Wednesday, Saturday, or Sunday afternoon he would notice as many as sixty or seventy Japanese in the Waterhouse house. The servants at this house very seldom had the owners come down and they are also said to have been raising pigeons. Mr. Moody was certain that this house had dormer windows.

R. A. COOKE, Jr.

HONOLULU, T. H.

Dec. 12, 1941.

Memorandum to the sac:

Dr. Tokue TAKAHASHI  
1385 Alewa Drive  
95 N. Vineyard St.

Louis KAHANAMOKU, Sheriff's Office came in two nights ago and furnished information on the subject.

He stated that about a year ago he rented a house from the subject on Liholiho St. Soon after he rented the house, the subject asked him to take a group of Japanese Naval Personnel out on a canoe ride. He also told KAHANAMOKU that he had to entertain the Navy men at his home that evening.

KAHANAMOKU stated that this incident took place about a year ago upon the visit here of a Japanese Training ship.

The subject's home on Alewa Heights commands a full view of Pearl Harbor. KAHANAMOKU further stated that the subject is interested in sailing and owns a sailing boat.

Upon checking at the Ala Moana Basin, William NELSON, in charge of the Basin informed that the subject bought a second-hand 38 foot yacht, a very sea-worthy craft about three years ago. This boat was sold to Dr. Louis GASPAR by the subject about three months ago.

According to NELSON, the subject was a poor sailor and had a couple of Japanese boys to help him operate the boat whenever he went out.

Extract, Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39.

## THE SPY GAME

In the military and naval intelligence service spies are classified as: (1) Stationary agents; (2) mobile agents; and (3) special agents.

The stationary agent has a mission assigned to him to secure information on a specified subject. He established himself in a place conveniently located and generally engages in a small business enterprise to serve as a cloak for his operations. A cafe or restaurant has been found to be one of the best screens, for by serving better food at lower prices he can eventually attract and make friends with people who may unwittingly, or wittingly, for a price, provide him with the information which he seeks. This information he pieces together to attain his final ends. Again these stationary agents may find employment in hotels and clubs where they come in contacts with guests and members in a casual way and pick up bits of information. Here they also have access to baggage in the absence of its owners and may examine into it. They may also find employment in Governmental or industrial plants which are engaged in the manufacture of war material and thus gain information which they are charged to obtain. Many of these stationary agents are women and they are characterized as the most dangerous of all. This is evidenced by the reappearance in our own Navy Department of a war time warning against them—a sign which reads:

"Beware of female spies. Women are being employed by the enemy to secure information from Navy men, on the theory that they are less liable to be suspected than male spies. Beware of inquisitive women, as well as prying men."

Stationary agents are also employed as "letter boxes." These maintain a permanent address where mail to the other spies operating in the district may be addressed, be received and cleared to them.

The mobile agents operate under the guise of tourists, travelers, students or traveling salesmen. There are thousands of them all over the world. They assume the status which is best likely to permit them to accomplish their mission.

The reports of this gentry are pieced together by experts and an accurate picture of certain situations reported upon may be gained.

Special agents are employed on special missions, where more or less skill is required. They are used principally in times of international tension and political crises. Hundreds of them were used in Austria before that country was taken over and in Czechoslovakia during the Sudeten crises, as well as later when that republic was broken up and dismembered. They have been used in the Polish Corridor for months and are now paving the way for a Danzig coup.

All of the great democratic nations are today passing on to their nationals who are employed in activities connected with the national defense, directly or remotely, the warning which France impressed upon her whole body politic during the World War: "Keep your mouths shut. Be on your guard. The ears of the enemy are listening to you."

HU181SN SCDE TOKYO 24 JG 4 816P

RIYOJI HONOLULU

01260 KOKOK UVUBA WWAYY IUIQO PETJJ UMNH IAHO GAUEY  
VYTIN DYKIE SVSFG BAUGL EFRAU ALDAI DHIYO MEYHE ATLIE  
LBUOL EIELI AWBUB

TOGO

HU187SN SCDE TOKYO 30 JG 4 905PM

RIYOJI

HONOLULU

SIKYU 92466 GOGOG PJVEU VUUIY UDFJG OUEAI JYPGB SUUPX SEEVF  
IOCAA ATTHA OTYVA GUUOO GWWDZ AUAUH SUIYD LLAHI ARRLO  
HEOIA QVEDE TLFGR YATAM EUEXA XWDEI PIDCO TGOOX

TOGO

HU301 CB SCDE TOKIO 18 JG 6 648P

RIYOJI

HONOLULU

SIKYU 01280 KEKEK OQUCQ SNAII UOIUB DDJIY HRBJI EEUGO  
CHVWO DAANJ OJJKV UUAKEH UYDSU QSORO

TOGO

HU131SN SCDE TOKYO 29 JG 6 925PM

RIYOJI HONOLULU

KINQU 92461 GOGOG RAWOU UEIYF ZZOFB SAUQY SSEVJ IIQYK SOSAB  
OUIER OESIO OJHUO JLREL OLAYS OOEYB IBOFJ HAETC YDSYU  
OOMDR DIKAM WGVOZ OIYFE NUVBD DUIZO JOCQI

TOGO

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CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 3

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF  
WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K.

- a. Army Contact Office memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 7 October 1941 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.
- b. M.I.D., Washington, Letter of transmittal dated 28 August 1941, w/letter dated 3 August 1941 from George Paisn to President Roosevelt re Japanese in Hawaii; summary of information dated 30 September 1941 re letter, and H.H.D. letter dated 30 September 1941 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply thereto attached).
- c. M.I.D., Washington, letter of transmittal dated 16 September 1941, w/letter from M.I.D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.
- d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1941, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to General Short dated 25 July 1941.
- e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, w/note attached.
- f. Inter-staff routing slip dated July 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Molokai, w/G-2, H.H.D. letter of transmittal dated 25 July 1941 re Activities of Foreigners in Country—Mexico.

## 342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- g. F.B.I. report dated 6 November 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
- h. F.B.I. report dated 9 October 1940 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.
- i. 14ND report dated 15 February 1943 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu Espionage Activities.
- j. 14ND report dated 15 June 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.
- k. 14ND report dated 14 February 1942 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu Espionage Activities.
- l. F.B.I. report to F.B.I., Washington, 28 March 1942, re notes found on a pad at Japanese Consulate.
- m. F.B.I. letter, 19 March 1942, re translations made of coded and confidential material from Japanese Consulate.
- n. Inter-staff routing slip dated 14 March 1942 re Translation of a Register Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F.B.I. letter of transmittal dated 13 March 1942 and report same subject attached.

### CONFIDENTIAL

#### I

File 336.8—Activities of Foreigners in U. S.—Japanese—Binder #2: From 1 April 1941 to 13 November 1941

#### HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

*Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.*

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE, 7 October 1941

Subject: Japanese Arrival In And Departure From Honolulu On Taiyo Maru. Memo. for: Col. Bicknell.

The Taiyo Maru, a NYK ship, under Japanese government requisition arrived here from Japan with 326 Japanese (145 aliens and 181 dual citizens) and others (Americans and Britishers) on the morning of November 1st, docking Pier 8 at about 9:00 A. M. This was the second NYK vessel to come here from Japan since the suspension of Japanese shipping to the United States; the first one having been the Tatuta Maru of Oct. 24th. The Taiyo Maru was especially assigned to make a round trip from Japan to Hawaii so that the people who had been stranded in Japan and Hawaii may return to their desired homes.

Majority of the passengers that arrived on the Taiyo were local people and a few of them were people going to America and Europe. The greater portion of the returning local people went to Japan either in spring or summer of this year for a short visit and they would have returned here earlier if transportation was available; the others have been either studying or working in Japan and would have remained in Japan longer under normal conditions, but the tense situation between United States and Japan more or less forced them to catch the first available ship on hand and come back to Hawaii.

It seemed, judging from interviews with the passengers and from reports of other contacts, every single one of the returning people was very glad to come back here and they were all determined to live here permanently. Moreover, they unanimously seemed to have felt very inconvenient and uncomfortable to live in Japan due to economic pressure although they have not experienced serious shortages in every day necessities. Many people have expressed the feeling that the people in Japan are united solidly and are well controlled by the government and are prepared to meet any eventuality. Many American citizens of Japanese ancestry seemed extremely vexed and expressed hatred toward the Japanese government for a discriminatory action against them; that is, American citizens were given only 10 yen as spending money on the ship while the alien Japanese were allowed to board the ship with 200 yen or more per person.

The baggages of the returning passengers on the Taiyo were carefully inspected by the Customs officials, but nothing of importance from the military, naval or national defense standpoints was discovered. However, it was interesting to note that these people brought back very little baggage, practically nothing compared to the number of baggages that usually were brought back here before during the normal times. The contents of these baggages consisted mainly of old personal effects and there was very small amount of new things indicating that either these people were out of funds or Japanese government

was carrying out strict control of outlet of goods from Japan. As far as I could gather, it was mainly due to strict government control of commodities, and lack of fund was secondary.

The inspection of the baggages of the people leaving here for Japan aboard the Taiyo Maru by the Customs Office started at 7:00 A. M., Monday, Nov. 3rd., and lasted till about 7:00 P. M., that night. It was resumed at 7:00 A. M., on the next day and was completed at around 6:30 P. M. About 125 families were inspected on the first day and about 225 families were inspected on the second day. The types of baggages consisted of trunks, suit cases, sacks, boxes, sewing machines, ice boxes, packages, etc. In them were found kitchen utensils, plates, tools, clothes, hats, shoes, books, magazines, and many other household goods and personal effects and some canned goods. One interesting feature of the baggages was that everyone of the families was taking a sewing machine and in one particular instance two sewing machines and that all these machines appeared to have been crated by the Singer Sewing Machine Co. It seemed all the leaving people were well aware of the government regulations concerning money or monetary certificates and commodities, for outside of a few cases, all complied studiously with the prescribed regulations.

Wednesday, Nov. 5th, was devoted primarily in checking the leaving people's money and certificates with the licenses that were issued by the local Freeze Order authorities and their passports and searching them and questioning them on matters that might be of interest to some authorities concerned. However, some hand baggages were also inspected on this day. The work for this day started at 7:00 A. M. and was over by 6:30 P. M.

Following information was gathered during the 3 day inspection, search, and questioning:

1. Practically all were going to Japan to visit their sick parents, brothers or sisters, or other relatives and they hope to return sometime later.

2. Some were going back to Japan to remain there permanently. These people did not even take the trouble of obtaining necessary immigration papers for re-entry here. I feel there were about 20 of these families. They seemed to have amassed enough money here to enable them to live comfortably in Japan the rest of their lives.

3. There were few others who were undecided. That is, they may come back to Hawaii if it will be possible, but otherwise they would be satisfied to remain in Japan forever. I guessed perhaps there were from 25 to 50 of these people.

4. There were about 25 Japanese business men and professional men returning to Japan. They were going back because of lack of business or were going back because they have finished their work here.

5. The amount of money carried by these people ranged from about 2,000 yen to 65,000 yen, which were either in the form of bank deposit certificate or drafts or bonds. Amount of American money carried by an individual ranged from about \$100 to \$200.

A great many of these people originally had intended to go to Japan a few months ago, but were forced to wait till now due to no shipping.

It is understood that 238 alien Japanese and 210 American citizens of Japanese ancestry have left for Japan on the Taiyo Maru. Three persons, I have been told, have cancelled their reservation since the baggage inspection started on Monday. Also, I understand that about 50 people have cancelled their reservations before they sent their baggages to the pier.

As soon as the final inspection was finished, the people were taken aboard the ship and were not allowed to come ashore. Hence, customary goodbyes were exchanged out in the street and in the park in front of the pier hours before the actual sailing of the ship. The Royal Hawaiian Band played "Aloha" at least 3 hours before the ship sailed. In other words, all the color and gaiety of the past was missing when the ship actually slid away from Pier 8 at 7:30 P. M., Wednesday, Nov. 5th.

Following are some interesting things noted during the 3 days of inspection:

1. Shoyei Kamiya declared that he is going to join the Japanese army. He even wrote it in the diary he carried. His brother is working at 711 S. King St. and his name is Shozen Kamiya.

2. Takumyo, Katsuto, a Buddhist Reverend, was found carrying obscene pictures in his baggage.

3. Uzo Shishido had many maps of East Asia which were published in conjunction with the recent China incident by Japanese magazines as supplements.

4. Several old Japanese were seen holding letter of appreciation from both

### 344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the Japanese Army and Navy offices for their contributions toward soldiers relief defense funds, and comfort bags, and other donations.

5. Kenpei Iuchi was the only man whose family record showed that he had been an ex-Japanese navy man.

6. Rev. Tatsuo Sawai took many old Japanese books and magazines back to Japan. He possessed a scratch paper on which appeared various data concerning the Japanese people in Mt. View, Hawaii, which he claimed he collected for the Japanese consulate in Honolulu while acting as a consular agent.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1 Enclosures:

201—Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in Hawaii  
dated 8/3/41.

CONFIDENTIAL

MID 201 (Paisn, George)  
Strictly private and *confidential*.

THE BOREAS,  
BLUE RIDGE,  
New York State.

Aug 3 1941

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in the island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of the reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and the military authorities in Hawaii. Should Japan destroy these stores at these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is a supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that our anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ GEORGE PAISN.

The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

8/21/41

Copies to:

G-3

Haw.

VSR/egs

## CONFIDENTIAL

## WAR DEPARTMENT

M. I. D.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, CONTACT OFFICE,  
215 Dillingham Building, Honolulu, T. H., 30 September 1941.

Subject: Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

## Summary of Information:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ GEORGE PAISN.

The Honorable F. D. ROOSEVELT.

## Evaluation

|            |              |                 |
|------------|--------------|-----------------|
| —of source |              | —of information |
|            | Reliable     |                 |
|            | Credible     |                 |
|            | Questionable |                 |
| X          | Undetermined | X               |

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 30 September 1941.

In reply refer to: 336.8—(Japanese)

Subject: Letter from George Paisn relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.  
To Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, New York.

1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your information, with the request that Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess concerning the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the Japanese Government, and the native Hawaiians.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,  
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA,  
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
Governors Island, New York, October 15, 1941.

Subject: LETTER FROM GEORGE PAISN RELATIVE TO JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN HAWAII.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, F Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

1. Reference is made to your communication of 30th, September, with ab subject title.

2. Before this office can comply with request contained therein to interview the subject, it is requested that this office be supplied with Mr. Paisn's address inasmuch as there is nothing contained in your communication which would indicate that he is a resident of this Corps Area.

*For the A. C. of S., G-2*

*Lt. Col., G. S. O.,  
Executive Officer, G-2*

336.8 (AGO) — 1st Ind.

Intelligence Section, Contact Officer, 214 Dillingham Building, Honolulu, T. 5 November 1941—To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs, 2d Corps Area Governors Island, N. Y.

1. Mr. Paisn's address as shown on his letter to the President was "T Boreas, Blue Ridge, New York State". This address was inadvertently omitted in S/I of 30 September 1941.

*GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. O.,  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2, Contact Officer.*

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
Washington, D. C., September 16, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

*Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2*

1 Enclosures: 336.8 San Francisco S-25—MID Summ. of Info. re Alleged exodus of Japanese.

CONFIDENTIAL

MID 336.8 San Francisco  
8-26-41

G2/  
DC

WAR DEPARTMENT  
M. I. D.

G-2, NINTH CORPS AREA, August 26, 1941

7399.42

Subject: Alleged exodus of Japanese.

Summary of Information:

A confidential informant reported to this office that he received information through one SILVER that all Japanese officials of Japanese concern in San Francisco have received instructions to liquidate their affairs as soon as possible and to leave for Japan. Only three (3) key individuals in each concern are not affected by this.

SILVER is said to be a buyer for a Japanese firm.

/s/ J. H. W

Evaluation  
 —of source —of information  
 X Credible X  
 Reliable  
 Questionable  
 Undetermined

Distribution:  
 G-2, WD  
 DIO, 12 ND

Further Dist:  
 G-1 G-3  
 G-4 WPD  
 FBI State  
 Haw. Phil.  
 Intell. File

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
 INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

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| No. of Ind. From and Date | To       | Subject: L/tr Adm Bloch to Gen Short dated<br>25 July 1941                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |          |
|---------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1st Ind. AG 4 Aug 41..... | G-2..... | This is apparently a G-2 communication.<br>1 Incl.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | O. M. M. |
| 2d Ind. G-2 4 Aug 41..... | C/S..... | Reference attached note from Chief of Staff:<br>The letter of Admiral Bloch herewith acknowledges receipt of the letter of the Commanding General, 25 July 1941, transmitting a copy of correspondence from the War Department, MID, to A. C. of S., G-2, Hawaiian Department, on the subject of small Japanese Submarines lurking in Hawaiian waters, etc., the communication having originated in Mexico and transmitted to the War Department by Military Attache. 2 Incls: Ltr. Admiral Bloch and Note C/S. | K. J. F. |
| 3d C/S H9 8/5/41.....     |          | File.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | L.       |
| 4th Ind. AG 8 Aug 41..... | G-2..... | For your file. 1 Incl L/14ND.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | O. M. M. |

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
 AND YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.,  
 August 1, 1941.

Lieutenant General W. C. SHORT, U. S. A.,  
 Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,  
 Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: This is to acknowledge receipt of your confidential letter 836.81 (C-2) J dated 25 July 1941. Upon the completion of study of the letter by interested members of my staff, in the absence of any instructions from you, we shall file it in our confidential files.

Very truly yours,

C. C. BLOCH,  
 Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
 Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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| No. of Ind. From and Date    | To        | Subject: Unknown subjects, book entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kionoaki Matsuo                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |          |
|------------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1st Ind. G-2 19 June 41..... | W-36 C/S. | Please note the attached report on the Japanese book "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" not on sale locally, but others of similar nature are advertised and sold here.<br>Review of "A Thesis on the Final Battle of the World"—by Lt. Gen. Kanji Ishihawa: Ultimate conflict between Japan and United States predicted as inevitable, with prophecies of Buddhism indicating final battle will be fifty years hence. 1 Incl: FBI File No. 97-254—Dated 6/9/41.*<br>6/13/41. | M. W. M. |
| C/S.....                     | G-2.....  | 16 located.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |          |

\* Returned to Contact Officer, 26 Jun 1941. VSW.

RS to CS: F. B. I. Report.

Please note the attached report on the Japanese book. "Three-power alliance and American-Japanese War" not on sale locally, but others of similar nature are advertised and sold here.

Review of "A Thesis on the Final Battle of the World" by Lt. Gen. Kanji Ishihawa:—Ultimate conflict between Japan and United States predicted as inevitable, with prophecies of Buddhism indicating final battle will be fifty years hence.

M. W. M.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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| No. of Ind. From and Date   | To       | Subject: Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near MOLOKAI.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |      |
|-----------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1st Ind. G-2 24 Jul-41..... | C/S..... | 1. Information furnished in MEXICO by source which has seldom proved to be reliable.<br>2. Alleged that about 12 special type small subs. will be submerged near MOLOKAI, kept in serviceable condition by Japanese fishing sampans, their crews secreted ashore among plantation workers. Three of these craft are reported to be here now.<br>3. Objective: The destruction of naval vessels, particularly plane carriers, at PEARL HARBOR. | KJF. |
| 3d Ind. G-2 25-Jul-41.....  | C/S..... | 1 Incl. Mil. Intel. Div. WD, June 17/41, IG No. 5940, subj: ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGNERS IN COUNTRY.<br>1. Herewith draft of letter to Admiral Bloch, as directed in 2d R/S ind. hereon.<br>2. If letter is approved and signed, please return to this office, for mailing and further action.<br>2 Incl. 1 Incl. added: Draft of letter to Admiral Bloch, dated 25 July 1941, File 336. 1 (G2)-J.                                                | KJF. |

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 July, 1941.

In reply refer to:

(G-2)336.81-J

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff,

Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

Reference attached report, the following action has been taken by this office:

Since the subject matter of this report concerns the Navy Department, a copy thereof has been furnished the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

ROBERT T. AITKEN,  
1st Lt. MI,  
ASST. A. C. OF S., G-2.

1 Incl.

Copy of letter, Comdg. Genl. Hawn. Dept. No. 336.81(G2)-J, dated 25 July 1941, together with inclosure forming a part thereof, subject: ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGNERS IN COUNTRY—MEXICO (I. G. #5940, dated 17 July 1941.

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

BOX 3, APO 456—% Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 201—C. D. Section—Hirayama, Unji

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1. This case originated at Honolulu, T. H. File No. 65-492.

Report made at Honolulu, T. H. Date when made: 11-6-40. Period for which made: 10-23, 29, 31-40. Report made by: F. G. Tillman. jwh

Title: REV. Unji Hirayama

Character of case: Espionage

Synopsis of facts: REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA, Hompa Hongwanji Mission, Lahaina, Maui, T. H., is in charge of that mission and principle of the Language School. He has not been observed engaged in suspicious activities but is said

to be fearful of his position as a Japanese Priest, believing that this group would be the first to be deported or interned in event of war. Names of associates set out.

Reference: Report of Special Agent N. J. ALAGA, Honolulu, T. H., dated 10-9-40.

Details: Confidential Informant M-2 was questioned generally concerning the Japanese organizations and religious groups in the vicinity of Lahaina, Maui, without any particular reference to the Subject UNJI HIRAYAMA on October 23, 1940, at which time he was to obtain statistical information relating to these groups. On October 29, 1940, this Informant advised the writer that he had just come from the home of REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA, from whom he had secured the names of the directors of the LAHAINA HONPA HONGWANJI MISSION purportedly in connection with his, the Informant's, usual work.

At this time the Informant stated that UNJI HIRAYAMA was concerned over the present Japanese situation and its reaction upon the [2] alien Japanese and citizens of Japanese ancestry and the plight of the Japanese in Hawaii should there be war between the United States and Japan. HIRAYAMA was said to have expressed the opinion that, should such an event happen, the Japanese priests in Hawaii would be the first group to suffer, that is, be interned or deported. The Subject was said to have had the opinion that preparatory or plans had been made to intern such Japanese on the islands of Lanai, Molokai, or Kahoolawe, T. H.

In this connection HIRAYAMA was said to have stated that the various Japanese Priests and School teachers were instructed, probably by the Japanese Consulate, not to express any pro-Japanese sympathies or to do anything which would impair their position in the communities in which they are employed.

The Confidential Informant M-2 stated that it is now the policy of the Japanese Government to replace the older Japanese Priests and School Principals, whom they are calling back to Japan, with younger and more active men who would not be antagonistic to the second-generation Japanese and who would be more able to run the affairs of the Japanese communities. HIRAYAMA was said to be a good mixer and able to drink with, as well as teach and compete in sports with the younger citizens of Japanese ancestry.

REVEREND HIRAYAMA was said to have related to the Informant that a group of American sailors thumbed a ride from him to Lahaina but when they observed his religious robes, refused to ride with him. Although two sailors, in another group, rode with the Subject on the same day, HIRAYAMA used this incident to illustrate to the Informant the precarious position of the Priests and the suspicions in which they are held by this Government. Following the above statement, HIRAYAMA was said to have again stated that he was afraid of future developments and what would happen to him.

There is set out the officers of the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission and the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission Japanese Language School, both groups being identical, as these individuals are probably the Subject's closest contacts in the community:

| Title              | Name                   | Citizenship  | Occupation                                                                                 |
|--------------------|------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chairman.....      | Jutaro Ito.....        | Citizen..... | Now in Japan; Vice Chairman SHINTO DAIJINGU TEMPLE, Lahaina.                               |
| Vice-Chairman..... | Mrs. Seichi Shota..... | Alien.....   | Wife of Asst. Consular Agent Zeichi Fukunaga.                                              |
| Secretary.....     | Yasuto Shibao.....     | Citizen..... | Student; now in Japan.                                                                     |
| Treasurer.....     | Zeichi Fukunaga.....   | Alien.....   | Active Consular Agent; NIPPUN JUI representative; Vice-Chairman Shinto Dai Jingu, Lahaina. |
| Auditor.....       | Okujyu Sasaki.....     | Alien.....   | Pioneer Mill Company, laborer.                                                             |
| Auditor.....       | Ishiro Wada.....       | Alien.....   | Pioneer Mill Company, laborer.                                                             |
| Auditor.....       | Shozo Tabata.....      | Alien.....   | Owner, S. Tabata Store.                                                                    |

[3] The following individuals are the teachers in the Japanese language school of which HIRAYAMA is principal:

MRS. FUMIE HIRAYAMA, wife of Subject  
 REV. RINIKO KAMI  
 MRS. ISUMI KAMI  
 TADAYASHI KUBOTA  
 MISS NISAN SHUTA (Citizen)  
 MISS TOMING KANEISHI  
 MRS. KOU TAMURA

MRS. FUMIE HIRAYAMA, above mentioned, is also the head of the Lahaina Japanese Women's Club (FUJINKAI). KOOCHI MASUDA, son of GOSAKU MASUDA, a consular agent at Lahaina, is the chairman of the Judo Club of the Lahaina Hongwanji Mission.

Inquiry was made of R. H. WATT, Factory Superintendent, TODD WILLETT, Overseer and former American Legion Commander, and HARRY TAYLOR, Assistant Superintendent, Pioneer Mill Company, Lahaina, who advised that there have been no rumors of an espionage nature concerning REVEREND UNJI HIRAYAMA, to their knowledge. In this connection, Mr. WILLETT has previously assisted the Army Intelligence and has exhibited an interest in these matters over a period of years.

The Confidential Information advised that REVEREND HIRAYAMA has not acted as a "consular agent," TURI-TSUGI-NIN, and has not the reputation of being such. He is known to the Confidential Informant as having been a priest at Paia Maui, as set forth in the reference report and in the Informant's opinion, does not live any better or appear to have a greater income than that usually enjoyed by men in a similar position. It is his opinion that HIRAYAMA is timid, and will return to Japan as soon as he has earned sufficient money for his purposes.

#### UNDEVELOPED LEAD

THE HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION at Honolulu, T. H., will keep in touch with Confidential Informant J-1 with reference to the contact of REV. UNJI HIRAYAMA with the Japanese Consulate.

Pending.

#### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1. This case originated at Honolulu, T. H. File No. 65-492

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H. Date when made: 10-9-40. Period for which made: 9-23-27-40. Report made by: N. J. Alaga. jwh

Title: Rev. Unji Hirayama. Character of case: Espionage.

Synopsis of facts: Confidential Informant J-1 stated that the local Japanese Consulate, in June of 1940, requested Subject to keep the Consulate informed as to any movement of the U. S. Fleet in the vicinity of Maui, T. H. Investigation reflects Subject to be the Buddhist Priest in charge of the Nishi Hongwanji Temple at Lahaina, Maui, having arrived in the Territory of Hawaii on May 3, 1936 from Japan. Subject is also the director of the Judo Section of the Maui Branch of the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai.

Details: At Honolulu, T. H. Instant investigation is predicated upon information received from Confidential Informant J-1, whose identity is known to the Bureau, that it had come to his attention in June, 1940, that Rev. HIRAYAMA of Lahaina, Maui, had been requested by a member of the local Japanese Consulate, identity unknown, to keep him informed as to the movements of the U. S. Fleet in the vicinity of Maui.

A check of the records of Confidential Informant N concerning Subject resulted negatively. The records of Confidential Informant A reflected that Subject is an alien, born in 1901 in Fukuoka-ken, Japan. He arrived on Maui on May 3, 1936, his occupation being that of Buddhist Priest. He immediately took charge of the Nishi Hongwanji Mission at Paia, Maui. He also became director of the Judo Section of the Maui Branch of the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai, a Japanese organization which apparently is organized merely for [2] the purpose of developing athletic skill in Judo and fencing, but which is believed to be a strictly nationalistic and militaristic organization, the main purpose of which is to instill in young men of Japanese ancestry militaristic and pro-Japanese ideals and principles, as well as to develop their bodies for military service.

Confidential Informant A's records further reflected that on August 7 1939, Subject was transferred to the Hongwanji Buddhist Temple at Lahaina, Maui, where he succeeded RENJO HIROZAWA. Confidential Informant A's report reflected that HIROZAWA had also been Consular Agent and Japanese language school principal at Lahaina and indicated a belief that Subject would take over

these duties. A Confidential Informant of Confidential Informant A, in commenting on Subject, stated that he was "doing strictly religious work."

F. C. BRYANT, Retail Credit Company, checked his records and ascertained that they reflected that Subject had recently applied for automobile insurance on a 1940 Plymouth sedan. The report indicated Subject's occupation as being a Buddhist Priest in the Hongwanji Mission and a teacher in the Hongwan Japanese language school, both in Lahaina, Maui. His net worth was ascertained at \$5,000 and his annual income as \$1,000. He was reported as possessing good reputation and as having good associates.

Inspector JAMES SLOAN, U. S. Immigration Service, checked that Department's records and ascertained that Subject, whose full name was reflected as being UNJI HIRAYAMA, had entered the Territory of Hawaii from Kobe, Japan on May 3, 1936, at Honolulu, on the SS "Bokuyo Maru" as a non-quota immigrant. He possessed passport #297184 issued by the Japanese Foreign Minister through the Kyoto Prefectural Office and bore non-quota immigration visa #1597 issued on April 10, 1936, by WALTER P. McCONAUGHY, U. S. Vice Consul at Kobe, Japan. The visa reflected that Subject was born on September 14, 1900, at Fukuoka-ken, Japan. It further reflected that Subject is married to one FUMI HIRAYAMA and has two children, YASUKO, born in 1932, and KOSHI, born in 1934. Subject's wife and children arrived in Honolulu with him. Subject indicated his occupation was that of Buddhist Priest and that he was entering the Territory of Hawaii as a non-quota immigrant who has been a minister continuously for at least two years prior to the time of application for admission to the U. S.; and that he enters the U. S. solely for the purpose of taking up his vocation as a minister of the Homba Honganji Temple. Subject's visa further indicated that his final destination was Paia, Maui, T. H., where he would be connected with the Homba Honganji Mission. His passage from Japan was paid for by the Homba Honganji Temple, Hyoto, Japan. He indicated he intended to remain in the U. S. for a period of 5 years.

A photograph of Subject appears attached to the immigration visa. Copies of this photograph have been made and are being retained in the files of the Honolulu Field Division.

Undeveloped lead: The HONOLULU FIELD DIVISION at Lahaina, Maui, will make a general [S] investigation for the purpose of ascertaining Subject's reputation in the community, the nature of his activities, his contacts, his income, etc. Will attempt to develop a confidential informant in a position to furnish accurate information as to Subject's activities.

Pending.

---

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS CPBC  
G-2 [CID]

BOX 3, APO 456, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 336.92—Japanese Consulate and Consular Agents

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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INVESTIGATION REPORT

*Fourteenth Naval District*

(Confidential)

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.  
Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H. Date: Feb. 15, 1943.  
Report made by: Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR; Ens. Don Woodrum, USNR.  
Period covered: June 15, 1942—Feb. 10, 1943. Status of Case: PENDING—14ND  
Origin of Case: Investigation of espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.

Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: (A) Copy of signed statement of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIROD dated Oct. 1, 1942, entitled "Trip to Kauai". (Photostat to ONI; copies to others.)

Copy to: ONI (5) Zone III (1)  
 14ND (3) Zone IV (1)  
 FBI-Hon (2) ClnCPac (1)  
 [Agts. have copy] MID-HD (2) Com14 (1)  
 2/27/43  
 ZONE II (1)

Source File No: 14ND/54 (c). ONI File No.:

Synopsis: Former clerks and employees of the Japanese Consulate were re-interviewed and various investigative leads developed therefrom followed.

Review of all known Consulate espionage activity indicates that the Consulate was concerned only in "legal" espionage; that is, that which could be discovered by observation (in a broad sense) without entering any restricted area. Interest was displayed in U. S. Fleet movements, airports, harbors, Army camps, and any new construction by the Army or Navy. Interest also was shown in power plant on Kauai. Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO's trip to Kauai in July, 1941, to collect information for the Consulate, is discussed herein. Trips taken by Secretary Tadasu MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO appear to have been made for general survey purposes. There is no evidence that either of these individuals established contacts on Kauai, Maui, or Hawaii. However, there is evidence that Vice Consul OKUDA maintained a personal espionage agent on Maui.

Other information indicates that the consulate was granted an allowance for "Korean Intelligence", and was using paid Korean informants to keep close contact with Korean nationalist movements.

[Stamped:] Feb 23 1943.

Deductions:

Approved

L. H. MAYFIELD,  
 Captain, U. S. Navy,  
 District Intelligence Officer.

By direction  
 WBS/cop

[1]

Confidential

FEBRUARY 15, 1943.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:

- (a) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, same subject.
- (b) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
- (c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
- (d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
- (e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Takaichi SAKAI.
- (f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Katsukichi MURAOKA.
- (g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Kanaye SAHARA.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 2, 1942, subject Shigetaro MATSUO.
- (j) FBI-Honolulu report, file 97-274, dated November 12, 1942, subject Noah Kwang Won CHO (available at Washington and Honolulu).
- (k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 27, 1942, subject Insuke HORIKAWA.
- (l) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject Unji Hirayama.
- (m) 14ND Investigation Report, dated March 28, 1942, subject Zenichi KAWAZOE.
- (n) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 8, 1942, subject Kenneth Kilsoo HAAN.
- (o) FBI-Honolulu report, file 100-1718, dated November 23, 1942, subject Kilsoo K. HAAN, with aliases (available in Washington, Los Angeles, and Honolulu).
- (p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 12, 1943, subject Sanji ABE.
- (q) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 12, 1942, subject Kikujiro Clifford KONDO.



- (r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 11, 1942, subject Katsuzo SATO.
- (s) 14ND Summary Report, dated February 8, 1943, subject Kenju OHTOMO.
- (t) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 8, 1941, subject JAPANESE POSTAL EMPLOYEES.
- (u) FBI-Honolulu Confidential Report, file 65-414, dated April 25, 1942, subject JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H. (CONFILE).
- (v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject VISITS OF JAPANESE PUBLIC VESSELS TO THE ISLAND OF OAHU.
- (w) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 3, 1942, subject Kimle DOUE.

[2] 1. This report is a continuation and an expansion of the material set forth in references (a), (b), and (c). During September and October, 1942, all former employees of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, who were still available were reinterviewed in the process of a joint investigation conducted by the Army Contact Office (MID), Honolulu; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu; and the District Intelligence Office. In addition, a number of other individuals who were in a position to supply information concerning the espionage activities of the Consulate were interviewed.

2. The following officers and agents were present at various times during the interrogations which were conducted at the Army Contact Office, Honolulu:

**Military Intelligence Division:**

Captain Frank O. Blake

Special Agent William T. Hiraoka

**Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu**

Special Agent J. Harold Hughes

Special Employee Larry S. Chiwa

**District Intelligence Office**

Lieutenant G. P. Kimball

Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson

Ensign Don Woodrum

3. The following individuals were interviewed at the Army Contact Office by representatives of the three agencies:

Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, subject of reference (d).

Joan Kimle KOTOSHIRODO—Wife of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.

Takaichi SAKAI—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (e).

Katsukichi MURAOKA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (f).

[3] Kanaye SAHARA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (g).

Yasumasa MURATA—A clerk at the Japanese Consulate until 1938.

Miss Kimle DOUE—Formerly employed as a receptionist at the Japanese Consulate; subject of reference (w).

John Yoshiye MIKAMI—Regular taxi driver for the Consulate, subject of reference (h).

Albert Shuichi HAYASHI—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.

Koreshige KUDO—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.

Shotaro NIIYA, alias Shigetaro MATSUO—Regular taxi driver for Kenzi KIMURA, manager of the Honolulu office of the N. Y. K. line. He is the subject of reference (i).

ICHITARO OZAKI—Consulate chauffeur.

Jitsuei TAKAMIYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and Tadasu MORIMURA, a Consulate secretary, on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Maui.

4. The following individuals were interviewed by agents of the Military Intelligence Division alone:

[4] Shingo NARIKAWA.—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA on the occasion of their trip to the Island of Hawaii.

George Masayoshi KAWAMOTO.—Relative of KOTOSHIRODO who was visited by KOTOSHIRODO during his stay on the Island of Hawaii.

Toshimasa MINATOYA.—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and his wife on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Kauai.

Namiko FUKUSHIMA.—Recipient of a present from Consul General KITA which was delivered by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO to Tetsunosuke SONE, a *toritsuginin* at Puunene, Maui.

**Mrs. Tetsunosuke SONE.**—Wife of Tetsunosuke SONE, interviewed in lieu of her husband, who is now interned on the mainland.

5. The following individual was interviewed by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

**Noah Kwang Won CHO.**—A Korean Christian minister who rendered various services to the Japanese Consulate on Korean matters. CHO is the subject of reference (j).

6. The following individual was interviewed by officers of the District Intelligence Office:

**Lawrence NAKATSUKA.**—Reporter employed by the Honolulu Star Bulletin who covered the Japanese Consulate as one of his regular assignments.

#### TRIPS MADE TO VARIOUS PARTS OF OAHU

##### *Pearl Harbor Area*

[5] 7. The information set forth in this report concerning the various trips made by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO is intended only to supplement the information thereon already set forth in reference (c). KOTOSHIRODO amplified certain phases of these trips, but he did not contradict his former story except on a few minor points.

8. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip from the Consulate to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor about January, 1941, when he was asked by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA to drive Kohichi SEKI, one of the Consulate secretaries, to Pearl City and Aiea. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that the purpose of these trips was to determine the number and type of ships in Pearl Harbor, and to keep the Consul General informed of the movements of United States Naval vessels. KOTOSHIRODO further stated that to the best of his knowledge, the personnel of the Consulate had begun making these trips either in December, 1940, or in January, 1941. (It should be noted here that there is no evidence that any agent of the Consulate ever entered the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, except upon official invitation.)

9. To the best of KOTOSHIRODO's recollection, it was early in 1941, probably January, that he overheard OKUDA tell SEKI that they (OKUDA and SEKI) should start "motoring around". KOTOSHIRODO also remembered having heard Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, say, about the same time, that all Consulate secretaries should start making Sunday "excursions" to the "public places" such as radio station KGU, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, and the like. KOTOSHIRODO stated that prior to January, 1941, he had never seen any evidence of any secretary's making trips away from the Consulate as he and SEKI and MORIMURA subsequently did.

10. For the first few months, SEKI acted as observer. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having "heard" that SEKI had attended a naval academy in Japan at one time, but had been forced to withdraw before graduation because of his health. However, SEKI was interested in, and had considerable knowledge of, naval matters. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI made a number of trips to Pearl Harbor together.

11. When Tadasu MORIMURA first arrived in March, 1941, SEKI and MORIMURA went to observe the ships in Pearl Harbor together. Occasionally KOTOSHIRODO went along with them. He stated that both secretaries knew how to identify various types of warships, and they would explain various identifying characteristics to KOTOSHIRODO.

12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in 1941 someone from the Consulate went out to look at the ships in Pearl Harbor about twice a week. However, SEKI appears to have been of the opinion that observations should be made more often.

[6] 13. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip alone to observe the ships at Pearl Harbor in August, 1941. He claimed not to have stopped any place on this particular trip, but to have counted what ships he could see while driving at 25 miles per hour on Kamehameha Highway, just outside the Navy Yard boundaries. Whenever he went to Pearl Harbor, whether alone or with MORIMURA or SEKI, KOTOSHIRODO always was asked to state how many ships he had counted. On some occasions he was told to count only the number of destroyers, while SEKI or MORIMURA would count the other types of ships.

14. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he knew the usual berths and anchorages of the various types of warships in Pearl Harbor. He stated, correctly, that battleships berthed on the Honolulu side of Ford Island; that carriers

berthed on the side of Ford Island nearest the Pearl City landing; that destroyers and cruisers moored in East Loch, off Waialu. He further stated that MORIMURA had pointed out a vantage spot on the Kamehameha Highway between Aiea and Makalapa where the best view of the Submarine Base could be obtained. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not know what a torpedo was, and he added that he had never heard MORIMURA discuss the subject.

15. KOTOSHIRODO remembered conversations with MORIMURA in which the latter had stressed the strategic importance of the Aiea and Pearl City regions for purposes of observation. MORIMURA had attempted to locate a girl friend in Aiea, presumably to develop her as an informant, and had asked KOTOSHIRODO if he had any close friends in Aiea or Pearl City "who could be trusted". KOTOSHIRODO was unable to say whether MORIMURA had succeeded in this plan.

16. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that occasionally he would board a jitney bus in Honolulu and head for some destination beyond Pearl Harbor. He would get off at Aiea and walk around a bit. On one occasion, according to his story, MORIMURA got off the jitney at Aiea and walked back along the Kamehameha Highway, finally coming to Navy Yard gate. KOTOSHIRODO was unable to state whether this was the Submarine Base gate or the main gate; however, the former seems more likely. At the gate, MORIMURA inquired about getting employment in the Navy Yard. The sentry referred him to an office downtown. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that he "roamed around" Aiea.

17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI had been driven to Pearl Harbor on a number of occasions by John Yoshiye MIKAMI, the usual Consulate taxi driver. However, MIKAMI, when interviewed, denied ever having driven SEKI on any of the observation trips, although he admitted driving KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA on numerous occasions.

#### *Kaneohe Bay Area*

18. About one month after MORIMURA arrived in Honolulu, KOTOSHIRODO drove him (in KOTOSHIRODO's car) over the Nuuanu Pali, thence around the Kokokahi Road. They drove slowly and looked across the bay toward the Kaneohe Naval Air Station. At the Kailua Beach Pavilion, they parked for about five minutes, but did not get out of the car. After leaving Kailua, they drove through Kailua town, without stopping, and proceeded along the highway to Honolulu via Waimanalo. They stopped at Waimanalo beach near the old pier. This time they got out of the car and walked out on the pier. However, they talked to no one. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he could not see Bellows Field (Army) from the pier. They stayed here for five or ten minutes, and then returned to Honolulu by way of Koko Head. They made no other stops. KOTOSHIRODO cannot remember having heard MORIMURA make any comment about the Naval Radio Station at Wailupe.

19. Shortly after their trip to Maui (early in May, 1941), MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, this time driven by MIKAMI, again went over the Nuuanu Pali. As they approached Kaneohe town, they turned onto the Kokokahi Road, and drove to the Kalama Road. While on the Kokokahi Road they had MIKAMI drive slowly. KOTOSHIRODO believes that MORIMURA had field glasses with him on this trip, but he was unable to remember whether MORIMURA had used them. However, he did remember MORIMURA's observing that all the hangars at the air station appeared to have been completed. MORIMURA had no camera with him. (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember seeing MORIMURA with a camera on any occasion.) On the Kalama Road, they stopped at a watermelon stand on the side of the road away from the beach. Then they proceeded to the Kailua Tavern, where MIKAMI ate breakfast, and KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA each drank a can of beer. They talked to no one but the waitress at the tavern. From there they returned to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali highway. The whole trip lasted about two and a half hours. KOTOSHIRODO believed that the purpose of this trip was to observe Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

20. Paragraph 34 of reference (c) describes a picnic held by the Consulate at the home of Sam WOODS, at Lanikai Beach, Oahu, about the middle of April 1941. Ichitaro OZAKI, regularly employed chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled two such picnics, an earlier one having taken place in 1940, while OKUDA was Acting Consul General. On this occasion, the entire Consulate staff attended. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali, and then OKUDA ordered OZAKI to drive

to Lanikai by way of Kaneohe (a considerable detour). They parked at Kaneohe and everyone in the party went sightseeing in a glass-bottomed boat in Kaneohe Bay. Then they drove to Lanikai by way of the Kokokahi Road. On the occasion of the second picnic, described in reference (c), they made no such detour, but proceeded directly to the WOODS home.

21. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to describe again the trip to Kailua which was detailed in paragraph 46 of reference (a). This trip was made in the latter part of October, 1941. (KOTOSHIRODO was unable to remember, however, if this trip was made prior to the arrival of, during the visit of, or after the departure of, the TATUTA MARU, Japanese evacuation ship which was in port October 23-24, 1941.) OKUDA accompanied MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO in the latter's car. This was the only trip on which OKUDA accompanied the other two, and OKUDA appeared to be very nervous. KOTOSHIRODO was given no explanation of the reason for this trip, nor was he told where to go when he left the Consulate. OKUDA merely in- [8] structed him to "just keep on driving". They proceeded over the Nuuanu Pali and went directly to Kailua. When they reached the Kailua Tavern, OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive straight ahead, toward the ocean, past the tavern to the first or second intersection. There KOTOSHIRODO was directed to stop the car, and MORIMURA got out. Then OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO drove down the road almost to the junction of the Kalama Road, where OKUDA told KOTOSHIRODO to stop the car and wait for MORIMURA, who was to be back in about 15 minutes.

22. KOTOSHIRODO stated that while driving from Honolulu he had glanced in the rear-view mirror and noticed that OKUDA had a money bag folded in such a manner as to indicate that there might be a stack of currency in it. When MORIMURA left the car he wore white trousers and an aloha (sport) shirt. He wore no coat, and his shirt was hanging outside his trousers. He had nothing in his hands. KOTOSHIRODO did not know where MORIMURA went. When the latter filed to return in 15 minutes, KOTOSHIRODO suggested that they return and look for him, but OKUDA said they were to wait instead. After an absence of about 30 minutes, MORIMURA returned. His appearance was the same as it was when he left, except he was carrying a tree branch with him. When he got into the car, MORIMURA told OKUDA, "It's all okay", or something similar, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.

23. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, when interrogated, stated that he had driven MORIMURA over to Windward Oahu some five or six times. KOTOSHIRODO came along on some of these occasions; at other times, MORIMURA was alone. On all occasions he was directed to drive slowly along the Kokokahi Road, which commands an excellent view of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

24. According to the statements made by Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, the Consul General's official car was never used for exploring the island. This car was driven only 17,000 miles during the four years it was used by the Consulate. It was used primarily by the Consul General himself, or by OZAKI when he drove around town on errands. The only time it was used for a trip to Windward Oahu was on those occasions when the Consul General escorted some visiting dignitary on a sightseeing tour of the island. The itinerary for these trips was to follow the coast around Koko Head and through Waimanalo, then return to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali.

#### *Other Parts of Oahu*

25. The reinterrogation of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI added little information concerning trips to other portions of Oahu, it being largely a repetition of the information set forth in paragraph 26 of reference (c). However, some miscellaneous items are of interest.

26. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard MORIMURA say that he had made a trip around the island only a day or so after his arrival (March 27, 1941). KOTOSHIRODO believed that MIKAMI had driven MORIMURA on this occasion. KOTOSHIRODO denied ever having made a complete circuit of the island with MORIMURA.

[9] 27. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered hearing MORIMURA speak of staying overnight on some Oahu beach, but MORIMURA had added no details, and the time and circumstances under which MORIMURA had done this were unknown to KOTOSHIRODO.

28. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO of meeting a "nice girl" at Wahiawa. Apparently she was a Japanese language school teacher, but MORIMURA did not reveal her name.

29. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA had made only one trip to the Haleiwa region. On that occasion they went directly to Haleiwa Park, by the beach, where they stopped the car near a concrete wall. They did not get out of the car, but sat there for five or ten minutes. MORIMURA mentioned that it was a good swimming beach, but did not talk about the reef or any other kindred subject of possible military interest. At the time, KOTOSHIRODO had no idea why MORIMURA made this trip to Haleiwa.

30. KOTOSHIRODO recalled two trips to Waianae. On the first occasion, they were driven by MIKAMI, and drove to the end of the road, Makua Cave. On the second occasion, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove in the former's car, and they went as far as Nanakuli Beach.

31. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had never driven the road between Wai-lua and Kaena Point.

32. KOTOSHIRODO could remember no significant discussions with MORIMURA concerning military objectives on Oahu. Beaches as potential landing spots for invasion forces were never discussed, he said. Hickam Field and the Kaneohe Naval Air Station were discussed only in a cursory fashion. Other airfields on Oahu were never mentioned. MORIMURA once estimated the air strength on Oahu to be no more than 500 planes. (That this figure was fairly accurate is reflected in the Navy Department communique of December 5, 1942, which revealed that there were 475 Army and Navy planes on Oahu on the morning of December 7, 1941.)

#### TRIPS TO OTHER ISLANDS

##### *Kauai*

33. During the course of the reinterrogation, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he had made a trip to the Island of Kauai for the Consulate during July, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO had not mentioned this trip on the original interrogation. He and his wife made this trip together; they were not accompanied by any other representative of the Consulate.

34. Originally, MORIMURA had been scheduled to make the trip to Kauai with KOTOSHIRODO, and the latter had been so informed by OKUDA about 10 days prior to the prospective date of departure. However, a disagreement arose among [10] OKUDA, MORIMURA, and SEKI. SEKI, who had made none of the trips to the outside islands, wished to make this trip himself, and because of this, friction developed between SEKI and MORIMURA. To settle the argument, OKUDA decreed that neither should go. Instead, he told KOTOSHIRODO to take Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO along as a "front".

35. Two days before he left, KOTOSHIRODO conferred for about an hour with OKUDA in the latter's office, and received the following instructions:

(a) OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a rough sketch of the Barking Sands Airport, said by OKUDA to have been taken from a newspaper, and instructed KOTOSHIRODO to note any activity there;

(b) OKUDA also showed KOTOSHIRODO a photograph of Nawiliwili port, taken about 1939, and instructed the latter to note any changes;

(c) OKUDA stated that he had heard a story (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember the source) that the United States Navy was planning to make some use of Hanalei Bay, and KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note evidence, if any, of Naval activity there;

(d) KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note what use was being made of the airport in the old race track at Lihue, and to further note any expansion activity there;

(e) He was further instructed to take a look at the power plant in Wainiha Valley (the only power plant on the Island of Kauai). The Vice Consul showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of Kauai, in English, which showed the location of the power plant, and had transmission lines printed in red. (It is believed that this map was a United States Geological Survey map, edition of 1912.)

OKUDA impressed upon KOTOSHIRODO that the primary rule to be obeyed was caution. He was to tell no one that he was from the Consulate. He was to make no inquiries about the things he was sent to observe. He was to contact no friends or relatives. He was to obtain only such information as he could see

with his own eyes. Before he left, both SEKI and MORIMURA told him to treat the trip as a vacation and have some fun.

36. KOTOSHIRODO and his wife departed for Kauai by airplane on Saturday morning, July 12, 1941. (This has been verified by an inspection of the records of the Inter-Island Airways, Ltd.) Mr. and Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO left their home at 0715 and were driven to the airport in MIKAMI's taxi. At John Rodgers Airport, KOTOSHIRODO learned that he would be unable to return to Honolulu on [11] Sunday afternoon, July 13th, as he had planned, so he decided to return the following morning. He then directed MIKAMI to meet the Monday morning plane. The plane for Kauai departed from Honolulu at 0800 and arrived at Port Allen airport about 0900, on July 12th.

37. A number of taxis were waiting for fares at the Port Allen field when KOTOSHIRODO's plane arrived. However, there was only one Japanese driver, so KOTOSHIRODO approached him. This driver has been identified as Toshimasa MINATOYA. OKUDA had warned KOTOSHIRODO that he should use only Japanese drivers when "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO told MINATOYA that he and his wife were sightseeing on Kauai and wanted to see both sides of the island. They agreed on a price. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he agreed to and paid \$25.00. MINATOYA, when interviewed, stated that the price was \$35.00. Records of the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, indicate that the latter figure was the correct one.)

38. From the airport, they drove directly to Waimea Canyon, getting out at the tourists' observation point for 10 or 15 minutes. Then they drove further up the road until they reached Kokee. At MINATOYA's suggestion, they turned back here. They returned to the Waimea Hotel, where MINATOYA and KOTOSHIRODO and his wife made mutual introductions and lunched together. However, KOTOSHIRODO did not tell MINATOYA that he was from the Consulate.

39. They left the Waimea Hotel about 1400 and drove to the Barking Sands. They had postponed this trip until the afternoon because of MINATOYA's information that the Army held bombing practice there in the morning. MINATOYA mentioned that there was a new airport at Barking Sands. They drove as far as a large sand hill, where KOTOSHIRODO and his wife got out of the car and walked to the top of a dune. They saw only sand, sea, and *keawe* (algaroba) trees. They remained at Barking Sands for about 15 minutes, and then departed in the direction of Lihue about 1530. Enroute to Lihue they stopped at the Spouting Horn for five or ten minutes, and the Ancient Hawaiian Battleground. Both these spots are well known points of tourist interest. They arrived at Lihue about 1730. They registered at the Lihue Hotel under their proper names, and dismissed MINATOYA with instructions to pick them up again the following morning. However, after KOTOSHIRODO and his wife had eaten dinner at the Lihue Hotel, they decided to go to a movie, so they called MINATOYA to drive them. All three went to the Lihue Theater, KOTOSHIRODO paying for the tickets.

40. One of the passengers on the plane on which the KOTOSHIRODOS flew to Kauai was Isuke HORIKAWA, subject of reference (k). HORIKAWA, who was taken into custody in April, 1942, was suspect because he was the owner of the Pensacola Hotel in Honolulu, a suspected Japanese espionage center prior to the war. HORIKAWA was the head cook at the Lihue Hotel, and was one of the wealthiest Japanese on the Island of Kauai. He was identified with a number of pro-Japanese activities on that island prior to the war. KOTOSHIRODO was questioned very closely regarding HORIKAWA's presence on the same plane, but KOTOSHIRODO main- [12] tained that this was pure coincidence. He stated that when he met HORIKAWA later at the Lihue Hotel, they merely exchanged greetings as having been fellow travelers earlier that day. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered HORIKAWA from having seen him at the Japanese Consulate on two occasions.

41. On Sunday morning, July 13th, KOTOSHIRODO and his wife ate breakfast at the hotel. At the suggestion of MINATOYA, they had the hotel pack them a picnic lunch, and they left the hotel about 0900 and drove around the east coast of Kauai. They went first to Wallua Falls, then to a grass shack at a *heiau* (ancient Hawaiian religious site). They visited a number of tourist spots, and finally arrived at Hanalei about noon. They ate their picnic lunch at the Hanalei Park pavilion, while KOTOSHIRODO observed the bay. He noted only that the water in Hanalei Bay was shallow and very calm, and that there was no sign of any construction work going on. About 1245, they drove to Haena where they visited both the wet cave and the dry cave, tourist attractions.

42. From Haena, they drove up Wainiha Valley to a point near the power plant. They turned the car around and parked about 50 or 100 yards below the power plant, and got out of the car to pick guavas. KOTOSHIRODO noted that the power plant was small, and had two lead-in water pipes, each about three feet in diameter. He also noted that the pipes were directly alongside the road, and that the plant was unfenced.

43. On the return journey, they stopped at Kilauea lighthouse, which is off the main highway, and went up into the lighthouse with the keeper. KOTOSHIRODO believed that he had signed his name in the lighthouse log.

44. From Kilauea, they drove directly to Nawiliwili harbor as far as the wharf where Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company steamers docked. He saw at once that there had been no new construction since the picture in OKUDA's possession had been taken (1939), so they left immediately. He did note, however, the Standard Oil Company gasoline tanks there.

45. From Nawiliwili they drove back to the hotel, arriving about 1630. They dismissed MINATOYA. That night they walked to the nearby Aloha Theater and saw a movie.

46. During the course of the afternoon, when they passed the Lihue airport twice, KOTOSHIRODO noted that the only signs of military activity there were some Army tents pitched in camp.

47. The following morning, July 14th, MINATOYA came to the hotel about 0800. The KOTOSHIRODOS checked out of the hotel about 0830, and MINATOYA drove them to the Hanapepe airport. Their plane departed for Honolulu about 0930, and arrived in Honolulu about 1000. MIKAMI was waiting for them, and drove them home. KOTOSHIRODO then drove his wife to her dressmaking shop, and he went back to the Consulate.

[13] 48. At the Consulate, OKUDA and MORIMURA had a two-hour conference with KOTOSHIRODO, and took notes while questioning the clerk. KOTOSHIRODO detailed the general lack of activity on Kauai, and MORIMURA finally remarked, "There isn't anything big going on it seems". SEKI was not present at this conference. He merely asked KOTOSHIRODO later if he had had a good time, but also commented that it was "waste time" just to "look from the road for things that were meant to be hidden".

49. On October 1, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO personally typed and signed a statement regarding his Kauai trip. A photostatic copy of his statement is herewith forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence as enclosure (A). Mimeographed facsimile copies thereof are provided for the other dissemines.

50. Toshimasa MINATOYA was interviewed on three occasions by a representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and his story substantiates that given by KOTOSHIRODO. Records of the Lihue Hotel and the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, also bear this out. There is no evidence of prior arrangement between KOTOSHIRODO and MINATOYA. MINATOYA remembered KOTOSHIRODO's having had a camera on this trip. The pictures taken by KOTOSHIRODO on this trip were examined by the interrogating officers and agents, and all proved to be either innocuous scenic views or pictures of Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the only map he took with him on the trip was an ordinary tourist cartograph, which were available at many places throughout the Territory. He made no markings on this map, nor did he make any notes concerning his observations.

51. Prior to his departure, KOTOSHIRODO was given about \$100.00 for his expenses by SEKI, out of which he claims he returned about \$7.00 or \$9.00. However, he stated that his expenses were: \$50.00 for the air fare, \$20.00 for the hotel bill, and \$25.00 for the taxi. (As already mentioned, this last figure actually was \$35.00.)

#### *Mau*

52. KOTOSHIRODO, upon request, again detailed the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Maui in May, 1941. These details were substantially the same as those set forth in paragraphs 15-18 of reference (c). The only change is that it was reported in reference (c) that KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited a pineapple cannery while on Maui; whereas KOTOSHIRODO stated on re-interview that they had passed a couple of pineapple canneries, but had not visited either.

53. Prior to their departure for Maui, OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of that island. However, he did not tell KOTOSHIRODO what to look for, that

is, what military objectives. OKUDA told MORIMURA, who later told KOTOSHIRODO, that the important places to be looked at were:

[14] (a) Puunene Air Field (Navy);

(b) Kahului Harbor;

(c) Lahaina Bay;

(d) National Guard Camp.

54. MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO visited Lahaina, a fleet anchorage off Maui, on the first day of their visit. However, they saw no ships there. Later that day they drove to Kahului on the other side of the island, passing Maalaea Airport, since abandoned, on the way. They drove out on a pier at Kahului. MORIMURA asked the driver whether Navy ships came into Kahului, and was told that destroyers and submarines occasionally paid that harbor a visit. MORIMURA commented on the fact that the water at Kahului was rough compared to that of Lahaina.

55. Sometime during their first day on Maui, MORIMURA discussed making a trip to the Hana region with their taxi driver. (This trip is long, and necessitates traveling over bad roads.) MORIMURA also asked if there were an air field there. The driver told them there was a field, but he thought that the road was too rough and too long for them to make the trip during the limited time MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO planned to be on Maui.

56. On the following day they drove to the top of Haleakala, and then to Kula Sanitarium. They got out of the car near the buildings. KOTOSHIRODO took a picture; MORIMURA commented on being able to see the ocean both on the Walluku side and the Lahaina side of Puunene Valley. They stayed at Kula about 10 minutes, seeing no one. In the afternoon they drove to the National Guard Camp at Waihee, about 10 minutes out of Walluku; however, they saw no troops. They drove along the coast a little farther, and then turned back and drove to the Puunene Airport where they boarded a plane for Honolulu about 1500.

57. Investigation indicated that the taxi driver on this trip was Kenneth Jitsuel TAKAMIYA, a Hawaiian-born *niset*, 26 years old, who was expatriated from his Japanese citizenship in 1934. He made only one trip to Japan, that being when he was 5 years old, and for a stay of only six months. TAKAMIYA, when interviewed, substantially confirmed KOTOSHIRODO's description of the trip around Maui. There was no evidence brought forth which would indicate that TAKAMIYA had any prior knowledge of the visit of the two men from the Consulate. Apparently the only two contacts made on Maui were with Itsuo HAMADA, as set forth in paragraph 15-16 in reference (c), and with Tetsunosuke SONE, as set forth in paragraph 17 of reference (c).

58. Although the contact with Itsuo HAMADA was in itself highly suspicious, nothing has been brought forth which would indicate that this contact was anything more than a casual coincidence. However, investigation by representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Maui have added some details concerning the contact made with Tetsunosuke SONE. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had visited SONE, who was a *toritsuginin* and principal of the Japanese language [15] school at Spreckelsville, and had delivered to him a package sent by Nagao KITA, the Japanese Consul General. This package was to be given to a Japanese woman (whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not recall) who lived at Spreckelsville. Investigation indicated that the woman in question was Miss Namiko FUKUSHIMA. Miss FUKUSHIMA, when interviewed, stated that she had gone to school in Japan from August, 1937 to May, 1938, and during that period she had become very well acquainted with a Yosuko ISHII, daughter of a Consul General ISHII, said to be a prominent member of the Japanese consular corps. After her return to Hawaii in 1938, Miss FUKUSHIMA maintained a personal correspondence with Miss ISHII. Apparently Miss ISHII had requested KITA to take a present to Miss FUKUSHIMA prior to KITA's coming to Honolulu as Consul General in March, 1941. The present, which Miss FUKUSHIMA produced for the interviewing agent, was a Japanese doll and a battle-dore. She stated that the package had been delivered to her by SONE.

59. A check of hotel registers, and an interview with Mrs. Itsuo HAMADA, failed to produce any evidence which would contradict KOTOSHIRODO's story.

60. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO carried binoculars on their trip to Maui. The only map they had was an ordinary tourist map, and the only mark that MORIMURA made on this map was a small check along the coastline just below Lahaina. MORIMURA reportedly made this check to indicate that the Lahaina coast was extremely rugged, and thus, presumably, un-



suitable for landings. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO made any written notes. OKUDA talked only to MORIMURA about the trip. Later MORIMURA observed to KOTOSHIRODO that "there wasn't much going on" on Maui. KOTOSHIRODO took a camera along, but made no effort to photograph the places they regarded as "important". The camera was used merely to add to their pose as tourists. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Maui trip had cost between \$115.00 and \$130.00.

61. According to KOTOSHIRODO, one outgrowth of the Maui trip was the confirmation of a belief held by MORIMURA that OKUDA had a personal agent collecting information for the Consulate on Maui. MORIMURA had expressed this opinion on a number of occasions, although SEKI disagreed with him. SEKI said that such a person would have to be paid well, and OKUDA did not have the funds with which to pay such an agent. (SEKI was Consulate treasurer, and presumably would know of such expenditures, unless OKUDA had a secret personal fund at his disposal.) MORIMURA stated that OKUDA expected him to tell OKUDA every secret, but the Vice Consul was not so "open-hearted" with MORIMURA, especially about the secret of Maui coverage. Since OKUDA and MORIMURA worked so closely together, it irked MORIMURA that OKUDA would not tell him of the Maui agent. The incident that confirmed MORIMURA's suspicions about Maui coverage occurred a few days after their return from that island: Vice Consul OKUDA asked MORIMURA whether he had seen any mooring buoys at Lahaina Roads. MORIMURA said that he had seen none, but OKUDA contradicted him and said that there *were* some buoys there. MORIMURA then went to KOTOSHIRODO and asked the same question of the clerk, but KOTOSHIRODO could not remember any buoys there either. MORIMURA concluded that OKUDA's personal agent had supplied the contrary information.

[16] 62. Possibly supporting MORIMURA's theory are these facts concerning the Maui trip: MORIMURA conducted that mission very laxly. He did not visit Hana to see for himself the airport facilities allegedly there. He traveled no farther north on the leeward coast than Mala Wharf. On the windward coast, he omitted more than half the road running north from Wailuku. He did nothing to observe the Puunene Naval Air Station field other than pass it going to and coming from the plane. On Hawaii and Kauai, almost every foot of highway along the coastline was traversed. It is believed that OKUDA's contact on Maui may have been Unji HIRAYAMA, a priest of the Homba Hongwanji who resided at Lahaina, and who was taken into custody on December 7, 1941. It is known that HIRAYAMA, who is the subject of reference (1), was requested on at least one occasion (June, 1940) to keep the Consulate informed of any movements of the United States Fleet at Lahaina, and it is believed that he complied with this request.

#### *Hawaii*

63. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to discuss again the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Hawaii in October, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO stated the facts of the trip substantially as they are set forth in paragraphs 19-24 of reference (c). The details KOTOSHIRODO added in his later version principally concerned the various drinking parties in which they indulged while on Hawaii.

64. Before they left Honolulu on the trip to Hawaii, MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he wanted to see:

- (a) Hilo harbor;
- (b) Kilauea. (Speculating on the reason for their desire to see Kilauea, it should be noted that there was a Hawaii National Guard camp there prior to the war, and also there was some talk of building a new airport in the lava flats);
- (c) South Point, where a new airport was actually in the process of construction;
- (d) Kohala, where there is an Inter-Island Airways landing field at Upolu.

65. In their trip around the island, they passed the Kilauea Volcano, and MORIMURA asked about the military camp there. They drove down the road toward South Point until they came to a sign "Kapu—Military Reservation". They made no effort to enter the reservation, but instead turned the car around and returned to the main highway. They could see nothing of interest from outside the gate.

66. They stopped at the Kona Hotel that night on the suggestion of the driver. The next day they included Upolu in their itinerary, but they only [17] paused there for a few minutes. They did not get out of the car. While in the Kohala district they also inspected Kawaihae, the landing from which cattle are swum out to the Inter-Island steamers.

67. On the fourth day of their visit they drove all around the city of Hilo, seeing Rainbow Falls, the Hilo Hospital, the waterfront, Hilo Country Club, and Puumaille Home (for the tubercular).

68. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA were not sent to contact anyone on the Island of Hawaii; on the contrary, they were strictly enjoined not to do so. However, KOTOSHIRODO made one exception, and made a personal call on his wife's cousin, Mrs. George KAWAMOTO. He brought her candy, and she was greatly surprised to see him. KOTOSHIRODO told her that he was staying at the Naniloa Hotel, but he stayed only a few minutes. However, after he had returned to the hotel, and was drinking in the bar with MORIMURA, George KAWAMOTO came in to see KOTOSHIRODO, having been told by his wife of KOTOSHIRODO's visit. KOTOSHIRODO introduced him to MORIMURA. They had a drink at the bar, and then KAWAMOTO invited them to the Hilo Theater. They saw the show, and then KAWAMOTO went home.

69. A representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, contacted George KAWAMOTO regarding his relationship with KOTOSHIRODO. KAWAMOTO stated that his wife was a cousin of KOTOSHIRODO's wife, and he gave an account of a visit made to Hawaii by KOTOSHIRODO and his wife in 1940. Apparently this trip was merely a vacation. However, there is nothing in the Military Intelligence Division report to indicate that KAWAMOTO was interrogated concerning the trip taken by KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Hawaii.

70. Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Hawaii also interviewed Shingo NARIKAWA, who was taxi driver for MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO while they were on Hawaii. Although interrogated at length, NARIKAWA could remember nothing which was at variance with the story given by KOTOSHIRODO.

#### *Tadasu Morimura*

71. From the information that has been collected from the Consular clerks and other persons close to the Consulate, it is apparent that MORIMURA was something of a mystery man. All agreed that he had special privileges. He was frequently drunk, often had women in his quarters overnight, came to work late or not at all, as he pleased, insulted the Consul General on occasions, and generally conducted himself as if he were beyond penalty. This naturally caused much comment among the Consulate secretaries and clerks.

72. Some of the secretaries and clerks believed that MORIMURA was an officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy. According to KOTOSHIRODO, however, SEKI denied this. SEKI said that he knew how Japanese naval officers behaved, and that MORIMURA definitely did not conduct himself as an officer.

[18] 73. It was publicly announced on MORIMURA's arrival that he had been sent to Honolulu to assist in expatriation matters. Takaichi SAKAI, senior clerk at the Consulate, who had been handling the routine of expatriation matters for a number of years, stated that MORIMURA had made a pretense of helping with the work for only the first three or four weeks he was here, but had done none of it personally, and appeared to know nothing about the work.

74. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, who, although uneducated, has given himself an amazing self education in naval matters, had little regard for MORIMURA, and emphatically stated that the secretary lacked the sharp eye and the smart gait of a Japanese military or naval officer.

75. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA was an eighth rank secretary in the Japanese consular service. This is the lowest rank, a first rank secretary being the highest. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard YUGE and Samon TSUKIKAWA, the Consular Secretary in charge of the code room, remark that eighth rank secretaries were usually sent to the least desirable posts in the consular service. The desirability of posts was said to vary according to climate. Most of the less desirable posts were in China. Honolulu, on the other hand, was considered one of the best posts in the Japanese consular service. It was usually given to men with many years of faithful service, and it was unusual for a secretary of the eighth rank to have his initial assignment in

Hawaii. They believed this to be MORIMURA's first assignment abroad, since his name, at the date of his arrival here, had not yet appeared in the consular roster of the Japanese Foreign Office. Because of this, they assumed that he was recently admitted to the foreign service, and had served only an indoctrination period in Tokyo before coming to Honolulu.

76. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA never talked about his past life except of the time he spent in grammar school. However, on one occasion, MORIMURA did refer to Chinese coolies pulling barges on the Yangtze river. He called the coolies the lowest people on earth. This remark led KOTOSHIRODO to believe that MORIMURA had lived in, or had at least visited, China.

77. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, supplied one version of MORIMURA's background. He stated that on one occasion he had overheard a conversation between SEKI and YUGE regarding MORIMURA. They had remarked that MORIMURA was the only child of a wealthy family of Ehimeken on Shikoku, in Japan. His father died when he was rather young, leaving his mother in comfortable circumstances, inasmuch as the family owned considerable land. Prior to his arrival in Hawaii, MORIMURA had been working in the Foreign Office in Tokyo, possibly for as long a period as three years, although it was more likely that he had been there for only two years. On one occasion he had been discharged from the Foreign Office for excessive drinking, but his mother had written to a prominent official about the matter, and through this connection had been able to have MORIMURA reinstated.

78. Whatever his background, MORIMURA was not popular with the rest of the Consulate staff. This was probably due to his youth, his favored position, [19] and the advantage he took of this position. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that SEKI greatly resented MORIMURA. SEKI had done the work of gathering data about ships in Pearl Harbor until MORIMURA came, but then had been relieved of these duties. SEKI openly exhibited professional jealousy, often telling KOTOSHIRODO that MORIMURA did not know what he was doing. The change in plans for the Kauai trip was cited as an example of this dissention. As KOTOSHIRODO put it during one of the interviews, both SEKI and MORIMURA were trying to gain all the credit for the information-gathering work. Further information about MORIMURA'S background is to be found on pages 10 and 11 of reference (u).

79. KOTOSHIRODO stated that shortly after MORIMURA's arrival, the new secretary made a point of "making friends" around town. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA spent a lot of time at the offices of the Japanese newspapers, particularly the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA had many friends at the Nippu Jiji, but until questioned at length showed no great willingness to "remember" who they were. Finally he admitted that of all the men at the Nippu Jiji, Shigeo FURUKAWA, the advertising manager, was best known to MORIMURA. The significance of this fact is indicated by the information contained in paragraphs 9-11 of reference (a). Paragraph 16 of reference (c) should also be noted in this regard. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA was an excellent Japanese poet. (Other information corroborates this statement.) KOTOSHIRODO was then asked if he would explain the common interest between MORIMURA and FURUKAWA. It was pointed out that FURUKAWA was about 55 years of age, a poet, a family man and a business man, whereas MORIMURA was only about 29, was not a poet, and preferred to spend his leisure in drinking and playing with the *geishas*. KOTOSHIRODO stated in answer to this that they often played *go* (Japanese checkers) together at the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA also knew Zenichi KAWAZOE, subject of reference (m), who covered the Consulate "beat" for the Nippu Jiji. Other Nippu Jiji personnel whom MORIMURA knew were Shoichi ASAMI, the city editor, and Katsuchi KAWAMOTO, the business manager. All these men have been interned.

80. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA came to the Consulate very rarely. He remembered FURUKAWA's coming there only when he brought Nippu Jiji representatives from the outside islands to introduce them to the Consul General.

81. KOTOSHIRODO stated that another close associate of MORIMURA was Katsuchihiro TAKAGISHI, chief chemist of the Honolulu Sake Brewery. TAKAGISHI was the subject of an intensive investigation by this office prior to his departure for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on November 5, 1941. TAKAGISHI is the son-in-law of an Admiral HYAKUTAKE of the Imperial Japanese Navy. (There are two admirals of this name, brothers, in the Japanese Navy; this office has been unable to determine which admiral is the father

of TAKAGISHI's wife.) TAKAGISHI was a frequent visitor of the Japanese Consulate, and often played golf with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and Tsunetaro HARADA, manager of the Pensacola Hotel, where TAKAGISHI resided. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he often thought that the friendship of MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI was "funny", because TAKAGISHI loved gold so much and MORIMURA did [20] not play the game. However, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI used to "chase women" together. It was never established that TAKAGISHI actually was engaged in espionage for Japan, although a mass of circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that he was so engaged.

*Seki and Morimura Discuss Espionage*

82. On many occasions KOTOSHIRODO was present at discussions between MORIMURA and SEKI. On other occasions, they would discuss things with him individually. It should be remembered that KOTOSHIRODO worked as SEKI's assistant while he was inside the office, although he was MORIMURA's assistant in collecting information outside the office. Because of this situation, KOTOSHIRODO was in close contact with both men.

83. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that the Japanese consulates all over the world were supposed to gather all the information they could without doing "illegal things". (This point is considerably amplified in reference (u).) MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that an outside system, which was separate and part from the Consulate, and which worked directly on orders from Tokyo, collected such information as it was necessary to obtain by "illegal" means. This would include, for example, the practice of buying secrets. MORIMURA observed that such an outside system would not report through the Consulate, nor would the Consulate contact the outside system. In all probability, the Consulate would know nothing of this outside system, he said.

84. MORIMURA once asked SEKI if there were any Japanese espionage agents (meaning those outside the Consulate) in the Territory of Hawaii. SEKI replied that he did not know. MORIMURA observed that he did not know what the facts were, but that there must be such a system. However, he did not know the manner in which such an outside system would operate.

85. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA and SEKI discuss espionage coverage on one occasion. SEKI stated that it was necessary for the Consulate to have a "good man" on each island. However, MORIMURA was of the opinion that this requirement would be difficult to meet, since the average Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii lacked the technical knowledge necessary in the work. MORIMURA and SEKI agreed that because of the large number of Japanese in the local population, Hawaii should be "the easiest place" to carry on espionage. However, they believed this advantage to be lost, because the local Japanese were too poorly educated to do this work. MORIMURA was very outspoken on this point, claiming that the *toritsuginin* (the so-called local consular agents) were no good for the work, and that most Japanese in Hawaii were "just trash" and insufficiently educated. He remarked that the Japanese had come to Hawaii as laborers and were therefore uneducated, whereas the Japanese on the mainland of the United States were much better educated.

86. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA say that throughout the world then (1941), all nations "use other kind of people" (i. e., non-nationals of the country employing [21] them) as espionage agents. MORIMURA believed that Japan sometimes used non-Japanese espionage agents (although KOTOSHIRODO never heard him say whether such agents were operating in Hawaii). MORIMURA once said in KOTOSHIRODO's presence that he had "heard in Tokyo" that Japan had long had a British naval officer acting as an espionage agent in China. (Whether this Britisher was working for Japan only against China, or against both China and Britain, or only against Britain, was not stated.) MORIMURA had said that this officer had been so employed "for years". However, he commented on the fact that non-Japanese agents were expensive. He said that the first time such agents submitted information, they submitted a lot of it, but after that the law of diminishing returns began to operate, and eventually the employer would pay the same price for mere dribblets. He also stated that it was safer and less costly to use Japanese agents in espionage work. However, more valuable information could be obtained by non-Japanese, although at a greater cost to Japan.

87. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he thought the extra-Consulate espionage system to which MORIMURA referred might be operating in Hawaii

at the present time, and sending information from Hawaii to Japan. KOTOSHIRODO expressed surprise that such an operation was considered possible, saying, "How can?" The only pertinent fact he could recall in this connection was that MORIMURA once remarked that it would be impossible to use short-wave radio for getting information out of Hawaii after war started because of "a device" the Americans had which enabled them to ascertain the exact location of a radio transmitter. KOTOSHIRODO knew what short-wave radio was, and knew of Radio Tokyo broadcasts, but professed complete ignorance about amateur radio stations. He stated that he had never heard anyone at the Consulate talk about the subject, nor had he and MORIMURA ever stopped to see anyone in town who operated an amateur short-wave radio station.

88. KOTOSHIRODO stated that on another occasion MORIMURA remarked to SEKI that Hawaii would be a fine place from which to watch a Japanese-American war. Either SEKI or MORIMURA observed that there would be no way for a spy to communicate from Hawaii to Japan by radio, referring to the risk of discovery by radio detection equipment.

89. Apparently one of the "legal" methods of collecting information indulged in by the Consulate was the close scrutiny of daily newspapers. Yasumasa MURATA, a clerk at the Consulate until 1938, stated that the local newspapers were clipped daily. He added that the Vice Consul always had charge of this work. The Vice Consul usually would mark such items as he desired and pass them on to MURATA, who would do the actual clipping. Usually two—occasionally three—clippings were secured of each item. One copy was sent to Japan, and one retained at the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he used to receive the first edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin for the Consulate at his home, because the first edition was not delivered to the zone in which the Consulate was located. KOTOSHIRODO's home, two blocks away, was near enough to be included in the delivery zone. Apparently the Consulate wanted to keep close watch on all editions of the paper. Many of the Consulate despatches (reviewed after the outbreak of war) merely contained synopses of press stories.

#### *Security Measures*

[22] 90. KOTOSHIRODO said that he was taught at the Consulate that the first rule in "information collecting" was "no get caught". He was told never to go out of his way to get information. Even if he could not see his desired objective from the highway, he was not to ask questions about it, nor leave the highway to view it. If ever he and MORIMURA were stopped by the authorities and questioned, KOTOSHIRODO was to explain that they were merely "sight-seeing". KOTOSHIRODO was to do the necessary talking, because of MORIMURA's poor command of English.

91. He was told never to take pictures of "important places". Although he took a camera to Kauai and Maui, this was merely a "prop" to carry out their pose as sightseers. KOTOSHIRODO expressly denied ever having taken pictures of air fields, harbors, power plants, or other conceivable military objectives. His snapshots were only of the usual scenic places, he said.

92. MORIMURA occasionally carried field glasses on his trips to various parts of Oahu. He never carried them to the outside islands. Even on Oahu he was extremely careful in their use. The field glasses used were bought early in 1941 at SEKI's insistence. Prior to that time, there had been no field glasses at the Consulate. To divert suspicion, the glasses were bought for the Consulate by Toro NISHIKAWA (now interned), an employee of the Nippu Ji Ji. (NISHIKAWA handled certain commercial printing orders from the Consulate.)

93. KOTOSHIRODO could recall no instance in which MORIMURA had made written notes of their observations prior to their returning to the Consulate after "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO likewise denied ever making any notes himself. Instead, he said that his practice was to report verbally what he had seen to MORIMURA or OKUDA, who would make notes, at the Consulate, of KOTOSHIRODO's reported observations.

94. KOTOSHIRODO stated that neither he nor MORIMURA ever carried maps which might attract suspicion. On such occasions as they did use maps, they carried cartographs published by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, and the only occasion upon which notations were made thereon was on the trip to Maui: see paragraph 60, above. However, in earlier interviews, as reported in paragraph 42 of reference (c), KOTOSHIRODO stated that on trips he made alone to the Pearl Harbor region, he had marked the positions of various warships on rough maps drawn by MORIMURA. (Note might be made here of KOTOSHIRODO's

extraordinary powers of perception and memory for details of events which happened months, or years, before. Many of his statements were otherwise known to be true, tending to make KOTOSHIRODO's statements and admissions generally reliable.)

95. KOTOSHIRODO said that when he was first employed at the Consulate (1935), he was told by Vice Consul YAMASAKI that he was not to talk about Consulate business to strangers. When KOTOSHIRODO first began to make trips to Pearl Harbor, SEKI warned him not to mention these trips to his wife.

#### *Christmas Presents Given by the Consulate*

[23] 96. Takaichi SAKAI stated that every year the Consulate gave Christmas presents to a number of United States Customs inspectors. He stated that he personally delivered gifts to the homes of Customs inspectors Carl E. EIFLER, George W. SPENCE, Anrew A. BUTA, and John OLIVIERA. These gifts usually consisted of merchandise orders of \$20.00 to \$30.00 drawn on M. McInerny, Ltd., or the Liberty House, both large Honolulu retail stores.

97. The Honolulu harbor master, James L. FRIEL, and his assistant, Frank J. UNTERMANN, received similar Christmas presents, according to SAKAI.

98. Another recipient was Ernest M. HIRAKAWA, an alien Japanese, foreman of the registry section of the United States Post Office, Honolulu. Comment has been made on HIRAKAWA in reference (t.)

99. Ichitaro OZAKI, regular chauffeur for the Consulate, confirmed the fact that he drove SAKAI around to deliver Christmas presents. Although he was unable to recall all the persons to whom presents had been delivered, he did remember that SPENCE and FRIEL were among the recipients. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered that Christmas presents were given to a number of persons.

#### *Mikami's Naval Knowledge*

100. The interrogating officers and agents were surprised at John Yoshiye MIKAMI's knowledge of naval matters. MIKAMI is so poorly educated that he speaks both pidgin Japanese and pidgin English. He has been a taxi driver for the greater part of his life. He was detained on January 6, 1942, and since that time has been incarcerated on Sand Island, Honolulu, with other internees.

101. During the course of the interrogation (September 28, 1942), it became apparent that even while interned MIKAMI had been able to keep familiar with current movements of the United States Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor. MIKAMI stated that only a week before a new battleship that he had never seen before, and a carrier that was either the LEXINGTON or the SARATOGA, had arrived at Pearl Harbor. (The SOUTH DAKOTA and the SARATOGA actually had arrived.)

102. He stated that in July, 1942, a large body of United States ships had left Pearl Harbor—for Australia, he presumed. He stated that these ships had recently returned. He then commented on the large number of destroyer movements.

103. MIKAMI commented upon seeing "the same old battleships" return to Pearl Harbor in August (true), and also upon a new carrier he had never seen before which entered Pearl Harbor on the same day. This latter was the WASP, on her first trip to Honolulu. (The Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, was seasonably [24] informed of the knowledge that MIKAMI, an internee, was able to see concerning current ship movements, from the interment camp on Sand Island.)

104. MIKAMI conversed intelligently about naval subjects in general. He mentioned "anti-torpedo nets", knew their purpose, and stated he had never seen them in use on his trips to Pearl Harbor before the war. He also mentioned "anti-airplane balloons" which he thought were impractical for use around Pearl Harbor because they would give away the exact location of the objective. MIKAMI also discussed the "balance of naval power" theory, and expressed the opinion that the United States-Japanese war began 30 years ago when a naval race between the two powers was started. He also expressed the opinion that the United States would beat Japan only when they had beaten the Japanese Navy.

105. MIKAMI was asked how he had acquired such a broad knowledge of naval subjects. He said that he had been reading American magazines for about three years, naming *Our Navy*, *Life*, and the *Naval Institute Proceedings*. He said he received copies of the latter publication when the Consul threw its old copies

away. He stated that he did not read Japanese naval magazines because "they tell big lies". However, whether MIKAMI actually gained his excellent (though perhaps superficial) knowledge of naval subjects by reading magazines in a language in which he is extremely deficient, or by some other means, remains a matter of conjecture.

#### KOREAN CONTACTS

106. All the Consulate clerks agreed that the Japanese Foreign Office made a point of keeping stationed in Hawaii one secretary who could speak Korean. There were two reasons for this practice: First, to handle various Korean matters which were a legitimate concern of the Consulate; second, to use the Honolulu Consulate as a "listening post" regarding various Korean nationalist movements. The Japanese apparently regarded Honolulu as an excellent place for keeping in touch with existing or incipient Korean political developments.

107. Takachi SAKAI, former senior clerk at the Consulate, who was employed there from 1927 until the outbreak of war, recalled that during his time secretaries Takeo KASHIMURA, Gishiro MASUO, Tadaaki IIZUKA, and Kyonosuke YUGE had spoken Korean and had handled Korean affairs at the Consulate. (For some reason SAKAI "forgot" to mention YUGE, the most recent of these secretaries, until it was brought to his attention at a subsequent interview. All the other clerks were familiar with YUGE's Korean duties they having been instructed to refer all Korean callers to YUGE as a matter of office routine.)

108. All the clerks employed at the Consulate prior to 1937 remembered having seen Kilsoo HAAN at the Consulate on a number of occasions. HAAN is the subject of a number of reports by this office, the most recent of which is reference (n). Yasumasa MURATA, who was employed at the Consulate until 1938, stated that he once heard from Tsuko KUROKAWA, who was senior clerk at the Consulate at the time, that the Consulate had been paying money to HAAN.

[25] 109. From a confidential, but reliable source, the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently received the originals, in Japanese, of various papers evidencing the interest of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, in Korean matters. Translations of these papers are set forth in reference (o). One source indicates that up to 1925, the Consulate was allowed \$100.00 a month for its Korean Intelligence Fund. From 1926 to 1931, the Consulate appears to have operated on an accumulated surplus in this field. Following that time, the Foreign Office appears to have made special allocations from time to time, as needed. A summary of these translations indicates that the following Korean informants received payment from the Japanese Consulate:

#### *Kwang Won Cho*

110. This individual is a Korean priest, mentioned as being a frequent visitor of the Consulate by the various clerks. He is more commonly known by the name, Father Noah CHO. The translations indicate that he received a payment of \$37.00 on May 19, 1934, and a payment of \$20.00 on August 6, 1934. He is the subject of a Registration Act case by the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a report of which is noted as reference (j), the synopsis of which follows:

"Subject [CHO] born October 21, 1897 in Korea; came to Hawaii in 1923 as Episcopal missionary and has since been associated with St. Luke's Korean Mission, Honolulu. He became priest at the St. Luke's Mission in 1931; however, his entire family, including mother, father, wife and five children presently residing in Korea, have never been in the United States. Confidential source reveals Subject paid \$37.00 in May, 1934, and \$20.00 in August, 1934, by Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, for informant's services. Signed statement obtained in which Subject admits contact with Consulate, beginning in 1932, and beginning about September, 1939, and extending to April, 1941. He admits having performed work for the Consulate relating to Korean activities; further, that during the latter period approximately \$200 was paid him by the Consulate for his services which included obtaining and translation of two Korean newspapers. Subject claims to have performed services for the Japanese Consulate under threat to bring harm to his family in Korea; however, his acceptance of remuneration makes this claim appear questionable. Subject denied receipt of any payments in 1934."

111. A check of the files of this office reveals the additional information that the Reverend CHO returned from a trip to Japan aboard the ASAMA MARU

on August 20, 1940. It is of possible significance that a fellow passenger aboard the ASAMU MARU was Sanji ABE, subject of reference (p), former Territorial senator, now interned, who was returning from a trip to Japan during which he conferred with Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA, and also made an overseas broadcast to Hawaii in which he praised Japan's war effort in China. Other passengers on the same ship were Clifford Kikujiro KONDO, subject of reference (q), now in custody; Katsuzo SATO, subject of reference (r), now in custody; and Kenju OHTOMO, subject [26] of reference (s). OHTOMO, executive secretary of the Young Men's Buddhist Association, Honolulu, and whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese government, has been classified on numerous occasions by this office as dangerous to internal security. Ten other of Reverend CHO's fellow passengers are now in custody, and another two, although still at large, have been classified as dangerous by this office. Although it may have been pure chance that these persons traveled on the same ship, the coincidence is being set forth for what it may be worth.

*Doo Ok Chung*

112. Translation of these papers indicated that CHUNG received \$80.00 on May 22, 1933. A review of the files of this office indicates that he is a 54-year-old alien, a tailor by trade, and operates a concession at the Honolulu Army and Navy Y.M.C.A. CHUNG appears to be extremely active in Kilsoo HAAN's SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. A letter from Dr. Soon HYUN, formerly chairman of the League in Honolulu, to HAAN, dated June 22, 1942, describes CHUNG as one of "the cornerstones of our League".

113. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that CHUNG was born in Korea in 1889, came to Hawaii in 1903. He has three sons serving in the United States Army. Another son, four daughters, his wife, and his mother all reside in the United States. He has been active in Korean political circles since 1915, when he joined the KOREAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. He withdrew from this and aided in forming the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE, becoming the second president of the latter organization. The KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE has been comparatively inactive since 1929, and eventually he joined the SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. He denied, with seeming sincerity, his ever having had contact with, or accepting money from, the local Japanese Consulate, but there appears to be no other individual in Hawaii of a similar name.

*Won Sam Kim*

114. The translation indicated that this individual received the following payments:

|                    |         |
|--------------------|---------|
| September 10, 1935 | \$20.00 |
| May 28, 1934       | 15.00   |
| July 24, 1934      | 25.00   |
| September 10, 1934 | 30.00   |
| May 31, 1936       | 20.00   |
| April 13, 1936     | 10.00   |
| May 2, 1936        | 10.00   |
| June 6, 1936       | 10.00   |
| March 29, 1937     | 18.00   |

Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that KIM was born in Korea in 1879, came to Hawaii in the early 1900s, and was a carpenter by trade. [27] In 1919 he had become a member of the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE. He died on March 14, 1939, in Honolulu, and his widow denied all knowledge of his past activities or relations with the Japanese Consulate.

*Sang Ho Lee (Yee)*

115. LEE was paid \$100.00 on March 31, 1932, and \$20.00 on August 19, 1933. Directories of that period indicate that an individual of this name was with the Nahm Choon Furnished Rooms, 339 North Beretania Street, Honolulu. Later directories do not include the name. However, the latest directory lists a Mrs. Sang Ho LEE, 1355 Miller Street, Honolulu.



116. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that LEE was born in Korea on November 5, 1879, and first arrived in the United States on February 3, 1905, under the name YE CHONG KUL. He visited China from July, 1922, to May, 1923. He departed from Honolulu bound for Korea on February 16, 1934, and has not re-entered the United States.

*Ok Nam Shin*

117. The translation indicates that this individual received \$50.00 on March 31, 1932, and \$3.40 on June 9, 1933. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that SHIN, a groceryman, was born in Korea in 1901, came to Honolulu in 1920, and returned to Korea in 1933. He returned to Honolulu in 1938, but went back to Korea shortly thereafter, and has never returned.

*Kylsoo Haan*

118. The following is a list of payments received by this individual, who is usually referred to as Kilsoo HAAN:

|                      |          |
|----------------------|----------|
| May 25, 1936.....    | \$60. 00 |
| August 15, 1936..... | 40. 00   |
| August 25, 1936..... | 10. 00   |

*Chin Ho Tough*

119. On May 22, 1933, TOUGH received the sum of \$80.00 from the Consulate. TOUGH (he is known by all the combinations of the above three names) has been the object of suspicion for a considerable period. He entered the Territory in 1931 as a Buddhist priest, but apparently has never practiced his profession. He was educated in Japan. For a while he worked at various military posts as a tailor, and later went into business for himself on the Island of Molokai. He has been very active on the UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE. When interrogated, TOUGH stated that he had visited the Consulate on only one occasion, that being upon his arrival in 1931 when it was necessary to have his passport stamped.

[28]

OTHER CONSULATE CONTACTS

*Ensei (Enjo) Kobayashi*

120. On March 15, 1932, KOBAYASHI received \$8.00 from the Consulate. An alien, aged 54, he was a priest of the Jodo sect (Buddhist), a Japanese language school principal, and a *toritsuginin* at Hawi, Kohala, Hawaii, T. H. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and subsequently was interned. He is reported to be at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, and apparently is planning for repatriation to Japan.

*Katsutchi Miho*

121. MIHO received the sum of \$27.00 from the Japanese Consulate on March 15, 1932. MIHO is a 59-year-old alien. Prior to the war he operated the MIHO HOTEL at Kahului, Maui, T. H., and was a *toritsuginin* for that district. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be interned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

*Minoru Murakami*

122. MURAKAMI received the sum of \$10.00 from the Consulate on March 15, 1932. MURAKAMI, a Japanese alien, formerly employed as a representative for the Nippu Jiji (Honolulu bilingual newspaper), has a long record of pro-Japanese activities and statements. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Apparently he desires to repatriate to Japan.

*Masao Sogawa*

123. On January 6, 1932, SOGAWA received the sum of \$50,000. He was editor and publisher of the Hawaii Shimpo, a Japanese weekly newspaper published in Honolulu until the outbreak of war. This paper was considered highly pro-Japanese in its sentiments. SOGAWA was taken into custody on December 14, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.

*Wade Warren Thayer*

124. On August 21, 1935, THAYER reportedly received the sum of \$40.00 from the Japanese Consulate. For years, THAYER was attorney for the Japanese Consulate, and was so registered with the Secretary of State. It is not known why this lone entry was found among the expenses of the Korean Intelligence Fund, inasmuch as it is believed that THAYER undoubtedly had some permanent financial arrangement with the Consulate with regard to his legal services.

## THE CONSULATE PREPARES FOR WAR

[29] 125. Takaichi SAKAI stated that in the summer of 1941 the Consulate began to burn old documents. All the clerks helped in this work, and about the same time, the clerks were paid bonuses each month. The clerks were told not to talk about the fact that documents were being burned almost daily in the back yard of the Consulate. SAKAI could recall no such burning of papers shortly before the war started, although he did observe that the number of visitors to the Consulate from the N. Y. K. Line and from the Yokohama Specie Bank increased greatly in the last two weeks of peace. These visitors sometimes carried handbags with them.

126. Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist at the Consulate, remembered that about the middle of November, 1941, two Yokohama Specie Bank officials came to the Consulate and went into Consul General KITA's room, where they stayed for about an hour. One of these men was Nihei MIYAMOTO, sub-manager of the bank. KITA was not present, and the two men were alone in the room. They asked for a typewriter. Miss DOUE believed that MIYAMOTO and his companion wrote a telegram which they sent under the name of the Consulate. She stated that they had probably done their own coding. She added that, to her knowledge, Torataro ONODA, of the Sumitomo Bank, had never done this.

127. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled that in June, 1941, the two yardmen of the Consulate had burned a large number of official appearing books. OZAKI was able to set the month because it was just before his departure for Japan. He was in Japan from June to November, 1941. OZAKI explained that the Consulate was not supposed to keep material longer than 10 years, and every year they accumulated material to burn. OZAKI stated that he helped carry these books from the Vice Consul's office to the yardmen, who would burn them. He estimated that more than 100 publications were thus burned in 1941. The two yardmen who did this burning, Saburo SUMIDA and Rokuro FUKUSHIMA, were repatriated to Japan in 1942 with the Consulate staff. OZAKI stated that he was in Japan when the United States freeze order against Japanese assets went into effect, but he heard that the Consulate burned a considerable amount of material at that time.

128. OZAKI stated that it was his belief that telegrams received from Japan were burned as soon as they were received, or at least within a week. He stated that in the code room of the Consulate was a small brazier, and when papers were burned in this room, he would sometimes notice smoke coming out of the window. He believed that he had seen more smoke coming out of this room after he had returned from Japan (on the last ship, November 1, 1941) than he had prior to his departure. He believed that code room material was burned about once a week. The code room was always cleaned by Saburo SUMIDA. Samon TSUKIKAWA, Consulate secretary in charge of coding, was always present during this operation.

129. On December 6, 1941, at about 1500, the two yardmen went into the coding room of the Consulate and removed a wheelbarrow full of papers and other [30] material. These they burned in a pit in the yard. OZAKI said that he put out this fire about 1900, just before darkness fell. He noted that everything had been burned. OZAKI said that yard rubbish was being burned all the time, so he was unable to state how often code room material was burned. The incident of December 6th was the only time he actually saw them remove the material from the code room.

130. OZAKI stated that the Consul and Vice Consul had an engagement to play golf with Tsunetaro HARADA on the morning of December 7, 1941. He remembered that MIKAMI's taxi had actually called at the Consulate for the two officials, but by that time guards had been placed around the Consulate. MIKAMI requested the guards to inform OKUDA of his arrival, which they did.

However, OKUDA sent back a message that MIKAMI was not to wait because he, OKUDA, probably would be unable to play golf that day.

131. OZAKI expressed his conviction, based on observations made prior to and subsequent to December 7, 1941, that Consul General KITA had no foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, he insisted that the Consul General had received a telegram from Washington at 0700 on the morning of December 7th. (This was a radiogram from Tokyo, reporting that Japanese-American and Japanese-British relations were strained.) Immediately upon its receipt, KITA had called TSUKIKAWA, who lived at the Kyoraku Kan Hotel, two blocks from the Consulate grounds, and insisted that the latter come to the Consulate immediately to decode this message. OZAKI stated that he heard of this incident from SEKI about a week or two after the attack. OZAKI stated that TSUKIKAWA was at the Consulate at the time of the attack.

132. OZAKI stated that the Consulate staff members were burning papers when the police arrived on the morning of December 7th. He remembered seeing smoke come out of the code room window. After the Consulate staff was repatriated (February, 1942), he went into the code room to clean it. All he saw was a big tub filled with ashes.

133. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he first heard the noise (of battle) about 0900 on the morning of December 7, 1941, so he walked to the Consulate to find out what all the commotion was about. KITA, OKUDA, SEKI, and TSUKIKAWA were all there, and appeared to be worried. MORIMURA dropped in a little later with his hair tousled, clothes wrinkled, and in short sleeves. KOTOSHIRODO heard him remark that it was a "noisy morning". MORIMURA wanted to go up on the heights and see what was going on, but KITA would not allow him to leave the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO left the Consulate about 1000.

#### CONSULATE DOMESTICS

134. As was reported in paragraphs 47 and 52 of reference (c), three of the domestics at the Consulate secured their positions through one Toyoki FUJITA, a flower grower. FUJITA was interviewed to determine his connection with the [51] Consulate. FUJITA stated that among other retail florist shops to which he sold his blossoms, was the SERVICE FLORIST, operated by one Tetsuo SHINAGAWA. SHINAGAWA supplied the Consulate with flowers. He secured this account because he is a brother-in-law of Ichitaro OZAKI, Consulate chauffeur, who apparently ordered flowers purchased by the Consulate. FUJITA first met OZAKI when he delivered some plants to the Consulate. On one occasion OZAKI asked FUJITA if the latter knew of a girl who would like to cook at the Consulate. FUJITA secured the services of Yoshie KIKKAWA. (Results of an interview with Miss KIKKAWA are set forth in paragraph 52-54 of reference (c).) Because FUJITA was once successful in securing a domestic, OZAKI asked him for assistance in securing help on two other occasions. FUJITA was able to send to the Consulate Sakae TANAKA, whose interview is set forth in paragraphs 55-56 of reference (c), and Kimika ASAKURA, paragraphs 47-51 of reference (c).

#### JAPANESE NAVY TANKERS

135. Takaichi SAKAI stated that when Japanese naval tankers called at Honolulu, their captain would call at the Consulate and talk for an hour or more with the Consul General or the Vice Consul. Sometimes the captains would leave the Consulate carrying envelopes they did not bring with them. One Ishichi MATSUDA, now in custody, the owner of a grocery store at the old Aala Market, often visited these vessels. He was noted on numerous occasions by representatives of this office to have carried a mail bag onto the boat. SAKAI explained that MATSUDA would pick up mail being held at the post office pending the arrival of the tankers and carry it aboard. Presumably this was a labor of love. SAKAI recalled hearing that Japanese navy men sometimes left the tankers here, then sailed aboard a tanker calling at Honolulu at a future date. However, SAKAI could not recall where he had heard this. He further disclaimed all knowledge of what these officers did while in port, or of where they lived while here. (In connection with this topic, see reference (v), paragraphs 42-43.)

#### TORITSUGININ

136. Takaichi SAKAI stated that the term *soryojikan toritsuginin* was not accurately translated as "consular agents". He believed the more correct transla-

tion to be "Consulate General 'go-between' men". He remembered Vice Consul OKUDA's once expressing the opinion that the *toritsuginin* were not agents of the Japanese government within the meaning of the United States statute requiring such agents to register with the State Department.

137. It should be remembered that the status of the *toritsuginin* was never clarified by judicial decision. They were "agents" of the Consulate only in a very loose sense of the term. They rarely received remuneration from the Consulate, and their duties apparently were merely routine. Actual military espionage on the part of a *toritsuginin* has been proven to the satisfaction of this office only in one case, that of Unji HIRAYAMA, subject of reference (1). Economic [32] espionage has been indicated in a number of other cases. However, the basic motive in placing all *toritsuginin* in custody immediately after the attack of December 7th was the fact that, as a class, they were extremely pro-Japanese, and there is evidence to indicate that they were chosen to be *toritsuginin* on the basis of their loyalty to Japan. There is scarcely one who was not engaged in a number of pro-Japanese activities in addition to his duties as *toritsuginin*.

Pending—14ND.

[copy]

[1]

#### TRIP TO KAUAI

One day in the early part of July, 1941, Morimura told me that he and I will be sent on a trip to Kauai in the near future. Sometime after that Seki told me that he wants to see the island by himself. So it seemed to me then that both of them wanted so much to take a trip. I don't really know how the situation was between them. After several days (few days before we left) Morimura suddenly told me that he is not going and said that I will be sent. After hearing that from Morimura, I asked Seki what has happened. And Seki said that they (Morimura and Seki) had some kind of misunderstandings. I told Seki why he (Seki) himself doesn't go since I was told he wanted to go so much. But Seki said he is not going and told me to take my wife with me. He told me to go and have a good vacation. And then Okuda called me to his desk and told me to go to Kauai with my wife and also told me to see Seki about the money. Seki gave me about \$100, and the following day I went down to the airway company office to buy our tickets. The day before we left Okuda called me at his desk and gave me the following instructions. (1) See the things that could be seen from the highways: (2) Not to talk to anyone: (3) He said that he knew the air field project at the Barking Sand is going on. He told me to see that if it could be seen from outside: (4) See the Lihue air port if there is any improvements: (5) See the Hanalei bay if anything is being done. He said he saw in a newspaper that the U. S. Navy is planning to use the bay for small boat base: (5) He showed me the geological survey map of Kauai and told me to see the Wainiha power plant. [2] He said that it is the source of power used on Kauai: (6) He showed me a photograph of Port Allen and Nawiliwili harbors. He told me to see any change has been added. He told me to take the usual sightseeing schedule and see what I can see. I called up Mikami on the phone and told him to take us to the airport next morning.

Next morning (I believe it was Saturday in the middle part of July) my wife and I went to the airport in Mikami's car. We left the airport at about 8 a. m. and reached Hanapepe airport at about 9 a. m. I noticed Horikawa was one of the passengers of the same plane. After we reached the Hanapepe airport I happened to see Minatoya (I didn't know him then) and hired him to show us around the island. He said the auto fare will be \$25. Then we started out immediately for the Kokee. I asked him if we can see the Barking Sand. He said we cannot go there in the morning because the Army usually practice bombing there. We went up to the place where tourists usually see the canyon. We got out of the car and stayed there for about 15 minutes, and continued our drive to Kokee and we went as far as the place where there were some residences. Since Minatoya said there isn't anything more to see further up we turned back and came back to Waimea. Minatoya suggested to have our lunch at the Waimea Hotel so we went in and all three of us sat at one table. He then introduced himself and said he is working for some transportation company. He talked about his having brother who is a doctor in Honolulu. We, my wife and I, introduced ourselves too, but I didn't say I was from the consulate. Soon after lunch we left the hotel and started for the Barking Sand. We didn't stop at anywhere on the way and [3] reached the Barking Sand. We got off the car then walked up the sand hill and tried if the sand

really barks. I took a picture of my wife there. I looked from the sand hill if there was any work going on for the air field, but I couldn't see anything at all. Only things I saw were sandy beach and keawe trees. After staying there about 20 minutes and started back the same road to Lihue. On the way back to Lihue, we passed through Kukuiolono park and stopped at the Lawai beach to see the Spouting Horn. And then we rode to Koloa beach where we got off the car and walked around the sandy beach seeing many human skeletons. After staying there about 20 minutes we rode to Lihue without stopping anywhere. It was about 5 p. m. when we reached the Lihue hotel. We registered there and shown to our room. We had our dinner at the dining hall. After dinner my wife and I thought of going to see some movie so we called up Minatoya on the phone and asked him to take us. He came soon after and we went to the Lihue theatre. We three sat together. I remember the title of the picture was "Strawberry Blonde". After show Minatoya took us back to the hotel. We stayed in our room until we retired. There was some kind of party at the hotel that nite. The following morning Minatoya came to the hotel at about 8 a. m. After breakfast I happend to see Horikawa in the kitchen so I went in just to say hello. I introduced myself and my wife. All he said to us was that "You were on the same plane yesterday morning. Are you on a sightseeing trip?" Minatoya put the lunch in the car and we started out at about 9 a. m. We went to see the Wailua fall. We didn't go near to the fall but just saw it far from the hill. Then we went to see [4] the Grass shack where we got off the car and saw some old Hawaiian mats, drum and sandals. From there we went to see the Slipery fall. We got off the car and walked down to the fall. After staying there about 15 minutes we started to Hanalei direction. We didn't stopped anywhere before reaching Hanalei where we had our lunch. We ate our lunch in the pavilion. I didn't see anything been done at the bay. After staying there about 45 minutes we started to Haena. On the way I asked the driver if we can see the power plant and he suggested of seeing it on the way back. We went in the dry cave in the car and got off the car at the wet cave to see it. On the way back we went up the Wainiha valley and went as far as the power plant was. I expected to see something large but All I saw were two pipes running down and one small power house building. Without stopping the car ye just turned back from there and stopped about 1/2 mile down on the same road and picked some mountain apples. After staying there about 15 minutes we started back and didn't stopped anywhere before we reached Kilauea lighthouse. Minatoya suggested of seeing the lighthouse since it is the largest one in the world. The watchman of the lighthouse came and showed us in to the lighthouse. We climed the stairs and saw the large lens. I remember we signed our names on the visitors' signature book. From there started back and didn't stopped anywhere before reaching Lihue. On the way to Lihue we went down to Nawiliwili harbor. We didn't got off the car. Minatoya said pointing one office building that was his company office. We reached Lihue hotel at about 5 p. m. After dinner at the hotel my wife and I thought of going to see [5] Japanese movie and walked to the theatre. (I don't remember the name of the theatre, it was very near to the hotel) It happened that night was the bank night at the theatre. After seeing the show we went back to the hotel and retired soon. The following morning Minatoya came at about 8 a. m. we checked out the hotel at about 8:30 a. m. I remember I paid \$20.00 to the hotel. We went straight to the Hanapepe airport. We left the Hanapepe airport at about 9:30 a. m. and reached Rogers airport at about 10 a. m. Mikami met us there and took us home. I took my wife to her shop and went to the consulate. Seki, Morimura and Okuda asked me how was the trip. They asked me if I enjoyed. I said it was fine but I couldn't see much. Seki said it's natural that I didn't see much. He said many things couldn't be seen from the highways. Then Okuda called me at his desk and asked me to tell him what I have seen. I told him I didn't see anything at the barking sand. I told him it was so quiet and I even never seen a plane flying. I told him there wasn't anything at the Hanalei bay. All I noticed was the sea was calm and it was a large bay. He asked me how was the reef of the bay but I said I couldn't see any reefs. I told him there were two pipes running down the mountain at the power plant at Wainiha and one building. He asked me anything more so I said none. I told him there wasn't anything new at the Nawiliwili harbor and Port Allen harbor. I told him at the Lihue airport I didn't see anything but some army tents. I didn't tell him that I talked to Horikawa. Morimura never asked me anything about the trip. [6]

When I talked with Okuda Morimura was there too. Morimura just said "There isn't anything big going on it seems".

On the trip I brought along one tourist map. I didn't bring any letter or notes to anybody and I didn't bring back anything from anyone to the consulate.

/s/ RICHARD M. KOTOSHIRODO.

OCT. 1, 1942.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

*Confidential*

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H. Date: June 15, 1942.

Report made by: Lieut. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, and Ensign Don Woodrum, USNR.

Period covered: February 15—June 15, 1942. Status of Case: PENDING—14ND.

Origin of Case: General investigation of espionage activities of Japanese Consulate

General, Honolulu—see reference (a).

Reference: See first page of details.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: None.

Copy to:

ONI (5)

CinCPac (1)

Com14 (1)

MID-HD (2) Zone II (1)

FBI-Hon (2) Zone III (1)

14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND/#64-A. ONI File No.:

*Synopsis.*—Questioning of former employees of Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, indicates that Tadasi MORIMURA, Consulate secretary who came to Honolulu in March, 1941, was the chief collector of facts for the Consulate concerning the movements of U. S. Navy vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor.

MORIMURA's coming to Hawaii was accompanied with publicity that he would attend to expatriation matters at Consulate, which work he did not do. His work at the Consulate was done in privacy of Vice Consul OKUDA's office, involving poring over a map of Oahu, but the exact nature of his work is not known. MORIMURA went to his office at hours of his choice. He spent much time away from the office, visiting strategic points on Oahu, such as Pearl City peninsula and Alea Heights (both commanding a view of Pearl Harbor), Haleiwa beach (a potential landing place), Kaneohe Bay (across from the Naval Air Station), and made flying trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii. On drives around Oahu, he often took with him KOTOSHIRODO, Consulate clerk, and MIKAMI, a regular taxi driver for Consulate, but sometimes sent KOTOSHIRODO alone to count ships in Pearl Harbor, which they last did on December 5, 1941. MORIMURA contacted many persons who have since been interned.

*Deductions.*—Naval information reported to Tokyo by despatches analyzed in reference (b) was chiefly gathered by, or under the direction of, MORIMURA.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/cop

[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, Honolulu — Espionage Activities.

References:

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 9, 1942.

(b) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 14, 1942.

(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kimie DOUE, dated February 3, 1942.

(d) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Takaichi SAKAI, dated February 3, 1942.

(e) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kanaye SAHARA, dated February 3, 1942.

(f) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, dated February 8, 1942.

(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Telsaku ETO, dated January 29, 1942.

(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Telsaku ETO, dated June 15, 1942.

(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI, dated February 6, 1942.

(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kenzo MAEHARA, dated May 11, 1942.

(k) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ryuichi MORIBE, dated March 6, 1942.

(l) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ikuzo SATO, dated May 16, 1942.

This report has been prepared to supplement references (a) and (b), and to demonstrate, insofar as is known to this office, the means by which the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, gathered information relative to ship movements.

1. In paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of reference (a), it was stated that when interrogated, Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist and typist at the Consulate, and subject of reference (c), stated that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, had arrived from Japan on March 27, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, but did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned to a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, and the nature of his work there was unknown to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA often came to work about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and was seldom at his desk in the afternoon. Miss DOUE stated that there was a week during October or November, 1941, when MORIMURA did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi between 1000 and 1100, and she would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the ROYAL TAXI STAND, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu, (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. (The proprietor of this taxi stand, John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (i), has been interned.) On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, subject of reference (f), one of the Consulate clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

[2] 2. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

3. Takaichi SAKAI, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (d), when interrogated corroborated Miss DOUE's statements about MORIMURA's failure to concern himself with expatriation matters and his frequent departure from the Consulate during business hours.

4. Another Consulate clerk, Kanaye SAHARA, subject of reference (e), also was interrogated. SAHARA stated that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or the third, cut off at the first joint, but could not remember which hand was without a finger. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours with KOTOSHIRODO, adding that KOTOSHIRODO often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day.

5. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they were going to "important places", and, upon being asked what he meant by that, said "military places." On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and because neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO would make any mention of where they had gone when they returned to the Consulate. SAHARA added that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he often used on these trips.

6. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data on diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years old, and if he is a regular member

of the consular service, he should have been listed, as he could not at his age be a recent college graduate. (MORIMURA is said to have told Sakae TANAKA, a Consulate maid, that he was graduated from Hedai University.)

7. SAHARA added that he believed that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they entered or departed from the office. When asked if he thought this was not strange in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA made the explanation that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy one another's company.

8. In light of these revelations, KOTOSHIRODO was interviewed, and his personal history is set forth in reference (f). (It should be noted that none of the Consulate clerks were interrogated until after they had severed their connections with the Japanese Government.)

[3] 9. KOTOSHIRODO stated that his duties at the Consulate were to receive and open local and Japanese mail, and to handle out-going mail. He usually logged in letters from the Foreign Office, Japan, but these letters were actually opened by Kokichi SEKI, one of the secretaries. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he wrote down the date of receipt and the number of each item from the Foreign Office, which was addressed to the Consul-General, but he did not see the actual letters, as these usually came in inner envelopes. SEKI would take this mail in to Vice Consul OKUDA, and from there it would go into the Consul's office. Each letter had a receipt inside the first envelope which was signed and returned to the Foreign Office. Routine letters would come back to SEKI from the Vice Consul, and either SEKI or KOTOSHIRODO would enter the subject of each letter and its date in a record book.

10. SEKI's predecessor at this job was Mitsugi IKETANI, who returned to Japan late in 1940. (It was recently learned that while he was in Hawaii, IKETANI was head of the JAPANESE RED CROSS.)

11. Mail from the Foreign Office, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was of two types—that which pertained to the business of the Honolulu Consulate only, and letters addressed to all Consulates. The former type would carry consecutive numbers. Ordinary mail consisted of domestic matters such as births, deaths, marriages, expatriation, divorce, and adoption. This type of mail, and the circular letters addressed to all Consulates, would arrive by post, and would be picked up at the Consulate's post office box by the chauffeur, or would be delivered by a regular mail carrier. Other mail would arrive by diplomatic courier. This would be opened in the telegraph (or, coding) room by Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary. The couriers would carry the mail in a suitcase, and upon arrival, would go straight into the telegraph room accompanied by the Consul, Vice Consul, and SEKI. KOTOSHIRODO did not remember the same courier ever coming twice, and he added that one would not necessarily arrive every time an N.Y.K. liner called at Honolulu.

12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that letters received from local sources were not logged in at the Consulate. Only those received from the Foreign Office, other Japanese Consulates, and those of especial importance were logged. Most of the local mail came from consular agents, and consisted of letters or routine reports.

13. Office supplies for the Consulate were purchased by SEKI, who also acted as treasurer. KOTOSHIRODO's desk was in SEKI's office, so he was familiar with the purchasing. Most office supplies were purchased from the Honolulu Paper Company, and the remainder from the Hakubundo Book Store. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the persons usually contacted at the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE were Tomoaki NAKAMURA or Minoru FUJUWARA, the manager. NAKAMURA was familiar with everyone in the Consulate. Confidential Informant J-1 (rating "A") had previously informed this office that NAKAMURA was one of the most frequent visitors at the Consulate, and although there was no evidence that he had purpose other than that of selling office supplies, it was noted that he treated everyone in the Consulate, from the Consul General down, with insolent camaraderie and general disrespect that was unusual—one might say, unique—coming from a member of the local Japanese community. NAKAMURA made frequent trips to all parts of the Island of Oahu in the course of business, but when interviewed, denied that he had ever supplied information of any nature whatsoever to the Consulate. NAKAMURA has been interned.

[4] 14. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of his activities with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not altogether frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived



at the Consulate in March, 1941. A week later, KOTOSHIRODO drove the new secretary over Tantalus, a residential district on the heights overlooking Honolulu. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he drove MORIMURA out to Waipahu, a planation town about a mile equidistant from the northern shores of the Middle Loch and the West Loch of Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA was anxious to visit a tea house called the SHIOYU, which was off the highway to the left below the high school, and which was noted for its baloon fish soup. KOTOSHIRODO had been there before. The Consulate chauffuer, Ichitaro OZAKI, advised that it was impossible to get service there without prior reservation, but MORIMURA insisted. However, at the intersection KOTOSHIRODO said, "Let's not go," and MORIMURA agreed, so they turned around. Following this admission, KOTOSHIRODO displayed a reluctance to remember any further trips with MORIMURA outside of town, but was finally persuaded to recall trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii.

15. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he was asked to go to Maui by Vice Consul OKUDA. KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA left John Rodgers Airport, Honolulu, at 8:00 a. m. on the morning of May 5, 1941, and arrived at the Maui airport an hour later. They immediately hired a cab and a driver. The driver was a second-generation Japanese who could not converse very well with MORIMURA. MORIMURA spoke little English and had difficulty understanding the local *Nisei* brand of Japanese. However, they utilized the services of this driver for the two days they were on Maui. From the airport, they proceeded to the TOMOEDA HOTEL, a Japanese hotel located in Kahului, the east coast port of Maui. KOTOSHIRODO said that this hotel was run by a Japanese with a "funny eye" (elaborated to mean that he couldn't see from it). MORIMURA talked to the owner of the hotel about a Japanese poem, but never introduced himself. (The HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nippu Jiji, a Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated March 10, 1941, described HAMADA as having a left eye that was either injured or made of glass. HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nijju Jiji, a Honolulu bilingual (Japanese-English) daily newspaper. HAMADA is now in custody.)

16. It is interesting to note that HAMADA was a frequent contact of Shigeo FURUKAWA, the activities of whom were reported in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12 of reference (a). Letters from HAMADA to FURUKAWA at Kula Sanatorium, Maui, were found in FURUKAWA's possession, and it is known that HAMADA visited FURUKAWA, at Kula, a number of times. It was also reported that the two men phoned each other on occasions. One of HAMADA'S letters was a forceful plea that FURUKAWA dismiss the notion of suicide from his mind. FURUKAWA, as was shown in reference (a), made two attempts at suicide following the outbreak of hostilities. Another letter talked of Japanese poetry, FURUKAWA being a poet of some small reputation. Before entering Kula Sanatorium, FURUKAWA was advertising manager for the Nippu Jiji, of which HAMADA was the Kahului representative.

[5] 17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA stayed at HAMADA's hotel for two hours. They rested and had breakfast, but did not stay because the hotel looked too dirty. After they left HAMADA, they drove to the Grand Hotel in Walluku, Maui, not a Japanese hotel. They registered here, and then drove to Lahaina, on the west coast of Maui. Ships of the United States Fleet, when visiting Maui, anchor off Lahaina Roads. They stopped at a fountain shop for a while, then drove back to Walluku. From here they drove to Sprecklesville, a few miles from Walluku. There KOTOSHIRODO went to a Japanese school and met Tetsunosuke SONE. Consul General KITA had requested KOTOSHIRODO to give a package to the person to whom it was addressed, a female. KOTOSHIRODO thought the package contained a gift of some sort. He gave the package to SONE, because the woman to whom it was addressed was supposed to be one of SONE's former pupils. A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated April 11, 1942, states that SONE was the principal of the Japanese language school at Sprecklesville, had served as a Japanese consular agent for 30 years, and had served as a private in the Japanese army for two years. SONE was taken into custody on January 5, 1942, and on January 21, 1942, the Internee Hearing Board at Walluku, Maui, recommended that SONE be paroled. While KOTOSHIRODO was presenting the package to SONE, MORIMURA stayed in the car. After leaving the school, they saw a pineapple cannery, and then returned to the hotel in Walluku about 4:00 p. m. After dinner they took a walk,

saw a swimming meet, and about 9:00 p. m. dropped down to the fairgrounds hall where there was dancing. They bought tickets and went inside, but did not dance. They returned to the hotel about 11:00 p. m.

18. The following day, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited Iao Valley, located in Maui's northern range of mountains, back of Wailuku. Then they drove up the summit of Mount Haleakala, a dormant volcano rising 10,000 feet above sea level which is located in the southern half of Maui. They remained at the top about 20 minutes, and on their return from the summit, passed Kula Sanatorium. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they merely drove up to the sanatorium, got out of the car, and surveyed the building. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a photograph of the building which he still has in his album. He insisted that he did not give the print or the negative to MORIMURA, or to anyone else at the Consulate. In the afternoon they drove to the Makawao district, in central Maui, and arrived at the airport about 2:30 p. m. The plane took off at 4:00 p. m. and they arrived in Honolulu about 5:00 p. m. (The fact of MORIMURA's interest in the Kula region should be read in connection with the information reported in paragraphs 4, 9, 10, and 11 of reference (a).)

[6] 19. The second trip, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was made October 13-17, 1941. Again, Vice Consul OKUDA requested that KOTOSHIRODO accompany MORIMURA. They went to Hilo, Island of Hawaii, by plane, arriving in Hilo about 10:00 a. m. on the 13th. They hired a taxi driver, using him during their entire visit. His name was NARIKAWA, employed by the ABC TAXI COMPANY (probably Shigeo NARIKAWA, 1014 Kamehameha Avenue, Hilo). MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO registered at the Naniloa Hotel, operated by the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and were assigned Room 8. After lunch on October 13th, they drove up to Kilauea Volcano, and spent the entire afternoon around the craters. They visited the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO, and purchased photographs of the volcano in eruption and of the *lehua* flower. (The [7] proprietor of the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO was then Kenzo MAEHARA, subject of reference (j), who has been placed in custodial detention, principally for his association with officers of Japanese naval and other public vessels which used to call at Hilo.) On October 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO drove to the Kona district (west side of Hawaii), via Kilauea Volcano, stopping for lunch at the SHIRAKAWA HOTEL, at Waiohinu. (Of Kayato SHIRAKAWA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the hotel bearing his surname, this office has no derogatory information.) At Kona, they stayed at the KONA HOTEL, at Holualoa, but according to KOTOSHIRODO they did not talk to anyone there. (Jentaro INABA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the KONA HOTEL, has no adverse record in the files of this office.) On the evening of the 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO went to a motion picture show at Kainaliu, about seven miles from Holualoa.

20. Certain facts about the trip to Kona are of interest. Although there are a number of Japanese hotels in Hilo, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO preferred to stay at the Naniloa, which is a new hotel catering to the tourist trade. It is the most expensive hotel in Hilo. The trip from Hilo to Kona can be made in three and one half to four hours by automobile. However, a leisurely trip must have been made, inasmuch as Waiohinu is only a little more than half way between Hilo and Kona. At Kona there is a hotel comparable to the Naniloa, the Kona Inn, also operated by Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and catering to tourists. In Kona, however, they preferred to stay at a Japanese hotel.

21. On October 15th, they departed from Kona and drove to Kawaihae to see cattle shipping. Kawaihae is the port for the Immense Parker Ranch, and other smaller ranches in the neighborhood. From here they proceeded to Kapaau, in the Kohala district, and lunched at the NAMBU HOTEL. Here they talked to an old man, whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not remember. The old man told them about the birth and childhood of Kamehameha (probably Kamehameha I, (1758-1819), first king of Hawaii). Directories show the proprietor of this hotel to be one Yoshio HORI. They had lunch at one o'clock and, stopping only to view Akaka Falls, returned to Hilo, arriving there about dark. That night, after dinner, they went to the Hananoya Tea House where they met two Japanese girls. The chauffeur went along with them. They returned to the hotel about 4:00 a. m.

22. The following day, October 16th, they went to see the County Fair at the High School and Intermediate School Building. Later they saw Rainbow Falls, the Country Club golf course, Puumale Home (county hospital for tubercular patients), and then went to eat Japanese food at the Tokiwatel. They returned

to Hilo about 2:00 p. m. That evening they again visited the Hananoya Tea House, but left at 11:00 p. m.

[8] 23. On October 17th, they checked out of the hotel and went directly to the airport, taking the 10:00 a. m. plane for Honolulu. They arrived in Honolulu at 11:45 a. m.

24. KOTOSHIRODO insisted that the two tea house girls, the driver, and the old man at the NAMBU HOTEL at Kapaau were the only persons they contacted on the whole trip. KOTOSHIRODO stated that, on both trips, he handled money which was given to him at the Consulate before they left. On the Maui trip he was given \$110.00, and on the Hawaii trip, \$300.00. On the latter trip they spent \$65.00 at tea houses, while the driver cost them \$55.00.

25. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a number of trips to various points on Oahu with MORIMURA. In the early part of April, 1941, about two weeks after MORIMURA's arrival, MORIMURA asked KOTOSHIRODO to take him motoring to the Kaneohe district. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali and turned into the Kokokahi road which runs along Kaneohe Bay (across from Kaneohe Naval Air Station). They followed this road until they reached the Kailua beach pavilion. They got out of the car, and took a stroll in the park on the ocean side of the pavilion. In the car again, they drove past the cattle farm and the Kailua Theater, and then turned left on the road running to the Weimanalo district. Here they stopped near the old wharf on Waimanalo beach. They walked over to the wharf where several people were fishing. After about ten minutes, they got back in the car and returned to Honolulu, arriving at the Consulate about 4:00 p. m. In July or August, 1941, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA again made a trip to the Kaneohe district. This time they went in MIKAMI's taxi. Again they followed the Kokokahi road along Kaneohe Bay, and at one point MORIMURA told MIKAMI to slow down. Further along the road they stopped at a roadside stand and purchased two watermelons. This stand was near a pine grove (KOTOSHIRODO evidently mistook ironwood trees for pines), on the *mauka* (towards the mountains) side of the road. They drove on to Kailua Tavern where MIKAMI had breakfast, while MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO each had a can of beer. They were served by a waitress of Portuguese ancestry. After about twenty minutes they returned to the Consulate via the Nuuanu Pali road.

26. On a Japanese holiday in April, the Yasukuni Shrine Extraordinary Ceremony, when the Consulate was closed, MIKAMI drove KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Waianae, on the west coast of Oahu. They drove out beyond Waianae to Makua Cave, where the road ends. They departed from town about ten in the morning and returned about two, having lunched at a Chinese store in Waianae. KOTOSHIRODO admitted making three trips to Haleiwa, on the northwest coast of the island, with MORIMURA. The first trip was made in the latter part of April. They stopped at Haleiwa beach, near a ballground, for about ten minutes. Then they returned to Honolulu. Both the trip to, and [9] the trip from, Haleiwa were made via Wahiawa. The second trip occurred some time in May; the third in July. On neither trip did they get out of the car. KOTOSHIRODO remembered stopping at the *mauka-ewa* (towards the mountain-towards Ewa plantation) corner of the Pearl City intersection for a while, but he could not remember whether MORIMURA talked with anyone on those occasions. (It should be noted that the Waianae and Haleiwa beaches are considered important as the places on Oahu where enemy troops might first attempt landings.)

27. Early in the summer of 1941, MIKAMI drove MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO up on Alea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. No one got out of the car, and KOTOSHIRODO was uncertain whether or not MORIMURA used binoculars. After a few minutes they drove down the hill again. In November they again drove to Alea Heights. This time they drove in KOTOSHIRODO'S car, and they were there about ten o'clock in the morning. MORIMURA directed them to visit a house just off the road, and stated that the person whom he was visiting was a Mrs. MATSUO. He asked KOTOSHIRODO to enter the house, too, so KOTOSHIRODO followed. MORIMURA introduced himself to her, and asked her about the condition of the Japanese school and the Japanese people in that district. Mrs. MATSUO hesitated, and refused to give a definite answer, stating that there were other people in the district who knew more about such matters. She offered to introduce him to other persons, but MORIMURA said that would not be necessary. MORIMURA talked with her for about 20 minutes. Afterwards they drove directly to the Consulate.

28. Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, and Lieutenant G. P. Kimball, USNR, of this office, questioned Mrs. MATSUO concerning MORIMURA's visit. Mrs. MATSUO is a *nisei* whose husband, now deceased, was a Japanese consular agent during his lifetime. She remembered the visit of MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, although she did not remember their names, and she did not know that they had come from the Consulate. She stated that MORIMURA asked her how the Japanese were being treated. She answered that the Japanese on the plantation (Honolulu Plantation) were being well treated. MORIMURA then asked if they weren't "suspected." Mrs. MATSUO stated that she told him that Americans of Japanese ancestry were not suspected if they were loyal Americans. After they had gone, Mrs. MATSUO wondered if they were agents of the United States. The interrogating agents concluded that MORIMURA was looking for a case of disaffection in Mrs. MATSUO, but found her to be barren soil. From Mrs. MATSUO's house an excellent view can be had of the usual battleship moorings in East Loch.

29. During July or August, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove to the top of Punchbowl about 8:30 a. m. (Punchbowl is a small, extinct crater which overlooks downtown Honolulu.) According to KOTOSHIRODO, they merely looked at the view and drove down again.

[10] 30. All the foregoing information has not been presented precisely as KOTOSHIRODO first told it. Much of it was drawn from KOTOSHIRODO only after several hours of questioning and prompting. Later he was taken to various areas on Oahu where he pointed out the exact spots he had visited with MORIMURA and MIKAMI. Later he typed out and signed a statement of all he had said. The information which KOTOSHIRODO gave has been rearranged in this report to indicate the various areas which he and MORIMURA visited.

31. KOTOSHIRODO finally admitted that he had made about thirty trips to the Pearl City peninsula and vicinity with MORIMURA. Sometimes they went in MIKAMI's taxi, sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car. On the peninsula proper they visited the Pan-American Airways landing, and also the soda water stand belonging to Teisaku ETO, subject of references (g) and (h). However, they did not always visit these two places. ETO is an alien about 67 years old. His soft drink stand is adjacent to the Pearl City Navy landing, and from this spot one may obtain an excellent view of Pearl Harbor.

32. About two days after his arrival, in March, 1941, MORIMURA hired a taxi and went around the Island of Oahu, alone. About a week after his arrival, SEKI accompanied MORIMURA to the Pan-American Airways clipper landing at Pearl City. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he heard this from SEKI.) About a week later, MORIMURA insisted that KOTOSHIRODO drive him to the peninsula in KOTOSHIRODO's car. They got out of the car and bought soft drinks at ETO's stand. MORIMURA talked to the ETOS, both the old man and his wife, about their business. He asked them how long they had been situated in this spot. KOTOSHIRODO did not know whether MORIMURA had a previous introduction to the ETOS, or had merely struck up an acquaintance. KOTOSHIRODO said that he heard SEKI and MORIMURA speak of ETO. They thought him a very common fellow, and thought it amusing that an alien Japanese was permitted to operate his business so close to a naval base.

33. Another Consulate contact in the Pearl City area was a young Japanese who worked at a store on the *mauka* (towards the mountains) side of the highway at the junction of Kamehameha Highway and Pearl City Road. MORIMURA would talk to this Japanese while KOTOSHIRODO played the pinball machines. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they visited this place at least six times a month, and sometimes MORIMURA would go there alone. The last time KOTOSHIRODO stopped at this store with MORIMURA was in September, 1941. When KOTOSHIRODO was taken to the Pearl City junction, he identified the PEARL SERVICE STATION as the place MORIMURA had spoken to the young Japanese. However, KOTOSHIRODO has been unable to identify any employee of the PEARL SERVICE STATION or any other person thereat as the person to whom MORIMURA had spoken. This service station was owned and operated by one Nakajiro KURASHIGE.

[11] 34. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in the middle of April, 1941, all the Consulate staff members, together with their wives and children, went on a picnic at the home of Sam WOODS at Lanikai Beach, Oahu. The party went to their destination in four taxis and the official Consulate car. On the way to the WOODS residence, they travelled on the Kalaniana'ole Highway around Koko Head. They started out about 9:30 a. m. and arrived about 10:30 a. m. They

lunched in the yard, and afterwards played soft ball. They were served coconut juice from nuts picked by an old Japanese man. Also present were a middle-aged Hawaiian couple. At about 3:00 p. m. they left for home, returning to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali. They reached the Consulate shortly before 4:00 p. m. It was originally believed that one SAKURADA, yard man for Sam WOODS, had arranged this party. However, investigation indicated that SAKURADA had nothing to do with the affair. MIKAMI, the taxi driver, apparently arranged the outing. MIKAMI had chauffeured for the WOODS on occasions, and also had connections on the windward side of Oahu, where Lanikai is located, through a Mrs. BECKLEY, who arranged *luaus* (Hawaiian feasts). MIKAMI sometimes would transport the food prepared by Mrs. BECKLEY to its destination. MIKAMI was well acquainted with Mrs. Mary FREITAS, housekeeper for the WOODS. The WOODS were away on the mainland, and MIKAMI arranged the picnic through Mrs. FREITAS.

35. KOTOSHIRODO also was questioned concerning the existence of maps at the Japanese Consulate. He stated that MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu on his desk, which he saw both MORIMURA and the Vice Consul study at times. KOTOSHIRODO denied that any marks were made on this map, or that any Japanese writing appeared thereon. He was shown a new Geological Survey map of Oahu (1928 edition), and he believed that this was identical to the map which MORIMURA had in his office. KOTOSHIRODO also stated that he had seen MORIMURA working on a map of the Pacific Ocean with a compass and protractor.

36. In light of the evidence that MIKAMI was a conspicuous member of the KOTOSHIRODO-MORIMURA expeditions, MIKAMI was interrogated on January 6, 1942, by Agent Tillman, Lieutenant Kimball, and Captain F. O. Blake of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. MIKAMI stated that he drove persons from the Consulate to golf, to parties, downtown for shopping, to take the children to school, and to Waikiki for swimming. He added that while driving the Consul's car, he paid bills and did other errands. He had been doing this for the past six or seven years. MIKAMI was extremely reluctant to answer questions, but eventually considerable information was obtained. He admitted driving MORIMURA along the Kokokahi Road, where views were obtained of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station. He said that several times MORIMURA had instructed him to drive slowly so that a better view could be obtained. At one spot they stopped for at least three or four minutes. MIKAMI believed that [12] MORIMURA had binoculars with him, but was unable to say whether MORIMURA had used them or not. KOTOSHIRODO went along with them the second trip only. MIKAMI stated that on one occasion he had driven MORIMURA to Haleiwa, via the windward side of the island. They stopped at "Sato's restaurant" in Haleiwa. ("Sato's restaurant" has been identified as the SEAVIEW INN, owned by Ikuzo SATO, subject of reference (1). It is known that on many around-the-island automobile trips of visiting Japanese naval officers, a stop was made at the SEAVIEW INN, usually to eat lunch. While such stops might be accounted for by the fact that the SEAVIEW INN is the logical half-way point at which to stop for lunch on such trips, it should be noted that the restaurant is located in plain view of Haleiwa beach, which is considered one of the places on Oahu where enemy troops might attempt a landing.) MIKAMI went on to state that he had driven MORIMURA to Wahiawa on two occasions. On one of these trips they attempted to enter Schofield Barracks, but the sentry at the gate refused them permission to enter because MIKAMI's taxi did not have proper identification plates. He also stated that on one occasion, he drove Tomoaki NAKAMURA, of the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE (see paragraph 13, above), and someone from the Consulate, to Waipahu. They saw someone there, but MIKAMI could not remember who it was. (When questioned separately, NAKAMURA vigorously denied that he ever made such a trip.) MIKAMI also confirmed the trip to Waianae mentioned by KOTOSHIRODO.

37. MIKAMI admitted taking MORIMURA to Pearl City many times, and also admitted having stopped at ETO's stand at the end of the Pearl City peninsula. However, he claimed that he did not know ETO's name. He stated that sometimes he saw an old man, and sometimes he saw an old woman. He remembered hearing the old man say the fleet had just come in, or the fleet had just gone out, and that his business prospered when the fleet was in, but fared otherwise when the fleet was out. MIKAMI often played the pinball machines while MORIMURA conversed with ETO. When taken out to ETO's

stand, MIKAMI pointed out a large pile of lumber on the east side of the boat landing. He stated that this occupied a spot to which he and MORIMURA once walked in order to obtain a better view of the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.

38. One day, according to MIKAMI, he drove MORIMURA up the Waimano Road. The agents proceeded along this road with MIKAMI almost two miles to a point where MIKAMI said he, with MORIMURA, had turned around. At this particular point, and in the same general vicinity, there are no houses. The view of Pearl Harbor, where the agents turned around, is not good, which probably accounts for the fact that MORIMURA visited this place only once.

39. The agents also drove MIKAMI to Honouliuli. Here MIKAMI indicated a Japanese store, opposite a Standard Oil installation, at which he stated MORIMURA had asked directions. He stated that he had driven MORIMURA [15] to Honouliuli only once. Leaving the location of the Standard Oil installation, MIKAMI directed the agents along a dirt road to the main highway, which he stated he had followed back to Honolulu. It was noted that this same highway, if followed in the opposite direction, would lead to Fort Weaver and the West Loch Naval Ammunition Depot docks. However, MIKAMI denied that he had ever driven MORIMURA in that direction.

40. At Alea, MIKAMI directed the agents up the road to Alea Heights to a point just below the residence of Mr. Chester Clarke, where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor is obtained. This was the same spot to which the agents had previously been directed by KOTOSHIRODO. MIKAMI stated that he had taken MORIMURA to this spot on two or three occasions, and on at least one occasion, MORIMURA had gotten out of the car and stood about three minutes observing Pearl Harbor.

41. MIKAMI stated that on December 5, 1941, he again drove MORIMURA to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, proceeding along the old road through Fort Shafter and past Red Hill, and returning by the new Kamehameha Highway. MIKAMI stated that he saw two battleships at anchor between 1000 and 1030. Other ships, led by a battleship, were coming into the harbor at that time, but he could not say how many battleships were in the line. However, he remembered that the ship behind the battleship in the lead was almost as large, and the other ships were strung out behind. MIKAMI denied returning to Pearl Harbor that afternoon. (In paragraphs 6 and 8 of reference (b) it is noted that prior to the arrival of the ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA at Pearl Harbor on December 5, 1941, there were five battleships already moored. The ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA, inbound, passed the outer channel buoys of Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, that date, mooring before 1100.)

42. MIKAMI also stated that KOTOSHIRODO began to accompany MORIMURA to ETO's stand about the second or third trip that MORIMURA and MIKAMI made to Pearl Harbor. He added that he had taken KOTOSHIRODO to Pearl City without MORIMURA about four or five times. MIKAMI was asked if, when he took KOTOSHIRODO alone, the latter had ever said anything about his mission. MIKAMI replied that KOTOSHIRODO might have talked about ships. When pressed further, MIKAMI's memory failed him, and he would say only that the purpose of KOTOSHIRODO's trips appeared to be a desire to see the Naval base.

43. In light of the above statement, KOTOSHIRODO was again interrogated. He admitted that he had been to Pearl Harbor in MIKAMI's taxi about four times without MORIMURA, the last time in the latter part of November, 1941. He usually received instructions to make this trip from MORIMURA, who would direct him to go to Pearl Harbor and find out if there had been any [14] change in the number of ships in Pearl Harbor. However, KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not consult with MIKAMI concerning his mission. On this last trip, as well as on certain other occasions when KOTOSHIRODO had gone to Pearl Harbor unaccompanied by MORIMURA, he stated that the latter made a rough sketch of the harbor showing the approximate locations of the usual battleship, cruiser, and carrier moorings. Not much emphasis was placed on the location or presence of destroyers in the harbor. On the last trip KOTOSHIRODO went to the end of the peninsula, turned around without talking to anyone, and returned to the Consulate about 1000. He went to the end of the Pearl City peninsula to see exactly what type of carrier was berthed at Ford Island, for he could see from the highway that there was a carrier at the mooring on the west side of Ford Island. However, he went to the end of the peninsula pursuant to instructions from MORIMURA to "go all the way around."

43. KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his own car, alone, four or five times to check on the number of ships in the harbor. This was also done at the direction of MORIMURA. These trips, and the ones he made with MIKAMI without MORIMURA, were during the period from July to November, 1941. The last trip he made with MIKAMI alone was on November 27 or 28, 1941. The last trip he made with MORIMURA was later in the same week. KOTOSHIRODO denied that he had been to Pearl Harbor at any time during December. However, he stated that he once heard SEKI say that MORIMURA was going out to Pearl Harbor almost every day, and was spending a good deal of money on taxi fares. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Consulate paid all of his gasoline expenses, and bought some of his oil. The greasing and repair bills he paid himself.

44. On several occasions MORIMURA showed KOTOSHIRODO *Jane's Fighting Ships*. One of the things he remembers that MORIMURA pointed out was that certain American battleships could be distinguished by their masts, and that MORIMURA had used the word "yagura" /literally, "turret"/ to describe the cage masts on certain battleships.

45. KOTOSHIRODO stated that when MORIMURA first came to the Consulate, he and Vice Consul OKUDA used to go out together. However, as far as he knows, the time that he took MORIMURA and OKUDA to Kailua, as described in paragraph 46 of reference (a), is the only time they ever contacted anyone outside of the Consulate.

46. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA seemed to know Shigeo SHIGENAGA, proprietor of the VENICE CAFE, Honolulu. MORIMURA took KOTOSHIRODO there one time when Special Envoy KURUSU was on his way to Washington and was detained at Midway Island. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA had talked to some of the waitresses at the VENICE CAFE, and seemed to know them. (The [15] VENICE CAFE drew the largest part of its trade from Naval enlisted personnel. SHIGENAGA, the proprietor, is an alien, about 40 years old. His home, when searched, revealed a quantity of Japanese literature strongly nationalistic in tenor. Also discovered were photographs of high Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in 1939, as well as a photograph of a Japanese Army officer. SHIGENAGA has made several trips to Japan. In October, 1939, he invited Commander John P. Dix, USN, of the Shore Patrol, to visit Admiral Yorio SAWAMOTO aboard H. I. J. M. S. IWATE, flagship of a Japanese naval training squadron then visiting Honolulu. Commander Dix accepted, and SHIGENAGA made all arrangements through the Japanese Consulate. Commander Dix commented on the ease with which SHIGENAGA arranged the visit, and on the fact that SHIGENAGA treated all the Japanese officers present, from the Admiral on down, as equals. SHIGENAGA has been interned for the duration of the war.)

47. On February 9, 1942, Special Agent Tillman, Captain Frank O. Blake, of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and Lieutenant Kimball interrogated Kimika ASAKURA, who was employed as a maid at the Consul General's residence from June 16, 1941, to February 9, 1942. Miss ASAKURA is a dual citizen who was born at Alea, Oahu, on May 18, 1923. Miss ASAKURA stated that a man named FUJITA, first name unknown to her, came to her home on or about June 13, 1941, and asked if she would like to work at the Consulate. She had never seen FUJITA before, but she delivered that he knew her father. She believed that FUJITA was a flower raiser and lived in Paua Valley, Honolulu. He drove her to the Consulate on the same day. There she talked to Ichitaro OZAKI, the Consulate chauffeur, and later, to Kokichi SEKI, who engaged her services. Miss ASAKURA's duties at the Consulate were to clean the Consul General's living quarters, wait on table, and do his laundry. The Consul General lived upstairs in a building which is on the *makai* (towards the sea) side of the office building. Miss ASAKURA lived downstairs, sharing a room with Clara Yoshie KIKKAWA, who was the maid for the house in which MORIMURA lived.

48. Miss ASAKURA's predecessor at the Consul General's residence was a girl named Sakae TANAKA. Miss ASAKURA stated that Sakae TANAKA had been rather intimate with MORIMURA, according to gossip she had heard from Miss KIKKAWA, and the cook and his wife. Miss TANAKA left the Consul's employ because she had a quarrel with the cook.

49. Consul General KITA's most frequent social visitor was MORIMURA. MORIMURA would drop over to visit KITA in the evenings several times a month. Sometimes SEKI would drop in, and she would hear him talking about

treasury matters, money and business, with KITA. She stated that she had never heard MORIMURA discuss business matters with KITA.

[16] 50. The *mauka* (towards the mountains) residence in the Consulate residence in the Consulate grounds was occupied by Vice Consul OKUDA and his family. SEKI lived upstairs in the office building. MORIMURA occupied one of the residences facing on Kuakini Street, while Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, occupied the other residence on that street. OZAKI, the chauffeur, and his wife, lived above the garage.

51. Miss ASAKURA stated that on December 7, 1941, she called the Consul General about 8:30 a. m. and informed him that breakfast was served. KITA was in bed when he was called. Later he came down and ate his breakfast. Miss ASAKURA did not see KITA having breakfast as the usual way of serving that meal was to set it on the table in the dining room where he could help himself. She was busy with her work and did not see anyone come from the office building to call KITA. Neither did the telephone ring. Later in the morning, reporters came to the residence and asked for KITA. When the maid could not find him at the residence, she suggested to the reporters that he might be at his office. Thereafter, Miss ASAKURA remained at the Consulate and assisted in serving members of the staff, who were all living in the office building. She stated that her services as an interpreter were frequently used by the detectives who were placed on guard duty at the Consulate from and after the morning of December 7th.

52. On February 11, 1942, the agents interrogated Miss Yoshie KIKKAWA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that she had obtained her position at the Consulate through Toyoko FUJITA, who lived next door to the KIKKAWAS and raised flowers. At the Consulate, Miss KIKKAWA did housework for MORIMURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA occupied a house on the Consulate grounds facing Kuakini Street. She confirmed the fact that she shared quarters in the Consul General's house with Miss ASAKURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA usually got up at nine o'clock in the morning, had breakfast at nine-thirty, and went over to the Consulate office building about ten o'clock. He lunched about twelve, spending about an hour, and returned from the office about three. After that, MORIMURA sometimes played baseball in the grounds with other members of the staff and the clerks. Other times he read, listened to the radio, or went out with friends.

53. Sometimes, however, according to Miss KIKKAWA, MORIMURA would get up about seven in the morning. Often he would leave the Consulate about three in the afternoon with KOTOSHIRODO, and would be gone for several hours, not returning until about seven in the evening. On two occasions, KOTOSHIRODO stayed and had drinks and dinner with MORIMURA. She stated that Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary, once came to see MORIMURA after dinner. Sakae TANAKA, a former maid at the Consulate, came to see MORIMURA several [17] times in the evening after she had left the Consulate. Girls from the Shunchoro Tea House came to MORIMURA's house several times in the evenings, and remained two or three hours. On eight or nine occasions, after attending tea house parties, MORIMURA slept until noon. Each morning, MORIMURA had to be wakened. In September, 1941, MORIMURA went on quite a drunk. When he awoke, about noon, he was still drunk, and he made considerable commotion. Miss KIKKAWA went to the Consulate office building and informed SEKI, who came over and induced MORIMURA to go back to bed and sleep off his drunken condition. Upstairs, MORIMURA had a study, and in this was a wooden desk which he kept locked. On several occasions, Miss KIKKAWA saw letters written by MORIMURA, but the characters were too difficult for her to read, she said. She once saw a letter written by MORIMURA to a girl at a tea house. This letter she could read; it was a love letter written to a girl named Tomoyoko. (Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball later interviewed "Tomoyoko", a *geisha*. She admitted her association with MORIMURA, and told of a golf game she and another *geisha* once played with MORIMURA and Katsulichiro TAKAGISHI, an espionage suspect who left Honolulu for Japan on the Taiyo Maru, November 5, 1941.)

54. On December 7, 1941, Miss KIKKAWA, according to her statement to the agents, left the Consulate about 11:30 a. m. She had set breakfast on the table for MORIMURA about 8:30 a. m. There was a slip of paper on the table directing her to put breakfast on the table and then go home. MORIMURA usually left such messages on Saturday nights. There was nothing noticeably different about his activities just prior to December 7th, she said.



Miss KIKKAWA emphatically stated that she did not like MORIMURA, that he was "awful" and said "nasty things." MORIMURA told Miss KIKKAWA that he had lost the tip of his finger "on account of love". (It had been noted from several sources that one of MORIMURA's fingers, either the middle or third finger, was cut off at the first knuckle. However, the various observers have been uncertain which hand was mutilated.) Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA was quite friendly with Lawrence K. NAKATSUKA, a reporter for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Occasionally, NAKATSUKA used to telephone MORIMURA, and on one occasion that she knew of, they went to a tea house together.

55. Also on February 11, 1942, Miss Sakae TANAKA was interviewed by the agents. She stated that she lived in Upper Pauoa Valley, Honolulu, with her father, Yokichi TANAKA, a vegetable farmer. She was born in Honolulu on March 28, 1924, and worked at the Consulate from March 13 to June 12, 1941. She did housework in the Consul's residence. Miss TANAKA stated that she had obtained her job at the Consulate through FUJITA and in her own words, "he put me in there to work." She left the Consulate because of a quarrel with the cook, who had recently come from Japan, as to who had left the icebox open. Miss TANAKA denied having had any intimate relations with MORIMURA. She [18] stated that she once had asked him about his finger, but he refused to tell her anything about it. She often went to the house where MORIMURA lived, to see Miss KIKKAWA, who worked there. MORIMURA told her that he could not, and would not, let her go into his study room.

56. One Sunday, MORIMURA took both Miss TANAKA and Miss KIKKAWA over to Kaneohe, where they went out in the glass-bottom boat. This was while Miss TANAKA was still employed at the Consulate. They drove over with MIKAMI in his taxi, and MIKAMI joined them in the glass-bottom boat. After the boat trip, they went to Kailua and had lunch on the beach, returning to Honolulu via Koko Head. While on the boat, MORIMURA asked MIKAMI questions about Coconut Island, in Kaneohe Bay, but Miss TANAKA could not remember any other questions about the bay which MORIMURA asked. While at Kaneohe they drove by Dr. Iga MORI's country place and stopped and looked at it. However, Dr. MORI was not there, so they did not go into the house. (Dr. MORI is an "elder statesman" of the Japanese community of Honolulu, and was an advisor to the Consulate. He was taken into custody following the outbreak of hostilities, but due to his advanced age and enfeebled condition, subsequently was released.) Later, Miss TANAKA stated that prior to going to the Kaneohe district, they had driven up Alea Heights in MIKAMI's taxi.

57. Robert Orion Glover, Cy (AA), USNR, of the office of the Cable and Radio Censor, Honolulu, has reported that he was fairly well acquainted with MORIMURA, having met him through his membership in the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI. Glover has been training in Japanese military arts under the direction of Dr. Henry OKAZAKI at the NIKKO RESTORATION SANATORIUM, Honolulu, since 1934, and has conducted classes himself since 1937. A *kendo* (fencing) group, of which Glover was a member, began meeting in the summer of 1941. One George HAMAMOTO of Maui, who was a member of this group, declared that the group needed more help with its study. For this purpose, HAMAMOTO introduced MORIMURA to the group, in October, 1941. Glover first met MORIMURA in mid-October, and he was told that MORIMURA was a member of the Japanese Consulate staff, that he had come from Japan only three months before, and that he was an accomplished *kendo* man. In his *kendo* matches and instructing, MORIMURA disapproved of the local style of fencing which, as described by Glover, consists of short, rapid thrusts without much power. MORIMURA stressed the superiority of the heavy chop stroke, stating that the latter had proved best in the China "Incident." Glover said that MORIMURA did not speak English very well, although he was an attentive listener, and appeared to understand the language. MORIMURA showed particular interest in the *haoles* (whites) in the *kendo* class, and asked them many questions as to who they were, where they were educated, where they worked, and similar questions. Besides Glover, there were two other whites in the class, Ted Fielding, Y2c, USNR, and Harold Schnack, a [19] junior draftsman, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA once invited Glover and Fielding to join him in one of his wild parties, but the invitation was not accepted.

58. According to Glover, MORIMURA was known to travel a great deal, around Oahu and between the islands. MORIMURA once remarked to Glover that he was interested in Maui, that he had been over there and liked it very much.

MORIMURA also went fishing a great deal, shore-casting and spear-fishing with a glass box. It was not clearly established whether MORIMURA ever went deep sea fishing on sampans.

59. Alice ABE, a waitress at the SUNCHORO TEA HOUSE, Honolulu, whose professional name is "Sadako," also was interviewed by the investigators. She stated that MORIMURA and Ryuichi MORIBE, subject of reference (k), once held a private party at that tea house, with only those two men present. It is not known what was discussed at that meeting. (MORIBE, who has been interned, is a prominent alien businessman in the Japanese community of Honolulu. He admitted, among other things, attending a dinner with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and other prominent local Japanese who were close to the Consulate.)

60. A number of undeveloped leads concerning the Consulate and persons who had contacts with it are still under investigation by the local intelligence agencies, and new leads are from time to time uncovered in the investigation of seemingly unrelated cases of individuals being considered for internment. The same will be developed in further reports under the general title of this case, or under individual case titles, as may be appropriate.

Pending—14ND

#### UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

##### INVESTIGATION REPORT

##### *Confidential*

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District. Date: 14 Feb., 1942.

Report made by: Lieutenant (Jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

ONI (5)  
CinCPac (1)  
Com14 (1)  
FBI-Hon (2)  
MID HD (2)  
14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A. ONI File No.:

*Synopsis.* During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.

Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inaccurate as to destroyers.

Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was engaged in this espionage activity.

The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.

*Deductions.* Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to protect battleships in the harbor.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy.  
District Intelligence Officer.

[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities  
References:

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject, 2-9-42.

(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAMI, 2-6-42.

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a). It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and (b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.

2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those communications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter discussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December, 1941.

3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor, and their entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consulate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] area for the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings to the Consulate. The *modus operandi* of MORIMURA and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:

WYOMING AND TWO SEAPLANE  
TENDERS DEPARTED THIRD.

(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battle-ships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.

5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister TOGO by the local Consulate:

USS HONOLULU ARRIVED 1300/4th

From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300, on 23 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the

CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, between 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message was sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the HONOLULU type and 2 destroyers.

The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One (ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to Tokyo.

7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735, the same morning.

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore, correct.

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed, before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.

11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now used as minelayers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as to all destroyer-type ships are presented: At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon of 5 December, the four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, and at 1612.

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of interest:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the fourth.

There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.

14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington:

On the evening of the fifth the Battleship Wyoming and one sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 17 destroyers; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock: 4 light cruisers; 2 destroyers. (CA and CV all —) PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet.

The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts: The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the following are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYOMING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0800, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day—four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three seaplane tenders (AVDs)—which to the untrained observer might have appeared also to be destroyers.

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered at 0830, cleared at 0920, [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the harbor.

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms "moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in drydock and those not in drydock.) From Navy Yard operational data, it was determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.

21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 1248, was called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic):

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further comment thereon is offered.

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco:

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third. The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner LURLINE is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo:

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the fourth. About 1100 tons; one stack; and had a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.

[8] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT's crew went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December, 1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. Paragraphs 4, 14.)

C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU. (Paragraph 5.)

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9.)

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it is concluded that:

A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the erroneous reports.)

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, readily available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her

turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battle-ships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was surprisingly inaccurate.

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).

Pending.

[1] ENCLOSURE (A) : *Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other consuls, concerning military and naval subjects*

21 MARCH 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.

29 APRIL 1941

(To Tokyo)

The American Army transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

14 MAY 1941

(To Tokyo)

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Emons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

7 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units [3] of the fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

13 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)

Reference; San Francisco msg #92:

SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

26 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

27 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Chungking-Burma Road—Trucks.

28 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)

Daniel Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4] managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via Clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

8 JULY, 1941

(To Tokyo and Washington)

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin pact of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force: the local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

13 JULY 1941

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the west coast and [5] loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

26 JULY 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

2 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not [6] announced)



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entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

23 SEPTEMBER, 1941

(To Tokyo)

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

18 NOVEMBER 1491

(To Tokyo)

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma Road trucks 3000 2 ton trucks.

The attached copy (of report sent to F.B.I., Washington by Mr. Shivers on 3/28/42 re notes found on desk pad at Japanese Consulate) was furnished Col. Bicknell.

[1] 1941

- 1/6 (J) Greek ship New year 23 3  
Ambassador Nomura, New Year greetings 71. (70)
- 1/13 (E) Mr. Hemenway. 10:30 A. M. Hawaiian Trust.  
Mr. Thayer.
- 1/15 (E) Lecture on "Chinese Drama" by Reverent Stephen Mark of the Com-  
munity Church of Honolulu.  
7:30 P. M. Jan. 13, at Mrs. John Marks. (?)
- 1/16 (J) Tsunoda, Memorial pamphlet.
- 1/16 (E) Annual meeting and election of officers of Chamber of C. of Honolulu.  
12 Noon. Jan. 19 at Young Hotel roof. Midkiff child, Bowen Smith
- 1/17 (E) Ordinary meeting of Japan Chamber of Commerce. 12: Noon.  
Mr. Stevenson T. 6303 a lawyer taking care of Greek steamer "Madours  
Pateras".
- 1/19 (E) 1: P. M. Judo opening ceremony. Army & Navy Y. M. C. A.
- 1/22 (E) 6:30 P. M.—Dr. Takahashi.
- 1/24 (J) ? Wakayama. Ishizaki, Yamamoto.
- 1/24 (J) Kinoshita. Japanese School  
Hilo, Toyonaka city, Umabayashi,  
To Japan Kunizukuri.
- 1/24 (E) Grade wind. Trades wind.
- 1/25 (J) Mr. Kamio, head of the purchasing dept. of House of Mitsukoshi.
- 1/25 (E) Standard Trading Co. National Merchandise Commerce.
- 1/26 (E) Indoor ball. Ceremony time will be fixed later.
- 1/26 (J) 6:30 Ishii Garage. In front the Consulate.
- 1/27 (J) ? association (party) Miyoshino (tea house) 6:30 P. M.
- 1/29 (E) Lt. Comr. Edwin Layton.
- 1/29 (E) Hanahauoli PTA meeting. 7:30 P. M.  
Speaker: Mrs. Sam Reisbord,  
Mrs. A. E. Steadman,  
Mrs. Robert Judd.
- 2/3 (E) Wrote to Consul T. Kuroki (?) about "Snail" (Sooil) or (Siroil).  
Lt. Commander Edwin T. Layton intelligent officer.
- [2] 2/4 (J) From Japan.
- 2/5 (E) Major General Walter C. Short is to arrive aboard Matsonia.
- 2/6 (E) Mr. & Mrs. Okudu  
5-7 Waialae Golf Club. Reception in honour of Lt. General & Mrs.  
Herron and Major G. & Mrs. Short.
- 2/7 (E) By way of comparison.
- 2/11 (J) Golf, during morning, 9:30  
6:30 A. M.  
Dr. Mori, Kimura, attend Okumura, Katsuki, Sumida.
- 2/14 (J) Yokohama Specie 14/2  
Consul Muto, Takazaki. 6:00 p. m. Mochizuki (tea house)  
Shunchoro (tea house) \$6.00  
Dinner
- 2/15 (E) 8.93

- 2/18 (E) Kamakura. Mr. Shirai Specie Bank depart for Japan  
Successor Ninel Miyamoto.
- 2/19 (E) Noon Mr. Midkiff.
- 2/20 (J) To telegram concerning Trade wind (boat).
- 2/20 (E) Maiden voyage Katheleen Norris  
A Jew in Love Ben Hecht  
For Men Only Beth Proun  
Wife For Sale Katheleen Norris
- 2/21 (J) Pacific Bank, 6:30 Mochizuki (tea house)  
Tokyo, wind. Ozaki
- 2/21 (E) Manhattan Love Song Kathleen Norris  
Angel in the Home Kathleen Norris  
O We Too Are Drifting Gale Wilhelm  
Second Hand Wife Kathleen Norris
- 2/25 (E) Museum Mr. Brian.
- 2/27 (J) Mochizuki (cancelled) Royal Hawaiian 6:30  
Mr. & Mrs. Iida Mr. & Mrs. Mori.
- 2/27 (E) Oriental Literature Society 7:30  
*Not able to attend.*  
Mochizuki.
- 2/28 (J) Asama Maru Washington Suzuki, wife Miyoko  
677182
- 3/3 (J) [3] Sa— ? 6:00 Mochizuki Teahouse.
- 3/4 (E) Midkiff 6:30 Cigar N. D. Edmunds (Edwards?)
- 3/6 (E) Academy Art. March 4, March 16. Mr. and Mrs. Okuda.
- 3/7 (E) Pan-Pacific Union Noon luncheon Y. W. C. A. J. N. Midkiff.  
(J) Chamber of Commerce.
- 3/9 (J) McCully, dress-maker, 9th—1:00 p. m.
- 3/10 (J) Invitation to the members of the Consulate. 6:30 p. m. Kyushuya  
(hotel) ?
- 3/11 (E) Mr. Sumida.  
(J) Soto-ahu (Soto Sect) Pacific branch  
Kogan Yoshizumi  
The Nissel Club Research meeting. 3 persons  
Watanabe excursion party. Son five years. ?
- 3/14 (E) ? 92262 68 904  
(J) March 6th, reached Yokohama.  
Army Colonel. Head of the Bureau of the Personnel Affairs.  
? ? (two names of places ? ) attached to embassy.  
Arrival of the Consul General.
- 3/15 (J) Departure of the Astoria, Salt Lake and other six vessels.  
Heavy cruiser Louisville, Light cruiser St. Louis and so forth, docked.
- 3/16 (J) Nichibel Chuzo Kabushiki Kai sha (Brewery company in Hilo).  
Fujimoto Manager Hayashi Place, 3 persons Teuada, Takehara,  
Imai.
- 3/17 (J) Secretary Morimura, leaving on 20th on Tatsuta Maru from Yoko-  
hama.  
(E) Dr. Franco Montanari, Italian Consul; Wade C. Hiberly, Asst. Col.  
Customs.
- 3/21 (J) Welcome reception for the Consul General, under the auspices of the  
United Japanese Society. Friday the 21st, Natsunoya, 6:00 p. m.
- 3/22 (J) Welcome reception for the Consul General, United Society (crossed  
out). Army Commander in Chief, General Short.  
(E) Return call—Short.
- 3/24 (E) 7:30 P. T. A., Hanahauoli School.
- 3/26 (J) Place: Shunchoro teahouse 6:30.
- 3/27 (J) Meeting: Thursday luncheon. Concerning the indictment of the  
owner of the Japanese fishing boat.  
(E) Saturday (crossed out) meeting.
- 3/28 (J) Buddhist. Mochizuki.  
(E) 4-10 to Ft. Shafter.
- [4] 3/29 (J) Meeting to discuss the name lists of the Japanese side.
- 3/30 (E) Murata dug (drug?) 1819 Homerule St., Kalihi. (The word "Makiki"  
underlined in ink, written on same page).
- 3/31 (J) 7 Commerce.

- 4/1 (J) Morimura  
Stopover of Ambassador Kurusu when returning.
- 4/3 (E) Miss Loraine E. Kuck at home, 1951 Vancouver Dr., April 3rd  
3—30; 6 p. m.
- 4/4 (J) Kagawa and his party.  
Banquet. Y. W. C. A. dinner  
Luncheon Japanese Christian Association, Nuananu Y. M. C. A.  
Tea Party, home of Dr. Iga Mori  
Consul General
- (E) Reception party at Dr. Iga Mori's home from 3 to 8.
- 4/6 (J) Only Consul General to University Graduates' Club.
- 4/10 (J) Consul General Reception for the Japanese side. 6 p. m.  
(E) Panamean ship "Loidn" (?) "Loida").
- 4/12 (J) General meeting of the Fujin-kai. Use of the Consulate Building.  
Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce.  
Newly appointed Wo Fat (chop sul restaurant)  
United Japanese Society, rural representatives.  
Councillors—about 60 members invited  
Consulate member.
- 4/14 (J) Auspices: The Oahu Branch of the Hawaii Japanese Christian Association; Time: Noon luncheon; Place: Pleasanton Hotel.  
Oahu Branch head; Chiyokichi Furuta.
- 4/15 (J) Consul General Rotary Club Guest.  
(E) Rotary Club guest. Luncheon, Young Hotel.
- 4/16 (J) Nitta-maru docks from mainland.  
Obata—1 N. Y. K.  
Consul Fukushima 3 A. M.  
Japanese Society. Luncheon.
- 4/17 (J) Yamamoto (to) Yamashiro Hotel.  
Japanese food.  
(E) Mr. Charles Bishop  
Kinney  
c/o Bernard Farden, 711 Prospect St., Tel. 4451  
6:30 Mr. and Mrs. Kinney  
(In brackets): Mr. Kita—Mr. and Mrs. Okuda.
- [5] 4/18 (J) Yawata-maru  
Lunch Fukuda, a clerk  
Evening lent to United Japanese Society.
- 4/20 (E) Captain Charles (?) Hinfharoon.
- 4/22 (J) Consul General. Reception for the foreign people.  
(E) Telephone number: 67907  
Policeman, res. parking place  
Norman Gay. Tel. 98542 - 2629 Manoa Rd.
- 4/23 (J) N. Y. K. invitation, evening. 6:30 Shunchoro (tea house).  
(Phone No.) 65985.
- 4/24 (E) 10:30 (crossed out). Luncheon - Norman Gay.
- 4/24 (E) Wade Warren Thayer is to leave for mainland by Lurline to attend the National Boy Scout meeting in Washington.
- 4/27 (J) Fukuuchi \$25.00 contribution.  
\$10.00 contribution.  
(E) Member (with arrow pointing to \$25.00 contribution). 5:00 p. m.
- 4/28 (E) The number: 3-6-0-9 written thus, and boxed.
- 4/29 (E) Dr. Arthur L. Dean.  
Director of the Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.  
(Sato ? Mr. Wallis, M. Alexander)  
Walter F. Dillingham (in Jap. characters: "Pres., Oahu Railway Co.")?  
Walter F. Frear (spelled "Frier").  
Frank Tremaine? (this is written on separate sheet—reverse side?)
- 4/30 (E) Party at C. G. Residence for members of the Consulate.  
(J) Frank Tremaine, Honolulu United Press correspondent, left on Lurline  
Representatives Tasaburo Shimizu and Riichi (?) Yamamichi left on Lurline
- 5/1 (E) Invited to luncheon, Mr. S. Abe, Senator.

- 5/2 (J) Mochuzuki (tea house) 6:00 informal  
(E) Call on Mr. Strench (?)
- 5/3 (E) Evening. Hananoya; wedding party of Mr. Hadada. (Hananoya: tea-house).
- 5/4 (E) Expected—M. S. Asama Maru in port.
- 5/6 (J) Entertainer—a good talker.  
Kokusai Theater—Gunnison—Young man's eye glasses.  
(E) F. A. Conteur  
Mr. Baker, photographer  
Dr. Robinson, University of New York  
Mr. R. A. Gunnison.
- [6] 5/7 (J) Sogawa, Toyama, Tsuchiya—not yet.  
(E) Afternoon 2:00 P. T. A. meeting, Hanahauoli School  
Evening 6:30—C. G. Residence; newspapermen  
Sears Roebuck & Co, 8-10.
- 5/8 (E) 4:15 Doyle's services at Elks' Club, Waikiki.  
(Word "tidbits" written in lower left-hand corner).
- 5/9 (E) Luncheon 12:00 Junior Chamber of Commerce.
- 5/10 (E) Mothers' Day.
- 5/11 (J) 11:30 a. m., where to: Haloiwa.  
Evening 6:30, Dr. Faus, Port Lock Rd.
- 5/13 (E) Telephone call to Lt. Comdr. Layton.
- 5/15 (E) Monthly Study meeting 7:45 p. m. at Dr. Mori's. Speaker Cons. Gen. Kita.  
Kalama ? ?
- 5/16 (E) Meeting 6:30 p. m. Official Residence. Prominent Japanese.  
P. P. U. (Pan-Pacific Union?) Wade.
- 5/18 (J) Okazaki (judo) arena.  
(E) 10:00 am. losen (?) first ball, finish 12:00  
Midkiff.
- 5/19 (E) May 19, 4:30 p. m. Assembly Room, Hanahauoli School.
- 5/23 (J) Fujii Hayakawa  
(E) Tuesday lecture, Richard Lane.
- 5/24 (E) Kazukuehn 149 Sei 1476 Wrong 1568 no visit? 1896  
Punahou School 8:00 a. m.
- 5/25 (J) Uluma—Ryukyu (Okinawa) word). "Ulu" means SAND; "ma" means ISLAND.  
(E) 7:00 p. m. Bartlett & Robertson.
- 5/26 (J) Hawaii Shogyo Sha (Hawaii Commercial Press).  
(E) Mrs. Peck; Mr. and Mrs. Jones; Mr. Robertson.  
(Following numbers—phone? 4327-9951.
- 5/29 (J) Kimura ? Matsuda Shunchoro (teahouse).  
(E) Shunchoro (teahouse)—Moribe 6:30
- 5/27 (J) Y. M. C. A.—6:00 a. m.
- [7] 5/30 (J) 9:00 a. m. Moillili  
Standing Committee: Serizawa, Sasaki, Ogata  
President.
- 6/3 (J) Invitation to Meiji University.
- 6/4 (E) Mr. F. Midkiff—2739  
3609 Mr. Frazier
- 6/6 (E) 8:00 p. m. Central Court of the Honolulu Academy of Arts.
- 6/10 (E) Ironwood.
- 6/11 (J) Yokohama Specie, Matsuda, night  
Time: 6:30  
Place: Halekulani  
Mr. and Mrs. Matsuda; Mr. and Mrs. Mori (Jr.); Takahashi; Mr. and Mrs. Soga (Jr.) Kita; Mr. and Mrs. Okuda; Mr. and Mrs. Yuge
- 6/12 (E) Mr. Yugen (Eugene?) Turner speaks on China Affairs at Y. M. C. A., noon.  
If there is any problem that you like to have explained, please feel free to call upon us.
- 6/13 (E) Resterick. Academy of Arts.  
Friel—5439 (tel. no.?)  
(J) Road—land—will estimate.

# 398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 6/16 (E) Mr. Judd speaks on "Hawaii as the Pivot on the Pacific" at P. P. U. luncheon. (Lawrence M. Judd?)
- 6/21 (E) Mr. Arthur E. Goodwin, Tel. 66220—1704 Keesumoku St.
- 6/23 (E) 3 Masao Moriyu  
237 Takashi Yoshida.
- 6/26 (E) Alfred C. Young, Punahou, speaker, President of the Alumni Ass'n.
- 6/28 (E) Luau at Punahou School, 6:30 p. m.
- 6/29 (J) Concerning heikan? fishing boat. Freeze of Foreign Assets. Pennsylvania.
- 6/30 (E) Italian Consulate—3948
- 7/4 (E) Arriving July 9th, Kamakura—Diplomatic courier, Kajuwo Taki to Customs.
- 7/7 (J) Italian Consul meets at the Cocktail party.  
(E) Carl Armfelt, 2235 Kalia Rd., Tel. 99865—Cocktail party.
- 7/8 (J) Tour inspection committee to South America, representatives: head—Kohei Hara; Mishimura, ?; Shinohada, Takahaki; Tehara, Kiyoshi; Toda, ?; Secretary. NYK Hirasaki Maru.
- [8] 7/11 (J) The opening of the meeting. All Islands Commercial Meeting. Mochizuki. Mr. & Mrs. 4:30—6:30.
- 7/22 (J) First 3 months \$21.00  
From the 4th month \$30.00  
First Private \$36.00  
Senior Private \$54.00  
Corporal \$60.00  
Special Sergeant \$150.00  
(food, clothing, board)
- 7/23 (J) United Society, Shunchoro teahouse 6:00 p. m.
- 7/27 (J) Contractors Organization, Ishii Garden, 6:00 p. m.
- 7/29 (E) P. P. U.
- 8/4 (J) Ukishima, Halekulani.
- 8/6 (J) Matsuda, invitation 6:30  
Kimura, Onoda, Mr. and Mrs. Matsui
- 8/10 (E) "M" Day—Mobilization day  
(J) Jews residing in America 477 ten thousand (4,770,000)  
Negroes 1189 ten thousand (11,890,000)
- 8/11 (J) Ukishima came from the island.  
(E) The word "Monday" is written six times and underlined. The figures: \$3,200.00 and \$2,000.00 are written all over page, and boxed in some cases.
- 8/14 (J) Honolulu Geisha (girls) organization.  
Memorial day, 30 years anniversary; Congratulatory entertainment, Kokusai theater, from the 14th to the 20th.
- 8/20 (J) French Consul—money?  
(E) I see no necessity for denying the statement since it is entirely baseless on the face of it.
- 8/21 (J) Douye.  
(E) Thursday, Pratt.
- 8/29 (J) Miyoshino (teahouse) Hanafuji (Teahouse girl's name?) 6:00 p. m.  
(E) Manual—handbook.
- 8/30 (J) Ikezawa—79588 (phone no?)  
(E) Vice Consul and Mrs. Otojiro Okuda  
JZK 15160 (radio station?)
- [9] 8/31 (J) Aug. 31, 1933, at present there are 24 nations in Europe.  
According to President Roosevelt, 70 millions of dollars.  
L. L. B. loaned three million two thousand four hundred dollars.
- 9/2 (E) 93870 Hanahauoli School.
- 9/3 (J) 1. Japanese of Shanghai, 88,000 assets (assents) 8,000,000 yen.  
2. The Americans say that manufacturing ability of the Japan Army and Navy airplanes are average 250 plans monthly; together with the people-owned planes and Army and Navy, it is 5000 planes.  
(70% are attack planes. Year ? Airplane School ?)
- 9/4 (E) full-fledged American.  
Tenement house. (Japanese character meaning same).
- 9/6 (J) Tanabe—944172 (James T. Tanabe, 1920 Bingham St.)

- 9/7 (J) From July 1st, 1941 to the end of the year, 1943, there will be: Large ships 1,153 (12,014,000 tons) on the high seas.  
 Battleships and warships. From Jan 1941 to August there will be:  
 Completed ships—213  
 Installed ships—436  
 Ships launched last year:  
 1 Battleship  
 1 Cruiser  
 8 Submarines  
 8 Destroyers  
 Installation:  
 2 Battleships  
 13 Cruisers  
 18 Submarines  
 57 Destroyers  
 1 Plane carrier
- 9/9 (J) Candy. (Tea and cake to be served?)  
 9:30 a. m. 11:00 a. m.
- 9/10 (E) 10:00 a. m. Installation of Bishop Sweeney, D. D., at Cathedral of Our Lady of the Peace.
- 9/13 (E) President Coolidge for Manila and Shanghai.
- 9/16 (J) Stop-over: Kunichi Kiyohara, Department of Justice Secretary  
 Hamada, Professor of Imperial University  
 Nishina, Technician  
 Kuga, Courier  
 ? Watanabe, Representative Nagatani
- (E) President Tailor.
- 9/16 (E) Shalgeta ? up the can (case?).
- [10] 9/18 (J) San Francisco departure: bounded for the east.  
 Penant ? (name of the ship). Two Japanese.
- 9/20 (J) Foliage plant. Like the chrysanthemum, tulip. A plant which the leaves are to be considered.  
 (E) Single adultery; double adultery; foliage plant
- 9/23 (E) Miss Caroline Curtis, 6th grade teacher, anahauoli School.
- 9/24 (J) Ship bounded for the east, Penant. Expected to dock.  
 Fujiwara, Asayoshi or Yoritoshi.
- 9/28 (J) 1. Tennis - soft ball 8:30 — 12:30  
 2. 12:30 Fair golf with Harada, list purse ? (Fair Golf: Terr. Golf Course, Ala Wai) ?
- 9/30 (J) Sumida family marriage party, at Natsu-no-ya (teahouse) 6:30 p. m.  
 (E) ? fairway, 1:00 p. m.
- 10/2 (E) Jitney sale - high jinks.  
 (J) Bolsterous merrymaking.
- 10/4 (E) Both my feet had gone to sleep - I got to my feet.  
 (J) Got numb - got numb.
- 10/6 (E) Dr. Bowels who was Mrs. Carry in Osaka met at P. P. U.  
 Mr. Harbin, Hiroshima Higher Normal School met at P. P. U.  
 P. P. U. Straddles, Panama Zone. suave, polite, haggling and bickering  
 (J) 2. pm. Yama no Sakaya (name of brewery in town). Note: on reverse side of calendar sheet, up in corner next to the number 6 is the word "coincident" written in English.
- 10/7 (J) One gallon is: "nishi ichigo" (in Japanese measurement).  
 One pint is equal to "nigo hassayaku" (in Japanese measurement).  
 (E) Midkiff at home 6:00 p.m. (pencil)  
 Dr. Gulike (Gulick) 4:00 p.m. "  
 1. Dr. Bowels from Japan spoke at P. P. U. (written in pen).  
 Muffed the fly? (pencil)
- 10/8 (J) Natsumoya (teahouse). Baseball social gathering.  
 (E) Miss ? who was in Hiroshima. Elm at King?  
 Murray CIO leader was at odds with Lewis.
- [11] 10/9 (J) Klichl or Nobuyuki, Tokyo city.  
 (A person's name, not clear) Yodobashi-ku, Nishi-Ochiai 1-134.

- (E) I know how to get up a bridge game.  
That's would be from frying pan into fire.  
Volcanic Isle, by Wilfrid Fleisher. (book?)
- 10/10 (J) San Francisco departure. Ship bound for the east; Berdia (name of ship). Two Japanese.
- (E) Addition, as follows:  
1. 79  
5. 27  

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7. 06
- 10/11 (E) 1.00 Unlala Pu?
- 10/12 (E) Soft ball, Wahiawa  
(J) Athletic Association.
- 10/13 (J) Shunchoro. Invitation: Matsuda, in place of?  
Noda  
Consul General Okuda  
Yokohama Specie
- 10/14 (J) Form (in the circle).  
Japanese returning?  
From the beginning  
President Pierce from Shanghai docked. Chinese aviation, 100 persons on board.
- 10/15 (E) Marriage reception of Takabashi's daughters at Royal Hawaiian Hotel, 4-6 p. m.  
(J) Resignation of the Kanoe Cabinet.  
For once, only once, only this.  
Waimanalo air field, or planes I suppose.
- 10/16 (J) Sakamoto. (Takejiro Sakamoto, 1518-F Hiram Lane, is listed in phone book under the number given, viz.—8429.)  
(E) \$7.00 for nothing  
Tel. numbers as follows: 684202 (crossed out) 8429 (underlined).
- 10/17 (J) Marine Inspector, Tatsuta-Maru  
Department of Communication  
Tsuchiya, a clerk  
Also, Foreign Department, Maeda, a clerk.
- (E) Official quarters discounted to overlook (in Jap) this possibility
- [12] 10/16 (J) Fujita, Sasaki, Hiramitsu.  
Ceremonial Rites of the Yasukuni Shrine (in Japan). Miyumoto.
- (E) Holiday.  
It's the stove that's getting me down.
- 10/19 (J) Taiyo Maru. Consul Kaoru Iwanaga.  
Tomoki Doi, Department of Communication clerk.  
Marine Inspector.
- 10/20 (E) 7:30  
10/23 (J) Tatsuta-Maru docked.  
10/24 (J) Departure, Tatsuta-Maru.  
10/27 (J) Disposition of the income from the freight by the special computation of the consulate.  
Get permission from the Freeze Order officer.
- 11/1 (J) Taiyo-Maru docked. Consul Iwanaga, Inspector Doi.  
First—9. Second—50. Third—271.  
Three o'clock, regular staff—403 Portable—88 Extra—200.  
Kikuchi (may be the name).  
(E) Pier. 2458 (tel. no.?)
- 11/2 (J) Immigration official  
(E) Customs 2  
Harbor Master.
- 11/5 (J) Taiyo-Maru left port. 7:40 p. m.  
Mori, Matsuda, Muramoto, Onoda, Soga, Makino, Sato, Ohya.
- 11/8 (E) 1. Fairway.  
pufferfish  
with his back to the piano  
(J) Ishii Garden  
Balloon fish.
- 11/10 (J) Ambassador Kurusu's arrival, extended. (delayed?)

- 11/11 (E) 1. Armistic Day. Holiday  
(J) 2. Ambassador Kurusu's arrival extended one day.
- 11/12 (E) Ambassador Kurusu arrived by China Clipper, 4:35 p. m. at Pearl Harbor.
- 11/13 (J) Ambassador Kurusu left for California by Clipper, 3:00 p. m.
- [13] 11/13 (E) Invited Mr. Morris and Mr. F. Tremaine at Ishii Garden (UP).
- 11/14 (J) Expect Argentina Japan Ambassador "Gandel Ottel".  
(E) (Addition as follows:) 4.49  
5.30  
1.93  

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11.72
- 11/15 (J) The flying power:  
2,500 fighting planes, or over  
17,000 members Officers (41,000)  
180,000 members Flying Soldiers (600,000)  
10,000 members Flying cadets (600,000) (this latter figure is crossed out).
- 11/19 (J) Foreign radio program.  
(E) TZI—9535 kc. 10:30 p. m.  
15105 News 1:30 p. m.  
" 6:00 p. m.  
9535 9535 (this latter is crossed out).
- 11/23 (E) The word OBSERVE written four different times and underlined in each case. The word LOT also appears several times, same way.  
(J) The words SEA and SAILOR appear several times.
- 12/1 (E) Within the predictable future.  
2600000 19,463,14  
236 6,635,86  

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2,499.00 26,099.00
- 12/2 (E) (Only following figures appear):  
23600 24  
26,099.00  
24,478.25  

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1,620.75  
3.38  

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1,624.13

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
HONOLULU, T. H., March 19, 1942.

Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Army Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: There are being forwarded herewith copies of translations made of coded and confidential material obtained from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu. It may be observed that Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" are not included inasmuch as they are messages which were not decoded.

Photographic copies of the originals of all of the foregoing will be furnished you at an early date.

Very truly yours,

R. L. Shivers,  
R. L. SHIVERS,  
Special Agent in Charge.

Enclosures.



*Translation of a Register of Radiograms*

1. Two copies of the translation of radiograms received by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu during 1941 is forwarded to you for your information.

G. W. B.

Encl. (2).

HONOLULU, T. H., March 13, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington, D. C.

Re: JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H., CONFILE—ESPIONAGE (J)

DEAR SIR: Reference is made to a letter to the Bureau dated March 2, 1942, transmitting a translation of a register of radiograms sent by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu during the year of 1941. This letter indicated that a register of messages received by the Consulate would be translated and forwarded to the Bureau.

In accordance therewith, there are being forwarded copies of a translation of a register of radiograms received by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu during 1941. The synopses of the messages recorded in the enclosures herewith are believed to represent all of the incoming radio activity on the part of the Japanese Consulate.

This register should be considered with the register of radiograms transmitted, which was forwarded to the Bureau by letter dated March 2, 1942, and with the photorecord negatives of this register and other coded material which were forwarded to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

R. L. SHIVERS,  
Special Agent in Charge.

FGT:LT

65-414.

Enclosures—5.

cc: G-2 Honolulu (3 enclosures), ONI Honolulu (3 enclosures).

TRANSLATION OF FORM IN WHICH WERE RECORDED THE INCOMING TELEGRAMS TO  
THE CONSULATE

## INCOMING TELEGRAMS

## TELEGRAMS, OFFICIAL MESSAGES

SECRET----- ORDINARY-----

NO. -----

FILE NO. -----

DATED----- month----- day

RECEIVED----- month----- day

FROM-----

TO-----

ATTACHED TO:

RECEIVED----- month----- day

SUBJECT: (gist of contents)

CHANNEL OF DISPOSITION:

TO----- month----- day

FROM----- month----- day

TO----- month----- day

FROM----- month----- day

TO----- month----- day

FROM----- month----- day

TO----- month----- day

FROM----- month----- day

TO----- month----- day

FROM----- month----- day

TO: THE ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION-----

TELEGRAM SECTION (X)

PERSON IN CHARGE: -----

REMARKS:

## EXPLANATIONS

## TYPES OF CODES:

A-----AN (GO)  
 B-----RYAKU (GO)  
 C-----HEI (ordinary)

## ABBREVIATIONS:

CG-----CONSUL GENERAL  
 ADS-----ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION  
 TS-----TELEGRAM SECTION

1. The letter GO is very similar to another letter, namely, REI, which may mean ORDER (in the sense of issued order), but since the letter—GO or REI—may also be a designation of a certain type of code, this explanation is being attached for reference. This letter appears under columns entitled *TELEGRAM NO. & CODE TYPE and CONTENTS*.

2. The word GOGAI is presumably a designation to the effect that the radiogram does not belong to any one type of code for the word literally means "outside of number." However, the word may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

3. The word MU literally means nil or none, but this may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

## TOP SECRET

[5] FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                        | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1-B.....                 | 19       | 1/17       | Re granting of social allowances.....                                                                           | To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18. |
| 2-(A).....               | 20       | 1/17       | Re Greek ship heading towards Japan..                                                                           | To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18. |
| 3-B.....                 | 26       | 1/24       | Re remittance of development (of intelligence) expenses.                                                        | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24. |
| 4-B.....                 | 27       | 1/24       | Re crew members connected with Japan-Russian (?) fishing industry. (to the Ambassador #37)                      | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24. |
| 5-B.....                 | 28       | 1/26       | Ditto..... (to the Ambassador #38)                                                                              | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| 6-B.....                 | 31       | 1/27       | Re invitation of Ambassador Nomura and his party.                                                               | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| 7-B.....                 | 32       | 1/27       | Re delivery of telegram to Ambassador Nomura.                                                                   | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28. |
| 177-B.....               | 33       | 1/27       | Re expression of views by the Minister on the speech by Secretary "Hull" against Japan. (to the Ambassador #39) | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28. |
| 8-A.....                 | 69       | 2/15       | Re collecting of information.....                                                                               | To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/14. |
| 9-B.....                 | 78       | 2/25       | Re crew members connected with Russo-Japanese (?) fishing.                                                      | To the CG 2/25, to the TS 2/25. |
| 10-B.....                | 80       | 2/26       | Re date when Consul General Kita will start for his new post.                                                   | To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/26. |
| [4] 11-B.....            | 82       | 2/27       | Re invitation to participate in the special festival of the Yasukuni Shrine to MASA NAKAMURA.                   | To the CG 2/27, to the TS 2/27. |
| 12-B.....                | 83       | 3/1        | Re Consul General Kita's companion.                                                                             | To the CG 3/1, to the TS 3/1.   |
| 13-B.....                | 91       | 3/8        | Re recrossing by CHINEI KANE-SHIRO.                                                                             | To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.   |
| 14-B.....                | 90       | -----      | Re appointment of Secretary (TADASHI) MORIMURA to service in this Consulate.                                    | To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.   |
| 584-A.....               | 94       | 3/10       | Re disposition of secret documents.... (dated 3/10)                                                             | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11. |
| 15-B.....                | 111      | 3/18       | Re starting for new post of Secretary Morimura.                                                                 | To the CG 3/18, to the TS 3/18. |
| 16-A.....                | 116      | 3/20       | Re granting of visa for transit to "WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE".                                                    | To the CG 3/20, to the TS 3/21. |
| 619-A.....               | 117      | 3/22       | Re Greek vessel heading towards Japan.                                                                          | To the CG 3/22, to the TS 3/22. |
| 17-A.....                | 119      | 3/25       | Re radiograms and secret documents to this Consulate carried by courier Mori.                                   | To the CG 3/25, to the TS 3/25. |
| 18-C.....                | 120      | 3/25       | Re inquiry on boarding of ship by the Consul General's "cook."                                                  | To the CG 3/25, to the TS 3/25. |
| 7-YUGO.....              | 127      | 3/27       | Re distribution of code type TSU and AN. (type GO #1 type 9) (dated 3/12)                                       | To the CG 3/31, to the TS 4/1.  |

# 404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                                                                         | Disposition                                                        |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 19-B.....                | 139      | 4/5        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                                                   | To the CG 4/5, to the TS 4/5.                                      |
| 20-B.....                | 145      | 4/7        | Re verification expense of crewmen's registration.                                                                                                                                               | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.                                      |
| [5] 21-B.....            | 144      | 4/7        | Re request for contribution of article from Premier Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the magazine commemorating the completion of the Memorial Hall of the Japanese Hospital of Honolulu. | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.                                      |
| 814-ANGO.....            | 148      | 4/10       | Re departure of Panamanian vessel towards Japan-<br>(to Britain #123)                                                                                                                            | To the CG 4/10, to the TS 4/10.                                    |
| 819-RYAKUGO.....         | 152      | 4/11       | Re stopping in port of courier Secretary FUKUDA and his party.                                                                                                                                   | To the CG 4/11, to the TS 4/12.                                    |
| 22-A.....                | 151 (12) | 4/11       | Re simplifying procedure for expatriation from Japanese nationality.                                                                                                                             | To the CG 4/11, to the TS 4/12.                                    |
| 23-B.....                | 162      | 4/18       | Re remittance of allowances for rent...                                                                                                                                                          | To the CG 4/28, to the TS 4/19.                                    |
| 24-C.....                | 163      | 9/18       | Re expatriation notices in official gazette.                                                                                                                                                     | To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19.                                    |
| 11-B-YUGO.....           | 164      | 4/18       | Re supplementary addition of RYAKUGO (code?) to transferred telegram no. E.                                                                                                                      | To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19.                                    |
| 25-B.....                | 179      | dated 4/28 | Re notice of expatriation of HISAO NAKAZAWA in the official gazette.                                                                                                                             | To the CG 4/28, to the TS 4/28.                                    |
| 26-B.....                | 180      | 4/30       | Re crew members connected with Russo-Japanese(?) fishing.<br>(to the Ambassador #186)<br>(dated 4/30)                                                                                            | To the CG 4/30, to the TS 5/1.                                     |
| 963-ANGO.....            | 181      | dated 4/30 | Re change of indicator words in request telegram.<br>(Secret)                                                                                                                                    | To the CG 4/30, to the TS 5/1.                                     |
| -C.....                  | 19       | 5/3        | Re notice of expatriation of .....<br>..... in the official gazette.                                                                                                                             | To the CG 5/3, to the TS 5/3.                                      |
| [6] 28-C.....            | 194      | 5/7        | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                                                                                                      | To the CG 5/7, to the TS 5/3.                                      |
| 29-C.....                | 199      | 5/12       | Ditto.....                                                                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 5/12, to the TS 5/13.                                    |
| 30-A.....                | 200      | 5/12       | Re purchase of OKUMA's house (or purchase of house by OKUMA).                                                                                                                                    | To the CG 5/12, to the TS 5/13.                                    |
| (17)-AN-YUGO.....        | 198      | 5/10       | Re method for use of telegraphic code type TSU.<br>(dated 4/12)                                                                                                                                  | To the CG 5/13, to the TS .....<br>To the CG 5/13, to the TS 5/13. |
| 1058-ANGO.....           | 201      | 5/14       | Re abstinence from speeches disadvantageous to the Axis.                                                                                                                                         | To the CG 5/14, to the TS 5/14.                                    |
| 31-C.....                | 208      | 5/21       | Re expatriation notice in the official gazette.                                                                                                                                                  | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22.                                    |
| 32-B.....                | 211      | 5/22       | Re transmission of lodging expenses for TSUKIKAWA by wire.                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 5/22, to the TS 5/22.                                    |
| 33-C.....                | 213      | 5/24       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                                                                                                      | To the CG 5/24, to the TS 5/24.                                    |
| 34-B.....                | 226      | 5/29       | Re trip to Hawaii by the Meiji University baseball team.                                                                                                                                         | To the CG 5/29, to the TS 5/29.                                    |
| 35-C.....                | 225      | 5/29       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                                                                                                      | To the CG 5/29, to the TS 5/29.                                    |
| 36-A.....                | 227      | 5/30       | Re transmission by wire of this Consulate's expenses for the development of intelligence for this year.                                                                                          | To the CG 5/30, to the TS 5/31.                                    |
| 37-C.....                | 228      | 5/31       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                                                                                                      | To the CG 5/31, to the TS 5/31.                                    |
| 38-C.....                | 230      | 6/2        | Ditto.....                                                                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/2.                                      |
| 39-C.....                | 238      | 6/5        | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                                                                                                      | To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/5.                                      |
| 40-C.....                | 243      | 6/7        | Ditto.....                                                                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/7.                                      |
| [7] 41-A.....            | 246      | 6/9        | Re subsidy to the "Pan-Pacific Union".<br>(dated 6/9)                                                                                                                                            | To the CG 6/9, to the TS 7/9.                                      |
| 1211-ANGO.....           | 247      | 6/9        | Re establishment of propaganda organ of the League of Nations<br>(from Hankow #186)                                                                                                              | To the CG 6/9, to the TS 6/10.                                     |
| 42-C.....                | 250      | 6/11       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette                                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 6/12, to the TS 6/12.                                    |
| 43-C.....                | 254      | 6/13       | Ditto.....                                                                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/13.                                    |
| 44-B.....                | 266      | 6/21       | Ditto.....                                                                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 6/21, to the TS 6/21.                                    |
| 45-(C).....              | 282      | 6/25       | Re expatriation.....                                                                                                                                                                             | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26.                                    |

## FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                  | Disposition                           |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 46-A.....                | 284      | 6/27       | Re investigation of the true facts surrounding discovery of the mutiny plot of the crew on the battleship "Pennsylvania." | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27.       |
| 47-B.....                | 289      | 6/28       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 6/28, to the TS 6/30.       |
| 1399-ANGO.....           | 300      | 7/3        | Re putting into force the telegraphic code type "TA."                                                                     | To the CG 7/3, to the TS 7/3.         |
| 48-C.....                | 301      | 7/4        | Notice of expatriation.....                                                                                               | To the CG 7/4, to the TS 7/6.         |
| 49-A.....                | 302      | 7/4        | Message from the NYK.....                                                                                                 | To the CG 7/5, to the TS 7/5.         |
| 50-B.....                | 312      | 7/10       | Re resending of radiogram.....                                                                                            | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| 51-C.....                | 313      | 7/10       | Notice of expatriation.....                                                                                               | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| 52-C.....                | 321      | 7/12       | Ditto.....                                                                                                                | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14.       |
| [8] 53-B.....            | 322      | 7/12       | Re transmission by wire of salaries(?) for foreign diplomatic establishments.                                             | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14.       |
| 54-C.....                | 325      | 7/15       | Re expatriation notice.....                                                                                               | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/15.       |
| 55-A.....                | 329      | 7/16       | Re return of the Imperial portrait.....                                                                                   | To the CG 7/16, to the TS 7/16.       |
| 56-A.....                | 331-330  | 7/16       | Re report of gathering of local information.                                                                              | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17.       |
| 57-B.....                | 336      | 7/17       | Re arrival in port of courier OSHIO.....                                                                                  | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18.       |
| 58-C.....                | 344      | 7/21       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 7/21, to the TS 7/21.       |
| 59-C.....                | 352      | 7/24       | Ditto.....                                                                                                                | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/26.       |
| 1631-ANGO.....           | 395      | 7/28       | Re issuing of instructions on entry into port of Japanese vessels.                                                        | To the CG 7/28, to the TS 7/26 (287). |
| 60-A.....                | 394      | 7/28       | Re returning of the portraits of the three Imperial Majesties.                                                            | To the CG 7/28, to the TS 7/29.       |
| 61-A.....                | 404      | 7/29       | Re ..... the secret #2 type UNNUN.                                                                                        | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/29.       |
| 62-C.....                | 409      | 7/30       | Notice of expatriation.....                                                                                               | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 7/30.       |
| 63-A.....                | 419      | 7/31       | Re courier OSHIO.....                                                                                                     | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.        |
| 64-C.....                | 420      | 7/31       | Expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                                  | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.        |
| 65.....                  | 432      | 8/2        | Re calling at "Honolulu" of Tatuta Maru.                                                                                  | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.         |
| [9] 66-A.....            | 450      | 8/6        | Re sailing of the Tatuta Maru directly to Japan.                                                                          | To the CG 8/6, to the TS 8/8.         |
| 67-C.....                | 451      | 8/6        | Re expatriation notice.....                                                                                               | To the CG 8/6, to the TS 8/8.         |
| 68-A.....                | 457      | 8/8        | Re visa for passing through to the Britisher, McBain.                                                                     | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/8.         |
| 69-C.....                | 459      | 8/9        | Expatriation notice.....                                                                                                  | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/9.         |
| -A.....                  | 460      | 8/9        | Request telegram from the Yokohama Specie Bank dated Aug. 9.                                                              | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/9.         |
| 70-C.....                | 469      | 8/13       | Expatriation notice.....                                                                                                  | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.       |
| 71-A.....                | 470      | 8/13       | Re loan from the Specie Bank.....                                                                                         | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.       |
| 1836-ANGO.....           | 477      | 8/16       | Re movements of foreign warships....                                                                                      | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/19.       |
| 72-B.....                | 486      | 8/22       | Re request for permission for inspection tour within the jurisdiction.                                                    | To the CG 8/22, to the TS 8/22.       |
| 73-A.....                | 492      | 8/26       | Request telegram from Specie Bank....                                                                                     | To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27.       |
| 74-C.....                | 496      | 8/28       | Re expatriation notice.....                                                                                               | To the CG 8/28, to the TS 8/28.       |
| 75-A.....                | 498      | 8/29       | Re telegraphic code.....<br>(Special telegram type GO, no. 1907)                                                          | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 9/5.        |
| 76-A.....                | 497      | 8/29       | Re loans from Specie Bank to this Consulate.                                                                              | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29.       |
| 1906-ANGO.....           | 499      | .....      | Re survey pertaining to Domei broadcasts.                                                                                 | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29.       |
| 77-A.....                | 502      | 8/30       | Re telegraphic code.....                                                                                                  | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30.       |
| [10] 78-A.....           | 507      | 9/1        | Re movements and whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet.                                                                          | To the CG 9/1, to the TS 9/2.         |
| 79-A.....                | 516      | 9/5        | Request telegram from Specie Bank....                                                                                     | To the CG 9/5, to the TS 9/5.         |

## FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                     | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 80-C.....                | 524      | 9/10       | Expatriation notice in the official gazette.                                 | To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/11.   |
| 81-A.....                | 534      | 9/12       | From OGAWA.....                                                              | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/13.   |
| 82-A.....                | 558      | 9/24       | Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.....                                                   | To the CG 9/24, to the TS 9/25.   |
| 83-A.....                | 559      | 9/24       | Re report of movements of U. S. Fleet..                                      | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.   |
| 84-(C).....              | 561      | 9/25       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                  | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.   |
| 85-(C).....              | 578      | 9/30       | Ditto.....                                                                   | To the CG 9/30 to, the TS 9/30.   |
| 86-A.....                | 579      | 10/1       | Re financial report.....                                                     | To the CG 10/1, to the TS 10/2.   |
| 87-B.....                | 582      | 10/2       | Re contents of baggage directed to this Consulate.                           | To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/2.   |
| 88-C.....                | 586      | 10/3       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                  | To the CG 10/4, to the TS 10/6.   |
| 89-C.....                | 600      | 10/9       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                  | To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.   |
| 90-C.....                | 604      | 10/11      | Ditto.....                                                                   | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| 91-B.....                | 612      | 10/14      | Re return to Japan of TSUYOKO AYUZAWA.                                       | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| 92-C.....                | 613      | 10/14      | Expatriation notice.....                                                     | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| 2179-RYAKUGO.....        | 622      | 10/15      | Re advance of expenses for sojourn to Secretary MAEDA.                       | To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15. |
| [11] 93-C.....           | 625      | 10/16      | Expatriation notice in official gazette..                                    | To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17. |
| 94-B.....                | 654      | 10/20      | Re landing of Secretary MAEDA.....                                           | To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21. |
| 95-A.....                | 656      | 10/20      | Re relaying (of message) to Secretary MAEDA.                                 | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 96-A.....                | 660      | 10/21      | Re surveillance of movements of "NEWMAN".                                    | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 97-A.....                | 661      | 10/21      | Re reports of forcible detention of "LEO SIROTA".                            | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 98-B.....                | 671      | 10/22      | Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary TOKUNAGA.                          | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 99-B.....                | 672      | 10/22      | Re number of passengers on the Taiyo Maru.                                   | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 100-B.....               | 673      | 10/22      | Re departure of Taiyo Maru from Yokohama.                                    | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 101-B.....               | 680      | 10/24      | Re clearance of baggage entrusted in care of Consul Iwanaga.                 | To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25. |
| 102-B.....               | 690      | 10/15      | Re expatriation notice.....                                                  | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 103-?.....               | 691      | 10/25      | Re investigation of whether the aircraft carrier "Yorktown" is there or not. | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 2231-RYAKUGO.....        | 693      | 10/27      | Re delay in arrival of Taiyo Maru.....                                       | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27. |
| 104-AN-RYO.....          | 694      | 10/27      | Re issuing of entry visa to "NEWMAN".                                        | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27. |
| 105-AN-RYO.....          | 698      | 10/28      | Re issuing of visa to the American "CRICHTON COLVIN".                        | To the CG 10/28, to the TS 10/28. |
| 106-C.....               | 702      | 10/29      | Expatriation notice.....                                                     | To the CG 10/29, to the TS 10/29. |
| [12] 107-C.....          | 708      | 10/31      | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                  | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| 018-A.....               | 707      | 10/31      | Re transmission of (message?) to REISAN (REI #3).                            | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| 2264-RYAKUGO.....        | 724      | 11/5       | Re according of conveniences to Ambassador KURUSU.                           | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.   |
| 109-C.....               | 761      | 11/12      | Expatriation notice.....                                                     | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14. |
| 2318-A.....              | 762      | 11/12      | Re according of conveniences to the "Argentine" Ambassador.                  | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14. |
| 110-B.....               | 765      | 11/14      | Re easing of the Freeze Order.....                                           | To the 11/14, to the TS 11/14.    |
| 111-A.....               | 771      | 11/15      | Re reports pertaining to warships and ships.                                 | To the 11/15, to the TS 11/19.    |
| 112-A.....               | 778      | 11/17      | Re letter(s) sent through Consul IWANAGA.                                    | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/17. |
| 113-A.....               | 783      | 11/18      | Re reports on movements of U. S. warships and ships.                         | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19. |
| 114-A.....               | 789      | 11/20      | Re location of Fleet Training Base.....                                      | To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21. |
| 115-C.....               | 800      | 11/22      | Expatriation notice in official gazette..                                    | To the CG 11/22, to the TS 11/24. |

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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## FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                   | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2378-ANGO.....           | 801      | .....      | Re reports on matters pertaining to finance.                               | To the CG 11/22, to the TS 11/24. |
| 116-C.....               | 804      | 11/24      | Expatriation notice in official gazette.                                   | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 117-(C).....             | 807      | 11/26      | Ditto .....                                                                | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| 118-A.....               | 827      | 11/28      | Re disposal of ANGO (code) .....                                           | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| 119-A.....               | 828      | 11/28      | Re reports of movements of U. S. warships and ships.                       | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| [13] 2420-1-ANGO.....    | 434      | 11/29      | Re reply telegram as to names of employees and number in their families.   | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 120-C.....               | 835      | 11/29      | Expatriation notice .....                                                  | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 2422-ANGO.....           | 836      | 11/29      | Re reports of entrance and exit and other movements of warships and ships. | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 121-A.....               | 843      | .....      | Re representation of interests .....                                       | To the CG 11/30, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 122-C.....               | 844      | 12/1       | Expatriation notice .....                                                  | To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/1.   |
| 2422-GOAN.....           | 845      | 12/1       | Re entrance and exit and movement of warships and ships.                   | To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/1.   |
| 2437-ANGO.....           | 846      | 12/1       | Re personal affairs of Consular staff.....                                 | To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/2.   |
| 2445-ANGO.....           | 848      | 12/2       | Re destruction by fire of code books ..                                    | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/2.   |
| 123-A.....               | 849      | 12/2       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet .....                                          | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/3.   |
| 2461-ANGO.....           | 851      | 12/3       | Re ANGO FUGO (Ango code or cryptographic code).                            | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/3.   |
| 124-B.....               | 852      | 12/3       | Re sending of families' travelling expenses.                               | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/3.   |
| 125-B.....               | 858      | 12/4       | Re payment of year-end bonuses to employees.                               | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4.   |
| 126-A.....               | 857      | 12/4       | Request telegram .....                                                     | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4.   |
| 2466-ANGO.....           | 856      | 12/4       | Re return to Japan of families (of Consulate staff?).                      | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4.   |
| 128-A.....               | 863      | 12/7       | Re reports of movements, etc., of warships and ships.                      | To the CG 12/6, to the TS 12/6.   |
| 127-C.....               | 862      | .....      | Expatriation.....                                                          | To the CG 12/6, to the TS 12/6.   |

[14]

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR

|                    |     |      |                                                                                                         |                                 |
|--------------------|-----|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 315-YUANGO.....    | 1   | 1/6  | Re exchange visas between Japanese and Russians. (dated 12/30)                                          | To the CG 1/7, to the TS 1/7.   |
| 2-ANGO.....        | 27  | 1/18 | Re method of exit (from Japan?) of American citizens to Japanese descent. (from the Minister #25)       | To the CG 1/18, to the TS 1/18. |
| 1-B.....           | 38  | 1/29 | Re entry of nationality of dual citizens                                                                | To the CG 1/29, to the TS 1/30. |
| 2-B.....           | 46  | 2/1  | Re inquiry of names of Ambassador NOMURA'S party.                                                       | To the CG 2/1, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 6-RYAKUGO.....     | 51  | 1/4  | Newspaper reports concerning forcible detention of Greek vessel. (from Los Angeles to the Minister #18) | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 7-RYAKUGO.....     | 52  | 2/4  | Re denial of rumors of forcible detention of Greek vessel. (from the Minister #53)                      | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 22-RYAKUGO.....    | 70  | 2/14 | Re arrival at post of Ambassador NOMURA.                                                                | To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/17. |
| 3-A.....           | 79  | 2/25 | Re bill for freezing foreign credits in the United States.                                              | To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/26. |
| 6-ANYUGO.....      | 95  | 3/10 | Re gathering of military information in U. S. and Canada. (from the Minister #73) (dated 2/18)          | To the CG 3/11, to the TS 3/13. |
| 8-ANYUGO.....      | 96  | 3/10 | Re handling of visas for foreigners coming to Japan. (to the Minister #109) (dated 2/25)                | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| [15] 25-HEIGO..... | 102 | 3/11 | Re visit of Minister MATSUOKA to Germany and Italy. (from the Minister GO-#590)                         | To the CG 3/11, to the TS 3/12. |

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## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type     | File No.       | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                                    | Disposition                     |
|------------------------------|----------------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 26-RYAKUGO.....              | 104            | 3/12       | Re official tour of Europe by Minister MATSUOKA and the assumption of superintending of foreign Minister's duties by KONOYE.<br>(from the Minister GO-#629) | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| 27-ANGO.....                 | 105            | 3/13       | Re telegraphic code.<br>(from the Minister GO-#633)                                                                                                         | To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/13. |
| 28-ANGO.....                 | 106            | 3/13       | Re visas of Netherlander(s).<br>(from the Minister GO-#643)                                                                                                 | To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/13. |
| 29-ANGO.....                 | 109            | 3/14       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.<br>(to the Minister #34)                                                                                                       | To the CG 3/14, to the TS 3/17. |
| 20-YU-GO-RYAKU.....          | 108            | 3/14       | Tenor of arguments concerning the Far Eastern problem.<br>(to the Minister #29)<br>(dated 3/6)                                                              | To the CG 3/14, to the TS 3/17. |
| 4-B.....                     | 110            | 3/15       | Re transmission by wire of advances..                                                                                                                       | To the CG 3/15, to the TS 3/17  |
| 30-RYAKU-YUGO.....           | 114            | 3/19       | Tenor of press comments on Minister Matsuoka's visit to Europe.<br>(to the Minister #36)<br>(dated 3/14)                                                    | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19. |
| 31-RYAKU-YUGO.....           | 118            | 3/24       | Re regulations for survey of Japanese assets abroad.<br>(from the Minister GO-#702)                                                                         | To the CG 3/24, to the TS 3/24. |
| 33-RYAKU-YU.....             | 121            | 3/26       | Comments on the President's speech.<br>(to the Minister #39)<br>(dated 3/19)                                                                                | To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27. |
| 24-YUGO.....                 | 129            | 4/2        | Re text of report of "LOWREY".....<br>(to the Minister #41)<br>(dated 3/24)                                                                                 | To the CG 4/2, to the TS 4/3.   |
| [16] 33-ANGO.....            | 130            | 4/2        | Re movements of the U. S. Fleet.....<br>(to the Minister #46)                                                                                               | To the CG 4/2, to the TS 4/3.   |
| 25-ANGO-YU.....              | 133            | 4/3        | Re reporting of limits of aid to Britain..<br>(dated 3/28)                                                                                                  | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/4.   |
| 35-RYAKUGO.....              | 136            | 4/4        | Re change of Minister.....<br>(from the Minister #786)                                                                                                      | To the CG 4/4, to the TS 4/5.   |
| 32-ANGO.....                 | 137            | 4/4        | Re informative telegrams.....<br>(from the Minister #758)                                                                                                   | To the CG 4/4, to the TS 4/5.   |
| 36-ANGO.....                 | 138            | 4/4        | Re method of new use of TSUGO (HAGI).<br>(from the Minister GO-#779)<br>(*TSUGO means code type TSU)                                                        | To the CG 4/5, to the TS 4/5.   |
| 37-ANGO.....                 | 140, 141       | 4/5        | Greater East Asia reports.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#759)                                                                                               | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.   |
| 38-ANGO.....                 | 142, 143       | 4/5        | Information on Europe and America..<br>(from the Minister GO-#760)                                                                                          | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.   |
| GOGAI-A (outside of code-A). | 146            | 4/7        | Re indicator words and number of words of telegram(s).                                                                                                      | To the CG 4/8, to the TS 4/8.   |
| 41-RYAKUGO.....              | 155            | 4/14       | Re signing of the neutrality pact between Russia and Japan.<br>(from the Minister GO-#833)                                                                  | To the CG 4/14, to the TS 4/15. |
| 42-ANGO.....                 | 161            | 4/16       | Re continuation of voyage of Panamanian vessel to Japan.<br>(to the Minister #60)                                                                           | To the CG 4/17, to the TS 4/19. |
| 52 (57)-B.....               | 165            | 4/18       | Re granting of holiday on Grand Festival of Yasukuni Shrine.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#72).                                                               | To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19. |
| 42-A.....                    | 166            | 4/9        | Movements of U. S. Fleet.....<br>(to the Minister #61)                                                                                                      | To the CG 4/19, to the TS 4/21. |
| 44-RYAKUGO.....              | 171            | 4/22       | Re return to Japan of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, etc.<br>(from the Minister GO-#927)                                                                        | To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/22. |
| [17] 30-RYAKU-YU-GO.         | 169            | 4/21       | Tenor of the press.....<br>(to the Minister #55)<br>(dated 4/12)                                                                                            | To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/23. |
| KETSU-RYAKU-YUGO             | 170            | 4/21       | Tenor of press concerning conclusion of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.<br>(to the Minister #57)<br>(dated 4/15)                                            | To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/23. |
| 46-RYAKUGO.....              | 176            | 4/26       | Re completion of ratification of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.                                                                                            | To the CG 4/26, to the TS 4/26. |
| 45-ANGO.....                 | 177            | 4/26       | Re intelligence strategy versus the U. S.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#82)<br>(from the Minister #180)                                                       | To the CG 4/26, to the TS 4/28. |
| 37-RYAKU-YU-GO.....          | 178            | 4/27       | Tenor of press in regard to conclusion of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.<br>(dated 4/21)                                                                   | To the CG 4/27, to the TS 4/28. |
| 48-ANGO.....                 | 183, 184 (215) | 4/30       | Greater East Asia reports.....<br>NI-(1); NI-(2)<br>(from the Minister GO-#960)                                                                             | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/2.   |

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.             | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                   | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 49-ANGO.....             | 185, 186<br>187, 188 | 4/30       | Second reports from Europe and America.<br>(from the Minister GO-#959)                                                                     | To the CG 5/2, to the TS 5/3.   |
| 52-ANGO.....             | 193                  | 5/5        | Re seizure of German(s) on board American ship by British warship.<br>(to the Minister #69)<br>(dated 5/2)                                 | To the CG 5/6, to the TS 5/7.   |
| 59-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 202                  | 5/19       | Tenor of press concerning U. S. aid to Britain and American-Japanese relations.<br>(to the Minister #70)<br>(dated 5/6)                    | To the CG 5/19, to the TS 5/19. |
| [18] 42-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 204                  | 5/19       | Re strikes in munitions factories.<br>(dated 5/13).                                                                                        | To the CG 5/19, to the TS 5/19. |
| 56-RYAKUGO.....          | 205                  | 5/19       | Re enforcement of trade control regulations.<br>(from the Ambassador—Minister?—GO-#1064).                                                  | To the CG 5/19, to the TS 9/20. |
| 43-AN-YU-GO.....         | 203                  | 5/19       | Re introduction of bill to control foreign language schools.<br>(to the Minister #74)<br>(dated 5/14)                                      | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22. |
| 61-ANGO.....             | 215, 217<br>221, 216 | 5/27       | Third reports from Europe.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1125)<br>(dated 5/26)                                                                 | To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28. |
| 60-ANGO.....             | 218, 219<br>220.     | 5/27       | Greater East Asia reports.<br>(from the Minister #1124)<br>(dated 5/26)                                                                    | To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28. |
| 2-ANGO.....              | 222                  | 5/27       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.<br>(to the Minister #84)                                                                            | To the CG 5/28, to the TS 5/28. |
| 67-ANGO.....             | 239, 240             | 6/4        | Re introduction of bill to regulate foreign language schools.<br>(to the Minister #90)                                                     | To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/7.   |
| 44-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 236                  | 6/4        | Re function of the export control bureau.<br>(to the Minister #78)<br>(dated 5/20)                                                         | To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/6.   |
| 68-ANGO.....             | 241                  | 6/4        | Re receipt transit, degree of reliability of intelligence telegrams.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#116)<br>(from the Minister #1480)         | To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/6.   |
| 51-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 237                  | 6/4        | Tenor of the press in regard to the President's speech.<br>(to the Minister #88)<br>(dated 5/29)                                           | To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/6.   |
| [19] 69-ANGO.....        | 248                  | 6/10       | Re mutual exemption of passport visa fees between Japan and Italy.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1302)                                         | To the CG 6/10, to the TS 6/10. |
| 70-ANGO.....             | 251, 252,<br>253     | 6/11       | Re suspension of use of temporary terms in naval code book S, and formulation of temporary terminology #6.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1217) | To the CG 6/11, to the TS 6/13. |
| 53-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 255                  | 6/12       | Re requisitioning of U. S. ships.<br>(to the Minister #92)<br>(dated 6/5)                                                                  | To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/13. |
| 72-ANGO.....             | 257(8)               | 6/16       | Re enrollment of class #2 of the HEI-SHIKAN (a school?)<br>(from the Minister #65)                                                         | To the CG 6/16, to the TS 6/17. |
| 74-ANGO.....             | 260                  | 6/17       | Re prohibition of Germans from leaving the country.<br>(to the Ambassador #24)                                                             | To the CG 6/17, to the TS 6/18. |
| 79-RYAKUGO.....          | 268                  | 6/23       | Re outbreak of war between Germany and Russia.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1293)                                                             | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23. |
| 77-ANGO.....             | 269                  | 6/23       | Re transmitted telegram #28.<br>(freezing of foreign capital)<br>(Ambassador #29)                                                          | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23. |
| 81-ANGO.....             | 271                  | 6/23       | Re press guidance policy in regard to the Russo-German War.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1293)                                                | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23. |
| 83-RYAKUGO.....          | 274                  | 6/23       | Re regulations relative to the application of the foreign capital freeze order.<br>(to the Ambassador #30)                                 | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24. |
| 76-RYAKUGO.....          | 275                  | 6/23       | Ditto.<br>(to the Ambassador #28)                                                                                                          | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24. |
| [20] 78-ANGO.....        | 273                  | 6/21       | Re inspection of mail matter.<br>(to the Minister #104)                                                                                    | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |
| 84-ANGO.....             | 281                  | 6/25       | Re form of coded radiogram of director(?).<br>(from the Minister GO-#1308)                                                                 | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |



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## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.   | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                     | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 80-ANGO.....             | 276        | 6/23       | Re change of ANGO code.....<br>(cryptic code)<br>(from the Minister GO-#1295)                                                | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |
| 82-ANGO.....             | 272        | 6/23       | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister CP-#1305)                                                                                   | To the CG 6/26, to the TS 6/26. |
| 55-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 283        | 6/26       | Re tenor of press in regard to the incident of the "ROBIN MOOR".<br>(to the Minister #100)                                   | To the CG 6/26, to the TS 6/27. |
| 88-RYAKUGO.....          | 285        | .....      | Re strikes of machinists in ship-building industries in San Francisco.<br>(to the Minister #108)                             | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27. |
| 79-RYAKUGO.....          | 286        | 6/27       | Re reply telegram concerning total amount of uncollected loans.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1329)                              | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27. |
| 80-RYAKUGO.....          | 287        | 6/27       | Re according of conveniences to HARUJI TAHARA, director of the Overseas Japanese Central Society.<br>(from the Minister #71) | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/30. |
| 66-ANGO.....             | 291        | 6/28       | Re handling of visa for the British....<br>(from the Minister GO-#1161)<br>(date: 6/22)                                      | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 6/30. |
| 91-ANGO.....             | 292, 293   | 6/28       | Re ANGO code (cryptic code).....<br>(from the Minister #1166)                                                                | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 6/30. |
| 86-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 294<br>295 | 6/30       | Outbreak of the Russo-German war and the tenor of the press.<br>(to the Minister #105)                                       | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 7/2.  |
| [#1] 94-ANGO.....        | 303        | 7/3        | Re survey of number of visa granted for transit through Japan.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1381)                               | To the CG 7/4, to the TS 7/3.   |
| 6-C.....                 | 304        | 7/5        | Re arrival in port of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.                                                                                 | To the CG 7/5, to the TS 7/7.   |
| 7-B.....                 | 308        | 7/9        | Re giving a message to courier TAKI (or TAGI).                                                                               | To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.  |
| 95-ANGO.....             | 307        | 7/8        | Greater East Asia reports (re visit to Japan by Wang Chin-wei and party).<br>(from the Minister GO-#1406)                    | To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.  |
| 8-A.....                 | 310        | 7/9        | Re survey of assets of Japanese residing in U. S.                                                                            | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10. |
| 9-A.....                 | 316        | 7/10       | Re transferring of telegram pertaining to movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                          | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10. |
| 97-ANGO.....             | 317        | 7/10       | U. S. Navy.....<br>(to the Minister #122)                                                                                    | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/14. |
| 100-ANGO.....            | 323        | 7/12       | Re freezing of Japanese credits in the U. S.                                                                                 | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14. |
| 96-ANGO.....             | 318        | 7/11       | Re steps for preparation for emergency situation.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1366)                                            | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/15. |
| 99-ANGO.....             | 319        | 7/11       | Re before and after measures on financial matters to be taken in case of emergency.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1367)          | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/15. |
| 101-ANGO.....            | 328        | 7/14       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.....<br>(to the minister #123)                                                                   | To the CG 7/14, to the TS 7/16. |
| 102-HEIGO.....           | 333        | 7/16       | Re resignation en bloc of the KONOYE Cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1526)                                                | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17. |
| [#1] 103-HEIGO.....      | 337        | 7/18       | Re issuance of Imperial command to Premier KONOYE to form another cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1539)                   | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18. |
| 104-ANGO.....            | 338        | 7/18       | Re rigidifying of supervision of telegraph and telephone.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1525)                                    | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/21. |
| 107-HEIGO.....           | 340        | 7/19       | Re appointment of Foreign Minister TOYOTA.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1550)                                                   | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 108-HEIGO.....           | 341        | 7/19       | Re installation of new cabinet with ceremony.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1551)                                                | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 109-ANGO.....            | 342        | 7/19       | Re Cabinet shift and Japanese foreign policy.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1560)                                                | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 110-ANGO.....            | 243        | 7/19       | Re correction in telegram.....<br>(from the Minister GOGAI)                                                                  | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 57-YUGO.....             | 339        | 7/19       | Tenor of press.....<br>(to the Minister #119)                                                                                | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 111-RYAKUGO.....         | 345        | 7/21       | Political change in Japan and the tenor of the press.                                                                        | To the CG 7/21, to the TS 7/22. |
| 113-ANGO.....            | 354        | 7/24       | Re Tatuta Maru.....<br>(to the Minister #133)                                                                                | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/25. |

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 115-ANGO.....            | 361      | 7/25       | Re controlling of Japanese shipping... (from the Minister #93)                                                          | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25. |
| 118-ANGO.....            | 365      | 7/25       | Re wiring instructions to Japanese vessel(s). (to the Minister #138)                                                    | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25. |
| 114-ANGO.....            | 362      | 7/24       | Re TAKIZO MATSUMOTO..... (from the Minister #92)                                                                        | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 116-ANGO.....            | 370      | 7/25       | Re situation of entrance into and departure from port of Japanese ships. (to the Minister #135)                         | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| [23] 121-ANGO.....       | 390      | 7/29       | Re entrance of Japanese vessels into American ports. (to the Minister #140)                                             | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 120-ANGO.....            | 375      | 7/26       | Re arrival in Hawaii of Undersecretary of the Navy "FORRESTAL." (to the Minister #139)                                  | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 122-ANGO.....            | 397      | 7/26       | Re developments up to conclusion of arrangements for mutual defense of French Indo-China. (from the Minister GO-#1598)  | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30. |
| 124-ANGO.....            | 407, 408 | 7/29       | Re war situation. (from the Minister GO-#1642)                                                                          | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30. |
| 128-HEIGO.....           | 412      | 7/30       | Summary of the regulations controlling trade with foreigners. (Minister GO-#1657)                                       | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 127-HEIGO.....           | 413      | 7/30       | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1656)                   | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 131-ANGO.....            | 433      | 8/1        | Re postponement of arrival in port of Asama Maru. (to the Minister #148)                                                | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 135-RYAKUGO.....         | 434      | 8/2        | Re seizure of goods on TATUTA MARU.                                                                                     | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 136-ANGO.....            | 441      | 8/3        | Re the third KOKURA MARU.... (to the Minister #152)                                                                     | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 138-RYAKUGO.....         | 442      | 8/4        | Re departure from San Francisco of the TATUTA MARU. (to the Minister #153)                                              | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 137-HEIGO.....           | 443      | 8/4        | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1732)                   | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| [24] 132-GO-RYAKU.....   | 439      | 8/4        | Re manner of enforcement of the freeze order. (to the Minister #151)                                                    | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 140-ANGO.....            | 445      | 8/4        | Re TATUTA MARU. (to the Minister #154)                                                                                  | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 143-ANGO.....            | 447      | 8/4        | Re method of investigation of bank examiner. (to the Minister #157)                                                     | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 146-ANGO.....            | 452      | 8/5        | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #159)                                                                  | To the CG 8/5, to the TS 8/8.   |
| 144-ANGO.....            | 453, 454 | 8/6        | Re naval code book. (from the Minister GO-#1738)                                                                        | To the CG 8/7, to the TS 8/8.   |
| 148-ANGO.....            | 458      | 8/8        | Re decrease of telegraphic matter and shortening of the contents. (from the Minister GO-#1767)                          | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/9.   |
| 153-ANGO.....            | 464      | 8/9        | Re British battleship "WARSPITE". (from the Minister #108)                                                              | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.  |
| 154-ANGO.....            | 465      | 8/9        | Re cash held in this Consulate. (from the Minister GO-#1781)                                                            | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.  |
| 158-HEIGO.....           | 472      | 8/15       | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1818)                   | To the CG 8/15, to the TS 8/20. |
| 159-ANGO.....            | 473      | 8/11       | Re amendment of regulations pertaining to entry into and sojourn in country by foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1819) | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/18. |
| 59-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 478      | 8/15       | Drift of argument regarding Japan-U. S. relations. (to the Minister #164) (dated 8/12)                                  | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/20. |
| [25] 164-ANGO.....       | 479, 480 | 8/18       | Re condition of the Japanese residents in San Francisco.                                                                | To the CG 8/18.                 |
| 60-YU-GO-RYAKU.....      | 489      | 8/23       | Tenor of press in regard to joint declaration by Britain and the U. S. (to the Minister #168) (dated 8/15)              | To the CG 8/23, to the TS 8/27. |
| 174-RYAKUGO.....         | 493      | 8/25       | Re revision of passport visas and passage certification regulations. (from the Minister GO-#1820)                       | To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27. |
| 10-A.....                | 511      | 9/2        | Re arrival at post of newly-appointed "Bishop SWEENEY" of the "Catholic" parish.                                        | To the CG 9/2, to the TS 9/5.   |

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## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.        | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                         | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|-----------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 61-AN-YU-GO.....         | 514             | 9/4        | Re method of enforcement of the freeze order.<br>(to the Minister #181)<br>(dated 8/25)                                                          | To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.     |
| 62-AN-YU-GO.....         | 515             | 9/4        | Re treatment of Japanese residing in U. S. by America.<br>(to the Minister #182)<br>(dated 8/25)                                                 | To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.     |
| KETSU-A.....             | 517             | 9/5        | Movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #195)                                                                                       | To the CG 9/5, to the TS 9/8.     |
| 191-ANGO.....            | 518             | 9/6        | Re applicants for class #2 of the HEISHIKAN (a school?)                                                                                          | To the CG 9/6, to the TS 9/8.     |
| 10-C (11).....           | 522             | 9/8        | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1656)                                         | To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.     |
| 194-ANGO.....            | 523             | 9/8        | Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHIKAN (a school?)<br>(to the Minister #200)                                                                    | To the CG 9/9, to the TS 9/9.     |
| 12-B.....                | 525             | 9/10       | Re stopping in port of courier KUGA..                                                                                                            | To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10.   |
| [86] 195-ANGO.....       | 527             | -----      | Re forwarding of mail matter between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #205)                                                                   | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/15.   |
| 200-ANGO.....            | 537             | 9/13       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.<br>(to the Minister #211)                                                                                 | To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/15.   |
| 63-YU-GO-RYAKU.....      | 538             | 9/15       | Tenor of press in regard to the "message" to the President from Premier Konoye.<br>(to the Minister #190)<br>(dated 8/30)                        | To the CG 9/15, to the TS 9/16.   |
| 202-ANGO.....            | 545             | 9/17       | Re transmission of letters (documents, records, or notes).<br>(to the Minister #214)                                                             | To the CG 9/18, to the TS 9/18.   |
| 218-ANGO.....            | 549             | 9/20       | Japan-U. S. ship communication problem.<br>(from the Minister #126)                                                                              | To the CG 9/21, to the TS 9/23.   |
| 209-ANGO.....            | 550             | 9/20       | Re revision in handling of urgent telegrams.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2040)                                                                     | To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/24.   |
| 211-ANGO.....            | 555, 556        | 9/22       | Japan-U. S. ship communication problem.<br>(to the Minister #220)                                                                                | To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/24.   |
| 295-ANGO.....            | 566             | 9/26       | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #127)                                                                           | To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/30.   |
| 216-ANGO.....            | 570             | 9/26       | Re carrying out of diplomatic policy....<br>(from the Minister GO-#2077)                                                                         | To the CG 9/28, to the TS 9/30.   |
| 66-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 577             | 9/29       | Re expansion of Far Eastern aerial route by Pan-American Airways.<br>(to the Minister #224)                                                      | To the CG 9/29, to the TS 10/2.   |
| [87] 220-AN-TOKU-GO.     | 581             | 10/1       | Re inspection of baggage, etc., when leaving country.<br>(from the Minister #406)                                                                | To the CG 10/1, to the TS 10/2.   |
| 222-ANGO.....            | 584             | 10/2       | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #230)                                                                                    | To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/4.   |
| 214-GO-AN.....           | 585             | 10/9       | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #231)                                                                                    | To the CG 10/3, to the TS 10/4.   |
| 225-RYAKUGO.....         | 589             | 10/4       | Re official announcement of temporary postal control order.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2121)                                                      | To the CG 10/6, to the TS 10/6.   |
| 226-HEIGO.....           | 590             | 10/7       | Re special festival of the Yasukuni Shrine.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2129)                                                                      | To the CG 10/7, to the TS 10/8.   |
| 228-ANGO.....            | 592             | 10/7       | Re distribution of propaganda "pamphlets" with aim to alienate Japan from Germany.<br>(to the Minister #234)                                     | To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/8.   |
| 230-ANGO.....            | 593, 594        | 10/8       | Greater East Asia reports.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#2130)                                                                                   | To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/9.   |
| 232-RYAKUGO.....         | 595, 596<br>603 | 10/10      | Presidential message regarding amendment of the neutrality act, and tenor of press regarding Japan-U. A. negotiations.<br>(to the Minister #235) | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| 234-ANGO.....            | 614, 620        | 10/13      | Re problem of Japan-America ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #136)                                                                      | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/15. |
| 237-ANGO.....            | 621             | 10/14      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #237)                                                                                                             | To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15. |
| 238-ANGO.....            | 623             | 10/15      | Re ailing of the TATUTA MARU....<br>(from the Minister #139)                                                                                     | To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15. |

## FROM : THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                           | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 239-ANGO.....            | 624      | 10/15      | Re problem of Japan-America ship communication.                                                                    | To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17. |
| [28] (7)-A 12.....       | 627, 626 | 10/16      | Problem of Japan-America ship communication.<br>(from the Minister, to various Consulates, GO-#237)                | To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17. |
| 241-HEIGO.....           | 633      | 10/16      | Re resignation en masse of KONOYE Cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2190)                                         | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 242-HEIGO.....           | 634      | 10/16      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister GO-#2191)                                                                              | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 243-RYAKUGO.....         | 637      | 10/16      | Re number of passengers on TATUTA MARU.<br>(from the Minister #142)                                                | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/16. |
| 245-HEIGO.....           | 638      | 10/17      | Re issuance of Imperial command (for formation of Cabinet?) to War Minister TOJO.<br>(from the Minister (GO-#2195) | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 246-RYAKUGO.....         | 639      | 10/17      | Re withdrawal of Ambassador(s) to the Soviet Union from Moscow.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2149)                    | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/19. |
| 252-HEIGO.....           | 646      | 10/18      | Re installation of Minister TOGO<br>(from the Minister GO-#2196)                                                   | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 253-HEIGO.....           | 647      | -----      | Re completed selection of members of the TOJO Cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2197)                             | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 249-ANGO.....            | 651      | 10/17      | Japan-America ship communication problem.                                                                          | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 245-ANGO.....            | 652      | 10/17      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #245)                                                                                    | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 247-ANGO.....            | 649-650  | 10/17      | Japan-America ship communication problem.<br>(from the Minister #145)                                              | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| [29] 255-ANGO.....       | 658      | 10/20      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #146)                                                                                  | to the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 258-ANGO.....            | 663, 664 | 10/21      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #150)                                                                                  | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| 259-ANGO.....            | 668      | 10/21      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #252)                                                                                    | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| 261-ANGO.....            | 670      | 10/21      | Re method of interpreting telegrams...<br>(to the Ambassador #335)                                                 | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 257-ANGO.....            | 666      | 10/22      | Japan-America ship communication problem.<br>(to the Ambassador #72)                                               | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 260-ANGO.....            | 669      | 10/21      | Re carrying of American dollar bills...<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#310)                                           | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/21. |
| 262-ANGO.....            | 676      | 10/22      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #254)                                 | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/24. |
| 13-B.....                | 677      | 10/23      | Re passengers boarding TAIYO MARU.                                                                                 | To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/24. |
| 264-ANGO.....            | 678      | -----      | Japan-America ship communication problem.<br>(to the Minister #255)                                                | To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/24. |
| 265-ANGO.....            | 684      | 10/24      | Re going to the U. S. of members of the Chungking air force.<br>(to the Minister #258)                             | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 266-ANGO.....            | 687      | 10/24      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(from the Minister #154)                               | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 267-ANGO.....            | 695      | 10/26      | Re progress of warship construction, etc.<br>(to the Minister #260)                                                | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27. |
| [30] 268-AN-(1)-GO..     | 697      | 10/27      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(from the Minister #159)                               | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28. |
| 68-RYAKU-YU-GO....       | 701      | 10/29      | Tenor of press on change of Cabinet...<br>(to the Minister #249)                                                   | To the CG 10/29, to the TS 10/30. |
| 273-RYAKUGO.....         | 716      | 11/2       | Re departure of TATUTA MARU...<br>(to the Minister #289)                                                           | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 275-ANGO.....            | 717, 718 | 11/2       | Re mail matter to be loaded on TATUTA MARU.<br>(to the Minister #201)                                              | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 274-ANGO.....            | 719      | 11/2       | Problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #200)                                    | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 278-ANGO.....            | 729      | 11/5       | Re departure of British cruiser...<br>(to the Minister #278)                                                       | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/7.   |
| 280-ANGO.....            | 732      | 11/7       | Re simplifying of expatriation...<br>(to the Minister #280)                                                        | To the CG 11/7, to the TS 11/10.  |
| 281-ANGO.....            | 738      | 11/8       | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #282)                                 | To the CG 11/8, to the TS 11/11.  |

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## FROM : THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                       | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 69-RYAKU-YU-GO....       | 743      | 11/10      | Tenor of press on trip to U. S. by Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(to the Minister #280)                                | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 283-ANGO.....            | 740      | 11/10      | Problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #287)                                | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10. |
| 14-A.....                | 752      | 11/12      | Re transmission of message to Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from the Minister #168)                                   | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 284-ANGO.....            | 755      | 11/12      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(from the Minister #169)                           | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| [51] 285-ANGO.....       | 767, 768 | 11/12      | Greater East Asia report #5.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2292)                                                   | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/17. |
| 287-ANGO.....            | 769, 766 | 11/12      | European and American reports #5.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2291)                                              | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| 292-ANGO.....            | 773      | 11/14      | Problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #292)                                | To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/17. |
| 290-ANGO.....            | 774, 775 | 11/13      | Condition of progress of warship construction and national defense plans.<br>(to the Minister #289)            | To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/17. |
| 291-ANGO.....            | 772      | 11/13      | Re decision on basic plans for adjustment of relations between Japan and U. S.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2313) | To the CG 11/13, to the TS 11/19. |
| GOGAI-A.....             | 780      | 11/17      | Re interpretation of telegram(s).....                                                                          | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/19. |
| 297-ANGO.....            | 791      | 11/19      | Re overseas broadcast in case of crisis in Japan's foreign policy.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2353)             | To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/21. |
| 298-ANGO.....            | 794      | 11/19      | Re movements of British warships....<br>(to the Minister #300)                                                 | To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/24. |
| 302-RYAKUGO.....         | 805      | 11/25      | Re extension of time of anti-Comintern pact.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2389)                                   | To the CG 11/25, to the TS 11/25. |
| 305-HEIGO.....           | 811      | 11/26      | Re demise of Princess YOSHIKO, wife of the deceased Prince KAYA.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2406)               | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| [52] 303-ANGO.....       | 812      | 11/25      | Re Japanese employed locally and second generation employees not on regular staff.<br>(to the Minister #304)   | To the CG 11/25, to the TS 11/25. |
| 71-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 813      | 11/26      | Re severance of diplomatic relations with Japan by "IRAQ."<br>(from the Ambassador #1181)<br>(dated 11/24)     | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/28. |
| 307-ANGO.....            | 818-821  | 11/27      | Re method of telegraphing in connection with the situation.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2409)                    | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| 310-ANGO.....            | 829      | 11/28      | Re Japan-America negotiations.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#2416)                                             | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| 315-ANGO.....            | 837      | 11/29      | Re reply telegram in regard to foreign merchantmen and warships.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2431)               | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 313-ANGO.....            | 833      | 11/28      | Re vessels requisitioned by the U. S. Army and the Navy.<br>(to the Minister #317)                             | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 318-ANGO.....            | 847      | 12/1       | Re arrival and departure and movements of warships.<br>(to the Minister #316)                                  | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/2.   |
| 321-RYAKUGO.....         | 855      | 12/3       | Re number of attendants of families of members of the Consulate wishing to board the TATUTA MARU.              | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.   |
| 70-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 860      | 12/5       | Tenor of press.....<br>(dated 11/19)                                                                           | To the CG 12/5, to the TS 12/6.   |

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## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO

|                     |    |      |                                                                         |                                 |
|---------------------|----|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 218-YU-GO-RYAKU.... | 2  | 1/6  | Tenor of American press.....<br>(to the Minister #312)<br>(dated 12/20) | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/8.   |
| 2-YU-GO-RYAKU.....  | 11 | 1/13 | Re alien registration.....<br>(to the Ambassador #1)<br>(dated 1/7)     | To the CG 1/13, to the TS 1/14. |
| 1-B.....            | 14 | 1/14 | Re tour of the country by the "Subaru Show" troupe.<br>(dated 1/16)     | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/14. |

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                                                         | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 4-RYAKUGO.....           | 15       | 1/15       | Re settling on wearing of every day clothes for various functions.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#1)<br>(from the Minister GO-#68)                                                  | To the CG 1/15, to the TS 1/15. |
| 5-AN-YU-GO.....          | 16       | 1/16       | Re U. S. warships.<br>(to the Minister #3)<br>(dated 1/6)                                                                                                                        | To the CG 1/16, to the TS 1/17. |
| 2-A.....                 | 22       | 1/22       | Re method of leaving country of American citizens of Japanese parentage.<br>(to the Minister #11)                                                                                | To the CG 1/22, to the TS 1/23. |
| 2-RYAKU-YU-GO.....       | 43       | 1/30       | Re refusal of American freighters to be chartered by Russia.<br>(to the Minister #10)<br>(dated 1/21)                                                                            | To the CG 1/30, to the TS 2/4.  |
| 3-C.....                 | 44       | 1/31       | Re holding of reception for Ambassador NOMURA in San Francisco.                                                                                                                  | To the CG 1/31, to the TS 2/4   |
| 4-RYAKU-YU-GO.....       | 47       | 2/1        | Tenor of press in regard to the Minister's speech in the Diet.<br>(to the Minister #13)<br>(dated 1/24)                                                                          | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.   |
| [34] 7-ANGO.....         | 53       | 2/4        | Re request for expenses for development of intelligence.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#15)<br>(from the Minister #45)                                                              | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.   |
| -HEI-YU-GO.....          | 55       | 2/5        | Re mediation in border controversy between Thailand and French Indo-China.<br>(from the Minister GO-#155)<br>(dated 1/25)                                                        | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| -RYAKU-YU.....           | 54       | 2/5        | Ditto<br>(from the Minister GO-#154)<br>(dated 1/25)                                                                                                                             | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| 10-ANGO.....             | 57       | 2/5        | Re policy of intelligence work against the U. S.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#13)<br>(from the Minister #43)                                                                      | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| 9-ANGO.....              | 58       | 2/5        | Main points concerning establishment of intelligence organ against the U. S.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#14)<br>(from the Minister #44)                                          | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| 10-AN-YU-GO.....         | 61       | 2/6        | Re careful selection of matters to be telegraphed and making concise the wording of the telegrams.<br>(from the Ambassador KETSU)<br>(from the Minister GO-#185)<br>(dated 1/30) | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 11-AN-YU-GO.....         | 62       | 2/6        | Re sending by wire of expenses for the development of intelligence.<br>(from the Minister GO-#138)<br>(dated 1/23)                                                               | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 13-ANGO.....             | 63       | 2/7        | Re alteration of method for using temporary terminology in naval code book S.<br>(from the Minister GO-#242)                                                                     | To the CG 2/7, to the TS 2/10.  |
| [35] 14-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 64       | 2/10       | Tenor of press in regard to Minister's speech in the Diet.<br>(to the Minister #16)                                                                                              | To the CG 2/10, to the TS 2/12. |
| 14-ANGO.....             | 65       | 2/10       | Reguiding of resident Japanese.<br>(from the Minister #19)                                                                                                                       | To the CG 2/10, to the TS 2/12. |
| 16-ANGO.....             | 71       | 2/15       | Press accounts regarding the Far Eastern situation.<br>(from the Minister GO-#310)                                                                                               | To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/17. |
| 17-A.....                | 72       | 2/17       | Re handling of visa for foreigners visiting Japan.<br>(from the Minister GO-#300)                                                                                                | To the CG 2/17, to the TS 2/18. |
| 15-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 74       | 2/20       | Tenor of press on arrival of Ambassador NOMURA at his post.<br>(to the Minister #22)<br>(dated 2/10)                                                                             | To the CG 2/20 to the TS 2/24.  |
| 18-ANGO.....             | 75, 76   | 2/21       | Re telegraphic code.<br>(from the Minister GO-#337)                                                                                                                              | To the CG 2/21, to the TS 2/24. |
| 19-RYAKUGO.....          | 77       | 2/21       | Re refraining from making official tours within the year.<br>(from the Ambassador KETSUGO)<br>(from the Minister GO-#365)                                                        | To the CG 2/21, to the TS 2/24. |
| 19-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 81       | 2/26       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.<br>(to the Minister #24)<br>(dated 2/15)                                                                                                            | To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/27. |

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## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                       | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 20-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 88       | 3/6        | Tenor of press in regard to Japan's southward move question.<br>(to the Minister #27)<br>(dated 2/21)                          | To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/7.   |
| 21-RYAKU-YU-GO....       | 87       | 3/6        | Re the "embargo" problem.....<br>(dated 2/24)                                                                                  | To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/7.   |
| 23-A .....               | 97       | 3/10       | Re disposition of secret documents.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#584)                                                         | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11. |
| [36] 24.....             | 98       | 3/10       | Re passport visa fees.....<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#30)<br>(from the Minister GO-#555)                                      | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11. |
| 4-B.....                 | 103      | 3/12       | Re returning of advances.....<br>(to San Francisco #4)                                                                         | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| 11-AN-YU-GO.....         | 115      | 3/19       | Re investigation of the trend of the U. S.<br>(from the Minister #112)<br>(dated 3/8)                                          | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/21. |
| 55-ANGO.....             | 126      | 3/27       | Re reporting of bounds of aid to Britain.<br>(from the Minister #111)                                                          | To the CG 3/27, to the TS 3/28. |
| 5-A.....                 | 128      | 3/29       | Re telegraphic code kept in the Consulate General in "Chicago."<br>(from Chicago GO-#3)<br>(to the Minister #8)                | To the CG 3/29,                 |
| 6-A.....                 | 147      | 4/9        | Re easy clearance of courier MORI....                                                                                          | To the CG 4/9, to the TS 4/10.  |
| 15-AN-YU-GO.....         | 157      | 4/16       | Re number of Japanese registered and number enlisted.<br>(to the Minister #195)<br>(dated 4/1)                                 | To the CG 4/16, to the TS 4/18. |
| 7-A.....                 | 175      | 4/24       | Re easy clearance of courier MORI....                                                                                          | To the CG 4/24, to the TS 4/26. |
| 96-ANGO.....             | 207, 206 | 5/20       | Re issuing of visa for direct transit to Russian(s).<br>(from the Minister GO-#2337)<br>(to Vladivostok and New York GO-#1086) | To the CG 5/20, to the TS 5/20. |
| 21-RYAKU-YU-GO....       | 209      | 5/20       | Re enforcement of system of sanctioning transit export (?) via America.<br>(to the Minister #275)<br>(dated 5/7)               | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22. |
| [57] 103-ANGO.....       | 212      | 5/22       | Re issuing of visa for direct transit to Russian(s)<br>(from the Minister #246)<br>(to New York and Vladivostock, GO-#1103)    | To the CG 5/22, to the TS 5/22. |
| 22-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 214      | 5/26       | Re situation in the U. S. as regards the European war.<br>(GO-#88)<br>(dated 5/12)                                             | To the CG 5/26, to the TS 5/28. |
| 106-ANGO .....           | 224      | 5/28       | Re movements of the U. S. Fleet .....<br>(to Panama #15)                                                                       | To the CG 5/28, to the TS 5/29. |
| 114-ANGO .....           | 229      | 5/31       | Re notification of Japanese shipping in regard to suspension of use of temporary terminology #8.<br>(dated 5/31)               | To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/6.   |
| 8-A.....                 | 234      | 6/3        | Re reference to date official messages were dispatched.                                                                        | To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/4.   |
| 21-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 235      | 6/4        | Re enforcement of system of sanctioning transit export (?) via U. S.<br>(to the Minister #288)<br>(dated 5/20)                 | To the CG 6/4, to the TS 6/5.   |
| 117-RYAKUGO .....        | 244      | 6/7        | Re method of seizure of foreign merchantmen.<br>(to the Minister #373)<br>(dated 6/7)                                          | To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/7.   |
| 118-RYAKUGO .....        | 245      | 6/7        | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #374)<br>(special telegram)                                                                     | To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/9.   |
| 125-ANGO.....            | 256      | 6/13       | Re arrival in Japan of Wang Chin-Wei.<br>(from the Minister #1251)                                                             | To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/16. |
| 128-ANGO.....            | 261      | 6/18       | Re giving strict warning for observance of secrecy of this Consulate and related agencies.                                     | To the CG 6/18, to the TS 6/18. |
| [38] 132-RYAKUGO.        | 262      | 6/19       | Re promulgation of detailed regulations, item 402, pertaining to expatriation.<br>(to the Minister #411)                       | To the CG 6/19, to the TS 6/20. |
| 2-B.....                 | 265      | 6/20       | Re refusal of visa for Meiji University baseball team.<br>(to the Minister #413)                                               | To the CG 6/20, to the TS 6/21. |

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.  | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                       | Disposition                           |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 10-(A).....              | 280       | 6/23       | Re delivering of message to Commander TATIBANA on Nitta Maru.                                                                  | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/24.       |
| 11-A.....                | 277       | 6/23       | Re Commander TATIBANA.....                                                                                                     | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24.       |
| 12-A.....                | 278, 279  | 6/23       | Ditto.....                                                                                                                     | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/26.       |
| 144-ANGO.....            | 288       | 6/27       | Re regular publications for use in development (of intelligence?) and propaganda.                                              | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/30.       |
| 148-ANGO.....            | 290       | 6/28       | Re question of closing Japanese Consulates in the U. S.<br>(to the Minister #437)                                              | To the CG 6/28, to the TS 6/30.       |
| 140-RYAKUGO.....         | 297       | 6/30       | Re concentration of sale of British goods and British-controlled currency.<br>(from the Minister GO- #1198)<br>(dated 6/26)    | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 7/2.        |
| 142-RYAKUGO-(1).....     | 298       | 7/2        | Re stopping in port of Lt. Commander (or Major) OKADA and Engineer First Lieutenant YAMADA.                                    | To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.         |
| 153-RYAKUGO-(1).....     | 299       | 7/1        | Re gathering of telephone directories and name directories.                                                                    | To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.         |
| 156-ANGO.....            | 311       | 7/9        | Re returning the Imperial portrait....<br>(from the Minister #481)                                                             | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| [39] 158-ANGO.....       | 314       | 7/9        | Re report of assets of Japanese nationals and commercial firms in the U. S.<br>(to the Minister #487)                          | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| 26-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 309       | 7/9        | Re concentration of sale of foreign goods.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1276)                                                     | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| 165-ANGO.....            | 324       | 7/14       |                                                                                                                                | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/15.       |
| 168-RYAKUGO.....         | 326       | 7/15       | Re extension of time limit for reporting foreign assets.                                                                       | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/16.       |
| 13-A.....                | 335       | 7/17       | Re resending of telegram(s).....                                                                                               | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18.       |
| 177-HEIGO.....           | 346       | 7/22       | Re registration of foreign government officials and employees.                                                                 | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/22.       |
| 178-ANGO.....            | 347-349   | 7/22       | U. S. attitude towards Japan.....<br>(to the Minister #548)                                                                    | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/23.       |
| 179-ANGO.....            | 350       |            | Re Consulates on West Coast.....<br>(to the Minister #549)                                                                     | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/24.       |
| 180-GO-RYAKU.....        | 351       | 7/23       | Steps to be taken by U. S. government in case of occupation of French Indo-China by Japanese troops.<br>(to the Minister #551) | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/23.       |
| 183-ANGO.....            | 355 (359) | 7/24       | Re problem of closure of Consulates...<br>(1) (2)<br>(to the Minister KETSUGO)                                                 | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/24.       |
| 182-RYAKUGO.....         | 356       | 7/24       | Tenor of press in regard to the French Indo-China problem.<br>(to the Minister #561)                                           | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/25.       |
| [40] 183-HEIGO.....      | 357, 358  | 7/24       | Re official announcement of procedure for overruling assumption(?) of expatriation.<br>(to the Minister #562)                  | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 184-HEIGO.....N.....     | 360       |            | ... ? ... in regard to public announcement of retaliatory measures against Japan by the President.<br>(to the Minister #568)   | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 187-ANGO.....            | 363       | 7/25       | Re date of announcement of freeze order against Japan.<br>(to the Minister #573)                                               | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 189-HEIGO.....           | 360       | 7/25       | Re announcement of freeze order against Japan.<br>(Minister #576)                                                              | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/26.       |
| 192-(HEI)-GO.....        | 371       | 7/25       | Amendment to regulations.....<br>(Minister #579)<br>Writ.                                                                      | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 190-(HEI)-GO.....        | 372       | 7/25       | Re freeze order.....<br>(Minister #577)                                                                                        | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/26.       |
| 191-(HEI)-GO.....        | 373       | 7/25       | Ditto. Revised Presidential order....<br>(Minister #578)                                                                       | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 188-ANGO.....            | 364       | 7/25       | Re surveillance of U. S. warships passing through the Panama Canal.<br>(to Panama #22)                                         | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/26 (297). |
| 196-RYAKUGO.....         | 376       | 7/26       | Re exemption provisions of the freeze order.<br>(to the Minister #586)                                                         | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.       |



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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.             | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                             | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 188-ANGO.....            | 368                  | 7/25       | Re holding of assets of the various Consulates (and other Japanese governmental agencies?) in the Embassy.<br>(to the Minister #575) | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 193-ANGO.....            | 376                  | 7/26       | Re telegraphic code.....                                                                                                             | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| [41] 186-GO.....         | 366                  | 7/26       | Re application of the Freeze Order to Germany and German nationals.<br>(to the Minister #569)                                        | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/26. |
| 195-RYAKUGO.....         | 377                  | 7/26       | Gist of the Presidential "statement" on promulgation of the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #585)                                  | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 186-ANGO (2).....        | 367                  | 7/25       | Re application of the Freeze Order to German citizens in general.<br>(to the Minister #569)                                          | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| -HEIGO.....              | 378-389              |            | General license No. 11.....<br>(to the Minister #588)<br>(Special telegram #11?)                                                     | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 194-ANGO.....            | 391, 392             | 7/26       | Home policy of Finance Commissioner NISHIYAMA in regard to freezing of Japanese credit.<br>(to the Minister #583)                    | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 198-ANGO.....            | 393, 388             | 7/26       | Re evacuation of resident Japanese....<br>(to the Minister #587)                                                                     | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 197-ANGO.....            | 399, 400             | 7/26       | Re moving into French Indo-China and propagandizing Japan's foreign policy.<br>(from the Minister #1587)                             | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/30. |
| 201-ANGO.....            | 402                  | 7/28       | Re exit from and entry into port of shipping.<br>(to the Minister #593)                                                              | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30. |
| 200-ANGO.....            | 401, 403<br>405, 406 | 7/28       | Re public opinion in the U. S. associated with the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #590)                                           | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 202-ANGO.....            | 410                  | 7/30       | Re reply concerning "balance" in bank of government funds.                                                                           | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| [42] 205-ANGO.....       | 411                  | 7/30       | Re entry into port of Japanese vessel.<br>(to the Minister #613)                                                                     | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 206-RYAKUGO.....         | 416                  | 7/30       | Re shipment.....<br>(to the Minister #616)                                                                                           | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 204-ANGO.....            | 418                  |            | Re shipment on Japanese vessels.....<br>(to the Minister #661)                                                                       | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 207-ANGO.....            | 421                  | 7/31       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #619)                                                                                                 | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.  |
| KETSU-B.....             | 423                  | 7/31       | Re specification of main licensed list of articles.<br>(from the Minister #431)                                                      | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 201-ANGO.....            | 424                  | 7/31       | Re counter-measure against the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #621)                                                               | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 7/31. |
| 209-ANGO.....            | 425                  |            | Re American currency bonds held by Japanese residing in U. S.<br>(to the Minister #619)                                              | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/4.  |
| 208-ANGO.....            | 426, 427<br>428      | 7/31       | Re counter-move towards U. S.-Japan relations.<br>(to the Minister #618)                                                             | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/4.  |
| 214-ANGO.....            | 431                  | 8/1        | Re baggage on TATUTA MARU....<br>(to the Minister #630)                                                                              | To the CG 8/1, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 218-ANGO.....            | 44?                  | 8/7        | Re shipment on Japanese vessels.....<br>(to the Minister #637)                                                                       | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 219-ANGO.....            | 437                  | 8/2        | Re oil embargo act.....<br>(to the Minister #638)                                                                                    | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 430                  | 8/2        | Re exit from and entry into port of Japanese shipping.<br>(to the Minister #632)                                                     | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| [43] 220-ANGO.....       | 436                  | 8/2        | Re ASAMA MARU.....<br>(to the Minister #639)                                                                                         | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 212-ANGO.....            | 435                  | 8/2        | Re problem of shipment on TATUTA MARU and HEIAN MARU.<br>(to the Minister #636)                                                      | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 215-ANGO.....            | 438                  | 8/4        | Re effect of the Freeze Order on finances of foreign diplomatic establishments.<br>(to the Minister #631)                            | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 444, 446             | 8/4        | Re problem of shipment on TATUTA MARU.<br>(from the Minister #442)                                                                   | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 224-ANGO.....            | 448                  | 8/4        | Re oil embargo act.....<br>(to the Minister #647)                                                                                    | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                           | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 233-ANGO.....            | 461      | 8/8        | Re application of the Freeze Order to diplomatic and consular officials. (to the Minister #670)                                                    | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/9.   |
|                          | 462      | -----      | Re evacuation of resident Japanese. (from the Minister #453)                                                                                       | To the 8/8 to the TS 8/11.      |
| 14-A.....                | 463      | 8/9        | Re reply telegram in regard "balance" in bank of government funds.                                                                                 | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.  |
| KETSU-A.....             | 471      | 8/13       | Talks (?) of "MOORE" concerning observations on the U. S.-Japan situation.                                                                         | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/14. |
| -ANGO.....               | 475, 476 | 8/16       | Re counter-measures towards U. S.-Japan relations. (from the Minister #475)                                                                        | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/18. |
| 15-C.....                | 481      | 8/18       | Re forwarding of exequatur from U. S. President to Consul-General KITA.                                                                            | To the CG 8/18, to the TS 8/20. |
| 245-ANGO.....            | 483      | 8/18       | Re allotment of "running expenses" (to the Minister #712)                                                                                          | To the CG 8/19, to the TS 8/20. |
| [44] 16-A.....           | 484      | 8/19       | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                                                                    | To the CG 8/19, to the TS 8/21. |
| 250-ANGO.....            | 487, 488 | 8/22       | Re U. S. treatment of Japanese nationals residing in the U. S. (from the Minister #489)                                                            | To the CG 8/22, to the TS 8/28. |
| 255-ANGO.....            | 490      | 8/25       | Re problem of evacuation of resident Japanese. (to the Minister #742)                                                                              | To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27. |
| 254-ANGO.....            | 491, 494 | 8/26       | Re enforcement of the Freeze Order (to the Minister #741)                                                                                          | To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27. |
| 256-ANGO.....            | 495      | 8/26       | Re drawing on allowances. (to the Minister #743)                                                                                                   | To the CG 8/27, to the TS 8/27. |
| 29-B.....                | 500      | 8/29       | Re KIYOSHI MAYAKAWA, Japanese government official.                                                                                                 | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29. |
| 257-RYAKUGO.....         | 501      | 8/29       | Re method of disposal of mail matter to U. S. in Japan. (to the Minister #775)                                                                     | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30. |
| -A.....                  | 504, 505 | 8/30       | Re evacuation of resident Japanese. (from the Minister #516)                                                                                       | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 9/2.  |
| 258-ANGO.....            | 506, 508 | 8/30       | Re writing of Representative KASAI concerning U. S.-Japan relations. (to the Minister #760)                                                        | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 9/2.  |
| GOGAI-A.....             | 509      | 9/1        | Re correction of telegram (to the Minister #GOGAI) (re writing of articles by Representative KASAI)                                                | To the CG 9/1, to the TS 9/2.   |
| 18-A.....                | 510      | 9/2        | Re stopping in port of courier.                                                                                                                    | To the CG 9/3, to the TS 9/5.   |
| 262-ANGO.....            | 519      | 9/6        | Re registration of wealth by Japanese nationals and commercial firms in the U. S. (to the Minister #787)                                           | To the CG 9/6, to the TS 9/9.   |
| [45] KETSU-B.....        | 520      | 9/6        | Re mail matter to Japan. (from Mexico GO-#86)                                                                                                      | To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 521      | -----      | Re method of forwarding mail matter to the U. S. followed in Japan. (from the Minister #541)                                                       | To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 528      | 9/11       | Re evacuation of resident Japanese. (from the Minister #555)                                                                                       | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/13. |
| 272-ANGO.....            | 529-533  | 9/10       | Re mutual cancellation of frozen credit towards computation of government funds.                                                                   | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/15. |
| KETSU-A.....             | 535      | 9/13       | Re transmission of radiograms addressed to this Consulate. (from the Minister #552)                                                                | To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/15. |
| 19-A.....                | 536      | 9/13       | Re delivery of documents. (to San Francisco #41)                                                                                                   | To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/19. |
| KETSU-B.....             | 543      | 9/16       | Re arrangement for alleviation of Freeze Order between Japan and the U. S. (from the Minister #566)                                                | To the CG 9/16, to the TS 9/18. |
| KETSU-A.....             | 542      | 9/16       | Ditto. (from the Minister #567)                                                                                                                    | To the CG 9/16, to the TS 9/18. |
| 278-RYAKUGO.....         | 544      | 9/17       | Re drawing up of name-list based on arrangement for alleviation of the Freeze Order.                                                               | To the CG 9/17, to the TS 9/18. |
| 277-ANGO.....            | 546      | 9/17       | Re arrangement for alleviation of the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #820)                                                                         | To the CG 9/17, to the TS 9/18. |
| 279-ANGO.....            | 547      | 9/17       | Re President Roosevelt's speech. (to the Minister #816, gist ??)                                                                                   | To the CG 9/18, to the TS 9/18. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 548      | 9/19       | Re method for replenishment government funds (estimate?) following arrangement for alleviation of the freezing of credit. (from the Minister #575) | To the CG 9/19 to the TS 9/23.  |

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## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.      | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| [46] 283-(AN)-GO.....    | 552           | 9/19       | Re extension of time limit for reporting foreign assets.<br>(to the Minister #833)                      | To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/23.   |
| METSU-A.....             | 553           | 9/23       | Re arrangement for easing of the credit freeze.<br>(from the Minister #578)                             | To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/23.   |
| 285-ANGO.....            | 557           | 9/22       | Re alleviation of the credit freeze.....<br>(to the Minister #840)                                      | To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/25.   |
| 287-ANGO.....            | 560           | 9/24       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #?)                                                                      | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.   |
| 288-ANGO.....            | 562, 563      | 9/25       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #848)                                                                    | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 564, 567, 568 | 9/26       | Re evacuation of the resident Japanese.<br>(from the Minister #596)                                     | To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/27.   |
| 291-ANGO.....            | 565           | 9/26       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #854)                                                                    | To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/27.   |
| (20)-A.....              | 571           | 9/27       | Re inquiry in regard to receipt of telegram.                                                            | To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30.   |
| 292-ANGO.....            | 569, 572      | 9/26       | Re arrangement for alleviation of the credit freeze.<br>(to the Minister #855)                          | To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30.   |
| 293-ANGO.....            | 573, 574      | 9/27       | Japan-U. S. ship communication problem.<br>(to the Minister #864)                                       | To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30.   |
| -ANGO.....               | 575           |            | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #610)                                                                  | To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30.   |
| 296-ANGO.....            | 580           | 9/30       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #875)                                                                    | To the CG 9/30, to the TS 10/2.   |
| 297-RYAKUGO.....         | 583           | 10/2       | Re fees of freeze-affected nationals to banks of deposits.<br>(to the Minister #888)                    | To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/2.   |
| [47] KETSU-ANGO.....     | 587, 588      | 10/3       | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #631).                                 | To the CG 10/4, to the TS 10/6.   |
| 300-RYAKUGO.....         | 591           | 10/7       | Re amendment of nationality laws with object of nullifying dual citizenship.<br>(to the Minister #905). | To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/8.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 599           | 10/8       | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #910).                                | To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.   |
| KETSU-HEIGO.....         | 597, 598      | 10/8       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #911).                                                                   | To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.   |
| 303-HEIGO.....           | 601           | 10/9       | Re amendment of nationality laws with object of nullifying dual citizenship.<br>(to the Minister #913). | To the CG 10/10, to the TS 10/10. |
| 309-ANGO.....            | 602           | 10/10      | Re entry permit.....<br>(to the Minister #922).                                                         | To the CG 10/10, to the TS 10/11. |
| KETSU-HEIGO.....         | 605           |            | Problem of Japan U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #653).                                 | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| KETSU-B.....             | 606           | 10/11      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #652).                                                                 | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 607           | 10/11      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #651).                                                                 | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| 305-ANGO.....            | 608, 609      | 10/11      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #926).                                   | To the CG 10/13, to the TS 10/13. |
| KETSU-RYAKUGO.....       | 617           | 10/14      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #660?).                                                                | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| KETSU.....               | 615, 616      | 10/14      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #661).                                                                 | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| [48] —ANGO.....          | 618, 619      | 10/13      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #938)                                                                    | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| —ANGO.....               | 629           | 10/16      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #951)                                                                    | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 323-RYAKUGO.....         | 631           | 10/16      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                              | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 310-ANGO.....            | 628           | 10/16      | Re carrying of American dollar bills.<br>(from the Minister #670)                                       | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 322-A.....               | 635           | 10/17      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #953)                                    | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 325-(HEI)-GO.....        | 636           | 10/17      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #956)<br>(separate telegram)                                             | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 326-GO.....              | 640           | 10/17      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #963)                                                                    | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 328-RYAKUGO.....         | 641           | 10/17      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #684)                                  | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                     | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 327-ANGO.....            | 462, 643 | 10/18      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #683)                                                            | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/20. |
| 325-ANGO.....            | 644      | 10/17      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #685)                                                            | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 331-ANGO.....            | 645      | 10/18      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #969)                                                              | To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21. |
| 330-ANGO.....            | 653      | 10/18      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #687)                                                            | To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21. |
| 332-ANGO.....            | 657      | 10/20      | Problem of Janan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #971)                         | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 655      | 10/20      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #688)                                                            | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| [49] KETSU-ANGO.....     | 667      | 10/21      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #695)                                                            | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 336-ANGO.....            | 674, 675 | 10/22      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #982)                                                              | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/23. |
| 21-A.....                | 679      | 10/23      | Ditto                                                                                        | To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/25. |
| 340-ANGO.....            | 681      | 10/24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #705)                    | To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25. |
| 341-ANGO.....            | 683      | 10/24      | Ditto                                                                                        | To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25. |
| 342-ANGO.....            | 689      | 10/24      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #990)                                                              | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| KETSU-A.....             | 686      | 10/24      | Re results of the Japanese overseas broadcasts.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2222)              | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 22-A.....                | 696      | 10/27      | Re inquiry concerning receipt of telegram.                                                   | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28. |
| (23)-B.....              | 698      | 10/27      | Re credit report of this Consulate and Consulate staff.                                      | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28. |
| (24)-A.....              | 703      | 10/30      | Re inquiry as to whether articles were entrusted to courier KUGA or not.                     | To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/29. |
| 347-ANGO.....            | 704, 705 | 10/29      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1011)                     | To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/30. |
| 348-ANGO.....            | 706      | 10/30      | Re report of foreign assets<br>(to the Minister #1015)                                       | To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/31. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 709      | 10/31      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #715)                       | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| [50] 349-ANGO.....       | 710      | -----      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1018)                        | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| 355-ANGO.....            | 712      | 11/1       | Re alleviation of freeze affecting our governmental agencies in the U. S.                    | To the CT 11/1, to the TS 11/4.   |
| (25)-A.....              | 714, 713 | 11/2       | Re mail matter to be loaded on TAI-YO MARU, and Consul IWAN-AGA.                             | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/2.   |
| (26)-A.....              | 720      | 11/4       | Ditto                                                                                        | To the CG 11/4, to the TS 11/4.   |
| (27)-B.....              | 727      | 11/5       | Re tax exemption and clearance of souvenir gifts presented to former honorary Consul.        | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/6.   |
| 352-ANGO.....            | 721<br>U | 11/4       | Re disapproval of loading of mail matter.<br>(to the Minister #1033)                         | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/6.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 722      | 11/4       | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #728)                                                            | To the TS 11/6.                   |
| 328-ANGO.....            | 728      | 11/5       | Re report of foreign assets                                                                  | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/7.   |
| (28)-B.....              | 730      | 11/6       | Re allowance for members of this Consulate.                                                  | To the CG 11/6, to the TS 11/7.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 737      | 11/8       | Re alleviation of freeze affecting our governmental agencies in the U. S.<br>(Minister #749) | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 356-RYAKUGO.....         | 744      | 11/10      | Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.                                                  | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 365-ANGO.....            | 745      | 11/10      | Re alleviation of credit freeze<br>(to the Minister #1067)                                   | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 358-ANGO.....            | 753      | 11/12      | Re delivery of message to Ambassador KURUSU.                                                 | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/12. |
| [51] GOGAI-A.....        | 754      | 11/12      | Re interpretation of telegrams                                                               | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| 359-ANGO.....            | 756      | 11/12      | Re easing of the Freeze Order                                                                | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| KETSU-(C).....           | 758      | 11/12      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #761)                                                            | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| KETSU-A.....             | 759      | 11/12      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #1081)                                                             | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |



# 422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.      | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                    | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (28)-A.....              | 757           | 11/12      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order.....<br>(from the Minister #744)                                                         | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| 357-ANGO.....            | 746-749       | 11/11      | Re present situation in the U. S.....                                                                                       | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| 362-ANGO.....            | 763           | 11/13      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order.....                                                                                     | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| KETSU-B.....             | 764           | 11/13      | Ditto.....                                                                                                                  | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| 29-B.....                | 776           | 11/15      | Re resume of contents of bill for defense of Hawaii and "PUERTO RICO."<br>(to the Minister #1101)                           | To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/15. |
| 364-ANGO.....            | 777           | 11/15      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order.....                                                                                     | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/17. |
| 367-RYAKUGO.....         | 779           | 11/17      | Re registration of real property belonging to Consulates in the U. S.                                                       | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/19. |
| 368-ANGO.....            | 781           | 11/17      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1120)                                                    | To the CG 11/18, to the TS 11/19. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 782           | 11/17      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #786)                                                                                      | To the CG 11/18, to the TS 11/19. |
| [52] 369-HEIGO.....      | 784           | 11/18      | Telegram of thanks from Ambassador KURUSU.                                                                                  | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19. |
| KETSU-A.....             | 785           | .....      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #791)                                                      | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19. |
| 370-RYAKUGO.....         | 786, 787      | 11/18      | Re enforcement of regulations pertaining to restriction and ban of leaving and entering country.<br>(to the Minister #1127) | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19. |
| 372-1?-ANGO.....         | 790           | 11/19      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order.....                                                                                     | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/21. |
| 371-1?-ANGO.....         | 792, 793      | 11/19      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #1151)                                                                                       | To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 795           | 11/21      | Re reporting of developments of Japan-U. S. negotiations.<br>(to the Minister #1145)                                        | To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21. |
| 375-ANGO.....            | 802           | .....      | Re reply on names and competence of members of Consulate, etc.                                                              | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 376-ANGO.....            | 803           | 11/23      | Re personal affairs of members of the Consulate.<br>(to the Minister #1162)                                                 | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 374-ANGO.....            | 797, 798, 799 | 11/23      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1152)                                                    | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 399-ANGO.....            | 806           | 11/25      | Ditto.....<br>(to San Francisco #66)                                                                                        | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| 380-ANGO.....            | 809           | 11/25      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #1168)                                                                                       | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| 388-ANGO.....            | 810           | 11/25      | Re application for permit to leave country.<br>(to the Minister #1182)                                                      | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| [53] 377-ANGO.....       | 808           | 11/25      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #819, #820)                                             | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 12/1.  |
| KETSU-RYAKUGO.....       | 815           | 11/26      | Re TATUTA MARU's schedule.....<br>(from the Minister #838)                                                                  | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 383-RYAKUGO.....         | 814           | 11/26      | Separate telegram.<br>Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1181)                              | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 12/1.  |
| KETSU-A.....             | 817           | 11/26      | Re boarding of TATUTA MARU.....<br>(from the Minister #837)                                                                 | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| 384-ANGO.....            | 822, 823      | 11/27      | Re U. S. regulations permitting leaving and entering of country.<br>(to the Minister? #1201)                                | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 824, 825      | 11/27      | Present condition of Japan-U. S. negotiations.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2416)                                              | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| 223-GO-AN.....           | 826           | 8/4        | Re investigation and reporting of movements of warships.                                                                    | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| 387-ANGO.....            | 830           | 11/28      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(Minister #1211)                                                           | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| KETSU-A.....             | 831, 832      | 11/26      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #839)                                                                                      | To the 11/29, to the TS 12/1.     |
| KETSU-A.....             | 839           | 11/28      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #846)                                                                                      | To the 11/29, to the TS 12/1.     |
| KETSU-A.....             | 840, 841      | 11/29      | Re disposition of American currency bonds.<br>(from the Minister #850)                                                      | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                      | Disposition                      |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| KETSU-A.....             | 842      | 11/26      | Re entrusting of rights and interests in the U. S.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2403)            | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1. |
| [54] KETSU-A.....        | 850      | 12/2       | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #370)                        | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/3.  |
| KETSU-B.....             | 854      | 12/3       | Re transmission by wire of secret expenses for third period and temporarily increased amount. | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.  |

## FROM: SEATTLE

|                     |     |      |                                                                                                  |                                 |
|---------------------|-----|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| [55] 161-AN-YU-GO.. | 4   | 1/8  | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #198)<br>(dated 12/24)                   | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 1-AN-YU-GO.....     | 10  | 1/13 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #1)<br>(dated 1/3)                                                | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 2-AN-YU-GO.....     | 12  | 1/14 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #2)<br>(dated 1/6)                                                | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 3-AN-YU-GO.....     | 17  | 1/16 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #3)<br>(dated 1/8)                                                | To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18. |
| 4-AN-YU-GO.....     | 25  | 1/23 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #4)<br>(dated 1/16)                                               | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24. |
| 5-AN-YU-GO.....     | 41  | 1/31 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #5)<br>(dated 1/21)                                               | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 7-AN-YU-GO.....     | 49  | 2/7  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #7)<br>(dated 1/24)                                               | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 9-AN-YU-GO.....     | 56  | 2/5  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #9)<br>(dated 1/25)                                               | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 12-AN-YU-GO.....    | 68  | 2/12 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #11)<br>(dated 1/25)                                              | To the CG 2/13, to the TS 2/13. |
| 13-AN-YU-GO.....    | 73  | 2/19 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #13)<br>(dated 2/10)                                              | To the CG 2/19, to the TS 2/19. |
| [56] 14-AN-YU-CO..  | 84  | 3/5  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #14)<br>(dated 2/24)                                              | To the CG 3/5, to the TS 3/6.   |
| 1-A.....            | 89  | 3/6  | Ditto.....                                                                                       | To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/6.   |
| 15-AN-YU-GO.....    | 92  | 3/8  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #15)<br>(dated 2/26)                                              | To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.   |
| 16-AN-YU-GO.....    | 100 | 3/10 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #16)<br>(dated 3/4)                                               | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| 19-AN-YU-GO.....    | 122 | 3/20 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #20)<br>(dated 1/20)                                              | To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27. |
| 18-AN-YU-GO.....    | 124 | 3/27 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #18)<br>(dated 3/17)                                              | To the CG 3/28, to the TS 3/28. |
| 21-AN-YU-GO.....    | 149 | 4/10 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #23)<br>(dated 4/1)                                               | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/15. |
| 22-RYAKU-YU-GO....  | 150 | 4/10 | Re calling attention to enforcement of Nationality Laws.<br>(to the Minister #24)<br>(dated 4/2) | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/15. |
| 23-AN-YU-GO.....    | 172 | 4/23 | Re movement of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #26)<br>(dated 4/10)                      | To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24. |
| 24-AN-YU-GO.....    | 174 | 4/23 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #29)<br>(dated 4/16)                                              | To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24. |
| 2-A.....            | 182 | 4/30 | Re U. S. Navy.....<br>(to the Minister #36)                                                      | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/1.   |
| [57] 3-A.....       | 231 | 6/2  | Re U. S. Navy.....<br>(to the Minister #36)                                                      | To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/3.   |
| 37-AN-YU-GO.....    | 249 | 6/30 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #51)<br>(dated 5/28?)                                             | To the CG 6/10, to the TS 6/12. |

# 424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: SEATTLE—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                             | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 42-AN-YU-GO.....         | 296      | 6/30       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #56)<br>(dated 6/23)                                                                  | To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.     |
| 66-RYAKUGO.....          | 662      | 10/28      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister GO #2205)                                        | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| 70-ANGO.....             | 692      | 10/24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Ambassador #34)                                             | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 73-ANGO.....             | 715      | 11/2       | Re registration of property.<br>(to the Ambassador #39)                                                              | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 75-ANGO.....             | 725      | 11/5       | Re sailing of the HIKAWA MARU..<br>(to the Minister #158)                                                            | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.   |
| 78-ANGO.....             | 738      | 11/8       | Re Japan shipping communication....<br>(to the Minister #162)                                                        | To the CG 11/8, to the TS 11/11.  |
| 79-ANGO.....             | 739      | 11/8       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #166)                                                                                 | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11. |
| 81-ANGO.....             | 750      | 11/10      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #166)                                              | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14. |
| 83-ANGO.....             | 770      | 11/14      | Re adoption of the message associated with the situation by the Council of the League of Organizations of "Seattle." | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/17. |
| 85-ANGO.....             | 796      | 11/20      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. shipping communication.<br>(to the Minister #175)                                          | To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/24. |

[58]

## FROM: NEW YORK

|               |                 |       |                                                                                                                  |                                   |
|---------------|-----------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2-RAKUGO..... | 35              | 1/27  | Re restrictions of parcel post to Japan..                                                                        | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28.   |
| 3-RAKUGO..... | 40              | 1/30  | Ditto.....                                                                                                       | To the CG 1/30, to the TS 1/30.   |
| 1-A.....      | 154             | 4/12  | Re verbal message to Secretary FUKUSHIMA.                                                                        | To the CG 4/12, to the TS 4/15.   |
| 52-ANGO.....  | 414, 415<br>417 | 7/30  | Re counter-measures against the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #372)                                          | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.    |
| 54-ANGO.....  | 449             | 8/5   | Re withholding of the cryptograph of the Yokohama Specie Bank branch.                                            | To the CG 8/5, to the TS 8/8.     |
| 57-ANGO.....  | 455, 456        | 8/8   | Re manner of evacuation of the resident Japanese.<br>(to the Minister #391)                                      | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/8.     |
| 60-ANGO.....  | 466, 467<br>468 | 8/13  | Re manner of evacuation of the resident Japanese.<br>(to the Minister #401)                                      | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.   |
| 67-ANGO.....  | 485             | 8/20  | Re counter-measures against the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #414)                                          | To the CG 8/20, to the TS 8/20.   |
| 18-ANGO.....  | 512, 513        | 9/4   | Re cryptographic code.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#1907)                                                       | To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.     |
| 83-ANGO.....  | 685             | 10/24 | Re steps for payment of boat fare for passengers on requisitioned ships in Japan.<br>(to the Minister #487)      | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 96-ANGO.....  | 711             | 10/31 | Re report of foreign assets.....<br>(to the Minister #88)                                                        | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| [59] 2-B..... | 726             | 11/5  | Re resending of telegram advising of dates of arrival and departure of Secretary TOKUNAGA and wife.              | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.   |
| 88-ANGO.....  | 733             | 11/8  | Re procedure for foreigners to depart from Japan.<br>(to the Minister #496)                                      | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11. |
| 89-ANGO.....  | 734, 735        | 11/8  | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #234)                                                                           | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11. |
| 90-ANGO.....  | 816             | 11/26 | Re evacuation of Japanese commercial firms and employes of branch banks in the U. S.<br>(from the Minister #242) | To the CG 11/27.                  |
| 91-ANGO.....  | 838             | ----- | Re cancellation of portion of Freeze Order.                                                                      | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 94-ANGO.....  | 853             | 12/3  | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #271)                                                                           | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.   |
| 96-ANGO.....  | 861             | 12/5  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #535)                                                                             | To the CG 12/5, to the TS 12/6.   |

[60]

## FROM: FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 29-AN-YU-GO.....         | 6        | 1/7        | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #474)<br>(dated 12/23)<br>(from Manila)                                         | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 48-AN-YU-GO.....         | 8        | 1/10       | Re naval planes of the U. S. ....<br>(to the Minister #466)<br>(dated 12/14)                                                            | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 28-AN-YU-GO.....         | 9        | 1/10       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #470)<br>(dated 12/16)                                                                                   | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 1-B.....                 | 50       | 2/1        | Re Greek ship, "ELENE S. EN-BILICOS".                                                                                                   | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 2-ANGO.....              | 66       | 2/12       | Re method of leaving country for American citizens of Japanese parentage.<br>(to the Minister #2)<br>(dated 1/31)<br>(from New Orleans) | To the CG 2/12, to the TS 2/12. |
| 4-AN-YU-GO.....          | 101      | 3/10       | Re telegraphic code in possession of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."<br>(to the Minister #4)<br>(dated 3/4)<br>(from New Orleans)       | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| 1-HEI-YU-GO.....         | 112      | 3/19       | Re opening of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."<br>(to the Minister #1)<br>(dated 3/7)<br>(from Houston)                                  | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19. |
| 2-HEI-YU-GO.....         | 113      | 3/19       | Re district under jurisdiction of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."<br>(from the Minister #1)<br>(dated 3/8)<br>(from Houston)            | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19. |
| [61] 1.....              | 153      | 4/11       | Re sending of hard "tennis balls".....<br>(from Peking)                                                                                 | To the CG 4/12, to the TS 4/12. |
| MU-B.....                | 156      | 4/15       | Re departure of the Panamanian ship to Japan.<br>(from Britain)                                                                         | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/17. |
| 11-ANGO.....             | 167      | 4/19       | Re stopping in port of the American, "BOB COOK."<br>(to the Minister #222)<br>(from Manila)                                             | To the CG 4/19, to the TS 4/21. |
| 1-ANGO.....              | 168      | 4/20       | Re resending of telegram.....<br>(from Manila)                                                                                          | To the CG 4/21, to the TS 4/21. |
| 4-HEI-YU-GO.....         | 195      | 5/8        | Re new "Address" of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."<br>(dated 4/25)<br>(from Houston)                                                   | To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.   |
| 1-B.....                 | 305      | 7/7        | Re interpretation of telegram(s).....<br>(from Ambassador to Britain)                                                                   | To the CG 7/8, to the TS 7/10.  |
| No number-A.....         | 306      | 7/7        | Delivering message to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.<br>(separate telegram)                                                                     | To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.  |
| -A.....                  | 474      | 8/15       | Symbol for the Consulate head.....<br>(from Canton)                                                                                     | To the CG 8/15.                 |
| -A.....                  | 482      | 8/15       | Symbol for the Consulate head.....<br>(from Canton)                                                                                     | To the CG 8/19.                 |
| 9-AN-YU-GO.....          | 539      | 9/15       | Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHI-KAN (a school?).<br>(to the Minister #36)<br>(dated 9/10)<br>(from Vancouver)                      | To the CG 9/15, to the TS 9/16. |
| GOGAI-C.....             | 731      | 11/7       | Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(to the Minister GOGAI)<br>(from Manila)                                                          | To the CG 11/7, to the TS 11/8. |

[62]

## FROM: LOS ANGELES

|                      |    |      |                                                                                           |                                 |
|----------------------|----|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 105-AN-YU-GO.....    | 3  | 1/6  | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #220)<br>(dated 12/23)            | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 106-AN-YU-GO.....    | 5  | 1/6  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #221)<br>(dated 12/27)                                     | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 107-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 7  | 1/7  | Re sending of representatives of the Patriotic Women's Society.<br>(to the Minister #222) | To the CG 1/9, to the TS 1/10.  |
| 1-AN-YU-GO.....      | 13 | 1/14 | Movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(dated 1/6)                                           | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |



# 426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: LOS ANGELES—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                                           | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1-(C).....               | 18       | 1/16       | Re visit to the U. S. by the "Subaru Show" troupe.                                                                                                                 | To the CG 1/16, to the TS 1/17. |
| 4-AN-YU-GO.....          | 24       | 1/23       | Re movements of the U. S. warships (to the Minister #7) (dated 1/13)                                                                                               | To the CG 1/23, to the TS 1/24. |
| 5-AN-YU-GO.....          | 42       | 1/30       | Ditto (to the Minister #9) (dated 1/21)                                                                                                                            | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 10-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 59       | 2/6        | Re parcel post to Japan (to the Minister #14) (dated 1/26)                                                                                                         | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 11-AN-YU-GO.....         | 60       | 2/6        | Re movements of the U. S. Navy (to the Minister #15) (dated 1/27)                                                                                                  | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 2-AN-YU-GO.....          | 23       | 1/23       | Re problem of evacuation of the Japanese residents in the U. S. (to the Minister #4) (dated 1/10)                                                                  | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/25. |
| [65] 13-AN-YU-GO.....    | 67       | 2/12       | Movements of U. S. Navy (to the Minister #17) (dated 2/1)                                                                                                          | To the CG 2/12, the TS 2/13.    |
| 2-A.....                 | 85       | 3/5        | Ditto                                                                                                                                                              | To the CG 3/5, to the TS 3/6.   |
| 15-AN-YU-GO.....         | 125      | 3/27       | Ditto (to the Minister #33)                                                                                                                                        | To the CG 3/28, to the TS 3/28. |
| 16-AN-YU-GO.....         | 132      | 4/3        | Re visit to the U. S. by the Representatives, YAMAJI and SHIMIZU. (from the Minister #25) (dated 3/26)                                                             | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/4.   |
| 17-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 133      | 4/3        | Re visit to the U. S. by delegates of the Japan Christian Federation. (to the Minister #34) (dated 3/26)                                                           | To the CG 4/3 to the TS 4/4.    |
| 18-AN-YU-GO.....         | 159      | 4/15       | Movements of the U. S. Navy (to the Minister #38) (dated 4/5)                                                                                                      | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/18. |
| 20-AN-YU-GO.....         | 173      | 4/23       | Ditto (to the Minister #44) (dated 4/12)                                                                                                                           | To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24. |
| 9-A.....                 | 190      | 5/1        | Ditto (to the Minister #50) (dated 5/1)                                                                                                                            | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/3.   |
| 23-AN-YU-GO.....         | 196      | 5/8        | Re participation of delegates of the Japan Christian Federation at the special conference of the American Christian Federation. (to the Minister #53) (dated 4/26) | To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.   |

[64]

## FROM: PORTLAND

|                     |     |      |                                                                                                        |                                 |
|---------------------|-----|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2-ANGO.....         | 197 | 5/28 | Re movements of the U. S. Navy (to the Minister #66)                                                   | To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.   |
| 4-A.....            | 232 | 6/2  | Ditto                                                                                                  | To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.   |
| 7-ANGO.....         | 233 | 6/2  | Ditto (to the Minister #83)                                                                            | To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.   |
| 5-B.....            | 259 | 6/17 | Re greeting courier YAMAZAKI at pier.                                                                  | To the CG 6/17, to the TS 6/17. |
| 32-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 263 | 6/19 | Re strike by the employees of the "NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane Company. (to the Minister #87) (dated 6/6) | To the CG 6/20, to the TS 6/21. |
| 33-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 264 | 6/15 | Re strike by the employees of the "NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane Company. (to the Minister #92) (dated 6/9) | To the CG 6/19, to the TS 6/21. |
| 34-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 270 | 6/23 | Ditto (to the Minister #95) (dated 6/11)                                                               | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/24. |
| 6-A.....            | 315 | 7/9  | Re survey of assets of Japanese people living on the mainland U. S.                                    | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10. |
| 11-ANGO.....        | 327 | 7/15 | Re movements of U. S. Warships (to the Minister #112)                                                  | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/18. |
| 7-A.....            | 334 | 7/17 | Re resending of telegram(s)                                                                            | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/18. |
| 36-ANGO.....        | 529 | 9/10 | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #176)                                       | To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10. |

## FROM: PORTLAND—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                            | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| [65] 44-ANGO.....        | 554      | 9/20       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #190)                                                | To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/24.   |
| 47-ANGO.....             | 610      | 10/13      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #201)                | To the CG 10/13, to the TS 10/13. |
| 49-RYAKUGO.....          | 630      | 10/16      | Re notices of attainment of military age for year 1942.<br>(to the Minister #200)   | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 50-ANGO.....             | 632      | 10/17      | Ditto.....<br>(Minister #94)                                                        | To the BG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 62-ANGO.....             | 659      | 10/20      | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.<br>(to the Minister #205)                    | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 65-ANGO.....             | 684      | 10/24      | Re investigation of Japanese associations by the F. B. I.<br>(to the Minister #207) | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 67-ANGO.....             | 700      | 10/28      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #209)                                                | To the CG 10/28, to the TS 10/29. |
| 60-ANGO.....             | 723      | 11/4       | Re simplifying of procedure for expatriation.<br>(to the Minister #214)             | To the CG 11/4, to the TS 11/7.   |
| 313-ANGO.....            | 833      | 11/29      | Re ships requisitioned by the U. S. Army and the Navy.<br>(to the Minister #317)    | To the CG 11/29.                  |
| 71-RYAKUGO.....          | 859      | 12/4       | Re procedure for expatriation.<br>(from the Minister #110)                          | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/5.   |

[66]

## FROM: MISCELLANEOUS PLACES

|                |     |      |                                                                                                                        |                                 |
|----------------|-----|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| -(C).....      | 29  | 1/26 | Re reception dinner for Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA, KAMAKURA MARU)                                  | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| -C.....        | 30  | 1/27 | Re delivery of message from Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)                            | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| -C.....        | 36  | 1/28 | Ditto.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)                                                                    | To the CG 1/28, to the TS 1/28. |
| -(C).....      | 27  | 1/29 | Re inquiry on functions for Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Secretary OKUMURA)                                             | To the CG 1/29, to the TS 1/30. |
| -C.....        | 39  | 1/29 | Re reply as to functions for Ambassador NOMURA.                                                                        | To the CG 1/29, to the TS 1/30. |
| -C.....        | 45  | 2/1  | Telegram of thanks from Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)                                | To the 2/1, to the TS 2/4.      |
| -C.....        | 86  | 3/6  | Telegram of thanks.<br>(from Secretary MIYAZAKI on Yawata Maru)                                                        | To the 3/6, to the T 3/6.       |
| -(C).....      | 93  | 3/8  | Re printing of English name-cards for Consul General KITA.<br>(from Consul General KITA on TATUTA MARU)<br>(dated 3/9) | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/10. |
| -(C).....      | 107 | 3/13 | Re stopping in port of Ambassador TOMII.<br>(from Consul General KITA on Tatuta Maru)                                  | To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/14. |
| [67] -(C)..... | 123 | 3/26 | Re reporting on time of arrival at post of Secretary MORIMURA.<br>(from Secretary MORIMURA on Nitta Maru)              | To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27. |
| -(C).....      | 131 | 4/3  | Reply telegram from Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from Ambassador KURUSU on Tatuta Maru)                                      | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/3.   |
| -C.....        | 135 | 4/3  | Re arrival in port of MASABUMI NAKAMURA.<br>(from MASABUMI NAKAMURA on Kamakura Maru)                                  | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/3.   |
| -C.....        | 160 | 4/17 | Re arrival in port of SHIMIZU and YAMAGI.<br>(from SHIMIZU and YAMAGI on Yawata Maru)                                  | To the CG 4/17, to the TS 4/18. |

# 428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: MISCELLANEOUS PLACES—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                             | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| -(C) -----               | 189      | 5/1        | Re boarding of ship by HANA KU-SANOBU.<br>(from the Kamakura Maru)                                                   | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/1.     |
|                          | 210      | 5/20       | Re calling at port of Representative SHIMIZU.<br>(from Representative SHIMIZU on Asama Maru)                         | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22.   |
| -(C) -----               | 223      | 5/27       | Telegram of greeting.<br>(from Minister YAMAGATA on Tatuta Maru)                                                     | To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28.   |
| -C -----                 | 242      | 6/6        | Re inquiry on completion of draft deferment procedure.                                                               | To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/7.     |
| -C -----                 | 267      | 6/21       | Re stopping in port of Representative TAKAMI.<br>(from Representative TAKAMI on Kamakura Maru)                       | To the CG 6/21, to the TS 6/23.   |
| -C -----                 | 320      | 7/12       | Telegram of thanks from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.<br>(from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU on Kamakura Maru)                      | To the CG 7/11, to the TS 7/14.   |
| [68] -C -----            | 332      | 7/17       | Re stopping in port of Major (or Lt. Commander) YANO.<br>(from Major YANO on Tatuta Maru)                            | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17.   |
| -A -----                 | 422      | 7/31       | Re purchase of superior grade seed and shoots of "pineapple."<br>(from Head of the Foreign Affairs Section, Formosa) | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.    |
| -C -----                 | 503      | 8/30       | Re changing of broadcasting wave length to Hawaii.<br>(from Japan Broadcasting Company)                              | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30.   |
| -(C) -----               | 576      | 9/29       | Re request in regard to departure of Professor Lee Sireta.<br>(from Professor NORMSUGI of the Tokyo Music Academy)   | To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30.   |
| -(C) -----               | 611      | 10/12      | Re sending of divorce papers.<br>(from YASUKO KANDA, Tokyo)                                                          | To the CG 10/12, to the TS 10/18. |
| -X -----                 | 648      | 10/19      | Re replenishment of fuel oil of TATUTA MARU.                                                                         | To the CG 10/19, to the TS 10/21. |
|                          | 688      | 10/25      | Re changing of broadcasting cycle.<br>(from Tokyo Japanese Broadcasting)                                             | To the CG 10/25,                  |
| GOGAI -----              | 731      | 11/7       | Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU<br>(from Manila)                                                                   | To the CG 11/7.                   |
| -C -----                 | 741      | 11/9       | Re stopping in port of Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from Secretary YUKI at Midway)                                         | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10. |
| -C -----                 | 742      | 11/10      | Re stopping in port of Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from Ambassador KURUSU at Midway)                                      | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10. |
| -(C) -----               | 751      | 11/12      | Ditto<br>(dated 11/11)                                                                                               | to the TS 11/12.                  |

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 4

### INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets L and M.

a. G-2, H. H. D., letter of transmittal to G-2, Washington, dated 7 March 1942 re translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Inter-staff routing slip dated 7 March 1942 and F. B. I. report dated 2 March 1942 re same subject.

b. Inter-staff routing slip dated 2 April 1942 re Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. letter dated 2 April 1942, same subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

File 336.92

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

*BOX 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.***JAPANESE CONSULATE & CONSULAR AGENTS—Translation of Japanese Consulate Radio Log Book**

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,  
*FORT SHAFTER, T. H., 7 March 1942.*

**Subject: Translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book****To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.**

1. Attached hereto is the translation of a message log book, as maintained by the staff of the Honolulu Japanese Consulate, which shows the file number, code, date and subject matter of radio messages sent from the Consulate to various points for the year 1941.

2. This information is forwarded for such use as it may serve to your office.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
*Colonel, G. S. C.,*  
*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

GWB:mkc

1 encl.—Translation as noted.

CC:

Dept. Signal Office, H. H. D. (2)

O. N. J., Honolulu, T. H. (1)

[Handwritten:]

338.92—Consular Representative

333.4—Espionage.

7 MARCH 42.

*Translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log*

1st Ind.

CO DSO

1. Attached hereto is the translation of a log book, as maintained by the staff of the Honolulu Japanese Consulate, which shows the file number, code, date and subject matter of radio messages sent from the Consulate to various points for the year 1941.

2. This information is forwarded for such use as it may serve to your office.

Enclosure: (2)

G. W. B.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
*Honolulu, T. H., March 2, 1942.*

The following is a translation of a form, printed in Japanese, on which radio messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H., were recorded:

*Outgoing Messages*

Telegrams, official:

|                  |                    |
|------------------|--------------------|
| Secret_____      | Ordinary_____      |
| No_____          |                    |
| File No._____    |                    |
| Dispatched_____  | Month_____Day_____ |
| From_____        |                    |
| To_____          |                    |
| Attached to_____ |                    |

## 430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*Outgoing Messages—Continued*

Subject: (gist of contents)

Disposal and development:

|           |                                        |            |          |
|-----------|----------------------------------------|------------|----------|
| From----- | To-----                                | Month----- | Day----- |
| "-----    | "-----                                 | "-----     | "-----   |
| "-----    | "-----                                 | "-----     | "-----   |
| "-----    | "-----                                 | "-----     | "-----   |
| "-----    | The Archives and Document Section----- |            |          |
| "-----    | The Telegram Section-----              |            |          |
|           |                                        | Month----- | Day----- |

Person in charge: -----

Remarks:

Entries were not made in all of the spaces provided on the above form. The symbols, A N (cryptogram ?), R Y A K U (code), and H E I (ordinary message), were written over the printed characters for "Official Dispatches" and are represented in the translation by A, B and C, respectively. There were also used in this manner the Japanese characters Y U (pertaining to postal?) and M U (a negative term).

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

| (Code ? No.)  | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                   |
|---------------|----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1-B-----      | 1-----   | 1-4-----   | Matter re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's Society.                                                |
| 2-A-----      | 4-----   | 1-6-----   | Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                   |
| 3-A-----      | 5-----   | 1-7-----   | Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                   |
| 4-B-----      | 6-----   | 1-9-----   | Matter re Greek Ship heading toward Japan.                                                                            |
| 5-A-----      | 7-----   | 1-9-----   | Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                   |
| 6-B-----      | 9-----   | 1-11-----  | Report of gist of conversation with "ABEND".                                                                          |
| 7-B-----      | 10-----  | 1-11-----  | Conversation on meeting with newly appointed Commander KIMMEL.                                                        |
| 8-A-----      | 11-----  | 1-13-----  | Movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                             |
| 9-B-----      | 12-----  | 1-13-----  | Matter re social expenses for third period.                                                                           |
| 10-B-----     | 13-----  | 1-15-----  | Matter re invitation to luncheon for Ambassador NOMURA.                                                               |
| 11-A-----     | 14-----  | 1-16-----  | Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                    |
| 12-A-----     | 16-----  | 1-18-----  | Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan.                                                                            |
| 13-B-----     | 17-----  | 1-20-----  | Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan. (LA CONICUS)                                                               |
| 14-A-----     | 18-----  | 1-21-----  | Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                    |
| 15-A-----     | 19-----  | 1-22-----  | Matter re visit to Japan by American citizens of Japanese ancestry without passports.                                 |
| 16-A-----     | 20-----  | 1-23-----  | Matter re movement of U. S. warships.                                                                                 |
| [#] 17-B----- | 22-----  | 1-24-----  |                                                                                                                       |
| 18-A-----     | 24-----  | 1-28-----  | Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                    |
| 19-A-----     | 27-----  | 1-29-----  | Matter re simplifying clearance of documents carried by Consul General NAKAMURA.                                      |
| 20-B-----     | 28-----  | 1-29-----  | Matter re proposal of Admiral RICHARDSON to welcome Ambassador NOMURA.                                                |
| 21-B-----     | 32-----  | 1-30-----  |                                                                                                                       |
| 22-B-----     | 34-----  | 2-1-----   | Report of arrival here of Ambassador NOMURA.                                                                          |
| 23-B-----     | 36-----  | 2-1-----   | Matter re reporting to Rear Admiral KIMMEL about appointment (NOMURA's).                                              |
| 24-B-----     | 37-----  | 2-3-----   | Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.                                                                                   |
| 25-A-----     | 38-----  | 2-6-----   | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                          |
| 26-A-----     | 39-----  | 2-7-----   | Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.                                                                                   |
| 27-A-----     | 40-----  | 2-15-----  | Re sending telegram regarding information to the Military Command.                                                    |
| 28-B-----     | 42-----  | 2-20-----  | Re designation of naval defense area in "Kaneoh" Bay.                                                                 |
| 29-A-----     | 43-----  | 2-21-----  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                          |
| 30-B-----     | 44-----  | 2-21-----  |                                                                                                                       |
| 31-A-----     | 45-----  | 2-24-----  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                          |
| 32-B-----     | 46-----  | 2-25-----  | Re explanation of Minister (Foreign?) in the Diet.                                                                    |
| 33-B-----     | 48-----  | 2-26-----  | Re report of names of persons accompanying Consul-General KITA.                                                       |
| 34-A-----     | 49-----  | 2-27-----  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                          |
| [#] 35-B----- | 50-----  | 3-1-----   | Re Consul-General KITA'S cook accompanying him.                                                                       |
| 36-B-----     | 51-----  | 3-1-----   | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                        |
| 37-B-----     | 52-----  | 3-3-----   | Re recrossing (of ocean) by CHINEI KANESHIRO.                                                                         |
| 38-A-----     | 54-----  | 3-4-----   | Movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                              |
| 39-A-----     | 55-----  | 3-4-----   | " " " " " "                                                                                                           |
| 40-B-----     | 56-----  | 3-5-----   | Re granting of passport to KENJO KOHARA (or OBARA) missionary of the Hongwanji Sect.                                  |
| 41-B-----     | 57-----  | 3-6-----   | Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.                                                                                  |
| 42-B-----     | 58-----  | 5-6-----   | Re correction of telegram.                                                                                            |
| 43-A-----     | 59-----  | 3-10-----  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                          |
| 44-A-----     | 60-----  | 3-10-----  | " " " " " "                                                                                                           |
| 45-B-----     | 62-----  | 3-14-----  | Re report of arrival in office of Consul-General KITA.                                                                |
| 46-B-----     | 64-----  | 3-18-----  | Re issuing of passports for traveling to Hawaii to GIEN MITANI and TAIYU OKAMOTO, missionaries of the Hongwanji Sect. |

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                                                 |
|--------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 47-A         | 65       | 3-21       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                        |
| 48-B         | 66       | 3-21*      | Visit to New Zealand of U. S. warships.                                                                                                                             |
| 49-C         | 67       | 3-24       | Re information on Consul-General's cook going on board ship                                                                                                         |
| 50-A         | 69       | 3-24       | Re movement of U. S. warships.                                                                                                                                      |
| [4] 51-A     | 70       | 3-25       | Re wireless messages and secret documents carried by Courier MORI.                                                                                                  |
| 52-A         | 71       | 3-26       | Re expenses for development of intelligence for year 1941.                                                                                                          |
| 53-B         | 72       | 3-27*      | Re report of arrival in office of secretary MORIMURA.                                                                                                               |
| 54-A         | 73       | 3-27       | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                         |
| 55-A         | 75       | 3-28       | Re visit to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.                                                                                                            |
| 56-A         | 76       | 3-29*      | Re passport visa for WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE.                                                                                                                        |
| 57-B         | 77       | 3-29*      | Re verification expenses of Seamen's registration.                                                                                                                  |
| 58-B         | 78       | 4-1*       | Re request to Prince KONOYE and Minister MATSUOKA for articles to be printed in publication commemorating the completion of the extension to the Japanese Hospital. |
| 59-B         | 81       | 4-3*       | Re arrival in port of Foreign Minister of the Netherlands.                                                                                                          |
| 60-B         | 82       | 4-5*       | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                      |
| 61-A         | 84       | 4-7* (?)   | Re arrival in port of Japan Christian Federation.                                                                                                                   |
| 62-B         | 85       | 4-8        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                      |
| 63-A         | 86       | 4-9        | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                         |
| 64-A         | 90       | 4-14       | " " " " " "                                                                                                                                                         |
| [5] 65-A     | 92       | 4-15       | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                         |
| 66-A         | 93       | 4-17       | " " " " " "                                                                                                                                                         |
| 67-B         | 96       | 4-21       | Re arrival in port of President Roosevelt's eldest son.                                                                                                             |
| 68-A         | 97       | 4-21       | Re movement of U. S. warships.                                                                                                                                      |
| (MU)-B       | 98       | 4-23       | Re receipt of decoding book for use on request telegrams.                                                                                                           |
| (MU)-B       | 99       | 4-23       | Re receipt of wireless code TA.                                                                                                                                     |
| 69-A         | 102      | 4-28       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 70-A         | 103      | 4-28       | Re arrival in port of British warship.                                                                                                                              |
| 71-B         | 104      | 4-29*      | Re transport "WASHINGTON."                                                                                                                                          |
| 72-B         | 105      | 4-30*      | Re trip of "HENRY LUCE" to Chungking.                                                                                                                               |
| 73-A         | 107      | 4-30       | Re seizure of crew members of the "COLUMBIA" by British warship.                                                                                                    |
| 74-B         | 108      | 5-1*       | Re taking of office by Ambassador GAUSS.                                                                                                                            |
| 75-A         | 109      | 5-1        | Re seizure of German subjects by British warship.                                                                                                                   |
| 76-A         | 110      | 5-6        | Re movements of U. S. Warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 77-A         | 111      | 5-8        | The local general emergency situation.                                                                                                                              |
| 78-A         | 113      | 5-12       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 79-B         | 114      | 5-14*      | Re granting of passport to travel to Hawaii to KAKUSHIN KUSUDA, priest of the Higashi Hongwanji Sect.                                                               |
| [6] 80-B     | 115      | 5-14*      | Re arrival of B-17 Bombers.                                                                                                                                         |
| 81-A         | 116      | 5-16       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 82-A         | 117      | 5-20       | Re aid fund to "Pan-Pacific Union".                                                                                                                                 |
| 83-A         | 118      | 5-21       | General situation.                                                                                                                                                  |
| 84-B         | 119      | 5-22       | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                      |
| 85-B         | 120      | 5-23*      | Re arrival in port of Labor Minister and party of New Zealand.                                                                                                      |
| 86-A         | 122      | 5-26       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 87-B         | 123      | 5-27*      | Re departure of "TRADEWIND".                                                                                                                                        |
| 88-B         | 124      | 5-27       | Arrival in port of Foreign Minister KLEFFENS of Holland.                                                                                                            |
| 89-B         | 126      | 5-29*      | Re passing through of MANUEL FOX.                                                                                                                                   |
| 90-B         | 129      | 6-3*       | Re according convenience to ? who is attending the centennial celebration of "PUNAHOU SCHOOL".                                                                      |
| 91-A         | 130      | 6-3        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 92-A         | 132      | 6-6        | Re boarding of German subject on TATUTA MARU (Dispatch #15 to San Francisco).                                                                                       |
| 93-B         | 133      | 6-6*       | Re deportation of Japanese and Koreans.                                                                                                                             |
| 94-B         | 134      | 6-7*       | Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the U. S. Fleet's visit to the mainland.                                                                               |
| [7] 95-A     | 136      | 6-9        | Re request of German subject MEHNERT KLAUS to board Japanese liner.                                                                                                 |
| 96-A         | 137      | 6-12       | Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.                                                                                                                    |
| 97-A         | 138      | 6-13       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 98-A         | 139      | 6-13       | Local general emergency situation.                                                                                                                                  |
| 99-B         | 140      | *          | Re arrival in port of U. S. transport "PRESIDENT PIERCE".                                                                                                           |
| 100-A        | 141      | 6-14       | Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.                                                                                                                    |
| 102-B        | 143      | 6-16*      | Re closing of German Consulate General in the U. S.                                                                                                                 |
| 103-B        | 144      | 6-17*      | Re visit here by the baseball team of MEIJI UNIVERSITY (to the Minister #25).                                                                                       |
| 104-A        | 146      | 6-20       | Conversation of Italian Consul.                                                                                                                                     |
| 105-B        | 147      | 6-23*      | Re arrival in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS.                                                                                                                             |
| 106-A        | 148      | 6-23       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                              |
| 107-B        | 149      | *          | Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.                                                                                                                                        |
| 108-A        | 150      | 6-27       | Re arrival in port of Commander TACHIBANA (to the Minister #27).                                                                                                    |
| 109-B        | 151      | 6-28       | Re money loaned out by this Consulate.                                                                                                                              |
| [8] 110-B    | 152      | 6-28*      | Re arrival in port of Americans on inspection tour of Burma Road.                                                                                                   |
| 111-A        | 153      | 6-28       | Re plot for disorder (riot) on "PENNSYLVANIA".                                                                                                                      |
| -C           | 154      | 6-30       | Re correction in usage of code type TSU.                                                                                                                            |
| 112-B        | 155      | 6-30*      | Re closure of German Consulate.                                                                                                                                     |
| 113-A        | 156      | 7-1        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |



# 432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                      |
|--------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 114-B        | 159      | 7-3*       | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                           |
| 115-A        | 161      | 7-7        | Re movement of U. S. warships.                                                                           |
| 116-B        | 162      | 7-8        | Re re-telegraphing of telegrams.                                                                         |
| 117-B        | 163      | 7-8*       | Re participation of U. S. flyers in the Chinese Air Force.                                               |
| 118-A        | 164      | 7-8        | Telegram by request of Nippon Yusen Kaisha.                                                              |
| 119-A        | 165      | 7-10*      | Re number of foreigners with visas to pass through Japan.                                                |
| 120-B        | 166      | 7-11       | Re size of Imperial Portrait.                                                                            |
| 121-B        | 169      | 7-11*      | Re report of speech by LATTIMORE, advisor to CHIANG KAI SHEK.                                            |
| 122-A        | 170      | 7-14       | Re request for instructions regarding returning of the Imperial Portrait.                                |
| 123-A        | 171      | 7-14       | Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                 |
| 124-B        | 173      | 7-15*      | Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc.                                                                    |
| [9] 125-B    | 174      | 7-15*      | Re commencing of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet Union.                                     |
| 126-A        | 176      | 7-17       | Re status of employees. (to the minister #38).                                                           |
| 127-A        | 177      | 7-18       | Re wavelength of KGMB                                                                                    |
| 128-A        | 179      | 7-19       | Re return of Imperial Portrait.                                                                          |
| 129-A        | 180      | 7-21       | Movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                 |
| 130-A        | 181      | 7-22*      | Re issuing of visa for passing through to McBAIN.                                                        |
| 131-A        | 182      | 7-22       | Re investigation of passengers on board YAWATA MARU.                                                     |
| 132-A        | 185      | 7-26       | Re arrival in port of ASAMA MARU.                                                                        |
| 133-A        | 186      | 7-26       | Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                                       |
| 134-B        | 187      | 7-26*      | Re arrival of the Under-Secretary of the Navy and Freeze Administrators.                                 |
| 135-A        | 188      | 7-28       | Re arrival of Japanese liner.                                                                            |
| 136-A        | 189      | 7-28*      | Re visa for Mr. and Mrs. McDAIN (McBAIN ?).                                                              |
| 137-B        | 190      | 7-29       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                             |
| 138-B        | 191      | 7-29       | Re entry into American ports by Japanese liners.                                                         |
| 139          | 192      | 7-30*      | Effect on residence here of enforcement of the Freeze order.                                             |
| 140-B        | 193      | 7-30*      | Re broadcast to Hawaii.                                                                                  |
| 141-B        | 194      | 7-30       | Re exception of application of Freeze order to Chinese diplomats and Consulate. (to the Minister #44).   |
| [10] 142 A   | 196      | 8-1        | Re itinerary of Courier OSHIO (to San Francisco #19).                                                    |
| 143-A        | 197      | 8-1        | Re departure and arrival of ASAMA MARU.                                                                  |
| -C           | 200      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Naval Code Book type S-HE and related charts.                                              |
| -C           | 201      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type YA, etc.                                                             |
| -C           | 202      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Common Code Book for the three Ministries, the Foreign, the War, and the Foreign (Navy ?). |
| -C           | 203      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type HEI.                                                                 |
| 144-A        | 204      | 8-2        | Telegram by request of Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                             |
| 145-A        | 206      | 8-4        | Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                 |
| 146-A        | 207      | 8-5*       | Re placing of the Coast Guard under the Navy.                                                            |
| 147-A        | 209      | 8-7        | Re visa for passing through to the Britisher McBAIN.                                                     |
| 148-A        | 211      | 8-8        | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                   |
| 149-A        | 212      | 8-11       | Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                                       |
| 150-A        | 213      | 8-13       | Re bank "balance" of official funds. (to the Minister #47.)                                              |
| 151-A        | 214      | 8-12*      | Re cash in hand of this Consulate.                                                                       |
| [11] 152-A   | 216      | 8-13       | Re employees of this Consulate.                                                                          |
| -A           | 217      | 8-15       | Telegram by request of Branch Office of the Yokohama Specie Bank dated August 15.                        |
| 153-A        | 220      | 8-18       | Movements of U. S. warships.                                                                             |
| 154-A        | 221      | 8-19       | Condition of Japanese people here.                                                                       |
| 155-A        | 225      | 8-27       | Re treatment of Japanese Subjects in the U. S. by the Americans.                                         |
| 156-B        | 226      | 8-28*      | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                           |
| 157-A        | 227      | 8-30       | Re survey regarding DOMEI broadcast.                                                                     |
| 158-B        | 228      | 9-2        | Re unreceived telegram.                                                                                  |
| 159-B        | 229      | 9-2*       | Re passing through of American pilots.                                                                   |
| 160-A        | 230      | 9-2        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                |
| 161-A        | 234      | 9-4        | To OGAWA.                                                                                                |
| 162-A        | 235      | 9-5        | Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago.                                                            |
| -A           | 236      | 9-5        | Telegram by request of the Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                         |
| 163-A        | 237      | 9-6        | Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                 |
| 164-A        | 239      | 9-9        | Re mail to Japan.                                                                                        |
| 165-A        | 240      | 9-13       |                                                                                                          |
| 166-A        | 241      | 9-13       | Re arrival in port of French warship.                                                                    |
| [12] 167-A   | 242      | 9-13       | Re propaganda "pamphlets" of 5th columnists against Japan.                                               |
| 168-A        | 243      | 9-15       | Re transfer of official telegrams to this Consulate.                                                     |
| 169-A        | 244      | 9-15       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                   |
| 170-A        | 245      | 9-17*      | Re arrival in port of Courier (to Shanghai #1).                                                          |
| 171-A        | 249      | 9-19       | Information concerning the military.                                                                     |
| 172-A        | 250      | 9-22       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                   |
| 173-A        | 251      | 9-22       | Re departure of French warship.                                                                          |
| 174-B        | 252      | 9-23*      | Re arrival in port of military mission to Chungking.                                                     |
| 175-A        | 253      | 8-24       | Re problem of U. S. and Japanese ship transportation.                                                    |
| 176-A        | 254      | 9-25       | Re questions pertaining to financial report.                                                             |
| 177-B        | 256      | 9-29*      | Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats.                                                              |
| 178-A        | 257      | 9-29       | Movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                 |
| 179-A        | 258      | 9-29       | " "                                                                                                      |
| 180-B        | 259      | 9-30*      | Re contents of baggages sent to this Consulate.                                                          |
| 181-A        | 260      | 10-1       | Re question of the Japanese Language Schools.                                                            |
| [13] 182-A   | 261      | 10-2       | Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.                                                                                   |

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                 |
|--------------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 183-B        | 262       | 10-2*      | Re problem of Japanese owned fishing boats.                                                         |
| 184-A        | 263       | 10-2       | Re transportation of British soldiers by American ships.                                            |
| 185-B        | 264       | 10-4       | Re measures for time of war.                                                                        |
| 186-A        | 265       | 10-6       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 187-B        | 266       | 10-10*     | Re talks by Delegate KING.                                                                          |
| 188-A        | 267       | 10-13      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 189-A        | 268       | 10-15      | Re going to the U. S. of Chinese airmen.                                                            |
| 190-A        | 269       | 10-16      | Re training of Chinese airmen by the United States.                                                 |
| 191-A        | 271       | 10-17      | Re payment of boat fare (shipping charges) in Japan.                                                |
| 192-A        | 273       | 10-20      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                       |
| 193-A        | 278       | 10-23      | Re LEO SIROTA.                                                                                      |
| 194-A        | 283       | 10-24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                       |
| 195-A        | 284       | 10-25*     | Re granting of visa to the American, CRICHTON COLVIN.                                               |
| 196-A        | 285       | 10-25*     | Re report of assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff (to the Ambassador #65).                  |
| [14] 197-A   | 286       | 10-25      | Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance for members of this Consulate (to the Ambassador #66). |
| 198-A        | 287       | 10-25*     | Re granting of visa for entry into country to NEWMAN.                                               |
| 199-A        | 289       | 10-28      | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                     |
| 200-A        | 291       | 10-28      | ?                                                                                                   |
| 201-A        | 292       | 10-29      | Re transmission (of message) to .....?                                                              |
| 202-A1       | 295       | 10-29      | Re LEO SIROTA.                                                                                      |
| 203-B        | 299       | 11-1*      | Re arrival of TAIYO MARU.                                                                           |
| 204-A        | 301       | 11-4       | Re delay in departure of TAIYO MARU.                                                                |
| 205          | 303       | 11-4       | Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU.                                                          |
| 206-B        | 305       | 11-6*      | Re departure of TAIYO MARU.                                                                         |
| 207-A        | 306       | 11-6       | Re transmission (of message) to .....?                                                              |
| 208-A        | 307       | 11-6       | Survey of passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.                                                       |
| 209-A        | 308       | 11-7       | Re request for easy clearance for Consul IWANAGA.                                                   |
| 210-A        | 310       | 11-7*      | Re cancellation of trip to Japan of NEWMAN.                                                         |
| MU-C         | 311       | 11-8       | Re distribution of JIGO telegraphic code and attached decoding book.                                |
| MU-C         | 312       | 11-8       | Re sending of TAGO telegraphic code and attached decoding book.                                     |
| [15] MU-C    | 313       | 11-8       | Re second receipt of common indicator words and key book.                                           |
| 211-A        | 314       | 11-8       | Re according of convenience for clearance to passengers on TAIYO MARU and two other ships.          |
| 212-A        | 315       | 11-10      | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                         |
| 213-B        | 316*      | 11-10      | Re bounds of application of martial law in Hawaii.                                                  |
| 214-A        | 317       | 11-11      | Re number of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.                                                    |
| 215-A        | 318       | 11-11      | Re easing of freeze applying to Japanese governmental agencies in the United States.                |
| 216-C        | 320*      | 11-12      | Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU.                                                                    |
| 217          | 322       | 11-13      | From Ambassador KURUSU.                                                                             |
| 218-A        | 324       | 11-13      | From Ambassador KURUSU.                                                                             |
| 219-A        | 325       | 11-14      | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                     |
| 220          | 326       | 11-14      | Re conversation between Ambassador KURUSU and NEWMAN.                                               |
|              | 327       | 11-15      | Telegram by request of Vice-Consul OKUDA.                                                           |
| 221-A        | 329       | 11-18      | Revenues in connection with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU.                                             |
| 222-A        | 330       | 11-18      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 223-B        | 331*      | 11-18      | Re suspension of announcement of ship sailings.                                                     |
| 224-B        | 332*      | 11-18      | Re stopping in port of technicians being sent to the Burma Road.                                    |
| [16] 225-A   | 333       | 11-19      | To .....                                                                                            |
| 226-A        | 334       | 11-19      | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                     |
| 227-A        | 335       | 11-22      | To .....                                                                                            |
| 228-A        | 336       | 11-22      | Departure of American convoy for Singapore.                                                         |
| 229-A        | 337       | 11-22      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 230-A        | 338       | 11-22      | " " " " " "                                                                                         |
| 231-A        | 339       | 11-23      | Re movements of warships and ships.                                                                 |
| 232-A        | 240 (340) | 11-23      | Re disposition of telegraphic code.                                                                 |
| 233-A        | 341*      | 11-24      | Re demand of return of advances to courier KUGA.                                                    |
| 234-A        | 342       | 11-24      | Re Fleet training base.                                                                             |
| 235-A        | 343       | 11-25      | Re representation of interests.                                                                     |
| 236-A        | 344       | 11-25      | To .....                                                                                            |
| -A           | 347       | 11-26      | Telegram by request of the Specie Bank.                                                             |
| 237-A        | 348       | 11-26      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 238-A        | 350       | 11-28      | Miscellaneous military information.                                                                 |
| 239-A        | 352       | 11-29      | BK(?) (In Roman letters).                                                                           |
| 240-A        | 353       | 11-29      | BK(?) " " "                                                                                         |
| 241-A        | 355       | 12-1       | BK(?) " " "                                                                                         |
| [17] 242-A   | 356       | 12-1       | Re report of number of Consular staff and their families.                                           |
| 243-A        | 357       | 12-3       | Movements of warships and ships.                                                                    |
| 244-A        | 358       | 12-2       | Re personnel of Consulate.                                                                          |
| C            | 359       |            | Re burning of codes.                                                                                |
| 245-A        | 360       | 12-3       | To .....?                                                                                           |
| 246-A        | 361       | 12-3       | Re remittance of traveling expenses of families.                                                    |
| 247-A        | 362*      | 12-3       | B. S. (?) (Message reports movements warships).                                                     |
| 248-A        | 363*      | 12-3       | B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).                                                     |
| 249-A        | 362*      | 12-4       | Re entry in port of foreign warships and ships.                                                     |



# 434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                  |
|--------------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 250-A .....  | 365*      | 12-4 ..... | B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).                      |
| 251-A .....  | 366*      | 12-5 ..... | Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU. |
| 252-A .....  | 367 ..... | 12-5 ..... | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                               |
| 253-A .....  | 368*      | 12-6 ..... | B. K. (?)                                                            |
| 254-A .....  | 369*      | 12-6 ..... | Ditto.                                                               |

### TO SEATTLE

|                |            |             |                                                                                                  |
|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [18] 1-B ..... | 346* ..... | 11-26 ..... | Re investigation of date of crossing to United States by ICHISAKU ICHINUKIDA (request Telegram). |
|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

### TO LOS ANGELES

|           |           |            |                                                                         |
|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1-B ..... | 15 .....  | 1-17 ..... | Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI and troupe. (request telegram)       |
| 2-A ..... | 18 .....  | 1-21 ..... | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #14)                   |
| 3-A ..... | 20 .....  | 1-23 ..... | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #16)                   |
| 4-B ..... | 101*      | 4-26 ..... | Departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI. (to San Francisco #11) |
| 5-A ..... | 175 ..... | 7-16 ..... | Re re-sending of telegram.                                              |

### TO SAN FRANCISCO

|                 |           |                         |                                                                                                               |
|-----------------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1-B .....       | 2 .....   | 1-6 .....               | Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship. (to New York #1)                                                        |
| 2-B .....       | 3 .....   | 1-6 .....               | Re date of arrival in and departure from San Francisco of Minister SUMA.                                      |
| (1)-B .....     | 1 .....   | 1-4 (duplication) ..... | Re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's Society. (to the Minister #1)                          |
| 3-B .....       | 9 .....   | 1-11 .....              | Report of gist of conversation with ABEND. (to the Minister #6)                                               |
| 4-A .....       | 19 .....  | 1-22 .....              | Re trip to Japan without passports by American citizens of Japanese parentage. (to the Minister #15)          |
| [19] 5-B .....  | 35 .....  | 2-1 .....               | Re names of Ambassador NOMURA's party. (to the Minister #5).                                                  |
| 6-B .....       | 63*       | 3-15 .....              | Re journey of Ambassador TOMII.                                                                               |
| 7-A .....       | 83 .....  | 4-7 .....               | Re resending of telegram.                                                                                     |
| 8-A .....       | 84*?      | 4-7 .....               | Re stopping in port of the Japan Christian Federation. (to the Minister #61).                                 |
| 9-(A) .....     | 89 .....  | .....                   | Reshifting of telegrams.                                                                                      |
| 10-B .....      | 94*       | 4-19 .....              | Re departure of courier FUKUDA.                                                                               |
| 11-B .....      | 101*      | 4-26 .....              | Re departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI.                                                           |
| 12-A .....      | 107 ..... | 4-30 .....              | Re the seizure of crew members of the COLUMBIA by British warship. (to the Minister #73).                     |
| 13-A .....      | 109 ..... | 5-1 .....               | Re seizure of German(s) by British warship. (to the Minister #75).                                            |
| 14-B .....      | 121*      | 5-24 .....              | Re request for easy clearance of courier TAGI (or TANOGI or TAKI).                                            |
| 15-A .....      | 132 ..... | 6-6 .....               | Re German boarding the TATUTA MARU.                                                                           |
| (1)-A-YU .....  | 137 ..... | 6-12 .....              | Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #96).                                       |
| 16-C .....      | 168 ..... | 7-11 .....              | Telegram of thanks of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.                                                                  |
| 17-A .....      | 182 ..... | 7-22 .....              | Re investigation of passengers of the YAWATA MARU.                                                            |
| 18-B .....      | 185*      | 7-31 .....              | Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU.                                                                       |
| 19-A .....      | 196 ..... | 8-1 .....               | Re journey of courier OSHIO.                                                                                  |
| [20] 20-B ..... | 199*      | 8-2 .....               | Re stopping in port of Honolulu of the TATUTA MARU. (re transfer of telegram #55 received from the Minister). |
| 21-A .....      | 224 ..... | 8-25 .....              | Re non-receipt of telegram.                                                                                   |
| 22-B .....      | 272*      | 10-20 .....             | Re landing of Secretary MAEDA.                                                                                |
| 23-B .....      | 274*      | 10-22 .....             | Re passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.                                                                        |
| 24-A .....      | 288 ..... | 10-27 .....             | Re delivery to Secretary MAEDA.                                                                               |
| 25-A .....      | 293 ..... | 10-29 .....             | Re physical examination of the passengers on board the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #68)                      |
| 26-B .....      | 309*      | 11-7 .....              | Re departure of Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.                                                                  |
| 27-B .....      | 321*      | 11-12 .....             | Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU? (to the Minister #78).                                            |
| 28-C .....      | 323 ..... | 11-13 .....             | .....                                                                                                         |
| 29-A .....      | 328 ..... | 11-17 .....             | Re resending of telegram.                                                                                     |
| 30-A .....      | 362*      | 12-3 .....              | B. S. (to the Minister #247)                                                                                  |
| [21] -(C) ..... | 21 .....  | 1-24 .....              | Re reception program for Ambassador NOMURA. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).                          |
| -(C) .....      | 27 .....  | 1-26 .....              | " " " " " "                                                                                                   |
| -(C) .....      | 28 .....  | 1-28 .....              | Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).                        |
| -C .....        | 29 .....  | 1-29 .....              | Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Secretary OKUMURA).                                         |
| -C .....        | 30 .....  | 1-29 .....              | Re sending of aide-de-camp by Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).         |

## TO SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                          |
|--------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| -C.....      | 31.....  | 1-30.....  | Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Secretary OKUMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).                       |
| -C.....      | 68.....  | .....      | Re meeting the boat by Vice-Consul OKUDA. (to Secretary MORIMURA on NITTA MARU).                             |
| -(C).....    | 74.....  | 3-27.....  | Private telegram of Consul General. (to FUMIKO TAKAO from OSAKA).                                            |
| -(C).....    | 80.....  | 4-2.....   | To Ambassador KURUSU. (from TATUTA MARU).                                                                    |
| -(C).....    | 91.....  | 4-15.....  | Private request telegram of Consul General. (to HARUNO YOSISE, Tokyo).                                       |
|              | 127..... | 6-2.....   | Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General to the GAKUYODO in Canton).                        |
| [22].....    | 128..... | 6-2.....   | Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General to Mrs. MAKI, Tokyo).                              |
| -C.....      | 135..... | 6-7.....   | Re declaration of residence of MASAO KADOFUJI. (to Villagemaster ENBUCHI, Otomari branch office, Kafu-futo). |
| -C.....      | 145..... | 6-20.....  | Condolatory telegram. (to wife of Councillor AKAGI in Shanghai).                                             |
| -C.....      | 198..... | 8-2.....   | Re son of Consul NAKAUCHI. (to Consul Nakauchi, Los Angeles).                                                |
| -(C).....    | 219..... | 8-16.....  | Request telegram of Consul General. (to translator MAZAKI from Shanghai).                                    |
| 1-A.....     | 1.....   | 9-8.....   | Re export of pineapple seedlings. (to Head of Section of Foreign Affairs, Formosa).                          |
|              | 270..... | 10-17..... | Re inquiry on condition of fuel oil supply. (to Secretary MAEDA on TATUTA MARU).                             |
| -C.....      | 294..... | 10-29..... | Re connection of Secretary —naga to American liner, etc. (to Consul IWANAGA on TAIYO MARU).                  |

## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS

|                    |         |           |                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------|---------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [23] (1)-A-YU..... | 4.....  | 1-6.....  | Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #2)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                                  |
| (2)-A-YU.....      | 7.....  | 1-9.....  | Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #5)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.                                                                                 |
| 1-B.....           | 8.....  | 1-10..... | Re enquiry on advisability of trip to United States by the SUBARU SHOW.<br>Dispatched to: San Francisco and Los Angeles.                                                 |
| (3)-YU-A.....      | 14..... | 1-16..... | Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #11)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                  |
| (4)-B-YU.....      | 15..... | 1-17..... | Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI's troupe. (to Los Angeles #1)<br>Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.                                                           |
| (5)-A-YU.....      | 24..... | 1-28..... | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #18)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                             |
| 2-B.....           | 28..... | 1-29..... | Re proposal of Commander-in-chief RICHARDSON for reception of Ambassador NOMURA. (to the Minister #20)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador in U. S., and San Francisco.         |
| 3-B.....           | 32..... | 1-30..... | Re offer of Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON to send aide-de-camp to meet the Ambassador (NOMURA?). (to the Minister #21).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco. |
| [24] 4-B.....      | 34..... | 7-1.....  | Conditions of Ambassador NOMURA's stopping in port here. (to the Minister #22).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.                                          |
| (6)-A-YU.....      | 38..... | 2-6.....  | Re movement of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #25).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                |
| (7)-A-YU.....      | 43..... | 2-21..... | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #29)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                |
| (8)-A-YU.....      | 45..... | 2-24..... | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #31).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                                                |
| (9)-A-YU.....      | 49..... | .....     | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #34)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                |
| (10)-B-YU.....     | 51..... | 3-1.....  | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #36)<br>Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                          |
| 5-A.....           | 53..... | 3-3.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.<br>Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.                                                                                  |
| 6-A.....           | 54..... | 3-4.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #38)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                                              |
| (11)-A-YU.....     | 55..... | 3-4.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #39)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                                              |

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## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

| (Code ? No.)   | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                      |
|----------------|----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [26] (12)-B-YU | 58       | 3-6        | Re correction of telegram. (to the Minister #42)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                   |
| (13)-A-YU      | 59       | 3-10       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #43).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (14)-A-YU      | 60       | 3-10       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #44).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (15)-A-YU      | 65       | 3-21       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #47)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle and Los Angeles.              |
| (16)-A-YU      | 69       | 3-24       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #50).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (17)-A-YU      | 73       | 3-27       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #53).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| 7-A            | 75       | 3-28       | Re trip to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.                                  |
| (18)-B-YU      | 85       | 4-8        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                     |
| [26] (19)-A-YU | 63*      | 4-9        | Re Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #63)<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                |
| (20)-A-YU      | 90       | 4-14       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #64).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (21)-A-YU      | 92       | 4-15       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #65).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (22)-A-YU      | 93       | 4-17       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #65).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| 8-B            | 96*      | 4-21       | Re stopping in port of eldest son of President ROOSEVELT. (to the Minister #67).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.                |
| (23)-A-YU      | 97       | 4-21       | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #68).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.             |
| 9-A            | 100      | 4-24       | Re transferring of telegram regarding movements of U. S. Fleet.<br>Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (24)-A-YU      | 180      | 4-28       | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #69).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.             |
| (25)-B-YU      | 104*     | 4-29       | Re transport WASHINGTON.<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.                                                                 |
| [27] (26)-A-YU | 109      | 5-1        | Re seizure of German(s) by British warship. (to the Minister #75).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle. |
| (27)-A-YU      | 110      | 5-6        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #76).                                                                         |
| (28)-A-YU      | 113      | 5-12       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #78).                                                                         |
| (29)-B-YU      | 115*     | 5-14       | Re arrival of B-17 bombers. (to the Minister #80).                                                                                       |
| (30)-A-YU      | 116      | 5-16       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #81).                                                                         |
| (31)-B-YU      | 119      | 5-22       | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #84).                                                                    |
| (32)-A-YU      | 122      | 5-26       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #86).                                                                         |
| 10-A           | 125      | 5-29       | Re check-up and reporting of names of U. S. warships.<br>Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.                         |
| (33)-YU-A      | 130      | 6-3        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #91).<br>Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle.               |
| (34)-B-YU      | 134*     | 6-7        | Re trip to Washington by Admiral KIMMEL and visit to the mainland by the Fleet. (to the Minister #94).                                   |
| (35)-A-YU      | 138      | 6-13       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #97).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle.                |
| [28] (36)-B-YU | 140*     | 6-13       | Re arrival in port of U. S. Army transport PRESIDENT PIERCE. (to the Minister #99).<br>Dispatched to: San Francisco and Manila.          |
| (37)-A-YU      | 148      | 6-23       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #106).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle.     |
| 11-A           | 157      | 7-1        | Re stoppage of sending of code(s).<br>Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                                             |
| 12-A           | 160      | 7-5        | Re survey of assets of Japanese residing within the United States.                                                                       |

## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                           |
|--------------|----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 13-A         | 171      | 7-14       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #123)                                                                                 |
| 14-B         | 174*     | 7-15       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re commencement of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet Union. (to the Minister #125) |
| 15-A         | 180      | 7-21       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #129)                                              |
| 16-A         | 188      | 7-28       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re entry into port of Japanese vessel. (to the Minister #135)                                 |
| 17-A         | 190      | 7-29       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #137)                                                                                           |
| 18-C         | 191      | 7-29       | Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco.<br>Re entry into U. S. port of Japanese vessel(s). (to the Minister #138)                       |
| [29] 19-C    | 195*     | 7-31       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU. (to San Francisco #18)                                |
| 20-A         | 197      | 8-1        | Re entry into and embarkation from port of the ASAMA MARU. (to the Minister #143)                                                             |
| 21-A         | 206      | 8-4        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #145)                                                                              |
| 22-A         | 208      | 8-6        | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re transferring of telegram(s). (telegram from the Minister #66)                              |
| 23-A         | 211      | 8-8        | Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #148)                                                                                 |
| 24-A         | 220      | 8-18       | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #153)                                                                                        |
| 25-A         | 221      | 8-19       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Local Japanese situation. (to the Minister #154)                                              |
| 26-A         | 222      | 8-21       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Ambassador #48)                                       |
| 27-B         | 226*     | 8-28       | Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.<br>Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #156)                           |
| 28-A         | 230      | 9-2        | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #160)                              |
| [30] 29-A    | 231      | 9-3        | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re HAYAKAWA. (to the Ambassador #51)                                                          |
| 30-B         | 232*     | 9-3        | Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.<br>Re HAYAKAWA. (from the Ambassador #29)                                                          |
| 31-A         | 237      | 9-6        | Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.<br>Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #163)                                |
| 32-A         | 239      | 9-9        | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re mail matter to Japan. (to the Minister #164)                                               |
| 33-A         | 241      | 9-13       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re stopping in port of French warship. (to the Minister #166)                                 |
| 34-A         | 242      | 9-13       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re propaganda pamphlets of fifth columnists against Japan. (to the Minister #167)             |
| 35-A         | 243      | 9-15       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re transfer of official telegrams sent to this Consulate. (to the Minister #168)              |
| 36-A         | 244      | 9-15       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #169)                                 |
| 37-A         | 250      | 9-22       | Dispatched to Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #172)                                  |
| [31] 38-A    | 251      | 9-22       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re departure of French vessel. (to the Minister #173)                                         |
| 39-A         | 253      | 9-24       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re problem of shipping communication. Japan-United States. (to the Minister #175)             |
| 40-B         | 256*     | 9-29       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re question of fishing boats owned by Japanese. (to the Minister #177)                        |
| 41-A         | 257      | 9-29       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #178)                                              |
| 42-A         | 258      | 9-26       | Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #179)                                                                                              |
| 43-A         | 260      | 10-1       | Re problem of Japanese Language Schools. (to the Minister #181)                                                                               |
| 44-B         | 262*     | 10-2       | Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats. (to the Minister #183)                                                                            |
| 45-A         | 263      | 10-2       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re transportation of British soldiers by American vessels. (to the Minister #184)             |
| 46-A         | 265      | 10-6       | Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Vancouver.<br>Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #186)                   |
|              |          |            | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.                                                                                                  |

## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

| (Code ? No.)   | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                             |
|----------------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 47-A.....      | 267.....  | 10-13..... | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #188)                                                                                |
| [52] 48-A..... | 268.....  | 10-15..... | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re going to the United States of Chinese airmen. (to the Minister #189)                         |
| 49-A.....      | 271.....  | 10-17..... | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re payment of boat fare in Japan. (to the Minister #191)                                        |
| 50-A.....      | 273.....  | 10-20..... | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #192)                                       |
| 51-B.....      | 274*..... | 10-22..... | Re passengers of the TAIYO MARU. (to San Francisco #23)                                                                                         |
| 52.....        | 275*..... | 10-22..... | Dispatched to: Ambassador and Minister.<br>Re number of passengers on TAIYO MARU. Telegram transferred. (from the Minister #99)                 |
| 53.....        | 276*..... | 10-22..... | Transfer telegram re departure from Yokohama of the TAIYO MARU. (from the Minister #100)                                                        |
| 54-A.....      | 283.....  | 10-24..... | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #194)                                                                            |
| 55-A.....      | 280.....  | 10-28..... | Re movement of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #199)                                                                                              |
| 56-A.....      | 298.....  | 11-1.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re suspension of loading of mail matter on TAIYO MARU. (to the Ambassador #71)                  |
| 57-A.....      | 300.....  | 11-1.....  | Dispatched to: Minister, San Francisco and Seattle.<br>Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier. (to the Ambassador #73)                     |
| [33] 58-A..... | 301.....  | 11-4.....  | Dispatched to: Minister, San Francisco and Seattle.<br>Re delay in sailing of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #204)                                |
| 59-A.....      | 303.....  | 11-4.....  | Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU (to the Minister #205)                                                                                |
| 60-B.....      | 305*..... | 11-6.....  | Re departure of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #206)                                                                                              |
| 61-A1.....     | 314.....  | 11-8.....  | Dispatched to: San Francisco and Seattle.<br>Re according of convenience in clearance to TAIYO MARU and two other ships. (to the Minister #211) |
| 62-A.....      | 315.....  | 11-10..... | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #212)                                                                                             |
| 63-(C).....    | 320*..... | 11-12..... | Dispatched to: U. S., and San Francisco.<br>Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #216)                                             |
| 64-C.....      | 323.....  | 11-13..... | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to San Francisco #28)                                       |
| 65-A.....      | 324.....  | 11-13..... | Dispatched to: Minister and Ambassador.<br>From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #218)                                                       |
| 66-A.....      | 325.....  | 11-14..... | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #219)                                                                                |
| 67-A.....      | 329.....  | 11-18..... | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Revenues connected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #221)                       |
| 68-A.....      | 330.....  | 11-18..... | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #222)                                                                                |
| [34] 69-A..... | 331*..... | 11-18..... | Re suspension of announcement of arrival and departure of ships. (to the Minister #223)                                                         |
| 70-A.....      | 334.....  | 11-19..... | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #226)                                                                                |
| 71-A.....      | 353.....  | 11-29..... | BK. (?) (to the Minister #240)                                                                                                                  |
| 72-A.....      | 361.....  | 12-3.....  | Re sending of traveling expenses of family (families). (to the Minister #246)                                                                   |
| 73-A.....      | 366*..... | 12-5.....  | Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #251)                                                      |

End of matching of telegrams.

## TO NEW YORK

|                 |           |           |                                                              |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| [35] 1-(B)..... | 2.....    | 1-6.....  | Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship.                        |
| 2-A.....        | 210.....  | 8-7.....  | Re telegram to the Specie Bank.                              |
| 3-B.....        | 302*..... | 11-4..... | Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA. |
| 4-B.....        | 304.....  | 11-5..... | Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA. |

## TO THE AMBASSADOR

|                    |         |           |                                                                                                        |
|--------------------|---------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [36] (1)-YU-B..... | 5.....  | 1-7.....  | Movements of the U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #3)                                                      |
| 1-B.....           | 10..... | 1-11..... | Interview with Rear Admiral KIMMEL, newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief. (to the Minister #7)           |
| (2)-YU-B.....      | 11..... | 1-13..... | Movements of the U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #8)                                                      |
| 2-B.....           | 22..... | 1-24..... | ? (To Minister #17)                                                                                    |
| 3-B.....           | 25..... | 1-28..... | Re registration of families and servants of officials of foreign government with the State Department. |
| 4-B.....           | 33..... | 2-1.....  | Re expected time (date) of arrival in office of Ambassador NOMURA.                                     |
| 5-B.....           | 35..... | 2-1.....  | Re names of Ambassador NOMURA's staff.                                                                 |

## TO THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                        |
|--------------|----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 6-B          | 36       | 2-1        | Re reporting to Commander-in-Chief KIMMEL of new appointment.                                              |
| 7-B          | 41       | 2-18       | Re measure for freeing of foreign assets in the United States.                                             |
| (3)-B-YU     | 42       | 2-20       | Re designation of naval defense area in Kaneohe Bay. (to the Minister #28)                                 |
| (4)-YU-B     | 46       | 2-26       | Re explanations of the Minister in the Diet.                                                               |
| 8-B          | 47       | 2-26       | Re date when Consul-General KITA will start for his new post. (from the Minister #10—telegram relayed).    |
| [57] 9-B     | 51       | 3-1        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #36)                                       |
| 10-B         | 58*      | 3-6        | Re correction of telegram. (to the Minister #42)                                                           |
| 11-B         | 61       | 3-11       | Re request for refundment of advances.                                                                     |
| 12-B         | 62*      | 3-14       | Re report of arrival at post of Consul-General KITA. (to the Minister #45)                                 |
| (5)-B-YU     | 66*      | 3-21       | Re visit to New Zealand of U. S. warship(s)                                                                |
| 13-A         | 79       | 4-2        | Re inquiry of name of Consulate to which telegraphic code was transferred.                                 |
| 14-B         | 87       | 4-10       | Re investigation of code type KETSU telegram(s).                                                           |
| 15-A         | 88       | 4-10       | Re easy clearance of courier MORI.                                                                         |
| 16-A         | 103      | 4-28       | Re entry into port of British warship. (to the Minister #70)                                               |
| 17-A         | 111      | 5-7        | Local general situation. (to the Minister #77)                                                             |
| (6)-A-YU     | 118      | 5-21       | General situation. (to the Minister #83)                                                                   |
| 18-B         | 120*     | 5-23       | Re stopping in port of Minister of Land of New Zealand. (to the Minister #85)                              |
| 7-B-YU       | 128*     | 5-27       | Re departure of the TRADE WIND. (to the Minister #87)                                                      |
| 19-A         | 130      | 6-3        | Re movements of the U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #91)                                        |
| [58] 20-A    | 131      | 6-4        | Re reply to date of sending of official message (s).                                                       |
| 21-B         | 134*     | 6-7        | Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the visit of the Fleet to the Mainland. (to the Minister #94) |
| (8)-A-YU     | 139      | 6-13       | Local general situation. (to the Minister #98)                                                             |
| 22-A         | 141      | 6-14       | Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #100)                                    |
| 23-A         | 142      | 6-16       | Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #101)                                    |
| 24-B         | 143*     | 6-16       | Re closure of German Consulates in the United States. (to the Minister #102)                               |
| 25-B         | 144*     | 6-17       | Re coming here of the MELJI University baseball team. (on request of N. Y. K.)                             |
| 26-A         | 146      | 6-20       | Talks with Italian Consul. (to the Minister #104)                                                          |
| (9)-B-YU     | 147*     | 6-23       | Re stopping in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS. (to the Minister #105)                                            |
| (10)-B-YU    | 149*     | 6-26       | Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.                                                                               |
| 27-A         | 150      | 6-27       | Re arrival in port of Commander TATIBANA.                                                                  |
| 28-B         | 155*     | 6-30       | Re closure of German Consulate (s). (to the Minister #112)                                                 |
| 29-A         | 156      | 7-1        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #113)                                           |
| [59] 30-A    | 158      | 7-2        | Re regular foreign text publications for overseas propaganda use.                                          |
| (31)-B       | 159*     | 7-3        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #114)                                      |
| 32-A         | 161      | 7-7        | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #115)                                                     |
| 33-B         | 163*     | 7-8        | Re participation of American flyers in the Chinese Air Force. (to the Minister #117)                       |
| 34-C         | 167      | 7-11       | Telegram of thanks for Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.                                                              |
| 35-A         | 170      | 7-14       | Re instructions for returning the Imperial Portrait. (to the Minister #122)                                |
| 36-A         | 172      | 7-15       | Re request for transfer of telegram(s).                                                                    |
| 37-B         | 173      | 7-15       | Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc. (to the Minister #124)                                               |
| 38-A         | 176      | 7-17       | Re status of employees.                                                                                    |
| 39-(A)       | 178      | 7-18       | Re request for transfer of telegrams.                                                                      |
| 40-C         | 183      | 7-24       | Re registration of officials and employees of foreign governments.                                         |
| 41-A         | 184      | 7-24       | Re returning of the Imperial Portrait.                                                                     |
| 42-B         | 187*     | 7-26       | Re arrival of Under-secretary of the Navy and Freeze Administrator. (to the Minister #134)                 |
| 43-B         | 192*     | 7-30       | Effect of the enforcement of the Freeze Order on the resident Japanese. (to the Minister #139)             |
| [40] 44-B    | 194*     | 7-30       | Re exemption of Chinese diplomats and Consulates from application of Freeze Order.                         |
| 45-A         | 205      | 8-2        | Re re-sending of telegram.                                                                                 |
| 46-A         | 207*     | 8-5        | Re incorporation of the Coast Guard within the Navy. (to the Minister #146)                                |
| 47-A         | 213      | 8-12       | Re bank "balance" of official funds, etc.                                                                  |
| 48-A         | 222      | 8-21       | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                            |
| 49-A         | 225      | 8-27       | Re treatment of the Japanese residents in the U. S. by Americans. (to the Minister #155)                   |
| 50-B         | 229*     | 9-2        | Re passing through of American airplane "pilots". (to the Minister #159)                                   |
| 51-A         | 230      | 9-3        | Re H A Y A K A W A.                                                                                        |
| 52-A         | 233      | 9-3        | Re H A Y A K A W A.                                                                                        |
| 53-A         | 235      | 9-5        | Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago. (to the Minister #162).                                      |



# 440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## TO THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                   |
|--------------|----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 54-A         | 247      | 9-17       | Re reporting of names of Consulate staff members in regard to the Freeze Order.                       |
| 55-B         | 248*     | 9-18       | Re drawing up a name-list under arrangement for the easing of the credit freeze order.                |
| 56-A         | 249      | 9-19       | Military information. (to the Minister #171).                                                         |
| [41] 57-A    | 255      | 9-27       | Re correction of telegram numbers.                                                                    |
| 58-B         | 264*     | 10-4       | Re measure for time of war. (to Minister #185)                                                        |
| 59-B         | 266*     | 10-10      | Re conversation of Delegate KING. (to the Minister #187).                                             |
| 60-A         | 277      | 10-22      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                         |
| 61-B         | 279*     | 10-24      | Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA. (from the Minister #101—telegram relayed.) |
| 62-A         | 280      | 10-24      | Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA.                                            |
| 63-A         | 281      | 10-24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                         |
| 64-A         | 282      | 10-24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                         |
| 65-A         | 285*     | 10-25      | Re report on assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff.                                            |
| 66-A1        | 286      | 10-25      | Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance of Consulate members.                                    |
| 67-A         | 290      | 10-28      | Re correction of telegram numbers.                                                                    |
| 68-A         | 293      | 10-29      | Re physical examination of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.                                        |
| 69-A         | 296      | 10-30      | Re notification of receipt of telegram. (in connection with courier KUGA.)                            |
| 70-A         | 297      | 11-1       | Re allowance for this Consulate members.                                                              |
| [42] 71-A    | 298      | 11-1       | Re suspension of loading of mail matter on board the TAIYO MARU.                                      |
| 72-B         | 299*     | 11-1       | Re arrival of the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #203)                                                  |
| 73-A         | 300      | 11-1       | Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier.                                                          |
| 74-A         | 307      | 11-6       | Re investigation of people boarding the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #208)                            |
| 75-B         | 316*     | 11-10      | Re bounds of application of the Martial Law in Hawaii. (to the Minister #213)                         |
| 76           | 317      |            | Re number of passengers on the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #214)                                     |
| 77-A         | 319      | 11-11      | Re easing of the freeze in Japanese governmental agencies in the U. S.                                |
| 78-B         | 321*     | 11-12      | Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.                                                           |
| 79-A         | 322      | 11-13      | From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #217)                                                        |
| 80-A         | 326      | 11-14      | Ambassador KURUSU's talk with NEWMAN.                                                                 |
| 81-A         | 343      | 11-25      | Re representation of interests. (to the Minister #235.)                                               |
| 82-B         | 345*     | 11-25      | Re report of names of families of this Consulate's members.                                           |
| 83-A         | 354      | 12-1       | Re representation of interests.                                                                       |
| 84-A         | 369*     | 12-6       | BK (to the Minister #254)                                                                             |

## TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

|          |     |      |                                                                                        |
|----------|-----|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [43] 1-A | 76  |      | Re passport visa of WILLIAM INRY HOLCOMBE. (to the Minister #56)                       |
| 1-B      | 81  | 4-3  | Dispatched to: New Orleans.                                                            |
| 2-A      | 95  | 4-19 | Re stopping in port of the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. (to the Minister #59): |
| 3-B      | 104 | 4-29 | Dispatched to: Manila.                                                                 |
| 4-B      | 105 | 4-30 | Re re-sending of telegram.                                                             |
| 2-C      | 112 | 5-12 | Dispatched to: Manila.                                                                 |
| 1-B      | 126 | 5-29 | Re transport WASHINGTON. (to the Minister #71).                                        |
| 2-B      | 152 | 6-28 | Dispatched to: Manila.                                                                 |
| MU-(C)   | 215 | 8-13 | Re going to Chungking of HENRY LUCE. (to the Minister #72).                            |
| MU-A     | 218 | 8-16 | Dispatched to: Canton.                                                                 |
| MU-A     | 223 | 8-22 | Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate.                                                   |
| [44] 1-B | 245 | 9-17 | Dispatched to: Canton.                                                                 |
| 2-B      | 246 | 9-17 | Re stopping in port of courier.                                                        |
|          |     |      | Dispatched to: Shanghai.                                                               |
|          |     |      | From Secretary KIYOHARA.                                                               |
|          |     |      | Dispatched to: Shanghai.                                                               |

## EXHIBIT "A"

NR 63

15 MARCH 1941

*Mackay Radio*

From: Kita.

To: Consul, San Fran.

The following from Ambassador Tomii: I and Ikeoawa, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, secretary to Embassy, expect to arrive your place (San Francisco) on the December Tatuta Maru X Will depart (San Francisco) the same day at 2300 by Santa Fe "Chief" #24 Request that you reserve one double bedroom compartment and one lower berth X Also please reserve same accommodations on the Liberty Limited departing Chicago on the 23rd for Washington.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 64

18 MARCH 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

When the two Honganji Missionaries: Azakawato Mitanihira (?) Home address: Shimane Kin, Oti Gun, Kawatomuna (correction Kawatomura) and Okamoto Taiyu, home address: Tokio, Suginami Ku, Kamlogikubo (?) #730 request passports from there Tohawaii (from Washington ?) If there is no objection after an examination of their records, please expedite the forwarding of the passports. Both men are coming to fill vacancies.

NR 66

21 MARCH 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

(by code in mail to Washington).

\* \* \* According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummins, Tucker, arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland and the destroyer Clark, Cassin, Cunningham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit x The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor x It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane x Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" (gaihu) until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was reported.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 72

27 MARCH 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

\* \* \* Monimura reported for duty on the 27th (Correction Morimura).

*Mackay Radio*

No. 76

29 MARCH 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Holcomb has not arrived in the past ten days. Furthermore as the Harrison (steamship) will not return to our country the subject person is the one who is going direct to Manila.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 77

29 MARCH 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Re passports for sailors on Japanese ships calling at the port of Honolulu and other US ports . . .

R. C. A.

NR 78

1 APRIL 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Ref #29 of 7 March

With respect to the request of the client (Irainin) although I realize that . . . is unreasonable, please forward by mail on the Yawata Maru which departs from Yokohama on the 10th of April X I appreciate your special efforts.



R. C. A.

3 APRIL 1941

81

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio, Manila Consulate.

Holland's foreign minister, his wife, and the colonial minister (Takumu Gaimuken Daijin) arrived here from San Francisco on the 2nd via Clipper and departed for Batavia via Manila on the 3rd X Local newspapers stated that this inspection of the Nel at this time is noteworthy.

R. C. A.

. 5 APRIL 1941

NR 82

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Re charges against the owner of the confiscated fishing boats . . .

NR 84

APRIL ? 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister.

Later seizure proceeding have been instituted against the other eighteen of the nineteen ships mentioned in my previous dispatch X After considerable deliberation a court judgment was obtained under which the 1st of the ships was confiscated by the US Government X Even tho it was to be put up at auction, judging from examples on the mainland, by the time the price is so reduced by sale at auction, the owner gets nothing X Furthermore the parties concerned get quite a blow from the customs as a result of this seizure X Already steps are being taken to claim loss from a standpoint of damage to the boats, and in one case authority has been granted for a release from bond X Later on such steps will be taken in all cases.

R. C. A.

19 APRIL 1941

NR 94

From: Kita.

To: Consul, San Fran.

Radio industry employee (?) Fukuda departed here the 18th for your city X Because of his position please use your influence in getting him through customs.

NR 96

21 APRIL 1941

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaijin, Tokio.

President Roosevelt's eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt together with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed for Manila on the 21st X The local newspapers said that both men said that any statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington X Perhaps is Chungking.

R. C. A.

26 APRIL 1941

101

From: Kita.

To: Consul General, San Fran.

For your information Shimizu and Yamazi, members of the Diet, departed here the 25th on the Lurline for Los Angeles X From Los Angeles they plan to proceed to your city.

R. C. A.

30 APRIL 1941

105

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Inf: Manila.

Mr. Henry Buse (correction Luce) managing editor and publisher of Time, Fortune, and Life and Claire Booth (pen name) took the Clipper for Manila on the 30th x They plan to go to Chungking by way of Hongkong x After a trip of about two months they plan, upon returning to the States, to conduct a series of lectures at various places x This information from the newspapers.

*Mackay Radio*

108

1 MAY 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Gauss, the newly appointed American Ambassador to China, enroute to his new station put in here on the 30th on the President Garfield. He plans going direct to Chungking.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 114

14 MAY 1941

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaijin, Tokio.

When there is a request for a passport to Hawaii from Kusuda Kakushin missionary bishop ?? of the Higushii (correction Higashi) Honganji ( a temple) (Home address: Niigata, Nishibori Dori 7 Bango ??) If there is no objection from the investigation of his record please forward passport at once x He has applied as a successor to Okiji who returned home early November (request message).

NR 115

14 MAY 1941

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaijin, Tokio.

With respect to message No 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. General Emmons departed San Fran. at 1550 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickman Field at 0558 the 14th.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 120

23 MAY 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Inf: Washington, D. C.

The New Zealand's Minister of Lands Frank Langstone, former Premier J. Gordon Coates and part of eight put in here on the 21st by Clipper enroute to Washington x They plan to discuss problems concerning the protection of British and US territory.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 121

24 MAY 1941

From: Kita.

To: Minister, San Francisco.

Code Clerk Taki is heading for your office via the Tatuta Maru your good offices are requested in helping him through customs.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 123

27 MAY 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

The Trade Wind left port on the 26th and should arrive Yokohama the end of June.

*Mackay Radio*

NR 126

29 MAY 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

Inf: Hongkong.

Cravens of the foreign office after visiting Nel, Australia, and New Zealand put in here on the Clipper enroute to Washington, D. C.

*R. C. A.*

NR 129

3 JUNE 1941

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokio

The Punahou School is extending an invitation to Mr. Tadamichi Taketi, Director of the Taiwan Pottery Company to attend the One Hundred Year Celebration x I have no objections to his attending and request you issue necessary passport.

444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

R. C. A.

NR 133

6 JUNE 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister Tokio

8 Jap nationals sailed the tenth on the Tatsuta (2 stowaways and 6 deportees) having been deported by the immigration authorities bound for Kobe and Yokohama X Yokohama three Japs Kobe three Japs two Koreans.

7 JUNE 1941

NR 134

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio

INF: Ambassador Washington (by mail to San Francisco and Los Angeles and Seattle)

1. On the fourth received work (correction word) from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy no extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Dept officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units on the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods X the periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

13 JUNE 1941.

NR 140

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio

INF: (have forwarded by mail to San Francisco and Manila)

Ref San Francisco MSG #92

SS Pres Pierce with about nine hundred Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the eleventh and sailed the twelfth.

R. C. A.

16 JUNE 1941.

NR 143

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio

Inf: Minister Washington

Because of return (resignation(?))—recall was probably the word used, though it was a resignation in fact) of honorary German consul I have been requested by Germany Embassy in Washington to handle German affairs here.

R. C. A.

17 JUNE 1941

N. 144

From: Kita

To: (Action) Minister Washington

(Info) Foreign Minister, Tokio

Group visas were refused for a Meiji U. Baseball Team Kita is requested that Jap Ambassador use his influence to get the visas authorized.

R. C. A.

27 JUNE 1941  
(June 23 ?)

No. 147

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio

Chungking Burma Road—Trucks

R. C. A.

26 JUNE 1941

No. 149

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by Clipper the 25th.

R. C. A.

28 JUNE 1941

No. 152  
From: Kita  
To: Ryoji Hongkong  
Foreign Minister, Tokyo

Daniel Armstein Harold Davis Manco Hellman transportation managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via Clipper for Hongkong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

R. C. A.

30 JUNE 1941

No. 155  
From: Kita  
To: Koshi Washington  
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Memo from German Consul he closes shop on the 30th.

*Mackay Radio*

3 JULY 1941

No. 159  
From: Kita  
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo  
Koshi Washington

Continued it has been decided to confiscate 7 ships (total ships 8) (no Kori (?) yu 1 selu no uti (?) 3 vessels have been released under hand and 2 have already gone fishing.

This matter of seizing fishing vessels is of a difficult nature: It is fishing season (?) and as it has a large influence on local food supplies, the authorities concerned are observing it. (Part not clear—seems to be something about outrage against Japanese) there is a movement to buy the confiscated ships (by U.S. Government) and to release them underhand. At the same time delegate King is making endeavors and those in Washington should make representations.

*Mackay Radio*

8 JULY 1941

No. 163  
From: Kita  
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo—Minister Washington

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin pact of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force the local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his Consulate (largely from local air groups) newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese Military Attaché in Washington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) newspapers or the 5th 200 men have already (toppa seun) gone (?). The Chinese Consul (correction Consul) General ayoids a statement regarding his orders.

*Mackay Radio*

10 JULY 1941

No. 165  
From: Kita #119 of 10th, 20th or 30th (No month shown).  
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo  
Ref: Your Circular 1381 . . . .

Strictly secret: 9th one American and one German should have departed by now.

*Mackay Radio*

11 JULY 1941

No. 169  
From: Kita  
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Movements and opinions of Chiang Kai Shek new adviser Latimore.

*Mackay Radio*

15 JULY 1941

No. 173  
 From: Kita  
 To: Koshi Washington  
 Foreign Minister Tokyo

The Italian Consulate was closed on the 10th, the Consul has at last obtained permission to withdraw a portion of the government funds and all of the private funds of the staffmembers. The Consul and one secretary have ordered the resident civil official to take over the post, and after the Consul has visited his mother who resides in New York he will proceed to his new post on the Tatsuta Maru sailing from San Francisco the 31st (the secretary will proceed on the Yawata Maru sailing here the 18th) no request was made to entrust official or other documents to that office.

*Mackay Radio*

15 JULY 1941

No. 174  
 From: Kita  
 To: Koshi Washington  
 Riyoji San Francisco  
 Foreign Minister Tokyo

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

*Mackay Radio*

26 JULY 1941

No. 187 -  
 From: Kita  
 To: Koshi Washington  
 Foreign Minister Tokyo

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide, will leave Alameda in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane 6 officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

*Mackay Radio*

22 JULY 1941

No. 181  
 From: Kita  
 To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

This office has a request from a Mr. W. R. B. McBain, Manager of the Shanghai firm of George-McBrain, and his wife Mrs. V. W. K. McBrain for a visa to visit Japan. These people spend a good deal of their time in Shanghai, and have been residing here for the past six weeks. They wish to stop over between ships in Japan. And state that they have visited there many times before. They both have on two previous occasions (19 July 1939 and 25 August 1939) obtained visas in Shanghai. They returned to their home country in 1940. Have you any objections to these visas. Answer to that question requested.

*Mackay Radio*

28 JULY 1941.

No. 189  
 From: Kita  
 To: Foreign Minister Tokyo  
 Some sort of answer requested.

*Mackay Radio*

No. 192

JULY 30 1941

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington  
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Since the enforcement of the law freezing Japanese credits in America has been anticipated for a long, at this office and through the Japanese language newspapers all the residents were warned of the effects upon them in case it was put into force, and even with the enforcement of the law on the 26th the residents did not show any particular disquietude. The methods of application of the law were announced and since the actual restrictions on the residents businesses, remittance to Japan, and importation of Japanese goods were considered quite lenient, they were accepted calmly. The remittances to Japan in anticipation of the freezing order and also the hoarding of U. S. currency has amounted to a considerable sum. Furthermore the United States authorities here have emphasized that although in the midsts of the worst anti-American circumstances the residents have nothing to fear so long as they obey U. S. laws.

*Mackay Radio*

No. 193

30 JULY 1941.

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

To Japan Broadcasting Company your new frequencies are lousy for Hawaii  
Please go back to 19-25-31 meters

*Mackay Radio*

No. 194

30 JULY 1941.

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington  
Foreign Office Tokyo

According to a report in an English language paper on the 30th a telegram has been received by the local Chinese Consul General from a Central American ambassador to the fact that steps are being considered to exempt Chinese diplomatic and consular officials from the application of the freezing order.

31 JULY 1941.

No. 195

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington  
Riyoji San Francisco  
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Since the Tatsuta Maru will sail directly from San Francisco to Japan, the arrival and departure of the Abama Maru entering this 31st will be difference from usual. Moreover when the Tatsuta Maru enters this port there will be no loading problem, two hundred and some persons will board, and it has been announced that the local customs authorities will not obstruct the arrival and departure of this ship.

R. C. A.

2 Aug. 1941.

No. 199

From: Kita

To: Riyoji San Francisco

The Tatsuta Maru will arrive in Honolulu August 1, loaded according to instructions from the N. Y. K.

R. C. A.

7 Aug. 1941.

No. 207

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Visas were refused in both cases your indulgence is requested.

R. C. A.

12 AUGUST 1941.

No. 214

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

\$483 for defense fund.

28 AUG. 1941.

No. 226

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington

Riyoji San Francisco

Foreign Minister Tokyo

Subsequently, still another boat was adjudged confiscated (total 9 boats) and one other boat was released, as in my earlier telegrams, and after the effective intervention of the Territorial Governor and others, according to information from Washington on the 28th, the Justice Department has decided that seven of the aforementioned boats be sold to United States citizens to satisfy the stipulations of the Department, and that the former owners should pay back 20% of the appraised value plus court costs together with the indebtedness on the boats themselves.

*Mackay Radio*

2 SEPT. 1941.

No. 229

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

On the 2d an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced) entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

*Mackay Radio*

15 SEPT. 1941.

No. 232

From: Kita

To: Riyoji San Francisco

Foreign Minister Tokyo

Hayakawa Kiyoshi, a Government official of this country, intended to enter your port in April of this year, if he is still in your city, please register him with the State Department as a foreign Government official. If he has already left your city please investigate and reply by cable giving the year, month, and day of departure and as many other details as possible.

*Mackay Radio*

17 SEPT. 1941.

No. 245

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Riyoji Shanghai

Kugami Watawabe Tajima sailing on Tyler for Shanghai welcome

*Mackay Radio*

17 SEPT. 1941.

No. 246

From: Kita

To: Riyoji Shanghai

Arrival of Katuyama here from Shanghai Oct 1 via Pres. Tyler

*Mackay Radio*

18 SEPT. 1941.

No. 248  
From: Kita  
To: Koshi Washington  
Finance.

*Mackay Radio*

23 SEPT. 1941.

No. 252  
From: Kita  
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo  
Magruder to Chungking via Manila

29 SEPT. 1941.

No. 256  
From: Kita  
To: Koshi Washington  
Ryoji San Francisco  
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Two of the seven fishing boats reported released according to stipulations were sold on the 26th at prices comparable to their appraised values to the Hawaii Canning Company which has a very close connection with the boats, and court proceedings were dispensed with.

In connection with the above, the former owners, at the beginning as in my telegrams, must pay to the court out of the selling price 20% of the appraised value (\$2,110 for one boat and \$1,017 for the other) and also court costs (\$178.86 for one and \$185.80 for the other).

It is expected that the same procedure will be followed in the cases of the other five boats. However, the above being a civil case, a decision is expected, but criminal procedure still remains, but this also is expected to be disposed of with leniency.

*Mackay Radio*

30 SEPT. 1941.

No. 259  
From: Kita  
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo  
Trace baggage.

2 OCT. 1941.

No. 262  
From: Kita  
To: Koshi Washington  
Ryoji San Francisco  
Foreign Minister Tokyo

Once more on September 30 two other boats were sold, in the same way as explained in my previous telegram, to the Hawaii Canning Company court procedure being followed.

*R. C. A.*

4 OCT. 1941.

No. 264  
From: Kita  
Ao: Koshi Washington  
Foreign Minister Tokyo

The special session of the Legislature of Hawaii which open from September 15th for the purpose of considering legislation for war time action (M-Ray Bill) passed the aforesaid bill and the Territorial Governor affixed his signature to it on the 3rd. This bill invests far-reaching authority in the Territorial Governor in case of war, chief provisions of which are: the organization of special police and fire fighting forces and medical squads, etc., anti-air preparations, the utilization of community installations and highways, the regulation of food supplies and commodity prices, the control of rumors etc., in order to put the above measures into effect a budget of \$500,000 is being appropriated. Details by mail.



R. C. A.

1941 Oct. 10.

No. 266

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington  
Foreign Minister Tokyo

According to information in the newspapers delegate King who is here at present says that as for the plan for a revision of the Territorial Nationality Law, the United States wants to settle the problem of dual citizenship, but a complete settlement without negotiating with the interested countries cannot be expected. Consequently after the delegate returns to Washington and has conferred with the War Department, it is his intention to introduce into Congress a resolution requesting provisions for the breaking-off of nationality from the countries concerned.

R. C. A.

20 Oct. 1941.

No. 272

From: Kita

To: Ryoji San Francisco

The State Department has no objection to the landing of Maeda (Jimushokan) at either Honolulu to San Francisco and will omit formalities, according to information received from the American Embassy in Tokyo on the 20th Please transmit the above information to Maeda upon the arrival of the Tatuta Maru.

22 Oct. 1941.

No. 274

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington  
Foreign Minister Tokyo  
Ryoji San Francisco

Since there is room for 50 first class and 80 second class passengers on the Taiyo Maru, it is suggested that the Tatsuta Maru allotment be made use of and transferred to the Taiyo Maru here. Please reply by telegraph.

R. C. A.

22 Oct. 1941

No. 275

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington  
Ryoji San Francisco

The passengers on the Taiyo Maru are as follows: (Table below of 5 columns and 6 rows)

| Nationality                     | 1st class | 2nd class | 3rd class | Total |
|---------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| Japanese.....                   | 5         | 20        | 124       | 149   |
| American of Jap extraction..... | 1         | 28        | 150       | 179   |
| Americans (?).....              | 2         | 11        | None      | 13    |
| English.....                    | 1         | None      | None      | 1     |
| Total.....                      | 9         | 59        | 274       | 342   |

R. C. A.

22 Oct. 1941

No. 276

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington  
Ryoji San Francisco

The Taiyo Maru, requisitioned by the Imperial Government, sailed from Yokohama today the 22nd

Consul Iwanaga Hiraku (-----)

and Doi Tomoyoshi (-----)

an official in the communications department were given passage by the kantoku (Doi is qualified as a shipping kantoku).

R. C. A.

No. 279

24 Oct. 1941

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington

The Foreign Minister is presenting a commemorating gift to the recently resigned honorary consuls at Philadelphia and San Juan (one cloisonne flower vase each). These are being sent in two wooden boxes addressed to the embassy (Washington) in the care of Consul Iwanaga, who is a passenger on the Taiyo Maru sailing from here on the 22nd. It is requested that arrangements be made for their clearance through customs and ultimate delivery.

R. C. A.

No. 284

25 Oct. 1941

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Mr. Crichton Colvin an American of the International News Service has requested a visa for a stopover in Japan. He expects to leave here on the Tatuta Maru sailing November 4th. Instructions requested.

R. C. A.

No. 285

25 Oct. 1941

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

Since the time limit for reporting is near, shall this office and its staff report? Please telegraph immediately instructions and items of the report.

R. C. A.

No. 287

25 Oct. 1941

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Re your No. 96 Newman wishes to return to Japan on the Taiyo Maru leaving here Nov. 4th. After conferring with the head of the department, please let me know if you have any objections.

*Mackay Radio*

No. 299

1 Nov. 1941

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

The Taiyo Maru arrived safely on the first it is being handled by the Americans in the same manner as was the Tatsuta Maru the above information was received from both Doi, an official in the office and from the Chief of the Shipping Bureau.

*Mackay Radio*

No. 302

4 Nov. 1941

From: Kita

To: Ryoji New York City

Consul Clerk Tokunaga Honolulu to Lisbon via New York extend courtesies.

6 November 1941

From: Kita

To: Ryoji Seattle Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

The Taiyo Maru departed safely at 7:40 p m on the fifth carrying 23 bags of 3rd class mail.

The above information has been received from both Manager Doi and the Chief of the Marine Bureau (harbor master?).

*Mackay Radio*

7 NOVEMBER 1941

No. 309

From: Kita

To: Ryoji San Francisco

Consul Clerk Tokunaga arrives San Francisco twelfth on Lurline.

452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*Mackay Radio*

7 NOVEMBER 1941

No. 310

From: Kita

To: Tokio Foreign Minister

After granting Newman's visa, he informs us that he has cancelled his passage on the Taiyo Maru and will remain here for the presnt.

*Mackay Radio*

11 NOVEMBER 1941

No. 316

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

Secretary of War Stimson on the third pointed out to Congress that the aliens in Hawaii amount to one-tenth of the total population and emphasizing the danger of strikes and sabotage he demanded that in case of the existence of an emergency on an attack, the President should be granted the right to declare martial law in Hawaii and also Porto Rico. According to information from Washington on the 4th, Delegate King issued a protesting statement to the effect that the above was an insult to the loyalty and patriotism of the (local) Government and people. The territorial Governor also reported that since the power to declare martial law was already vested in the Governor of the Territory there was no necessity for such legislation. In short, the recent Army proposal was to permit the President to directly order the local military commander to put martial law into effect.

*R. O. A.*

12 NOVEMBER 1941

No. 321

From: Kita

To: Koshi Washington

Ryoji San Francisco

Following from Ambassador Kurusu: Although I have no objections for various reasons I would like you to take care of Washington's decision in this affair.

Wants some thing forwarded immediately to San Francisco (may be the results of above).

18 NOVEMBER 1941

No. 331

From: Kita

To: Yuoji San Francisco

Koshi Washington

Foreign Minister Tokyo

Local postal inspections (Yumuvensakan) announced on the 17th that from now on arrivals and departures of clippers and ships (except for Hawaiian (local) mail ships?) will not be published.

*Mackay Radio*

18 NOVEMBER 1941

No. 332

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc. Burma Road trucks 3,000 2-ton trucks.

*Mackay Radio*

24 Nov 1941

No. 341

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Spend \$200 ? ? ? ? ?

*Mackay Radio*

25 Nov. 1941.

No. 345

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington.

Consulate personnel.

No. 362

*R. C. A.*

3 DEC. 1941

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

Consul San Francisco

## URGENT REPORT

1. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on 2nd.
2. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on 3rd.

*R. C. A.*

No.

3 DEC. 1941

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo #363

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third

*R. C. A.*

No. 364

4 DEC. 1941

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo

PM/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X Approximately 100 tons one stack one four inch gun fwd and aft X fueled?

Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British Consulate

*R. C. A.*

No. 365.

4 DEC. 1941.

From: Kita.

To: FM Tokyo.

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th.

*Radiogram R. C. A.*

No. 368.

6 DEC. 1941.

From: Kita.

To: F. M. Tokyo.

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

*R. C. A.*

No. 369.

6 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Washington-Tokyo.

On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and one sweeper entered port.

Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: BB-9, CL-3, DD-17, am-3.

Ships in dock: CL-4, DD-2.

(CA (cruiser) and CV (carrier) all — —).

P. S.—CV cannot be found in the fleet (?).

454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT "E"

*Mackay Radio*

No. 67.

24 MARCH 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

00490 (Please convey the following) to Sato, non official staff of the Bureau of American Affairs Please let me know whether the above kokku person has boarded the Nitta Maru or not ( let me know also) the above name.

*Globe Wireless, Ltd.*

No. 68.

24 MARCH 1941.

From: Consul General Kita.

To: Tadashi Morimura, Nitta Maru.

As you (your ship) reach the wharf please wait at your cabin for Vice Consul Okuda is to meet you.

*Mackay Radio*

No. 74.

27 MARCH 1941.

From: Nagao Kita.

To: Takao, Fumiko, Comino, Minami-Kanachi-Gun, Osaka, Japan.

Received notice of your uncle's death. I extend my consolation.

*Globe Wireless, Ltd.*

No. 80.

2 APRIL 1941.

From: Consul General Kita.

To: Ambassador Kurusu, Tatsuta Maru.

Wish you bon voyage. Please let me know where to send the doll.

*RCA*

No. 91.

15 APRIL 1941.

From:

To: Haruno Yoshise, 19 Kasumicho, Azabu-Ku, Tokyo.

Received your wire I am glad I am healthy sky is clear and gay the morning of the 15th.

NOTE: Message asked by the Consul General.

*Globe Wireless, Ltd.*

No. 106.

30 APRIL 1941.

From: Consul General Kita.

To: Captain Asama Maru.

Please advise me if Hana Kusanobu is on board your ship.

*Mackay Radio*

No. 112.

12 MAY 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Consul, New Orleans, La.

(Please convey) the following to Representative Shimizu. I extend my condolence to the death of Representative Yamaji.

*RCA*

No. 127

2 JUNE 1941.

From: Consul General Kita.

To: Gaku-Yoo-Do, Canton (is the name of a book store or hotel).

Having seen the death of Mr. Seltaro Mori in the papers. I extend my deep consolation.

Note in handwriting on face of message: "Message asked by Consul General."

ROA

No. 128.

2 JUNE 1941.

From: Nagao Kita.

To: Lady Maki, 167 Kagomachi, Koishikawa-Ku, Tokyo.

Having seen the news of the death of your husband in the papers I really don't know how to extend my consolation.

Note in handwriting on face of message: "Message asked by Consul General."

ROA

No. 135.

7 JUNE 1941.

From: Kita, Consul General,

To: Karafuto Village Head, Tofuchi, Ootomari City (Sanchlin).

Your letter dated the seventh concerning Masao Mato (you have cited as Asao, but we have no such person with that name) his statement of residence dated February 1 has already been sent to the mayor of Ootomari City.

R O A Radiogram

No. 145.

20 JUNE 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Consul Shanghai.

I extend my consolation to Mrs. Councillor Akagi for her husband's death.

Note in handwriting on message: "Message asked by Consul General Kita."

Mackay Radio

No. 167.

11 JULY 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Minister, Washington, D. C.

00340 From Ambassador Shigemitsu to Minister Wakasugi. I thank you very much for your kindness during my stay also convey my thanks to Councillor Iguchi and to Ikashokei (May be Mr. Ikasho) Further convey my best wishes to Obata and Kawakami.

Mackay Radio

No. 168.

11 JULY 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Consul, San Francisco.

00160 From Ambassador Shigemitsu. Received yours. I thank you very much for your hospitality during my stay at your place. Please convey the same thought to your wife.

Mackay Radio

No. 183.

24 JULY 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Koshi (Minister), Washington, D. C.

00400 40177 Concerning the debt of your honor and employee Kusanobu it has been sent by me as dated July ninth number nine.

ROA

No. 198.

2 AUG. 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Consul, Los Angeles, Cal.

Kiyoshi is on Asama Maru He is well Busy in various things Take care.

Handwritten note on message: "Consul General private message."

456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*R. C. A. Radiogram*

13 AUG. 1941.

No. 215

From: Kita.

To: Consul Canton.

I am taking your trouble to convey my words of condolence to the President Chin (may be Chan or Chen) and also to Mrs. Chin Heki (also Chinese name) concerning the death of Mrs. K (name).

*R. C. A.*

16 AUG. 1941.

No. 219.

From: Kita.

To: Masaki, interpreter

c/o Japanese Consulate General Shanghai.

Please cancel the thing which I asked your favor a few days ago for it has been arranged. Will let you know the details by mail. Give my best regards to your colleagues and to my friends.

*Globe Wireless, Ltd.*

17 OCT. 1941.

No. 270.

From: Kita.

To: Maeda, purser **Tatsuta Maru.**

Please let me know sure whether the ship is planning to refuel with oil here or not.

*Globe Wireless, Ltd.*

29 OCT. 1941.

No. 296.

From: Kita.

To: Consul Iwanaga **Taiyomaru**

Is the ticket in the possession of Secretary and Mrs. Tokumaga a straight ticket to San Francisco or just until Honolulu. Further please let me know whether you have reserved (hotel reservation) and also the number of members.

*Mackay Radio*

15 NOV. 1941.

No. 327.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister. Tokyo.

G000GAI (type of telegram) Please deliver the inclosed letter from Okuda which should have been entrusted to clerk Mori of the personal affairs section by calling out whomsoever is living at Okuda's home (request telegram).

HU 303 CB Tokio 42 JG 6 1001PM

1941 Dec 6 AM 7 07

Riyoji Honolulu

01270 Nanatuki hatihizuke kogosangoo noloriwa nanatuki nijuuhatihi hatituki rokuhizuke nihatiticoo nireihatigoo nimeilwa kyuctuki juugohizuke sanitinigoo minisanmeilwa juutkihatihi juutuki sanhizuke saaninigoo itiyonreinei juutuki nirzuke sanninanagoo sawkyuumei oyobi doojituzuke sannihatigoo juumeira juutituki juuhatihi juutituki itihizuke sangooyongoo sanreigoomeilwa juunituki yonhuizukenite kokuseki ridatuseri

**Togo**

[Translation]

Riyoji (Consul) Honolulu

The remainder of #53 dated (gazetted) July 8, July 28, August 6. #281, #208 of 2 persons are dated (gazetted) as September 15. #312 of 223 persons are dated (gazetted) as October 8, October 3. #322 of 140 persons are dated (gazetted) as October 2. #3277 of 39 persons are also dated (gazetted) as same date. #326 of 10 persons are dated (gazetted) as November 18, November 1. #3, #4, #30 persons are dated (gazetted) as December 4. And thus were expatriated.

**Togo.**

## EXHIBIT "F"

#320

Riyoji San Francisco

1941 Nov 12 PM 8 40

90063 dalate 02160 kurusutaisi clipper engine koshoonlyori Midway shuppatsu  
nihitien juunihī gogogoji bujitootini toochakuseri

KITA

Translation:

Riyoji (Consul) San Francisco

90063 Diate (?) 02160

Because of engine trouble of the Clipper, Ambassador Kurusu departure from  
Midway delayed. He arrived here safely on the 10th, 5 p. m.

KITA (Consul General Kita)

The same telegram was sent to the following:

Koshi (Minister) Washington, D. C.

Gaimu-Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo.

1941 Nov 13 PM 5 52

#323

Gaimuda Jin Tokio

90064 Sookooate

00280 kurusutaisi judsanri gogosanji California Clipper nite kitimuke shuppatsu-  
tuseri nao United Airlines tootishayori kiti dooshaye juuyonhi gogorokujī  
yonzuugofun kitihatu zyuugohigogo nijigojuppon kufutyaku nohikooki arrange  
katadaden serutikoro kikanyorimo nenotane miolotanikame okusgaitasi  
gaimudaijin zaibetaisie tendenseri

KITA

[Translation]

Gaimu Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo

Ambassador Kurusu left for your place by the California Clipper at 3:00 p. m.  
on the 13th. Further, (we asked) the United Airlines Company of Honolulu  
to wire the same company of San Francisco to arrange for reservation of plane  
leaving San Francisco at 6:45 p. m. on the 14th reaching Washington at 2:50  
on the 15th. To make sure, I wish you to ascertain the above. (We also) tele-  
grammed to Foreign Minister and to the Ambassador to the U. S.

KITA (Consul General Kita)

The above telegram also sent to the following:

Ryoji, San Francisco (Consul)

Koshi, Washington, D. C. (Minister)

1941 Nov 15 AM 10 12

GAIMUDAIJIN TOKYO

GOOGAI ZINZIKA MORIZOKUTE OKUDAYORI GOIRAIŠUBEKI FUUSHO-  
RUSUTAKU YOBIDASINOUE OWATASIKOU KAKKO IRAIHOO KAKKO

KITA

[Translation]

Gaimu-Daijin (Foreign Minister) Tokyo

PLEASE HAND OVER THE SEALED LETTER WHICH OKUDA WISHES  
TO BE FORWARDED TO MORI CLERK OF THE PERSONNEL AFFAIRS  
BUREAU BY CALLING SOMEONE LIVING AT OKUDA'S RESIDENCE. (RE-  
QUEST)

KITA (Consul General Kita)

## EXHIBIT "G"

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate  
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining the message number  
861.

Re: Cancellation of portion of freeze order (?)

----- (?)

Ditto to the Minister #535

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate  
at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 854:

Re: Transmission by wire of secret expenses for third period and tem-  
porarily increased amount.



The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 851:

Re: Ango Fugo (Ango code or cryptograph)

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 863:

Re: Reports of movements, etc., of warships and ships.

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 852:

Re: Sending of families traveling expenses.

The "register of messages received" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 857:

"Request Telegram"

The following message was decoded at the Honolulu Office as being encoded in Code Type GO-307 (4-1) being that described in enclosure "C":

1941 DEC 7 AM 3 20

No. 864

ZL MRHU68 Tokio JG 19 9PM 6TH

Japanese Consul Honolulu

Relations strained between Japan and the United States and Britain.

Togo

The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 367:

Re: Movements of U. S. warships and ships.

The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 366:

"Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU"

The "register of messages transmitted" maintained by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu reflects the following information pertaining to message number 360:

To: (?)

#### EXHIBIT 3

These are work sheets for use in decoding messages based on the Japanese "Telegraphic Code Type 'O'."

There are three groups of coding on page one, the last group continuing on page two. The decode of the last group when translated into English is as follows:

(Strictly Confidential)

Of late in Japan the demand for American dollar currency has increased. In view of this, when mei jin (the English equivalent of this is master or expert) return to Japan, please arrange so that they will, as far as possible, not bring back money orders but bring with them paper currency in as large amounts as possible.

There are also two radiogram blanks containing 16 and 12 vertical groups respectively of 19 letters which resemble the above-described work sheets.

These work sheets are also similar to the photostatic copies of work sheets found at the Consulate and forwarded to the Bureau by letter dated February 27, 1942.

#### EXHIBIT 4

The following is the special method for using "WA" and "O" (or "WO") code:

##### 1. Special method for using the "WA" code.

This method is to be used for strictly secret telegrams and, similar to the method of use in the past, is an instrument for transposing letters. The following five ways are the methods for using this instrument:

(a) Based on two separate key words such as *kanda*, *kudan* with five letters as a unit, we transpose letters alternately. The words shall be composed of five letters of the "alphabet" with one index taken from *c*, *g*, and *o* and placed as the second and the fourth letters with the same vowel (including *v*) picked at random placed as the first, third, and the fifth letters. For instance, *icici*, *agaga*, *uouou*. (Thereonafter where the index is made up of five letters (?) of the "alphabet" is the same in all of the special methods for using "WA" and

"O" (or "WO") codes. Furthermore, since in the index of the special method for using the "WA" code where one vowel picked at random is repeated in the first, third, and the fifth letters is common to all, this will not be indicated severally.

\*(*kanda, kudan* are crossed out with red pencil and in the margin directly overhead is written "revised 6-1, (a) *AKASAKA*")

(b) As in (a), we transpose letters alternately based on two separate key words such as *sanso, suisso* having five letters as a unit. As index, we place either *z, j, or x* as the second and the fourth letters. For instance, *isisi, ejje, oxoxo*.

\*(*sanso, suisso* are crossed out with red pencil and in the margin directly overhead is written "SEKITAN") 6243715

(c) Based on three separate key words such as *Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka* with five letters as a unit, we transpose letters alternately. As index we place *t* and *d* as second and fourth letters. For instance, *atata, ududu*.

\**Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka* crossed out. Inserted in margin is "FUKUOKA." 2637541

(d) We base the transposition of the key word, *Otohime* with seven letters as a unit. As index we use either *b, v, or p*.

\**Otohime* crossed out and *AKISAME* 1547243 inserted in margin.

(e) We transpose letters alternately based on two separate key words such as *Kumagai, Naozane* with seven letters as a unit. As index we use either *m* or *n* as the second and fourth letters. For instance, *imim, enene*.

2. Special method for using "O" (or "WA") code. This method of use is being established to supplement the SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "WA" CODE, and is the same as (1) when it comes to being based on transposition of letters. However, (c) shall be limited to usage only when communicating in regard to telegraphic code.

(a) Transposition shall be based on the key word, *x Tagonoura*, having nine letters as a unit. In the case of index of SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "O" CODE, it is the opposite to that of "WA" code. The same uniform consonant shall be placed as the first, third, and fifth letters, and the same vowel picked at random shall be placed as the second and fourth letters. As the first, third, and fifth letters of the index for (a) either *l* or *r* shall be used. For instance, *lolol, rurur*.

*x* means this was suspended after 7-15.

(b) Transposition shall be based on the key word, *x Odanobunaga*, having eleven letters as a unit. Either *t* or *d* shall be used as first, third, and fifth letters of this index. For instance, *totot, didid*.

*x* means this was suspended after 7-15.

(c) Based on key word, *Hanayoridango*, having thir *x* teen letters as unit. Either *h* or *f* shall be used first, third, and fifth letters of the index. For instance, *hahah*.

\**Hanayoridango* is crossed out and following inserted: SOKOKUNOTAMENI

(d) Based on key word, *Kinokuniyabunzaomon*, having nineteen letters as unit. As index, either *k* or *g* is used as first, third, and fifth letters.

(Annotation) When based on this SPECIAL METHOD OF USE, the index of the ordinary method shall absolutely not be attached to either "WA" code or "O" (or "WO") code.

\*The following word is inserted in the margin:

K I N O K U N I Y A B U N Z | A E M O N  
7 5 10 14 8 16 11 6 18 13 17 12 19 2 4 9 15 13

3. Method or arrangement of end of cryptograms (code ?). The following methods should be expressly used in arranging the ends of both SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "WA" CODE and SPECIAL METHOD OF USE OF "O" (or "WO") CODE.

(a) When transposing based on five letters as a unit, if fillers are necessary for the end words, after using fillers, (on fillers refer to (c)) arrange the five letters of the end word(s) according to day telegram is dispatched in the following manner:

|                    |       |
|--------------------|-------|
| (A) day with 1, 6  | 54321 |
| (B) day with 2, 7  | 43215 |
| (C) day with 3, 8  | 32154 |
| (D) day with 4, 9  | 21543 |
| (E) day with 5, 10 | 15432 |

(b) When transporting with seven or more letters as unit:

(A) When prescribed transposition ends exactly at the end of the cryptograms:

(1) When this ends at the end of one word (five letters), the method in (a) is not necessary.

(2) When this ends in the middle of one word, fillers shall be used to make it into five letters, and the arrangement should be according to the method in (a). Therefore, a portion of the end word shall have twofold transposition.

(B) When at the end of the cryptogram(s) there originates an incomplete number which falls short of filling up the unit:

(1) When the end of the portion with completed transposition comes exactly at the end of one word, an incomplete number will result. In regard to the portion which has incomplete transposition, five letters each shall be arranged according to the method in (a). (When fillers are necessary, use them in the last word.)

(2) When that portion with completed transposition ends in the middle of a word, five letters each shall be arranged according to (a) excepting (in ?) that end portion with transposition completed but not attaining one word (five letters) and that portion which has incomplete transposition. (In other words, the end portion with transposition completed shall be transposed twice. Furthermore, in case of necessity for the use of fillers, using them in the last word is same as in the case of (a).)

\*This paragraph is unclear even in the original text.—Translator.

(c) For fillers in this SPECIAL METHOD OF USE, the fillers prescribed in the code book(s) are not used at all. Appropriate letters which do not make sense should be selected and used. However, in cases where two or more fillers are necessary, be sure to mix and use vowels and consonants. Moreover, be careful not to repeat the same letter or place it one after another, or use them over and over again, or arrange them in "alphabet" order.

(d) The last word (not the last word in the text of the telegram) of a cryptogram which is arranged in the foregoing manner should always be placed at the beginning of the cryptogram (not at the beginning of the text of the telegram). In other words, place the last word of the cryptogram next to the index. (This can be done easily if at the time of dispatching a telegram, a space for one word is left vacant next to the index and after wording of the cryptogram which begins directly after the space is completed the vacant space is filled.)

4. Telegrams based on this method shall all be handled as strictly confidential. Consequently, the word "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL" which in the past was inserted at the beginning of the cryptogram or at the end shall be omitted from this method of usage.

\*In the right hand corner of first page is inscribed the date "1939."

# EXHIBIT 5

[1] Dispatched: April 19, 1939

Received: May 13, 1939

From: Minister ARITA

To: Consul-General MIZUSAWA

Re: RECORDING OF CERTIFICATES OF CUSTODY, CATALOGUES OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENTS, CATALOGUES OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY BURNING.

Code type: (AN)-YU-GO-#5

In the past the names of codes and numbers on telegraphic codes, certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning, have been written as is and transmitted. Since this is very unsatisfactory from the standpoint of protection of the codes when such official messages are opened and detected, hereafter you should revise the method for recording certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning and also the method for recording official messages pertaining to the foregoing as designated below.

| <i>Code Type</i> | <i>Name of country</i> |
|------------------|------------------------|
| I (as in JIM)    | BRITAIN                |
| HO               | FRANCE                 |
| HEN              | GERMANY                |
| CHI              | ITALY                  |
| RI               | SOVIET RUSSIA          |
| NU (or DO)       | BELGIUM                |
| RU               | POLAND                 |
| O (or WO)        | TURKEY                 |
| WA               | UNITED STATES          |
| KA               | BRAZIL                 |
| YO               | CHINA                  |
| REN              | SPAIN                  |
| SO               | PORTUGAL               |
| NE               | HOLLAND                |
| KE               | SIAM                   |
| G                | CANADA                 |
| I (as in DIME)   | CUBA                   |
| J                | MEXICO                 |
| L                | PERU                   |
| O                | CHILE                  |
| Q                | ARGENTINA              |
| W                | MANCHUKUO              |
| R                | EGYPT                  |
| Y                | HUNGARY                |

0 \_\_\_\_\_ se  
1 \_\_\_\_\_ ka  
2 \_\_\_\_\_ i  
3 \_\_\_\_\_ ni  
4 \_\_\_\_\_ wa (or ha)  
5 \_\_\_\_\_ wo  
6 \_\_\_\_\_ to  
7 \_\_\_\_\_ na  
8 \_\_\_\_\_ he  
9 \_\_\_\_\_ ru

**Example:** from #306 to #309 4 copies  
NisetoSnlserv (number of copies will  
not be indicated)  
Code type NU, from #98 to #103  
BELGIUM-ruheMkaseni 6 copies

5. In deliveries of certificates of custody of documents, catalogues of transfer of documents, and catalogues of manuscripts destroyed by burning, the name of the subject (RE:) will be recorded as "1999-IU-00-#5."

## 462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## [3] \*\*\*\* Remarks:

1. In the upper margin on page 1 is a rectangular enclosure within which is inserted the word, **STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**.

2. The following are notes recorded in upper margin of page 3:

Code type TSU----- COLUMBIA  
 #1 RULES FOR USAGE OF SAME (?) MATSU----- NICARAGUA  
 #2 RULES FOR USAGE OF SAME----- COSTA RICA

(this portion appears in the upper margin directly overhead section 1 of foregoing translation.—Translator.)

3. Refer to Telegram from the Minister YU-GO-#280 dated 8-17-40)  
 (the above note appears in the upper margin on page 3 following that of (2) directly above.—Translator.)

CONFIDENTIAL

File 336.92

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—o/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

Japanese Consulate & Consular Agents—Translation of Japanese Consulate  
 Radio Log Book

## EXHIBIT 6

## [1] CATALOGUE OF TELEGRAPHIC CODES

(Connected with Foreign Office)

| Type of code                                |          |            | Number         |                                                                    | Copies |
|---------------------------------------------|----------|------------|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| 1. NE                                       | Holland  | 88         | hehe           |                                                                    |        |
| 2. G                                        | Canada   | 147        | kahana         |                                                                    |        |
| 3. I (eye)                                  | Cuba     | 147        | kahana         |                                                                    |        |
| 4. I.                                       | Peru     | 146        | kahato         |                                                                    |        |
| 5.                                          |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 6. I (sit)                                  | Britain  | 189 to 191 | kahezuNkaruka  |                                                                    |        |
| 7.                                          |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 8. HO                                       | France   | 54         | woha           |                                                                    |        |
| 9.                                          |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 10. HEN                                     | Germany  | 129 to 130 | kairuKkanise   |                                                                    |        |
| 11.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 12. O                                       | Turkey   | 232 to 234 | iniSiintha     |                                                                    |        |
| 13.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 14. YO                                      | China    | 40         | hase           |                                                                    |        |
| 15.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 16. NU (or DO)                              | Belgium  | 363 to 365 | nitoniSiintowo |                                                                    |        |
| 17.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 18.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 19. Revised-L                               | Peru     | 55 to 56   | wowoKwoto      |                                                                    |        |
| 20.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 21. SO                                      | Portugal | 138        | kanibe         | {A, 1<br>B, 1}                                                     |        |
| 22.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 23.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 24.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 25. TSU                                     | Colombia | 172        | kanal          | {MATSU, 1<br>UME, 1<br>SAKURA, 1<br>FUJI, 1<br>HAGI, 1<br>KIKU, 1} |        |
| 26.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 27.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| [2] 28. RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU"            |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| (MATSU)-#1                                  |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| NICARAGUA                                   |          | 172        | kanal          |                                                                    | 1      |
| 29. RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU"                |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| (MATSU)-#2                                  |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| COSTA RICA                                  |          | 172        | kanal          |                                                                    | 1      |
| 30.                                         |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 31. TO NICARAGUA                            |          | 195 to 196 | karuwoKkaruto  |                                                                    | 2      |
| 32. {32, 33 for general use—2 copies        |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 33. {NEW ZEALAND-1                          |          | 195 to 196 | karuwoSkaruto  |                                                                    |        |
| 34. X {34, 35 for personal affairs—2 copies |          | 195 to 196 | karuwoMkaruto  |                                                                    | 6      |
| 35. {NEW ZEALAND-2                          |          |            |                |                                                                    |        |
| 36. {36, 37 for finances—2 copies           |          | 195 to 196 | karuwoUkaruto  |                                                                    |        |
| 37. {NEW ZEALAND-3                          |          | 196 to 196 |                |                                                                    |        |

## CATALOGUE OF TELEGRAPHIC CODES—Continued

| Type of code                                                                                                      | Number              | Copies        |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| 38. RULES FOR USAGE OF "TSU"—<br>REVISED EDITION #2                                                               |                     |               |
| HONDURAS                                                                                                          | 14                  | kaha          |
| 39. Z AFGHANISTAN                                                                                                 | 88                  | hehe          |
| 40. TA VENEZUELA                                                                                                  | 13                  | kani          |
| 41. DEI PANAMA                                                                                                    | 114                 | kakaha        |
| 42. SPECIAL COMMUNICATION<br>NUMBER TABLE-1                                                                       | 76                  |               |
| 43. NUMBERS CHART-1                                                                                               | 114                 |               |
| 44. NUMBERS CHART-1                                                                                               | 114                 |               |
| 45.                                                                                                               |                     |               |
| 46. U(put)URUGUAY                                                                                                 | 176 to 177          | kahatoKkanena |
| 47. HATO (former name: CODE BOOK<br>"RO" FOR JOINT USE BY<br>FOREIGN OFFICE, WAR MIN-<br>ISTRY AND NAVY MINISTRY) | 12 (old number: 35) |               |
| 48. RULES FOR USE OF ABOVE<br>(HATO)                                                                              | 12                  |               |
| 49. EXPLANATION OF RULES FOR<br>USE OF ABOVE                                                                      | 12                  |               |
| 50. MIXED NUMBERS TABLE FOR<br>ABOVE (HATO)-1                                                                     | 12                  |               |
| 51. MIXED NUMBERS TABLE FOR<br>ABOVE-2                                                                            | 12                  |               |
| 52. MIXED NUMBERS TABLE FOR<br>ABOVE-3                                                                            | 12                  |               |
| [5] 53. JI NORWAY                                                                                                 | 81                  | heka          |
| 54. ENCODING AND DECODING<br>TABLE ATTACHED TO<br>ABOVE                                                           | 81                  |               |
| 55. ATTACHED ENCODING AND<br>DECODING TABLE FOR TEL-<br>EGRAPHIC CODE "TA"<br>PARAGUAY                            | 13                  | koni          |

## EXHIBIT 7

|         |           |               |               |
|---------|-----------|---------------|---------------|
| Holland | Turkey    | hehe          | ininiSiniha   |
| Canada  | China     | kahana        | hase          |
| Cuba    | Belgium   | kahana        | nitoniSnitowo |
| Peru    | Peru      | kahato        | woto          |
| Britain | Portugal  | kaheruMkaruka | kenihe        |
| France  | Colombia  | woha          | kenal         |
| Germany | Nicaragua | kairuKkanise  | kanal         |

NOTE: This sheet is identical with the foregoing one except that alongside PERU is "wowoKwoto". The second sheet is also identical with the foregoing one except that alongside PERU is "wowo."

## EXHIBIT 8

|        |                 |
|--------|-----------------|
| Turkey | i-ni-i (or ini) |
| Peru   | wo-wo (or wowo) |

(Month)

(Day)

(Year)

NAGAO KITA,  
Consul-General at Honolulu

NOTE: The word "three copies" is inserted in the upper right hand margin.

## EXHIBIT 9

Page 1:  
1. Uruguay

Page 2:  
Panama

kakaha

## EXHIBIT 10

|                                      |                |             |        |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|--------|
| Costa Rica                           | kanal          | Honduras    | kaha   |
| New Guinea                           | karumoKkaruto  | Afghanistan | hehe   |
| New Zealand—1                        | karuwoSskaruto | Venezuela   | kani   |
| New Zealand—2                        | karuwoMkaruto  | Panama      | kakaha |
| New Zealand—3                        | karuwoUkaruto  |             |        |
| Special Communication Number Table—1 | #76            | 1 copy      |        |
| Numbers Table—1                      | #114           | 1 copy      |        |
| Numbers Table—2                      | #114           | 1 copy      |        |
| Uruguay kanatoKkanana                |                |             |        |
| Telegraphic Code Type "Kato"         | #12            |             |        |

## EXHIBIT 11

|                                        |        |      |        |
|----------------------------------------|--------|------|--------|
| Afghanistan                            | hehe   |      |        |
| Venezuela                              | kani   |      |        |
| Panama                                 | kakaha |      |        |
| Special Communication Number Table—1   |        | #76  | 1 copy |
| Numbers Table—1                        |        | #114 | 1 copy |
| Numbers Table—2                        |        | #114 | 1 copy |
| Uruguay kanatoKkanana                  |        |      |        |
| Telegraphic Code Type "Hato"           |        | #12  |        |
| Rules of Usage of Same                 |        | #12  |        |
| Explanation of Rules for Usage of Same |        | #12  |        |
| Mixed Numbers Table of Same—#1         |        | #12  |        |
| Mixed Numbers Table of Same—#2         |        | #12  |        |
| Mixed Numbers Table of Same—#3         |        | #12  |        |
| Norway heka                            |        |      |        |
| Attached Encoding and Decoding Table   |        | #81  | 1 copy |
| Paraguay kani                          |        |      |        |

-----

(Month)      (Day)      (Year)

NAGAO KITA  
*Consul-General at Honolulu*

## EXHIBIT 12

|               |               |               |               |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Holland       | hehe          | Italy         | kaseruUkakase |
| Canada        | kahana        | Turkey        | iniiSiniha    |
| Cuba          | kahana        | China         | hase          |
| Peru          | kahato        | United States | kaheseIkaheka |
| Chile         | kaito         | Belgium       | nitoniSnitowo |
| Britain       | kaheruMkaruka | Peru          | wowoKwoto     |
| France        | woha          | Spain         | kanaha        |
| Germany       | kairuKkanise  | Portugal      | kanihe        |
| Soviet Russia | kakaseAkakaka |               |               |

9-8-39

KOSAKU MIZUSANA, *Consul-General*  
 BINJIRO KUDO, *Acting Consul-General*

## EXHIBIT 13

|               |               |               |               |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Holland       | hehe          | Italy         | kaseruUkakase |
| Canada        | kahana        | Turkey        | iniiSiniha    |
| Cuba          | kahana        | China         | hase          |
| Peru          | kahato        | United States | kaheseIkaheka |
| Chile         | kaito         | Belgium       | nitoniSnitowo |
| Britain       | kaheruMkaruka | Peru          | wowoKwoto     |
| France        | woha          | Spain         | kanaha        |
| Germany       | kairuKkanise  | Portugal      | kanihe        |
| Soviet Russia | kakaseAkakaka |               |               |

12-31-39

BINJIRO KUDO  
*Acting Consul-General*

NOTE: Writing on upper right hand corner of margin on page 1 reads: "three copies."

## EXHIBIT 14

|               |               |               |               |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Holland       | hehe          | Italy         | kaseruUkakase |
| Canada        | kahana        | Turkey        | inliSiniha    |
| Cuba          | kahana        | China         | hase          |
| Peru          | kahato        | United States | kaheseIkaheka |
| Chile         | kalto         | Belgium       | nitoniSnitowo |
| Britain       | kaheruMkaruka | Peru          | wowoKwoto     |
| France        | woha          | Spain         | kanaha        |
| Germany       | kairuKkanise  | Portugal      | kanihe        |
| Soviet Russia | kakaseAkakaka |               |               |

3-13-40

Acting Consul-General: BINJIRO KURO  
 Consul-General: KUCHI GUNJI

## EXHIBIT 15

|               |               |               |               |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Holland       | hehe          | Turkey        | inliSiniha    |
| Canada        | kahana        | China         | hase          |
| Cuba          | kahana        | United States | kaheseIkaheka |
| Peru          | kahato        | Belgium       | nitoniSnitowo |
| Chile         | kalto         | Peru          | wowoKwoto     |
| Britain       | kaheruMkaruka | Spain         | kanaha        |
| France        | woha          | Portugal      | kanihe        |
| Germany       | kairuKkanise  | Colombia      | kanal         |
| Soviet Russia | kakaseAkakaka | Nicaragua     | kanal         |
| Italy         | kaseruUkakase | Costa Rica    | kanal         |

9-11-40

KIICHI GUNJI, Consul-General  
 OTOJIRO OKUDA, Acting Consul-General

## EXHIBIT 16

|                |               |               |               |
|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| [1] Holland    | Belgium       | kahana        | wowoKwoto     |
| Canada         | Peru          | kahana        | kanaha        |
| Cuba           | Spain*        | kahato        | kaniha        |
| Peru           | Portugal      | kalto         | kanal         |
| Chile*         | Colombia      | kaheruMkaruka | kanal         |
| Britain        | Nicaragua     | woha          | kanal         |
| France         | Costa Rica    | kairuKkanise  | karuwoKkaruto |
| Germany        | New Guinea    | kakaseAkakaka | karuwoSkaruto |
| Soviet Russia* | New Zealand-1 | kaseruUkakase | karuwoMkaruto |
| Italy*         | New Zealand-2 | inliSiniha    | karuwoUKaruto |
| Turkey         | New Zealand-3 | hase          | kaha          |
| China          | Honduras      | kaheseIkaheka |               |
| United States* | hehe          | nitoniSnitowo |               |

[2] 12-31-40

Consul-General: KIICHI GUNJI [SEAL]\*

Acting Consul-General: OTOJIRO OKUDA [SEAL]

\*Indicates that these are crossed out.

## EXHIBIT 17

|         |               |               |               |
|---------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Holland | hehe          | Peru          | wowoKwoto     |
| Canada  | kahana        | Portugal      | Kenihe        |
| Cuba    | kahana        | Colombia      | kanal         |
| Peru    | kahato        | Nicaragua     | kanal         |
| Britain | kaheruMkaruka | Costa Rica    | kanal         |
| France  | woha          | New Guinea    | karuwoKkaruto |
| Germany | KairuKkanise  | New Zealand-1 | karuwoSkaruto |
| Turkey  | inliSiniha    | New Zealand-2 | karuwoMkaruto |
| China   | hase          | New Zealand-3 | karuwoUkaruto |
| Belgium | nitoniSnitowo | Honduras      | kaha          |

3-14-41

Acting Consul-General:

Consul-General:

OTOJIRO OKUDA [SEAL]

NAGAO KITA [SEAL]



## EXHIBIT 18

|                                      |            |
|--------------------------------------|------------|
| Rules for use of same                | #12        |
| Explanation of rules for use of same | #12        |
| Mixed numbers table #1 of same       | #12        |
| Mixed numbers table #2 of same       | #12        |
| Mixed numbers table #3 of same       | #12        |
| Norway                               | heka       |
| Attached encoding and decoding table | #81 1 copy |
| Paraguay                             | kani       |
| 12-2-41                              |            |

NAGAO KITA,  
Consul-General at Honolulu.

Remarks: This page of which there is one original and two carbon copies appears to be a continuation of another sheet or sheets which are not in possession of the Honolulu Office.

## EXHIBIT 19

*Plans for emergency disposition of telegraphic business*

1. Cryptographic code
  - (a) Burn in case of emergency.
  - (b) Draw up a CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE beforehand.
  - (c) Things to be left to the last and brought home to this Ministry:
    - (1) 3 copies of CATALOGUE OF TRANSFER OF BUSINESS dated 3-14-41.
    - (2) 3 copies of Records of Transfer of Secret Books in 1941.
    - (3) 3 copies each of CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE.

## EXHIBIT 20

*Catalogue of manuscripts destroyed by fire*

| Name of book                                       | Military secrets—                           | Number | Copies |
|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping (A).    | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#154. | 2435   | 1      |
| Naval Code Book "S"-----                           | Navy Ministry—confidential #25.....         | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"—#1..        | Navy Ministry—confidential #26.....         | 173    | 1      |
| #1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S"—#1.  | Navy Ministry—confidential #27.....         | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"—#2..        | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#117. | 173    | 1      |
| #2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S"—#1.  | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#118. | 173    | 1      |
| Temporary Usage "S" for Navy-----                  | Strict military secrets.....                | 4547   | 1      |
| Naval Code Book "S"—C-----                         | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#197. | 647    | 1      |
| Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S"—C (#1). | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#202. | 647    | 1      |

The foregoing were burned Dec. 2, 1941.

A letterhead in red in lower left hand corner reads: Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu.

12-2-41

(from) Nagao Kita, Consul-General at Honolulu  
(to) Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry

Printed words in red in lower left hand corner reads: Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu

This manuscript appears to be the rough draft of "CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS DESTROYED BY FIRE" the translation of which has already been completed. However, since no names were mentioned in the translation, a translation is herewith made of the second page as it might supplement the completed translation.

The foregoing were burned \_\_\_\_\_ (Month) \_\_\_\_\_ (Day) \_\_\_\_\_ (Year)

KAGAO KITA,  
Consul-General at Honolulu.

to: the Aide-de-camp—Navy Ministry.

**EXHIBIT 21.***Record of transfer of secret books for the year 1940*

| Name of book                                                       | Military secrets—#                              | Number | Copies |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping—Overseas Code Book..... | Strictly secret—Navy—#25.....                   | 1475   | 1      |
| Regulations for Usage of Overseas Code Book.....                   | Military secrets—Navy—#525.....                 | 97     | 1      |
| Encoding and Decoding Table for Overseas Code Book.....            | Military secrets—Navy—#539-A.....               | 97     | 1      |
|                                                                    | Military secrets—Navy—#539-B.....               | 97     | 1      |
| Naval Code Book "S".....                                           | Navy Ministry—confidential #25.....             | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"—#1.....                     | Navy Ministry—confidential #26.....             | 173    | 1      |
| #1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S"—#1.....              | Navy Ministry—confidential #27.....             | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"—#2.....                     | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#117..... | 173    | 1      |
| #2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S"—#1.....              | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#118..... | 173    | 1      |

Notification of above is hereby made.

3-13-40

Former custodian: Bynjiro Kudo, Acting Consul-General

New custodian: Kyichi Gunji, Consul-General

Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu

To: the AIDE-DE-CAMP

Navy Ministry

**Remarks**

1. The scribbling at the upper right hand corner of the page reads, "four copies".

2. The last work in the title, 1939, is changed with ink to 1940, and this date is the one inserted in the translation.

3. Also in the title, the words "presently in possession" are crossed out and changed to "transfer of" which term is used in the translation.

4. The date at the end of the record, namely 12-31-39, is crossed out and changed to read 3-13-40, and this is inserted in the translation.

**EXHIBIT 22.***Record of transfer of secret books for year 1939*

| Name of book | Military secrets—No.                            | Number | Copies |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|              | (This portion is identical with the one above.) |        |        |

Notification of above is hereby made.

9-8-39.

Former custodian: KOSAKU MIZUSAWA,  
Consul-General.

New custodian: BINJIRO KUDO,  
Acting Consul-General.

To: the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.

## EXHIBIT 23

*Certificate of custody*

Naval code book "S"—B (strict military secret—Navy Ministry—#197)—— #647  
 Mixed numbers table of naval code book "S"—B (strict military secret—  
 Navy Ministry—#202)----- #647  
 The foregoing are being preserved.  
 8-2-41.

Custodian: NAGAO KITA [PRIVATE SEAL],  
*Consul General at Honolulu.*

To: the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.

## EXHIBIT 24

*Certificate of custody*

|                                                                                                           | Number | Copies |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| 1. Naval Code Book "S" (Navy Ministry—Confidential #25)-----                                              | 173    | 1      |
| 2. Regulations for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"—#1 (Navy Ministry—Confidential #26)-----                  | 173    | 1      |
| 3. #1 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S" (#1) (Navy Ministry—Confidential #27)-----               | 173    | 1      |
| 4. Rules for Usage of Naval Code Book "S"—#2 (Navy Ministry—Confidential #117)-----                       | 173    | 1      |
| 5. #2 Mixed Numbers Table of Naval Code Book "S" (#1) (Straight Military Secrets—Navy Ministry—#118)----- | 173    | 1      |

The foregoing are being held by this office.

KOSAKU MIZUSAWA,  
*Consul-General at Honolulu.*

To: the Aide-de-camp, Navy Ministry.

## EXHIBIT 25

*Record of secret books in hand for year 1938*

| Name of book                                        | Military secrets—                 | Number | Copies |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Secret Telegraphic Regulations on Shipping..        | Strictly Secret—Navy—#25-----     | 1475   | 1      |
| Overseas Code Book.....                             | Military Secrets—Navy—#525-----   | 97     | 1      |
| Regulations for Usage of Overseas Code Book.        | Military Secrets—Navy—#539-A----- | 97     | 1      |
| Encoding and Decoding Table for Overseas Code Book. | Military Secrets—Navy—#539-B----- | 97     | 1      |

Notification of above is hereby made.  
 12-31-38

Custodian: KOSAKU MIZUSAWA,  
*Consul General, Honolulu.*

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry.

*Record of transfer of secret books for the year 1939*

| Name of Book                                         | Military Secret                              | Number | Copies |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Secret Telegraphic Regulations for Shipping-(A)..... | Strict Military Secret Navy Ministry—#154.   | 2435   | 1      |
| Overseas Code Book.....                              | Military Secrets—Navy—#525-----              | 97     | 1      |
| Rules for Usage of Above.....                        | Military Secrets—Navy—#539-A-----            | 97     | 1      |
| Encoding and Decoding Table for Same.....            | Military Secrets—Navy—#539-B-----            | 97     | 1      |
| Naval Code Book "S"-----                             | Navy Ministry—Confidential #25-----          | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for Usage of Same—#1-----                      | Navy Ministry—Confidential #26-----          | 173    | 1      |
| #1 Mixed Numbers Table for Same-1-----               | Navy Ministry—Confidential #27-----          | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for Usage of Same—#2-----                      | Strictly Military Secret—Navy Ministry—#117. | 173    | 1      |
| #2 Mixed Numbers Table for Same-1-----               | Strict Military Secret—Navy Ministry—#118.   | 173    | 1      |
| Temporary Usage "S" for Navy-----                    | Strict Military Secrets-----                 | 4547   | 1      |

Notification of foregoing is hereby made.  
9-11-40

Former custodian: KIICHI GUNJI,  
Consul General

New custodian: OTOJIRO OKUDA,  
Acting Consul-General

*Japanese Consulate-General at Honolulu*

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry

# EXHIBIT 27

## *Record of secret books of 1940 presently in possession*

| Name of book                                       | Military secrets—                           | Number | Copies |
|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Secret telegraphic regulations on shipping (A)     | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#154. | 2435   | 1      |
| Overseas code book                                 | Military secrets—Navy #525                  | 97     | 1      |
| Rules for usage of overseas code book              | Military secrets—Navy—#539-A                | 97     | 1      |
| Encoding and decoding table for overseas code book | Military secrets—Navy—#539-B                | 97     | 1      |
| Naval code book "S"                                | Navy Ministry—Confidential #25              | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for usage of naval code book "S"—#1          | Navy Ministry—Confidential #26              | 173    | 1      |
| #1 mixed numbers table of naval code book "S"—#1   | Navy Ministry—Confidential #27              | 173    | 1      |
| Rules for usage of naval code book "S"—#2          | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#117. | 173    | 1      |
| #2 mixed numbers table of naval code book "S"—#1   | Strict military secrets—Navy Ministry—#118. | 173    | 1      |
| Temporary usage "S" for Navy                       | Strict military secrets                     | 4547   | 1      |

Notification of above is hereby made.  
12-31-40

OTOJIRO OKUDA,  
Acting Consul-General

*Japanese Consulate General At Honolulu*

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry

# EXHIBIT 28

## *Record of transfer of secret books in 1941*

| Name of Book | Military Secrets—#                             | Number | Copies |
|--------------|------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|              | (this portion is identical with the one above) |        |        |

Notification of above is hereby made.  
3-14-41

Person formerly in charge: OTOJIRO OKUDA,  
Acting Consul-General.

Person presently in charge: NAGAO KITA,  
Consul-General,  
*Japanese Consulate,  
General, Honolulu.*

To: the Aide-de-camp Navy Ministry

## EXHIBIT 29

[1] The margin bears the date 9-21-40 written in ink with the 9-21 crossed out with pencil and the date 12-31 inserted with pencil adjacent to the crossed out date.

*Transfer of business catalogue*

|                                                                                                              |                                                               |                                               |                     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "NE" code                                                     | #88 (hehe)                                    | Holland             |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "G" code                                                      | #147 (kahana)                                 | Canada              |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "I" code                                                      | #147 (kehena)                                 | Cuba                |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "L" code                                                      | #146 (kahato)                                 | Peru                |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "O" code                                                      | #126 (kalto)                                  | Chile               |
| *The word Chile is crossed out with red pencil and in the margin above is inserted the words "burned 11-26". |                                                               |                                               |                     |
| 3 copies of                                                                                                  | "I" code                                                      | #189 to #191<br>(kaheruNkaruka)               | Britain             |
| * "I" code—I as in it; "I" is a pronunciation of a Japanese letter.                                          |                                                               |                                               |                     |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "HO" code                                                     | #54 (woha)                                    | France              |
| 2 copies of                                                                                                  | "HEN" code                                                    | #129 to #130<br>(kairuKkaniso)                | Germany             |
| 2 copies of                                                                                                  | "RI" code                                                     | #110 to #111<br>(kakasoAkakaka)               | Russia              |
| *This whole line is crossed out with red pencil.                                                             |                                                               |                                               |                     |
| 8 copies of                                                                                                  | "CHI" code                                                    | #109 to #110<br>(kaseruAkakaso)               | Italy               |
| *This whole line is crossed out with red pencil.                                                             |                                                               |                                               |                     |
| 3 copies of                                                                                                  | "O" (or "WO") code                                            | #232 to #234<br>(InilSiniha)                  | Turkey              |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "YO" code                                                     | #40 (hase)                                    | China               |
| 8 copies of                                                                                                  | "WA" code                                                     | #180 to #181<br>(kaheseIkaheka)               | United States       |
| 3 copies of                                                                                                  | "NU" (or "DO")                                                | #363 to #365<br>(nitoniSnitowo)               | Belgium             |
| 2 copies of                                                                                                  | REVISED "L" code                                              | #55 to #56<br>(wowoKwoto)                     | Peru                |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "REN" code                                                    | #174 (kanaha)                                 | Spain               |
| *This whole line is crossed out with red pencil.                                                             |                                                               |                                               |                     |
| 2 copies of                                                                                                  | "SO" code                                                     | #138 (kanhe)<br>(Sections A & B)              | Portugal            |
| [2] 6 copies of "TSU" code (MATSU, UME, SAKURA, FUJI, HAGI, KIKU)<br>#172 (kanai) Colombia                   |                                                               |                                               |                     |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "TSU" code (MATSU) Use regulations #1                         | #172 (kanai)                                  | Nicaragua           |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "TSU" code (MATSU) Use regulations #2                         | #172 (kanai)                                  | Costa Rica          |
| 2 groups of                                                                                                  | "TO" code—code for use in relaying telegrams)                 | #195 to #196<br>(karuwoKkaruto)               | New Guinea          |
| 2 groups of                                                                                                  | "X" code—telegraphic code                                     | #195, #196 (karuwoSkaruto)<br>(karuwoMkaruto) | New Zealand 1, 2, 3 |
| 1 copy of                                                                                                    | "TSU" code—revised regulations #2 for use of telegraphic code | Honduras                                      |                     |
| 12-31-40                                                                                                     |                                                               |                                               |                     |

(Signed) OTOJIBO OKUDA,  
*Acting Consul-General, Honolulu.*

[3] The page with writing in ink crossed out in pencil reads:

The above transfer of business has been completed.

9-11-40

Person transferring business:

ZENICHI GUNJI,  
*Consul General.*

Person taking over duties:

OTOJIBO OKUDA,  
*Acting Consul-General.*

[4]

*Transfer of duties catalogue (3-14-41)*

|                                                                    |               | Number                           | Number of copies |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|------------------|
| "NE" code                                                          | (Holland)     | 88                               | 1                |
| "G" code                                                           | (Canada)      | 147                              | 1                |
| "I" code                                                           | (Cuba)        | 147                              | 1                |
| "L" code                                                           | (Peru)        | 146                              | 1                |
| "P" code                                                           | (Britain)     | 189 to 191                       | 3                |
| "HO" code                                                          | (France)      | 54                               | 1                |
| "HEN" code                                                         | (Germany)     | 129 to 130                       | 2                |
| "O" (or "HO") code                                                 | (Turkey)      | 232 to 234                       | 3                |
| "YO" code                                                          | (China)       | 40                               | 1                |
| "NU" (or "DO") code (REVISED)                                      | (Belgium)     | 363 to 365                       | 3                |
| REVISED "L" code                                                   | (Peru)        | 55 to 56                         | 2                |
| "SO" code                                                          | (Portugal)    | 138 (A---1 copy)<br>(B---1 copy) | 2                |
| "TSU" code (MATSU, UME, SAKURA, FUJI, HAGI, KIKU) (1 copy of each) | (Colombia)    | 172                              | 6                |
| "TSU" code (MATSU) REGULATIONS FOR USE—#1                          | (Nicaragua)   | 172                              | 1                |
| "TSU" code (MATSU) REGULATIONS FOR USE—#2                          | (Costa Rica)  | 172                              | 1                |
| "TO" code—code for relaying telegrams                              | (New Guinea)  | 195 to 196                       | 2                |
| "X" code                                                           | (New Zealand) | 195 to 196                       | 6                |

\* "I" as in sit; Japanese pronunciation.

## [5] "TSU" code Regulations for use of telegraphic code—#2—revised (Honduras) 14 1

The above transfer of business has been completed.

3-14-41

Person transferring business:

OTOJIRO OKUDA,  
Acting Consul-General.

Person taking over business:

NAGAO KITA,  
Consul-General.*Codes destroyed by burning*

|                        |                              |                 |          |
|------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------|
| Telegraphic code "O"   | #126 (kaito)                 | (Chile)         | 1 copy   |
| Telegraphic code "WA"  | #109 to #110 (kaseruAkakase) | (Italy)         | 8 copies |
| Telegraphic code "RI"  | #110 to #111 (kakaseKkakaka) | (Soviet Russia) | 2 copies |
| Telegraphic code "WA"  | #180 to #181 (kaheseWkaheka) | (U. S.)         | 8 copies |
| Telegraphic code "REN" | #174 (Kenaha)                | (Spain)         | 1 copy   |

11-26-40

(Signed) OTOJIRO OKUDA,  
Acting Consul-General, Honolulu.**EXHIBIT 30***Telegraphic code survey chart*

NOTE: The following is a translation of the first column on the left reading from top to bottom.

1940  
End of July  
End of August  
September 11 (Transfer)  
End of September  
End of October  
End of November  
End of December  
End of January 1941  
End of February 1941

March 14 (Transfer)  
Last day of March  
Last day of April  
Last day of May  
Last day of June  
Last day of July  
Last day of August  
Last day of September  
Last day of October

NOTE: The word in the upper right corner of the chart is "TOTAL."

**EXHIBIT 31**

*Page 1*—Drafted January 4, 1941

*Confidential*

Re: Official Orders YU-GO-#5 1939

Please examine the three enclosures we are submitting in reference to this matter.

*Page 2*

Re: SUBMISSION OF RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and also RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME.

Since 2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and 4 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME is herewith submitted as follows, . . . (following page missing)

*Pages 3 and 4*—Drafted January 4, 1941.

*Confidential*

To: Minister

Re: SUBMISSION OF RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and also RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME

2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR THE YEAR 1940 PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION and 4 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SAME as follows, and we hope you will dispose of the matter at your own discretion.

1. 2 copies of RECORD OF SECRET BOOKS FOR YEAR 1940 IN POSSESSION
2. 2 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SECRET BOOKS 3-13-40
3. 2 copies of RECORD OF TRANSFER OF SECRET BOOKS 9-11-40

**EXHIBIT 32**

Date: 12-2-41

From: Foreign Minister Togo

To: Consul General Kita

Re: Burning of code books.

Code type: (AN)-GO-2445

(Strictly confidential)

Be careful so that outsiders will not find out (?) and immediately take the following steps:

1. Leave one each of code type O (or WO) and RYAKU (type L) and burn all telegraphic codes (including code books used in common by the three Ministries and code books connected with the Navy).
2. Simultaneous with the burning, telegraph the one word, HARUNA.
3. Burn all secret documents containing records of incoming and outgoing telegrams.
4. After taking precautions so that no outside suspicion will not fall, dispose of all secret documents in the same manner.

Since the foregoing measures are in preparation for and in consideration of an emergency, keep this matter to your Consulate alone, and we hope that you will hereafter carry out your duties with calmness and care.

This letter bears the seal of NAGAO KITA and the name OKUDA (the Vice-Consul OTOJIRO OKUDA).

(NOTE): Register of messages transmitted reflects that message #359 is in "re burning of codes".

**EXHIBIT 33**

The following translation was prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Honolulu

19 November, 1941

From: Consul General Muto

To: /not stated/

Subject: Overseas broadcasts in the event of international crisis involving Japan

Order #297 (Memorize)

Foreign Minister Order No. 2253 (19—). Code for chief of consulate/legation, &c.

As a result of pressure of international situation when we may reach the most critical condition at any moment—in such circumstances, because it is a time when telegrams between Japan and opposing countries will be stopped

when an international crisis is near, in our overseas radio broadcasts directed to all points in the middle and at the end of Japanese language news a weather report will be made:

1. If concerning America-Japanese relations: "Kigashi no kaze, ame".
2. If concerning Japan-Russian relations: "Kita no kaze, kumori".
3. If concerning Japan-English relations (including invasion of Thailand, Singapore, Malay, N.E.I., Eastern India): "Nishi no kaze, hare".

By repeating these (phrases) as shown above, it is desired that you make suitable disposition of books and codes.

It is desired that you handle this with the greatest secrecy. It is desired that you, according to this information /pass this news along immediately/?.

## EXHIBIT 34

11-2-41

From: Foreign Minister

To: Consul General Kita

RE: Disposition of ANGO (type of code). Code type L (AN)—Urgent—  
#118 Handler (handling?) of code of head of Consulate

In reference to your telegram, #232, the instructions of the transmitted telegram GO-#2353 do not mean that the ANGO (type of code) should be burned immediately. The point of the broadcast of this matter is that when the worst is about to come about the opposing nation is expected to suspend communication by means of coded telegrams and this (broadcast) is aimed at informing the diplomatic establishment in that nation about this situation without recourse to telegrams. Regardless of what the actual situation is at the place you are stationed, do not dispose of the ANGO unqualifiedly. As far as the real situation permits, preserve it to the very last.

NOTE: The following are inserted in the margin on page 1:

1. Seal of Consul General KITA.
2. Signature of Vice-Consul OKUDA.
3. The number 827 in the upper left margin.

## EXHIBIT 35

[1]

Date: 11-27-41

From: Consul General Muto at San Francisco

To: Consul General Kita

Re: Method of communication (on matters) pertaining to the situation.

Code Type: (AN)-GO-307 4-1

Telegram from the Minister to this Consulate #GO-2400 (4-1) 27th, P. M.

Very urgent

Handler of Kanoho Fugo (code of head of establishment):

At a time when the situation is tense, we are going to use IMMEI DEMPO (telegrams in which names are mentioned, which names are to have certain meanings) in the following manner as method of communication to cope with the critical situation. We hope you will understand.

Since we shall use the names on the left column and compose an appropriate ordinary telegraphic message (plain wording) in order to telegraph contents on the column at the right, we hope that there will be no mistakes in operation (of the code).

Illustration:

"Japanese and Russian troops clashed." This message will be dated the 15th and will read as follows: "Secretaries HIZIKATA and KUBOTA have been ordered to service at your Consulate STOP"

Telegrams in the future which will be based on this method shall always have the word, STOP, inserted at the end of the telegraphic wording so as to distinguish them from the rest of the telegrams. (Consequently, the last word will not be used in other telegrams.)

[2] Date: 11-27-41 P. M.

From: Consul General MUTO at San Francisco

To: Consul General KITA

Code type: GO-307 (4-1)

Telegram from the Minister #2400 (very urgent)

Arimura

Asai

code communication prohibited  
communicate by means of "Radio" broadcasts.



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|            |                                                                                                                          |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Asakura    | listen carefully since communication will be done by means of "radio" broadcasts.                                        |
| Asikaga    | unable to listen in on the overseas broadcasts due to interferences.                                                     |
| Azuma      | pressure on Japan steadily increases.                                                                                    |
| Edoguti    | prepare to evacuate                                                                                                      |
| Hanabusa   | evacuation preparations completed                                                                                        |
| Hanazono   | make preparations to entrust protection of Japanese rights and interests to appropriate foreign representative (Consul). |
| Hatakeyama | diplomatic relations between Japan and _____ severed.                                                                    |
| Hattori    | relations between Japan and _____ imperilled.                                                                            |
| Ibaragi    | send reply telegram on forecast of severance of diplomatic relations with Japan by the country in which you are serving. |
| Inagaki    | are you in receipt of matter pertaining to _____?                                                                        |
| Tsukikana  | am in receipt of matter pertaining to _____                                                                              |
| Kashiwagi  | started positive action against _____                                                                                    |
| Kobayakawa | suspend altogether (granting of) entry and transit visae to _____                                                        |
| [3] Kodama | _____ Japan                                                                                                              |
| Komiyama   | _____ China                                                                                                              |
| Koyahagi   | _____ Britain                                                                                                            |
| Kubota     | Soviet Union                                                                                                             |
| Kuribara   | France                                                                                                                   |
| Kusunoki   | Germany                                                                                                                  |
| Matutani   | Italy                                                                                                                    |

Date: 11-27-41 P. M.  
 From: Consul General in San Francisco  
 To: Consul General KITA  
 Code type: (AN)-GO-807 (4-3)  
 (very urgent)  
 Telegram from the Minister GO-2409

|               |                                                    |
|---------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| Hizikata      | Japanese troops and _____ clashed.                 |
| Hosino        | Japan and _____ are about to start full-scale war. |
| Minami        | United States                                      |
| Miwata        | Canada                                             |
| Miyazaki      | Mexico                                             |
| Morokosi      | Brazil                                             |
| Motizuki      | Panama                                             |
| [4] Kagamine  | Argentina                                          |
| Nakazato      | Thailand                                           |
| Nango         | French Indo-China                                  |
| Nogi (Teigi?) | Netherlands East Indies                            |
| Ogawa         | Malay                                              |
| Okumura       | Australia                                          |
| Onizuka       | South African Union                                |
| Onodera       | enemy nation                                       |
| Otani         | today                                              |
| Onisi         | year                                               |
| Siboya        | next year                                          |
| Simamaka      | this year                                          |
| Sakakibara    | month                                              |
| Sigenori?     | day                                                |
| Sanzyoo?      | hour                                               |
| Ichiro        | 1                                                  |
| Nisaku        | 2                                                  |
| Santaro       | 3                                                  |
| Yoichi        | 4                                                  |
| Goroo         | 5                                                  |
| Masaroku      | 6                                                  |
| Simetaro      | 7                                                  |
| Yasokiti      | 8                                                  |
| Hisamatsu     | 9                                                  |
| Atumi         | 0                                                  |

## EXHIBIT 36

THE FOLLOWING TRANSLATION WAS PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL  
INTELLIGENCE, HONOLULU

158 16 -36

To: CONSUL GENERAL MUTO, SAN FRANCISCO

From: CONSUL GENERAL KITA, HONOLULU

Matters relating to ( ) telegram indicators (authenticators).  
(memorize, : confidential?)

*Paraphrase:*

Instruction by mail #148.

Telegram #383 from the Ambassador.

Telegram #1586 from the Minister (of Foreign Affairs?)

In the future, on The Telegrams originated by this Department, the indicator *Kongo* should be placed in front of the beginning number of *urgent* telegrams, and the indicator *Hyuga* in front of the beginning number of routine (ordinary) telegrams. At the end, in *urgent* Telegrams, use the indicator *Takao* and for ordinary Telegrams use *Atago* at the end.

/Can't decipher all the last line, but it may be/—

Circular telegram should be like Ordinary reports (information).

## EXHIBIT 37

*September 20, 1941.*

From Consul-General Muto at San Francisco.

To Consul-General Kita

(Subject) Matter concerning revision of handling urgent wire.

"AN" (designation used for a certain class of wire—probably cryptograph)

GO #209

Wire order #2040 from the Minister (20th, P. M.)

(strictly secret)

Although there are reasons for sending outgoing wire GO-#1767, recently the number of outgoing and incoming wires have finally decreased. For instance, today's incoming wires have reached a point where it was possible to make a general interpretation. Consequently, henceforth, when attaching "urgent" or "very urgent", give consideration to its content and its urgency. In case very urgent action or reply wire is necessary due to misuse of an urgent report (telegram?), care should be taken so as not to cause important error in its disposition. In this connection, also with the idea of economizing the telegraphic fees in mind, following revision in the handling of urgent and very urgent wires has been made and it has been decided to put it into practice from October 1. Hence, please follow out the above.

## NOTE

1. Emergency wire. (Japanese word used is KINKYU, giving sense of emergency) Matter that requires immediate disposition in spite of the fact that it is late in the night (the word "urgent" should be written on the wire draft). The word KINKU (urgent) should be written at the very beginning of the text.

2. Very urgent wire. (Japanese word used is SHIKYU, giving sense not as urgent as KINKYU). In case a matter is received late in the night and could be taken care of early the next morning.

The word DAIQU (very urgent) should be written at the head of the text.

3. Urgent wire (Japanese word used is SHIKYU, giving a sense that it should be taken care of as soon as possible. In other words, it is urgent, but its urgency is not as strong as when the word KINKYU, mentioned in Note 1 is used.)

Matter that should be disposed of according to priority without regard to the order of the prefix.

The word SIKYU (urgent) should be written at the head of the text.

Please notify immediately with special wire as informed.

The above letter bears the seal of NAGAO KITA, the Consul-General and the name of OKUDA (OTAJIRO OKUDA, the vice-Consul).

## EXHIBIT 38

April 26, 1941. Out.  
May 8, 1941. In.

From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles.  
To: Consul-General KITA.  
(Subject)

Concerning attendance of representatives of the National Christian Council of Japan at the special meeting of the Federal Council of Churches in America. "AN" (designation for a certain class of wire). (code Type) YU-GO #23.

To: The Minister, Number 53 (26th, P. M.)

Regarding your message "25"

The meeting ended as scheduled and the gist of it is as follows:

1. The main subjects of discussion were: the question of uniting the Christian churches of Japan; the Shinto temple question in Korea; and the question of improving the America-Japan relations.

2. Furthermore, a change was made to extend the meeting about a month and dividing the group into four branches, such matters as concrete plan of improving America-Japan relations which are now confronting them, the religious questions relating to the United States and Japan, and the measures that should be taken by the churches as churches will be studied by a conference of mixed group consisting of the Japanese and Americans.

3. A joint communique will be issued by this Council within a few days.

4. A consultation will be held at New York on May 13 and the last meeting will be held in Chicago for 3 days, starting from May 29.

Furthermore, the party, with the exception of KAGAWA, is scheduled to leave for Japan on June 5.

Above has been sent by "AN" (certain type of wire) to the Ambassador in America and other offices in America.

The above letter bears the seal of NAGAO KITA, Consul General and the name OKUDA (OTOJIRO OKUDA, Vice-Consul).

## EXHIBIT 39

Translator's note: The red stamp is KITA's seal. ODUDA.

JUNE 9, 1941. Out.  
JUNE 19, 1941. In.

From: Consul NAKAUCHI of Los Angeles  
To: Consul-General KITA

(Subject) Matter concerning strike by employees of North American Aircraft Plant :a--

"RYAKU" (designation used for a certain class of wire—probably code) #33.

To: Minister. #92 (9th, P. M.)

Regarding the outgoing wire #67.

(JORD—probably means information A)

Later developments of the strike is as follows:

1. At the big meeting (general meeting) held in the afternoon on the 8th by the employees, FRANKENSTEIN who was sent by the AUW headquarters read of MURRAY, CIO president, THOMAS, UAW president, and PERKINS, Secretary of Labor, to return to work and urged to quit the strike, but he was forced to get down from the platform in the midst of his speech and the employees decided to continue the strike.

2. Against this measure, the head of the air corps in the western division, Lt. Colonel BRANSHAW, receiving an order from Washington, declared that "By virtue of the authority of the President and by order of the Secretary of War, the Army will take over the said plant and its business." Simultaneously, leading 3,500 armed soldiers, aided by 500 policemen equipped with tear-gas broke up the picket lines and declared that the plant will be reopened immediately under the Government control.

Special wire was sent to the Ambassador in American and code wires were sent to other offices.

## EXHIBIT 40

Page 1

6-17-41

From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles

To: Consul General KITA

Re: Meeting courier YAMAZAKI

Code type: (RYAKU)-#5

Request member of Consulate to meet courier YAMAZAKI, passenger on board the NITTA MARU which sailed from here on the 17th, since papers (letters) to your Consulate have been entrusted in his care.

\*In the margin are the following:

1. Seal of NAGAO KITA (the Consul-General)
2. Signature of OKUDA (the Vice-Consul)
3. Scribbling which reads:
  - a. Mr. YUGE please go to meet the boat.
  - b. TAKEO YAMAZAKI (?) arrives in port 6-20.
4. #259

Page 2

7-9-41

From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles

To: Consul General KITA

Re: SURVEY OF ASSETS OF JAPANESE IN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

Code type: (AN)-#6

In reference to your telegram GO-#12, in accordance with the annual business survey, survey is being conducted through organizations.

\*In margin are the seal of Consul General KITA and the signature of Vice-Consul OKUDA. Also the number, 315.

Pages 3, 4, 5

Dispatched: 6-6-41

Received: 6-19-41

From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles

To: Consul General KITA

Re: STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES OF "NORTH AMERICAN" AIRCRAFT COMPANY.

Code Type: (RYAKU)-YU-GO-#32

To the Minister #87 (the 6th, P.M.)

(Report A)

Concerning the threatened strike for higher wages (raising of minimum wages from 50¢ to 75¢ or a uniform increase of 10¢ in wages) by 9,000 employees of the local "North American" Aircraft Company who are also members of the "United" Automobile Workers' Union of the CIO, negotiations have been going on through the good offices of the National Defense Mediation Board in Washington for the past two months. However, since the board is believed to be working in league with the company and deliberately postponing settlement, the strike was started early on the morning of the 5th with a "picket" line posted, and work by all employees numbering 12,000 has been stopped. Because of this, the Army Air Corps at "March Field" has taken out 8 completed B-25 bombers (5 more planes were taken out on the 6th) and 21 AF6A training planes. The local AFL intends to wire the Office of Production Management that the majority of the majority of the workers are being victimized by the radical element of the CIO. (Concerning the relation between the AFL and the CIO, refer to CONFIDENTIAL—#454 dated 5-10.)

The company at present, putting those of the United States and Britain together, has orders for warplanes amounting to \$200,000,000 and produces monthly 225 planes, and is said to manufacture 25% of the total production of planes in the United States.

This report has been wired to the Ambassador and has been sent by coded telegrams to the various diplomatic establishments in the United States.

(Note: In the margin is inserted the number, 263, and also the seal of Consul General KITA and the signature of Vice-Consul OKUDA.)

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Pages 6, 7

Dispatched: 6-11-41

Received: 6-23-41

From: Consul NAKAUCHI at Los Angeles

To: Consul-General KITA

Re: STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES OF "NORTH AMERICAN" AIRCRAFT COMPANY.

Code type (RYAKU)-YU-GO-%34

To the Minister #95. (11th; P. M.)

Reference: Outgoing telegram #92  
(Report A)

The Military took over the factory and the strike ended on the night of the 10th. From the 10th to the 11th the major portion of the employees returned to their work and began day and night production. During the strike there was a decrease in production of about forty planes. Armed troops guarded the inner and outer premises of the factory, and not only did they give personal protection to the workers, but also it is reported that three of the strike leaders have been fired and seven others are being held.

Details will be reported by mail.

The Ambassador is in receipt of this relayed telegram and the various diplomatic establishments have been notified by coded messages.

### EXHIBIT 41

The head of the office—KITA's seal. Person in Charge—OKUDA.

Written—July 5, 1941.

To: San Francisco

To: Los Angeles

From: Consul-General KITA.

Subject—Investigation of the assets of the Japanese in America.

"AN" (designation used for a certain type of wire) Order #12.

Regarding order #599, strictly secret to America, from the Minister, in view of the times there are reasons which make investigation of this matter by this office within its jurisdiction considerably difficult and delicate. So, please send a return wire informing this office as to how the matter is being handled in your office.

This wire is addressed to San Francisco and Los Angeles.

### EXHIBIT 42

Head of Office—KITA's seal. Person in Charge—OKUDA.

Written—May 12, 1941.

To: Consul ITO at New Orleans.

From: Consul-General KITA

Subject—Mourning for Representative YAMAJI's death.

"HEI" (designation used for a certain class of wire—probably ordinary wire) #2.

To: Representative SHIMIZU, as follows:

We sincerely express our condolence over the death of Representative YAMAJI.

### EXHIBIT 43

The writing in red pencil reads:

MATTER PERTAINING TO CENSUS REGISTRATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAME.

1. Courtesy to gathering (Greeting to assembly).
2. In accordance with orders of the Japanese Government . . . . .
3. All came according to official orders; thank them for their assistance and cooperation.
4. Personally thank all for their friendship (the consular staff and their families.)
5. Not to visit each island.
6. Have self-confidence that Japan has been right in her acts.
  - a. In the Far-Eastern problem leading up to the present situation.
  - b. In the origin of the Chinese Incident.

c. Against present attitude of the United States towards Japan.  
 7. Actual abilities (power). (Words erased read: Power of Japan.)

8. "Rieki Daiho" (meaning now known) Represent interests (of Japan?).

Note: (by D.C.) Ricki daihyo refers to the representation of Japanese interests here after the breakoff of relations with the United States. It developed later that Sweden took over the representation of Japanese interests in the islands while Spain assumed this function in the rest of the United States.)

9. Request take custody of Consulate.

10. United States understanding. (Probably "with understanding of the U. S." meant.)

11. Emergency committee.

12. United Japanese Association, Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Japanese?).

13. Census registration.

14. Method of making remittances to Japanese residents of Hawaii in Japan.

15. Development of perseverance and independence (sympathy towards first and second generation Japanese.)

a. In comparison with Japanese residents of China.

b. Avoid unnecessary friction.

16. Do not blacken the Japanese name (would lower the position of the Japanese.)

17. Thank all officials and the public.

18. Pray for health.

19. Families in Japan will be protected.

20. Instructions to consular staff.

21. Announcement of census registration.

#### CONFIDENTIAL

#### HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 (CID)

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

FILE 004.5—PHOTOGRAPHY.

#### *Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate*

1st Ind Contact Office D. S. O. 2 Apr 42.

1. Transmitted herewith are 156 photographs composing a complete copy of the "Register of Incoming Messages" and 124 photographs of a "Register of Messages Received", maintained by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.

Encls: as noted.

G. W. B.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 206 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,  
 Honolulu, T. H., April 2, 1942.

Lt. Col. GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2*  
*Army Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.*

Re: Japanese Activities, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: I am forwarding herewith 156 photographs composing a complete copy of the "Register of Incoming Messages" and 124 photographs of a "Register of Messages Received," maintained by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.

These should be considered with the translations previously furnished your office.

Very truly yours,

(s) R. L. Shivers  
 R. L. SHIVERS,  
*Special Agent in Charge.*

cc ONI, with enclosure  
 Enc.

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 5

*Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*

The following documents were obtained from the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District, Honolulu.

a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cablegrams from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and numbers of cablegrams in date order: 363, 3 December 1941; 364, 4 December 1941; 365, 4 December 1941; 221, 5 December 1941; 368, 6 December 1941; and 369, 6 December 1941.

b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November 1941 to the following addresses: Shagro, San Francisco; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu; Growsumida, Honolulu; and Shokin, Honolulu.

c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November 1941 to the following addresses: Rev. Hiro Higuchi, Waipahu Community Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.; American Consul, Papeete; Y. Watanabe, Box 511, Walluku, Maui, T. H.; and Shokin, Honolulu.

d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 November 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae.

e. Four confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities, dated: 9 February 1942, 14 February 1942, 15 June 1942, and 15 February 1943.

f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941, Japanese time.

g. An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands prepared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND, dated 20 April 1943.

h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg) T. W. Joyce.

h1-h35. Various evaluations and related paper from 14ND, Honolulu.

12/3/41

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo #363

Wyoming and two seaplane-tenders departed third.

12/4/41

# 364

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo

PM/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X approximately 1100 tons one stack one four inch gun fwd and aft X fueled?

Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British Consulate

12/4/41

# 365

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th

12/5/41

# 221

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo

In reply to Number 221 (Banker)

Auditing accounts with Government expenditures only not completed X Upon settlement of above will have balance of \$16,224.13

(Special students expenses \$2610 ?????????)

6 DEC. 41

# 368

From: KIta

To: F. M. Tokyo

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickman Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

Delivered 1248

Transmitted 1304

6 Dec 1941

Delivered to RCA—1801

Transmitted—1807

No. 369

From: KIta

To: Washington—Tokyo

On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

BB—9

CL—3

DD—17

am—3

Ships in dock:

CI—4

DD—2

(CA and CV all——)

PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet (?)

11/27 2.33 PM

Shagro San Francisco

Two hundred screenings reply price

(S HATA SHOTEN)

11/27 7.31 AM

ZL HU17 Mexico City 13 1130AM 27th

Dr Holmes 45 Young Building, Honolulu

We stay here expecting you.

FATHER

11/27 9.14 AM

ZL HU 36 San Francisco 35 1105AM 27th

Growsumida Honolulu

Recable yesterday advice positively best possible would not have sent cable yesterday unless all possibilities extending contract had been exhausted must have immediate cable authorization and amendments lettercredit otherwise cannot prevent cancellation

11/27 9.01

ZL OHU39 New York 17 155 PM 27th

Shokin Honolulu

TODORIYORIDEN KONOSAINARUBEKU TASUUKITYOOSSEI MURUKO-TOSIKARU BESITOOMOWARURU NITUKIHUUYOONA RABANISEIYATOSI RETOONIIYORITUGO OTUKEHOKUBEIKA KUTENISSEIGENIN HAIRYO-NEGAITASI SIMEISIKYUUDEN POONOKENKAKUTEN ETQKUHOKUSEYO

SHOKEN



482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

11/25 6.55 AM

RH 014 Los Angeles Calif 15 905AM 25th

Rev HIRO HIGUCHI

Waipahu Community Church

Waipahu Oahu.

Richard Currier died last night pneumonia

HANK

11/25 10.30 AM

W 054 Washington DC USG 88 FST 55 3.15 PM 26

AMERICAN COUNSUL PAPEETE

Twentyfifth Swiss interests your August 25 eight am Swiss Legation has informed department that in letter dated September 20 Paul Nordmann stated that he has been temporarily released from internment to consult physician at Papeete Legation received prisoners post card dated September 25 signed by Nordmann stating that he was in bad health and still detained by police authorities at Papeete Legation is particularly anxious to learn reason for expulsion decree against him on July 31 please make informal inquiry and report by telegraph

HULL

11/25 12.35 PM

SB HU70 Los Angeles Calif 24/23 230PM 25th

NLT Y Watanabe Box 511 Walluku Maui

Gladly received your letter air mailing \$500 today depending everything on you wire when ship

MAYEDA

11/25 1.58 PM

w 83 New York 18 5.50 25

Shokin Honolulu

TODORIYORIDEN KINZITUHONPOOSE NKITIMUKESYUPPA NSUBE-KINITUKIKO NOSAIZAIBEIKAKU TENINSAISYOOGEN DONIKIRITUME-SEI ZEI TASUUKITYOO SUBUYOOTOKUBETU NAIRYONEGAI TASI NAODOOSENNITEKI TYOOSIUBEKISIME ISIKYUUTODORIE HENDEN-SEYO

SHOKIN

Mackay Radio

1941 NOV 19 PM 8 47

NLT HACHIYAEINOSUKE

TOKYOMITUKOSI

GOANCHAKUO SHUKUSU REINOKENWA KOSHOCHU KINJITY KAI-KETUNOMIKOMI JUSHOWA TOMO HONOLULU EIBUNWA TOKETU-KANNO KYOKAWOETE OKURUYOCHUIARI ASUSIRASU

ARAKI

Translation:

INOSUKE HACHIYAE,

TOKYO MITSUKOSHI

FELICITATIONS ON SAFE ARRIVAL IN REGARD TO CERTAIN MATTER NOW IN NEGOTIATION LOOKS LIKE DECISION IN NEAR FUTURE RESIDENCE STILL HONOLULU ENGLISH WORDS TO BE SENT AFTER PERMIT FROM FREEZE OFFICE. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED WILL LET YOU KNOW TOMORROW

ARAKI

NOTE: If this was sent by Joe ARAKI it deserves attention. SS

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District. Date: 9 Feb. 1942.

Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941-9 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending in 14ND.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: and References: (See first page of details.)

14ND (3)

Copy to: ONI (5)  
CinCPac (1)  
Com 14 (1)  
FBI-Hon (2)  
MID-HD (2)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A. ONI File No.:

Synopsis: On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has been found that KUEHN'S signal system ever was employed.

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941 will be charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

Deductions: Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

Approved:

J. H. MAYFIELD  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
District Intelligence Officer

WBS/zw  
11D

[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities  
References:

- (a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
- (b) Com14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
- (c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
- (d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 5-1-41.
- (e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI), 5-31-41.
- (f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 7-17-41.
- (g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKI, 2-3-42.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
- (j) 1ND Investigation4 Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

- (A) Table Showing Number of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.
  - (B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.
1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed very important.

[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo  
(Secret Military Message No. —)

(By Chief of Consulate's Code)

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.

From: Fujii

Re Signals I Wish to Simplify Communications as follows:

(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) Battle Force, including Scouting Force, are about to put to sea—

1. Several Aircraft Carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
3. Several Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third.
4. All Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third.
5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
- 8.

[3]

(2) Signal

1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night—one light from 8 PM to 9 PM indicates "1", from 9 PM to 10 PM indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time, indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 AM until noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen cloth indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 PM to 1 AM every hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".

5. "KGMB want ads" advertisements 9:45 AM—

(a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6".

(b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7".

(c) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates "5" or "8".

In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala Road which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 PM to 8 PM indicates "3" or "6"; 8 PM to 9 PM indicates "4" or "7"; 9 PM to 10 PM indicates "5" or "8".

[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3

December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, the FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of his family.)

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the indicated markings.

[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a "Lanikai beach House"; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Walluku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by Agent McCarthy:

"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn's house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period. [7] It was pointed out by many of the residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in traveling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with automobiles headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office."

[8] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following pertinent incident:

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanatorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing the light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanatorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to

**FURUKAWA.** This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, **FURUKAWA** subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While **FURUKAWA** is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien." This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of **Shigeo FURUKAWA** was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander **Sadatomo OKADA, IJN**, among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941, **FURUKAWA's** name. (References (d) and (f)).

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant **Adelson** the following report, dated 19 December, regarding investigation of the **Haleakala** and **Kula Sanitarium** region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight—actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of **Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game Warden)**, a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers **Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez** and **Chas. Ledward**.

"In addition the **VJ3 Squadron** and the **Maui Range** is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December 1941, the reporting officer in Company with **Mr. Anderson** from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the **PUUNENE** area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the **MALAAEA BAY** vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of **Kahoolawe**. This fire lasted 3 minutes.

At 8:40 p. m. the light at **Puunene** came on again and in response the light at **Malaaea Bay** came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers **Wong** and **Ledward** also observed the above but placed the fire in the channel between **Kahoolawe** and **Lanal** instead of on **Kahoolawe**.

"**Col. Lyman** has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the **Kahoolawe** fire signal seen.

"**Kahoolawe** as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan—"Maise C", owned by one of the **Baldwins** and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (**Y. Yamauchi**) has made a trip to the island—where **Baldwin** keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, **Mr. Baldwin** has requested **Col. Lyman's** permission to send the "Maise C" to **Kahoolawe**. **Col. Lyman** advised **Mr. Baldwin** that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, **Col. Lyman** will notify this office if and when the "Maise C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

"However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December, 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant **Adelson** to investigate this case on **Maui**), Provisional Police patrolling the **Kula** area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further report regarding **FURUKAWA**, from Lieutenant **Adelson**, which is quoted, in part:

"... Miss **Marie Dupont**, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed.

[11] "Miss **Dupont** stated that at about 2130 on the night of 18 December, 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light

flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanitorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject light any matches."

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA, since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being prepared on FURUKAWA.

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships at sea.

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is Ichio Fujii.

[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.

17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu, from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at Moliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been discovered.

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case is continuing.

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:

Miss Kimie DOUE  
Takaichi SAKAI  
Katsukichi MURAOKA  
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO  
Kanaye SAHARA  
Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJI

22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasu MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vinyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 8299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [14] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On those occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.



30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, those men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".



[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and Allen, is submitted for information:

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty shop brought in only about \$80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the [18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for \$40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was \$6,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was \$9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of \$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the \$40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "these figures were purely fictitious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals con-

tained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30 and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new \$100.00 bills, some \$20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Maluniu Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Maluniu Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reappeared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very similar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has

seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.

48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the \$14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original \$14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, \$5,000.00 in new \$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given \$2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth Kuehn). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through, Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following information appeared on the suspect card:

(Occupation)

"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu None at present  
Formerly (1918) officer in Germany Navy; cultivates acquaintances among officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNS had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Government, through the Consulate.

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December, 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)

Pending—14ND.

6 February, 1942.

Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

| Date       | Time | Types of ships |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |
|------------|------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
|            |      | BBs            | CAs | CLs | CVs | SSs | DDs | DMs | AVDs | (#) |
| 11/22----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 8   | 2    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 8   | 2    | 32  |
| 11/23----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 8   | 2    | 32  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 4   | 2    | 28  |
| 11/24----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 4   | 1    | 26  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 4   | 2    | 27  |
| 11/25----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 24  | 5   | 2    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 10  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 26  | 8   | 3    | 37  |
| 11/26----- | 0800 | 3              | 10  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 24  | 8   | 2    | 34  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 23  | 8   | 3    | 34  |
| 11/27----- | 0800 | 3              | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 23  | 8   | 3    | 34  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 28  | 8   | 3    | 39  |
| 11/28----- | 0800 | 1              | 8   | 0   | 2   | 4   | 11  | 4   | 3    | 18  |
|            | 1800 | 6              | 8   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |
| 11/29----- | 0800 | 6              | 7   | 6   | 1   | 2   | 24  | 4   | 3    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 6              | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |
| 11/30----- | 0800 | 5              | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 25  | 4   | 3    | 32  |
|            | 1800 | 5              | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |

Key: BB—battleship; CA—heavy cruiser; CL—light cruiser; CV—aircraft carrier; SS—submarine; DD—destroyer; DM—light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD—seaplane tender (destroyer type).

(#) Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

[1] ENCLOSURE (B): Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941

## BATTLESHIPS (BBS)

|                                                   |   |
|---------------------------------------------------|---|
| 0600—At moorings (ARIZONA, NEVADA, OKLAHOMA)----- | 3 |
| 0658—NEVADA underway-----                         | 3 |
| 0705—ARIZONA underway-----                        | 3 |
| 0748—NEVADA cleared-----                          | 2 |
| 0801—ARIZONA cleared-----                         | 1 |
| 1045—PENNSYLVANIA entered-----                    | 2 |
| 1053—CALIFORNIA entered-----                      | 3 |
| 1102—MARYLAND entered-----                        | 4 |
| 1110—TENNESSEE entered-----                       | 5 |
| 1123—WEST VIRGINIA entered-----                   | 6 |
| 1155—PENNSYLVANIA moored-----                     | 6 |
| 1210—CALIFORNIA moored-----                       | 6 |
| 1232—MARYLAND moored-----                         | 6 |
| 1240—TENNESSEE moored-----                        | 6 |
| 1306—WEST VIRGINIA moored-----                    | 6 |
| 1547—UTAH moored (#)-----                         | 7 |
| 1648—UTAH moored (#)-----                         | 7 |
| 1800—At moorings-----                             | 7 |

(#) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and used as a target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a battleship.

## HEAVY CRUISERS (CAs)

|                                   |    |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| 0600—At moorings-----             | 11 |
| 0625—NORTHAMPTON underway-----    | 11 |
| 0632—CHESTER underway-----        | 11 |
| 0640—SALT LAKE CITY underway----- | 11 |
| 0718—NORTHAMPTON cleared-----     | 10 |
| 0727—CHESTER cleared-----         | 9  |
| 0735—SALT LAKE CITY cleared-----  | 8  |

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## LIGHT CRUISERS (CLS)

|                                        |   |
|----------------------------------------|---|
| 0600—Underway in harbor (DETROIT)----- | 1 |
| 0637—DETROIT cleared-----              | 0 |
| 1138—HELENA entered-----               | 1 |
| [2] 1131—HONOLULU entered-----         | 2 |
| 1148—ST. LOUIS entered-----            | 3 |
| 1200—PHOENIX entered-----              | 4 |
| 1212—RALEIGH entered-----              | 5 |
| 1250—HELENA moored-----                | 5 |
| 1300—HONOLULU moored-----              | 5 |
| 1300—RALEIGH moored-----               | 5 |
| 1305—PHOENIX moored-----               | 5 |
| 1328—ST. LOUIS moored-----             | 5 |
| 1350—DETROIT entered-----              | 6 |
| 1510—DETROIT moored-----               | 6 |
| 1800—At moorings-----                  | 6 |

## AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS)

|                                               |   |
|-----------------------------------------------|---|
| 0600—At moorings (LEXINGTON, ENTERPRISE)----- | 2 |
| 0735—ENTERPRISE underway-----                 | 2 |
| 0838—ENTERPRISE cleared-----                  | 1 |
| 1800—At moorings-----                         | 1 |

## SUBMARINES (SSS)

|                             |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 0600—At moorings-----       | 4 |
| 1254—ARGONAUT underway----- | 4 |
| 1300—TROUT underway-----    | 4 |
| 1340—ARGONAUT cleared-----  | 3 |
| 1350—TROUT cleared-----     | 2 |
| 1800—At moorings-----       | 2 |

[3]

## DESTROYERS (DDS)

|                                   |    |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| 0600—At moorings or underway----- | 26 |
| 0602—MUGFORD cleared-----         | 25 |
| 0605—GRIDLEY cleared-----         | 24 |
| 0608—MAURY cleared-----           | 23 |
| 0612—BAGLEY cleared-----          | 22 |
| 0617—HENLEY cleared-----          | 21 |
| 0620—CRAVEN cleared-----          | 20 |
| 0621—PATTERSON cleared-----       | 19 |
| 0623—BALCH cleared-----           | 18 |
| 0625—HELM cleared-----            | 17 |
| 0628—RALPH TALBOT cleared-----    | 16 |
| 0630—FANNING cleared-----         | 15 |
| 0632—McCALL cleared-----          | 14 |
| 0640—DUNLAP cleared-----          | 13 |
| 0641—BENHAM cleared-----          | 12 |
| 0647—CONYNGHAM cleared-----       | 11 |
| 1205—WORDON entered-----          | 12 |
| 1221—ALYWIN entered-----          | 13 |
| 1228—CONYNGHAM entered-----       | 14 |
| 1232—CASSIN entered-----          | 15 |
| 1236—HULL entered-----            | 16 |
| 1243—DALE entered-----            | 17 |
| 1245—REID entered-----            | 18 |
| 1247—DOWNES entered-----          | 19 |
| 1254—DEWEY entered-----           | 20 |
| 1300—MONAGHAN entered-----        | 21 |
| 1308—TUCKER entered-----          | 22 |
| 1318—CONYNGHAM moored-----        | 22 |
| 1330—FARRAGUT entered-----        | 23 |
| 1333—CASE entered-----            | 24 |
| 1336—MacDONOUGH entered-----      | 25 |



|                         |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| —PHELPS entered.....    | 26 |
| —CASSIN moored.....     | 26 |
| —ALYWIN moored.....     | 26 |
| —REID moored.....       | 26 |
| —DOWNES moored.....     | 26 |
| —TUCKER moored.....     | 26 |
| —WORDEN moored.....     | 26 |
| —DALE moored.....       | 26 |
| —CASE moored.....       | 26 |
| —MONAGHAN moored.....   | 26 |
| —HULL moored.....       | 26 |
| —DEWEY moored.....      | 26 |
| —FARRAGUT moored.....   | 26 |
| —PHELPS moored.....     | 26 |
| —MacDONOUGH moored..... | 26 |
| —At moorings.....       | 26 |

## MINESWEEPERS (DMS)

|                           |   |
|---------------------------|---|
| —At moorings.....         | 8 |
| —GAMBLE underway.....     | 8 |
| —MONTGOMERY underway..... | 8 |
| —BREESE underway.....     | 8 |
| —RAMSAY underway.....     | 8 |
| —GAMBLE cleared.....      | 7 |
| —MONTGOMERY cleared.....  | 6 |
| —BREESE cleared.....      | 5 |
| —RAMSAY cleared.....      | 4 |
| —At moorings.....         | 4 |

## SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| —At moorings..... | 3 |
| —At moorings..... | 3 |

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
INVESTIGATION REPORT

## Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.  
 Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District Date: 14 FEB., 1942.  
 Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.  
 Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending.

Summary of Case:  
 Receipt of DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Closures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval contacts.

Copy to:

ONI (5)  
 CinCPac (1)  
 COM14 (1)  
 FBI-Hon (2)  
 MID-H (2)  
 14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A

Synopsis: During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which reached the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December. Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of warships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inaccurate as to destroyers.

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Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was engaged in this espionage activity.

The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.

Deductions: Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to protect battleships in the harbor.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/zw

[1] Confidential

14 FEBRUARY 1942

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References: (a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject 2-9-42.

(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHIRODO, 2-8-42.

(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAMI, 2-6-42.

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a). It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and (b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.

2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those communications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter discussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December, 1941.

3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor, and their entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consulate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] area for the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings to the Consulate. The *modus operandi* of MORIMURA and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:

WYOMING and two seaplane-tenders departed third.

(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane

tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.

5. On 4 December, at 1857, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister TOGO by the local Consulate:

USS HONOLULU arrived 1300/4th.

From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300, on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, between 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message was sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One (ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to Tokyo.

7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735, the same morning.

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore, correct.

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed, before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.

11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now used as mine-layers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as to all destroyer-type ships are presented: At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that after-

noon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon on 5 December, the four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, and at 1612.

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of interest:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the fourth.

There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.

14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington:

On the evening of the fifth the Battleship Wyoming and one sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 17 destroyers; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock: 4 light cruisers; 3 destroyers. (CA and CV all —) PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet.

The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts: The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the following are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYOMING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0600, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day—four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three seaplane tenders (AVDs)—which to the untrained observer might have appeared also to be destroyers.

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered at 0830, cleared at 0920, [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the harbor.

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms "moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in drydock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.

21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 1248, which called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic):

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further comment thereon is offered.

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco:

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.

The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner LURLINE is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo:

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the fourth, about 1100 tons; one stack; and had a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British Consulate.

[8] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT's crew went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December, 1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4, 14.)

C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU. (Paragraph 5.)

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9).

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it is concluded that:

A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTO SHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the erroneous reports.)

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane's *Fighting Ships*, readily available in Honolulu clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battleships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was surprisingly inaccurate.

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).

Pending

[1]

14 FEBRUARY 1942.

ENCLOSURE (A): Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

21 MARCH, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.

29 APRIL, 1941

(To Tokyo)

The American Army Transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

14 MAY, 1941

(To Tokyo)

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Emmons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickman Field at 0658 the 14th.

7 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)

the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started negotiations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance to attach to his visit.

According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel sought plans for sending units [3] of the fleet back to the mainland creation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels were not announced.

13 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)

reference San Francisco Msg #92:

President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hundred aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the

26 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo)

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

27 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Yungking—Burma Road—trucks

28 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)

Al Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4] of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the Clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

8 JULY 1941

(To Tokyo and Washington)

Report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that Japanese pilots are joining the China Air Force: The local Chinese Consul on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his Consulate (largely from local groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese Military Attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) Furthermore according to English (age) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone. The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

15 JULY, 1941

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)

The evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test oil, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

26 JULY 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral [Name], Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in

506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

2 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced) entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

23 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

18 NOVEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma Road trucks 3000—2 ton trucks.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

*Confidential*

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H.

Date: June 15, 1942

Report made by: Lieut. (Jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, and Ensign Don Woodrum, USNR

Period covered: February 15—June 15, 1942 Status of Case: Pending—14ND

Origin of Case: General investigation of espionage activities of Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu. See reference (a).

References: See first page of details.

Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: None

Copy to:

ONI (5)

CinCPac (1)

Com14 (1)

MID-HD (2) Zone II (1)

FBI-Hon (2) Zone III (1)

14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND/#54-A ONI File No.:

Synopsis: Questioning of former employees of Japanese Consulate, Honolulu indicates that Tadasi MORIMURA, Consulate secretary who came to Honolulu in March 1941, was the chief collector of facts for the Consulate concerning the movements of U. S. Navy vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor.

MORIMURA's coming to Hawaii was accompanied with publicity that he would attend to expatriation matters at Consulate, which work he did not do. His work at the Consulate was done in privacy of Vice Consul OKUDA's office. He involved poring over a map of Oahu, but the exact nature of his work is not known. MORIMURA went to his office at hours of his choice. He spent much time away from the office, visiting strategic points on Oahu, such as Pearl City peninsula and Alea Heights (both commanding a view of Pearl Harbor), Haleiwa beach (a potential landing place), Kaneohe Bay (across from the Naval Air Station), and made flying trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii. On drives around Oahu, he often took with him KOTOSHIRODO, Consulate clerk, and



MI, regular taxi driver for Consulate, but sometimes sent KOTOSHIRODO to count ships in Pearl Harbor, which they last did on December 5, 1941. MORIMURA contacted many persons who have since been interned. Actions: Naval information reported to Tokyo by despatches analyzed in (b) was chiefly gathered by, or under the direction of, MORIMURA. Moved:

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.

op

JUNE 15, 1942

: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities  
nces:

- 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 9, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 14, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kimie DOUE, dated February 3, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Takaichi SAKAI, dated February 3, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kanaye SAHARA, dated February 3, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, dated February 8, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated January 29, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated June 15, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI, dated February 6, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kenzo MAEHARA, dated May 11, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ryulchi MORIBE, dated March 6, 1942.
- 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ikuzo SATO, dated May 16, 1942.

report has been prepared to supplement references (a) and (b), and to state, insofar as is known to this office, the means by which the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, gathered information relative to ship movements. Paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of reference (a), it was stated that, when interrogated, Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist and typist at the Consulate, subject of reference (c), stated that Tadasu MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, had arrived from Japan on March 27, 1941, for the sole purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, but did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned to a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, and the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA often came to work about two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and was seldom at his desk in the afternoon. Miss DOUE stated that there was a week during October or November, 1941, when MORIMURA did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi between 1000 and 1100, and could not see him again the same day. The [2] staff of the Consulate called the proprietor of the ROYAL TAXI STAND, located at 6 South Street, Honolulu, (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. (The proprietor of this taxi stand, John Yoshie MI, subject of reference (i), has been interned.) On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, subject of reference (f), one of the Consulate clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and sometimes they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO would come back for the rest of the day.

According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Hawaii which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time.

Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

3. Takaichi SAKAI, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (d), when interrogated, corroborated Miss DOUE's statements about MORIMURA's failure to concern himself with expatriation matters and his frequent departure from the Consulate during business hours.

4. Another Consulate clerk, Kanaye SAHARA, subject of reference (e), also was interrogated. SAHARA stated that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or the third, cut off at the first joint, but could not remember which hand was without a finger. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours with KOTOSHIRODO, adding the KOTOSHIRODO often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day.

5. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they were going to "important places", and, upon being asked what he meant by that, said "military places." On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and because neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO would make any mention of where they had gone when they returned to the Consulate. SAHARA added that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he often used on these trips.

6. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data on diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years old, and if [3] he is a regular member of the consular service, he should have been listed, as he could not at his age be a recent college graduate. (MORIMURA is said to have told Sakae TNAKA, a Consulate maid, that he was graduated from Hedai University.)

7. SAHARA added that he believed that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they entered or departed from the office. When asked if he thought this was not strange in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA made the explanation that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy one another's company.

8. In light of these revelations, KOTOSHIRODO was interviewed, and his personal history is set forth in reference (f). (It should be noted that none of the Consulate clerks were interrogated until after they had severed their connections with the Japanese Government.)

9. KOTOSHIRODO stated that his duties at the Consulate were to receive and open local and Japanese mail, and to handle out-going mail. He usually logged in letters from the Foreign Office, Japan, but these letters were actually opened by Kokichi SEKI, one of the secretaries. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he wrote down the date of receipt and the number of each item from the Foreign Office, which was addressed to the Consul-General, but he did not see the actual letters, as those usually came in inner envelopes. SEKI would take this mail in to Vice Consul OKUDA, and from there it would go into the Consul's office. Each letter had a receipt inside the first envelope which was signed and returned to the Foreign Office. Routine letters would come back to SEKI from the Vice Consul, and either SEKI or KOTOSHIRODO would enter the subject of each letter and its date in a record book.

10. SEKI's predecessor at this job was Mitsugi IKETANI, who returned to Japan late in 1940. (It was recently learned that while he was in Hawaii, IKETANI was head of the JAPANESE RED CROSS.)

11. Mail from the Foreign Office, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was of two types—that which pertained to the business of the Honolulu Consulate only, and letters addressed to all Consulates. The former type would carry consecutive numbers. Ordinary mail consisted of domestic matters such as births, deaths, marriages, expatriation, divorce, and adoption. This type of mail, and the circular letters addressed to all Consulates, would arrive by post, and would be picked up at the Consulate's post office box by the chauffeur, or would be delivered by a regular mail carrier. Other mail would arrive by diplomatic courier. This would be opened in the telegraph [4] (or, coding) room by Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary. The couriers would carry the mail in a suitcase, and upon arrival, would go straight into the telegraph room accompanied by the Consul, Vice Consul, and SEKI. KOTOSHIRODO did not remember the same courier ever coming twice, and he added that one would not necessarily arrive every time an N. Y. K. liner called at Honolulu.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that letters received from local sources were not in at the Consulate. Only those received from the Foreign Office, other Consulates, and those of especial importance were logged. Most of the mail came from consular agents, and consisted of letters or routine reports. Office supplies for the Consulate were purchased by SEKI, who also acted as insurer. KOTOSHIRODO's desk was in SEKI's office, so he was familiar with the purchasing. Most office supplies were purchased from the Honolulu Book Company, and the remainder from the Hakubundo Book Store. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the persons usually contacted at the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE were Tomoaki NAKAMURA or Minoru FUJUIWARA, the manager. NAKAMURA was familiar with everyone in the Consulate. Confidential Informant J-1 (rating "A") had previously informed this office that NAKAMURA was one of the most frequent visitors at the Consulate, and although there was evidence that he had purpose other than that of selling office supplies, it was felt that he treated everyone in the Consulate, from the Consul General down, with insolent camaraderie and general disrespect that was unusual—one might say unique—coming from a member of the local Japanese community. NAKAMURA made frequent trips to all parts of the Island of Oahu in the course of his business, but when interviewed, denied that he had ever supplied information of a nature whatsoever to the Consulate. NAKAMURA has been interned. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of his relations with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not very frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived at the Consulate in March, 1941. A week later, KOTOSHIRODO drove the new car over Tantalus, a residential district on the heights overlooking Honolulu. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he drove MORIMURA out to Waipahu, a station town about a mile equidistant from the northern shores of the Pearl Harbor Loch and the West Loch of Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA was anxious to visit a tea house called the SHIOYU, which was off the highway to the left of the high school, and which was noted for its balloon fish soup. KOTOSHIRODO had been there before. The Consulate chauffeur, Ichitaro OZAKI, advised that it was impossible to get service there without prior reservation. MORIMURA insisted. However, at the intersection KOTOSHIRODO said, "I will not go," and MORIMURA agreed, so they turned around. Following their dismissal, KOTOSHIRODO [5] displayed a reluctance to remember further trips with MORIMURA outside of town, but was finally persuaded to recall trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that he was asked to go to Maui by Vice Consul A. KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA left John Rodgers Airport, Honolulu, at 8:00 a. m. on the morning of May 5, 1941, and arrived at the Maui airport an hour later. They immediately hired a cab and a driver. The driver was a second-generation Japanese who could not converse very well with MORIMURA. MORIMURA spoke little English and had difficulty understanding the local *Nisei* brand of Japanese. However, they utilized the services of this driver for the two days they were on Maui. From the airport, they proceeded to the TOMOEDA HOTEL, a Japanese hotel located in Kahului, the east coast of Maui. KOTOSHIRODO said that this hotel was run by a Japanese with "no eye" (elaborated to mean that he couldn't see from it). MORIMURA talked to the owner of the hotel about a Japanese poem, but never introduced the subject. (The TOMOEDA HOTEL was operated by one Itsuo HAMADA. A letter from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated March 10, 1941, described HAMADA as having a left eye that was either blind or made of glass. HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an editor for the Nippu Jiji, a Honolulu bilingual (Japanese-English) daily newspaper. HAMADA is now in custody.)

It is interesting to note that HAMADA was a frequent contact of Shigeo KAWA, the activities of whom were reported in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12 of reference (a). Letters from HAMADA to FURUKAWA at Kula Sanatorium, Maui, were found in FURUKAWA's possession, and it is known that HAMADA visited FURUKAWA, at Kula, a number of times. It was also recalled that the two men phoned each other on occasions. One of HAMADA's letters was a forceful plea that FURUKAWA dismiss the notion of suicide from his mind. FURUKAWA, as was shown in reference (a), made two attempts at suicide following the outbreak of hostilities. Another letter talked of Japanese poetry, FURUKAWA being a poet of some small reputation. Before leaving Kula Sanatorium, FURUKAWA was advertising manager for the Nippu Jiji, of which HAMADA was the Kahului representative.

17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA stayed at HAMADA hotel for two hours. They rested and had breakfast, but did not stay because the hotel looked too dirty. After they left HAMADA, they drove to the Grand Hotel in Wailuku, Maui, not a Japanese hotel. They registered here, and then drove to Lahaina, on the west coast of Maui. Ships of the United States Fleet when visiting Maui, anchor off Lahaina Roads. They stopped at a fountain shop for a while, then drove back to Wailuku. From here they drove to Spreckelsville, a few miles from Wailuku. There KOTOSHIRODO went to a [redacted] Japanese school and met Tetsunosuke SONE. Consul General KITA had requested KOTOSHIRODO to give a package to the person to whom it was addressed, a female. KOTOSHIRODO thought the package contained a gift of some sort. He gave the package to SONE, because the woman to whom it was addressed was supposed to be one of SONE's former pupils. A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated April 11, 1942, states that SONE was the principal of the Japanese language school at Spreckelsville, had served as a Japanese consular agent for 30 years, and had served as a private in the Japanese army for two years. SONE was taken into custody on January 5, 1942, and on January 21, 1942, the Internee Hearing Board at Wailuku, Maui, recommended that SONE be paroled. While KOTOSHIRODO was presenting the package to SONE, MORIMURA stayed in the car. After leaving the school, they saw a pineapple cannery, and then returned to the hotel in Wailuku about 4:00 p. m. After dinner they took a walk, saw a swimming meet, and about 9:00 p. m. dropped down to the fairgrounds where there was dancing. They bought tickets and went inside, but did not dance. They returned to the hotel about 11:00 p. m.

18. The following day, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited Iao Valley located in Maui's northern range of mountains, back of Wailuku. Then they drove up the summit of Mount Haleakala, a dormant volcano rising 10,000 feet above sea level which is located in the southern half of Maui. They remained at the top about 20 minutes, and on their return from the summit, passed Ku Sanatorium. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they merely drove up to the sanatorium, got out of the car, and surveyed the building. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a photograph of the building which he still has in his album. He insisted that he did not give the print or the negative to MORIMURA, or to anyone else at the Consulate. In the afternoon they drove to the Makawao district, in central Maui, and arrived at the airport about 3:30 p. m. Their plane took off at 4:00 p. m. and they arrived in Honolulu about 5:00 p. m. (The fact of MORIMURA's interest in the Kula region should be read in connection with the information reported in paragraphs 4, 9, 10, and 11 of reference (a).)

19. The second trip, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was made October 13-14, 1941. Again, Vice Consul OKUDA requested that KOTOSHIRODO accompany MORIMURA. They went to Hilo, Island of Hawaii, by plane, arriving in Hilo about 10:00 a. m. on the 13th. They hired a taxi driver, using him during the entire visit. His name was NARIKAWA, employed by the ABC TAXI COMPANY (probably Shigeo NARIKAWA, 1014 Kamehameha Avenue, Hilo). MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO registered at the Naniloa Hotel, operated by the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and were assigned Room 8. After lunch on October 13th, they drove up to Kilauea Volcano, and spent the entire afternoon around the craters. They visited the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO, and purchased photographs of the volcano in eruption and of the *lehua* flower. The [redacted] proprietor of the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO was then Kenzo MAEHARA, subject of reference (j), who has been placed in custodial detention, principally for his association with officers of Japanese naval and other public vessels which used to call at Hilo.) On October 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO drove to the Kona district (west side of Hawaii), via Kilauea Volcano, stopping for lunch at the SHIRAKAWA HOTEL, at Waiohinu. (Of Kayato SHIRAKAWA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the hotel bearing his surname, this office has no derogatory information. At Kona, they stayed at the KONA HOTEL, at Holualoa, but according to KOTOSHIRODO they did not talk to anyone there. (Jentaro INABA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the KONA HOTEL (has no adverse record in the files of this office.) On the evening of the 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO went to a motion picture show at Kainaliu, about seven miles from Holualoa.

20. Certain facts about the trip to Kona are of interest. Although there are a number of Japanese hotels in Hilo, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO preferred

at the Naniloa, which is a new hotel catering to the tourist trade. It is the most expensive hotel in Hilo. The trip from Hilo to Kona can be made in about one-half to four hours by automobile. However, a leisurely trip must be made, inasmuch as Waiohine is only a little more than half way between Hilo and Kona. At Kona there is a hotel comparable to the Naniloa, the Kona Inn, operated by Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and catering to tourists. In Kona, however, they preferred to stay at a Japanese hotel.

On October 15th, they departed from Kona and drove to Kawaihae to take the shipping. Kawaihae is the port for the immense Parker Ranch, and the smaller ranches in the neighborhood. From here they proceeded to Kapaau, in the Kohala district, and lunched at the NAMBU HOTEL. Here they talked to an old man, whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not remember. The old man told them about the birth and childhood of Kamehameha (probably Kamehameha I, 1758-1819), first king of Hawaii.) Directories show the proprietor of this hotel to be one Yoshio HORI. They had lunch at one o'clock and, stopping only at Kilauea Falls, returned to Hilo, arriving there about dark. That night, after they went to the Hananoya Tea House where they met two Japanese men, the chauffeur went along with them. They returned to the hotel about 11:00 p. m.

The following day, October 16th, they went to see the County Fair at the Hilo School and Intermediate School Building. Later they saw Rainbow Falls, the Country Club golf course, Puumale Home (county hospital for tubercular patients), and then went to eat Japanese food at the Tokiwatei. They returned to Hilo about 2:00 p. m. That evening they again visited the Hananoya Tea House, but left at 11:00 p. m.

23. On October 17th, they checked out of the hotel and went directly to the airport, taking the 10:00 a. m. plane for Honolulu. They arrived in Honolulu at 11:45 a. m.

KOTOSHIRODO insisted that the two tea house girls, the driver and the man at the NAMBU HOTEL at Kapaau were the only persons they contacted during the whole trip. KOTOSHIRODO stated that, on both trips, he handled money and was given to him at the Consulate before they left. On the Maui trip he was given \$110,000, and on the Hawaii trip, \$300.00. On the latter trip they were given \$5.00 at tea houses, while the driver cost them \$55.00.

KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a number of trips to various points in Hawaii with MORIMURA. In the early part of April, 1941, about two weeks after MORIMURA's arrival, MORIMURA asked KOTOSHIRODO to take him to the Kaneohe district. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali and turned onto the Kaneohe road which runs along Kaneohe Bay (across from Kaneohe Air Station). They followed this road until they reached the Kailua beach area. They got out of the car, and took a stroll in the park on the ocean side pavilion. In the car again, they drove past the cattle farm and the Kailua beach, and then turned left on the road running to the Waimanalo district. They stopped near the old wharf on Waimanalo beach. They walked over to the wharf where several people were fishing. After about ten minutes, they got into the car and returned to Honolulu, arriving at the Consulate about 4:00 p. m. In July or August, 1941, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA again made a trip to the Kaneohe district. This time they went in MIKAMI's taxi. Again they drove along the Kokokahi road along Kaneohe Bay, and at one point MORIMURA asked MIKAMI to slow down. Further, along the road they stopped at a roadside stand and purchased two watermelons. This stand was near a pine grove (KOTOSHIRODO evidently mistook ironwood trees for pines), on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the road. They drove on to Kailua Tavern where MIKAMI had breakfast, while MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO each had a can of beer. They were served by a waitress of Portuguese ancestry. After about twenty minutes they returned to the Consulate via the Nuuanu Pali road.

On a Japanese holiday in April, the Yasukuni Shrine Extraordinary Ceremony when the Consulate was closed, MIKAMI drove KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Waianae, on the west coast of Oahu. They drove out beyond Waianae to Makua Cave, where the road ends. They departed from town about 10:00 a. m. the morning and returned about two, having lunched at a Chinese store in Waianae. KOTOSHIRODO admitted making three trips to Haleiwa, on the west coast of the island, with MORIMURA. The first trip was made in the latter part of April. They stopped at Haleiwa beach, near a ballground, for about ten minutes. Then they returned to Honolulu. Both the trip to, and the trip from, Haleiwa were made via Wahiawa. The second trip oc-

curred some time in May; the third in July. On neither trip did they get out of the car. KOTOSHIRODO remembered stopping at the *mauka-ewa* (towards the mountain—towards Ewa plantation) corner of the Pearl City intersection for a while, but he could not remember whether MORIMURA talked with anyone on those occasions. (It should be noted that the Waianae and Haleiwa beaches are considered important as the places on Oahu where enemy troops might first attempt landings.)

27. Early in the summer of 1941, MIKAMI drove MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO up on Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. No one got out of the car, and KOTOSHIRODO was uncertain whether or not MORIMURA used binoculars. After a few minutes they drove down the hill again. In November they again drove to Aiea Heights. This time they drove in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and they were there about ten o'clock in the morning. MORIMURA directed them to visit a house just off the road, and stated that the person whom he was visiting was a Mrs. MATSUO. He asked KOTOSHIRODO to enter the house, too, so KOTOSHIRODO followed. MORIMURA introduced himself to her, and asked her about the condition of the Japanese school and the Japanese people in that district. Mrs. MATSUO hesitated, and refused to give a definite answer, stating that there were other people in the district who knew more about such matters. She offered to introduce him to other persons, but MORIMURA said that would not be necessary. MORIMURA talked with her for about 20 minutes. Afterwards they drove directly back to the Consulate.

28. Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, and Lieutenant G. P. Kimball, USNR, of this office, questioned Mrs. MATSUO concerning MORIMURA's visit. Mrs. MATSUO is a *nisei* whose husband, now deceased, was a Japanese consular agent during his lifetime. She remembered the visit of MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, although she did not remember their names, and she did not know that they had come from the Consulate. She stated that MORIMURA asked her how the Japanese were being treated. She answered that the Japanese on the plantation (Honolulu Plantation) were being well treated. MORIMURA then asked if they weren't "suspected". Mrs. MATSUO stated that she told him that Americans of Japanese ancestry were not suspected if they were loyal Americans. After they had gone, Mrs. MATSUO wondered if they were agents of the United States. The interrogating agent concluded that MORIMURA was looking for a case of disaffection in Mrs. MATSUO, but found her to be barren soil. From Mrs. MATSUO's house an excellent view can be had of the usual battleship moorings in East Loch.

29. During July or August, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove to the top of Punchbowl about 8:30 a. m. (Punchbowl is a small, extinct crater which overlooks downtown Honolulu.) According to KOTOSHIRODO, they merely looked at the view and drove down again.

[10] 30. All the foregoing information has not been presented precisely as KOTOSHIRODO first told it. Much of it was drawn from KOTOSHIRODO only after several hours of questioning and prompting. Later he was taken to various areas on Oahu where he pointed out the exact spots he had visited with MORIMURA and MIKAMI. Later he typed out and signed a statement of what he had said. The information which KOTOSHIRODO gave has been rearranged in this report to indicate the various areas which he and MORIMURA visited.

31. KOTOSHIRODO finally admitted that he had made about thirty trips to the Pearl City peninsula and vicinity with MORIMURA. Sometimes they were in MIKAMI's taxi, sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car. On the peninsula proper they visited the Pan-American Airways landing, and also the soda water stand belonging to Teisaku ETO, subject of references (g) and (h). However, they did not always visit these two places. ETO is an alien about 67 years old. His soft drink stand is adjacent to the Pearl City Navy landing, and from this spot, one may obtain an excellent view of Pearl Harbor.

32. About two days after his arrival, in March, 1941, MORIMURA hired a taxi and went around the Island of Oahu, alone. About a week after his arrival, SEKI accompanied MORIMURA to the Pan-American Airways clippings landing at Pearl City. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he heard this from SEKI.) About a week later, MORIMURA insisted that KOTOSHIRODO drive him to the peninsula in KOTOSHIRODO's car. They got out of the car and bought soft drinks at ETO's stand. MORIMURA talked to the ETOS, both the old man and his wife, about their business. He asked them how long they had been situated in this spot. KOTOSHIRODO did not know whether MORIMURA had a previous introduction to the ETOS, or had merely struck up a

stance. KOTOSHIRODO said that he heard SEKI and MORIMURA of ETO. They thought him a very common fellow, and thought it amusing that an alien Japanese was permitted to operate his business so close to a base.

Another Consulate contact in the Pearl City area was a young Japanese who worked at a store on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the highway at the junction of Kamehameha Highway and Pearl City Road. MORIMURA would talk to this Japanese while KOTOSHIRODO played the pinball games. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they visited this place at least six months a month, and sometimes MORIMURA would go there alone. The last time KOTOSHIRODO stopped at this store with MORIMURA was in September, 1941. When KOTOSHIRODO was taken to the Pearl City junction, he identified the PEARL SERVICE STATION as the place MORIMURA had spoken to the young Japanese. However, KOTOSHIRODO has been unable to identify any employee of the PEARL SERVICE STATION or any other person thereat or person to whom MORIMURA had spoken. This service station was owned and operated by one Nakajiro KURASHIGE.

34. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in the middle of April, 1941, all the Consulate staff members, together with their wives and children, went on a picnic at the home of Sam WOODS at Lanikai Beach, Oahu. The party went to their destination in four taxis and the official Consulate car. On the way to WOODS residence, they travelled on the Kalanianaʻole Highway around the Head. They started out about 9:30 a. m. and arrived about 10:30 a. m. They lunched in the yard, and afterwards played soft ball. They were served fruit juice from nuts picked by an old Japanese man. Also present were a young married Hawaiian couple. At about 3:00 p. m. they left for home, returning to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali. They reached the Consulate shortly before 6 p. m. It was originally believed that one SAKURADA, yard man for Sam WOODS, had arranged this party. However, investigation indicated that SAKURADA had nothing to do with the affair. MIKAMI, the taxi driver, apparently arranged the outing. MIKAMI had chauffeured for the WOODS on occasions, and also had connections on the windward side of Oahu, where Lanikai is located, with a Mrs. BECKLEY, who arranged luaus (Hawaiian feasts). MIKAMI sometimes would transport the food prepared by Mrs. BECKLEY to its destination. MIKAMI was well acquainted with Mrs. Mary FREITAS, housekeeper for the WOODS. The WOODS were away on the mainland, and MIKAMI arranged the picnic through Mrs. FREITAS.

KOTOSHIRODO also was questioned concerning the existence of maps of the Hawaiian Islands in the Japanese Consulate. He stated that MORIMURA had a large map of the island of Oahu on his desk, which he saw both MORIMURA and the Vice Consul study at times. KOTOSHIRODO denied that any marks were made on the map, or that any Japanese writing appeared thereon. He was shown a Geological Survey map of Oahu (1928 edition), and he believed that this was identical to the map which MORIMURA had in his office. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he had seen MORIMURA working on a map of the Pacific Islands with a compass and protractor.

In light of the evidence that MIKAMI was a conspicuous member of the KOTOSHIRODO-MORIMURA expeditions, MIKAMI was interrogated on January 14, 1942, by Agent Tillman, Lieutenant Kimball, and Captain F. O. Blake of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. MIKAMI stated that he drove persons from the Consulate to golf, to parties, downtown for shopping, to take the children to school, and to Waikiki for swimming. He added that while driving the Consul's car, he paid bills and did other errands. He had been doing this for the past six or seven years. MIKAMI was extremely reluctant to answer questions, but eventually considerable information was obtained. He admitted driving MORIMURA along the Kokokahi Road, where the offices were obtained of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station. He said that several times MORIMURA had instructed him to drive slowly so that a better view of the island could be obtained. At one spot they stopped for at least three or four minutes. MIKAMI believed that [12] MORIMURA had binoculars with him, but was unable to say whether MORIMURA had used them or not. KOTOSHIRODO was along with them the second trip only. MIKAMI stated that on one occasion he had driven MORIMURA to Haleiwa, via the windward side of the island, where they stopped at "Sato's restaurant" in Haleiwa. ("Sato's restaurant" has been identified as the SEAVIEW INN, owned by Ikuzo SATO, subject of reference 12). It is known that on many around-the-island automobile trips of visiting

Japanese naval officers, a stop was made at the SEAVIEW INN, usually to eat lunch. While such stops might be accounted for by the fact that the SEAVIEW INN is the logical half-way point at which to stop for lunch on such trips, it should be noted that the restaurant is located in plain view of Haleiwa beach which is considered one of the places on Oahu where enemy troops might attempt a landing.) MIKAMI went on to state that he had driven MORIMURA to Wahiawa on two occasions. On one of these trips they attempted to enter Schofield Barracks, but the sentry at the gate refused them permission to enter because MIKAMI's taxi did not have proper identification plates. He also stated that on one occasion, he drove Tomoaki NAKAMURA, of the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE (see paragraph 13, above), and someone from the Consulate, to Waipahu. They saw someone there, but MIKAMI could not remember who it was.) (Where question separately, NAKAMURA vigorously denied that he ever made such a trip.) MIKAMI also confirmed the trip to Waianae mentioned by KOTOSHIRODO.

37. MIKAMI admitted taking MORIMURA to Pearl City many times, and also admitted having stopped at ETO's stand at the end of the Pearl City peninsula. However, he claimed that he did not know ETO's name. He stated that sometimes he saw an old man, and sometimes he saw an old woman. He remembered hearing the old man say the fleet had just come in, or the fleet had just gone out, and that his business prospered when the fleet was in, but fared otherwise when the fleet was out. MIKAMI often played the pinball machines while MORIMURA conversed with ETO. When taken out to ETO's stand, MIKAMI pointed out a large pile of lumber on the east side of the boat landing. He stated that this occupied a spot to which he and MORIMURA once walked in order to obtain a better view of the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.

38. One day, according to MIKAMI, he drove MORIMURA up the Waimanalo Road. The agents proceeded along this road with MIKAMI almost two miles to a point where MIKAMI said he, with MORIMURA, had turned around. At this particular point, and in the same general vicinity, there are no houses. The view of Pearl Harbor, where the agents turned around, is not good, which probably accounts for the fact that MORIMURA visited this place only once.

39. The agents also drove MIKAMI to Honouliuli. Here MIKAMI indicated a Japanese store, opposite a Standard Oil installation, at which he stated MORIMURA had asked directions. He stated that he had driven MORIMURA [13] to Honouliuli only once. Leaving the location of the Standard Oil installation, MIKAMI directed the agents along a dirt road to the main highway, which he stated he had followed back to Honolulu. It was noted that this same highway, if followed in the opposite direction, would lead to Fort Weaver and the West Loch Naval Ammunition Depot docks. However, MIKAMI denied that he had ever driven MORIMURA in that direction.

40. At Alea, MIKAMI directed the agents up the road to Alea Heights to a point just below the residence of Mr. Chester Clarke, where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor is obtained. This was the same spot to which the agents had previously been directed by KOTOSHIRODO. MIKAMI stated that he had taken MORIMURA to this spot on two or three occasions, and on at least one occasion MORIMURA had gotten out of the car and stood about three minutes observing Pearl Harbor.

41. MIKAMI stated that on December 5, 1941, he again drove MORIMURA to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, proceeding along the old road through Fort Shafter and past Red Hill, and returning by the new Kamehameha Highway. MIKAMI stated that he saw two battleships at anchor between 1000 and 1030. Other ships led by a battleship, were coming into the harbor at that time, but he could not say how many battleships were in the line. However, he remembered that the ship behind the battleship in the lead was almost as large, and the other ships were strung out behind. MIKAMI denied returning to Pearl Harbor that afternoon. (In paragraphs 6 and 8 of reference (b) it is noted that prior to the arrival of the ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, there were five battleships already moored. The ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA, inbound, passed the outer channel buoys of Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, that date, mooring before 1100.)

42. MIKAMI also stated that KOTOSHIRODO began to accompany MORIMURA to ETO's stand about the second or third trip that MORIMURA and MIKAMI made to Pearl Harbor. He added that he had taken KOTOSHIRODO to Pearl City without MORIMURA about four or five times. MIKAMI was asked if, when he took KOTOSHIRODO alone, the latter had ever said anything about his mission. MIKAMI replied that KOTOSHIRODO might have talked about



When pressed further, MIKAMI's memory failed him, and he would say that the purpose of KOTOSHIRODO's trips appeared to be a desire to see the naval base.

In light of the above statement, KOTOSHIRODO was again interrogated. He admitted that he had been to Pearl Harbor in MIKAMI's taxi about four times at MORIMURA, the last time in the latter part of November, 1941. He received instructions to make this trip from MORIMURA, who would tell him to go to Pearl Harbor and find out if there had been any [14] change in the number of ships in Pearl Harbor. However, KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not consult with MIKAMI concerning his mission. On this trip, as well as on certain other occasions when KOTOSHIRODO had gone to Pearl Harbor unaccompanied by MORIMURA, he stated that the latter made a sketch of the harbor showing the approximate locations of the usual ship, cruiser, and carrier moorings. Not much emphasis was placed on the location or presence of destroyers in the harbor. On the last trip KOTOSHIRODO went to the end of the peninsula, turned around without talking to anyone, and returned to the Consulate about 1000. He went to the end of the Ford City peninsula to see exactly what type of carrier was berthed at Ford Island, for he could see from the highway that there was a carrier at the mooring on the west side of Ford Island. However, he went to the end of the peninsula pursuant to instructions from MORIMURA to "go all the way around."

KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his taxi, alone, four or five times to check on the number of ships in the harbor. This was also done at the direction of MORIMURA. These trips, and the ones he made with MIKAMI without MORIMURA, were during the period from July to November, 1941. The last trip he made with MIKAMI alone was on November 28, 1941. The last trip he made with MORIMURA was later in the same month. KOTOSHIRODO denied that he had been to Pearl Harbor at any time in December. However, he stated that he once heard SEKI say that MORIMURA was going out to Pearl Harbor almost every day, and was spending a great deal of money on taxi fares. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Consulate paid all of his gasoline expenses, and bought some of his oil. The greasing and oil bills he paid himself.

On several occasions MORIMURA showed KOTOSHIRODO *Jane's Fighting Ships*. One of the things he remembers that MORIMURA pointed out was that certain American battleships could be distinguished by their masts, and MORIMURA had used the word "yagura" /literally, "turret"/ to describe the masts on certain battleships.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that when MORIMURA first came to the Consulate, he and Vice Consul OKUDA used to go out together. However, as far as he knows, the time that he took MORIMURA and OKUDA to Kailua, as described in paragraph 46 of reference (a), is the only time they ever contacted anyone outside of the Consulate.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA seemed to know Shigeo SHIGENAGA, proprietor of the VENICE CAFE, Honolulu. MORIMURA took KOTOSHIRODO there one time when Special Envoy KURUSU was on his way to England and was detained at Midway Island. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA had talked to some of the waitresses at the VENICE CAFE, and told him to know them. (The [15] VENICE CAFE drew the largest part of its trade from Naval enlisted personnel. SHIGENAGA, the proprietor, is an American about 40 years old. His home, when searched, revealed a quantity of Japanese literature strongly nationalistic in tenor. Also discovered were photographs of high Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in 1939, as well as a photograph of a Japanese Army officer. SHIGENAGA has made several trips to Japan. In October, 1939, he invited Commander John P. Dix, USN, of the USS Patrol, to visit Admiral Yorio SAWAMOTO aboard H. I. J. M. S. IWATE, a ship of a Japanese naval training squadron then visiting Honolulu. Commander Dix accepted, and SHIGENAGA made all arrangements through the Japanese Consulate. Commander Dix commented on the ease with which SHIGENAGA arranged the visit, and on the fact that SHIGENAGA treated all the Japanese officers present, from the Admiral on down, as equals. SHIGENAGA even interned for the duration of the war.)

On February 9, 1942, Special Agent Tillman, Captain Frank O. Blake, of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and Lieutenant Kimball interrogated Kimika ASAKURA, who was employed as a maid at the Consul's residence from June 16, 1941, to February 9, 1942. Miss ASAKURA is a naturalized citizen who was born at Alea, Oahu, on May 18, 1923. Miss ASAKURA

stated that a man named FUJITA, first name unknown to her, came to her home on or about June 13, 1941, and asked if she would like to work at the Consulate. She had never seen FUJITA before, but she believed that he knew her father. She believed that FUJITA was a flower raiser and lived in Pauoa Valley, Honolulu. He drove her to the Consulate on the same day. There she talked to Ichitaro OZAKI, the Consulate chauffeur, and later, to Kokichi SEKI, who engaged her services. Miss ASAKURA's duties at the Consulate were to clean the Consul General's living quarters, wait on table, and do his laundry. The Consul General lived upstairs in a building which is on the *makai* (towards the sea) side of the office building. Miss ASAKURA lived downstairs, sharing a room with Clara Yoshie KIKKAWA, who was the maid for the house in which MORIMURA lived.

48. Miss ASAKURA's predecessor at the Consul General's residence was a girl named Sakae TANAKA. Miss ASAKURA stated that Sakae TANAKA had been rather intimate with MORIMURA, according to gossip she had heard from Miss KIKKAWA, and the cook and his wife. Miss TANAKA left the Consul's employ because she had a quarrel with the cook.

49. Consul General KITA's most frequent social visitor was MORIMURA. MORIMURA would drop over to visit KITA in the evenings several times a month. Sometimes SEKI would drop in, and she would hear him talking about treasury matters, money and business, with KITA. She stated that she had never heard MORIMURA discuss business matters with KITA.

[16] 50. The *mauka* (towards the mountains) residence in the Consulate residence in the Consulate grounds was occupied by Vice Consul OKUDA and his family. SEKI lived upstairs in the office building. MORIMURA occupied one of the residences facing on Kuakini Street, while Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, occupied the other residence on that street. OZAKI, the chauffeur, and his wife, lived above the garage.

51. Miss ASAKURA stated that on December 7, 1941, she called the Consul General about 8:30 a. m. and informed him that breakfast was served. KITA was in bed when he was called. Later he came down and ate his breakfast. Miss ASAKURA did not see KITA having breakfast as the usual way of serving that meal was to set it on the table in the dining room where he could help himself. She was busy with her work and did not see anyone come from the office building to call KITA. Neither did the telephone ring. Later in the morning, reporters came to the residence and asked for KITA. When the maid could not find him at the residence, she suggested to the reporters that he might be at his office. Thereafter, Miss ASAKURA remained at the Consulate and assisted in serving members of the staff, who were all living in the office building. She stated that her services as an interpreter were frequently used by the detectives who were placed on guard duty at the Consulate from and after the morning of December 7th.

52. On February 11, 1942, the agents interrogated Miss Yoshio KIKKAWA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that she had obtained her position at the Consulate through Toyoki FUJITA, who lived next door to the KIKKAWAS and raised flowers. At the Consulate, Miss KIKKAWA did housework for MORIMURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA occupied a house on the Consulate grounds facing Kuakini Street. She confirmed the fact that she shared quarters in the Consul General's house with Miss ASAKURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA usually got up at nine o'clock in the morning, had breakfast at nine-thirty, and went over to the Consulate office building about ten o'clock. He lunched about twelve, spending about an hour, and returned from the office about three. After that, MORIMURA sometimes played baseball in the grounds with other members of the staff and the clerks. Other times he read, listened to the radio, or went out with friends.

53. Sometimes, however, according to Miss KIKKAWA, MORIMURA would get up about seven in the morning. Often he would leave the Consulate about three in the afternoon with KOTOSHIRODO, and would be gone for several hours, not returning until about seven in the evening. On two occasions, KOTOSHIRODO stayed and had drinks and dinner with MORIMURA. She stated that Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary, once came to see MORIMURA after dinner. Sakae TANAKA, a former maid at the Consulate, came to see MORIMURA several [17] times in the evening after she had left the Consulate. Girls from the Shunchoro Tea House came to MORIMURA's house several times in the evenings, and remained two or three hours. On eight or nine occasions, after attending tea house parties, MORIMURA slept until noon. Each morning, MORIMURA had to be awakened. In September, 1941, MORIMURA went on quite a drunk. When he awoke, about noon, he was still drunk, and he

considerable commotion. Miss KIKKAWA went to the Consulate office and informed SEKI, who came over and induced MORIMURA to go back and sleep off his drunken condition. Upstairs, MORIMURA had a study, this was a wooden desk which he kept locked. On several occasions, Miss KAWA saw letters written by MORIMURA, but the characters were too difficult for her to read, she said. She once saw a letter written by MORIMURA at a tea house. This letter she could read; it was a love letter written to a girl named Tomoyoko. (Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball interviewed "Tomoyoko", a *geisha*. She admitted her association with MORIMURA, and told of a golf game she and another *geisha* once played with MORIMURA and Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, an espionage suspect who left Honolulu for Japan on the Taiyo Maru, November 5, 1941.)

On December 7, 1941, Miss KIKKAWA, according to her statement to the Consul, left the Consulate about 11:30 a.m. She had set breakfast on the table for MORIMURA about 8:30 a.m. There was a slip of paper on the table directing her to put breakfast on the table and then go home. MORIMURA usually left messages on Saturday nights. There was nothing noticeably different in his activities just prior to December 7th, she said. Miss KIKKAWA specifically stated that she did not like MORIMURA, that he was "awful" and "tasty things." MORIMURA told Miss KIKKAWA that he had lost the tip of his finger "on account of love". (It has been noted from several sources that MORIMURA's fingers, either the middle or third finger, was cut off at the first knuckle. However, the various observers have been uncertain which finger was mutilated.) Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA was quite friendly with Lawrence K. NAKATSUKA, a reporter for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Occasionally, NAKATSUKA used to telephone MORIMURA, and on occasions that she knew of, they went to a tea house together.

Also on February 11, 1942, Miss Sakae TANAKA was interviewed by the Consul. She stated that she lived in Upper Pauoa Valley, Honolulu, with her husband, Yokichi TANAKA, a vegetable farmer. She was born in Honolulu on February 28, 1924, and worked at the Consulate from March 13 to June 12, 1941. She did housework in the Consul's residence. Miss TANAKA stated that she retained her job at the Consulate through FUJITA and in her own words, "he kept me in there to work." She left the Consulate because of a quarrel with FUJITA, who had recently come from Japan, as to who had left the icebox open. Miss TANAKA denied having had any intimate relations with MORIMURA.

[18] stated that she once had asked him about his finger, but he refused to tell her anything about it. She often went to the house where MORIMURA lived, to see Miss KIKKAWA, who worked there. MORIMURA always made sure that he could not, and would not, let her go into his study room.

One Sunday, MORIMURA took both Miss TANAKA and Miss KIKKAWA to Kaneohe, where they went out in the glass-bottom boat. This was while MORIMURA was still employed at the Consulate. They drove over with MORIMURA in his taxi, and MIKAMI joined them in the glass-bottom boat. After the trip, they went to Kailua and had lunch on the beach, returning to Honolulu via Koko Head. While on the boat, MORIMURA asked MIKAMI questions about Coconut Island, in Kaneohe Bay, but Miss TANAKA could not answer any other questions about the bay which MORIMURA asked. While they were there, they drove by Dr. Iga MORI's country place and stopped and looked at it.

However, Dr. MORI was not there, so they did not go into the house. Dr. MORI is an "elder statesman" of the Japanese community of Honolulu, and has been an advisor to the Consulate. He was taken into custody following the outbreak of hostilities, but due to his advanced age and enfeebled condition, he was eventually released. Later, Miss TANAKA stated that prior to going to Kaneohe district, they had driven up Aiea Heights in MIKAMI's taxi.

Robert Orion Glover, Cy (AA) USNR, of the office of the Cable and Radio Division, Honolulu, has reported that he was fairly well acquainted with MORIMURA, having met him through his membership in the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU Club. Glover has been training in Japanese military arts under the direction of Henry OKAZAKI at the NIKKO RESTORATION SANATORIUM, Honolulu, since 1934, and has conducted classes himself since 1937. A *kendo* (fencing) group, of which Glover was a member, began meeting in the summer of 1941. Glover, George HAMAMOTO of Maui, who was a member of this group, declared that the group needed more help with its study. For this purpose, HAMAMOTO induced MORIMURA to the group, in October, 1941. Glover first met MORIMURA in mid-October, and he was told that MORIMURA was a member of the

Japanese Consulate staff, that he had come from Japan only three months before, and that he was an accomplished *kendo* man. In his *kendo* matches and instructing, MORIMURA disapproved of the local style of fencing which, as described by Glover, consists of short, rapid thrusts without much power. MORIMURA stressed the superiority of the heavy chop stroke, stating that the latter had proved best in the China "Incident." Glover said that MORIMURA did not speak English very well, although he was an attentive listener, and appeared to understand the language. MORIMURA showed particular interest in the *haoles* (whites) in the *kendo* class, and asked them many questions as to who they were, where they were educated, where they worked, and similar questions. Besides Glover, there were two other whites in the class, Ted Fielding, Y2c USNR, and Harold Schnack, a [19] junior draftsman, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA once invited Glover and Fielding to join him in one of his wild parties, but the invitation was not accepted.

58. According to Glover, MORIMURA was known to travel a great deal, around Oahu and between the islands. MORIMURA once remarked to Glover that he was interested in Maui, that he had been over there and liked it very much. MORIMURA also went fishing a great deal, shore-casting and spear-fishing with a glass box. It was not clearly established whether MORIMURA ever went deep-sea fishing on sampans.

59. Alice ABE, a waitress at the SUNCHORO TEA HOUSE, Honolulu, whose professional name is "Sadako", also was interviewed by the investigators. She stated that MORIMURA and Ryuichi MORIBE, subject of reference (k), once held a private party at that tea house, with only those two men present. It is not known what was discussed at that meeting. (MORIBE, who has been interned, is a prominent alien businessman in the Japanese community of Honolulu. He admitted, among other things, attending a dinner with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and other prominent local Japanese who were close to the Consulate.)

60. A number of undeveloped leads concerning the Consulate and persons who had contacts with it are still under investigation by the local intelligence agencies, and new leads are from time to time uncovered in the investigation of seemingly unrelated cases of individuals being considered for internment. The same will be developed in further reports under the general title of this case, or under individual case titles, as may be appropriate.

PENDING—14ND

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Confidential

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Fourteenth Naval District

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities

Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H.

Date: Feb. 15, 1943

Report made by: Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, Ens. Don Woodrum, USNR.

Period covered: June 15, 1942—Feb. 10, 1943 Status of Case: PENDING—14ND

Origin of Case: Investigation of espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu

Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: (A) Copy of signed statement of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHI-RODO, dated Oct. 1, 1942, entitled "Trip to Kauai". (Photostat to ONI; copies to others.)

Copy to: ONI (5)

14ND (3)

FBI-Hon (2)

MID-HD (2)

Zone II (1)

Zone III (1)

Zone IV (1)

CinCPac (1)

Com14 (1)

Source File No. 14ND/54(c) ONI File No.:

*Synopsis.*—Former clerks and employees of the Japanese Consulate were interviewed and various investigative leads developed therefrom followed.

ew of all known Consulate espionage activity indicates that the Consulate concerned only in "legal" espionage; that is, that which could be discovered observation (in a broad sense) without entering any restricted area. Interest displayed in U. S. Fleet movements, airports, harbors, Army camps, and any instruction by the Army or Navy. Interest also was shown in power plant mail. Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO's trip to Kauai in July, 1941, to information for the Consulate, is discussed herein. Trips taken by Secre-adasi MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO appear to have been made for survey purposes. There is no evidence that either of these individuals shed contacts on Kauai, Maui, or Hawaii. However, there is evidence ice Consul OKUDA maintained a personal espionage agent on Maui. r information indicates that the Consulate was granted an allowance for n Intelligence", and was using paid Korean informants to keep close con-th Korean nationalist movements.

actions:  
proved

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.  
By direction

/cop

FEBRUARY 15, 1943.

at: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities  
nces:

- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, same subject.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Takaichi SAKAI.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Katsukichi MURACKA.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Kanaye SAHARA.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 2, 1942, subject Shigetaro MATSUO.
- ) FBI-Honolulu report, file 97-274, dated November 12, 1942, subject Noah Kwang Won CHO (available at Washington and Honolulu).
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 27, 1942, subject Isuke HORI-KAWA.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject Unji HIRAYAMA.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated March 28, 1942, subject Zenichi KAWAZOE.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 3, 1942, subject Kenneth Kilsoo HAAN.
- ) FBI-Honolulu report, file 100-1718, dated November 23, 1942, subject Kilsoo K. HAAN, with aliases (available in Washington, Los Angeles, and Honolulu).
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 12, 1943, subject Sanji ABE.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 12, 1942, subject Kikujiro Clifford KONDO.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 11, 1942, subject Katsuzo SATO.
- ) 14ND Summary Report, dated February 8, 1943, subject Kenju OH-TOMO.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 8, 1941, subject JAPANESE POSTAL EMPLOYEES.
- ) FBI-Honolulu Confidential Report, file 65-414, dated April 25, 1942, subject JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H. (CONFILE).
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject VISITS OF JAPANESE PUBLIC VESSELS TO THE ISLAND OF OAHU.
- ) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 3, 1942, subject Kimie DOUJE.

[2] 1. This report is a continuation and an expansion of the material set forth in references (a), (b), and (c). During September and October, 1941, all former employees of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, who were still available were reinterviewed in the process of a joint investigation conducted by the Army Contact Office (MID), Honolulu; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu; and the District Intelligence Office. In addition, a number of other individuals who were in a position to supply information concerning the espionage activities of the Consulate were interviewed.

2. The following officers and agents were present at various times during the interrogations which were conducted at the Army Contact Office, Honolulu:

**Military Intelligence Division:**

Captain Frank O. Blake

Special Agent William T. Hiraoka

**Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu**

Special Agent J. Harold Hughes

Special Employee Larry S. Chiwa

**District Intelligence Office**

Lieutenant G. P. Kimball

Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson

Ensign Don Woodrum

3. The following individuals were interviewed at the Army Contact Office: representatives of the three agencies:

Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, subject of reference (d).

Joan Kimie KOTOSHIRODO—Wife of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.

Takaichi SAKAI—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (e).

Katsukichi MURAOKA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (f).

[3] Kanaye SAHARA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (g).

Yasumasa MURATA—A clerk at the Japanese Consulate until 1938.

Miss Kimie DOUE—Formerly employed as a receptionist at the Japanese Consulate; subject of reference (w).

John Yoshiye MIKAMI—Regular taxi driver for the Consulate, subject of reference (h).

Albert Shulchi HAYASHI—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.

Koreshige KUDO—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.

Shotaro NIYA, alias Shigetaro MATSUO—Regular taxi driver for Kenji KIMURA, manager of the Honolulu office of the N. Y. K. line. He is the subject of reference (i).

ICHITARO OZAKI—Consulate chauffeur.

Jitsuei TAKAMIYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and Tadasi MORIMURA, a Consulate secretary, on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Maui.

4. The following individuals were interviewed by agents of the Military Intelligence Division alone:

[4] Shingo NARIKAWA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA on the occasion of their trip to the Island of Hawaii.

George Masayoshi KAWAMOTO—Relative of KOTOSHIRODO who was visited by KOTOSHIRODO during his stay on the Island of Hawaii.

Toshimasa MINATOYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and his wife on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Kauai.

Namiko FUKUSHIMA—Recipient of a present from Consul General KITAHARA, which was delivered by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO to Tetsunosuke SONE, a *toritsuginin* at Puunene, Maui.

Mrs. Tetsunosuke SONE—Wife of Tetsunosuke SONE, interviewed in lieu of her husband, who is now interned on the mainland.

5. The following individual was interviewed by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

Noah Kwang Won CHO—A Korean Christian minister who rendered various services to the Japanese Consulate on Korean matters. CHO is the subject of reference (j).

6. The following individual was interviewed by officers of the District Intelligence Office:

Lawrence NAKATSUKA—Reporter employed by the Honolulu Star Bulletin who covered the Japanese Consulate as one of his regular assignments.

## TRIPS MADE TO VARIOUS PARTS OF OAHU

*Pearl Harbor Area*

The information set forth in this report concerning the various trips made MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO is intended only to supplement the information thereon already set forth in reference (c). KOTOSHIRODO amplifies certain phases of these trips, but he did not contradict his former story on a few minor points.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip from the Consulate to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor about January, 1941, when he was asked by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA to drive Kokichi SEKI, one of the Consulate secretaries, to Pearl City and Alea. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that the purpose of these trips was to determine the number and types of ships in Pearl Harbor, to keep the Consul General informed of the movements of United States vessels. KOTOSHIRODO further stated that to the best of his knowledge, personnel of the Consulate had begun making these trips either in December, 1940, or in January, 1941. (It should be noted here that there is no evidence that any agent of the Consulate ever entered the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, without official invitation.)

To the best of KOTOSHIRODO's recollection, it was early in 1941, probably in January, that he overheard OKUDA tell SEKI that they (OKUDA and SEKI) should start "motoring around." KOTOSHIRODO also remembered seeing heavy Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, say, about the same time, that all Consulate secretaries should start making Sunday "excursions" to "public places" such as radio station KGU, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, and the Navy Yard. KOTOSHIRODO stated that prior to January, 1941, he had never seen any evidence of any secretary's making trips away from the Consulate as he and MORIMURA subsequently did.

For the first few months, SEKI acted as observer. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having "heard" that SEKI had attended a naval academy in Japan at some time, but had been forced to withdraw before graduation because of his poor health. However, SEKI was interested in, and had considerable knowledge of, naval matters. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI made a number of trips to Pearl Harbor together.

When Tadasi MORIMURA first arrived in March, 1941, SEKI and MORIMURA went to observe the ships in Pearl Harbor together. Occasionally KOTOSHIRODO went along with them. He stated that both secretaries knew how to identify various types of warships, and they would explain various identifying characteristics to KOTOSHIRODO.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that in 1941 someone from the Consulate would go out to look at the ships in Pearl Harbor about twice a week. However, SEKI and MORIMURA have been of the opinion that observations should be made more frequently.

13. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip alone to observe ships at Pearl Harbor in August, 1941. He claimed not to have stopped anywhere on this particular trip, but to have counted what ships he could see while driving at 25 miles per hour on Kamehameha Highway, just outside the Navy Yard boundaries. Whenever he went to Pearl Harbor, whether alone or with MORIMURA or SEKI, KOTOSHIRODO always was asked to state how many ships he had counted. On some occasions he was told to count only the number of destroyers, while SEKI or MORIMURA would count the other types of ships.

KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he knew the usual berths and moorings of the various types of warships in Pearl Harbor. He stated, correctly, that battleships berthed on the Honolulu side of Ford Island; that cruisers berthed on the side of Ford Island nearest the Pearl City landing; that destroyers and cruisers moored in East Loch, off Waiau. He further stated that MORIMURA had pointed out a vantage spot on the Kamehameha Highway between Alea and Makalapa where the best view of the Submarine Base could be obtained. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not know what a torpedo was, and he added that he had never heard MORIMURA discuss the subject.

KOTOSHIRODO remembered conversations with MORIMURA in which the latter had stressed the strategic importance of the Alea and Pearl City areas for purposes of observation. MORIMURA had attempted to locate a friend in Alea, presumably to develop her as an informant, and had asked KOTOSHIRODO if he had any close friends in Alea or Pearl City "who could

be trusted". KOTOSHIRODO was unable to say whether MORIMURA had succeeded in this plan.

16. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that occasionally he would board a jitney bus in Honolulu and head for some destination beyond Pearl Harbor. He would get off at Alea and walk around a bit. On one occasion, according to his story, MORIMURA got off the jitney at Alea and walked back along the Kamehameha Highway, finally coming to a Navy Yard gate. KOTOSHIRODO was unable to state whether this was the Submarine Base gate or the main gate; however, the former seems more likely. At the gate, MORIMURA inquired about getting employment in the Navy yard. The sentry referred him to an office downtown. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that he "roamed around" Alea.

17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI had been driven to Pearl Harbor on a number of occasions by John Yoshiye MIKAMI, the usual Consulate taxi driver. However, MIKAMI, when interviewed, denied ever having driven SEKI on any of the observation trips, although he admitted driving KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA on numerous occasions.

#### *Kaneohe Bay Area*

18. About one month after MORIMURA arrived in Honolulu, KOTOSHIRODO drove him (in KOTOSHIRODO's car) over the Nuuanu Pali, thence around the Kokokahi Road. They drove slowly and looked across the bay toward the Kaneohe Naval [7] Air Station. At the Kailua Beach Pavilion, they parked for about five minutes, but did not get out of the car. After leaving Kailua they drove through Kailua town, without stopping, and proceeded along the highway to Honolulu via Waimanalo. They stopped at Waimanalo beach, near the old pier. This time they got out of the car and walked out on the pier. However, they talked to no one. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he could not see Bellows Field (Army) from the pier. They stayed here for five or ten minutes, and then returned to Honolulu by way of Koko Head. They made no other stops. KOTOSHIRODO cannot remember having heard MORIMURA make any comment about the Naval Radio Station at Wailupe.

19. Shortly after their trip to Maui (early in May, 1941), MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, this time driven by MIKAMI, again went over the Nuuanu Pali. As they approached Kaneohe town, they turned onto the Kokokahi Road, and drove to the Kalama Road. While on the Kokokahi Road they had MIKAMI drive slowly. KOTOSHIRODO believes that MORIMURA had field glasses with him on this trip, but he was unable to remember whether MORIMURA had used them. However, he did remember MORIMURA's observing that all the hangars at the air station appeared to have been completed. MORIMURA had no camera with him. (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember seeing MORIMURA with a camera on any occasion.) On the Kalama Road, they stopped at a watermelon stand on the side of the road away from the beach. Then they proceeded to the Kailua Tavern, where MIKAMI ate breakfast, and KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA each drank a can of beer. They talked to no one but the waitress at the tavern. From there they returned to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali highway. The whole trip lasted about two and a half hours. KOTOSHIRODO believed that the purpose of this trip was to observe Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

20. Paragraph 34 of reference (c) describes a picnic held by the Consulate at the home of Sam WOODS, at Lanikai Beach, Oahu, about the middle of April, 1941. Ichitaro OZAKI, regularly employed chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled two such picnics, an earlier one having taken place in 1940, while OKUDA was Acting Consul General. On this occasion, the entire Consulate staff attended. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali, and then OKUDA ordered OZAKI to drive to Lanikai by way of Kaneohe (a considerable detour). They parked at Kaneohe and everyone in the party went sightseeing in a glass-bottomed boat in Kaneohe Bay. Then they drove to Lanikai by way of the Kokokahi Road. On the occasion of the second picnic, described in reference (c), they made no such detour, but proceeded directly to the WOODS home.

21. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to describe again the trip to Kailua which was detailed in paragraph 46 of reference (a). This trip was made in the latter part of October, 1941. (KOTOSHIRODO was unable to remember, however, if this trip was made prior to the arrival of, during the visit of, or after the departure of, the TATUTA MARU, Japanese evacuation ship which was in port October 23-24, 1941.) OKUDA accompanied MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO



the latter's car. This was the only trip on which OKUDA accompanied the two, and OKUDA appeared to be very nervous. KOTOSHIRODO was given no explanation of the reason for this trip, nor was he told where to go when he left the Consulate. OKUDA merely instructed him to "just go on driving". They proceeded over the Nuuanu Pali and went directly to Kailua. When they reached the Kailua Tavern, OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive straight ahead, toward the ocean, past the tavern to the second intersection. There KOTOSHIRODO was directed to stop the car and MORIMURA got out. Then OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO drove down the road almost to the junction of the Kalama Road, where OKUDA told KOTOSHIRODO to stop the car and wait for MORIMURA, who was to be in about 15 minutes.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that while driving from Honolulu he had glanced in the rear-view mirror and noticed that OKUDA had a money bag folded in a manner as to indicate that there might be a stack of currency in it. When MORIMURA left the car he wore white trousers and an aloha (sport) shirt. He wore no coat, and his shirt was hanging outside his trousers. He had a knife in his hands. KOTOSHIRODO did not know where MORIMURA went. When the latter failed to return in 15 minutes, KOTOSHIRODO suggested that he return and look for him, but OKUDA said they were to wait instead. After the absence of about 30 minutes, MORIMURA returned. His appearance was the same as it was when he left, except he was carrying a tree branch with him. When he got into the car, MORIMURA told OKUDA, "It's all okay", or something of the sort, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.

John Yoshiye MIKAMI, when interrogated, stated that he had driven MORIMURA over to Windward Oahu some five or six times. KOTOSHIRODO was along on some of these occasions; at other times, MORIMURA was alone. On all occasions he was directed to drive slowly along the Kokokahi Road, which affords an excellent view of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

According to the statement made by Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, the Consul General's official car was never used for exploring the island. This car was driven only 17,000 miles during the four years it was used by the Consul General. It was used primarily by the Consul General himself, or by MIKAMI when he drove around town on errands. The only time it was used for a trip to Windward Oahu was on those occasions when the Consul General escorted a visiting dignitary on a sightseeing tour of the island. The itinerary for these trips was to follow the coast around Koko Head and through Waimanalo, and return to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali.

#### *Other Parts of Oahu*

The reinterrogation of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI added little information concerning trips to other portions of Oahu, it being largely a repetition of the information set forth in paragraph 26 of reference (c). However, some miscellaneous items are of interest.

KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard MORIMURA say that he had made a trip around the island only a day or so after his arrival (March 27, 1941). KOTOSHIRODO believed that MIKAMI had driven MORIMURA on this occasion. KOTOSHIRODO denied ever having made a complete circuit of the island with MORIMURA.

27. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered hearing MORIMURA speak of an overnight on some Oahu beach, but MORIMURA had added no details, the time and circumstances under which MORIMURA had done this were known to KOTOSHIRODO.

MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO of meeting a "nice girl" at Haleiwa. Apparently she was a Japanese language school teacher, but MORIMURA did not reveal her name.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA had made only one trip to the Haleiwa region. On that occasion they went directly to Haleiwa Park, to the beach, where they stopped the car near a concrete wall. They did not get out of the car, but sat there for five or ten minutes. MORIMURA mentioned that it was a good swimming beach, but did not talk about the reef or any other subject of possible military interest. At the time, KOTOSHIRODO had no idea why MORIMURA made this trip to Haleiwa.

KOTOSHIRODO recalled two trips to Waianae. On the first occasion, they were driven by MIKAMI, and drove to the end of the road, Makua Cave.

On the second occasion, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove in the former's car, and they went as far as Nanakuli Beach.

31. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had never driven the road between Waiialua and Kaena Point.

32. KOTOSHIRODO could remember no significant discussions with MORIMURA concerning military objectives on Oahu. Beaches as potential landing spots for invasion forces were never discussed, he said. Hickam Field and the Kaneohe Naval Air Station were discussed only in a cursory fashion. Other airfields on Oahu were never mentioned. MORIMURA once estimated the air strength on Oahu to be no more than 500 planes. (That this figure was fairly accurate is reflected in the Navy Department's communique of December 5, 1942, which revealed that there were 475 Army and Navy planes on Oahu on the morning of December 7, 1941.)

#### TRIPS TO OTHER ISLANDS

##### *Kauai*

33. During the course of the reinterrogation, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he had made a trip to the Island of Kauai for the Consulate during July, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO had not mentioned this trip on the original interrogation. He and his wife made this trip together; they were not accompanied by any other representative of the Consulate.

34. Originally, MORIMURA had been scheduled to make the trip to Kauai with KOTOSHIRODO, and the latter had been so informed by OKUDA about 10 days prior to the prospective date of departure. However, a disagreement arose among [10] OKUDA, MORIMURA, and SEKI. SEKI, who had made none of the trips to the outside islands, wished to make this trip himself, and because of this, friction developed between SEKI and MORIMURA. To settle the argument, OKUDA decreed that neither should go. Instead, he told KOTOSHIRODO to take Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO along as a "front".

35. Two days before he left, KOTOSHIRODO conferred for about an hour with OKUDA in the latter's office, and received the following instructions:

(a) OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a rough sketch of the Barking Sands Airport, said by OKUDA to have been taken from a newspaper, and instructed KOTOSHIRODO to note any activity there;

(b) OKUDA also showed KOTOSHIRODO a photograph of Nawilawili port, taken about 1939, and instructed the latter to note any changes;

(c) OKUDA stated that he had heard a story (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember the source) that the United States Navy was planning to make some use of Hanalei Bay, and KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note evidence, if any, of Naval activity there;

(d) KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note what use was being made of the airport in the old race track at Lihue, and to further note any expansion activity there;

(e) He was further instructed to take a look at the power plant in Wainiha Valley (the only power plant on the Island of Kauai). The Vice Consul showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of Kauai, in English, which showed the location of the power plant, and had transmission lines printed in red. (It is believed that this map was a United States Geological Survey map, edition of 1912.)

OKUDA impressed upon KOTOSHIRODO that the primary rule to be obeyed was caution. He was to tell no one that he was from the Consulate. He was to make no inquiries about the things he was sent to observe. He was to contact no friends or relatives. He was to obtain only such information as he could see with his own eyes. Before he left, both SEKI and MORIMURA told him to treat the trip as a vacation and have some fun.

36. KOTOSHIRODO and his wife departed for Kauai by airplane on Saturday morning, July 12, 1941. (This has been verified by an inspection of the records of the Inter-Island Airways, Ltd.) Mr. and Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO left their home at 0715 and were driven to the airport in MIKAMI's taxi. At John Rodgers Airport, KOTOSHIRODO learned that he would be unable to return to Honolulu on [11] Sunday afternoon, July 13th, as he had planned, so he decided to return the following morning. He then directed MIKAMI to meet the Monday morning plane. The plane for Kauai departed from Honolulu at 0800 and arrived at Port Allen airport about 0900, on July 12th.

37. A number of taxis were waiting for fares at the Port Allen field when KOTOSHIRODO's plane arrived. However, there was only one Japanese driver,

KOTOSHIRODO approached him. The driver has been identified as Toshi-MINATOYA. OKUDA had warned KOTOSHIRODO that he should use Japanese drivers when "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO told MINATOYA he and his wife were sightseeing on Kauai and wanted to see both sides of the island. They agreed on a price. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he agreed to pay \$25.00. MINATOYA, when interviewed, stated that the price was \$20.00. Records of the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, indicate that the latter figure was the correct one.)

From the airport, they drove directly to Waimea Canyon, getting out at the tourists' observation point for 10 or 15 minutes. Then they drove further up the road until they reached Kokee. At MINATOYA's suggestion, they turned back here. They returned to the Waimea Hotel, where MINATOYA and KOTOSHIRODO and his wife made mutual introductions and lunched together. However, KOTOSHIRODO did not tell MINATOYA that he was from the Consulate.

They left the Waimea Hotel about 1400 and drove to the Barking Sands. MINATOYA had postponed this trip until the afternoon because of MINATOYA's information that the Army held bombing practice there in the morning. MINATOYA mentioned that there was a new airport at Barking Sands. They drove as far as a large sand hill, where KOTOSHIRODO and his wife got out of the car and walked to the top of a dune. They saw only sand, sea, and *keawe* (algaroba).

They remained at Barking Sands for about 15 minutes, and then departed in the direction of Lihue about 1530. Enroute to Lihue they stopped at the Lighthouse for five or ten minutes, and the Ancient Hawaiian Battleground. These spots are well known points of tourist interest. They arrived at Lihue about 1730. They registered at the Lihue Hotel under their proper names, and dismissed MINATOYA with instructions to pick them up again the following morning. However, after KOTOSHIRODO and his wife had eaten dinner at the Lihue Hotel, they decided to go to a movie, so they called MINATOYA to drive with them. All three went to the Lihue Theater, KOTOSHIRODO paying for the tickets.

One of the passengers on the plane on which the KOTOSHIRODOS flew from Honolulu was Isuke HORIKAWA, subject of reference (k). HORIKAWA, who was taken into custody in April, 1942, was suspect because he was the owner of the Pensacola Hotel in Honolulu, a suspected Japanese espionage center prior to the war. HORIKAWA was the head cook at the Lihue Hotel, and was one of the wealthiest Japanese on the Island of Kauai. He was identified with a number of pro-Japanese activities on that island prior to the war. KOTOSHIRODO was questioned very closely regarding HORIKAWA's presence on the plane, but KOTOSHIRODO maintained that this was pure coincidence. He stated that when he met HORIKAWA later at the Lihue Hotel, they merely exchanged greetings as having been fellow travelers earlier that day. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered HORIKAWA from having seen him at the Japanese Consulate on two occasions.

On Sunday morning, July 13th KOTOSHIRODO and his wife ate breakfast at the hotel. At the suggestion of MINATOYA, they had the hotel pack them a picnic lunch, and they left the hotel about 0900 and drove around the east coast of Kauai. They went first to Wailua Falls, then to a grass shack at a *heiau* (ancient Hawaiian religious site). They visited a number of tourist spots, and finally arrived at Hanalei about noon. They ate their picnic lunch at the Hanalei Park pavilion, while KOTOSHIRODO observed the bay. He noted only that the water in Hanalei Bay was shallow and very calm, and that there was no sign of any construction work going on. About 1245, they drove to Haena where they visited both the wet cave and the dry cave, tourist attractions.

From Haena, they drove up Wainiha Valley to a point near the power plant. They turned the car around and parked about 50 or 100 yards below the power plant, and got out of the car to pick guavas. KOTOSHIRODO noted that the power plant was small, and had two lead-in water pipes, each about three feet in diameter. He also noted that the pipes were directly alongside the road, and that the plant was unfenced.

On the return journey, they stopped at Kilauea lighthouse, which is off the main highway, and went up into the lighthouse with the keeper. KOTOSHIRODO believed that he had signed his name in the lighthouse log.

From Kilauea, they drove directly to Nawiliwili harbor as far as the wharf where Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company steamers docked. He saw at the wharf that there had been no new construction since the picture in OKUDA's possession had been taken (1939), so they left immediately. He did note, however, that Standard Oil Company gasoline tanks were there.

45. From Nawiliwili they drove back to the hotel, arriving about 1630. They dismissed MINATOYA. That night they walked to the nearby Aloha Theater and saw a movie.

46. During the course of the afternoon, when they passed the Lihue airport twice, KOTOSHIRODO noted that the only signs of military activity there were some Army tents pitched in camp.

47. The following morning, July 14th, MINATOYA came to the hotel about 0800. The KOTOSHIRODOS checked out of the hotel about 0830, and MINATOYA drove them to the Hanapepe airport. Their plane departed for Honolulu about 0930, and arrived in Honolulu about 1000. MIKAMI was waiting for them, and drove them home. KOTOSHIRODO then drove his wife to her dressmaking shop, and he went back to the Consulate.

[13] 48. At the Consulate, OKUDA and MORIMURA had a two-hour conference with KOTOSHIRODO, and took notes while questioning the clerk. KOTOSHIRODO detailed the general lack of activity on Kauai, and MORIMURA finally remarked, "There isn't anything big going on it seems". SEKI was not present at this conference. He merely asked KOTOSHIRODO later if he had had a good time, but also commented that it was "waste time" just to "look from the road for things that were meant to be hidden".

49. On October 1, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO personally typed and signed a statement regarding his Kauai trip. A photostatic copy of his statement is herewith forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence as enclosure (A). Mimeographed facsimile copies thereof are provided for the other dissemines.

50. Toshimasa MINATOYA was interviewed on three occasions by a representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and his story substantiates that given by KOTOSHIRODO. Records of the Lihue Hotel and the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, also bear this out. There is no evidence of prior arrangement between KOTOSHIRODO and MINATOYA. MINATOYA remembered KOTOSHIRODO's having had a camera on this trip. The pictures taken by KOTOSHIRODO on this trip were examined by the interrogating officers and agents, and all proved to be either innocuous scenic views or pictures of Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the only map he took with him on the trip was an ordinary tourist cartograph, which were available at many places throughout the Territory. He made no markings on this map, nor did he make any notes concerning his observations.

51. Prior to his departure, KOTOSHIRODO was given about \$100.00 for his expenses by SEKI, out of which he claims he returned about \$7.00 or \$9.00. However, he stated that his expenses were: \$50.00 for the air fare, \$20.00 for the hotel bill, and \$25.00 for the taxi. (As already mentioned, this last figure actually was \$35.00.)

#### *Maui*

52. KOTOSHIRODO, upon request, again detailed the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Maui in May, 1941. These details were substantially the same as those set forth in paragraphs 15-18 of reference (c). The only change is that it was reported in reference (c) that KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited a pineapple cannery while on Maui; whereas KOTOSHIRODO stated on re-interview that they had passed a couple of pineapple canneries, but had not visited either.

53. Prior to their departure for Maui, OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of that island. However, he did not tell KOTOSHIRODO what to look for, that is, what military objectives. OKUDA told MORIMURA, who later told KOTOSHIRODO, that the important places to be looked at were:

- [14] (a) Puunene Air Field (Navy);  
 (b) Kahului Harbor;  
 (c) Lahaina Bay;  
 (d) National Guard Camp.

54. MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO visited Lahaina, a fleet anchorage off Maui, on the first day of their visit. However, they saw no ships there. Later that day they drove to Kahului on the other side of the island, passing Maalaea Airport, since abandoned, on the way. They drove out on a pier at Kahului. MORIMURA asked the driver whether Navy ships came into Kahului, and was told that destroyers and submarines occasionally paid that harbor a visit. MORIMURA commented on the fact that the water at Kahului was rough compared to that of Lahaina.

55. Sometime during their first day on Maui, MORIMURA discussed making a trip to the Hana region with their taxi driver. (This trip is long, and necessitates traveling over bad roads.) MORIMURA also asked if there were an air field there. The driver told them there was a field, but he thought that the road was too rough and too long for them to make the trip during the limited time MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO planned to be on Maui.

56. On the following day they drove to the top of Haleakala, and then to Kula Sanitarium. They got out of the car near the buildings. KOTOSHIRODO took a picture; MORIMURA commented on being able to see the ocean both on the Wailuku side and the Lahaina side of Puunene Valley. They stayed at Kula about 10 minutes, seeing no one. In the afternoon they drove to the National Guard Camp at Waihee, about ten minutes out of Wailuku; however, they saw no troops. They drove along the coast a little farther, and then turned back and drove to the Puunene Aripport where they boarded a plane for Honolulu about 1500.

57. Investigation indicated that the taxi driver on this trip was Kenneth Jitsuei TAKAMIYA, a Hawaiian-born *Nisei*, 26 years old, who was expatriated from his Japanese citizenship in 1934. He made only one trip to Japan, that being when he was five years old, and for a stay of only six months. TAKAMIYA, when interviewed, substantially confirmed KOTOSHIRODO's description of the trip around Maui. There was no evidence brought forth which would indicate that TAKAMIYA had any prior knowledge of the visit of the two men from the Consulate. Apparently the only two contacts made on Maui were with Itsuo HAMADA, as set forth in paragraphs 15-16 in reference (c), and with Tetsunosuke SONE, as set forth in paragraph 17 of reference (c).

58. Although the contact with Itsuo HAMADA was in itself highly suspicious, nothing has been brought forth which would indicate that this contact was anything more than a casual coincidence. However, investigation by representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Maui have added some details concerning the contact made with Tetsunosuke SONE. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had visited SONE, who was a *toritsuginin* and principal of the Japanese language [15] school at Spreckelsville, and had delivered to him a package sent by Nagao KITA, the Japanese Consul General. This package was to be given to a Japanese woman (whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not recall) who lived at Spreckelsville. Investigation indicated that the woman in question was Miss Namiko FUKUSHIMA. Miss FUKUSHIMA, when interviewed, stated that she had gone to school in Japan from August, 1937 to May, 1938, and during that period she had become very well acquainted with a Yosuko ISHII, daughter of a Consul General ISHII, said to be a prominent member of the Japanese consular corps. After her return to Hawaii in 1938, Miss FUKUSHIMA maintained a personal correspondence with Miss ISHII. Apparently Miss ISHII had requested KITA to take a present to Miss FUKUSHIMA prior to KITA's coming to Honolulu as Consul General in March, 1941. The present, which Miss FUKUSHIMA produced for the interviewing agent, was a Japanese doll and a battledore. She stated that the package had been delivered to her by SONE.

59. A check of hotel registers, and an interview with Mrs. Itsuo HAMADA, failed to produce any evidence which would contradict KOTOSHIRODO's story.

60. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO carried binoculars on their trip to Maui. The only map they had was an ordinary tourist map, and the only mark that MORIMURA made on this map was a small check along the coastline just below Lahaina. MORIMURA reportedly made this check to indicate that the Lahaina coast was extremely rugged, and thus, presumably, unsuitable for landings. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO made any written notes. OKUDA talked only to MORIMURA about the trip. Later MORIMURA observed to KOTOSHIRODO that "there wasn't much going on" on Maui. KOTOSHIRODO took a camera along, but made no effort to photograph the places they regarded as "important". The camera was used merely to add to their pose as tourists. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Maui trip had cost between \$115.00 and \$130.00.

61. According to KOTOSHIRODO, one outgrowth of the Maui trip was the confirmation of a belief held by MORIMURA that OKUDA had a personal agent collecting information for the Consulate on Maui. MORIMURA had expressed this opinion on a number of occasions, although SEKI disagreed with him. SEKI said that such a person would have to be paid well, and OKUDA did not have the funds with which to pay such an agent. (SEKI was Consulate treasurer, and presumably would know of such expenditures, unless OKUDA had a secret per-

sonal fund at his disposal.) MORIMURA stated that OKUDA expected him to tell OKUDA every secret, but the Vice Consul was not so "open-hearted" with MORIMURA, especially about the secret of Maui coverage. Since OKUDA and MORIMURA worked so closely together, it irked MORIMURA that OKUDA would not tell him of the Maui agent. The incident that confirmed MORIMURA's suspicions about Maui coverage occurred a few days after their return from the island: Vice Consul OKUDA asked MORIMURA whether he had seen any mooring buoys at Lahaina Roads. MORIMURA said that he had seen none, but OKUDA contradicted him and said that there *were* some buoys there. MORIMURA then went to KOTOSHIRODO and asked the same question of the clerk, but KOTOSHIRODO could not remember any buoys there either. MORIMURA concluded that OKUDA's personal agent had supplied the contrary information.

[16] 62. Possibly supporting MORIMURA's theory are these facts concerning the Maui trip: MORIMURA conducted that mission very laxly. He did not visit Hana to see for himself the airport facilities allegedly there. He traveled no farther north on the leeward coast than Mala Wharf. On the windward coast he omitted more than half the road running north from Wailuku. He did nothing to observe the Puunene Naval Air Station field other than pass it going to and coming from the plane. On Hawaii and Kauai, almost every foot of highway along the coastline was traversed. It is believed that OKUDA's contact on Maui may have been Unji HIRAYAMA, a priest of the Homba Hongwanji who resided at Lahaina, and who was taken into custody on December 7, 1941. It is known that HIRAYAMA, who is the subject of reference (1), was requested on at least one occasion (June, 1940) to keep the Consulate informed of any movements of the United States Fleet at Lahaina, and it is believed that he complied with this request.

#### *Hawaii*

63. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to discuss again the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Hawaii in October, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO stated the facts of the trip substantially as they are set forth in paragraphs 19-24 of reference (c). The details KOTOSHIRODO added in his later version principally concerned the various drinking parties in which they indulged while on Hawaii.

64. Before they left Honolulu on the trip to Hawaii, MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he wanted to see:

- (a) Hilo harbor;
- (b) Kilauea. (Speculating on the reason for their desire to see Kilauea it should be noted that there was a Hawaii National Guard camp there prior to the war, and also there was some talk of building a new airport in the lava flats);
- (c) South Point, where a new airport was actually in the process of construction;
- (d) Kohala, where there is an Inter-Island Airways landing field at Upolu.

65. In their trip around the island, they passed the Kilauea Volcano, and MORIMURA asked about the military camp there. They drove down the road toward South Point until they came to a sign "Kapu—Military Reservation". They made no effort to enter the reservation, but instead turned the car around and returned to the main highway. They could see nothing of interest from outside the gate.

66. They stopped at the Kona Hotel that night on the suggestion of the driver. The next day they included Upolu in their itinerary, but they only [17] paused there for a few minutes. They did not get out of the car. While in the Kohala district they also inspected Kawaihae, the landing from which cattle are swum out to the Inter-Island steamers.

67. On the fourth day of their visit they drove all around the city of Hilo, seeing Rainbow Falls, Hilo Hospital, the waterfront, Hilo Country Club, and Puumale Home (for the tubercular).

68. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA were not sent to contact anyone on the Island of Hawaii; on the contrary, they were strictly enjoined not to do so. However, KOTOSHIRODO made one exception, and made a personal call on his wife's cousin, Mrs. George KAWAMOTO. He brought her candy, and she was greatly surprised to see him. KOTOSHIRODO told her that he was staying at the Naniloa Hotel, but he stayed only a few minutes. However, after he had returned to the hotel, and was drinking in the bar with MORIMURA, George KAWAMOTO came in to see KOTOSHIRODO, having been told by his wife of KOTOSHIRODO's visit. KOTOSHIRODO introduced him to MORI-

A. They had a drink at the bar, and then KAWAMOTO invited them to Ilo Theater. They saw the show, and then KAWAMOTO went home.

A representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, contacted George KAWAMOTO regarding his relationship with KOTOSHIRODO. KAWAMOTO stated that his wife was a cousin of KOTOSHIRODO's and he gave an account of a visit made to Hawaii by KOTOSHIRODO's wife in 1940. Apparently this trip was merely a vacation. However, there is nothing in the Military Intelligence Division report to indicate that KAWAMOTO was interrogated concerning the trip taken by KOTOSHIRODO from MORIMURA to Hawaii.

Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Hawaii also interviewed Shingo NARIKAWA, who was taxi driver for MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO while they were on Hawaii. Although interrogated at length, NARIKAWA could remember nothing which was at variance with the story given by KOTOSHIRODO.

#### TADASI MORIMURA

From the information that has been collected from the Consular clerks and other persons close to the Consulate, it is apparent that MORIMURA was something of a mystery man. All agreed that he had special privileges. He was frequently drunk, often had women in his quarters overnight, came to work late if at all, as he pleased, insulted the Consul General on occasions, and generally conducted himself as if he were beyond penalty. This naturally caused comment among the Consulate secretaries and clerks.

Some of the secretaries and clerks believed that MORIMURA was an officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy. According to KOTOSHIRODO, however, MORIMURA denied this. SEKI said that he knew how Japanese naval officers behaved, and that MORIMURA definitely did not conduct himself as an officer.

73. It was publicly announced MORIMURA's arrival that he had been sent to Honolulu to assist in expatriation matters. Takaichi SAKAI, senior clerk at the Consulate, who had been handling the routine of expatriation matters for a number of years, stated that MORIMURA had made a pretense of working with the work for only the first three or four weeks he was here, but had none of it personally, and appeared to know nothing about the work. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, who, although uneducated, has given himself an informal self education in naval matters, had little regard for MORIMURA, and sarcastically stated that the secretary lacked the sharp eye and the smart gait of a Japanese military or naval officer.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA was an eighth rank secretary in the Japanese consular service. This is the lowest rank, a first rank secretary being the highest. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard YUGE and Samon NARIKAWA, the Consular Secretary in charge of the code room, remark that eighth rank secretaries were usually sent to the least desirable posts in the consular service. The desirability of posts was said to vary according to climate. The least desirable posts were in China. Honolulu, on the other hand, was considered one of the best posts in the Japanese consular service. It was usually given to men with many years of faithful service, and it was unusual for a secretary of the eighth rank to have his initial assignment in Hawaii. MORIMURA believed this to be MORIMURA's first assignment abroad, since his name, at the date of his arrival here, had not yet appeared in the consular roster of the Japanese Foreign Office. Because of this, they assumed that he was recently transferred to the foreign service, and had served only an indoctrination period in Japan before coming to Honolulu.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA never talked about his past life or of the time he spent in grammar school. However, on one occasion, MORIMURA did refer to Chinese coolies pulling barges on the Yangtze river. He called them the lowest people on earth. This remark led KOTOSHIRODO to believe that MORIMURA had lived in, or had at least visited, China.

Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, supplied one version of MORIMURA's background. He stated that on one occasion he had overheard a conversation between SEKI and YUGE regarding MORIMURA. They had remarked that MORIMURA was the only child of a wealthy family of Ehime-ken, Japan. His father died when he was rather young, leaving him in comfortable circumstances, inasmuch as the family owned considerable property.

Prior to his arrival in Hawaii, MORIMURA had been working in the Consular Office in Tokyo, possibly for as long a period as three years, although

it was more likely that he had been there for only two years. On one occasion he had been discharged from the Foreign Office for excessive drinking, but his mother had written to a prominent official about the matter, and through this connection had been able to have MORIMURA reinstated.

78. Whatever his background, MORIMURA was not popular with the rest of the Consulate staff. This was probably due to his youth, his favored position [19] and the advantage he took of this position. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that SEKI greatly resented MORIMURA. SEKI had done the work of gathering data about ships in Pearl Harbor until MORIMURA came, but then had been relieved of these duties. SEKI openly exhibited professional jealousy, often telling KOTOSHIRODO that MORIMURA did not know what he was doing. The change in plans for the Kauai trip was cited as an example of this dissension. As KOTOSHIRODO put it during one of the interviews, both SEKI and MORIMURA were trying to gain all the credit for the information-gathering work. Further information about MORIMURA's background is to be found on pages 10 and 11 of reference (u).

79. KOTOSHIRODO stated that shortly after MORIMURA's arrival, the new secretary made a point of "making friends" around town. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA spent a lot of time at the offices of the Japanese newspapers, particularly the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA had many friends at the Nippu Jiji, but until questioned at length showed no great willingness to "remember" who they were. Finally he admitted that of all the men at the Nippu Jiji, Shigeo FURUKAWA, the advertising manager, was best known to MORIMURA. The significance of this fact is indicated by the information contained in paragraphs 9-11 of reference (a). Paragraph 10 of reference (c) should also be noted in this regard. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA was an excellent Japanese poet. (Other information corroborates this statement.) KOTOSHIRODO was then asked if he would explain the common interest between MORIMURA and FURUKAWA. It was pointed out that FURUKAWA was about 55 years of age, a poet, a family man and a business man, whereas MORIMURA was only about 29, was not a poet, and preferred to spend his leisure in drinking and playing with the *geishas*. KOTOSHIRODO stated in answer to this that they often played *go* (Japanese checkers) together at the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA also knew Zenichi KAWAZOE, subject of reference (m), who covered the Consulate "beat" for the Nippu Jiji. Other Nippu Jiji personnel whom MORIMURA knew were Shoichi ASAMI, the city editor, and Katsuichi KAWAMOTO, the business manager. All these men have been interned.

80. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA came to the Consulate very rarely. He remembered FURUKAWA's coming there only when he brought Nippu Jiji representatives from the outside islands to introduce them to the Consul General.

81. KOTOSHIRODO stated that another close associate of MORIMURA was Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, chief chemist of the Honolulu Sake Brewery. TAKAGISHI was the subject of an intensive investigation by this office prior to his departure for Japan aboard the *Taiyo Maru* on November 5, 1941. TAKAGISHI is the son-in-law of an Admiral HYAKUTAKE of the Imperial Japanese Navy. (There are two admirals of this name, brothers, in the Japanese Navy; this office has been unable to determine which admiral is the father of TAKAGISHI's wife.) TAKAGISHI was a frequent visitor of the Japanese Consulate and often played golf with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and Tsunetaro HARADA, manager of the Pensacola Hotel, where TAKAGISHI resided. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he often thought that the friendship between MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI was "funny", because TAKAGISHI loved golf much and MORIMURA did [20] not play the game. However, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI used to "chase women" together. It was never established that TAKAGISHI actually was engaged in espionage for Japan, although a mass of circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that he was so engaged.

#### SEKI AND MORIMURA DISCUSS ESPIONAGE

82. On many occasions KOTOSHIRODO was present at discussions between MORIMURA and SEKI. On other occasions, they would discuss things with him individually. It should be remembered that KOTOSHIRODO worked as SEKI's assistant while he was inside the office, although he was MORIMURA's assistant



ecting information outside the office. Because of this situation, KOTO-  
ODO was in close contact with both men.

MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that the Japanese consulates all over  
world were supposed to gather all the information they could without doing  
l things". (This point is considerably amplified in reference (u).) MORI-  
also told KOTOSHIRODO that an outside system, which was separate  
part from the Consulate, and which worked directly on orders from Tokyo,  
ed such information as it was necessary to obtain by "illegal" means. This  
include, for example, the practice of buying secrets. MORIMURA ob-  
that such an outside system would not report through the Consulate, nor  
the Consulate contact the outside system. In all probability, the Consulate  
know nothing of this outside system, he said.

MORIMURA once asked SEKI if there were any Japanese espionage agents  
ing those outside the Consulate) in the Territory of Hawaii. SEKI replied  
e did not know. MORIMURA observed that he did not know what the  
were, but that there must be such a system. However, he did not know  
anner in which such an outside system would operate.

KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA and SEKI discuss espionage coverage  
occasion. SEKI stated that it was necessary for the Consulate to have a  
man" on each island. However, MORIMURA was of the opinion that this  
ement would be difficult to meet, since the average Japanese in the Terri-  
f Hawaii lacked the technical knowledge necessary in the work. MORI-  
and SEKI agreed that because of the large number of Japanese in the  
population, Hawaii should be "the easiest place" to carry on espionage.  
er, they believed this advantage to be lost, because the local Japanese were  
only educated to do this work. MORIMURA was very outspoken on this  
claiming that the *toritsuginin* (the so-called local consular agents) were  
d for the work, and that most Japanese in Hawaii was "just trash" and  
ciently educated. He remarked that the Japanese had come to Hawaii  
rers and were therefore uneducated, where the Japanese on the Mainland  
United States were much better educated.

KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA say that throughout the world then  
all nations "use other kind of people" (i. e., non-nationals of the country  
ving [21] them) as espionage agents. MORIMURA believed that  
sometimes used non-Japanese espionage agents (although KOTOSHIRODO  
heard him say whether such agents were operating in Hawaii). MORI-  
once said in KOTOSHIRODO's presence that he had "heard in Tokyo" that  
had long had a British naval officer acting as an espionage agent in China.  
her this Britisher was working for Japan only against China, or against  
hina and Britain, or only against Britain, was not stated). MORIMURA  
ld that this officer had been so employed "for years". However, he com-  
d on the fact that non-Japanese agents were expensive. He said that the  
me such agents submitted information, they submitted a lot of it, but after  
e law of diminishing returns began to operate, and eventually the employer  
pay the same price for mere dribbles. He also stated that it was safer and  
stly to use Japanese agents in espionage work. However, more valuable  
ation could be obtained by non-Japanese, although at a greater cost to

KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he thought the extra-Consulate es-  
e system to which MORIMURA referred might be operating in Hawaii  
present time, and sending information from Hawaii to Japan. KOTOSHI-  
expressed surprise that such an operation was considered possible, saying,  
can?" The only pertinent fact he could recall in this connection was that  
MURA once remarked that it would be impossible to use short-wave radio  
tting information out of Hawaii after war started because of "a device"  
mericans had which enabled them to ascertain the exact location of a radio  
mitter. KOTOSHIRODO knew what short-wave radio was, and knew of  
Tokyo broadcasts, but professed complete ignorance about amateur radio  
s. He stated that he had never heard anyone at the Consulate talk about  
bject, nor had he and MORIMURA ever stopped to see anyone in town  
operated an amateur short-wave radio station.

KOTOSHIRODO stated that on another occasion MORIMURA remarked  
KI that Hawaii would be a fine place from which to watch a Japanese-  
can war. Either SEKI or MORIMURA observed that there would be no  
or a spy to communicate from Hawaii to Japan by radio, referring to  
sk of discovery by radio detection equipment.

89. Apparently one of the "legal" methods of collecting information indulged in by the Consulate was the close scrutiny of daily newspapers. Yasumasu MURATA, a clerk at the Consulate until 1938, stated that the local newspapers were clipped daily. He added that the Vice Consul always had charge of this work. The Vice Consul usually would mark such items as he desired and pass them on to MURATA, who would do the actual clipping. Usually two—occasionally three—clippings were secured of each item. One copy was sent to Japan and one retained at the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he used to receive the first edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin for the Consulate at his home, because the first edition was not delivered to the zone in which the Consulate was located. KOTOSHIRODO's home, two blocks away, was near enough to be included in the delivery zone. Apparently the Consulate wanted to keep close watch on all editions of the paper. Many of the Consulate despatches (reviewed after the outbreak of war) merely contained synopses of press stories.

[22]

## SECURITY MEASURES

90. KOTOSHIRODO said that he was taught at the Consulate that the first rule in "information collecting" was "no get caught". He was told never to get out of his way to get information. Even if he could not see his desired objective from the highway, he was not to ask questions about it, nor leave the highway to view it. If ever he and MORIMURA were stopped by the authorities and questioned, KOTOSHIRODO was to explain that they were merely "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO was to do the necessary talking, because of MORIMURA's poor command of English.

91. He was told never to take pictures of "important places". Although he took a camera to Kauai and Maui, this was merely a "prop" to carry out their pose as sightseers. KOTOSHIRODO expressly denied ever having taken pictures of air fields, harbors, power plants, or other conceivable military objectives. His snapshots were only of the usual scenic places, he said.

92. MORIMURA occasionally carried field glasses on his trips to various parts of Oahu. He never carried them to the outside islands. Even on Oahu he was extremely careful in their use. The field glasses used were bought early in 1941 at SEKI's insistence. Prior to that time, there had been no field glasses at the Consulate. To divert suspicion, the glasses were bought for the Consulate by Toro NISHIKAWA (now interned), an employee of the Nippu Ji ji. (NISHIKAWA handled certain commercial printing orders from the Consulate.)

93. KOTOSHIRODO could recall no instance in which MORIMURA had made written notes of their observations prior to their returning to the Consulate after "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO likewise denied ever making any notes himself. Instead, he said that his practice was to report verbally what he had seen to MORIMURA or OKUDA, who would make notes, at the Consulate, of KOTOSHIRODO's reported observations.

94. KOTOSHIRODO stated that neither he nor MORIMURA ever carried maps which might attract suspicion. On such occasions as they did use maps, they carried cartographs published by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, and the only occasion upon which notations were made thereon was on the trip to Maui, see paragraph 60, above. However, in earlier interviews, as reported in paragraph 42 of reference (c), KOTOSHIRODO stated that on trips he made alone to the Pearl Harbor region, he had marked the positions of various warships on rough maps drawn by MORIMURA. (Note might be made here of KOTOSHIRODO's extraordinary powers of perception and memory for details of events which happened months, or years, before. Many of his statements were otherwise known to be true, tending to make KOTOSHIRODO's statements and admissions generally reliable.)

95. KOTOSHIRODO said that when he was first employed at the Consulate (1935), he was told by Vice Consul YAMASAKI that he was not to talk about Consulate business to strangers. When KOTOSHIRODO first began to make trips to Pearl Harbor, SEKI warned him not to mention these trips to his wife.

[23]

## CHRISTMAS PRESENTS GIVEN BY THE CONSULATE

96. Takaichi SAKAI stated that every year the Consulate gave Christmas presents to a number of United States Customs inspectors. He stated that he personally delivered gifts to the homes of Customs Inspectors Carl F. EIFLER, George W. SPENCE, Andrew A. BUTA, and John OLIVIERA. These gifts usually consisted of merchandise orders of \$20.00 to \$30.00 drawn on M. McInerney, Ltd. or the Liberty House, both large Honolulu retail stores.

97. The Honolulu harbor master, James L. FRIEL, and his assistant, Frank J. UNTERMANN, received similar Christmas presents, according to SAKAI.

98. Another recipient was Ernest M. HIRAKAWA, an alien Japanese, foreman of the registry section of the United States Post Office, Honolulu. Comment has been made on HIRAKAWA in reference (t).

99. Ichitaro OZAKI, regular chauffeur for the Consulate, confirmed the fact that he drove SAKAI around to deliver Christmas presents. Although he was unable to recall all the persons to whom presents had been delivered, he did remember that SPENCE and FRIEL were among the recipients. KOTOSHI-RODO also remembered that Christmas presents were given to a number of persons.

#### MIKAMI'S NAVAL KNOWLEDGE

100. The interrogating officers and agents were surprised at John Yoshiye MIKAMI's knowledge of naval matters. MIKAMI is so poorly educated that he speaks both pidgin Japanese and pidgin English. He has been a taxi driver for the greater part of his life. He was detained on January 6, 1942, and since that time has been incarcerated on Sand Island, Honolulu, with other internees.

101. During the course of the interrogation (September 28, 1942), it became apparent that even while interned MIKAMI had been able to keep familiar with current movements of the United States Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor. MIKAMI stated that only a week before a new battleship that he had never seen before, and a carrier that was either the LEXINGTON or the SARATOGA, had arrived at Pearl Harbor. (The SOUTH DAKOTA and the SARATOGA actually had arrived.)

102. He stated that in July, 1942, a large body of United States ships had left Pearl Harbor—for Australia, he presumed. He stated that these ships had recently returned. He then commented on the large number of destroyer movements.

103. MIKAMI commented upon seeing "the same old battleships" return to Pearl Harbor in August (true), and also upon a new carrier he had never seen before which entered Pearl Harbor on the same day. This latter was the WASP, on her first trip to Honolulu. (The Fleet Intelligence Office, Pacific Fleet, was seasonably [24] informed of the knowledge that MIKAMI, an internee, was able to see concerning current ship movements, from the internment camp on Sand Island.)

104. MIKAMI conversed intelligently about naval subjects in general. He mentioned "anti-torpedo nets", knew their purpose, and stated he had never seen them in use on his trips to Pearl Harbor before the war. He also mentioned "anti-airplane balloons" which he thought were impractical for use around Pearl Harbor because they would give away the exact location of the objective. MIKAMI also discussed the "balance of naval power" theory, and expressed the opinion that the United States-Japanese war began 30 years ago when a naval race between the two powers was started. He also expressed the opinion that the United States would beat Japan only when she had beaten the Japanese Navy.

105. MIKAMI was asked how he had acquired such a broad knowledge of naval subjects. He said that he had been reading American magazines for about three years, naming *Our Navy*, *Life*, and the *Naval Institute Proceedings*. He said he received copies of the latter publication when the Consul threw its old copies away. He stated that he did not read Japanese naval magazines because "they tell big lies". However, whether MIKAMI actually gained his excellent (though perhaps superficial) knowledge of naval subjects by reading magazines in a language in which he is extremely deficient, or by some other means, remains a matter of conjecture.

#### KOREAN CONTACTS

106. All the Consulate clerks agreed that the Japanese Foreign Office made a point of keeping stationed in Hawaii one secretary who could speak Korean. There were two reasons for this practice: First, to handle various Korean matters which were a legitimate concern of the Consulate; second, to use the Honolulu Consulate as a "listening post" regarding various Korean nationalist movements. The Japanese apparently regarded Honolulu as an excellent place for keeping in touch with existing or incipient Korean political developments.

107. Takaichi SAKAI, former senior clerk at the Consulate, who was employed there from 1927 until the outbreak of war, recalled that during his time secretaries Takeo KASHIMURA, Gishiro MASUO, Tadaaki IIZUKA, and Kyonosuko

YUGE had spoken Korean and had handled Korean affairs at the Consulate (For some reason SAKAI "forget" to mention YUGE, the most recent of the secretaries, until it was brought to his attention at a subsequent interview. All the other clerks were familiar with YUGE's Korean duties, they having been instructed to refer all Korean callers to YUGE as a matter of office routine.)

108. All the clerks employed at the Consulate prior to 1937 remembered having seen Kilsoo HAAN at the Consulate on a number of occasions. HAAN is the subject of a number of reports by this office, the most recent of which is reference (n). Yasumasa MURATA, who was employed at the Consulate until 1937, stated that he once heard from Tsuko KUROKAWA, who was senior clerk at the Consulate at the time, that the Consulate had been paying money to HAAN.

[25] 109. From a confidential, but reliable source, the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently received the original in Japanese, of various papers evidencing the interest of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, in Korean matters. Translations of these papers are set forth in reference (o). One source indicates that up to 1925, the Consulate was allowed \$100.00 a month for its Korean Intelligence Fund. From 1926 to 1934, the Consulate appears to have operated on an accumulated surplus in this fund. Following that time, the Foreign Office appears to have made special allocations from time to time, as needed. A summary of these translations indicates that the following Korean informants received payment from the Japanese Consulate:

*Kwang Won Cho*

110. This individual is a Korean priest, mentioned as being a frequent visitor of the Consulate by the various clerks. He is more commonly known by the name, Father Noah CHO. The translations indicate that he received a payment of \$37.00 on May 19, 1934, and a payment of \$20.00 on August 6, 1934. He is the subject of a Registration Act case by the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a report of which is noted as reference (j), the synopsis of which follows:

"Subject /CHO/ born October 21, 1897 in Korea; came to Hawaii in 1923 as Episcopal missionary and has since been associated with St. Luke's Korean Mission, Honolulu. He became priest at the St. Luke's Mission in 1931; however his entire family, including mother, father, wife and five children presently residing in Korea, have never been in the United States. Confidential source reveals Subject paid \$37.00 in May, 1934, and \$20.00 in August, 1934, by Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, for informant's services. Signed statement obtained in which Subject admits contact with Consulate, beginning in 1932, and beginning about September, 1939, and extending to April 1, 1941. He admits having performed work for the Consulate relating to Korean activities; further, that during the latter period approximately \$200 was paid him by the Consulate for his services which included obtaining and translation of two Korean newspapers. Subject claims to have performed services for the Japanese Consulate and threat to bring harm to his family in Korea; however, his acceptance of remuneration makes this claim appear questionable. Subject denied receipt of any payments in 1934."

111. A check of the files of this office reveals the additional information that the Reverend CHO returned from a trip to Japan aboard the ASAMA MARU on August 20, 1940. It is of possible significance that a fellow passenger aboard the ASAMA MARU was Sanjia ABE, subject of reference (p), former Territorial senator, now interned, who was returning from a trip to Japan during which he conferred with Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA, and also made an overseas broadcast to Hawaii in which he praised Japan's war effort in China. Other passengers on the same ship were Clifford Kikujiro KOND, subject of reference (q), now in custody; Katsuzo SATO, subject of reference (r), now in custody; and Kenju OHTOMO, subject [26] of reference (s). OHTOMO, executive secretary of the Young Men's Buddhist Association, Honolulu, and whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese government, has been classified on numerous occasions by this office as dangerous to internal security. Ten other of Reverend CHO's fellow passengers are now in custody, and another two, although still at large, have been classified as dangerous by this office. Although it may have been pure chance that these persons traveled on the same ship, the coincidence is being set forth for what it may be worth.

*Doo Ok Chung*

112. Translation of these papers indicated that CHUNG received \$80.00 on May 22, 1933. A review of the files of this office indicates that he is a 54-year-old alien, a tailor by trade, and operates a concession at the Honolulu Army and Navy Y. M. C. A. CHUNG appears to be extremely active in Kilssoo HAAN's SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. A letter from Dr. Soon HYUN, formerly chairman of the League in Honolulu, to HAAN, dated June 22, 1942, described CHUNG as one of "the cornerstones of our League".

113. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that CHUNG was born in Korea in 1889, came to Hawaii in 1903. He has three sons serving in the United States Army. Another son, four daughters, his wife, and his mother all reside in the United States. He has been active in Korean political circles since 1915, when he joined the KOREAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. He withdrew from this and aided in forming the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE, becoming the second president of the latter organization. The KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE have been comparatively inactive since 1929, and eventually he joined the SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. He denied, with seeming sincerity, his ever having had contact with, or accepting money from, the local Japanese Consulate, but there appears to be no other individual in Hawaii of a similar name.

*Won Sam Kim*

114. The translation indicated that this individual received the following payments:

|                         |         |
|-------------------------|---------|
| September 10, 1935..... | \$20.00 |
| May 28, 1934.....       | 15.00   |
| July 24, 1934.....      | 25.00   |
| September 10, 1934..... | 30.00   |
| May 31, 1933.....       | 20.00   |
| April 13, 1933.....     | 10.00   |
| May 2, 1933.....        | 10.00   |
| June 6, 1933.....       | 10.00   |
| March 29, 1937.....     | 18.00   |

Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that KIM was born in Korea in 1879, came to Hawaii in the early 1900s, and was a carpenter by trade. [27] In 1919 he had become a member of the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE. He died on March 14, 1939, in Honolulu, and his widow denied all knowledge of his past activities or relations with the Japanese Consulate.

*Sang Ho Lee (Yee)*

115. LEE was paid \$100.00 on March 31, 1932, and \$20.00 on August 19, 1933. Directories of that period indicate that an individual of this name was with the Nahm Choon Furnished Rooms, 339 North Beretania Street, Honolulu. Later directories do not include the name. However, the latest directory lists a Mrs. Sang Ho LEE, 1355 Miller Street, Honolulu.

116. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that LEE was born in Korea on November 5, 1879, and first arrived in the United States on February 3, 1905, under the name YE CHONG KUL. He visited China from July, 1922, to May, 1923. He departed from Honolulu bound for Korea on February 16, 1934, and has not re-entered the United States.

*Ok Nam Shin*

117. The translation indicates that this individual received \$50.00 on March 31, 1932, and \$3.40 on June 9, 1933. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that SHIN, a groceryman, was born in Korea in 1901, came to Honolulu in 1920, and returned to Korea in 1933. He returned to Honolulu in 1938, but went back to Korea shortly thereafter, and has never returned.

*Kylsoo Haan*

118. The following is a list of payments received by this individual, who usually referred to as KILSOO HAAN:

|                      |          |
|----------------------|----------|
| May 25, 1936.....    | \$60. 00 |
| August 15, 1936..... | 40. 00   |
| August 25, 1936..... | 10. 00   |

*Chin Ho Tough*

119. On May 22, 1933, TOUGH received the sum of \$80.00 from the Consulate TOUGH (he is known by all the combinations of the above three names) has been the object of suspicion for a considerable period. He entered the Territory in 1931 as a Buddhist priest, but apparently has never practiced his profession. He was educated in Japan. For a while he worked at various military posts as a tailor, and later went into business for himself on the Island of Molokai. He has been very active on the UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE. When interrogated, TOUGH stated that he had visited the Consulate on only one occasion, that being upon his arrival in 1931 when it was necessary to have his passport stamped.

[28]

## OTHER CONSULATE CONTACTS

*Ensei (Enjo) Kobayashi*

120. On March 15, 1932, KOBAYASHI received \$8.00 from the Consulate. An alien, aged 54, he was a priest of the Jodo sect (Buddhist), a Japanese language school principal, and a *toritsuginin* at Hawi, Kohala, Hawaii, T. H. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and subsequently was interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, and apparently is planning for repatriation to Japan.

*Katsuchi Miho*

121. MIHO received the sum of \$27.00 from the Japanese Consulate on March 15, 1932. MIHO is a 59-year-old alien. Prior to the war he operated the MIHO HOTEL at Kahului, Maui, T. H., and was a *toritsuginin* for that district. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be interned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

*Minoru Murakami*

122. MURAKAMI received the sum of \$10.00 from the Consulate on March 15, 1932. MURAKAMI, a Japanese alien, formerly employed as a representative for the Nippu Jiji (Honolulu bilingual newspaper), has a long record of pro-Japanese activities and statements. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Apparently he desires to repatriate to Japan.

*Masao Sogawa*

123. On January 6, 1932, SOGAWA received the sum of \$50.00. He was editor and publisher of the Hawaii Shimpo, a Japanese weekly newspaper published in Honolulu until the outbreak of war. This paper was considered highly pro-Japanese in its sentiments. SOGAWA was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.

*Wade Warren Thayer*

124. On August 21, 1935, THAYER reportedly received the sum of \$40.00 from the Japanese Consulate. For years, THAYER was attorney for the Japanese Consulate, and was so registered with the Secretary of State. It is not known why this lone entry was found among the expenses of the Korean Intelligence Fund, inasmuch as it is believed that THAYER undoubtedly had some permanent financial arrangements with the Consulate with regard to his legal services.

[29]

## THE CONSULATE PREPARES FOR WAR

125. Takaichi SAKAI stated that in the summer of 1941 the Consulate began to burn old documents. All the clerks helped in this work, and about the same time, the clerks were paid bonuses each month. The clerks were told not to talk about the fact that documents were being burned almost daily in the back yard of the Consulate. SAKAI could recall no such burning of papers shortly before the war started, although he did observe that the number of visitors to the Consulate from the N. Y. K. Line and from the Yokohama Specie Bank increased greatly in the last two weeks of peace. These visitors sometimes carried handbags with them.

126. Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist at the Consulate, remembered that about the middle of November, 1941, two Yokohama Specie Bank officials came to the Consulate and went into Consul General KITA's room, where they stayed for about an hour. One of these men was Nihei MIYAMOTO, sub-manager of the bank. KITA was not present, and the two men were alone in the room. They asked for a typewriter. Miss DOUE believed that MIYAMOTO and his companion wrote a telegram which they sent under the name of the Consulate. She stated that they had probably done their own coding. She added that, to her knowledge, Torataro ONODA, of the Sumitomo Bank, had never done this.

127. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled that in June, 1941, the two yardmen of the Consulate had burned a large number of official appearing books. OZAKI was able to set the month because it was just before his departure for Japan. He was in Japan from June to November, 1941. OZAKI explained that the Consulate was not supposed to keep material longer than 10 years, and every year they accumulated material to burn. OZAKI stated that he helped carry these books from the Vice Consul's office to the yardmen, who would burn them. He estimated that more than 100 publications were thus burned in 1941. The two yardmen who did this burning, Saburo SUMIDA and Rokuro FUKUSHIMA, were repatriated to Japan in 1942 with the Consulate staff. OZAKI stated that he was in Japan when the United States freeze order against Japanese assets went into effect, but he heard that the Consulate burned a considerable amount of material at that time.

128. OZAKI stated that it was his belief that telegrams received from Japan were burned as soon as they were received, or at least within a week. He stated that in the code room of the Consulate was a small brazier, and when papers were burned in this room, he would sometimes notice smoke coming out of the window. He believed that he had seen more smoke coming out of this room after he had returned from Japan (on the last ship, November 1, 1941) than he had prior to his departure. He believed that code room material was burned about once a week. The code room was always cleaned by Saburo SUMIDA. Samon TSUKIKAWA, Consulate secretary in charge of coding, was always present during this operation.

129. On December 6, 1941, at about 1500, the two yardmen went into the coding room of the Consulate and removed a wheelbarrow full of papers and other [30] material. These they burned in a pit in the yard. OZAKI said that he put out this fire about 1900, just before darkness fell. He noted that everything had been burned. OZAKI said that yard rubbish was being burned all the time, so he was unable to state how often code room material was burned. The incident of December 6th was the only time he actually saw them remove the material from the code room.

130. OZAKI stated that the Consul and Vice Consul had an engagement to play golf with Tsunetaro HARADA on the morning of December 7, 1941. He remembered that MIKAMI's taxi had actually called at the Consulate for the two officials, but by that time guards had been placed around the Consulate. MIKAMI requested the guards to inform OKUDA of his arrival, which they did. However, OKUDA sent back a message that MIKAMI was not to wait because he, OKUDA, probably would be unable to play golf that day.

131. OZAKI expressed his conviction, based on observations made prior to and subsequent to December 7, 1941, that Consul General KITA had no foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, he insisted that the Consul General had received a telegram from Washington at 0700 on the morning of December 7th. (This was a radiogram from Tokyo, reporting that Japanese-American and Japanese-British relations were strained.) Immediately upon its receipt, KITA had

called TSUKIKAWA, who lived at the Kyoraku Kan Hotel, two blocks from the Consulate grounds, and insisted that the latter come to the Consulate immediately to decode this message. OZAKI stated that he heard of this incident from SEKI about a week or two after the attack. OZAKI stated that TSUKIKAWA was at the Consulate at the time of the attack.

132. OZAKI stated that the Consulate staff members were burning papers when the police arrived on the morning of December 7th. He remembered seeing smoke come out of the code room window. After the Consulate staff was repatriated (February, 1942), he went into the code room to clean it. All he saw was a big tub filled with ashes.

133. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he first heard the noise (of battle) about 0900 on the morning of December 7, 1941, so he walked to the Consulate to find out what all the commotion was about. KITA, OKUDA, SEKI, and TSUKIKAWA were all there, and appeared to be worried. MORIMURA dropped in a little later with his hair tousled, clothes wrinkled, and in short sleeves. KOTOSHIRODO heard him remark that it was a "noisy morning". MORIMURA wanted to go up on the heights and see what was going on, but KITA would not allow him to leave the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO left the Consulate about 1000.

#### CONSULATE DOMESTICS

134. As was reported in paragraphs 47 and 52 of reference (c), three of the domestics at the Consulate secured their positions through one Toyoki FUJITA, a flower grower. FUJITA was interviewed to determine his connection with the [31] Consulate. FUJITA stated that among other retail florist shops to which he sold his blossoms, was the SERVICE FLORIST, operated by one Tetsuo SHINAGAWA. SHINAGAWA supplied the Consulate with flowers. He secured this account because he is a brother-in-law of Ichitaro OZAKI, Consulate chauffeur, who apparently ordered flowers purchased by the Consulate. FUJITA first met OZAKI when he delivered some plants to the Consulate. On one occasion OZAKI asked FUJITA if the latter knew of a girl who would like to cook at the Consulate. FUJITA secured the services of Yoshie KIKKAWA. (Results of an interview with Miss KIKKAWA are set forth in paragraph 52-53 of reference (c).) Because FUJITA was once successful in securing a domestic, OZAKI asked him for assistance in securing help on two other occasions. FUJITA was able to send to the Consulate Sakae TANAKA, whose interview is set forth in paragraph 55-56 of reference (c), and Kimika ASAKURA, paragraphs 47-51 of reference (c).

#### JAPANESE NAVY TANKERS

135. Takaichi SAKAI stated that when Japanese naval tankers called at Honolulu, their captain would call at the Consulate and talk for an hour or more with the Consul General or the Vice Consul. Sometimes the captains would leave the Consulate carrying envelopes they did not bring with them. One Ishichi MATSUDA, now in custody, the owner of a grocery store at the old Aala Market, often visited these vessels. He was noted on numerous occasions by representatives of this office to have carried a mail bag onto the boat. SAKAI explained that MATSUDA would pick up mail being held at the post office pending the arrival of the tankers, and carry it aboard. Presumably this was a labor of love. SAKAI recalled hearing that Japanese navy men sometimes left the tankers here, then sailed aboard a tanker calling at Honolulu at a future date. However, SAKAI could not recall where he had heard this. He further disclaimed all knowledge of what these officers did while in port, or of where they lived while here. (In connection with this topic, see reference (v), paragraphs 42-43.)

#### TORITSUGININ

136. Takaichi SAKAI stated that the term *soryojikan toritsuginin* was not accurately translated as "consular agents". He believed the more correct translation to be "Consulate General 'go-between' men". He remembered Vice Consul OKUDA's once expressing the opinion that the *toritsuginin* were not agents of the Japanese government within the meaning of the United States statute requiring such agents to register with the State Department.

137. It should be remembered that the status of the *toritsuginin* was never clarified by judicial decision. They were "agents" of the Consulate only in a very loose sense of the term. They rarely received remuneration from the Con-



and their duties apparently were merely routine. Actual military age on the part of a *toritsuginin* has been proven to the satisfaction of office only in one case, that of Unji HIRAYAMA, subject of reference (1). [32] espionage has been indicated in a number of other cases. However, the basic motive in placing all *toritsuginin* in custody immediately after the attack of December 7th was the fact that, as a class, they were ex-pro-Japanese, and there is evidence to indicate that they were chosen *toritsuginin* on the basis of their loyalty to Japan. There is scarcely one who has not engaged in a number of pro-Japanese activities in addition to his duties as *toritsuginin*.

ending—14ND.

#### TRIP TO KAUAI

One day in the early part of July, 1941, Morimura told me that he and I will be on a trip to Kauai in the near future. Sometime after that Seki told me that he wants to see the island by himself. So it seemed to me then that both of them would like to go so much to take a trip. I don't really know how the situation was between them. After several days (few days before we left) Morimura suddenly told me that he is not going and said that I will be sent. After hearing that from Morimura, I asked Seki what has happened. And Seki said that they (Morimura and Seki) had some kind of misunderstandings. I told Seki why he himself doesn't go since I was told he wanted to go so much. But Seki said that he is not going and told me to take my wife with me. He told me to go and have a vacation. And then Okuda called me to his desk and told me to go to work with my wife and also told me to see Seki about the money. Seki gave me \$100, and the following day I went down to the airway company office to buy tickets. The day before we left Okuda called me at his desk and gave me the following instructions. (1) See the things that could be seen from the island. (2) Not to talk to anyone. (3) He said that he knew the air field at the Barking Sand is going on. He told me to see that if it could be seen from outside. (4) See the Lihue airport if there is any improvements. (5) See Hanalei bay if anything is being done. He said he saw in a newspaper that the U.S. Navy is planning to use the bay for small boat base. (5) He showed me a geological survey map of Kauai and told me to see the Wainiha power plant. He said that it is the source of power used on Kauai. (6) He showed me a map of Port Allen and Nawiliwili harbors. He told me to see any change in the area. He told me to take the usual sightseeing schedule and see what I can see. I called up Nikami on the phone and told him to take us to the airport the next morning.

The next morning (I believe it was Saturday in the middle part of July) my wife and I went to the airport in Mikami's car. We left the airport at about 8 a. m. We reached Hanapepe airport at about 9 a. m. I noticed Horikawa was one of the passengers of the same plane. After we reached the Hanapepe airport I happened to see Minatoya (I didn't know him then) and hired him to show us around the island. He said the auto fare will be \$25. Then we started out immediately for the Kokee. I asked him if we can see the Barking Sand. He said we cannot see it in the morning because the Army usually practice bombing there. We went up to the place where tourists usually see the canyon. We got out of the car and stayed there for about 15 minutes, and continued our drive to Kokee and went as far as the place where there were some residences. Since Minatoya said there isn't anything more to see further up we turned back and came back to Waimea. Minatoya suggested to have our lunch at the Waimea Hotel so we went in and all three of us sat at one table. He then introduced himself and said he was working for some transportation company. He talked about his having a brother who is a doctor in Honolulu. We, my wife and I, introduced ourselves but I didn't say I was from the consulate. Soon after lunch we left the hotel and started for the Barking Sand. We didn't stop at anywhere on the island. [3] We reached the Barking Sand. We got off the car then walked up the sand hill and tried if the sand really barks. I took a picture of my wife and I looked from the sand hill if there was any work going on for the air force but I couldn't see anything at all. Only things I saw were sandy beach and palm trees. After staying there about 20 minutes and started back the same way to Lihue. On the way back to Lihue, we passed through Kukulolono park and stopped at the Lawai beach to see the Spouting Horn. And then we rode to

Koloa beach where we got off the car and walked around the sandy beach seeing many human skeletons. After staying there about 20 minutes we rode to Lihue without stopping anywhere. It was about 5 p. m. when we reached the Lihue hotel. We registered there and shown to our room. We had our dinner at the dining hall. After dinner my wife and I thought of going to see some movie so we called up Minatoya on the phone and asked him to take us. He came soon after and we went to the Lihue theatre. We three sat together. I remember the title of the picture was "Strawberry Blonde". After show Minatoya took us back to the hotel. We stayed in our room until we retired. There was some kind of party at the hotel that nite. The following morning Minatoya came to the hotel at about 8 a. m. After breakfast I happened to see Horikawa in the kitchen so I went in just to say hello. I introduced myself and my wife. All he said to us was that "You were on the same plane yesterday morning. Are you on a sight seeing trip?" Minatoya put the lunch in the car and we started out at about 9 a. m. We went to see the Wailua fall. We didn't go near to the fall but just saw it far from the hill. Then we went to see [4] the Grass shack where we got off the car and saw some old Hawaiian mats, drum and sandals. From there we went to see the Slipery fall. We got off the car and walked down to the fall. After staying there about 15 minutes we started to Hanalei direction. We didn't stop anywhere before reaching Hanalei where we had our lunch. We ate our lunch in the pavilion. I didn't see anything been done at the bay. After staying there about 45 minutes we started to Haena. On the way I asked the driver if we can see the power plant and he suggested of seeing it on the way back. We went way back we went up the Wainiha valley and went as far as the power plant was. I expected to see something large but All I saw were two pipes running down and one small power house building. Without stopping the car we just turned back from there and stopped about 1/2 mile down on the same road and picked up some mountain apples. After staying there about 15 minutes we started back and didn't stop anywhere before we reached Kilauea lighthouse. Minatoya suggested of seeing the lighthouse since it is the largest one in the world. The watchman of the lighthouse came and showed us in to the lighthouse. We climbed the stairs and saw the large lens. I remember we signed our names on the visitors' signature book. From there started back and didn't stop anywhere before reaching Lihue. On the way to Lihue we went down to Nawiliwili harbor. We didn't get off the car. Minatoya said pointing one office building that was his company office. We reached Lihue hotel at about 5 p. m. After dinner at the hotel my wife and I thought of going to see [5] Japanese movie and walked to the theatre. I don't remember the name of the theatre, it was very near to the hotel. It happened that night was the bank night at the theatre. After seeing the show we went back to the hotel and retired soon. The following morning Minatoya came at about 8 a. m. we checked out the hotel at about 8:30 a. m. I remember I paid \$20.00 to the hotel. We went straight to the Hanapepe airport. We left the Hanapepe airport at about 9:30 a. m. and reached Rogers airport at about 10 a. m. Mikami met us there and took us home. I took my wife to her shop and went to the consulate. Seki, Morimura and Okuda asked me how was the trip. They asked me if I enjoyed. I said it was fine but I couldn't see much. Seki said it's natural that I didn't see much. He said many things couldn't be seen from the highways. Then Okuda called me at his desk and asked me to tell him what I have seen. I told him I didn't see anything at the barking sand. I told him it was so quiet and I even never seen a plane flying. I told him there wasn't anything at the Hanalei bay. All I noticed was the sea was calm and it was a large bay. He asked me how was the reef of the bay but I said I couldn't see any reefs. I told him there were two pipes running down the mountain at the power plant and Wainiha and one building. He asked me anything more so I said none. I told him there wasn't anything new at the Nawiliwili harbor and Port Allen harbor. I told him at the Lihue airport I didn't see anything but some army tents. I didn't tell him that I talked to Horikawa. Morimura never asked me anything about the trip. [6] When I talked with Okuda Morimura was there too. Morimura just said "There isn't anything big going on it seems".

On the trip I brought along one tourist map. I didn't bring any letter or note to anybody and I didn't bring back anything from anyone to the consulate.

Oct. 1, 1942.

/s/ RICHARD M. KOTOSHIBODO

## Station JZI Program

12/8/41 (Japan Time)

Frequency 9535 Kilocycles

Our army and navy entering in a state of war with England and America on the 8th, an Imperial declaration of war against England and America was announced. Our army and navy, hence, has entered in a state of war with England and America. In regard to this, the Imperial army and navy headquarters at 6 am on the 8th announced that our army and navy entered a state of war with England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today. At the same time, the brilliant achievements of our armed forces, too, were announced by the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters, as follows: (1) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today, the 8th made a death-defying raid upon the Hawaiian Islands and air strength in the Hawaiian area. (2) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today sank the British gunboat . . . . . (sounded like *Blackburn*) and captured the American gunboat . . . . . (sounded like *Nice*) at Shanghai. (3) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today raided Singapore and achieved great results. (4) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today bombed enemy military establishments at Davao, Wake and Guam. (5) Our Imperial Army, entering into a state of war at dawn today, attacked Hongkong. (6) Our Imperial Army, cooperating closely with our Imperial Navy, undertook a landing operation in Malaya at dawn today and is obtaining great results. Furthermore, according to a Domei dispatch from the front, our Imperial air force at eight this morning carried out its first raid on Hongkong and returned safely back to their base. Immediately afterwards, a second raid reportedly was carried out.

On the 8th, a Domei dispatch from Honolulu reported that our naval air force raided the Hawaiian Islands at 7 am Hawaiian time, which is 3:05 am Japan time.

According to an announcement made by the White House, the casualty inflicted by our air force's raid was very great and the oil storage tanks on Guam, which are presently being besieged by our Imperial Navy, are throwing up large quantities of smoke.

The British gunboat was sunk and an American gunboat was captured. This was announced by the Imperial headquarters, but according to the announcement made by the headquarters of our fleet in China waters at 9 am today, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet in the China waters sent his staff officers to the British Gunboat *Picadelli* (phonetic) and the American Gunboat *Blackburn* (phonetic), respectively, immediately after our country entered in a state of war at 5:40 am and requested them to surrender for the peace and order of the world. Since the British gunboat refused to surrender, we were compelled to sink it. The American gunboat was captured with . . . . . We read the announcement

to respond to your will. On behalf of the government and the Army and Navy, we, Hideki and Shigetaro, your subjects, respectfully make this request. December 8, 1941.

(Signed) HIDEKI TOJO,  
Minister of War.  
SHIGETARO SHINADA,  
Minister of Navy.

Our Army and Navy has started a war against England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today, our Government at 7 am today held an emergency session of the cabinet at the premier's residence. Outside of Foreign Minister Togo, all the cabinet ministers were present. Firstly, Minister of Navy Shinada reported the developments of war against England and America and on this report, the course to be taken by the government was decided, upon Premier Tojo called on the Emperor and reported the decision. According to a Domei dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo replied by order Envoys Kurusu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull at 10 P. M. on the 7th, 3:30 A. M. of the 8th Japan time, and present our government's official reply to the American note of the 26th. At the same time, Foreign Minister Togo invited American Ambassador to Japan, Grew, to his residence at 7:30 A. M. today and handed him an official note similar to the one handed to Secretary of State Hull. Immediately afterwards at 7:45 am he invited British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie and explained to him the content of this reply.

Immediately after our loyal Army and Navy had entered a state of war with England and America at dawn today, it was decided to break off diplomatic relations with both countries and enter a state of war. Consequently, our government at 11:45 A. M. today declared war against England and America. At the same time, an order for the convocation of a two days special session of the Diet on the 15th was issued. At the emergency session urgent bills of appropriations and other nature will be presented and, at the same time, the government's policy to cope with the unprecedented emergency is expected to be explained by Premier Tojo and other ministers.

(Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were "Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time, 'West wind, clear'." Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.

At 8:30 A. M. today, our government made the Foreign Ministry announce the results of the Japanese-American negotiation and the Japanese-American notes. The announcement made clear the real facts of the effort exerted by our government till the very last minute to preserve the peace of the Pacific. Japan's note to America was an official reply to America's note of the 26th and notified the fact no settlement can be expected even if the negotiation were to be continued. It actually was a final notice

[5] Pacific has been brought about by America and England. It should be definitely stated at this time that President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill has undertaken the Pacific war without consideration of the war's havoc on humanity as one of their program for the domination of the world. In the course of the four and a half years of the China incident, each and every Japanese has shed tears of indignation against England and America's wicked hostile attitude but has remained patient for the sake of the peace of the Pacific as well as the world. This patience, today has reached its limit. The time has come to rise unitedly and risk the fate of the nation for the cause of righteousness.

At dawn today, December 8, the announcement of the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters to the effect that our Imperial Army and Navy will enter a state of war against American and British forces in the Western Pacific at dawn today was made public throughout our country through the radios and newspaper. Every one throughout the country has now further strengthened their determination that the inevitable has at last come and instantaneously, our peace loving idea has been transformed into a determination to punish the evil and cut off the sinister hands of the outrageously wicked England and America. Today, the sky over Japan was clear and devoid of even a speck of cloud and under this blue sky, which seemed to be congratulating the promising future of Japan, who has risen to fight for the establishment of a new order of East Asia as well as of the world just like the brilliant rays of the sun, our excellent air forces, as an indication of our strong air defense, is flying about everywhere. When I received this report that war on the Pacific had broken out, I hurried to my \* \* \* and on my way, I saw reflected upon the passers-by as well as those working, a hereto unseen expression of seriousness. Then with the issuing of the Imperial decree declaring war at 11:45 A. M., the nation's determination to march forward and support the emperor's will gushed forth. No long afterwards, Premier Tojo's confident determination of our country was announced over the radio, and, at the same time, the achievements of our Navy which is carrying on operations against American and British forces from Malaya to Honolulu with an overflowing amount of power as though the Pacific were too small, were reported throughout the nation. Hence, the confidence and spirit to rise against England and America and to secure Asia as the haven of the Asiatic race through the establishment of a new order of the world has been made to flare up within the heart of the people.

The next is a Domei despatch of the 8th from Stockholm, which states that according to a Reuter's despatch of the 7th from Washington, official sources in Washington believe that Germany will declare war against America in the next 24 hours.

At this time, let me again make a weather forecast "West wind, clear." (Repeated this forecast.)

Now, let us broadcast to you the talk of Major General Yoshizumi.

\* \* \* \* \*

# AN ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE ESPIONAGE PROBLEM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

PREPARED BY THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION, DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

April 20, 1943

## FOREWORD

The Counter Intelligence Section (Op-16-B-7) of the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is charged with counter-espionage responsibility in the Naval Service, recently promulgated a new operating plan, from which the following is extracted:

"In accordance with the new concepts of intelligence and counter intelligence, the Counter Intelligence Section *actively* seeks primary data and no longer *passively* waits for it to be received.

"This aggressive method of operation permits the Navy to detect and combat espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities directed against its war effort *before the fact*, rather than merely to establish an historical record of facts after the damage is done." (#)

One of the functions of the Counter Intelligence Section is to "delineate patterns of subversive thought and activity." (#) This is likewise a function of the Counter Intelligence Section (B-7) of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, which section has prepared the within analysis.

This analysis is intended to present facts and considered opinions pertaining to Japanese espionage in Hawaii and the correlative counter-espionage measures, both before and during this war. In formulating the analysis, deficiencies in existing counter-espionage methods and measures have been noted, and suggestions for the alteration or supplementation of existing methods and measures have been made.

No attempt has been made to analyze the related topics of sabotage and counter-sabotage. This analysis has been confined simply to espionage and counter-espionage, with only the necessary incidental introduction of other intelligence subjects.

Attention is invited to Appendix "A", which sets forth references to much of the source material pertaining to facts and opinions included in this analysis, and which particularly shows the sources of all quotations set forth herein.

A statement or paragraph footnoted to Appendix "A" is indicated by the symbol "(#)" at the end of the documented portion.

Particular places on the Island of Oahu which are mentioned in the analysis can be seen with reference to one another by consulting the map attached as Appendix "B".

The within analysis perhaps will be revised at a later date to include relevant facts hereafter discovered. Criticisms and suggestions are therefore especially requested.

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.

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## S-E-C-R-E-T

AN ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE ESPIONAGE PROBLEM  
IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

## I. INTRODUCTION

This analysis is predicated upon the premise that accurate knowledge of United States naval and military activities in the Hawaiian Islands (and particularly those in and around the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor) is of inestimable value to Japan. It may not be an overstatement to say that no single place in the world is of greater interest to Japanese naval leaders.

It is assumed that Japan, many years ago having foreseen the possibility of war with the United States, and fully realizing the importance of Pearl Harbor as a naval base, had arranged for an adequate espionage system to operate in Hawaii during wartime.

It is believed that Japan has, over a period of more than 30 years, collected complete information concerning the geography and hydrography of the Hawaiian Islands, and has studied the military and naval necessities arising therefrom. (Paragraph 81.)

At the present time, Japan is assumed to be primarily interested in the offensive, as distinguished from defensive, strength of forces of the United States based in or from Hawaii. The specific matters of interest to the enemy, at this time, are judged to be their present order of importance, are:

Departures and arrivals of Naval task forces and units, and the disposition of Naval units in Pearl Harbor and in other Hawaiian ports and waters.

Status of readiness and repair of Naval units, and specifically, information concerning damage to vessels and estimated time of repairs.

Character and strength of Marine forces in Hawaii, and particularly, movements of Marine forces.

Movements of military aircraft from and to the Hawaiian area.

(e) Movements of merchantmen and troop convoys.

Military and air strength of the Hawaiian Islands, particularly Oahu, and specifically, new airfield construction.

In any event, the matter of primary interest to Japan is the offensive strength and disposition of United States Naval forces in these Islands. If the assumption be correct, it is accurate to state that any Japanese espionage organization now operating in the Hawaiian Islands is primarily concerned with obtaining naval information.

## II. FACTORS REQUIRED IN THE OPERATION OF A WARTIME ESPIONAGE SYSTEM

An espionage system functioning in hostile territory in wartime is of necessity much more carefully set up than its peacetime predecessor. The restrictions imposed in wartime by the creating of new restricted areas, additional limiting of vital installations, the invoking of censorship, and the promulgation of curfew, blackout, and alien control regulations all contribute to the situation. Means of communication with the enemy overseas must be put into operation. Previously untapped sources of information must finally be utilized; agents formerly "uncovered" prior to the war, because of their known proximity to military and naval installations, their alien status, or their contact with known espionage centers or agents, must be discarded.

It is believed that any espionage organization functioning in the Territory of Hawaii in wartime must consider and balance the following factors to produce a workable equation:

(A) *Security*

It is axiomatic that any espionage group in enemy territory must remain undetected to continue proper functioning. It must provide maximum security for its organizational nucleus, sacrificing, if necessary, less important members to preserve the heart and brains of the system. Only the most necessary risks should be taken in gathering information and communicating the same to Japan. The structure of the espionage system should be known to one another only to the extent absolutely necessary, limiting so far as possible the ability of one agent to compromise the whole system. Agents who have no need to know each other should not know each other. In short, a strict echelon system should be maintained. Each agent knowing only the superior to whom he reports and the operative activities he directs.

**(B) Mobility**

9. There must be sufficient mobility of the espionage group to permit the ready collection and transmission of information, as well as to allow the necessary intercourse among agents of the group. This requires that movements of agents be unobtrusive, often necessitating the careful selection of pretexts. It must be anticipated in advance of war that movements in certain vital areas (for example, [4] the Honolulu waterfront) will be restricted in wartime. Hence, plans must be well laid to maintain the espionage organization's normal mobility in such areas.

10. Therefore, the espionage agents must be able to reach without apparent effort all information within public view, and to have other information brought to them by "insiders," as far as is possible. Such mobility obviates the necessity of information-gathering agents having to expose themselves as such.

**(C) Flexibility**

11. Wartime conditions are inherently unstable and unpredictable. The continued functioning of an espionage organization often may depend upon its ability to adapt itself to changing conditions. Proper security measures taken to prevent and detect espionage can be overcome only by a highly adaptable espionage organization—one which is prepared to use Caucasian agents as well as Orientals, women as well as men, and agents "planted" inside vital areas as well as those mingling with the general public outside.

12. It must reasonably have been anticipated by Japan that war with the United States in all probability would cause the Hawaiian Islands to be put under martial law, the exact nature of whose application could hardly have been anticipated. That the enemy, Japan, have a highly adaptable wartime espionage system was therefore particularly required in Hawaii.

**(D) Simplicity**

13. It is a basic requirement that the espionage organization should be as simple as possible. Simplicity makes for security and efficiency in such an organization. Too elaborate an organization is likely to place various portions of the mechanism at the whim of uncontrollable outside factors, as well as increase the likelihood that if one agent is discovered and "talks," the whole system will be exposed.

**(E) Deception**

14. As a means of achieving security, mobility, flexibility, and simplicity in its operations, the espionage organization must employ deception generally, as well as in specific operations. Its agents must, in the main, be [5] able to discharge their duties casually and without apparent illegality. Transfers of money necessary for the running of the organization must not arouse suspicion. The existence of a "front," possibly in the guise of a legitimate business house, is therefore necessary to afford cover to many of the activities of the espionage group. How a business "front" could be utilized will be noted later. (Paragraphs 142-146).

[6]

**III. FUNCTIONS OF AN ESPIONAGE SYSTEM**

15. For the purposes of this analysis, the functions of an espionage system operating in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime are assumed to be:

- (a) Collection of information;
- (b) Evaluation of information;
- (c) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination.

**(A) Collection of information**

16. In the Hawaiian area, information of value to the enemy can be collected by any or all of the following methods, which vary in risk, according to the circumstances indicated:

**(1) Observation**

17. From the Naval standpoint, the most important island of the Hawaiian group is Oahu, and unfortunately the geography of Oahu is such that observation



movements of Naval vessels cannot be prevented. The arrival and departure of ships at Pearl Harbor in the daytime is visible, to anyone interested, from a number of places not in any restricted area and where the presence of an observer would not arouse suspicion. For example, every vessel entering or leaving Pearl Harbor by daylight can readily be seen (and by a trained observer, identified as to type and class) from many buildings in downtown Honolulu. The number and type of ships in Pearl Harbor, whether in drydock, at anchor, or at moorings, can be determined with a high degree of accuracy by observation from the living on, or visiting, Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. The use of a field glass is required in aid of such observation is but a small obstacle. It is known that employees of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, were designated to observe and report on arrivals and departures of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor, and the number of vessels there, prior to the outbreak of the war. Much of their observing from Aiea Heights and areas nearer to Pearl Harbor, but at a lower elevation. (#) Likewise, many Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in recent years made sightseeing trips to Aiea Heights and the environs of Pearl Harbor. (#) It is also known that [7] at least one of the two-man Japanese submarines that participated in the attack on Oahu, December 7, 1941, had aboard a panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor, which was found to have been photographed from Aiea Heights—not by an enemy agent, but by a commercial photographer, who sold prints thereof openly in Honolulu. (#)

There are many ways, less direct than those noted above, where acute and intelligent observations will reveal information concerning Fleet dispositions. The number of officers and men on leave in Honolulu often will provide a clue to the number and identity of Fleet units in port. Where officers or men who reside in residences in Honolulu are known to be attached to a given ship, an observer will be able to state with reasonable certainty that if a certain officer or man is in Honolulu, his ship is in port and not at sea.

Thus, unless the observer enters a restricted area without right, or uses electronic or photographic equipment whose use is illegal, his activities in collecting information of naval value by observation alone can easily go wholly undetected.

#### *"Loose talk" and rumors*

No matter how extensive a campaign may be to prevent "loose talk" and "rumor mongering" concerning military and naval subjects, it seems impossible to prevent them entirely. Since much of what passes as rumor often contains elements of truth, the trained enemy agent, referring what he hears to a competent person, can make this a profitable source of information for the enemy. Many examples—for example, the sinking of the aircraft carriers LEXINGTON, YORKTOWN, and WASP, and the impending Battle of Midway—were common gossip in Honolulu before official announcement of the facts.

"Loose talk" is of two types—that which is offered gratuitously, and that which is "pumped" from one having knowledge of the facts. The distinction is important and is especially important in the operation of the espionage organization from the standpoint of risk.

#### *"Pumping"*

This type of information-gathering consists of eliciting facts from the person thereof, by pretext, use of force, or sensuous or intoxicating inducements. The [8] person imposed upon does not consciously and willingly betray his trust, but may be brought to do so by the enemy agent's use of force, flattery, representation, or proffer of food and drink, narcotics, or women. (#)

#### *"Inside" information*

This is the type of information generally bought and paid for by the enemy agent who need not (and generally cannot) obtain the information himself, but commissions someone else to provide him with the information. Unless, however, the espionage organization has developed a source of "inside" information prior to the outbreak of war, it may find it difficult to do thereafter because of the high risk involved in approaching a person with a proposition that he commit espionage in wartime. (#)

There is no evidence that any person in a position of military or naval command in the Hawaiian Islands, either before or during this war, has supplied information to enemy agents. However, history teaches that vigilance against espionage must be maintained.

(5) *"Planted" agents*

27. As distinguished from the traitor already in a place of trust who sells information to the enemy, a "plant" is an agent installed in a place of confidence (usually within a restricted area) who himself gathers all available information of value to the enemy. Less valuable and less likely to be used, but possible, is a person (for example, a domestic) "planted" in the home of any military, naval, or civilian official likely to have considerable knowledge of vital information.

28. Less likely to be found, but not to be dismissed, is the possibility of enemy agents using "planted" mechanical devices for the gathering of important information. Telephone wires over which vital information is transmitted may be "tapped." Microphones may be arranged in conference rooms and offices.

(6) *Overt criminal action*

29. Unable to secure desired information by any of the foregoing methods, the enemy espionage organization may resort to actions more easily detected, and therefore carrying a greater risk. Among the more direct methods would be murder, assault, forgery, burglary, and larceny (to secure [9] writings, maps, charts, and code books) and perjury, impersonation, and trespass (to secure entry to restricted areas). Murder and arson might be indulged in to destroy the evidence of other crimes incident to espionage activity.

30. It is believed, however, that under present conditions in Hawaii, it is unnecessary for the enemy to resort to overt criminal activity to carry out its espionage mission here.

(B) *Evaluation of information*

31. Since, as will be discussed below, the chief obstacle confronting an espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime is that of communicating information to Japan, it is desirable that all information collected by enemy agents be evaluated and digested locally as far as possible, so as to provide the shortest possible messages for transmission, whatever the means of communication may be.

32. While before the war broke out the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, was able to send lengthy intelligence reports and newspaper articles to Japan in the consular pouch, and was able to send encrypted radiograms and cablegrams without undue limit of length, it is assumed that the transmission of information to Japan is at the present time sufficiently difficult to prohibit the sending by most means of any great volume of information without great risk of detection. (#)

33. Therefore, it is believed necessary that the enemy have a competent evaluator (or evaluation unit) in the Hawaiian Islands, so that all available information can be digested to its important essentials. This presupposes one or more individuals highly intelligent and trained in military and naval subjects.

34. It is also believed likely that the chief evaluator of the espionage organization will be found to be the principal organizer and primary directive force of the group.

(C) *Communication of information to the effective enemy destination*(1) *General considerations*

35. In executing its ultimate function—that of communicating vital information to the enemy—the espionage organization, in all probability, exposes itself to a far greater risk than it does in discharging its other functions.

[10] 36. It is quite possible that more than one means of transmission of information is used. In general, it may be said that the more rapid types of communication involve the most risk, and that the sender will, therefore, use such means only when the value of data transmitted justifies the assumption of the greater risk.

37. "Spot news," such as the departures of a Naval task force, Marine force, bomber squadron, or a convoy, would merit the most speedy means of communication. Such intelligence obviously would lose its value if delayed too long in reaching the effective enemy destination.

38. On the other hand, more "durable" information, such as that concerning new construction (airfields, hangars, and ammunition dumps, for example), relating to conditions of a static and permanent nature, would be of value to the enemy even if delayed months in reaching Japan.

It must also be noted that certain information may be unsuitable for transmission telegraphically, and may have to be transmitted manually. Artifacts such as maps, charts, ordnance, or a bomb sight are of greatest value to the enemy only if received intact.

Certain information, although capable of telegraphic transmission, may be so lengthy as to make anything other than manual transmission impractical and dangerous. Detailed intelligence monographs and stolen code books may be examples.

The problem of transmission of information has been thoroughly considered, chiefly for the reason that it is believed that there is more likelihood of discovering the enemy's espionage organization through its communication facilities than in any other way. The organization exposes itself most openly in exercising its communication function. The possible ways in which it is thought that enemy agents might send information from here so as to directly and immediately reach Japan, are the following:

#### *Shore-to-ship contact*

Under this heading, there are a number of different methods by which communication between an enemy agent in the Hawaiian Islands and enemy submarines off shore can be effected. While there is no conclusive proof that communication has existed during the war or immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, there are two significant [11] facts which strongly suggest the possibility:

It has been learned since the outbreak of war that the local Consulate had a system for signalling by various means from the islands of Oahu and Maui. This system emphasized visual signalling from the windward coast of Oahu, presumably to submarines. (#)

Since the outbreak of war, enemy submarines have appeared off various points of the Hawaiian Islands, at night and close to shore. Evidence that such craft have appeared close off windward Oahu at various times is strong. However, enemy submarines have not engaged in combat activity in that area, nor could they have effected reconnaissance of United States Fleet units there (since that area is off the regular sea lanes and at the opposite side of Oahu from Pearl Harbor). It therefore appears that with the presence of enemy submarines off windward Oahu should be associated the possibility that they were used to receive communications from, or send them to, enemy agents on shore—likely the former—or to make physical contact with agents on shore. (Paragraphs 47-48.)

#### *Blinker-tube signalling*

The hills rising sharply from the shores of the Hawaiian Islands contain many natural signal positions. These hills are cut by many deep valleys, most of which open almost directly into the sea, rather than into plains lying between main mountain ranges and the sea. A blinker-tube signalling device (easily devised from a flashlight and a cylindrical tube, pipe, or can) operated from the valleys and brought to bear upon a prearranged sea area cannot be detected unless the observer is on an almost direct bearing with the tube.

Since the outbreak of war, local intelligence offices have received many reports concerning suspicious lights, flashes, and flares—some well inland, some on and near the sea, and some off shore. In the many cases investigated, no evidence of signalling to the enemy has been established, but neither have all the reports been satisfactorily explained.

45. The killing of Gichihiro UYENO, a Japanese alien by an Army sentry at Waimanalo (windward Oahu) shortly before midnight, July 25, 1942, is worthy of particular note. UYENO was discovered close to a machine-gun emplacement on the beach. Several times challenged by the sentry, UYENO failed to make himself known and took flight, whereupon the sentry shot him. While attempting to escape, UYENO discarded a flashlight which he had been carrying. Examination of the flashlight indicated that it had once been "blacked out" with colored cellophane, but that the cellophane had been removed. According to available information, UYENO previously had always been in his quarters at a private home (where he was employed as a yard caretaker) by 8:00 o'clock each night, coming out with the Military Governor's curfew for aliens. He was a recluse, but not deranged.

At the time he was first seen near the machine-gun emplacement, UYENO was approximately 400 yards from his quarters, in a place he had no legitimate

reason to be. He was abroad at night in violation of the Military Governor's order, was illegally in the vicinity of military emplacements, was carrying an unblackened flashlight (though unlighted), and failed to heed the sentry's challenges. In those circumstances, it is reasonable to say that UYENO knew he was risking death. The probability is that his mission at the time justified assuming that risk. It is conceivable that UYENO was proceeding to, or returning from, a point of vantage from which signalling would have been, or was accomplished with the use of the undimmed flashlight. In this connection, it is relevant to quote the following entries from the log of the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.), Honolulu, for July 26, 1942:

"0040 Ph. from For'd Echelon (Lt. Porteus): Several 'Radar' plots indicate a strange surface vessel (or surfaced submarine) off Kaneohe Bay

"0045 Ph. from For'd Echelon (Lt. Porteus): Reports that a guard at Bellow Field shot and killed a Japanese man; CO asked to identify him."

The deceased Japanese later was identified as UYENO. The place where he was shot was approximately ten miles, on a straight line, from Kaneohe Bay. (#)

47. It is relevant to observe that during the latter [13] part of July 1942, considerable suspicious offshore activity was noted in the windward Oahu area, near the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay. The following is a recapitulation of events, as related by a highly reliable informant:

On the first appearance in the last week of July, 1942, the Japanese submarine was seen to be sending signals toward the shore by means of blinking lights. The submarine was located at this time near the entrance of Kaneohe Harbor just off the Mokapu peninsula. On its second appearance, probably July 26, 1942, the submarine was fired on by the shore batteries with no effect. On its next appearance, July 27, 1942, it was reported that all shore batteries had fired on the enemy submarine, with at least one shot hitting its mark. The submarine retired to a position behind Moku Manu island. This position rendered safety to the vessel since it is characterized by two cliffs which rise from the water on either side of the channel between the two islands. The submarine's position in this channel rendered it impossible for direct shots to be thrown at it. It was also understood that airplanes took off to drop bombs on the submarine, but because of conditions, were unable to make satisfactory runs.

Coincident with the retiring of the submarine on this latter date, the figure of a man was seen to be swimming in the channel in Kaneohe Bay, emerging from the water close to the old Navy Pier, Kahalun landing, which is near Koolau. A company of soldiers was dispatched to head this individual off, but because of the nature of the terrain, which is characterized by swamps and heavy underbrush, he was able to evade this group. Footprints inspected showed that this man was wearing rubber-soled shoes. (#)

In connection with the foregoing report must be considered the following memorandum, dated July 30, 1942, from the Intelligence Unit, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay:

"For the past several months the U. S. Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, has been menaced by attack from enemy submarines. Numerous radar plots of such submarines have been recorded and our aircraft, destroyers, and coast artillery have been brought into action against enemy [14] submarines as recently as July 27, 1942."

48. More recently, similar enemy activity has been apparent off Kaneohe Bay. On April 15, 1943, the District Intelligence Officer received the following report from the same Intelligence Unit:

"On the night of April 6, 1943, in addition to radar contacts, the station crash boats, in search of survivors from a plane crash in the area outside of Kaneohe Bay, saw an object identified as a submarine conning tower. (There were no such friendly craft in this area at this time.)

"At 1100 on April 10, 1943, planes from the Naval Air Detachment, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, saw a submarine off Kahuku Point, (later identified as enemy submarine) break surface and shortly, on his approach, submerge. At 2100 that same evening radar contacts were made off Kaneohe Bay, bearing 345°, range 7000 yards. At 2200 the station gun batteries illuminated with star shells and fired upon the conning tower of a submarine, range 7000 yards, bearing 342°, proceeding rapidly to bearing 345° when it submerged.

"On April 11, 1943, a plane was dispatched from this station to search for an enemy submarine observed off the northeast coast of Maui."

Sight, sonic, and radar plots of enemy submarines and unidentified objects windward Oahu (particularly in the area off Waimanalo to Kaneohe Bay) have been recorded during the war. These usually have been at night. These together with the incidents involving UYENO and the unidentified swimmer Kaneohe Bay, cast the highest degree of suspicion upon the windward Oahu.

The coincidence of several such events in the last week of July, 1942, and with particularly active suspected enemy submarine activity at that time makes the situation doubly noteworthy. It is clearly possible that sighting of enemy craft has been, and still is, carried on in that region. Further, the possibility of actual physical contact between enemy submarines and enemy forces on shore is apparent.

#### Personal contact

The waters and beaches of much of the coastal areas [15] of the Hawaiian Islands are such that a reasonably good swimmer can swim from the shore to a submarine, or vice versa. This provides the enemy with a method of receiving written, graphic, pictorial, and oral information from the submarine without the need of putting ashore instructions, equipment, and new personnel for use in an espionage organization.

The landing of Nazi saboteurs on the Atlantic Coast of the United States, the spy in Canada, and the report referred to in paragraph 47, above, illustrate the possibilities of effecting physical contact with shore. (#) With even the slightest ease, enemy agents can be landed or picked up on islands of the Hawaiian Islands other than Oahu.

Before the war, there was speculation as to whether Hawaiian fishing boats (largely manned by alien Japanese) might be making contact with Japanese vessels in or near the Hawaiian area for subversive purposes. Such meetings were never proved. (#) Contacts of local sampans with enemy vessels are still in evidence at present, due to the strict patrolling of all such craft in Hawaiian waters and the limited distance from shore within which they must operate. Furthermore, persons of Japanese ancestry are no longer allowed to fish in boats on the coast.

#### Sonic devices

Sonic equipment for underwater signalling is mentioned as a possible, though not probable, means of communication between enemy agents in small boats in Hawaiian waters and submerged enemy submarines. The latter, of course, carry sonic signalling apparatus as standard equipment.

#### Water caches

The coastal areas of the Hawaiian Islands in some places have shelves off the reefs, the shelves being at relatively shallow depths. This is true to a large extent of the Waimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area and the north shore of Oahu. For many years it has been the practice of local fishermen (many of whom are alien Japanese) to lay fish traps in those waters without buoys or floats attached, later picking them up by dragging or diving. The waters in which this type of fishing has been practiced are in many cases deep enough to permit a submarine to navigate close to shore, where it could recover a cache.

#### (e) Land caches

There are a dozen or more small islands or rocks off windward Oahu, varying in height above the sea from 20 to 360 feet. Several lie parallel to the shore and are long enough to conceal a submarine off shore from the view of observers on shore. Several lie in the Waimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area. Espionage forces from shore could visit such islands or rocks with comparative security and intelligence pouches in prearranged places, such pouches to be later picked up by enemy submarines.

The use of land and water caches as a means of transferring information from the enemy has a singular advantage over many of the other means of communication. Where caches are used, the transmitter can choose the time most appropriate to the performance of his task, and the recipient can act as he wishes. The times of their respective actions need not, and probably would not, be the same.

**(3) Radio**

57. The use of this means of communication would be highly desirable to the enemy espionage organization, from the standpoint of rapidity of communication, but involves a high degree of risk. By radio, information could be sent directly to Japan, or, with less power, to Japanese stations in the Mandated Islands or to enemy surface units or submarines considerably closer to the Hawaiian Islands, for re-transmission.

58. Properly used, however, this method of communication could give the sender a fair degree of security, taking into consideration the following safeguards and operating procedures:

- (a) Transmissions on a given frequency to be of short duration;
- (b) Varying frequencies to be used;
- (c) Use of a mobile transmitter, hidden in a truck or automobile;
- (d) Use of frequency modulation;
- (e) Use of directional transmitting antenna;
- (f) Use of ultra-high frequencies.

[17] 59. In this work, small sets operating only with a key could be used. It is known that Japanese landing forces in the Orient have used portable ultra-high frequency field sets only 8" x 8" x 10" in size. By using the transmitter carefully, changing frequencies rapidly, and employing mobile equipment, a maximum degree of protection against detection could be achieved.

60. Frequency modulation transmissions would be chiefly of value in this work for its freedom from detection by ordinary (that is, amplitude modulation) receivers. Frequency modulation transmission in the higher frequencies is reported to have a service range of about twice the distance from the point of transmission to the horizon. Thus, a transmitter located at an elevation of 500 feet could send to an enemy submarine almost 30 miles away. (#)

61. In conjunction with frequency modulation or other type of transmission, the use of a directional antenna would greatly improve the security of the espionage activity by limiting the area within which monitoring equipment, fixed or mobile, would be able to intercept signals. Directional transmission in the higher frequencies, with their limited service ranges, would be used to best advantage with a fixed rather than mobile transmitter.

62. A strong objection to the use of radio is the unsatisfactory equation between the operator's vulnerability and his importance to the espionage organization. His technical skill would be a great asset, yet during periods of transmission he would be the most exposed member of the organization.

63. Other than an unidentified message intercepted by an Army radio unit on the morning of December 7, 1941 (following the attack on Oahu), which message was partly in German and partly unintelligible, and which reported in a very general way the damage caused by the Japanese attack, there has come to the attention of this office no instance of communication by radio from the Hawaiian Islands to the enemy. (#)

64. However, in line with what should always be the basic operating premise of the counter-espionage agent—to assume the worst and work against it—it must be assumed that the enemy has carried on radio communication from these Islands. On January 10, 1942, the senior FCC representative in Hawaii wrote

[18] "It is generally believed and logical to assume that radio is being used to convey information to the enemy in this area. The fact that no illegal operation has been discovered here to date means that the enemy is clever and that there is inadequate radio coverage. . ." (#)

After specifying the existing monitoring facilities and requesting additional equipment and personnel, the same writer believed that FCC would still be unable to cover the field completely, saying:

" . . . Those recommendations constitute a practical compromise with the requirements for theoretically perfect coverage."

On January 16, 1942, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation wrote

"In regard to present conditions in the Hawaiian Islands, it is apparent that illicit shortwave radio transmissions are being sent from clandestine stations operating in the islands themselves, in communication with mobile units of the Japanese Navy, through which intelligence information is being reported to the enemy. . ." (#)

65. Opinion is divided as to whether the enemy espionage organization would use radio as a frequent and usual means of communication with Japan, or use

in the rarest and most urgent cases. The answer to the question will depend upon the amount of risk apparently involved in such transmission and the suitability of other, less risky means of communication. Fixed and mobile FCC monitoring stations in the Hawaiian Islands maintain a constant watch for suspicious radio signals, and constitute a serious threat to any illicit transmissions. However, it is believed that such monitoring is not, and could not be, effective. Transmissions in the higher frequencies from certain portions of the island of Oahu cannot be received at certain other parts of the island. Emanating from a high-frequency transmitter located in a valley formed by sharply rising mountains usually might only be received within the valley or beyond its flanks, the mountains acting as a shield against lateral transmission. Using a directional antenna with a transmitter so situated, the field of interceptability might further be reduced, eliminating almost entirely the possibility of interception at least the fixed monitoring stations.

#### (4) *Commercial radio station transmissions*

In the Consulate communications plan already referred to (paragraph 42) this type of communication was provided for—a radio advertisement offering to sell a Chinese rug was to mean that several aircraft carriers had left Pearl Harbor; one advertising a complete chicken farm for sale, that all aircraft carriers had sailed; and, one offering to employ a beauty operator, that the whole Japanese force had sailed. If used, these transmissions were to have been sent on Radio KGMB, Honolulu, at about 9:45 o'clock on any morning. No such transmissions were in fact ever placed.

Such a method of code transmission is entirely feasible, although normally there would be a delay of at least a day in reporting information in this manner. Honolulu radio stations generally require that advertising copy be submitted at least the day before it is broadcast. Commercial radio transmissions on KGMB and KGMB, Honolulu, while probably not to be heard at all hours of the day in the Mandated Islands probably could be heard there at night. Day-broadcasts could be heard by Japanese vessels cruising between there and the Hawaiian Islands, and by them be relayed to Japan.

The type of code to be used in conjunction with radio advertising would be simple to conceive and should create no suspicion in the minds of censors or the public, because it would use only words well known to the trade of the advertiser. The use of nouns representing trade names or products would be required in this code, to escape the effects of any ordinary paraphrasing that censors or radio station operators might impose. An internal indicator could be used to differentiate ordinary advertisements from those intended to convey information to the enemy.

While the use of spot ads of the type mentioned in the Consulate communications plan would arouse suspicion at the present time, it should be mentioned that there are a considerable number of commercial firms (some of them owned by Japanese aliens) who regularly advertise over the local commercial radio stations, and have done so since before the war. One of these firms might be a "front" whose radio advertising could be used to transmit code messages.

#### (5) *Trans-Pacific and inter-island radio telephone; radiograms*

These means are grouped together because they each are interceptable by the enemy. There is good evidence that trans-Pacific telephone communications between Hawaii and California can be intercepted in Japan, but whether they are intelligible there depends on whether the Japanese have a suitable inverter ("crambler"). As to all of these means, however, sound counter-espionage practice requires that it be assumed that the Japanese can intercept such communications and render them intelligible.

Where these means are used to transmit information directly to an intercept station, a simple code similar to that which could be used in radio advertising might be appropriate. Here, again, the use of a business house as a "front" would be appropriate for the espionage organization. Examination of trans-Pacific telephone censorship extracts indicates that many such calls are of a business nature, and involve conversations concerning products and brand names.

In addition, these means can be used for the purpose of communicating directly with other Japanese espionage agents, on the Mainland. Their use for this purpose would be essentially the same as the use of commercial cable, air mail, regular mail, and courier, which are discussed below.

**(6) Cablegrams**

73. Assuming the existence of Mainland "post offices" to which intelligence messages might be sent, the use of commercial cable as a means of getting vital information out of the Hawaiian Islands is quite feasible. This practice presupposes the existence of an information relay system, whose task it would be to re-route the information through any of many possible channels to an Axis country or to an Axis agent in a neutral state, for relay to Japan.

74. This method of communication requires only a simple code, perhaps of few as 100 words and numerals, together with code designations for geographical sections on a grid map. If this means of communication were used often, several codes could be used to avoid the possibility of detection through repetition of the same code words.

75. Although the use of cablegram eliminates to some extent the time incident to transmissions by air mail [21] and ordinary mail, there are some obstacles interposed by censorship, inasmuch as the immediate censor might take a fancy to paraphrase a message or suppress it entirely (in which case the sender would not necessarily be notified). However, it is believed that the use of proper codes, especially designed to avoid censorship and the effect of paraphrase, would make this a useful means of communication.

**(7) Air mail; ordinary mail; parcel post; cargo; railway express**

76. These media of transmission have several advantages not possessed by some of those previously discussed: First, the permitting of transmission of bulky reports, in more detailed and more secure code; second, the opportunity for use of secret inks, grids, and other hidden writings; third, the transmission of maps, charts, plans, and other matter that must be represented graphically or pictorially, rather than verbally; and fourth, the transmission of physical objects of intelligence value, and written reports that have been reproduced on microfilm.

77. The great time lag between the happening of an event and the time a report of it reaches the effective enemy designation by one of the above means is the most serious disadvantage here. However, certain durable information (for example, that relating to the location of new airfields, drydocks, ammunition dumps, and especially the estimated dates of completion of construction in progress) would be only slightly diminished in value if so transmitted.

**(8) Courier**

78. The use of agents who are officers or crewmen of commercial airlines or the merchant marine has been suggested. (#) Such means would possess two advantages: First, in allowing the transmission of information by word of mouth and second, the handling of physical objects.

79. However, because of the vagaries of merchant marine sailing these days, an agent on a certain ship could not be expected to call at Honolulu regularly. This would necessitate having couriers on a large number of vessels, requiring the espionage organization to become too large in proportion to the benefits to be gained by the use of couriers. Also, the factor of time required in such transmission is an additional adverse condition. It is much more likely that officers or crewmen of Pan American Airways, whose clippers make fairly regular trips between Hawaii and California, or [22] other commercial airlines, would be sought to act as couriers.

**(9) Carrier pigeon**

80. Simply because it might be used for the carriage of information between islands of the Hawaiian group, this possibility is mentioned. However, it is considered relatively insecure, and perhaps vain, since inter-island mails are not censored and can therefore be used to better advantage than homing pigeons.

**[23] IV. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII PRIOR TO THE WAR****(A) Type of information collected**

81. An alien Japanese internee, who claims to have engaged in espionage for Japan in Hawaii 30 years ago, has stated that Japan started its espionage coverage of the Hawaiian Islands shortly after the Russo-Japanese War. (#) Initial study is said to have been made of the geography, topography, and hydrography of the Islands, so that by World War I, Japan had a rather complete compilation of all basic data concerning those subjects.



82. As indicated in Paragraph 19, the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, was particularly interested in the movements of United States Naval vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence that such movements were especially watched and reported by the Consulate prior to the summer of 1940. This probably is accounted for by the fact that until that time the status of relations between the United States and Japan did not demand such reporting and that up to that time Fleet movements were publicized in the press.

83. Of particular importance to the Consulate in 1941 was information concerning new airfields in the Islands. Persons attached to the Consulate travelled to the islands of Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii particularly to look for new airfield construction, while new fields on Oahu were constantly sought. (#) The importance of such information is readily apparent when one considers the attack of December 7, 1941.

84. Arrivals of new air squadrons and troops to strengthen Hawaii's defenses in 1941, and the passing through Honolulu of men and materiel destined for China, also were closely watched and reported by the Consulate to Tokyo. (#)

85. Data concerning beaches, reefs, anchorages, tides and currents, and the like, undoubtedly were gathered chiefly by alien Japanese fishermen who almost exclusively manned Hawaii's sampan fishing fleet. Those beaches most suitable for enemy landing operations were closely studied, both by Consulate personnel and visiting Japanese naval officers on sightseeing trips.

86. The Consulate is also known to have been interested, but to a lesser degree, in the waterfront facilities on the four main islands; and, in the case of Kauai, the electric powerhouse at Wainiha was the object of scrutiny by a member [24] of the Consulate staff sent to the Island of Kauai for that purpose in July, 1941. (#)

#### (B) Personnel

87. Upon the basis of known facts, persons who have engaged in espionage in the Hawaiian Islands for the benefit of Japan may be classified as (a) officials, (b) agents, and (c) volunteers. For instant purposes, Consulate staff members, employees, and *toritsuginin* ("go-betweens," popularly called "consular agents") are denominated officials. Other local residents—the self-appointed spies—are classed as volunteers.

88. It is believed that the Vice Consul, at Honolulu, was *ex officio* responsible for the conduct of espionage operations of the Consulate. Certain Consulate secretaries (alien Japanese) and one local-born clerk (a dual citizen) are known to have collected military and naval information for the Consulate, in each instance reporting their finding to the Vice Consul. In another instance, a consular agent who was a Buddhist priest at Lahaina, Maui, was called upon by the Vice Consul to report the movements of the Fleet at Lahaina Roads, (#) Other consular agents were asked to report economic matters.

89. When interrogated after the outbreak of war, the local-born Consulate clerk above referred to stated that he had heard one Consulate secretary (who also was engaged in espionage in Honolulu) state that it was Japan's policy to maintain two espionage systems in countries abroad—one system run by consulates, and the other separate from the consulates and entirely unknown to them. Whether any such extra-consulate espionage system was active in the Hawaiian Islands is not known. The difference in functions of the two systems was said to be that a consulate would indulge only in such espionage activity as could be carried on without compromising diplomatic and consular relations (such as the gathering of facts from newspapers, viewing ship movements from places of vantage not in any restricted area, and observing airfields and beaches from public highways), whereas an extra-consulate organization would carry on "illegal" espionage (such as trespassing restricted areas and the buying of confidential information).

90. The Consulate undoubtedly had a few paid agents, although in the one outstanding case, it does not appear whether the agent who received pay through the Consulate was receiving the same for services rendered at the direction of [25] the Consulate or of someone in Japan. This agent, Otto KUEHN, an alien German, is known to have received \$14,000.00 through the Consulate in October, 1941, but the money seems to have been transmitted directly from Japan, with the Consulate acting merely as delivery agent. However, subsequent to that time, KUEHN did commit overt acts of espionage and report his work to

the Consulate directly, for which acts he has since been tried by a military commission, found guilty, and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. The Consulate is known also to have paid certain other persons who appear to have been chiefly engaged in propaganda work, but who may well have engaged in espionage also. (#)

91. Much information of value to Japan is believed to have been gathered by Japanese espionage agents who came to Hawaii for relatively short periods of time, as non-quota immigrants or in the guise of visitors—in either case, seemingly having no connection with the local Consulate. One case is known of a Japanese agent who, around 1932, stayed in Hawaii for about four months, evidently to perform a specific mission. With the help of a Japanese bookstore owner (who had been naturalized as a United States citizen following his service in the United States Army in World War I), the visiting agent conducted considerable observation of the Island of Oahu and its points of naval and military interest. (#)

92. Espionage agents, or observers, who stayed but a short time in Honolulu were chiefly those military and naval officers of Japan who were passing through Honolulu on commercial or naval vessels. In the cases of visiting Japanese naval training squadrons, the officers invariably made sightseeing trips around Oahu, taking them within full view of Pearl Harbor, certain Army reservations, air fields, and strategic beaches. Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, expelled from the United States in the summer of 1941, is reliably reported to have come ashore here and to have driven with the Japanese Vice Consul to the vicinity of Waiānae, long considered a possible landing beach. (#)

93. It is also believed likely that when Japanese naval oil tankers used to call at Honolulu (up until 1941), tanker personnel occasionally would be left in Honolulu on specific missions, and would take a later vessel back to Japan. Adequate control of the personnel of such vessels was ever effected here. Tallies made by other Government agencies of the number of persons leaving and going aboard such ships here often would show that more persons had gone ashore than had returned before sailing, but the accuracy of these tallies cannot be positively asserted. A Japanese clerk of the Consulate who had been engaged in espionage activities stated, when interrogated, that he once heard that Japanese tankers would sometimes leave some of their personnel in Honolulu, but he could not state the source of his information. (#)

94. In an effort to "make face" with Japan's officialdom, several local Japanese residents (aliens and citizens) have gratuitously, and in some instances voluntarily, engaged in espionage or propaganda activities beneficial to Japan. The Japanese bookstore owner previously referred to was found to have gathered extensive military information (of dubious value, however). He also willingly obliged a visiting Japanese, since found to have been an espionage agent, by driving the latter to points of military importance on the island of Oahu. On other occasions (1936-1941), in response to requests received while visiting Japan, he sent to Japan large quantities of maps, charts, and hydrographic publications on sale in Honolulu. The full volume of what he transmitted is not known, but his effects show that he sent at least 43 ocean charts, 6 air charts, and 51 maps, as well as several publications. (#) Many other local Japanese residents, over a period of 20 years, voluntarily (and in most cases, proudly) volunteered to drive visiting Japanese naval personnel to points of interest on the various islands at which such personnel called. One Japanese alien resident on Alea Heights, whose home has an unsurpassed view of Pearl Harbor, is known to have been visited on occasions by officers of Japanese naval vessels who called at Honolulu prior to the war. (#)

### (C) Operational methods

#### (1) Collection of information

95 From the facts at hand, it must be said that almost all military and naval information known to have been transmitted from Hawaii to Japan, either through the Consulate or agents sent here on special missions, was gathered by the simple expedient of open observation, without trespassing restricted areas. (See Paragraphs 17-21) In this connection it will be remembered that an analysis of the military and naval data found in the effects of Lieutenant Commander Itaru TACHIBANA, IJN, prior to his expulsion from the United States in the summer of 1941, revealed that about 70% of the national defense information was compiled from public reading material. (#)

96. In only a few instances were Consulate observers known to have used binoculars to observe Pearl Harbor and the [27] Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and even then, not illegally.

97. In the few cases of trespass to Government reservations and defensive sea areas that were investigated before the war, none were investigated beyond the point necessary to secure a conviction for trespass. It was therefore never established that the trespassers were or were not trespassing incident to espionage activity.

98. Accurate maps and charts of the Hawaiian Islands and adjacent waters long were on sale in downtown Honolulu, and available to any purchaser. Tourist maps showed the approximate location of many military and naval installations. (#)

99. Photographs of many strategic places on Oahu were on sale in Honolulu stores—even panoramic views of Pearl Harbor. (See Paragraph 19.) With the exception of the highly suspicious activity of seven Japanese seen photographing from various points on the shore of Kaneohe Bay, looking toward the Naval Air Station, on November 4, 1941, no outstanding cases of suspicious photographing have been noted. (#) The Kaneohe Bay incident is significant, however, because construction work then in progress at the Naval Air Station could not readily be seen from any point close to the station, the same being on a peninsula. Photographs taken from across the bay, however, would have provided excellent information.

### *(2) Evaluation of information*

100. Since nothing is known of the contents of intelligence reports transmitted to Japan by couriers, it cannot be said whether the information therein was evaluated by the Consulate as to its over-all value, or as to reliability only, nor whether information sent through the Consulate was digested before transmission. However, according to former Consulate clerks, where reports were sent by commercial radio or cable, they were always predigested. Where a newspaper was the source of information transmitted by radio or cable, that fact would be stated.

101. It is believed that in general the Vice Consul was responsible for making close initial evaluation of all intelligence transmitted to Japan. While he rarely made observations himself, it was he who questioned the Consulate staff members who were sent to view ships in Pearl Harbor or to observe vital installations on Oahu or the outlying islands. He also seems to have been the person through whom reports from all available sources filtered, and in one specific [28] case he is reported to have told a secretary that the latter's observations on a certain matter were wrong (presumably basing his conclusion on what he considered better evidence from another source). (#)

102. Considerable information transmitted to Japan was clipped from local newspapers, all of which were personally studied and marked for clipping by the Vice Consul. (#)

103. With regard to facts not of a military or naval nature, but affecting the Japanese residents of Hawaii (and possibly Japan's international relations with the United States), these generally were discussed by the Consul General and the Vice Consul, in consultation with prominent alien Japanese residents who acted as advisors to the Consulate.

### *(3) Transmission of information to Japan*

104. While vessels of the N. Y. K. Line were running regularly through Honolulu (until mid-summer, 1941), much of the Consulate correspondence was transmitted to Japan by diplomatic couriers, who made regular trips between Tokyo and the embassy in Washington, and return. The captains of N. Y. K. liners and of Japanese naval oil tankers also carried pouches from the local Consulate to Japan.

105. However, in 1941, a large volume of commercial radio and cable messages was sent to Japan, most of the messages encrypted. (#) These means of communication were particularly necessary in the fall, when only one ship, which left Honolulu on November 5th, went to Japan.

106. Although there were many amateur radio operators of Japanese ancestry in Honolulu who might have been used for the purpose, there is no evidence that any Consulate traffic ever was sent to Japan through them. (#) Commercial communication facilities being open for that purpose, there was no need to jeopardize a potential source of wartime espionage transmission. Neither is there any evidence, nor was there ever any reason to believe, that the Consulate maintained its own radio transmitter for direct communication with Japan.

[29]

## V. PRESENT JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII

(A) *Introductory*(1) *Evidence of enemy espionage*

107. In the earlier sections of this analysis, there are set forth certain facts tending to show specific instances of enemy espionage activity. Properly functioning counter-espionage organizations must assume the existence of such enemy activity at the present time, for the contrary cannot be proved.

108. It is believed that there have been sufficient unexplained suspicious activities in the past 16 months to warrant the assumption that Japan is carrying on some form of espionage in the Hawaiian Islands. Assuming that the unidentified craft that have been detected at night close off Oahu and Maui since the outbreak of war were Japanese submarines and were in Hawaiian waters primarily on combat or reconnaissance missions, their presence here for either or both of those purposes alone cannot be reconciled with the fact that they have unnecessarily exposed themselves in waters close to shore—particularly in waters outside fruitful combat and reconnaissance areas. It is tactically unsound for submarines to have operated in many of the areas in which the unidentified craft were detected, except if they were there for some other reason—to pick up agents ashore, receive communications from shore, and the like.

(2) *Espionage activity as affected by the state of diplomacy*

109. It should be mentioned, in passing, that espionage activity must be, and in Hawaii has been, affected by the state of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan. The three usual states of international relations are:

- (a) Period of normal diplomatic relations.
- (b) Period of ruptured diplomatic relations, or non-diplomacy.
- (c) Period of belligerency.

110. In the recent history of United States-Japanese relations, the period of normal diplomatic relations ended on December 7, 1941. During that period espionage in Hawaii was largely handled through the Consulate, which could [30] expeditiously report its intelligence to Japan in encrypted despatches and by commercial cable and radio.

111. It is believed that the Japanese contemplated that a period of ruptured relations would exist before war was started, and appropriately planned a system of communication to be used in that period. Reference has been made to the signalling system of the Consulate. (See Paragraph 42 (a)). This system was designed and submitted to the Consulate by KUEHN, referred to in Paragraph 90. It is not known whether the signalling system was ever used.

112. The third phase in which an espionage system would have to work is the period of war, in which period all Japanese consulates and Japanese (foreign-owned) business houses, which formerly might have collaborated in the gathering and transmission of intelligence to Japan, would be closed.

113. It is believed that, in all likelihood, the espionage organization which would go into action in wartime would not have been operative as such before the war. At least, it would have maintained no connections with the Consulate or leading alien Japanese business houses, for fear of attracting the attention of counter-espionage agencies. The remainder of this analysis will dwell upon what is believed to be a workable pattern of Japanese wartime espionage in Hawaii.

(B) *Personnel*(1) *Selection of personnel prior to the war*

114. The successful operation of an espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime implies a considerable amount of forethought and planning. The key personnel of the system must have been in the Islands, prepared to execute their basic orders under such conditions as might develop.

115. Appendix "C" is a schematic diagram setting forth the various functional units of an espionage organization. It will be noted that the organization is divided into the directive, collection, evaluation, and communication units. Presumably the key men in the Islands when war broke out included the heads of each of these units. In discussing the matter of the probable or possible Japanese espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands, it is not intended that the use of the singular should imply that it is believed that only one such system might exist. The possibility must always be considered, that there are two or more systems, working [31] jointly or separately.

It is not necessary that all personnel ultimately needed in the organization should have been recruited before the war. In many of its functions, the espionage system will use in the most exposed positions persons recruited from any time, either because of their loyalty to Japan or for their love of money or revenge. It is quite possible that in past years the local Japanese Consulate in Hawaii, through its *toritsuginin* (themselves appointed because of their loyalty to Japan), had established lists of loyal Japanese who could be called upon at any time to aid Japan's cause. (Glichiro UYENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45-46, may have been a loyal Japanese so selected.)

Also presumably available to the wartime espionage organization would be a list of all persons, Japanese and non-Japanese, who might ever have been recruited by the Consulate in any criminal or subversive capacity. This group should include many persons loyal to Japan, or otherwise disaffected. In addition, such persons are likely to be more valuable because of their prior experience.

#### *Use of personnel used*

Opinion is varied concerning the nationality and race of personnel in the espionage system. The operating premise of counter-espionage agents embraces three conceptions of the possible composition of the Japanese espionage organization, namely, that it uses:

Individuals of Japanese ancestry only; or,

Only non-Japanese; or,

A combination of Japanese and non-Japanese.

Consensus of those who have carefully considered the problem is that the possibility of the last is the most likely.

It is reasonable to assume that Japan would have preferred to have built its wartime espionage organization in Hawaii wholly around Japanese of known loyalty to Japan. However, certain considerations might deter the adoption of such a policy:

Upon the outbreak of war, all Japanese in Hawaii immediately would be under the greatest degree of suspicion.

(b) Japan could not foresee the attitude of United States authorities in Hawaii towards resident Japanese, for the excellent reason that no policy regarding control of resident Japanese was formulated until after war began.

Therefore, Japan had no reasonable assurance that *any* person of Japanese ancestry would retain freedom of movement in wartime. Japan might well have assumed that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be denied access to vital information in wartime, that many such persons (possibly all alien males) would be subjected to that stringent curfew, travel control, and communications restrictions which attach to all such persons, and that mass evacuation or relocation measures might be invoked to remove virtually all Japanese from at least the island of Hawaii.

The foregoing facts were so considered by Japan, she would never have built her espionage organization entirely around a nucleus of Japanese.

On the other hand, Japan may have reasoned that the magnitude of the espionage problem in Hawaii, in terms of sheer numbers (160,000 Japanese residents), was such that the United States authorities would have to allow many Japanese to remain at liberty. If this were the reasoning, one might expect to find that the espionage agents include American-born Nisei, probably expatriated, and have negative records of pro-Japanese activities and positive records of Americanism. They might well be informants of the counter-espionage or law enforcement agencies. They could reasonably expect to be among the last to be evacuated or interned. It is therefore pertinent to observe that the Japanese so described are still at large and are able to carry on their appointed tasks.

Variations of the above two extremes are equally possible. For purposes of security, the vital core of the organization might be composed of non-Japanese. To the extent and effectiveness of United States security and counter-espionage measures became more apparent, the espionage leaders would be able to draw on the loyal Japanese personnel to the extent deemed prudent and necessary. Otherwise, the central unit might be under instructions to use no Japanese.

122. On the other hand, the nucleus of the organization may be composed of Japanese, who will make use of non-Japanese as the need and opportunities arise. This group might even have available a non-Japanese whose function would be to assume direction of the espionage organization in the event the members of the original core are immobilized or rendered ineffective by security or counter-espionage measures.

123. The Japanese already have used individuals of other racial groups to collect information. In Hawaii, during the last few weeks of peaceful relations, the Japanese Consulate General requested KUEHN, an alien, to submit a plan for shore-to-ship signalling. The Farnsworth and Thompson cases may also be cited. A former clerk of the local Consulate, when interrogated, told a story given him by one of the Consulate secretaries, that for years Japan had been purchasing information from a British naval officer stationed in China. (#) Reports from Mainland Naval Districts indicate that the Japanese contemplate using disaffected Negroes for espionage work. It is entirely plausible, then, that the Japanese espionage organization may be using Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, or members of other racial groups represented in the Territory of Hawaii.

124. A clear distinction must be made between the concept of a Japanese espionage organization which employs non-Japanese, and the concept of a German espionage unit operating here for the benefit of Japan. The existence of the latter type of organization, while possible, is deemed doubtful. Germany has little immediate military interest in Hawaii, and lacking that, it is doubted that it would risk the services of trained German agents to aid a not completely trusted Axis partner. If a German espionage unit is functioning in Hawaii, it probably exists merely as an observational check on information which Japan from time to time undoubtedly supplies Germany regarding military and naval operations centering around or emanating from Hawaii. There is the possibility that German and Italian agents might before the war have recruited personnel for the wartime Japanese espionage organization, and it is known that an Italian courier system was operating across the Pacific, through Honolulu, prior to the closing of the local Italian Consulate in July, 1941.

#### (C) Operations

##### (1) Functional units of the espionage organization

125. Reference to Appendix "C" will show that the functional divisions of the espionage organizations are believed to be four: [34]

- (a) Directive unit;
- (b) Collection unit;
- (c) Evaluation unit;
- (d) Communication unit.

The word "unit" is intended to mean functional, rather than personal, unity of operation, although a single person might in some cases be the entire personnel of one or more units. It is intended to stress the functions of the organization rather than the number of personnel.

##### (a) Directive unit

126. This is the person or section of the organization which directs all operations. It is assumed that well in advance of war, the head of this unit receives explicit instructions as to the nature of information to be gathered in Hawaii. In wartime, the relative importance of different types of intelligence, and the manner in which the same should be reported. The directive unit would be responsible for the entire espionage organization, centralize the authority there, and keep the machine functioning.

127. Probably but not necessarily, the head of the directive unit of the organization would also be directly in charge of the evaluation unit.

##### (b) Collection unit

128. The function of this section is to cull from available sources (see Paragraphs 16-30) such information as is known to be of value to Japan. The director of this unit may confine his activity to collection work alone, or may supervise that in addition to other duties. Conceivably, the directive head of the whole organization might personally direct the collection unit.

129. In all probability, the collection unit was partially organized before the war. In order to be able to best utilize certain sources of information in wartime, previous preparation would have been necessary. For example, to enable ready and constant observation of Pearl Harbor, it would be desirable to have a home on Alea Heights occupied by an agent of [35] the espionage organization. (#) Agents could more readily be "planted" in the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and in other vital areas, and disaffected persons could more readily be developed as sources of "inside" information, before the war than thereafter.

130. The prime requisite of an agent operating for the collection unit is that he have access to the information he desires without creating suspicion.

agents can collect information at their normal places of work or abode; must travel to obtain it. For the latter, unobtrusive mobility is a necessity. While much information of value can be learned in the course of a day's activity in the city of Honolulu proper, regular trips around the island of Oahu undoubtedly would be of great value (and perhaps be considered absolutely necessary by the directive unit). Travel around Oahu during daytime is virtually unrestricted, and the trained observer can readily determine the location of many new plane dispersal points, searchlights, radar stations, machinegun emplacements, and landing fields. For example, the airfield at Kūaloa, Oahu, extends across the around-the-island highway, so private vehicles drive across the runway of the field, and planes land across the highway. Automobiles on the highway are required to drive slowly in this area but are not allowed to stop, unless planes are landing or taking off, when automobiles must stop. Normal driving speed, however, affords ample opportunity on two or three trips, to locate most of the camouflaged revetments, estimate the length of the field, and locate wooded areas in which planes are hidden and being overhauled, and where fuel trucks are parked.

It would also seem likely that observers have been placed on the outside of the Hawaiian group (principally Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai), in order to make available to the head of the espionage organization (presumably on Oahu) military and naval information available on those islands. No censorship of information is transmitted between islands is maintained, and travel of civilians (including Japanese) by air is considerable, so that transmission of the information from outside islands would present no great difficulty. It is possible, though probable, that agents on outside islands would communicate their information directly to Japan. More likely still is the possibility that information may be sent from Oahu to outside islands for re-transmission to Japan.

#### (c) Evaluation unit

This section of the organization probably would contain one or more operatives familiar with military and naval matters. In order to discharge its duties, the evaluation unit would have to be cognizant of the basic functions of the organization as to the type of intelligence required to be obtained from the enemy.

This section would evaluate and digest all information of value to the organization, determine what information should be communicated, and probably the method of its communication—subject to the general supervision of the directive unit.

Where coding of messages is required, the same probably would be handled by this section, and not by the communication unit. This would be in keeping with the principle that, insofar as possible, the workings of the organization and the product of its work be known by as few persons within the organization as possible.

#### Communication unit

The function of the communication section is to transmit information from the Hawaiian area to the enemy, utilizing any or all of the means indicated in paragraphs 42-80, subject to the general supervision of the directive unit. The manner of transmission to be employed in each case will vary with the nature and urgency of the information to be sent, presumably the directive unit would determine what means of communication would be used.

A technical communication section is not required for all types of transmission. While the use of short-wave radio would require technicians, the use of other means might require only an expert cryptographer, who might be a member of the directive or evaluation units. However, there are many amateur radio operators in Honolulu (a large number of them Japanese), from whom could be drawn the necessary technicians for short-wave radio work. Many communications might be released in different ways through a business "front." Since it is believed that the espionage organization exposes itself most in communicating information, it is felt that those most exposed agents are those most likely to be securely insulated from the directive center. The organization should be so constructed that the apprehension of a communication would not lead to exposure of the whole system. Following the usual pattern, the [37] agent farthest from the hub would know no more than the agent from whom he receives his instructions (and preferably not even that). Various ways of effecting liaison between agents who do not know each other have been discovered in the past history of espionage and new

ways may be devised by a directive head having a good imagination and a reasonably good knowledge of prevailing counter-espionage measures in a given locality.

139. In the shore-to-ship sub-unit of the communication section (see Appendix "C") men of known loyalty to Japan, but not necessarily possessed of better than average intelligence, could be used to good advantage. These persons might be denominated "action men," whose only function it would be to conduct blinker tube signalling, or to swim or row to a submarine off shore, or to arrange land or sea caches. These persons would know little or nothing of the rest of the organization; they need not be told the meaning of messages they might be directed to transmit, nor the contents of pouches they might deliver.

140. Perhaps Giichiro UYENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45-46, was an "action man." Immediately before he was killed, his actions were those of a person who might have been proceeding to a point of vantage from which to conduct visual signalling to a submarine off shore. He was a recluse, living in such a manner and at such a place that suspicion was not likely to be attracted by a person calling upon him to give him instructions with regard to signalling. Had he been captured, rather than killed, he likely would not, and perhaps could not have named the person or persons who had given him instructions.

141. Anticipating that all local stocks of radio equipment might be commandeered for military use in the event of war, or that the purchase of suitable transmitting equipment during wartime would arouse suspicion, the organization certainly would be well supplied beforehand with such equipment, as well as with technicians and operators.

### (2) Use of a business firm as a "front"

142. As previously stated, the espionage organization must employ deception to cover many of its activities. Private individuals cannot, without good reason, engage in the ramified work of the espionage organization without soon inviting suspicion. Therefore, a "front" of some kind for the organization, most likely the use of a business firm is required. It is not assumed, however, that the "front" [38] would have to be a business house.

143. A glance at Appendix "C" shows the many activities that the espionage organization may engage in. The use of a business firm in discharging the communication function is stressed in the diagram, although it is obvious that the same "front" could be used also in the collection of information. For example, deliverymen of many Honolulu firms have access to certain restricted areas on Oahu; salesmen and collectors regularly make the around-the-island road trip in dealing with customers; workmen of all types have regular access to the Honolulu waterfront.

144. The heads of the directive or evaluation units, or both, might be managers of the business "front." Among customers patronizing such business houses might be agents of the espionage organization who call there to meet with the chiefs, either to receive instructions or to report information. Deliverymen and salesmen of the firm could in the normal course of their work contact with members of the espionage organization who never visit the business house.

145. An established business house whose volume of business warranted the same would be in a position to use regular commercial radio advertising as a medium for the transmission of intelligence to the enemy; similarly, overseas telephone calls, radiograms, cables, and mail.

146. An important advantage to be found in the use of a suitable business "front" would be the availability to it of large sums of cash, the procurement of which the ordinary individual in Hawaii at the present time would find most difficult.

### (3) Finances of the espionage organization

147. An espionage organization must have available to it at all times large sums of money for a number of purposes, among which may be mentioned:

- (a) Payment of agents' salaries;
- (b) Maintenance of a business "front";
- (c) Purchase of supplies and equipment;
- (d) Purchase of information.

It will be recalled that the eight Nazi saboteurs captured in [39] the United States in 1942 were supplied with currency amounting to more than \$100,000.00 for their operations.

148. Currency control measures instituted in the Territory of Hawaii since the war began could well have seriously affected the enemy espionage organization.



financial structure. First, the Military Governor ordered that all persons in the Hawaiian Islands should turn in to banks all currency in their possession in excess of \$200.00, and that they might thereafter draw no more than \$200.00 cash a month. Corporations and businesses requiring larger sums of cash on hand were given special licenses. Second, the Treasury Department called in all standard United States currency circulating in the Hawaiian Islands and issued new like currency bearing the word "Hawaii" overprinted thereon. The overprinted currency may not be taken from the Islands and is not legal tender elsewhere. Standard United States currency can no longer be used as legal tender in Hawaii, except when presented by United States Navy personnel arriving from outside the Territory.

149. Since it is difficult to smuggle into Hawaii in quantity money which is legal tender here, telegraphic and draft transfer of credits is the only feasible means of supplying the espionage organization with funds from without. These means afford little opportunity for the transfer of large amounts of money without suspicion, because of the close watch kept on all such transfers by censorship authorities. (#)

150. It is possible that the espionage organization might have foreseen that drastic currency control measures would be put into effect in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime, and to have planned accordingly. This could have been done in some measure by the purchase before the war of readily realizable assets, such as high grade securities and readily marketable real estate.

#### (4) *Instructions from Japan in wartime*

151. The general operating instructions of the enemy espionage organization as formulated prior to the war must have specified definite types of data that should be gathered during wartime and the manner of communicating the same to Japan. However, the course the war might take would affect these matters, necessitating new directives to the organization.

152. Code messages over Radio Tokyo are known to have been among the contemplated means of disseminating information to Japanese consulate abroad, just about the time of the outbreak of war. (#) This is still considered a likely means of [40] communicating with agents in Hawaii.

153. For the transmission of detailed instructions, new operating codes, or the introduction of new outside personnel into the organization, physical contact by enemy submarines with Hawaiian shores is feasible.

[41]

### VI. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE MEASURES IN HAWAII

#### (A) *"Counter-Espionage" defined and distinguished*

154. "Counter-espionage" is that intelligence activity which "has as its objective the denial of information to the enemy," and which "includes the supervision, coordination, and active operation of all investigative measures intended to prevent espionage." (#)

155. Counter-espionage does not include the functions of maintaining internal security, preventing sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, or isolating disaffected persons. However, agencies charged with the latter functions and the counter-espionage agencies must work in close cooperation and maintain a constant exchange of information regarding subversive trends, persons, and groups.

156. As used in this analysis, "internal security" does not refer to the security of the Naval Establishment, but to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands generally. The maintenance of such internal security is chiefly a problem of population control, and, from the intelligence viewpoint, is simply a matter of isolating from the general public enemy sympathizers and disaffected persons whose future actions may be detrimental to good public morale or injurious to vital installations. (#) The maintenance of the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands, under martial law, is the responsibility of the Military Governor, but the Navy has a fundamental concern in its maintenance:

"The Navy has a vital and paramount interest in maintaining the internal security of these Islands. This interest arises from the fact that, from a military point of view, the sole function of the Islands is to afford the United States an advanced Naval base." (#)

It must be emphasized, however, that the problems of internal security (that is, population control) and espionage (enemy information-gathering activity) are essentially dissimilar, and must be approached from entirely different angles.

157. The District Intelligence Officer has in the past investigated both espionage and internal security cases in the civilian population. Still a third class of cases which now occupies the greatest portion of the investigative efforts of this office is made up of the so-called "Naval security" cases, which concern the loyalty of Naval personnel and employees and other persons having access to Naval ships, stations, and other areas under Naval jurisdiction.

158. The functions of maintaining internal security or Naval security, preventing sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, and counter-espionage are not unrelated. It often develops that an espionage investigation will uncover persons whose activities or sympathies are inimical to the United States and its internal security, but do not necessarily involve espionage activities. In the respective cases, prompt dissemination of information is required, so that the officials properly charged with responsibility in the premises may pursue their own courses of action. This avoids having counter-espionage agents doing internal security and police work, and of having internal security and police officials working in the counter-espionage field.

#### (B) Various approaches to the espionage problem

##### (1) Introductory

159. Historically, espionage is a military operation, not a crime. The laws of war have always classed espionage as a permitted military practice, at the same time recognizing the right of nations spied upon to punish individual spies for their gathering or communicating of information to an enemy. (#) However, since the adoption of the Espionage Act of 1917 in the United States, where espionage was for the first time in this country defined as a civil (as distinguished from military) crime, there has been a tendency to class espionage as just another, albeit "glamorous," Federal criminal offense.

160. Because of the popular fallacy that espionage is just a crime, there has seemingly developed another popular (and costly) belief that the way to catch spies is to apply proven crime solution methods in counter-espionage work. This has not been wholly beneficial. While the skilled investigator's services are needed in counter-espionage work, his detective viewpoint (that is, crime solution rather than crime prevention) is a seriously diverting influence. By training, his mission has been to solve a crime that has already been committed. For example, the detective's work is half done when he starts, because at least he knows that a crime has been committed, and he need only find the person or persons responsible. Therefore, as a detective, he thinks in terms of starting an investigation only when evidence of a crime is shown him (that is, when he learns of the *corpus delicti*), usually by means of what he calls a "complaint."

161. But, there is seldom a visible *corpus delicti* of espionage. [43] In their very nature, espionage operations are conceived to be imperceptible if possible, and they rarely leave any evidence of their commission: A photograph taken of a warship leaves no tangible trace on the subject photographed; the irresponsible person who divulges confidential information is not warned when his utterances reach enemy ears; a secret code book is not marred by photostatting. The professional detective, however, attempts to adapt himself to this new field by considering the *suspect himself* as the *corpus delicti*. Thus, he opens a case on the basis of a specific or vague complaint, concerning a known or unknown person who "has been acting suspiciously," "spends too much money," "keeps his ear cocked when there is talk about ships at Pearl Harbor," "owns several cameras and does his own developing," and the like. He cannot appreciate the lesson of experience, that spies, unlike criminals, do not commit espionage the sense that ordinary crimes are committed, nor do they generally "act suspiciously" in the presence of the good citizens who generally are the informants in these cases.

162. In the rare instance where an espionage agent gets his desired information by overt criminal action (for example, by stealing classified matter) there is generally a discernible *corpus delicti*. From that point on, sound police investigation methods can be employed with a normal expectation of success in determining who committed the theft. However, counter-espionage is one incidentally interested in "catching the criminal"—it uses the immediate criminal as a guide to other members of the espionage system, with the thought in mind of eventually uncovering the whole network. Then, and only then, should any thought of prosecution (and its necessary, but undesirable, concomitant publicity) be considered. Here, again, the police detective adopted into the

counter-espionage fold is at a disadvantage, for he has been used to looking for newspaper recognition for his successful solving of cases. The disclosure of these /foreign espionage/ services is the main purpose of counter-espionage work and the most difficult problem which confronts the intelligence agent. Law enforcement or police procedures are entirely inapplicable for this work. Experienced counter-espionage agents have long since learned the futility of attacking espionage services by routine methods of investigation which may have proved successful in ordinary crime detection. . . ." (#)

## (2) The "Suspect" Approach

The "suspect" approach in counter-espionage is that which concerns with the investigation of one or more persons suspected of being espionage agents. For purposes of exposition, these suspects may be divided into classes:

- "Logical" suspects
- "Complaint" or "reported" suspects
- "Developed" suspects

The logical suspects are those persons who, because of the very nature of their occupations, are known or assumed to be engaged in espionage of one kind or another. In this class are diplomatic and consular officials, military and naval attaches, and visiting foreign government officials. Investigation of such persons may be made to determine whether in fact they are engaged in espionage, and, if they are, what other persons in contact with them are likewise engaged.

The reported suspects are those who are investigated on the basis of a specific complaint or report alleging that they are suspicious or subversive. (Paragraph 161) Approaching the espionage problem chiefly through the investigation of reported suspects is costly in effort and largely unproductive. It presents the police detective approach to a non-police problem.

Trying to identify the enemy's espionage organization by this approach generally is successful only if the original report is accurate and has been properly evaluated. Unfortunately, the intelligence offices are deluged with complaints, of which proper evaluation can generally only be made after a long investigation. In practically all such cases, the complaints are found to be groundless. In many cases, the allegations made can be neither proved, disproved, nor explained. The fact that a person is engaged in espionage can only be established in most cases only after intensive and discreet surveillance. Usually, surveillance cannot be used in the investigation of every complaint. The "complaint approach" psychology is fatal to effective counter-espionage, because it causes the investigator to depend mainly upon the incidental bits of information supplied by voluntary informants who are mainly untrained. Trained informants, paid or voluntary, are relatively few. Enemy agents are not likely to create suspicions in the minds of untrained [45] informants, and rarely will they leave themselves open to detection by even the best trained informant.

Because complaints are not likely to be received concerning the vital matters which the counter-espionage services should know, those services will continue to remain ignorant of espionage activity as long as they depend upon waiting for complaints before instituting counter-espionage measures of which investigations are but a part. And, as long as counter-espionage agencies continue to function principally on the "complaint basis," they are easy prey for the enemy espionage agents, who will provide diversions in the form of false reports, ("complaints") to the intelligence services, causing the counter-espionage services to waste a great deal of valuable time. Every investigative man-hour expended on a false "lead" is an additional hour of security for the espionage organization. (#)

What we have chosen to call the "developed" suspects are those persons who have been for all practical purposes established as enemy agents, either through investigation, or by chance. The development of a suspect to the point where he becomes a known enemy agent then presents a situation where further counter-espionage measures may be taken along either the suspect or the functional lines, or both.

## The "Functional" Approach

The functional approach in counter-espionage work is that imaginative approach which, utilizing a full knowledge of all known facts concerning the

*modus operandi* of enemy agents and reasonably estimating the objectives of the enemy's espionage, seeks to detect, counter, and neutralize enemy espionage functions. This approach is essentially a screening operation, the purpose of which is to throw both an observational surveillance and a protective cord around places and things it is believed the enemy agents will try to learn about. It is the same in principle as the putting of cheese in traps to attract and catch rats, thereby saving the tremendous effort of seeking out the rodents individually without having a clear idea of where to find them.

171. The difference between the functional approach and the suspect approach can be illustrated in a simple situation: Assume that on the island of Oahu there is a hill that affords the best possible location for visual signalling from shore to ship. Using the functional approach, a surveillance should be placed around the hill to ascertain what persons, if any, visit the locale either to engage in signalling or for no apparent [46] valid reason. When a like suspect is noted in this manner, further investigation along appropriate lines can be made. On the other hand, using the suspect approach in the same situation, the counter-espionage agents would sit in their offices, not thinking of the hill more than anything else, and await reports from informants concerning unusual occurrences or suspicious persons, some of which reports might possibly involve the hill.

172. Constant patrol or observation—the active seeking of information, distinguished from the passive receiving of it—is another manifestation of the functional approach. Thus, the continuous monitoring work of the Federal Communications Commission radio intelligence units in Hawaii is essentially a functional approach to the problem of detecting enemy transmissions. If the FCC monitors were to take action only upon the receipt of specific reports or complaints of suspicious radio activity—the suspect approach—the situation would be patently absurd.

173. It has been asserted that in discharging its communication function, the espionage organization is most vulnerable. Communications, above everything else, should be attacked vigorously and functionally. It is foolhardy to sit back complacently and await reports from informants who believe they have noticed a suspicious transmission, whether by radio, visual signal, or otherwise. Rather, all avenues of possible communication should be under constant observation. Then, if the enemy agent indulges in communication, he must cross the field of observation, thereby risking detection; and, if he does not attempt communication, the ultimate purpose of counter-espionage has been fulfilled, for no information has been transmitted to the enemy.

#### (C) Responsible Agencies

174. The United States Government agencies which before, or during, the present war were, or are, charged in some way with denying information to the enemy in the Hawaiian Islands are:

- (1) (Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. (MID))
- (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu Field Division. (FBI)
- (3) District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District. (DIO)
- [47] (4) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Radio Security Center (Hawaiian Monitoring Area). (FCC)
- (5) National Censorship:
  - (a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii.
  - (b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu.
- (6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu.

The functions of each of these agencies is discussed briefly below:

#### (1) Military Intelligence Division

175. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department, is in charge both combat intelligence and domestic intelligence staff functions. Active direction of domestic intelligence activities is delegated to an officer designated as the Contact Officer, whose office is in downtown Honolulu, proximate to all other agencies above named.

176. Until the declaration of martial law in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the MID had no investigative responsibility in counter-espionage matters except cases wherein the subjects were persons in the Army, employed by the Army, having access to Army reservations. (#) However, upon the outbreak of war, the Army Department Commander assumed the Military Governorship of Hawaii.

MID took over active direction of intelligence work affecting the general population.

7. On February 9, 1942, at Washington, the heads of MID, FBI, and ONI signed a new delimitation agreement, wherein it was provided that in areas under martial law the military commander should be responsible for domestic intelligence coverage. As to Hawaii, the new agreement has been interpreted to mean the Department Commander (Military Governor) is the military commander. The Contact Officer, MID, derives his authority from the Military Governor and is solely responsible for such intelligence coverage.

8. The Contact Officer is in close and frequent consultation with the Special Agent in Charge, FBI, and the District Intelligence Officer. He has a subordinate designated as liaison with FCC for radio intelligence work. In lesser degrees, the Contact Officer is in touch with the work [48] of the District Postal Director and the Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu.

9. Except in cases of espionage "directed solely against" the Navy and for subversive activities occurring within areas under Naval jurisdiction, or involving Naval personnel or employees or Naval contractors' personnel, the Contact Officer is responsible for counter-espionage planning and coverage in the Hawaiian Islands.

#### *Federal Bureau of Investigation*

1. The Special Agent in Charge heads the Honolulu Field Division, FBI. This field division embraces the Hawaiian Islands and not Honolulu alone.

2. Prior to December 7, 1941, FBI had investigative responsibility in all cases of subversive activity (including espionage) involving the general civilian population.

3. In cases of Japanese subjects, FBI and DIO had concurrent authority and responsibility. FBI supervised the formulation of a list of persons considered dangerous and who should be taken into custody in the event of war. Persons on whom the Attorney General of the United States had authorized the issuance of custodial detention warrants were promptly apprehended on December 7 or as soon thereafter as possible by squads of FBI, MID, and DIO agents, local police. Other persons on whom the Attorney General had not issued such warrants were apprehended under the authority of the Military Governor.

4. Even though the pre-war delimitation agreement (among MID, FBI, and DIO) remained in force until February 9, 1942, on the outbreak of war FBI in effect deferred to MID in the matter of counter-espionage responsibility and jurisdiction because the superimposition of martial law on the Hawaiian Islands effected such a radical change of circumstances as to make the then existing delimitation agreement inapplicable to conditions of martial law.

5. Under the present delimitation agreements, FBI has no responsibility for counter-espionage coverage in the Hawaiian Islands, but does cooperate with MID and the DIO in intelligence matters. However, FBI does in fact conduct investigations of possible espionage suspects, seeking to determine whether or not persons have acted as foreign governmental agents without having been properly registered with the Secretary of State. Even though the investigation of such suspects might also be of counter-espionage concern, the delimitation agreements do not make reference thereto.

#### *(3) District Intelligence Office*

1. The District Intelligence Officer is in charge of this organization and is solely responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence. The District Intelligence Office is composed of an office in downtown Honolulu, three zone offices on outlying islands, and ten intelligence units operating within Naval stations on Oahu, Maui, and Midway.

2. Prior to December 7, 1941, the DIO had investigative authority in all counter-espionage matters where the subjects were Navy personnel and employees and Naval contractors' employees, and concurrently with FBI, counter-espionage responsibility in cases of Japanese subjects. Upon the outbreak of war, the DIO deferred to MID, when the Contact Officer took over active direction of intelligence matters concerning the general civilian population. The DIO continued its efforts on Naval security cases, assisting MID insofar as possible in local security matters.

3. Under the new delimitation agreement of February 9, 1942, the Military Governor was charged with intelligence coverage, including the coordination of activities of other agencies with MID. Cognizance over strictly Naval cases has been retained by the the DIO, who has also lent all available assistance to

**MID.** Under a local agreement signed by the Military Governor, District Commander, and the Special Agent in Charge, FBI, on March 27, 1942, there was reserved to the DIO authority over "All matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, directed solely against such naval units or installations or fleet units and all matters pertaining especially to Fleet and Naval Intelligence, both domestic and beyond the Hawaiian area," as well as cases involving personnel of ships operating at territorial and privately-owned piers. (#)

**(4) Federal Communications Commission**

187. The Radio Intelligence Division of FCC maintains a Radio Security Center (Hawaiian Monitoring Area) in downtown Honolulu. This FCC activity maintains close liaison with MID, as well as with Army and Navy communications offices. Other investigative agencies, including the DIO, refer information concerning suspicious radio activity to FCC.

188. The FCC is actually a counter-espionage organization, for its duties include:

[50] (a) Detection of violations of the Espionage Act, as far as it relates to the use of radio for subversive purposes.

(b) Investigation of complaints and/or other information received alleging illegal and subversive radio activity.

(c) Detection of violations of rules and regulations established by the Director of Censorship relating to the operation of radio stations.

(d) Aiding other agencies of the Federal Government and representatives of the Allied Governments having an interest in operation of radio stations and espionage agents throughout the world as well as other related radio intelligence matters. (#)

**(5) National Censorship**

189. Functioning under the Director of Censorship, in Washington, the National Censorship organization has two main divisions in Hawaii, the Postal Censor and the Cable & Radio Censor. The primary mission of wartime censorship is to deny information to the enemy. Because of this, censorship is primarily a counter-espionage function.

**(a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii**

190. Censorship of the mails leaving the Territory of Hawaii has existed since December 7, 1941. Such censorship is peripheral only, and does not extend to local or interisland postal carriage.

191. MID, FBI, and the DIO maintain close liaison with the Postal Censor who supplies those and other interested offices with comment sheets concerning postal intercepts deemed to have intelligence value.

192. Postal censorship is not operated under the authority of the Military Governor, nor is it affected by any of the delimitation agreements previously referred to.

**(b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu**

193. Censorship of overseas radio-telephone calls, radiograms, and cablegrams was invoked by the District Intelligence Officer on the morning of December 7, 1941. On March 1, 1942, he was relieved of this censorship function by the Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu, who is responsible directly to the Director of Censorship, Washington.

194. The Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu, has supervision over only those communications leaving the Hawaiian Islands through commercial facilities. Inter-island radio-telephone and wireless traffic is censored by a representative of the Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

**(6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu**

195. Inasmuch as certain of his work is concerned with the enforcement of statutes and executive orders whose purpose is to deny information to the enemy, the Collector of Customs must be included as a counter-espionage officer.

196. In this field, the Collector's principal wartime function is to enforce the Trading with the Enemy Act. He has the right to examine any cargo leaving the United States not under government control, and enforces the requirement that export declarations be filed concerning exports. He is responsible for seeing that persons other than accredited United Nations couriers, entering the United States through the Hawaiian Islands, do not carry on their persons or in their effects censorable matter not previously passed by competent authority.

(D) *Investigation procedure*

*Prior to December 7, 1941*

Prior to the outbreak of war, investigations within their respective spheres of authority were made by FBI, MID, and the DIO of Japanese, Italian, and Communist subjects. Whether the investigations were initiated "espionage" or "internal security" cases was of little import, for the manner in which either type of case was handled was generally the same. Cases were opened on the basis of a "complaint" or specific report, alleging that a person was "acting suspiciously," was "pro-Nazi" or "pro-Japanese," served in the Japanese Army, and the like. The investigative process usually would include some or all of the following steps:

Check files of FBI, MID, DIO, Honolulu Police Department, and credit agencies (in most cases).

Check files of Immigration & Naturalization [52] Service or other government agencies (in appropriate cases).

Interview or re-interview original informant.

Interview subject's employer, business associates, and neighbors.

Check bank accounts.

Consult confidential informants.

Surveillance (rarely).

The type of investigation indulged in was well suited for the purposes of internal security, that is, determining whether certain persons in wartime might be likely to be loyal to, or sympathize with the cause of, or give to, nations at war with the United States. It was not suitable for counter-espionage cases.

In a few instances was the espionage problem in Hawaii attacked from a functional standpoint. This was largely, not not entirely, the fault of the possible local agencies. There was a serious shortage of trained personnel available for counter-espionage work. Inadequately staffed, in numbers, was hard put to investigate all prospective custodial detainees. The devoted a majority of its investigative time to investigation of Naval personnel cases, including applicants for the Naval Intelligence Service, and employees of the Navy and Naval contractors. While there was full cooperation between FBI and the DIO, insofar as assisting one another upon request, there was not close coordination of their work in attacking the Japanese espionage system here.

In the several instances of functional approach to the Japanese espionage problem, FBI and the DIO generally worked jointly. Together, they maintained a partial surveillance of the activities of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line), utilizing informants on the spot. FBI's investigation of the activities of the Italian Consul, in Honolulu, the DIO assisted, was similarly conducted, with fruitful results. When the Japanese "evacuation liner," the Taiyo Maru, was in Honolulu, November 1-5, 1941, FBI, the DIO, and Customs closely coordinated their efforts in effecting scrutiny of passengers returning to Hawaii from Japan, in interviewing persons leaving for Japan on the liner, and in maintaining a surveillance of the ship and activities on the nearby docks while the Taiyo Maru was in port. In furtherance of [53] the purpose of this investigation, representations were made to the Postmaster General, in Washington, with the result that he ordered that no mail other than second class newspapers, magazines, etc.) be put aboard the Taiyo Maru for cargo to Japan. (#)

*December 7, 1941, to March 27, 1942*

Almost immediately upon the outbreak of war, the Contact Officer, assumed general direction of intelligence work concerning the general Japanese population, with FBI and DIO assisting. In this period, intelligence agencies devoted almost all their time to the handling of internal security cases, pending persons who had been designated for custodial detention, conducting searches and interrogations, and investigating hundreds of specific complaints and rumors concerning alleged subversive activity.

A joint investigation of the past espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate General was instituted by MID, FBI, and the DIO (and still continuing) in the hope of gaining some indication of what Japan's wartime espionage organization in Hawaii might be like and what personnel it might employ. (#) Information gained in this investigation aided the FBI in its

investigation of Otto KUEHN, and established the latter's connection with Consulate. The product of this joint investigation, added to the facts ascertained by the pre-war partial surveillance of the Consulate, illustrates the value of the functional approach to the espionage problem.

(3) *Since March 27, 1942*

202. After the signing of the local delimitation agreement on March 27, 1942, FBI ceased to investigate internal security and espionage cases as such, but continued to make available to MID and the DIO all information in its files thereafter acquired. The DIO also ceased opening its own internal security cases in the general civilian field and opened about 2,000 security cases on persons of Japanese ancestry employed on Naval projects. DIO Zone Offices have continued to conduct internal security investigations when requested to do so by Army S-2 officers in their respective zones, to the extent of available information and personnel.

203. On the islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai, preliminary hearing boards, usually of three men (one each from MID, FBI, and DIO), hear nearly all cases where custodial detention of a person is considered. The function of the boards is to supplement investigations by interrogation, and [54] to advise the appropriate Army authority whether a warrant of detention should be issued. From time to time, in Honolulu, special investigating groups of MID, FBI, and DIO personnel are convened to interrogate persons likely to have important information concerning local Japanese subversive activity.

204. On three occasions, special investigating parties, composed of MID, FBI, and DIO representatives, generally totalling about 20 men, have flown to outer islands to aid resident intelligence personnel in conducting internal security investigations in large volume.

205. Cooperation of the three intelligence agencies in internal security work has been excellent. However, there has been virtually no effective work done in the field of counter-espionage. A small number of the cases investigated during this period (and since the war began) are entitled "espionage," but in few there have been anything other than an "internal security" approach to the problem. In nearly every instance, the emphasis has been on the personalities and their utterances, criminal and credit records, and probable nationalistic sympathies. There have been few cases approached in light of the functional bases of counter-espionage.

(E) *GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS*

(1) *Intelligence personnel*

206. Much of the failure to cope with the espionage problem in Hawaii is in the fact that sufficient trained personnel have not been assigned to this area. MID and DIO offices have grown greatly since December 7, 1941, without many additions of much needed trained counter-espionage agents. The number of trained FBI agents in Hawaii has been reduced during the war.

(2) *Coordination*

207. While there exists close coordination in the field of internal security work because the Army has complete responsibility therefor and either conducts its own investigations or requests DIO Zone Offices to conduct such investigations, the same cannot be said of counter-espionage efforts. This is perhaps attributable to problems presented by the local delimitation agreement of March 27, 1942.

(3) *Shoreline coverage*

208. It is believed that no agency has been paying adequate [55] attention to the coasts of the Hawaiian Islands, insofar as domestic intelligence coverage is concerned, nor is there known to be any plan for such coverage.

209. Insofar as this office has been advised, investigations of suspicious activities near or close off shore have been conducted by trained intelligence personnel in but a few cases. In some instances of reported suspicious activity, which activity might indicate that persons on shore were making contact with the enemy, the immediate investigation has been made by Army field personnel (sometimes working under the S-2 officer), but with no follow-up, detailed investigation by trained investigative personnel. (#)

210. The former Coastal Information Section (B-8) of the DIO functioned under the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and has been separated from the DIO since before the outbreak of war. What coastal intelligence work it



has been confined to the operational or combat implications of happenings  
ore.

#### *Travel control*

Civilians entering and leaving the Territory of Hawaii have not been  
t to careful scrutiny, interrogation, or search, nor required to identify  
elves. Until only recently, almost any person not under surveillance could  
the Territory without the knowledge of the intelligence or law enforce-  
agencies.

Several months ago, the DIO established the Naval Travel Control Office  
the Commerce and Travel Section (B-5). The Naval Travel Control Office  
ses all persons leaving the Territory by Pan American Airways clippers,  
ing military and naval personnel of the United Nations travelling under  
orders, diplomats in diplomatic status, and United Nations civilian officials  
ng on official business. The function of the processing office is to make sure  
identity of every commercial air traveller, and to apprise interested official  
es of what individuals are leaving the Territory. It is estimated that  
of the persons whose passage has been validated by the Naval Travel Con-  
fice were of more than nominal interest to the intelligence agencies.

It is anticipated that in the near future, the Military Governor of  
i will promulgate a general order establishing a similar travel control  
whose function it will be to process all travellers leaving the Territory  
(save those exempt because of official status), whether passage is taken  
or surface.

In the past, several violations of censorship have been detected in situa-  
where persons leaving the Territory have carried uncensored censorable  
(principally letters) on their persons or in their effects upon going aboard  
sailing from here. In the discovered cases, however, no indication of  
age activity has appeared, the violations involving personal motives  
(#)

That enemy couriers could with ease enter and leave these Islands, carry-  
al information on their persons or in their effects (or, better still, in their  
, is apparent. It is anticipated, however, that when surface as well as  
vellers are processed before leaving, the risks to couriers will be increased.

#### *Lack of coordination among domestic intelligence, combat intelligence, and operations activities*

Before and during this war the flow of information has been almost  
y from the domestic intelligence agencies to combat intelligence and  
ions activities, with little flowing from the latter to domestic intelligence.  
It is true that combat intelligence and operations offices have the primary  
t in operational data and are vitally interested in the security thereof,  
ot true that they have an exclusive interest in all such information. For  
le, the domestic intelligence agencies are, or should be, greatly concerned  
ll information indicating the presence of enemy units (particularly sub-  
s) close off the Hawaiian Islands.

As previously stated, the presence of an enemy submarine close to  
in an area and at a time inappropriate for combat action or reconnais-  
should be assumed to present a situation wherein the enemy is attempting  
ct contact with agents on shore. The responsibility for destroying or  
ng the enemy craft off shore lies with combat activities; the responsibility  
ecting who are the enemy agents on shore lies with domestic intelligence.  
omestic intelligence will not know that there is a specific instance of  
e enemy contact or signalling which it should investigate, unless the pres-  
ent enemy (or unidentified) units off shore is reported to it.

When there are operational movements in the Hawaiian [57] area  
n importance that enemy observers would be likely to report the same to  
emy—such as the facts concerning arrivals and departures of Naval task  
—the counter-espionage agencies should be made cognizant of such move-

Knowing *what* the enemy agents are likely to be interested in provides  
as to *when* enemy communications may be made. The security of oper-  
would not be endangered by providing counter-espionage agencies with  
pe of information, for it would be desired only in cases where an enemy  
on shore could by simple observation learn it himself. It is reasonable  
uch information should be given to the counter-espionage agencies, other-  
ey will have to go to the absurd extreme of stationing their own observers  
in the same manner that enemy agents do the information concerning  
vements.

[58]

## VII. CONCLUSION

219. The criticism implicit in the foregoing analysis is inescapable. It tended to be wholly constructive. The effect of the criticism is not directed against any one intelligence agency any more than any of the others. There has been excellent cooperation among the agencies, coordination of plans and measures to deal with espionage in Hawaii has not been what it could have been.

220. Whereas this analysis is the result of studies made by one of the intelligence agencies, the District Intelligence Office (Counter Intelligence Section) and is believed to be based upon all available pertinent facts, it is felt that if any, progress can be made until the three principal agencies jointly approach the problem discussed herein. It would be highly desirable to have a group of officers and agents—possibly only one or two from each agency, should be the best suited for the task involved—appointed to study the question of espionage in Hawaii. Such a joint study should enable the representatives to make intelligent and comprehensive recommendations for the improvement of counter-espionage technique and procedure in this area.

221. Unless vigorous, astute and coordinated counter-espionage measures are placed in operation in Hawaii, the primary task of Counter-Intelligence—discovery of information to the enemy—will never be performed.

[A-1]

## APPENDIX "A": SOURCE MATERIAL

This appendix has been prepared chiefly for the benefit of readers in the Department of Naval Intelligence, who may wish to pursue further certain topics mentioned in the foregoing analysis. No attempt has been made to supply disseminate this analysis with copies of all reports and other materials referred to below.

Immediately below are listed, as references, a number of investigation reports and other official correspondence which are cited in support of certain portions of the analysis. Following the list of references are explanations or citations of authority, arranged in the numerical order of paragraphs of the analysis.

## REFERENCES

- (a) DNI Conf. Ltr. A8-2/EN3-10, Serial 02525216, dated November 11, 1942, subject: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Activities.
- (b) ONI Counter-Intelligence Section (Op-16-B-7) Operating Plan, dated November 1942.
- (c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, subject: JAPAN CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.
- (d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
- (e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.
- (f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 7, 1942, same subject.
- (g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, same subject.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 6, 1941, subject: JAPAN EVACUATION SHIPS.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 15, 1941, same subject.
- (j) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 25, 1941, same subject.
- (k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 1, 1942, subject: E. Shigeru MATSUSAKA.
- [A-2] (1) 14ND Summary Report, dated April 30, 1942, same subject.
- (m) 13ND Investigation Report, dated May 1, 1941, subject: Lt. Colonel Sadatomo OKADA, IJN.
- (n) 12ND Investigation Report, dated July 17, 1941, same subject.
- (o) 14ND Investigation Report, dated August 6, 1942, subject: Oliver A. KIRKEBY.
- (p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 30, 1942, subject: Glichiro UYEDA.
- (q) DNI Conf. Memo., dated October 1, 1942, subject: GERMAN SABOTAGE AGENTS.
- (r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject: Rikio Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.
- (s) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject: Yoshio MIKAMI, alias John MIKAMI.
- (t) DNI Secret Memo., Serial 02304616, dated November 3, 1942, subject: JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject: Rev. Unji HIRA-  
 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 2, 1942, subject: Otto Carl Ferdi-  
 AENTSCH.  
 12ND Investigation Report, dated May 30, 1942, same subject.  
 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 11, 1942, same subject.  
 12ND Information Card, dated June 19, 1942, same subject.  
 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 24, 1942, subject: Louie  
 ON.  
 5ND Investigation Report, dated May 19, 1942, subject: Espionage, Vis-  
 more Signals and Enemy Radio Activity.  
 DNI Conf. Memo., Serial 01398716, to DIO-8ND (copies to DIOs-10-11-  
 14-15 NDs), dated June 3, 1942, subject: Flashing Lights and Suspected  
 s Along the Coast—Investigation of.  
 (cc) 11ND Investigation Report, dated October 8, 1941, subject: Itaru  
 IBANA.  
 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject: Visits of  
 ese Public Vessels to the Island of Oahu.

## DOCUMENTATION BY PARAGRAPHS

word.—All quotations are from reference (b), Pars. 1215-1216 and 1003.  
 19.—Reference (e); Reference (g); Reference (r); Reference (s), pp. 2-5.  
 erence (dd). The panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor and ships therein  
 taken by E. J. PARISH, Honolulu photographer, about 1937. An almost  
 cal photograph, taken by PARISH in 1938, is contained in the files of this  
 In 1937 or 1938, before offering such photographs for sale to the public,  
 SH called at the District Intelligence Office to obtain official permission  
 e. At that time, PARISH was told that while the Navy objected to the sale  
 h pictures, there was no law prohibiting such publication.  
 24-25.—Reference (o) presents a case in point, illustrating how a Navy  
 d man was first "pumped" for Naval information, then developed as a  
 of "inside" information, for which he was paid in "loans". KIRKEBY's  
 es were committed in 1936-1937, and he was met by Japanese espionage  
 both in San Francisco and in Los Angeles.  
 32.—For examples of the type of information reported by the Consulate  
 an in 1941 by cable and wireless, see reference (d).  
 Par. 42 a/.—The Consulate signalling system referred to is set forth  
 erence (c), Par. 4.  
 s. 45-46.—A preliminary report of the UYENO case, containing only the  
 s of the shooting but nothing concerning UYENO's possible motives, was  
 ed from the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.), Honolulu, shortly after the  
 nt. The investigating agent recommended further investigation, but a  
 of the files of the Army Contact Office on February 15, 1943, revealed no  
 r reports, and at that time a representative of the District Intelligence  
 was informed that the case was closed. UYENO is subject of reference  
 47.—Informant who furnished the information in the two indented para-  
 s is given reliability "A" by this office. His report was not rendered until  
 months after the events reported. A copy of informant's report was for-  
 d to the Army Contact Office, which returned to the District Intelligence  
 the following comment from another Army activity (not naming it):  
 \* \* \* As to a man swimming ashore and the finding of prints in the sand,  
 ere is no record on this \* \* \*  
 "It is very improbable that the events described in this report could have  
 appened without being recorded at this Headquarters."  
 51.—Reference (q) reports the landing and capture of eight Nazi sabo-  
 n the United States, 1942.  
 52.—Investigation by the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.) of former Japa-  
 sampan fishermen in Hawaii has revealed that many of the fishermen  
 d the United States illegally and are extremely pro-Japanese, but has pro-  
 as yet no specific evidence of espionage activity by such fishermen.  
 60.—See article on frequency modulation: "This New FM", *Naval Insti-  
 roceedings*, February, 1942.  
 63.—The suspicious radio message was intercepted as follows:  
 RAUMIG HINDERUST SINDEN ZURCH REMSCHIED REMSCHIE  
 ZAE MERE MSCHIE ID ----- DECK SEDWIG CGER DECK ORENE

**EL ZELME MELZEN HAFNO ANN EDLMANN ISAR ISAR SETZE UM MEUWEG SIEDEN IN GELS**

Source of above information was Combat Intelligence, 14ND, who reported "This transmitted Sunday A. M. /December 7, 1941/. Apparently local station to local station. Received from Army." A very free translation of understandable parts of the message was also submitted by Combat Intelligence:

Extensive areas have been completely razed . . . . Oriental . . . . Edlmann /proper name/ . . . . Set oil and machinery fires one after another in which many were killed.

*Par. 64.*—FCC writer referred to is Mr. Lee R. Dawson, supervisor, Hawaiian Monitoring Area. Quotations are from Mr. Dawson's letter of January 10, 1942, to Chief of National Defense Operations Section, FCC, subject: Additional Secondary Monitoring Units Needed in the Hawaiian Area. (Copies of this letter were indicated for Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and Commander, General, Hawaiian Department.)

Quotation of the Director of the FBI, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, is from his letter of January 16, 1942, to Hon. James Lawrence Fly, chairman of FCC. (Copies of this letter were sent to G-2, War Department, and ONI, Navy Department.)

*Par. 78.*—The Japanese are known to be using couriers among officers and seamen of merchant vessels plying between United States and South American ports: reference (t).

*Par. 81.*—Reference is to Tamotsu MATSUMURA, interned alien Japanese who was at one time a paid informant of this office. Before coming to Hawaii prior to the first World War, MATSUMURA was in the Japanese over-seas colonization service, being a civil secretary to the governor-general of Formosa. He admits having transmitted information of strategic value, concerning Hawaii, to Japan prior to 1914. In recent years, especially 1937-1940, he was a leading propagandist for Japan in Hawaii.

[A-6] *Par. 83.*—This appears from the admissions of Richard Masaharu KOTOSHIRODO, formerly a clerk at the local Consulate, who visited the islands of Maui, Kauai, and Hawaii in 1941 on espionage missions for the Consulate: reference (g).

*Par. 84.*—See enclosure (A) of reference (d).

*Par. 86.*—From KOTOSHIRODO's admissions: reference (g).

*Par. 88.*—Buddhist priest referred to is subject of reference (u).

*Par. 90.*—Propagandists referred to are Frank VON HEILAND and Rev. Junichiro TAJIMA. Paid informants of the Consulate, among them several Koreans, are discussed in reference (g).

*Par. 91.*—Japanese agent who was in Hawaii in 1932 was Rinzo SHIMOMURA mentioned in references (k) and (l), and Japanese bookstore owner was Eiichi Shigeru MATSUSAKA, subject of those reports.

*Par. 92.*—OKADA is the subject of references (m) and (n).

*Par. 93.*—The Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.

*Par. 94.*—For a detailed description of the information gathered by MATSUSAKA and transmitted to Japan, see enclosures to reference (k).

The alien on Aiea Heights is Shigeichi TAKAFUJI. A report of the activities of personnel of Japanese Naval vessels while visiting Hawaii before the war is contained in reference (dd).

*Par. 95.*—Report concerning information gathered by TACHIBANA is contained in reference (cc).

*Par. 98.*—When KOTOSHIRODO and Consulate Secretary Tadashi MATSUMURA made observation trips to the outside islands of the Hawaiian group in 1941, they carried with them only the innocuous-looking Hawaii Tourist Bureau cartographic maps. According to Consulate clerks interviewed, the maps and charts used by the Vice Consul in his office were standard U. S. Hydrographic Office and Coast & Geodetic Survey publications.

[A-7] *Par. 99.*—The photographing incident was referred immediately to the Honolulu, but no report of FBI's investigation of this case was written. The driver of the car which carried the seven Japanese has not been interned, but is serving a prison term for violation of a general order of the Military Governor regulating the amount of currency an individual may carry on his person.

*Paras. 101-102.*—KOTOSHIRODO related the information reported in the following paragraphs: see reference (g).

*Par. 105.*—See references (c) and (d).

*Par. 106.*—Army Contact Office, Honolulu, for some time past has been investigating all local Japanese known to have operated radio transmitters in Hawaii.

prior to the war. To date, the DIO has not been informed of any operator who has been found to have used his transmitter for subversive purposes.

*Par. 123.*—Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.

*Par. 129.*—Japanese aliens still live on Ala Hights and on Pearl City Peninsula (which juts into Pearl Harbor to a point only several hundred yards across open water from a carrier berth).

*Par. 149.*—While considerable amounts of "Hawaiian currency" have turned up in Mainland banks, it is believed that such currency could not be purchased from those banks because of prevailing legal restrictions.

*Par. 152.*—First sentence: source secret, but known to ONI. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (Overseas Department) is currently using regular short-wave broadcasts from China for the transmission of instructions in code to Kuomintang representatives in the United States. (See Postal Censorship Records No. SF-8391.)

*Par. 154.*—First quoted clause is from reference (b), *Par. 1005*; second is from ONI-T-8-10, Sec. 21203 (2).

*Par. 156.*—The distinction between the maintenance of internal security and the countering of enemy espionage seems to have been kept clearly in mind in a recent War Department publication: War Department Counter Fifth Column Plan (1942 Revision), promulgated November 2, 1942. Therein, the task of countering the Potential Fifth Column is essentially the task referred to in the foregoing Analysis as the maintenance of internal security in Hawaii. While the Counter Fifth Column plan seems not deemed to be applicable to Hawaii (for the Hawaiian Department commander is not on the distribution list), it is significant that the Plan and its study and improvement are the responsibility of the Provost Marshall General, and not of the Military Intelligence Service. This is a clear recognition of the fact that Counter Fifth Column planning is a police, rather than a counter-espionage function.

Quotation is from "A War-Time Problem, THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII, An Analysis", page 1, by Lt. Comdr. C. H. Coggins, MC, USN, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District (April, 1942).

*Par. 159.*—"War cannot be waged without all kinds of information about the forces and the intentions of the enemy, and about the character of the country within the zone of military operations. To obtain the necessary information, it has always been considered lawful to employ spies, and also to make use of the treason of enemy soldiers or private enemy subjects, whether they were bribed, or offered the information voluntarily and gratuitously. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations enacted the old customary rule that the employment of methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country is considered allowable. The fact, however, that these methods are lawful on the part of the belligerent who employs them does not protect from punishment such individuals as are engaged in procuring information. Although a belligerent acts lawfully in employing spies and traitors, the other belligerent, who punishes them, likewise acts lawfully . . ." Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (5th ed., 1935), Vol. II, Sec. 159, p. 337.

*Par. 162.*—Quotation is from ONI-T-8-10, Sec. 23201.

*Par. 168.*—While there is no positive evidence of the fact, it appears that several false reports concerning alleged Japanese espionage in Hawaii were given to the U. S. Naval Attache, at Mexico City, in early 1941. Each report contained some important known facts, around which apparently were spun many false statements. While ONI gave the reports very low reliability rating, the reports were of such a serious nature as to require investigation.

*Par. 176.*—Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, entered into by FBI, MID, and ONI, governed the respective spheres of responsibility of the three agencies in Hawaii until the outbreak of war.

*Par. 186.*—Copy of local agreement of March 27, 1942, was sent to ONI as enclosure to DIO-14ND (IHM/w) Conf. Ltd. (Personal) to Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN, dated June 20, 1942.

*Par. 188.*—Statement of FCC duties taken *verbatim* from memorandum of E. K. Jett, Chief Engineer, FCC; to all offices of the FCC Radio Intelligence Division, dated June 3, 1942, subject: Jurisdiction of the Radio Intelligence Division.

*Par. 199.*—Reports on Japanese "evacuation liners": see references (h), (i), and (j).

*Par. 201.*—Reports of the joint investigation of the Japanese Consulate: see references (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g).

*Par. 209.*—Reference (aa) sets forth the manner in which coordinated shore coverage by plane, surface craft, in automobiles, and on foot was effected along the North Carolina coast. This procedure could well serve the same purpose for the Hawaiian Islands. Reference (bb) indicates the interest and approval of ONI in that procedure.

*Par. 214.*—In one case, a merchant marine captain cabled his wife, "Happy birthday", to indicate the fact that his vessel was about to sail from Honolulu. References (v), (w), (x), and (y). In another case, the second officer of a German vessel used a simple code in ordinary correspondence to reveal movements of his ship prior to sailing: reference (z).

(Pages 197D and 198D of Exhibit 5, being an outline map of the Island of Oahu—Appendix "B"—and a chart captioned "Pattern of Espionage, Hawaiian Islands"—Appendix "C"—will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 10 and 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,  
SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,  
Honolulu, Hawaii, 3 December 1941

*Confidential*

MEMO FOR THE FILES

Reference: Wilkinson Report, 6 October 1941.

During the past 3 years in North China I had considerable official and semi-official contact with various German firms and their representatives in North China. With reference to the Wilkinson Report of the 6th October 1941, the following information is submitted for what it may be worth.

1. The German merchants in occupied China are given very little preference over other foreign (i. e. American, British, etc.) merchants and their business is being interfered with to practically the same extent by the Japanese military except in such cases as the military directly benefits. The German merchants fully realize they are only being *used* to the advantage of the Japanese and the preference they receive is only on sufferance.

2. The average German definitely detests the Japanese military clique and Japanese businessmen in China and much prefer to do business with the Chinese. They consider their future is with China rather than Japan.

3. In March 1941, one (Willhelm?) Dunsing (official Nazi representative in Northern Shantung) the Chefoo manager for Niggeman & Co., had just been freed by the local Japanese Gendarmerie to sell something like 90,000 bags of (U. S. goods) at a considerable loss; remarked to me, "never mind we (men from Germany) are only playing with them for the time being, we will get even, etc. They will be chased from country (China) and put where they belong. It is all planned". Dunsing then pointed to a map of the world on office wall saying, "here is our first step", drew an arc starting from Germany with the arc passing through the center of the Caspian Sea, and ending in the vicinity of Karachi. Dunsing was extremely angry at this time and while talking intermittently cursing the Japanese in general.

4. I had known DUNSING for about four years and am sure that he was sincerely expressing himself. This same sentiment has been expressed to me by other German merchants in China, and particularly by Helmut Lanz, owner and manager of the Shantung Traders Inc. of Chefoo; Rollo Miss of A. H. Anzures, Chefoo (German Consular Agents); Waldemar Balthaser of Krauch & Co., Shanghai, China, representatives of Deutsche Stickstoffhandels-gesellschaft.

T. W. Jones  
Lt. (Jg) T. W. Jones

Copy sent to M. I. D. on 12-5-41. S.

Attention Ens. Stevenson

NOTES—COMMENTS

Nov. 5th, 1941

I suggest that the number of German advisors and technicians appearing in these reports is somewhat exaggerated. I have met several of them in (

the past year and up to May of present year—and was given the impression Germany is reluctant to send as many as Japan asks for—also they are directors or mechanics supervising installation of German designed arms machinery, etc., and move about from yard to yard.

T. W. JOYCE.

(written in margin:) this info. too old to be of use—if Jap C. G. has fact will be reptd by U. S. Consuls—or friendly Consuls.

### COPY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,  
Washington, October 14, 1941.

A8-4/EF13 Serial No. 0965916

Director of Naval Intelligence

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Secret Agent in Manila—Information received from)

Re: (a) DIO-14 letter IHM/ba, dated August 22, 1941.

OPNAV dispatch 072049, October, 1941.

OPNAV dispatch 061720, August, 1941.

Paragraph 1 of reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer stated that a secret agent in the Far East suggested that an arrangement be effected for correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent could be carried in locked compartments of the Pan-American Airways clipper between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation, the British agent in the District would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information of particular interest to the United States Navy and Navy as gathered by him or his agents in the Far East.

Reference (b), the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, were authorized to arrange for the transmission of correspondence between accredited British intelligence officers in the District and in the Fourteenth Naval District by locked compartments or locked compartments of the Pan-American Airways service between Honolulu and Manila whenever and other considerations within the discretion of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, render the service practicable.

It is to be understood that this service is not to be considered in exchange for information gathered by the British Intelligence in the Far East and sent to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District via clipper for transmission to the District Intelligence Officer. Such transmission is decidedly cumbersome, slow and impracticable. Any such information should be transmitted by the British representatives to representatives of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, for his review and further transmission at his discretion. The proper British representatives in Washington have been informed of the foregoing and requested to make arrangements accordingly.

As a matter of interest to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, he is advised that the information contained in enclosure (A) with reference (a) was of importance or of particular interest to the Division of Naval Intelligence, but it was too detailed in its nature, too local in its application and too unsuitable for reception.

It is to be noted that reference (b) cancels reference (c).

(Signed) A. G. KIRK.

With copy of ref. (a) to: CINCAF

1 French Concession—Japanese Designs on.

14ND #1534  
Rating "C"

ND C rd #1463

A Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Japanese Government is "contemplating taking over French Concession of Shanghai in the name of Nanking Government. Japanese Army wishes to take action immediately but is not in agreement with Japanese Naval landing party. Meanwhile, Nanking

## 578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Government is going ahead selecting personnel for future administration what will be called "Shanghai Special Administrative Area". Informant believes that Nanking's action is more wishful thinking, but states that Japanese and Nanking efforts at penetration of the Shanghai French Concession lately has been intensified.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.  
From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC com14

14ND #  
Rating "

### Thai-Japanese Activities in

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: (A) In the middle of August, thirty aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG CHIENG-MAI airdrome; (B) Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department agents into the number of lighters and their usage in the Gulf of Siam; (C) The following proposal was said to have been presented to the Prime Minister of Thailand on August 18 by the Japanese Minister: (1) SATTAHIB Naval Base to be loaned to Japan; (2) 6 airdromes, north, south, and west Thailand to be lent to Japan, who will undertake to improve them; (3) Double tracks to be laid on the railway from ARANHI to BANGKOK; (4) Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand and (5) Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces; the foregoing proposals to be taken up by the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival in Thailand. FBI and MID cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #  
Rating "

### Formosa—Molto Airdrome

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 27 August, 1941: On 18 August, the following left for unknown destination—3 3-engine monoplane bombers, 2 twin-engine monoplane bombers, 4 fighters, 2 reconnaissance. On 28 June, the following left for Hainan under command of MIYASAKI—15 twin-engine monoplane bombers, 11 single-engine monoplane fighters, 8 single-engine bi-plane reconnaissance. On 3 July 24 aircraft under command of MORI GITARO left for Hainan.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.  
From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #  
Rating "

### Confidential

#### JAPAN—General Intelligence

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of 1 September, 1941: (A) 5 (reorganized) divisions have been mobilized in Japan for service in Manchuria; (B) All forces in Korea other than two divisions are to be in process of moving into Manchuria and to North Korea; (C) 3 new mechanized divisions have been added to Kwangtung Army as well as chemical warfare units trained in Japan by German instructors; (D) Training of parachute troops is being intensified but is considerably delayed by lack of transport airplanes; passenger airplanes from a commercial air line are being used for training purposes; (E) Informant reports unverified information to the effect that two Japanese Capital Ships will be completed and commissioned in the battle fleet by the end of 1941 and two airplane carriers will be completed in March and July, 1942, respectively.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant  
From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM1.

14ND #  
Rating "

### Confidential

#### Japanese Fleet Organization

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That from and after June, 1941, Japanese Navy was to have been divided into four fleets, with Admiral KATO as Commander of the First Fleet.



mander-in-Chief. The first fleet will be stationed near Indo-China, Thai, and Hainan; second fleet will be the main force for the southward advance; third fleet to be stationed to cover the Pacific flank and oppose the American Fleet; and, fourth fleet to be engaged in transport (convoy?) work. FBI and MID cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1532  
Rating "C"

#### Indo-China—Japanese Moves In

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese Navy intends to construct a submarine base at CAMRANH BAY. Japanese are reported to be taking steps to completely suppress all pro-Chinese elements in Indo-China, and to encourage Annamite independence movement which would be definitely pro-Japanese and anti-French. It is believed that object of Japanese moves is to create internal domestic trouble in Indo-China, thus providing further excuse for expansive Japanese control.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1528  
Rating "D"

#### Japan—Ordnance Production

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Chinese staff Secret Booklet of October, 1940, contains following information on Hiroshima Iron Works—Yearly production 9 anti-aircraft guns, 3 tanks, unknown number of Naval and Military guns. Monthly production of shells 300. Raw materials are obtained from Yawata, *Kyushu*. 2,000 men and women employed.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

*Confidential*

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

From: 14ND 9-23-41

14ND #152C  
Rating "C"

#### Japan—Indication of Action in Malaya

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That Japanese Army is calling up all English and Malay-speaking Japanese irrespective of age. Some Japanese born and educated in the Straits Settlement have left for Army service in Japan.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC com14

14ND #1530  
Rating "C"

#### Far East Exports to Germany

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (as of 23 July, 1941): German firms in the Far East have received instructions from the Commercial Counsellor instructing them that they *must* keep all goods purchased for export to Germany for a period of at least five months, since it can be expected that transport via Siberia will be resumed at the expiration of that period. Firms encountering difficulty over storage space are advised to ship goods to Dairen for storage. Further, all purchases of goods in the immediate future for export to Germany must be of "non-perishable" kind. FBIHON and G-2ND are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1526  
Rating "C"

#### China Blockade—Smuggling

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 28 June, 1941, Asaji FASAHARA, Commanding Officer of the Destroyer ACHI (or ASHI) of the Japanese Thirteenth Destroyer Flotilla, was found guilty of having allowed smuggling in his blockade area and was replaced by his second-in-command. The ACHI was patrolling off Hainan Island at the time. Admiral Seiichi SHIMOMI (or HIIMI), Commanding the Japanese South China Fleet, is suspected by his subordinate officers of being financially interested in the South China smuggling racket.

When Chiu-Ting-Wah, puppet magistrate at Chungahan, was assassinated recently in Macao, it was extensively rumored that SHINOMI's personal demand with the Governor of Macao was brought about by the consideration that CH had previously been working hand in glove with SHINOMI in breaking blockade which the latter himself was responsible for maintaining. FBI MID cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1  
Rating "C"

Formosa—Coastal Defenses

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine gun posts. These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each is manned by six to eight men. They were recently erected in great haste. 4,000 troops, with 6 tanks and 8 armored cars, are stationed at Taichung.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Formosa (Takao)—General Military Intelligence

14ND #182

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Transport #174 arrived at Takao 17 June with large quantities of military personnel, equipment (uniforms, shoes, helmets, respirators, etc.), all of which were sent by rail to Tainan. Sixty Chinese man Naval, Military, and Air Force experts and over thirty Japanese officers arrived on same vessel, but soon after landing they all left via SS HOSAN MARU for the Pescadores. It is reported that all of these men will soon be transferred to South China. On 21 June, 260 Mountain Artillery, together with local recruits, left Tainan for Koshun for maneuvers. On 25 June, 6 armored cars and 3 tanks left Tainan for Taito to participate in coastal defense exercises. On 26 June, about 800 recruits from Koshun Sector were sent to join Labor Corps at Tainan. These men were given a complete set of uniforms and equipment but no rifles. Their ages were from 35 to 45. On 6 June, they returned to Koshun for further training.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Formosa—Conscription

14ND #152

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Governor of Formosa has received orders to recruit within the next month (by 5 September, 1941) 100,000 men between the ages of 35-45 for service in Labor Corps. It is reported that an additional 150,000-200,000 recruits in Formosa are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Formosa—Troop movements

14ND #153

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: From 23 to 29 June, 1941, 500 troops of Taihoku Infantry were exercised in coastal defense near Shinchiku. On 24 June, 180 Artillery arrived at Karenko from Taihoku, together with 6 anti-aircraft guns drawn by trucks and 4 anti-aircraft machine guns. 25 June, Transport #141 and 163 arrived at Keelung and embarked military supplies and provisions. They both sailed for Hainan on 27 June.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

**Japanese Troop Movements**14ND #1520  
Rating "B"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 25 June, 1941, six hundred troops of Nakana Armored Car Unit arrived, together with three hundred Service Corps Troops with unknown number of armored cars and motorcycle combinations, all embarking on two transports at Shibaura, Tokyo, bound for Formosa. On 5 July, one thousand men of 32nd Infantry Regiment embarked in two transports at same port for Formosa. FBI and MID cognizant.

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14  
Japanese Troop Movements

14ND #1521  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 16 June, 1941, one transport arrived at Shikama (Port of Ilmeji) from Shanghai and discharged 200 wounded of the 11th Mixed Brigade, and 100 boxes of ashes. Wounded were sent to Tsuyama, Okayama-Ken. Reinforcements which left Japan in May and June, 1941, for North China were drawn from Sendai, Kanasawa, Yamagata, and Yonawawn. Reinforcements for the same period for South and Indo-China were drawn from Kanawawn, Kyushu, Kagoshima, Kurume, Saga, and Kumamoto. FBIHON G-2HD cognizant.

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14  
Formosa—Supplies

14ND #1522  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 17 June, 1941 SS MORAI MARU arrived at Keelung from Japan with about 400 cases of military uniforms and steel helmets. 200 cases were sent to Karenko by SS FUKUSEI MARU and the remainder to Taihoku by train. 19 June, Transport #140 arrived at Keelung from Japan with military supplies which were sent by rail to Taihoku and Taihu. This Transport left again on 22 June with a full load of copper ore. 20 June, Transport #135 arrived at Karenko with 600-700 tons of petrol from Japan via the Pescadores (where she unloaded an unspecified amount of petrol). FBIHON, G-2HD cognizant.

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14  
Manchuria—Travel Restrictions

14ND #1518  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August 1941: New regulations affecting all Europeans and most Chinese were introduced as of August 1, 1941 in Manchurian Frontier Regions. Permits for all travel must be obtained from Police Headquarters. Restrictions are especially severe in Mulin District, while travel in the interior is prohibited. Special control has been established at Mulin and Suisenho. Early in 1941 pressure was brought to bear on all foreigners in Jehol Province, and many left. Remaining foreigners, about twenty-five missionaries, are not now permitted to travel beyond the city. Tarter businessmen have been told to remove their business to Mukden area, the reason given being that Jehol is not safe. Garrisons in this area have been greatly augmented, large troop movements are taking place, considerable road construction is in hand, and it is not desired that aerial maneuvers should be witnessed by foreigners. FBIHON and G-2HD are Cognizant

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14  
Manchuria—Censorship

14ND #1519  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: All the correspondence from within Manchuria, addressed to China, is now censored. FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41  
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1516  
Rating "C"**Manchuria Mobilization**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of August 15: Whole population men and women, of eastern part of former Chinese Eastern Railway District has been mobilized as "militia" for defense and anti-aircraft work; all are registered and may not leave their villages without permission from Staff Headquarters. Fresh units of Japanese troops arrived in Mulin District the end of July, movements being shrouded in great secrecy. Troop movements at night. Police forbade population to visit villages or to engage in fishing or other occupation in vicinity except under special permit, this applying even to normal agricultural labor. FBIHON, G-2. Cognizant.

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI COM14 CINCPAC

14ND #1517  
Rating "C"**Manchuria—Construction**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August, 1941: New barracks near Mulin Coal Mines are now occupied by troops recently arrived. Maneuvers in which tanks participated have been held. Work has commenced on new highway from Irikte through Chola-Arabanu District. Cossacks, residing in this district, are engaged in the work. 1,500,000 Manchurian dollars have been allocated for hospitals, barracks, and other works at Telan-Heiho. Several European firms at Harbin have been permitted to tender work in the Tiamosi District and for work in connection with the Tiamosi-Madalsian Railway which opened two years ago. 3,000,000 Mongolian dollars have been allocated for Government Buildings, residences, hospitals, barracks, etc. All employees must be certified. Work to be completed not later than June 1, 1942. FBIHON, and G-2HD are cognizant.

*Confidential*

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

IHM/M  
SEPTEMBER 20, 1941.*Confidential*

From: District Intelligence Officer.

To: Director of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.

Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with.

Reference: (a) DIO conf. 14th ltr. dated 27 June, 1941. Subject Mr. Gerald E. Wilkinson.

(b) OpNay Despatch on same subject.

(c) DIO conf. 14th ND ltr. dated 22 August, 1941. Subject British Secret Agent in Manila, information received from.

1. Subject British Agent in Manila continues to forward information via Lock Box in Pan American Clipper planes to the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District. Much of this information is of value to the Military Intelligence in Hawaii, and to this office, as well as to the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reference (c) listed by numbers some of the cards containing this information which have been disseminated by the office of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Paragraph five of reference (c) stated that the District Intelligence Office considered this information to be valuable and requested authority by despatch to permit the sending of information by the local representative of Subject agent to Manila in the lock compartment of Pan American Airways planes.

3. The despatch reply requested in paragraph five of reference (c) has not been received to date.

I. H. MAYFIELD.

**Hongkong—Prospective disorders,**No. 148  
(Rating "C")

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that the Japanese are preparing to create strikes, disturbances, and riots when and if Japan breaks with England. Source stated that puppet officials of the Chungshan area and Japanese agents are being permitted to enter Macao with arms, and that it is through this channel a large quantity of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hongkong. An agent in the employ of FURUKAWA, Chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence at Macao, has been recruiting 100,000 refugee street-sleepers to take part in sabotage and

ance activities in Hongkong on the outbreak of hostilities. A large number of these street-sleepers are already receiving financial assistance from the Japanese. The following Chinese are said to be actively engaged in the foregoing activities in the pay of Japan: JOHN LUI, a senior member of the Shanghai Tai Insurance Co. His headquarters are at 19/20 Connaught Road, West, 3rd floor (next to Ping On Hotel) where he operates as the Chun Kin Firm. He fled Shanghai in July 1941 and was said to be planning a trip to Singapore hereafter. CHENG SAI-HOI, son of the Chief Detective of Amoy, is one of the close associates. TAM KWOK-WA has made many visits recently to Hongkong and is said to be employed by the Special Service Department of Japanese Intelligence at Macao, to act as Liaison between Macao and Hongkong. CHAU KONG TING has been in the employ of the Japanese for the past ten years, operating mainly in the Swatow/Amoy sector. He is believed to be residing in Connaught Road, West (number of house unknown.) FBI, MID cognizant.

Ref: 14ND 9-12-41.

ONI; All ND's; CincPac; Com14.

Chinese Foreign policy.

14ND #1492

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Admiral NOMURA (Ambassador to U. S.) has been instructed to work for a modification of the American embargo policy and to offer re-adjustment of American-Japanese relations on the basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined and recognized as foreign spheres of influence of the United States and of Britain. FBI and G2-HD cognizant.

Ref: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. Com14.

Chinese-Chinese Relations.

14ND #1470

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Japanese movement is considerably perturbed by the 'insincerity of the Siamese Government'. B. Japanese Government states that in spite of military 'representations' by Japanese Minister at Bangkok, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan and that is clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence. C. Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter. D. FEI WEN CHUAN further reports Japanese Government in carrying out its programme in French Indochina is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that the latter changes its attitude towards Japan and her co-prosperity programme. Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into line." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

Ref: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

Manchuria—Japanese Troop Movements.

14ND #1466

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Between 10 July and 17 July about 100 Japanese troops passed through Mukden proceeding north \* \* \* carrying full war kits. (Note. No means of checking numbers, which should be adopted with reserve). B. During period named a total of 75 troop 'specials' passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried artillery and tanks. C. On departure from Mukden on 21 July source was told by Japanese station master of South Manchurian railway that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop 'specials', but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was not used for cars these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suiyuan and Peking-Hankow lines. D. On 20 July troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in special troop trains via KOUFAUTZE on Peking-Mukden line. Source saw great activity at Tangku Tun junction." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

Ref: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC CoM 14.

**Japanese Foreign Policy.****14ND #  
Rating**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Admiral TOYODA (Japanese Foreign Minister) already has informed German Ambassador OTT the Japan is ready to re-adjust its political relations with the Reich at a pre-requisite for a new economic accord upon which will be founded the future economic relations between Asia and Europe. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

**FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT**

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL

*Honolulu, Hawaii*

**Manchuria—Railways, Buildings, etc.****14ND #  
Rating**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. It is reported that the following railways in Manchuria are now regarded as military lines on which number of passenger trains has been reduced to minimum: Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara and Korea via Tumen, Harbin Peian-Heiho, Hsingchiang-Taonan, Taonan-Da Arshan, Tsitsihar-Peian, Tsitsihar-Budhedu-Hailar and Manchouli, Tumen-Mudadzian, Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi, all railways in Jehol. B. Since end of June 1941 steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang-Harbin by construction of sidings and numerous small stations for storage. In Kwangtung leased territories since 1940 sand bag emplacements guard bridges station, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures. Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessary demands." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

**FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT**

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL

*Honolulu, Hawaii*

**Shanghai French concession.****14ND #  
Rating****Japanese Designs On.**

Ref: 14 ND card #1462 (Tientsin French Concession)

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That a plan similar to that stated in the reference card for Tientsin is said to be in order for Shanghai French Concession, with the Nanking Government said to be ready to assume control of the concession before 10 October, 1941. It is rumored that there is a committee studying this matter under the chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) General KAGESA, and that their recommendations have been forwarded to Tokyo for consideration. FBI (Hon) and G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI; All NDs; CincPac; Com 14.

**Formosa-Japanese Airplane Movements****14ND #**

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 25 July, 1941 following aircraft left OKAYAMA Airdrome for HAINAN: 24 twin-engine monoplane, heavy B; 15 monoplane fighters; 3 reconnaissance. 28 July following left for Indo-China: 6 three-engine monoplane, heavy B; 9 single-engine monoplane, light B. 30 July, 27 aircraft comprised mainly of twin-engine monoplane, heavy bomber, arrived KAGI from Japan and left 29 July for Indo-China. 1 August, 9 heavy bombers and 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-China. Parachute troops are being

trained daily at TOGO airdrome, 8 aircraft being used. FBI (Hon) ; G-2 (HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September 1941.

To: ONI ; All NDs ; CincPac ; Com14.

Formosa-Japanese Troop Movements.

14ND #1457

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 20 July, 1941 the following left KARENKO for INDO-CHINA—24,000 TAKAHASHI Infantry; 1200 ISE Artillery; 600 KONDO and FUKASE, A. F. V. Units with 16 armored cars, 15 light tanks, 40 motorcycles, and 32 field guns. FBI-Hon and G2- HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) ; All NDs ; CINCPAC ; COM14

Japanese Naval Ordnance.

14ND #1456

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3) ; Naval guns are being made at Osaka Arsenal under German supervision. On 8 May, 1941 war-ships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted out with new guns from this arsenal. FBI-Hon and G2- HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Factory.

14ND #1455

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports the following concerning the AICHI Aircraft Factory at NAGOKA. Beginning 3 April, 1941 German engineers arrived at this factory from the DORNIER works. They are said to be supervising construction of a new type of fighter. This is described as K.22 type twin-engine 2 seater, which is still in the experimental stage. 2600 laborers are working 24 hour shifts, and the production schedule aimed at is 50 planes per month. FBI-Hon and G2- HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Troops in Indo China.

14ND #1455

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 21 August 1941 the strength of Japanese troops in southern Indo-China numbered about 80,000, composed of units of: Guards; 28th Division; 38th Division; Formosan Army Corps; Naval landing party. Lieutenant General HDA is the Army High Commander, Major General KWANGI for air, and Vice-Admiral HIRATA for Navy. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Troop Movement.

14ND #1450

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East reports that on 8 June, 1941, 12,000 men left French Indo-China. He stated that it is rumored that they were bound for Manchuria, but he takes this with great reserve. On 14 June the following units of the 11th division, totalling 3300 men left Haina for an unknown destination: HIROSE Infantry Regiment, NAKAMURA Medium Artillery Battalion, HIROKA Transport Company and YOSHINO and KUNO Cavalry Squadrons. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Naval Construction.

14ND #1451

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (with considerable reserve) that 20 vessels of the following type were in July 1941 under construction at HARIMA Shipyard, OSAKA: Displacement 100 tons; dimensions 200 ft x 28 ft x 5 ft 6'';

speed 30 knots; armament 6 machine guns. These vessels were to be completed by the end of July 1941. Informant's source stated that these ships were to be used as troop landing craft in the Southern expansion movement of Japan. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

14ND #1  
Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-4): That Japan is constructing "Pocket Destroyers" by building the new craft *inside* some old hulks that have been emptied of machinery and equipment. He stated that as a further aid to secrecy the positions of these hulks are changed from time to time and being towed from one place to another. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.  
Japanese Aircraft Factory.

14ND -  
Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a factory situated at KAWAGUCHI in OSAKA, in May 1941, started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the AICHI Factory, NAGOYA. It is estimated that a labor force of 2,600 working ten hours a day, under supervision of 3 German advisers, producing wings and fuselage for 100 fighter planes per month. FBI-Hon and G2-Hd cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

——— Island—Japanese Construction.

14ND #—  
Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 21 April, 1941 two armed merchantmen left KOBE for ——— ISLAND. These ships had about 400 men of a naval landing party and 160 coolies. On 19 April these same ships had arrived at KOBE and unloaded scrap material and 1,800 caskets of ash and were loaded up with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components. The above measured about six by eight feet. FBI and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

German Raiders in Pacific.

14ND #1  
Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 20 Apr, 1941 two of the German vessels lying at KOBE left for KURE. Guns were to be fitted and the ships were to be ready for sea again at the beginning of August. FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. Com14.

Japan-Kobe Navy Yard.

14ND #1  
Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): The floating dock at Kobe, capable of accommodating ships of 18,000 tons, is expected to be transferred to Hainan. At the end of May 1941 an aircraft tender was under repair in this dock. 2,000 workmen working day and night shift were engaged on the aircraft tender and reconditioning the deck. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.  
To: ONI (2) All NDS. CINCPAC Com14.

Japanese Submarine Construction.

14ND #1  
Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): In collaboration with German advisers the construction of 75 submarines is projected in Japan. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 ships and the Osaka Iron Works is building 4. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14



ese aerial bomb factory.

14ND #——  
Rating "C"

sh Secret Agent, Far East, reports that there is a Japanese aerial bomb  
ry named HAKABE Heavy Industrial Works, located in Himeji. In mid  
1941 this factory was said to have had a working force of 600 laborers and  
rman engineers, producing monthly 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares.  
Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

ese National Policy.

14ND #1442  
Rating "C"

ish Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a competent British observer has  
ered the following report: "When Itagaki was appointed C-in-C, Korea,  
writer took the view that he is a convinced northern expansion, as opposed  
uthern expansion believer; and that his appointment was therefore to be  
reputed as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria,  
a being the first reserve pool for Manchuria. A technically competent ob-  
r in Hongkong now confirms this view and adds that Ushiroku, formerly  
C, South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of the Japanese forces in  
a, is of the same persuasion. He may be counted on not to neglect the  
a, therefore, however tempting the easy gains in the south may be at the  
ent. Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something  
ppen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc., by a certain date, such  
eptember 15th bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a  
of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis  
ers. The Japanese in the past have often revealed their long term ob-  
ves, but have very seldom talked about their next move and carried it out,  
cy in that respect being a habit with them." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cog-  
it.

: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

n—Airdrome at Kamakura.

14ND #1445  
Rating "C"

ish Secret Agent, Far East, reports: A large airdrome is under construc-  
near Kamakura (believed to be identical with Totsuka airdrome). The  
is 3,500 yards long and 3,500 yards wide and was to have been completed  
e end of August, 1941. 8,000 laborers were said to have worked on the field  
r the supervision of 18 German engineers. 3,000 parachute troops under  
ing there. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

n—General Military and Naval Information

14ND #1440  
Rating "C"

ish Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): "A There are naval  
s or depots at KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMA-  
RA and TOYOHASHI. B. Source states that at end of June there was con-  
table movement of Japanese sailors from Tokyo to Koshiro and Takahachi  
that between 26 and 28 June, 1941 numerous tramloads of young men arrived  
usi. C. At Rumi source observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders  
also several howitzers pulled by heavy trucks with camouflaged gun plat-  
s. D. At HAMAMOTO he observed 97th, 72nd and 8th divisions. E. At  
hizu 22nd Division. At OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA 2nd and 4th Divisions.  
oil storage tanks in this district which is very heavily industrialized.  
nments: All above observations were made at end June. Although agent has  
military training he is newly recruited and I have had no opportunity of  
s-examining him. Valuation therefore C-3). F. Area between Kobe, AWAJI  
SAKAI heavily fortified. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

: 14ND 9 September, 1941

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Japan—Underground Airdrome at Takarazuka

14ND #14  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, was informed by a Polish refugee journalist who was in Japan at the end of June 1941, that the latter had seen great earth works, indicating underground airdrome, with planes landing at TAKARAZUKA. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.  
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Japanese National Policy

14ND #14  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation B-2): That a fairly reliable informant of his states that his Japanese business associates (who include local heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank) appear genuinely to believe the present Japanese threats of future southward expansion are merely a "war of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight Great Britain or America. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.  
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Philippine—The Japanese Propaganda in

14ND #143  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, Reports (Valuation C-3): That an informant of his, a Sakdal candidate for the next Philippine election has stated that local Japanese agents have recently cultivated him closely and volunteered the following information: That 650-700 airplanes are now assembled on Formosa; that an attack on the Philippines and Singapore will take place simultaneously about the end of August; that the campaign in the Philippines will begin with a rising in Mindanao and the bombing of Manila; that the attack on Singapore will be overland through Siam where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support the Japanese; that heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. Informant states that he has given the names of the alleged Japanese agents to American Military Intelligence. He gives his own information on the Valuation C-3 and states "This looks like a whispering campaign." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.  
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Dutch East Indies—Japanese Propaganda in

14ND #143  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "It was reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I. following is now being said: 1. In MENADO. Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be taken off in vessels from Polao. a. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from eastward of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S. arrives. 3. Japanese will not be evacuated as evacuation would give N. E. I. indication of pending attack." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.  
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14  
Saigon

14ND #143  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-2): "Following from Free French sailors who left Saigon about August 8th: A. S. S. FRANCOIS LOUIS DREYFUS is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo." Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Francisco." B. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel AMIRAL CHARNER and the submarine PEGASE. C. S. S. SAGITARE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber." FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.  
From: 14ND 9 September, 1941  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14  
Philippine—Japanese Business in

14ND #143  
Rating "B"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation A-1): "A. Local Agents Tokyo Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram August 15th from Tokyo instructing them: 1. To accept no new business or renewals until further

re. 2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty. 3. To persuade local Japanese to insure direct with Japan if possible. B. This company's 1940 premium from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds)." FBI- and G2-ND cognizant.

14ND 9 September, 1941

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

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FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

District Intelligence Office

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel

HONOLULU, HAWAII

Japanese National Policy

14ND #1438

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A translation of a letter from Information Section of Concordia Society to local branch of same, dated 2 July, states that on that day the national policy in connection with Russo-Japanese war was decided at a liaison conference between the Government and Command. The following general principles were stated to have been decided upon: A. Japanese Government recognizes as her main guiding principles national safety and the success at any cost of establishment of new order in East Asia. B. Japan must depend only upon her own strength and resources to concentrate her attention upon East Asia problems. C. She must use every means to further her own aims but always take into consideration the constantly changing international position and must not allow herself to be detracted from present course by any claims, requests or suggestions, if even slight risk of losing her power and resources is involved." FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

14ND 9 September, 1941

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

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FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL

HONOLULU, HAWAII

American Measures by Japanese in Occupied China

14ND #1433

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 27 July, 1941 Japanese High Command has discussed retaliatory measures against American and British freezing of assets, and the following steps were decided upon and forwarded to Tokyo for approval: 1. Ascertaining financial holdings of Americans and British in China; 2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied areas and possibility of expulsion; 3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. (The Nanking Government to be forced to co-operate in such measure); 4. Expedition of plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese forces in British forces; 5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and Manchuria to the Nanking Government. FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

14ND 9 September, 1941

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

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FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

China

14ND #1431

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): "A. Between July and July 29th 12,000 troops left Bangkok for Indo China frontier. B. Confirmation is afforded by official Siamese communiques which stated

# 590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary and special missile units left for frontier — of July. C. An order has been placed with Japanese for delivery in July 1942 of 2 warships probably torpedo boats to replace 3 vessels sunk by French. D. 500,000 TICULS have been paid on account of this order." FBI-Hon and G-2-D cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent Far East, reports: A. OKAYANA Airdrome: Between 7 and 13 July, 1941 about 25 aircraft have been arriving here nightly from Japan. On 19 July the following aircraft were based here: 40 tri-motor monoplanes, heavy B; 40 twin-engined monoplanes, Medium B; 40 single-engined monoplane, light B; 60 monoplane fighters; 20 reconnaissance; 4 four-engined transports. This airdrome is about one mile square and is the largest in Formosa. B. 14 July, 1941, 6 fighters arrived at TAIKONU from QUON Island. C. 10 and 11 July, 1941, 15 fighters arrived at KAGI from Japan. D. 10 July, 1941, 15 monoplane fighters arrived at KETTO from ——. E. 10 fighters reported at QUEMOY. F. Japanese Naval Units from PESCADOR laid mines, — June, 1941. G. 11 July, 1941, 200 mines and 120 torpedoes landed at — from Japan. FBI-Hon and G2-D cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941  
To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

*Confidential*

IHM/

AUGUST 22, 1941.

From: The District Intelligence Officer.  
To: Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence.  
Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila; information received from.  
Reference:

- (a) DIO Conf. Ltr. dated 27 June, 1941 on same subject.
- (b) Opnav despatch same subject.

Enclosure: (A) 14ND Cards Nos. 1345-1348, inclusive, and 1351-1355 inclusive.

1. In reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer outlined the proposal of a Mr. Wilkinson, a British Secret Agent in the Far East, that an arrangement be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent, Mr. Harry Dawson, be carried in the special locked compartments of Pan-American Airways clippers flying between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation Mr. Wilkinson would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information gathered by himself and his aid in the Far East and of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy. It was proposed that the District Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts should make the necessary arrangements with Pan-American Airways.

2. Reference (b) stated that the Department could not authorize the above plan at this time because of the status of the matter and the small amount of information submitted. The District Intelligence Officer informed Mr. Dawson of the Department's decision and has declined to forward any further correspondence from Mr. Dawson to Mr. Wilkinson. However, every clipper from the Orient brings confidential mail from Mr. Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, forwarded by the District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District.

3. By despatch from the District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was informed that Mr. Wilkinson was thoroughly reliable and trustworthy. Investigation in Honolulu disclosed that Mr. Wilkinson is the properly accredited branch manager in Manila for The H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and that his wife is a grand- [2] daughter of the original Mr. Theo. H. Davies. This company is one of the five largest corporations in the Territory of Hawaii and, although incorporated as an Hawaiian corporation, the majority of its stock is held by members of the Davies family who are British subjects and live in England.

4. Mr. Harry Dawson, above mentioned, is manager of the steamship department of Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, a British subject, and British vice-consul for Hawaii.

The District Intelligence Officer considers the information received from Wilkinson to be of value and requests authority by despatch to effectuate arrangement proposed by Mr. Wilkinson.

Information so far received by this office from Mr. Wilkinson has been furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence on Fourteenth Naval District dissemination cards Nos. 1240, 1322-1326 (inclusive), 1333, 1334, 1345-1348 (inclusive), 1351-1355 (inclusive). The last nine cards listed are forwarded herewith closure (A).

I. H. MAYFIELD.

#1333 Rating "B"

Japanese Military Armor

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that the Tohoku Imperial University, Metallurgical Laboratory, has compounded an excellent bullet resisting steel said to be more efficient than similar foreign steel. According to the patent announcement the steel is composed of: 0.15-0.35% carbon; 0.5-1.5% chrome; 0.6-2.0% manganese; 0.2-1.0% molybdenum; 0.2-1.0% cobalt of vanadium; silicon; remainder iron. Discoverers of the steel are K. ONO and S. CAHIBA.

(Hon); MID (HD) cognizant.

14 ND 8-15-41

ONI (2) CINCPAC (2) COM 14 (2)

Japanese Military Body Armour

An excellent anti-bullet steel has been evolved by the Metallurgical Laboratory of the Tohoku Imperial University headed by Mr. K. HONDA. According to the latest Announcement, the steel is composed of the following:

- 0.15-0.35% of carbon,
- 0.5-1.5% of chrome.
- 0.6-2.0% of manganese,
- 0.2-1.0% of molybdenum.
- 0.2-1.0% of cobalt of vanadium,
- 0.8% of silicon

and the remainder iron.

Series of tests for hardness proved that the metal was more efficient than the foreign anti-bullet steel. Discoverers of the metal are Messrs. K. ONO and S. CAHIBA.

#1334 Rating "B"

Japanese Industrial Management

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports information on above subject, which is stated verbatim: A. *Controller*. Decides all quantities of all materials required for factory under his control. Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc. even control development and study of prototype. Decides all promotions, wages in personnel, organization of leisure and adjustment of internal disputes. Supervises allotment of salaries, wages, bonuses. His control is complete and decisions are final. B. *Trained Engineers*. All certificated engineers from Imperial Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for Naval, military aviation factories. Engineers with certificates from private universities (such as Waseda) may work in other defence industries. Factories which are not working for national defense get no certificated engineers. Numbers are carefully fixed, e. g., Ishikawajima is allowed only 3 Imperial University graduates per annum. System extremely unpopular amongst students. C. *Limitation of Salaries*. Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1,170 Yen. Graduates from private university get 1,170 Yen annually. Rises begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 2,000 Yen per annum. D. *Artisans*. Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 4 hours, this works out at higher salaries than that of certificated engineers. E. *Workmen*. Workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this work is often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and have taken a week or fortnight's holiday. F. *Discipline*. No factory personnel may change factory or branch of work without consent from the controller. Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will accept no supervision. They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility. G. *Naval and Military Friction*. This extends to an astonishing degree, even in the same article is being made for both services. Files of all drawings are to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy. All component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with

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the result that double checking and control service has to be established. distinct trial and reception services have to be established. Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable. FBI-Hen and G-2HD are cognizant.

CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 6

*Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War  
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*

The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me 1 through 165, from the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonel Gerald Wilkinson) at Manila to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Honolulu, and were obtained from their respective files.

They comprise reports during the period from June to December 1941.

*Urgent cable received from Manila night of Dec. 3, 1941*

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

- A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
- B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
- C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Navy Intelligence Honolulu.

cc. Col. BICKNELL  
Mr. SHIVERS  
Capt. MAYFIELD

*Copy of cable received Nov. 27, 1941*

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 2 without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy).

American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.

Copies to: Mr. SHIVERS  
Capt. MAYFIELD  
Col. BICKNELL

*Cable recd. from Wellington 25.11.41*

Pacific raider intelligence.

(1) On 6th November U. S. A. "Capillo" sighted surface vessel in 003° South 177° 32' East. Vessel is thought to have been raider G number 41 believed to be "Steiermark" of HAPAG Line.

0355Z/2

*Extract from Manila*

To: Capt. MAYFIELD  
Mr. SHIVERS  
Col. BICKNELL

Following received indirectly from German source, reported to have good connections in Japan.

A. German ambassador Tokio is concentrating:

1. On breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the head of the Japanese fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America.

2. On destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis and Right army groups into a united front.

3. Encouraging higher officers of the KWANGTUNG and Korean armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.

B. German ambassador Tokyo has exercised considerable influence over General SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOSO NAKAMURA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among civilians were SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURU TOYAMA, KENSO ADACHI.

C. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.

D. In Korean and Kwantung forces following are known to be influenced by German ambassador: Lt.-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-General MITSUNAMI and Lt.-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in far east on basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. S. R. Government resulting in a guarantee of the INVIOABILITY of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers and, as a consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from the East.

(Value 3.)

Index: German Ambassador, activities in Tokio.

*Extract No. 182 for Honolulu*

27th October, 1941

To: Col. BICKNELL

Capt. MAYFIELD

----- report October 6th.

A. September 17th 9 repeat 9 twin-engined bombers left Kagi for West (destination not known).

B. September 18th 12 repeat 12 bombers, 3 repeat 3 fighters and 3 repeat 3 unidentified aircraft left TAIHOKU for Swatow.

C. TOSHIYEN (TAKAO) 2 repeat 2 seaplane hangars, each 160 repeat 160 by 50 repeat 50 by 45 repeat 45 feet have been erected. Rails run from hangars to sea wall where a crane is used for transfer of aircraft into sea.

D. A trial coastal reconnaissance unit of 50 repeat 50 reconnaissance and fighter aircraft is being organised in Formosa. Base of operation and particulars under investigation.

E. Paratroop training is still being carried out at KOGO and ROKKO.

F. Conscription and military training in Formosa has now reached the figure of 300,000 repeat 300,000, about one third of these are already receiving active training which will last over a period of four repeat four months.

G. A new fortress is under construction at SHOZAN (mountain overlooking Takao harbour). Due to utmost secrecy it is not yet known if guns are yet in position.

H. A small arms factory is being built at KOCHIYE (— degrees 15 north 120 degrees 32 east) where a new wharf and six new warehouses have been completed. This place is becoming an important port and a number of large merchant ships have called here. A new motor road connects with TAICHU.

I. At KAKENPH, four repeat four new wharves have been completed bringing total to six repeat six. Lengths vary from 130 repeat 130 to 250 repeat 250 feet. Total of warehouses (130 by 50 feet) number ten repeat ten.

October 2, 1941

Capt. MAYFIELD

Mr. R. SHIVERS

Col. BICKNELL

Following is a result of enquiries and information given in strict confidence from ex Chinese official whose Japanese wife died a few months ago.

A "CHRYSANTHEMUM Society" is a very secret patriotic organization members of which are Japanese wives, mistresses, and female employees of aliens.

B. Unquestionable loyalty to Emperor is shown by them secretly supplying information on a variety of subjects likely to be of assistance in extending power of empire.

C. Members living outside the empire with relatives at home and unable to report direct to their own authorities do so by code letters to homeland. Failure to carry out this sacred duty may result in reprisals against their families.

D. Any confirmation of above would assist further further enquiries.

(Value 2.)

Index—*Japanese subjects loyalty to Emperor.*

NOTE: It is common knowledge, in the far East that such activities are being carried out by servants wives or mistresses of Aliens however it is usually supposed that this is done more or less independently of any organization other than the Police in Japan and consulates elsewhere.

*Confidential*

J S. B.

OCTOBER 22, 1941

Capt. MAYFIELD

Mr. R. SHIVERS

Col. BICKNELL

Following is a result of enquiries and information given in strict confidence from an ex Chinese official whose Japanese wife died a few months ago.

A. "CHRYSANTHEMUM Society" is a very secret patriotic organization members of which are Japanese wives, mistresses, and female employees of aliens.

B. Unquestionable loyalty to Emperor is shown by them secretly supplying information on a variety of subjects likely to be of assistance in extending power of empire.

C. Members living outside the empire with relatives at home and unable to report direct to their own authorities do so by code letters to homeland. Failure to carry out this sacred duty may result in reprisals against their families.

D. Any confirmation of above would assist further enquiries.

(Value 2.)

(Not Carded)

OCTOBER 18, 1941.

Capt. MAYFIELD

Mr. R. SHIVERS

Col. BICKNELL

The most important problems for the Chinese Army, Government and Party are the lack of planes, heavy artillery and the maintenance of the goods prices.

The Chinese Government intend to construct a road from Sikang to British India. This road is to begin at Sichang in the province of Sikang, passes through Yungning and Taching in Yunan, Taching and Chayu in Sikang up to Sadiv the terminus of the railway in the province Assam. The length will be about thousand kilometers. The traffic along the Burma-Yunnan road which was originally calculated to be about 3000 tons a month has increased with 7000-10,000 tons a month. At Rangoon and along this road about 200,000 tons are still waiting for transport.

The war Ministry consents to publish gradually the list of killed and wounded men. The estimated loss of the enemy is about two million.

Since the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia the relations between the Kuomintang and Communists are becoming better.

The West road from Ho-erh-kwo-ase near the Chinese Russian frontier to Chungking has a length of 4406 kilometers. The transport along the Burma-Yunnan road is about 15,000 tons a month. The road is repeatedly bombed. The Kungky bridge has been bombed 16 times, the Huitung bridge 6 times, the Changn bridge 5 times. Damage has not been repaired. Now ferry-boats, pontoon bridges and wire ropes are used. In ordinary times traffic goes on, but during the rainy season it will be difficult and traffic will probably have to be stopped.

Value not known.

This data well known.

Periodically reported by official U. S. observers on the spot.

Index: Chinese Army Intelligence.

J L B.

Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

Col. Bicknell

OCTOBER 17, 1941.

[Hand written:] Not carded.

INDO CHINA—Persecution of Chinese

The Chinese Embassy at Vichy was informed by Chungking that the Saig police have arrested a number of Chinese men and women, some for taking part in a patriotic action, some for being suspected to be communists and others because



they refused to pay their taxes to the enemy. The Ambassador must discuss this question with the French Government and ask them to instruct the Government of Indo-China:

1. To allow respite to those who are behind in paying their taxes.
  2. To liberate the suspected people against whom there is no convincing evidence;
  3. As the people who took part in the patriotic action are most wealthy merchants and as their arrest and the order to expel them from the country have already caused a repercussion in local business, the Ambassador should request to have them released and the order to expel them cancelled.
- Value 1.  
[Hand written:] No value & may be reported by U. S. Consul. Not carded.

To Capt. Mayfield  
Extract No. 167 for Honolulu

14th OCTOBER, 1941.

Informer revisited Sasebo Dockyard in February and reports the following *hearsay* information.

- A. 6,000 ton cruiser was launched in the summer of 1940; and there were then rumours current that her tonnage was, in fact, 10,000 tons.
- B. A new cruiser was laid down about January 1941.  
This is said to be a sister ship of the vessel mentioned in paragraph A above.
- C. A "special type destroyer" is being built here.
- D. Aircraft carrier, formerly reported as completed has now left Sasebo.
- E. A floating dock, described as "the largest and most modern in Japan" has recently been completed here.
- F. In February 1941, 24 repeat 24-hour shifts were being worked and source was told that the yard was mainly employed on refits and repairs.

Capt. Mayfield  
Extract No. 165 for Honolulu

14th OCTOBER, 1941.

[Hand written:] rating C

- A. — confirms construction of naval small craft at the following yards only: URAGA, FUJIMAGATA AND HARIMA.
- B. This is only hearsay, but note that we now have independent reports from three different agents regarding construction at HARIMA yard.
- C. — also quotes a Japanese press report that the destroyer TANIKAZE was launched at HARIMA at end of 1940.  
Comment (There has always been great confusion regarding this particular destroyer.) The old TANIKAZE was still in commission up to 1935; and in 1937 we reported her as still at sea, having been rearmed and reconditioned.
- D. Source was told that destroyers have recently taken 8 repeat 8 months to build from laying down to completion.

To Capt. Mayfield  
Extract No. 163 for Honolulu

14TH OCTOBER, 1941.

----- reports on ENOSHIMA Peninsula, 17 kms. WNW of YOKOHAMA, in July 1941.

- A. 4 oil tanks have been completed here and 8 are under construction, total 12.
- B. 300 repeat 300 labourers are engaged in defence works.
- C. A naval ferry service running from HIRATSUKA to YOKOSUKA calls here.

To Capt. Mayfield  
Extract No. 159 for Honolulu

13TH OCTOBER, 1941.

----- obtained following *hearsay* information on Yokosuka dockyard from 3 entirely independent sources.

First sub source, a Tokyo merchant.

- A. Capital ship, 43,000 tons launched in summer of 1940.
- B. Capital ship, sister ship to above, on slip.

- C. Heavy cruiser, over 10,000 tons, on slip.
  - D. One vessel newly laid down, class unknown.
  - Second sub source*, a Yokohama electrical engineer.
  - E. Capital ship, over 40,000 tons, on slip.
  - F. Heavy cruiser, 15 to 25,000 tons, on slip.
  - Third sub source*, a Tokyo journalist.
  - G. Capital ship, over 40,000 tons, launched June 1940.
  - H. Capital ship, sister ship to above on slip.
  - I. Heavy cruiser, 15,000 tons, on slip.
  - J. *Comment*. All 3 sources seem agreed that there are 2 heavy ships *still* on slips at Yokosuka. (See 14ND card 1824)
- Otherwise, all above information is given with utmost reserve.

To Capt. Mayfield  
Extract No. 158 for Honolulu

13TH OCTOBER, 1941

About 300 workmen from Nagasaki dockyard were employed at Kure from October 1940 to February 1941. ----- following report is based on conversations with these men.

A. The Capital Ship, Nisshin, of over 40,000 repeat 40,000 tons, is now being completed here. *Note*:

*Comment*: Contradiction of agent's previous report that the Nisshin was a 10,000-ton cruiser.

- B. Another Capital ship of over 40,000 tons on slip.
- C. One heavy cruiser of unknown displacement on slips.
- D. One 20,000 repeat 20,000 ton aircraft carrier on slips.

E. Further confirmation of continuous submarine construction, which is now being carried out under supervision of considerable numbers of German technicians, who are constantly to be seen, both in Kure and the surrounding countryside.

F. Although we do not repeat nor regard the above information as accurate, it agrees remarkably closely with that given by the American Intelligence.

11TH OCTOBER, 1941

To Capt. Mayfield  
Extract No. 157 for Honolulu.

----- having revisited Nagasaki in February and received additional information up to May, reports as follows:—

A. *No. 1 Slip*. The Kashiwara Maru (tonnage of 27,700 tons confirmed) and her sister ship Itsuno Maru building at Kawasaki Yard, Kobe, are both being converted for use by the Fleet Air Arm.

*Note*. It is quite uncertain whether these are to be aircraft carriers, seaplane tenders or "aviation transports".

B. *No. 2 Slip*. A liner was laid down after launch of Kasuga Maru (April 1941).

*Told* she was towed to SASEBO on 1st May for conversion to aircraft carrier.

C. *No. 3 Slip*. A 12,000 tons merchant vessel was laid down after launch of Kobe Maru.

D. *No. 4 Slip*. A 12,000 ton merchant vessel was laid down here after launch of Nitta Maru.

*NOTE*. Source was *told* that vessels building on both No. 3 and No. 4 slips had been taken over by the Navy but that up to February 1941 no repeat alterations had been made to constructional plans.

E. *No. 5 Slip*. *Note*. This was formerly mistakenly reported as No. 4 slip. A "new type destroyer" is believed to be under construction here but she has been screened.

F. *No. 6 Slip* (previously reported as No. 5 slip). Capital ship under construction here, was launched on 23rd October, 1940.

Source *saw* this vessel at a great distance in February 1941 and said it did not look like an aircraft carrier, as there was a heavy forward superstructure and a long low superstructure amidships.

Source was *told* that this vessel was towed to Sasebo in February, 1941 for completion.

A new naval vessel (class unknown) is now under construction, and the ship is still screened.

G. 24 repeat 24 hour shifts are now being worked at Nagasaki.

Source was told that Kasuga Maru was not repeat not launched until April 1941 and that she was then towed to Sasebo on the 1st May for conversion to "an aircraft carrier".

See note to paragraph A above.

10TH OCTOBER, 1941.

Col. Bicknell only  
Extract No. 178 for Honolulu

It was reported that 500 paratroops trained in the Chiba area by German instructors recently left Sasebo for French Indochina in the destroyer Yukihaze.  
Value 5.

10TH OCTOBER, 1941.

To: Col. Bicknell  
Mr. Shivers  
Capt. Mayfield  
Extract No. 178 for Honolulu

It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North China to proceed Japan under Japanese flag. They will be armed to operate against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok.  
Value 4.

To: Capt. Mayfield  
Col. Bicknell  
Mr. Shivers  
Extract No. 175 for Honolulu

8TH OCTOBER, 1941.

It was reported on 12th September that:

A. German and Japanese S. I. S. have reached AGREEMENT whereby the Germans operate in all far eastern countries not occupied by the Japanese except Burma, Malaya, Indochina, N. E. I., and Philipplines which are operated by the Japanese.

B. In spite of this agreement Germans intend to operate in all far eastern countries under the cover of the D. N. B. In Indochina the D. N. B. and Domei will operate private W/T stations.

C. The Germans in Shanghai are operating, for political information, a Gestapo type of organization.  
Value 2

To: Mr. Shivers  
Col. Bicknell  
Capt. Mayfield  
Extract from Manila

It was reported on 12th September that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai has been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro in which capacity he will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.

Value 2

*Extract No. 174 for Honolulu*

To: Col. BICKNELL  
Mr. SHIVERS  
Capt. MAYFIELD

8TH OCTOBER, 1941.

It was reported on 12th September that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai has been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro in which capacity he will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.  
(Value 2)

*Extract No. 173 for Honolulu*

Col. Bicknell only

7TH OCTOBER, 1941.

— reports the following alterations in dispositions of Germans working in Japan.

- A. Kure. 5 working in shell factory, and 4 in shipbuilding yard.
- B. Yokosuka. 18 working in munitions factory, 26 in shipyard, 6 at aerodrome.
- C. No change.
- D. Maizuru. 5 working on A. R. P.

E. No change.

F. Totsuka. 18 aviation and parachute instructors, two constructional neers.

G. Shirahama. 8 working on aerodrome.

H. Nakamita. 10 working at aerodrome.

I. Nagoya. 4 working at Aichi aircraft factory.

J. Himeji. 5 working at chemical warfare factory.

K. 3 Germans, living in Osaka, pay periodic visits to Nankia Heavy Indus Corporation to superintend parachute manufacture.

L. Source was told that 125 Germans, en route for Japan, were detained by U. S. S. R. on outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.

M. Note please we have already reported movement of 30 German persons from Japan to Indo China.

N. Source was further told that there were 11 German aviation and parachute instructors stationed at Nanking, and a total of 84 attached to Japanese forces at Shanghai, Hankow and Nanchang, but this is given with reserve.

*Extract No. 172 for Honolulu*

6TH OCTOBER, 1941

Col. BICKNELL only

Source revisited Shirahama aerodrome and reports as follows.

A. Area has now been extended to 600 by 750 yards repeat 600 by 750 yards.

B. A sea wall is being built along the northern boundary and further constructional work is in progress at the North East corner.

Total of 1,200 labour force are still employed here.

C. Following buildings have now been erected to south of aerodrome:

1 large single storey workshop.

Two storey office.

Five oil tanks.

There are an additional five tanks on two small islands about one mile west of aerodrome.

D. All 10 tanks are described as about 40 feet in diameter and built partly underground with only 4 feet in height projecting above the surface.

E. Parachute training centre. All wounded have now been removed from establishment which is in full occupation by air force personnel and candidates for parachutist numbering in all 3,400.

F. A small proportion of these are attending lectures in fighter tactics, but great majority are undergoing elimination tests before commencing training in para troops.

These candidates include a considerable proportion of men formerly engaged in various technical trades such as plumbers and mechanics.

G. 8 German advisers are attached, two supervising aerodrome construction and six instructing in parachute work and aviation.

H. 50 women are employed in folding parachutes.

*Extract No. 180 for Honolulu*

6TH OCTOBER, 1941

To: Col. BICKNELL

Capt. MAYFIELD

Mr. SHIVERS

It was reported that—Head of Otto Wolff informed source that acting on instructions from Hamburg headquarters he is buying up materials of war which Germany is or will be in great need, e. g. wolfram, rubber, tin, etc. In particular they are interested in purchase of supplies of these in Siam where it is supposed that they shall be stored under innocuous cover names until such time as they can be delivered to Germany.

(Value 2.)

*Extract No. 181 for Honolulu*

6TH OCTOBER, 1941

To: Col. BICKNELL

Mr. SHIVERS

Capt. MAYFIELD

## N. E. I.—JAPANESE SUSPECT OKANO TETSUO

board the Kitano Maru the Japanese political agent OKANO TETSUO joined to the N. E. I. OKANO who lived in the Netherlands Indies from 1915, the possession of a settlement permit and therefore does not need a visa. According to a police report OKANO was employed by a high Japanese official during his stay in Japan. During his former stay in the Netherlands Indies OKANO was in close contact with many suspected Japanese.

(value 1.)

Oct. 6, 1941.

MAYFIELD  
R. SHIVERS  
BICKNELL

was reported that—

Source reports that opinion is being quietly expressed in German circles that these authorities fear that Germany may attempt to resume friendly relations with the Chungking Government after defeat or collapse of U. S. S. R. forces.

Japanese are alleged to fear that Germany may attempt to supply arms to Japan via the ALMA ATA route in barter exchange against important Japanese products, and

To fear a German-Russian-Chinese commercial bloc since German industrial and commerce circles are persistently demanding such a combination in the Far East since it would ensure to German industries the supply of raw material and would constitute a permanent market for her finished goods.

(value 3.)

*Extract No. 132 for Honolulu*

4TH OCTOBER, 1941.

MAYFIELD, only

is reported that—Japanese Consul KAWABACHI with a staff of five is expected to arrive DILLY, TIMOR, by flying boat on 9th or 11th October.

(value 2.)

*Extract No. 171 for Honolulu*

3RD OCTOBER, 1941.

BICKNELL only

— reports further on aerial bomb section of Himeji factory in July.

Labour force 700 repeat 700, male and female.

This factory is having difficulty in increasing its labour force owing to dangerous nature of work.

Three German technicians are attached.

On 14th June an order was received for 10,000 flares from the Military Air Department.

One ton repeat one ton bombs are now under production and 2,000 repeat of these have already been stored.

*Extract No. 170 for Honolulu*

3RD OCTOBER, 1941.

BICKNELL only

— reports on Aichi Factory Nagoya in July (following information obtained from a new sub source).

4 German technicians now attached.

Labour force increased to 6,000 repeat 6,000.

Junkers Jumo engines are being fitted to single engine, single seater army aircrafts, 25 repeat 25 of which are being completed every month.

Experiments on large 3 repeat 3 engined bomber are still being conducted under supervision of German advisers.

*Extract No. 169 for Honolulu*

Col. BICKNELL only

3rd OCTOBER, 1941

----- reports on Nanki Heavy Industries Corporation.

A. Only about 300 repeat 300 of the parachutes produced here every month are of satisfactory quality (i. e. only 50 per cent, but this is given as reserve).

B. Experiments with hemp fibre for parachutes have not repeat not produced satisfactory.

C. Babbed wire is also under production here.

D. Labour force 1,100 repeat 1,100 working 1 shift of 10 hours.

*Extract No. 128 for Honolulu*

To: Mr. SHIVERS

Col. BICKNELL

OCTOBER 3rd, 1941

----- reports that Japanese proprietor of TRIANGULO Studio, Manila, recently sought him out in order to tell him following:—

A. 500,000 men and 3000 tanks now in Formosa.

B. Aerial attack on Philippines to start October 12th.

C. Japanese Navy preparing to intercept 27 American ships en route Vladivostok.

The circumstances of presentation of this report, as well as its contents indicate resumption of whispering campaign.

Note similarity to reports on same subject from N. E. I.

*Extract No. 153 for Honolulu*

Capt. MAYFIELD, only

2nd OCTOBER, 1941

My telegram of 26th September, paragraphs D and E.

(Both jobs H. 1. and V. G. appear to be going to have three turrets, two forward and one aft.)

(Add to No. 149; rate c.)

*Extract No. 179 for Honolulu*

To: Col BICKNELL

Mr. SHIVERS

Capt. MAYFIELD

2nd OCTOBER, 1941

Following received indirectly from German source, reported to have good connections in Japan.

A. German ambassador Tokio is concentrating:—

1. On breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the head of the Japanese fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America.

2. On destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis and Right army groups into a united front.

3. Encouraging higher officers of the KWANTUNG and Korean armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.

B. German ambassador has exercised considerable influence over General SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOSO NAKAMURA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among civilians were SEIGO HAKANO, MITSUHI TOYAMA, KENSO ADACHI.

C. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.

D. In Korean and Kwantung forces following are known to be influenced by German ambassador: Lt-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major General MITSUNAMI and Lt-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in far east on basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. R. Government resulting in a guarantee of the INVIOABILITY of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers and, as a consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from the East.

(Value 3.)

*Extract No. 145 for Honolulu*

A. Source reports that on September 20th he met a certain CHU CHE SHENG, a head of a certain department of the Nanking Ministry of War.

B. Latter stated, appropos of announcement over the radio of sentence passed on a Japanese in Singapore for possession of seditious literature that "not long" General HATA had very secretly approached head of War Ministry, of Nanking, requesting his co-operation in enlistment of Chinese agents for work in Thailand, Burma and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure *FUKINESE* or *Chinese* speaking dialect of that province.

C. Chiu Che Sheng stated that a certain number of men were recruited and despatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated Chinese. Those chosen, in all cases, and some previous military knowledge gained through service at one time or another with Chinese forces. According to source CHEN KUANG is responsible directly to Japanese military H. Q. at Nanking and to all their authority.

D. Source endeavours to follow up. It is sent merely because Chiu Che Sheng's statements were spontaneous but it is not known if they have any foundation in fact.

(Value 3.)

The following is a report obtained October 1 from an American Shipping Agent from Kobe enroute to San Francisco.

1. He reports about September 10, 800 trucks assembled in the Sports ground Kobe and loaded soldiers. He could not state regiments since no civilians allowed near but he had opportunity to count the trucks. Their destination was supposedly Dairen.

2. Supplies of lub oil and gasoline are stored in valleys at Itozaki near Naval base, off the Inland sea. These valleys are dammed either end with concrete blocks—the whole stored area covered with soil and grass planted. A stevedoring superintendent told him Japanese navy has oil reserves for 2 years.

3. Maruzen Oil Co., Shanghai reported to be still importing gasoline and oil from U. S. which is then transhipped to Japan.

4. In early September a Frenchman from Saigon told him the Japanese were bluffing regarding troop numbers in French Indo China to divert public attention from the huge numbers being sent to the Siberian front via Dairen. The Frenchman estimated Japanese troops in French Indo China were only 35,000.

5. He reports the intense anti-American and British feeling in both Kobe and Yokohama. Every obstacle is put in the way of these nationals trying to complete formalities to leave the country. Both British and Americans have to stand in line in the streets for hours awaiting their applications to local police or prefecture officials examination, only to be told to come again next day. Personal search is made, particularly of British before they leave. One man, a Canadian (CPR Agent) was forced to lower his pants before embarking whilst police examined his body for hidden money.

(Valuation C2.)

*Extract No. 135 for Honolulu*

30th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

Only to Col. BICKNELL

**INDO CHINA—AVIATION—LANDING GROUND AT: CAP. ST. JACQUES**

(Cap. St. Jacques Town—107°06 East 10°21 North)

It will be noticed that the centre arm of the "T" has been somewhat extended, and that parts of the old landing Ground have been neglected and short scrub is now growing there.

**Surface.** The ground is reported as not suitable for Heavy Bombers.

Surface is sandy and not liable to flooding.

Source considers that the surface would be firmer after rain than during dry weather.

**Buildings:** Nil.

**Activities:** There is, at present, little activity and the Landing Ground is not being used.

A small Japanese guard is, however, on duty at nights.

(Valuation B 1.)

602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SEPTEMBER 29, 1942

To: Col. BICKNELL  
Mr. SHIVERS

It was reported that Admiral Decoux

A. Expressed his surprise at the many facilities accorded to Japanese in southern Indo China and his intention to put a stop to it. From personal observation in Saigon it was stated that something appears to have been done.

B. Stated that he had given instructions to Press to cease attacks on Britain and U. S. This was confirmed by Editor of "Breton" who states these instructions were given to a Press Meeting on 20th September.

(Value 2.)

*Extract No. 151 for Honolulu*

29th SEPTEMBER, 1942

Capt. MAYFIELD, only

— revisited Kure at beginning of July but was unable to enter dockyard himself owing to increased security measures.

We are of course unable to interrogate his sub source directly and following information is therefore given with reserve.

A. *Job F8.* Construction of upper works has been commenced.

B. *Jobs C. 96 and C. 97.* Vessels are expected to be launched in October completed in January 1942.

C. *German merchant ships.* Two German merchant ships of 6,000 and 4,000 tons respectively were being overhauled and refitted, having arrived from Kure on 2nd June. (Add ¶7 of #152)

([omit] Their structure was said to have deteriorated to such an extent to make them unable to carry the guns for which they had been designed they would therefore be with lighter guns than had originally been intended)

Source was told that these vessels would probably operate as troop transporters under Japanese flag.

D. *Labour force.* Has recently decreased to 6,300 repeat 6,300: this is believed due to shortage of raw materials: and superfluous labour was released for work in rice fields. (Muroshima is a rice growing district.)

One 10 repeat 10-hour shift is being worked on all shipbuilding jobs.

E. *New shell factory.* Labour force has been increased to 2,400 repeat 2,400 working in three shifts.

F. *German technicians.* Five repeat five are attached to shell factory four to shipyard.

(Rate C.)

To: Col. BICKNELL  
Mr. SHIVERS

29th SEPTEMBER, 1942

It was reported that—

A. The better class Annamites are pro French and anti Japanese and will join Pan Asiatic League the Japanese are forming. The Japanese are obtaining recruits for this League from the unemployed clerk class and from hired car drivers who are employed by them.

B. The Chinese more than any other community are inclined to cooperate with Japanese especially when their pockets gain.

C. There is talk of the formation of a Buddhist League.

Valuation 2

*Extract No. 150 for Honolulu.*

27th SEPTEMBER, 1942

Only to Col. BICKNELL

A. *Army Air Stations.*

ASAHIKAWA: pin point 43 degrees 44 minutes North, 142 degrees 16 minutes East. (Hokkaido)

FUKAYA: pin point 36° 9' North, 139° 16' East.

MIKATAGAHARA: pin point 34° 47' North, 137° 35' East.

B. *Naval air stations.*

KURIDA: pin point 35° 37' North 135° 7' East.



**C. Commercial Aviation Fields.**

NOSHIRO: pin point 40° 10' North, 140° 01' East.

**D. Landing fields with little or no equipment.**

NAIRO: South East coast of Sakhalien: pin point 49° 06' North, 142° 57' East.

AKKESHI: pin point 43° 05' North, 144° 50' East.

HIROO: pin point 42° 22' North, 143° 21' East.

TAKENOHARA: 39° 8' North, 141° 3' East.

KOFU: 35° 42' North, 138° 28' East.

TO TORI: 35° 36' North, 134° 16' East.

SHIBUSHI: 31° 32' North, 131° 9' East.

**Extract No. 149 for Honolulu**

26th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

Capt. MAYFIELD, only

----- revisited Malzuru dockyard at end of June and reports as follows:

A. *Pocket battleship afloat, "KISHU."* Vessel is still berthed near the slip from which she was launched.

Source was told that although the (rate D) Naval authorities were not repeat not satisfied with her performance, improvements could only be effected by extensive reconstruction. The authorities have decided not repeat not to undertake this, and vessel would therefore shortly join the sea-going fleet.

B. *Pocket battleship on slip.* Work still suspended.

C. *Two small vessels on slips.* Work still suspended, and hulls appear to have been put in a state of preservation, painted black and covered with canvas.

D. *Job H.1.*

*Forward Superstructure:* 6 storeys have now been completed and source was told there were to be 11 in all.

*Midship superstructure.* A row of steel girders has been erected on the after section. The section adjacent to the after superstructure has been increased in height, and what appears to be the stump of a mainmast is now visible.

*Aircraft hangar.* Source was told that the low structure immediately aft of the forward superstructure was to be the aircraft hangar.

Note. Source has previously reported that this ship was identical with "Job 45" at Yokosuka, and this resemblance appears to be growing.

E. *Job V.6.*

*Forward superstructure.* 7 storeys are now completed and work has commenced on the 8th.

Source was told this superstructure would also have 11 storeys.

F. (Rate D.) Source was told that launching of both these vessels had been delayed until December, but that it was expected to complete them by April. He volunteered the explanation that the short period required for completion was made possible by the advanced state of construction before launching.

He was also told that the difference at present to be seen between these two ships would disappear when they were completed.

G. 10 repeat 10-hour shifts were being worked on both ships.

H. (Rate D.) *2 new destroyers projected.* Source was told that, although blue print plans for these vessels had arrived in the yard, work had not repeat not commenced, due to the inability of Yawata Iron Works to supply constructional steel.

He was told that at lease one of the destroyers would be built in dry-dock.

I. 4 repeat 4 submarines (2 identified as I.57 and I.64) were in harbour.

J. Labour force in shipyard was reduced to 5,300 repeat 5,300 during June. About 7,000 repeat 7,000 Korean labourers are engaged in defence works outside the dockyards.

K. A. R. P.

Source was told that 5 Germans were supervising A. R. P. organization.

He said 4 large cases of sound locators arrive by train.

He was told that all important archives had been shifted from this dockyard, in anticipation of bombing attacks in the event of war with Russia.

**Extract No. 152 for Honolulu**

25th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

**JAPAN NAVAL KURE DOCKYARD**

Capt. MAYFIELD, only

*Increased Security Measures*

1. Source was unable to visit the dockyard in person, owing to increased security measures, and all the following information has been secured from a contact who had access to the yard. This sub-source has not been interrogated; his information is therefore given with reserve.

2. At the end of May a new permit for entry into the dockyard was issued; several arrests were made of unauthorized persons in the vicinity of the yard.

3. This was partially due to the increased troop movements from Ujina. Source reports on dockyard at the beginning of July:—

*Job F. 8*

4. Work was progressing on the upperworks.

2 DESTROYERS. C.96 and C.97

5. Vessels expected to be launched in October and completed in January

*German merchant ships*

6. Two German vessels, 6,000 and 4,000 tons respectively, arrived in the bay on 2nd June from Kobe for overhaul and refitting, and were still here at the beginning of July.

No card—reported in #151

add to #151

7. It was found that the ships were in poor condition. They are therefore more lightly armed than originally planned.

8. Sub-source was told that these vessels, on completion of refitting, will operate as transports under the Japanese flag.

NOTE: This last item is given with the utmost reserve.

*Labour force.*

9. Decreased to 6,300.

10. One 10-hour shift is worked on all shipbuilding jobs.

11. Decrease in labour force has been due to shortage of raw materials; superfluous labour has been released for work in the ricefields. (Miroshino a rice growing district).

*Shell factory*

12. Labour force increased to 2,400 working in 3 shifts.

GERMAN TECHNICIANS. 5 are attached to shell factory, 4 to shipyard.

*Extract No. 146 for Honolulu*

Capt. MAYFIELD, only

25th SEPTEMBER, 1941

A. Our telegram of 24th September, paragraph C. suggests that the vessel launched is the pocket battleship which we have previously reported as built at Yokosuka, but regarding which no further information was obtainable on her last trip.

B. Please note this is only conjecture, and we have no repeat no definite evidence to support it.

To: Col. Bicknell  
Capt. MAYFIELD

SEPTEMBER 25, 1941

---- reports.

A. 2 new types of Japanese heavy bombers have recently appeared in N. China. They are described as "type 98 and type 99 Naval."

B. Only specifications available and which apply to both types are:

Duration of flight, when not repeat not carrying maximum load, 10 repeat hours.

Speed not repeat not more than 250 miles repeat 250 miles per hour.

Service ceiling 35,000 repeat 35,000 feet.

C. The Hitachi aircraft works and the Ikegai Iron works are both producing German Jumo Junkers aero engines.

Combined output of these two works is 40 to 50 Jumo aero engines per month.

NOTE: Both these factories are located in town of Kawasaki which is midway between Tokyo and Yokohama and should not repeat not be confused with factories at Kobe.

D. Air force connections have recently been replaced by new men: this information is therefore not repeat not as reliable as that formerly obtained from same source and should be accepted with reserve pending confirmation.

*Extract No. 133 for Honolulu*

24th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

Capt. MAYFIELD only

A. ---- revisited Yokosuka dockyard at beginning of June but, owing to greatly increased security measures was unable to walk about the yard as on previous occasions.

B. He was obliged to remain in the waiting room in the administrative building, but was able to see the two large ships, jobs A45 and F15, both of which were still on the slips.

C. Note please that this contradicts reports by ----- that one heavy ship was launched here in the Spring; but discrepancy can be explained, if his statement in report under reference that three heavy ships are building here is correct.

D. *Job A45.* Main alternation of appearance is in forward superstructure where 7th storey has been completed, 8th storey has been added and 9th storey has been begun.

Source was told that there were to be 11 repeat 11 storeys in all, a fire control top being the 11th.

Source was also told that the aircraft hangar was situated in the low structure immediately aft of the forward superstructure.

Source was also told that this ship was due to be launched in October repeat October and to be completed in April, 1942. *Note.* Very short time for completion may be explained by the unusually advanced condition in which this ship is apparently being launched.

E. *Job F15.* Forward superstructure. 6th storey has been completed and work has commenced on a 7th storey which is built in at the after end.

Source was informed, but not repeat not definitely, that launch would take place about the same time as capital ships.

F. 24 repeat 24 hour shifts are still being worked on both these vessels.

G. Source was told that there was a total of 26 German technical advisers in the ship building department of which 4 were supervising the fitting out of these two vessels, particularly as regards the following points.

1. Mounting of new type of anti-aircraft gun.
2. Construction of fire control tower.
3. Improved method of catapulting aircraft.

H. *Destroyers.* Source was told that work on the two destroyers under construction here had been held up by shortage of steel produced by the Yawata Iron Works.

Source was told that 4 submarines and one transport were being refitted here in June.

J. *Labour force.* Total labour force in shipyard estimated at 8,800 repeat 8,800.

K. *A. R. P.* Source saw 9 air raid shelters near the main offices: constructed of concrete and estimated to be 120 feet by 60 feet by 11 feet high, of which 4 feet was below ground level.

*Extract No. 173 for Honolulu*

Only to BICKNELL

24th SEPTEMBER 1941.

INDO CHINA AVIATION LANDING GROUNDS

The following are less important Landing Grounds in South Indo China, but worthy of mention:

1. BARIA (107 11 East 10 31 North) 245 x 300 metres.
2. HON QUAN (106 36 East 11 37 North) 600 x 130 metres.
3. LONG THANH (108 17 East 11 7 North) 400 x 180 metres.
4. NUI BARA—500 x 350 metres.
5. TRANG BANG (106 22 East 11 1 North) 400 x 400 metres
6. VIN CHAU (105 54 East 10 10 North) 580 x 270 metres.
7. VO DAT (107 36 East 11 14 North) 600 x 750 metres.
8. SOCTRANG (105 31 East 9 32 North) 510 x 250 metres.

Of the above the following is known :

No. 5. Cannot be enlarged owing to nature of surrounding country.

No. 7. Of earth and grass surface. Liable to flooding during rains.

No. 8 SOCTRANG. Situated 2 kins to the SW of SOCTRANG on the road to BAI XAU. Ideal for enlargement as it is surrounded by flat land. Japanese have purchased the surrounding land and intend to enlarge and build an important aerodeome there.

Valuation B. 2

(Page 53C of Exhibit 6 is an outline map of Thailand and French Indochina and will be found reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBIT ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

*Japanese air bases in Indo-China*

|                     | No. of hangars | Landing Area in yards | Runways      | Remarks                                                    |
|---------------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>TONGKING</b>     |                |                       |              |                                                            |
| ?Bacninh            | (?)            | (?)                   | (?)          |                                                            |
| Gialam (Hanoi)      | 2              | 1220 x 1220           | 2(600 x 44)  | Always serviceable. Fuel & repairs. W/T.                   |
| Haiphong (Cat Bi)   | 2              | 2400 x 440            |              | Fuel & repairs. W/T.                                       |
| ?Laichau            | 0              | 660 x 250             |              | Fuel. Minor repairs. W/T Flooded July-Aug.                 |
| Langson             | 1              | 800 x 500             |              | Fuel. Minor repairs.                                       |
| Loakay              | (?)            | 1300 x 220            |              | Fuel. Minor repairs.                                       |
| Phulangthuong       | 2              | 660 x 660             |              | Fuel. Minor repairs.                                       |
| Phutho              | (small) 0      | 780 x 200             |              | Liable to flood. Fuel & minor repairs. Always serviceable. |
| <b>ANNAM</b>        |                |                       |              |                                                            |
| Nhatrang            | 1              | 550 x 300             |              | Fuel & repairs. Liable to flood.                           |
| Tourane             | 2              | (?)                   | 2(1300 x 44) | Fuel. Minor repairs. Always serviceable.                   |
| <b>COCHIN—CHINA</b> |                |                       |              |                                                            |
| Bienhoa             | 6              | 1100 x 770            |              | Fuel. Repairs. W/T.                                        |
| Kompong Trach       | 0              | 880 x 44              |              | Fuel. Minor repairs. Always serviceable.                   |
| Phnompenh           | 1              | 990 x 880 x 660       | 3(880 x 44)  | Fuel. Minor repairs.                                       |
| Siemreap (Angkor)   | (?)            | 2700 x 1900           |              | Fuel. Repairs.                                             |
| Soctrang            | 0              | 1100 x 880            |              | Always serviceable.                                        |
| Tansonmhut (Saigon) | 6              | 1100 x 880            | 2(1300 x 44) | Fuel. Repairs. W/T. Always serviceable.                    |

? Not certain if Japanese have actually used this base.

Only to Col. BICKNELL

*Extract No. 136 for Honolulu*

24th SEPTEMBER, 1941

**INDO CHINA AVIATION LANDING GROUNDS**

The following is a list of other Landing Grounds mentioned as existing in Indo China in 1938:

*Province of Annam.*—AN-KHE; BA NGOI; BA METHUOT; DAK DALAT; DONG HOI; DRAN; HA CO; PHAN RANG; PHANTHET; PHAN CAT; QUANG NGAI; QUANG TRI; TAM KY; TAN MY; THANH HUE; VINH; VINH HAO; TUY HOA; VAN XUAN; CANH DUONG;

*Province of CAMBODIE.*—CHROUI SRADAN; HAUT CHLONG; KOMPOUT; CHNANG; POMPONG THOM; KRATIE; MUONG OU DONG; PREY VEY; PURSAT; SAMBOR; SISCEHON; SOAI RIENG;

*Province of LAOS.*—BAN DON; BAN NA XALA; BAN NONG BOA; PHOU PHO; BAM THOUET; BUN KHONG; LA KHONE PENG; LAK SAO; LUANG PRABANG; MUONG SINH; NAPE; PAKSANE; PAKSE; SAM NEUA; SAVANNAKET; KIENG KHOUANG;

vince of TONKIN.—BACKAN: CAO BANG: DIENBIENPHU: DONG  
 : FORT BAYARD: HA GIANG: KEP HA: LAI CHAU: LANG SO  
 AY: MONCAY: NAM DINH: NGUYEN BINH: PHU LANG THUONG:  
 THO: QUYNH NHAI: SON LA: THAT KHE: TONG: VINH YEN:  
 all cases where any of these Landing grounds have not been referred to  
 previous reports, it can be assumed that they are small. State of preserva-  
 f still in existence, is unknown and doubtful.

MAYFIELD, only

*Extract No. 154 for Honolulu*

23rd SEPTEMBER, 1941.

JAPAN NAVAL MAIZURU DOCKYARD

orce revisited Maizuru dockyard at the end of June and reports as follows:

**POCKET BATTLESHIP AFLOAT—"AISHU"**

This vessel was seen berthed near the slip from which she was launched.  
 No work was going on, but source saw the large crane had been moved  
 er.

He was told that it was expected that this vessel would soon be sent to  
 be fleet, although the (Naval Authorities were not satisfied with her. This  
 because improvements could only be made by extensive reconstruction,  
 could not be authorized.)

**POCKET BATTLESHIP ON SLIP**

Work was still suspended on this vessel.

**TWO SMALL VESSELS ON SLIPS**

No further work on these vessels.

Entire keels have been covered with canvas, and painted black. Source  
 old that this was to preserve the steel.

**OB "H. I."**

ard Superstructure:

Six storeys have been completed and work has begun on the seventh.

Source was told that there were going to be eleven storeys in all.

RE.—This agrees with what he was told concerning the A.45 at Yokosuka.

hips Superstructure:

A row of steel bars has been put up in the after section.

The section adacent to the aft superstructure has been increased in height,  
 post or mainmast is visible.

aft hangar

Source was told that the low structure immediately aft of the forward  
 structure was the aircraft hangar.

**JOB V. 6.**

ard Superstructure

even storeys now completed and work has commenced on the eighth.

Source was told that this vessel, also, was to have eleven storeys.

and V. 6 GENERAL

Source was told that launch of both these vessels had been delayed until  
 umber, but that it was expected to complete them by April, this brief period  
 completion will be made possible by the advance state of construction before  
 ching.

In conversation with dockyard employee, source commented on dissiml-  
 y of forward superstructure on these two vessels, and on that of the A. 45 at  
 suka. He was told that on completion these differences would disappear.  
 10-hour shifts were worked on these vessels.

**PROPOSED TWO NEW DESTROYERS.**

Although the plans of these vessels had arrived at the yard, work had not  
 menced, owing to the inability of the Yawata Iron Works to supply steel.

18. Source was told that at least one of the destroyers would be built in dock.

(G). MISCELLANEOUS.

*Vessels refitting.*

19. Four submarines were seen moored in the harbour, two of which were to be I. 57 and I. 64.

20. One large armed trawler was seen in dry dock.

*Labour Force:*

21. This was reduced to 5,300 repeat 5,300 in the shipyard in June.

22. About 7,000 Korean labourers are engaged in the preparation of docks works outside the dock yard.

**MILITARY POLICE:**

23. A unit of 35 gendarmes is stationed in the dockyard.

**A. R. P.**

24. Source was told that five Germans were attached to assist in A. R. P. matters.

25. At the end of June, source saw four large cases of sound locators by train.

26. He was told that important documents had been shifted from the dock in anticipation of war with Russia. Should this occur, it is expected that Maizura will be bombed.

SEPTEMBER 23RD, 1941

*Extract No. 99 for Honolulu*

-----reports September 5th, Hainan Island.

A. Among instructions issued by General TERAUCHI SHOICHI (DQU COM AAB) to forces in this area were:

1. Black out exercises to commence from September 10th.

2. To complete by end of October the construction of 5 repeat 5 small factories. They are under direction of engineer Colonel HARAKAMI AAG).

B. Following are principal Intelligence Agents appointed at:—

Hainan Island, SANO (AFQ TAK).

Indo-China, TSUKADA (CIG JYS).

Canton, YOSHIMOTO TAIGIRO (BAD GOK CQU MAY SQU).

C. August 24th 500 repeat 500 cases of bombs, 1,200 repeat 1,200 cases of shells and 300 repeat 300 cases of aircraft spares landed at YU LIN KAN Japan.

SEPTEMBER 23RD, 1941

*Extract No. 100 for Honolulu*

D. August 25th 22 repeat 22 twin engine bombers, commanded by C. MORIYAMA (H DU DYA) arrived at KIUNG SHAN aerodrome from Foshan (stated to be dive bombers but this is to be accepted with reserve and is being questioned on this type).

E. According to air force gossip it has been decided that with the advent of the foggy season at Chung-King aircraft at Hankow will be transferred to the southern area and that after September 500 repeat 500 bombers are based in Indo-China.

To Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

*Extract No. 136 for Honolulu*

23RD SEPTEMBER, 1941

JAPANESE DAILY NOTES, YAMAMOTO GORO, VISA REFUSED

September 6th, 1941—YAMAMOTO Goro, member of the Mitsubishi Kaisha applied for a visa at the Netherlands consulate general at Batavia. He has been in the Netherlands Indies from February 19, 1940, till June 1941, as a representative of the aforesaid firm, but travelled over West Middle Java with YOSHIDA Toshio, naval officer and Major FUKUDA N.

medical officer. He now explains that his former stay at Java was connected with the audit of the accounts of the Mitsubishi concern (Batavia and Soerabang branches). However he never applied for a labour permit. There is no sufficient reason now for a renewed audit of the accounts after 4 years, visa was recommended for refusal.

Situation 1.

to Col. Bicknell

*Extract No. 134 for Honolulu*

20TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.

#### JAPANESE TROOPS IN INDO-CHINA

Partial confirmation as to presence of puppet troops in *Indo-China* is afforded from Free French sources, who put their proportion of total very much higher, i. e. 40 repeat 40 per cent Chinese and 10 repeat 10 per cent Manchukuo Korean.

Our opinion (based on experience in Formosa, Hainan and South China) that proportion of puppet troops to Japanese is always greatly exaggerated has very seldom proved to be more than 20 repeat 20 per cent.

Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

SEPTEMBER 19, 1941.

#### *Survey of the Political Situation in Japan* *Excellent survey for Sept. 19*

According to a well-informed Japanese, the army as well as about fifty ultranationalistic, pan-Asiatic organizations brought heavy pressure upon the Japanese government and the Navy in order to attack the oil tankers from America Vladivostokward. The Navy refused positively, maintaining that it was up to her to force Japan's national policy, being however prepared to carry out the policy decided by the Emperor with all its might.

The Japanese Navy seems as yet to be opposed to provoke America and is determined to be no match for the combined America-Allied Forces in the Pacific.

The army is firmly determined to continue to assist Germany in accordance with the Tripartite Pact by binding the Allied Forces in South-East Asia through occupation of Indo-China, which country Vichy handed over to the Japanese in the order of Hitler and through concentration of big military forces (about 1 million) at the Manchukuo frontier in order to lighten the pressure on Germany's East front.

The army was absolutely convinced that the Russian resistance would be annihilated, being much impressed by the reports of the Japanese military mission to Germany under Lt. General MATSUSHIMA. The army therefore expected soon to be able to occupy Siberia and the Maritime Provinces.

The army authorities and the majority of the Japanese people however do not fully realize that a quick destruction of Russia's army cannot be counted on with the result that the army is holding back for the present.

The recent speech of General Baron Sadao ARAKI concerning the necessity of national unity against the threatening danger from abroad, really has the effect of opinion between the army and navy about Japan's immediate policy as background.

Minister Sankichi TAKAHASHI, Cabinet-adviser and one of the most powerful Japanese leaders, published recently an article in which he doubted whether Germany will win the war and which should be considered as a hint, that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was a blunder.

The dispute between Army and Navy is supposed to have strengthened the position of KONOR and the entourage of the Emperor, giving the present situation a chance to maintain itself and to withhold the army from bringing about an armed conflict.

However, all this by no means implicates that Japan directly will turn its back on Hitler, nor will Japan be inclined to negotiate about the withdrawal of troops from Indo-China. This is considered impossible, firstly in view of the fact that the Axis-Pact was announced by Imperial Decree and secondly in view of the vital importance of the stranglehold on Indo-China by Japan, economically and strategically.

Another question to be reckoned with is the mission to Indo-China of Ambassador YOSHIZANA and his suite of Army, Navy, and other officials, who actually prepared Yoshizawa's appointment to Governor-General of Indo-China.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1941

To: Capt. Mayfield, Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

It is reported on 7th September, that.

A. Japanese Consul General Batavia stated that Japanese Government intended to attach the courier NOMOTO TATSUO to the Consulate for two months after his return from Singapore.

B. Consul General ISHIZAWA stated that N. is cipher expert attached to the Consulate with instructions on use of the new complicated Japanese code.

C. N. told Immigration authorities that he would hold conferences at various Japanese Consulates and would serve as a temporary cashier at Consulate General Batavia.

D. It was stated KAWASAKI YOSHIZAKI, who sailed from Japan on 14th September, was registered as a secretary to Consulate General but was in reality a code expert in service of Japanese Navy.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1941

To: Col. BICKNELL  
Mr. SHIVERS

It was reported on September 14 that General WU YI PING, who returned to that day from Tokio after a special visit on behalf of Nanking Government, stated:—

A. KONOYE Cabinet was experiencing much difficulty as a result of increasing criticism from extreme right-wing elements who were secretly demanding drastic measures to be taken to conceal Japan's position in the TIEH YO.

B. If it was true Premier had strengthened his position by obtaining support of the so-called "court groups" it was doubtful if this support was powerful enough to keep despotism of Rightists in full check. Main argument of the latter is that Japan, in order to gain any real results from conversations with American democracies in general, will have to make definite concessions, not only in China and Far East questions in general, but most probably in connection with her future relations to Axis.

C. Equally the Government understands that such concessions (particularly in relation to the China incident, which was started by the Army extremists) will lead to open insubordination of extreme Right groups and adoption of a protective policy by them, either in north or south, which will finally identify Japan's fate with that of Germany.

D. Cabinet's policy is therefore to drag out conversations with America to the utmost possible limit and to profit by any easing in the Far East situation which strengthens its own position.

E. Cabinet is also exercised as to the final effects of British and American economic policy and while it is putting on a bold front at present it realizes that the Japanese people are becoming anxious as to the future. This anxiety has been further increased by the inability of Germany to force a quick decision against Russia and thus help to remove the menace of the Soviet forces in the Far East.

Value 3

*Extract No. 123 for Honolulu*

17th SEPTEMBER, 1941

----- reports:

A. Important fortifications with heavy calibre guns "facing south" at Kotobuki Yama (22 degrees 29 min North 120 degrees 36 min. East).

Comment. This position appears to be about 4 miles from the sea and the purpose of such fortifications is hard to understand.

B. Calibre of largest guns mounted at Kotobuki Yama (Ape Hill: noted in the defences of Takao: subject of numerous reports in 1936 and 1937) is 14 inch maximum range 14 inch.

*Extract for Honolulu*

SEPT. 17, 1941

July 18, 1941

From censorship we learned that an AGARIE Saburo at Pelew (writing as a fisherman at Ambon) employed by the Japanese Navy Ministry "gathered stones."



"as you know" thus he writes further to his friend, "there are starting this 100 persons enlisted yearly as "celestial storming troops" destined for the Netherlands Indies. Although I should like to take part in it, I abandoned this as I earn monthly 200 and 300 yen."

It is very remarkable that some time ago a similar letter concerning the train- on the Island of Yap of storm troops destined for the Netherlands East Indies came to our attention.

19, 1941

Reference S. B. Japanese Notes from 9th July 1941, concerning KOSUGI Inori, director of Ishihara Sanyokoshi, who wished to make a tour of inspection of the I. S. K. Mines in Jahore and Trankanu.

On this person, formerly managing director of Nanyo Koshtsu Kaisha at New Guinea, entrance was refused to this country because of his devising plans to attack this country, as was revealed from his writing during a home search at the I. S. K. office at Nanokwari. According to him the Nanyo Kobatsu Kaisha is an outpost of the Japanese southward move, and his employees were the stormtroops. In connection with the discovery of this compromising correspondence he was dismissed by his company just as was (for the same reason) IWOUE, former administrator.

It is not without interest that this arduous southward expansionist now enters the service of the notorious Ishihara!

Reported to Col. Bicknell

*Extract No. 142 for Honolulu*

16TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.

It is reported that—

40 of the 80 Japanese aircraft at Tienho and Pakwan received orders to fly to China on 20th August.

airplane movements.

7,000 Korean conscripts who were training in Heito Formosa were sent to China in middle August.

Japanese troop Hainan (Runin).

Passed with reserve. Untried source.

Page 4.

Shivers

Mayfield

Bicknell

CONFIDENTIAL

SEPTEMBER 16, 1941.

It was reported that,

During conversation with a Japanese source in YAMASHITA line it was noted that owing to the acute shortage of shipping available for carrying Japanese goods from Japan to Shanghai, Japanese ----- were considering possibility of chartering foreign flag vessels for Yokohama and Kobe Shanghai runs. The source also reports investigation of a market in which he is personally interested, i.e., export of Japanese manufactured imitation Panama hats, fibre and rubber hoods to United States shows Japanese are making contracts with third parties here to sell their goods in order to obtain U. S. currency.

Goods in question are imported from Japan marked "Made in China" and sold by third parties hereto importers in U. S. against cash U. S. dollars or against credit to foreign exporters.

NOTE:

It has been consistently rumored on China coast that this is being abetted by Chinese merchants in Hongkong—

It is a fact that much of this goods moves through Hongkong.

*Extract No. 122 for Honolulu*

14th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

----- has supplied a sketch map of Yokosuka dockyard.

Points of interest are:—

One new building slip in position between No. 3 and No. 4 dock, as shown on sketch map.

Two new, very small, slips in basin adjacent to railway station, on each of which one motor torpedo boat is being built.

No repeat no alterations in dry docks.

Confirms position of small repair slip astern of "Mikasa already reported

----- agent in November, 1940.

*Extract No. 120 for Honolulu.*

13th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

- reports.
- A. Appearance in South China area of new type of high altitude bomber built in Germany.
  - B. Described as Heinkel-land (IHA OMR GYH OYK) type 98 repeat 98.
  - C. Its special function is "silent approach" bombing.

*Extract for Honolulu*

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

Between August 7 and August 10 mine layers for Pescadore laid further mines off TAI AN KEI.

August 13, 9 repeat 9 destroyers and 4 repeat 4 gunboats arrived KEELUNG and 3 repeat 3 destroyers arrived TAKAO from Japan and sailed after refueling.

August 9, 100 repeat 100 mines and 10 repeat 10 motor launches were loaded on transport which left for Indo-China.

*Extract No. 98 for Honolulu*

11th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

JAPAN—ECONOMIC—EFFECT OF ALLIED PRESSURE ON JAPAN IN N. E. I.

Concerning the economic pressure on Japan the following can be remarked. IMAGAWA Yoshitochi, Director of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Batavia, is rumoured to have said that the economic retaliatory measures taken by England, America and the Netherland East Indies were a heavy blow for Japan's economic position, but, in view of the good relations with Thailand, Indo-China, Manchuria and occupied China, Japan would quickly recover from it.

The difficult point was always and would remain whether the oil supplies would be stopped or not. The Japanese ambassadors in America and England had received instructions to do their utmost to prevent the stopping of these supplies. In the other case Japan would not hesitate but immediately take the necessary steps to occupy Borneo.

In the latter case (provided the Japan Japs had not attacked the other islands) England and America would only protest and not intervene).

According to a report from Soerabaja some big Japanese firms as for instance the Naayo Veem (Southern Godown Company) dismissed already members of their staff. In view of a report in Japanese newspaper the Japanese Consul at Soerabaja wrote this newspaper that the Japanese banks and firms did not intend to close down following the Netherlands economic measures. A similar letter he addressed to the head of the local Government of Soerabaja.

Valuation C Ø.

*Extract No. 119 for Honolulu.*

11th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

----- has again visited Himeji but has not repeat not been able to obtain any satisfactory confirmation of the location or existence of the aerial bomb and poison gas factory previously reported.

*Extract No. 116 for Honolulu*

10th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

----- while in Japan, was given the following information by Formosan friends from Takao area regarding Toshiyen Naval Base.

- A. 4 repeat 4 dry docks completed.
- B. Submarines are based here.
- C. New aerodrome completed.

*Extract No. 117 for Honolulu*

10th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

----- reports that the underground hangars at Okayama aerodrome reported in my telegram of September 3rd, paragraph C, are built to a similar design to that of Kasumigaura aerodrome and that they have a capacity for 50 repeat 50 aircraft.

*Extract No. 97 for Honolulu.*

10th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

## NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND SOUTH SEAS

## JAPANESE ESPIONAGE TRAINING.

From censorship we learned that MURAKAMI Shogo, employee of the Tjijoda Department Store, Soerabaja, in possession of a temporary residence permit dated 8.4.34, No. 434, being on furlough in Japan, follows a course at school of great importance for the National Policy" where he received lessons from officers of the Army and Navy, and from officials of the Ministry of Overseas affairs.

The name of the School he indicates as "XXX Institute, the teachers are marked in the same way XXX officers of the Army etc.,

Undoubtedly the School in question is one of the "Southward Expansion" schools where Japanese colonists are trained for their future task of propaganda and espionage.

Moreover Murakami is a great admirer of the German "Kultur", as we in February already learned from censorship. He has made a study of the German language and intended to go to Germany.

In connection with the above his temporary residence permit was cancelled by Government Order as he is considered dangerous for public peace and order.

Value C Ø.

*Extract No. 118 Honolulu.*

10th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

----- reports the construction of a new aerodrome at Toko, which affords independent confirmation of telegram of 15th May.

*Extract No. 94 for Honolulu*

9th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

N. E. I.; JAPANESE—REPRESENTATIVES OF OSAKA MAINICHI AND TOKYO NIOHI NICHU FORCED TO LEAVE N. E. I.

ISHIBASHI Tsuneyoshi and TOBISHIMA Sadashireo, representatives of the Osaka Mainichi and Tokio Nichi Nichi were forced to leave the country. In the future no reporters of the above mentioned Japanese newspapers will be allowed to enter the Netherlands Indies. The aforesaid measure was enforced on account of the systemic anti-Dutch press campaign in these papers.

ISHIBASHI, moreover, made photo's in forbidden areas and violated the alien registration ordinance.

Value 1.

*Extract No. 95 for Honolulu.*

9TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.

## N. E. I. JAPANESE ACTIVITIES AND APPLICATIONS FOR VISAS

ARAKI Keijiro, managing director of Toyo Bosuifu Manufacturing Co. applied for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Tokio. He intends to stay here for 3 months to inspect a rubber factory now under construction at Soerabaya following up his visit to this country in December in connection with the erection of a factory of waterproof cloth at Soerabaya. Although this matter is still under consideration and for this purpose MASHIBA Tetsuo, a proxy of this firm, is already in this country, it was advised to grant the visa under condition however that the duration of his stay is limited.

SHIGITA KENZO, exporter of automobile parts, accessories, etc. applied for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Shanghai. He intends to make a 2 month's business trip over Java. Applicant paid already a visit of about 14 days in April 1940 and a visit of about 20 days in January-February 1941 to Java. No objection.

HAYASHI Junjiro, acting manager of Nomura & Co. Singapore, who on 29th July left this country by plane after having paid a short visit to Batavia, again applied for a visa at the Netherlands Consulate-General, Singapore, as he has

to negotiate once again with the director of the Batavia Branch of this It was advised to grant the visa provided the duration of his stay is previously.

*Extract No. 96 for Honolulu*

9TH SEPTEMBER, 19

N. E. I.: JAPANESE EVACUATION OF WOMEN

In connection with the growing political tension between Japan and Netherlands Indies 180 Japanese women and children of Batavia, Sama and Soerabaya are reported to have embarked on 1st August on board of HARUNA MARU to return to their home country. From conversations during this embarkment it appeared that these families do not intend to return to this country before the war is over (which would be within 6 months according to some optimistic Japanese).

The employees of the Domei Agency in this country get also telegraphic consent from Tokio to repatriate their families. The Japanese Consul-General at Batavia is reported to have sent a circular to the Japanese colonists in order to advise them to speed up the evacuation of their wives and children. "Nanyo Kaiun" received permission from the Japanese Government to delay the passengers accommodation of the next two ships (Nichiran Maru and Burma Maru) for evacuation purposes. The Nichiran Maru is leaving Soerabaya on the 12th August.

In Semarang it is rumoured that the German women who from the Netherlands Indies intended to return to Germany via Japan and Russia are working in Japanese munition factories.

Valp. 1.

*Extract No. 112 for Honolulu*

9th SEPTEMBER, 19

----- reports regarding aerodromes which are in the vicinity of, and perhaps be identical with those already reported by R. A. F. Intelligence.

A. SUNOSAKI (IGD EAB) Naval aerodrome and seaplane base.

Pin point 34° 58' North, 139° 49' East.

6 kilometres East of promontory of the same name and 4 kilometres west of town of Joje (VIA HAL).

Area about 100 acres repeat 100 acres.

Possibly identical with Tateyama aerodrome.

B. FUNAHASHI (OJL HOP) Military aerodrome.

Pin point 35° 42' North, 139° 56' East. West of and adjacent to railway station of same name.

Area about 106 acres repeat 106 acres.

*Buildings:* 4 hangars, also barracks.

300 paratroops from Eastern Section Army headquarters undergoing training here under German supervision.

Source states "there is an aircraft factory in vicinity with German technicians attached".

Perhaps identical with Shinosaki aerodrome.

C. AKITSU (ITA IFX) Military aerodrome.

Pin point 35° 49' North, 139° 29' East. One and a half kilometres North of railway station of same name.

Area about 170 acres repeat 170 acres.

Total of 3000 personnel stationed here, of which a very small proportion believed to be paratroops being trained by German instructors.

Perhaps identical with Sayama aerodrome.

D. SHINAGAWA (BGU ECB) aerodrome and seaplane base.

Position approximately 35° 38' North, 139° 44' and a half minutes East.

One and a half kilometres south east of railway station of same name.

Area about 80 acres repeat 80 acres.

Possibly identical with Shibata aerodrome, already reported:

*Extract No. 114 for Honolulu*

9th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

----- reports on the following *new aerodromes* in Japan.  
 Yokkaido (BYO, PON, SIR) Military Aerodrome. Pin point 35° 40' North, 139° 09' East. One kilometre North West of railway station of same name. Area 75 repeat 75 acres.  
 Mio (AAF AHU) Military Aerodrome. Pin point 35° 0' North, 138° 31' East. Small number of paratroops from Shidzuoka Military formations are being trained here.  
 Suma (UHN LIL) Naval Aerodrome. Still under construction. Location approximately 5 kilometres west of Kobe. Area about 325 acres repeat 325 acres.

*Extract No. 115 for Honolulu*

9th SEPTEMBER, 1941.

Kanoya (UZH DUW) Military Aerodrome. Pin point 31° 25' North, 130° 05' East. Locally known as Kasanohara (MEN TAK AYO) Aerodrome. Area about 325 acres repeat 325 acres. Parachute unit being trained by German instructors. Aircraft factory in vicinity employing several thousand workmen. Possibly identical with Kanoya Naval Aerodrome.

*Extract No. 118 for Honolulu.*

9TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.

----- furnishes following information regarding aerodrome already reported by R. A. F. Intelligence.  
 Tsudanuma (IFX, JYS, IEC) Military Aerodrome. Area 75 repeat 75 acres. Paratroops of 1st repeat 1st Division under training here.  
 Yokaichi (BYO, GAZ, ECK) Military Aerodrome. Locally known as Yokaichi (ECB, BAC) aerodrome. Area 125 repeat 125 acres.

Col. Bicknell, Mr. Shivers

9TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.

Source reports that a meeting of important Japanese was held on August 1st in Yokohama Specie Bank Shanghai which was addressed by a certain Major General. He spoke—  
 Japanese-American conversations at Washington were commenced at urgent request of German Government conveyed to Admiral Toyoda through German Ambassador.  
 German Government's view was that only through such conversation would it be possible to discover real intention of Great Britain and U. S. A. following occupation of Iran and before opening of Moscow conference.  
 Ott in his message to Toyoda stressed that it should be possible for Japan, in discussing question of American aid to Russia via Vladivostock, to discover quantity and exact nature of cargoes which it is intended to send to Russia, number of vessels to be used, whether they would be convoyed and nature of at least main clauses in agreement for American assistance to Soviet.  
 He thought also, it should be possible to discover whether or not American aid would be sent via Iran.  
 He admitted that in its greater measure such information would be of more value to Germany than to Japan but held also that Japan would through such conversations obtain a clear indication of Anglo-American decisions and future plans in Pacific area and the degree of solidarity of the A. B. C. D. front.  
 He admitted that to gain such invaluable information Japan would have to adopt a conciliatory attitude but this coupled with astute diplomacy would probably cause American statesmen to reveal more than they realized.  
 KUNO stated German Government's proposals were fully discussed at recent meeting of Supreme Command. The results were conveyed by Prince Hiroto to the Emperor who then authorized former to address his recent message to American President.  
 Comment. I do not know what interpretation of value to place on this report. It may be a clever fabrication; on the other hand it is not inconsistent with

"SLICK" methods of German diplomacy and FACTUAL information and indications sought would be of much value to Reich if obtained.

Source was not repeat not at meeting but obtained the above information from Minutes of the Meeting filed at CONCORDIA Association. Comments would be of great value to us.

Your comments would be appreciated.

*Extract for Honolulu*

SEPTEMBER 6, 1941.

#### JAPAN—AIR

#### NOTES ON MISCELLANEOUS AERODROMES

Following is some miscellaneous information mostly hearsay on Japanese aerodromes:

##### A. SUNOSAKI ( )

1. Naval aerodrome and seaplane base.
2. *Locations.* Entrance Yokohama Bay. 34°58' north, 139°49' east. 6 kilometres east of promontory of same name. 4 kms. west of town of HOJO ( ) and TATEYAMA. NOTE: R. A. F. Intelligence thinks this is Tateyama aerodrome, located by them 34°59' N. 139°53' E.
3. *Area.* 120,000 tsubo, i. e. about 100 acres.
4. *Aircraft.* Aircraft stationed here include Messerschmitt ME 110 and Piaggio P. X. I. R. C. 40. Heavy bomber.

##### B. FUNABASHI (E. OF TOKYO 6 MILES)

5. Military aerodrome.
6. *Locations.* 35°42' north, 139°58' east. West of and adjacent to town and railway station of this name.
- NOTE: This might be the same aerodrome as that reported by R. A. F. Intelligence as Shinosaki; 35°43' N. 139°54' E.
7. *Area.* 130,000 tsubo, i. e. about 106 acres.
8. *Parachute Training.* 300 troops of the Eastern Section Army H. Q. are under training here as parachutists under German supervision.
9. There is one parachute training tower.
10. *Buildings.* Four hangers. Barracks for parachutists and aviation personnel.
11. *Aircraft factory.* Source states "there is an aircraft factory here with a few German technicians attached." This is hearsay only and no further information is available.

##### C. TSUDA NUMA

12. Military aerodrome.
13. *Location.* 35°41' North, 140°01' East. West of and adjacent to railway station of same name.
- NOTE: R. A. F. Intelligence gives location as 35°39' N, 140°05' E.
14. *Area.* 90,000 tsubo or 75 acres.
15. *Parachute training.* Parachute troops of 1st division are under training here.
16. There is one parachute training tower.

##### D. YOKAIDO

17. Military aerodrome.
18. *Location.* 35°40' North, 140°09' East. 1 kilometre N. W. of town and railway station of same name.
19. *Area.* 90,000 tsubo or 75 acres.

##### E. AKITSU

20. Military aerodrome.
21. *Location.* 35°49' north, 139 29' east.  
1 and a half kms. north of railway station of same name.
22. NOTE: This might be the same aerodrome as that reported by R. A. F. Intelligence as Sayama; 35°44' N, 139°28' E.
22. *Area.* 200,000 tsubo, i. e. about 170 acres.
23. *Parachute training.* Parachute training is carried out here under the supervision of German advisers.

There are *two* parachute jumping towners.

*Personnell* Total of 3,000 men are based here, inclusive of aviation personnel and parachutists.

#### F. YOKAICHI

*Military aerodrome.*

*Location.* 35°06' north, 136°13' east. 3 kms. E. S. E. of town of same name.

*NOTE:* R. A. F. Intelligence gives location as 35°10' N. 136°15' E.

Source states that name of aerodrome is known locally as Kawai, although AICHI is the nearest town.

*Area.* 150,000 tsubo or 125 acres.

*Parachute training.* There is *one* parachute training tower here.

#### G. MIO

*Military aerodrome.*

*Location.* 35°00' north, 138°31' east.

*Parachute training.* A small number of parachutists from SHIDZUOKA is under training here. There is *one* parachute training tower.

#### H. SUMA

*Naval aerodrome.* A new aerodrome is *under construction* at SUMA.

*Location.* Approximate 5 kms. west of KOBE.

*Area.* 400,000 tsubo, i. e. about 325 acres.

#### I. TOKYO

There is an aerodrome and seaplane base one and a half kms. S. E. of AGAWA railway station. Position is approximately 35°38' N, 139°44 and a minutes East.

*Area.* 100,000 tsubo, i. e. about 80 acres.

*Comment.* This may possibly be the SHIBATA aerodrome reported previously

#### J. KANOYA

*Location.* 31°25' north, 130°51' east.

*NOTE:* (a) Source states that this is a military aerodrome, whereas R. A. F. intelligence says it is Naval, and located at 31°2' N., 130°53' E. It is probable our source was misinformed as to the service, but it is possible that there are separate aerodromes in the vicinity.

Source also states that aerodrome is known locally as the KASANOHARA aerodrome.

*Area.* 400,000 tsubo, i. e. about 325 acres.

*Parachute training.* There is a parachute unit here being trained by German instructors. There are *two* parachute jumping towers.

*Aircraft factory.* Source was told that there was an aircraft factory here employing several thousand workmen.

act for Honolulu:

SEPTEMBER 5, 1941.

- reports considerable air traffic passing through Waichow Island from East to West, including a large proportion of twin-engined monoplane bombers.

SEPTEMBER 5, 1941.

The idea of the intensity of paratroop training at KOGO can be formed from the fact that 8 aircraft have been in daily use since the middle of July for this purpose.

uation B 2.

ct No. 125 for Honolulu.

4TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.

#### JAPAN

#### MILITARY

#### Unfamiliar Type of Armoured Car

old and well-established Source, who can generally be relied upon to use his eyes with accuracy, has reported seeing at TAKAO an unfamiliar type of armoured car which he describes as follows:

2. 20 ft. long, 9 ft. high, and six wheels with three wheels at the front back. (i. e. three wheels abreast).

3. This is given with all due reserve, but we should be interested to whether it fits in with any new type of vehicle in use elsewhere.

3RD SEPTEMBER, 1941

Extract No. 124 for Honolulu.

— gives following information on Japanese Naval Air units in China. (Compiled in April, 1941).

A. North China. Tsingtao Naval Squadron: Two light bomber squadrons.  
B. Central China. 2nd Combined Air Unit. YAMAMOTA KAWAHIRA (GOK ECB ECU).

1. 12th Naval Air Squadron, Location unknown. FURUSE KIKI (IRX RAW DIH). Three light bomber, three fighter squadrons.

2. 13th Naval Air Squadron, Location unknown. KIKUCHI ASAZO (ICK GOB AAF). 4 Heavy bomber, 1 reconnaissance squadron.

3. "Detached Air Unit". Location unknown. 2 light bomber squadrons.

C. South China. 1st Combined Air Unit. YAMAGUCHI TAMON (DYA CPA CBZ).

1. Kanoya Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. Three heavy bomber squadrons.

2. Takao Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. Three heavy bomber squadrons.

3. Kisarazu Naval Air Squadron. Walchow Island. Four heavy bomber, one fighter squadron.

D. Third Combined Air Unit. ONISHI TAKIJIRE (CQE PZA ISE IKB S).

1. 14th Naval Air Squadron. Sancho Island. 3 light bomber, 1 reconnaissance squadrons.

2. 15th Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. YAMAMOTO CHIKAO (DYA QAL UBR). 3 heavy bomber squadrons.

3. 16th Naval Air Squadron. Hainan. 2 heavy bomber, 1 fighter squadron.

E. 2nd Air Unit. KAGA. 3 light bomber, 1 fighter squadron. RYUHO (light bomber, 1 fighter squadron).

F. 3rd Air Unit. NOTORO and KAMOI. 2 reconnaissance squadrons each.

G. 4th Air Unit. CHIYODA and MOZUHO. 2 reconnaissance squadrons each.

H. Total aircraft 590 repeat 590.

#### JAPANESE REPATRIATION

14ND #  
Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation A-1): "372 Japanese students of Philippines have booked and paid for passage on SS MAREC JOFFRE due leave Manila for Shanghai August 13th." This is reported to be about four times the usual volume of Japanese departures. FBI (Hon); (HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 2 September, 1941

To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

Confidential

HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr.

14ND #  
Rating

Ref: ONI card 8-13-41, 14ND card #1390, same subject.

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Employed by R. K. O. Pict. B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period: Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has operated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that HULL was in Japanese employment." FBI (Hon); G-2(HD) cognizant.

To: ONI(2); All NDs; CincPac; Com14. 9-21-41

Confidential

#### DAKAR—Military Exercises

Rating

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): "Dakar air force carry out combined exercises with fleet from Monday or Tuesday, to Friday each week, but seldom on weekend." FBI (Hon); G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 2 September, 1941

To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14



*Confidential*

DAKAR—attitude of natives

14ND #1418  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): "Hatred of Germans, indifference to British. French community would prefer intervention in Dakar by America to intervention by Britain." FBI (Hon); G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 2 September, 1941

To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

*Confidential*

MOROCCO—Outgoing visas from

14ND #1419  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-1): "Morocco outgoing visas granted only after approval of German authorities." FBI (Hon); G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 2 September, 1941

To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

*Confidential*

DAKAR—Commercial Airlines

14ND #1414  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-1): "Air-France Service operating twice weekly in both directions—MARIGNANE—CASABLANCA—FORT ETIENNE—DAKAR. General BERGERET, in charge of French Aviation, visited Dakar regarding project to extend Air-France service to Brazil, stating that South American service could be re-established if German air service was allowed to pass through Dakar once a week. Governor BOYSSON refused this and matter was shelved." FBI (Hon), G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 2 September, 1941

To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

*Confidential*

DAKAR—Airdromes

14ND #1415  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): One Dakar airdrome on the Medina plateau at OUAHAM with 2 asphalt runways (1000 x 80 and 1300 x 150 meters). Another airdrome near RUFISQUE. Seaplane hangers at BEL-AIR, a little beyond arsenal. FBI (Hon), G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 2 September, 1941

To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

*Confidential*

DAKAR—munitions

14ND #1416  
Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (valuation C-2): "Local French officer (Dakar) told source that Navy has supplies but that Army is short." FBI (Hon); G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 2 September, 1941

To: ONI(2); all NDs; CincPac; Com 14

*Confidential*

Extract No. 71 for Honolulu

SEPTEMBER 1st, 1941.

-----reports August 20th.

A. In the middle of August, 30 repeat 30 aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI aerodrome.

B. Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department agents into numbers of lighters and their tonnage in the gulf of Siam.

C. On August 18th the Japanese minister presented the Prime Minister with following requests:—

1. SATTAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.
2. 6 repeat 6 aerodromes in north, south, and west will be lent Japan v undertakes to improve them.
3. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.
4. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
5. Japan to co-operate in improving Thai armed forces.

D. The above will be taken up by the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival from Japan.

Valuation C. 2.

Message ends.

Extracts for Honolulu

SEPT. 2, 1941

-----reports August 20.

A. In the middle of August, 30 repeat 30 aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI aerodrome.

B. Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department agents into numbers of lighters and their tonnage in the gulf of Siam.

C. On August 18 the Japanese minister presented the Prime Minister with following requests:

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4. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.
5. Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces.

D. The above will be taken up by the new Japanese ambassador on his arrival from Japan.

Valuation C 2.

Message ends.

Extracts for Honolulu

SEPT. 1, 1941

-----reports he recently met brother of Mayor of ----- who returned from Japan on 19th instant, later stated.

A. 5 new (reorganized) divisions have been mobilized in Japan for service Manchuria.

B. All forces in Korea other than two divisions are to be in process of being moved into Manchuria and to North Korea.

C. 3 new mechanized divisions have been added to Kwangtung army as well as chemical warfare units trained in Japan by German instructors.

D. Training of para troops is being intensified but is considerably delayed lack of transport aeroplanes. Passenger aeroplanes from commercial air line are being used for training purposes.

E. Source stated he heard that 2 capital ships will be completed and commissioned to battle fleet by end of this year and that 2 aeroplane carriers will be completed in March and July 1942 respectively (it should be noted that this was merely overheard in conversation).

F. Above passed with reserve as I am not in position to estimate reliance on original source.

30TH AUGUST, 1941

Extract No. 110 for Honolulu

----- independently reports on UDA (NYI JYS) aircraft factory.

A. Location 3 kilometres south of Kasumigaura aerodrome.

Pin Point: 35 degrees 59 minutes North 140 degrees 14 minutes East.

Note: This disagrees with ----- report who states it is in Tokyo, but Kasumigaura might loosely be called "near Tokyo".

B. This factory has been producing aircraft for the last 3 years.

C. Labour force 3,500 repeat 3,500.

D. Production—45 repeat 45 aircraft per month.

Note: We think that this factory is only used for assembling aircraft.

E. The German Messerschmidt M. E. 110 is under production here.

F. On 20th May source saw 6 or 7 Messerschmidts on the adjacent Kasumigaura aerodrome.

Extract No. 102 for Honolulu

29 T. H. AUGUST, 1941.

## JAPAN

## AIR

## Kasumigaura Aerodrome

*Location:*

1. On the shore close to western corner of Lake KASUMIGAURA, East of and adjacent to AMI Village.
2. Latitude 36°, 02' North. Longitude 140° 14' East.

*Size and Shape:*

3. Roughly rectangular, total aerodrome area, inclusive of buildings, about 1200 X 2000 yards. Source was informed that south edge of landing field had been extended about 300 yards.

*Surface:*

4. Sand and grass.

*Barracks and offices:*

5. 26 buildings on the east side provide accommodation for Headquarters, offices and barracks. These are two storey buildings painted in camouflage patches of brown and green.

*Hangars and Repair Shops:*

6. There are two steel hangars cum workshops on the north edge, about 200 by 90 feet high.
7. Source was told that aircraft were stored in three layers in these hangars.
8. A new large circular hangar about 250 yards in diameter was completed at the end of 1939 in the south-east corner.
9. This hangar only protrudes about 20 feet above the ground at its highest point and is believed to extend some distance below ground level.
10. It is built of reinforced concrete and covered with earth and grass.
11. There are 8 doors to this hangar.

*W/T*

12. The W/T station is situated on the south edge.

*Seaplane and Flying boat facilities:*

13. Hangar accommodation is believed to be provided by the two hangars on the north edge.
14. A number of mooring buoys were seen off shore.
15. What appeared to be three catapults were seen on the water's edge, north of the aerodrome.

*Aviation School:* 16. Source was informed that there is an aviation school here with 600 students.

*Personnel:* 17. Total of 2,600 aviation personnel is stationed here.

*Parachute Training:*

18. Two high towers for parachute training were seen on the south edge.
19. Source was told that 1,000 troops were being trained as parachutists, but it is believed that this large number is being tested out as to suitability and only a small proportion will be retained for training.

*German Advisers:* 20. 10 Germans are attached to this aerodrome and to the neighboring UDA Aircraft Factory.

*Aircraft:* 21. Source saw about 20 aircraft along the south edge, including 6 or 7 Messerschmitts Me 110.

*Valuation B. 2.*

Extract No. 111 for Honolulu  
— reports.

29TH AUGUST, 1941.

A. On 28th May at a naval air demonstration at Misaki near Yokohama he saw two 3-engine repeat 3-engine monoplane aircraft and 18 twin-engine monoplane aircraft.

B. Concerning the three-engined aircraft he was told:

C. These were Italian "Piaggio P. XI. RC. 40" bombers manufactured in Japan.

D. The engines are 14, repeat, 14 cylinder 1,000, repeat, 1,000 horsepower.

E. Load capacity: 4,200 kilogrammes, repeat, 4,200 kilogrammes.

F. Camouflage on under wings was light blue, grey and pale green in irregular patches.

G. Reference paragraph C above. It is suggested that these aircraft are with Italian engines and for this reason are named after them.

H. *Concerning the twin engine aircraft he was told:*

I. These were German Messerschmidt M. E. 110 fighters manufactured in UDA factory.

J. These aircraft gave a demonstration of *low level dive bombing*.

K. Source noted, however, that both these types of aircraft had single, not single rudders and stuck to this statement even when shown pictures in Japan.

L. Both these types of aircraft are based on the Sunosaki naval aerodrome near the promontory of the same name on the South West tip of China peninsula.

#### Extract for Honolulu

August 29, 1941

----- reports.

A. On June 25 600 troops of NAKANO (AAW TAK) armoured cars unit and 300 service corps troops with unknown number of armoured cars and motorcycles combinations, embarked on 2 transports at SHIBAURA, Tokio and for Formosa.

B. On July 5, 1000 repeat 1000 men of 32d repeat 32d infantry regiment embarked on 2 transports in Shibaura for Formosa.

Source of paragraphs A and B above was a ----- friend of source who was in dock at Shibaura for 14 days.

C. On June 16 1 transport arrived SHIKAMA (Port of HIMEJI) from Shanghai and discharged 200 wounded of 11th mixed brigade and 100 boxes of supplies. The wounded were sent to TSUYAMA (OKAYAMA KEN).

D. Reinforcements leaving Japan in May and June for north China have been drawn from following districts.

SENDAI, KANAZAWA, YAMAGATA and YONEZAWA.

E. Reinforcements during same period for south and Indo China were drawn from: KANAZAWA, KYUSHU, KAGOSHIMA, KURUME, SAGA and KUMAMOTO.

Valuation C 2.

#### Extract No. 109 for Honolulu

28TH AUGUST, 1941

----- reports on Yokosuka dockyard in June.

Valuation C.2.

B. *Capital ship*. This was launched in Spring of 1941.

C. *Armament* will consist of:

- 9 16 inch (40cm)
- 20 5 and a half inch
- 10 anti-aircraft.

D. Name Takamatsu.

E. A sister-ship is under construction at Maizuru dockyard.

F. *Heavy Cruiser*. This vessel is still on the slips.

G. Name Chichibu.

H. Displacement variously given as 10,000 tons to 25,000.

Note that this disagrees with ----- who states that it is 19,00 and ----- who says "between 15,000 and 25,000" tons.

I. 2 *Destroyers* are being armed in the bay. Source was unable to state whether these vessels were launched here or not.

J. Four repeat four fast motorboats are under construction. They are 10 tons and have one gun mounted forward.

Source was told that similar vessels were under construction in many Japanese shipyards. A merchant from Formosa informed him that private shipyard Takao were building the wooden hulls only of these ships for fitting out in Japanese yards.

K. A 7,000 ton cruiser and a destroyer were in dry dock.

L. One cargo boat was undergoing alterations.

M. On 10th June there were concentrated here:—

8 cruisers, 1 seaplane carrier, 11 destroyers, over 10 submarines and 18 transports.

N. Two of these transports were fitted with degaussing apparatus (described by source) and were destined for conveyance in the Sea of Japan.

O. About 20 German technicians travel daily to Yokosuka from Tokyo.

act for Honolulu

AUGUST 28, 1941.

Following is a summary of report dated August 15 on Manchurian frontier conditions:

**Mobilization: Troop movements.**

1. Whole population, men and women, of eastern part of former Chinese Eastern Railway district has been mobilized as "militia" for defensive and anti-aircraft work, all are registered and may not leave their villages without permission from staff headquarters.

2. Fresh units of Japanese troops arrived in MULIN district as from end of July, movements being shrouded in great secrecy. Police forbade population to visit villages or engage in fishing or other occupation in vicinity except under special permit, this applying even to normal agricultural labour. Troop movements took place at night.

**Construction.**

1. New barracks near Mulin coal mines are now occupied by troops recently arrived. Manoeuvres in which tanks participated took place.

2. Work has commenced on the new highway from IRIKTE through CHOLA-ARSHANU district. Cossacks resident in this district are engaged on the work.

3. PEIAN-HEIHO. Manchurian dollars 1,500,000 has been allocated for this work which includes hospitals, barracks, etc.

4. TIAMOSI. Several European firms at Harbin have been permitted to tender work in this district and for work in connection with the TIAMOSI-MUDALZIAN railway (opened two years ago). Construction of Government buildings, residences, hospitals, barracks, etc. Total allocation said to be Mongolian dollars 3,000,000. All employees must be certified. Work to be completed not later than June 1, 1942.

**Travel restrictions.**

1. New regulations, affecting all Europeans and most Chinese, were introduced as from August 1 in Manchurian frontier regions. Permits for all travel must be obtained from Police H. Q., travel in interior prohibited. Restrictions especially severe in Mulin district. Special control established at Mulin and SUIFENHO.

2. In spring of this year pressure was brought to bear on all foreigners in JEHOI Province and many left. Remaining foreigners—about 25 missionaries—are not now permitted to travel beyond the cities. Tarter business men have also been recommended to remove their business to MUKDEN area. Reason given is that Jehol is not safe—that troops have been greatly augmented, large troop movements are taking place, considerable road construction is in hand and it is not desired that aerial manoeuvres should be witnessed by foreigners.

**Censorship.** Private correspondence from within Manchuria addressed to Japan is now censored.

act for Honolulu

AUGUST 27, 1941.

— reports on HEITO aerodrome.

On June 18 following left for unknown destination:

Three, 3 repeat 3 engine monoplane bombers.

9 twin engine monoplane bombers.

4 fighters

2 reconnaissance

Total 18

On June 28 following aircraft left for Hainan under MIYASAKI.

15 twin engine monoplane bombers.

single engine monoplane fighters.

8 single engine biplane reconnaissance.

Total 34

On July 3, 24 aircraft under command of MORI GITARO (HDU NYA CQU) left for Hainan.

valuation C 3.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 26, 1941.

It is reported that SEDES BEY, secretary of \_\_\_\_\_, Tokio, and now in Baghdad, confirmed contents of this telegram in its entirety. He \_\_\_\_\_ addition that German influence in Japan is increasing in strength on account

of fact of diversity of Japanese circle. It is now realized that the ma-  
tors and advisors in navy, army, air force, propaganda service, Home  
have come to stay for at least the war period and their services are  
stable.

B. ----- of Germany Embassy is reported to have stated that  
mobilisation will have reached a sufficiently advanced state by end of  
beginning September that Japan will be able to move North or South as

C. In connection with southward movement he stated "Japan's con-  
with Thailand are proceeding slowly but it is a practical certainty that  
will side with Japan."

D. Germany Embassy in Tokyo are protesting to the Japanese Govern-  
cerning delivery of coal (particularly) and other commodities to Axis  
from French Indo China.

E. Germany has guaranteed to VICHY that Japanese occupation of I  
will be temporary only and Japan has agreed. Germany made this gu-  
order to secure close collaboration with VICHY.

*Extract No. 107 for Honolulu*

25th AUGU

----- reports regarding Pelew Islands.

A. A black-out practice is carried out monthly.

B. The construction of underground hangars is being pressed forward

C. Source: Japanese pearling luggers based on Pelew and operati  
Australian coast.

*Extract No. 108 for Honolulu*

25th AUGU

----- reports:-

A. HANEDA (NYI, JYS) Aircraft Factory, Tokyo has recently pro-  
repeat 100 Italian 3 repeat 3 engine mid wing monoplane bombers.

Note: Agent gives above characters for name of factory, but gives  
tion as UDA, characters for this are (UCO, JYS) which resemble those  
him.

B. These aircraft have been delivered to Army and have been seen  
over Tokyo.

C. Valuation C.3.

*Extract No. 106 for Honolulu.*

23rd AUGU

----- independently reports on Kawasaki Dockyard, Kobe.

A. Work on clearing civilian houses surrounding Kawasaki. Dock-  
menced on 10th July.

B. A factory controlled by the Dockyard for the construction of cor-  
craft will be erected on this site.

C. German engineers are supervising plans and installation of machi-  
Valuation C. 2

*Extract No. 105 for Honolulu*

23rd AUGU

----- reports on Shibata aircraft factory.

A. Under the supervision of German engineers, this factory has pro-  
repeat 2 engine monoplane fighter.

B. Armament 2 fixed machine guns (cannon guns?) and 4 moveable  
guns.

C. Tests have proved very satisfactory.

D. The Germans refer to this as Messerschmidt and the Japanese as  
Year of Showa" (1941) type.

Valuation C. 3.

AUGUST

----- reports on low Angle defences in Pescadores.

A. Gycote Island, 2 12 inch.

B. Koseisho Island, 2 6 inch.

C. Near Komokusel village, 2,000 yards north of Mako.

2 6 inch

2 4.7 inch

Near Kokutsutan village,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile north of Mako.  
 2 8 inch  
 2 6 inch  
 Taishoku.  
 East Fort, 2 12 inch  
 West Fort 2 6 inch  
 Sensan 2 6 inch  
 2 4.7 inch  
 19 A.A. guns have been located at 13 places.  
 Station C 2

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 21, 1941

reports August 6.  
 OKAYAMA aerodrome.  
 July 25 following aircraft left for Hainan:  
 24 repeat 24 twinengine monoplane heavy B.  
 15 repeat 15 monoplane fighters.  
 3 repeat 3 reconnaissance.  
 July 28 following left for Indo-China:  
 6 repeat 6 three engine monoplane heavy B.  
 9 repeat 9 single engine monoplane light B.  
 July 26, 27 repeat 27 aircraft comprised mainly of twin engine monoplane  
 B arrived KAGI from Japan and left July 29 for Indo-China.  
 August 1, 9 repeat 9 heavy B and 6 repeat 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-  
 na.  
 July 20 following left KARENKO for Indo-China:  
 24,000 repeat 24,000 TAKAHASHI (URA HOP) infantry.  
 1,200 repeat 1,200 ISE (AES AUI) artillery.  
 600 repeat 600 KONDO (SCY MRU) and FUKASE (IIU IRX) A.F.V.  
 with:  
 16 repeat 16 armoured cars.  
 15 repeat 15 light tanks  
 40 repeat 40 motor cycles  
 32 repeat 32 field guns  
 Paratroops are being trained daily at TOGO aerodrome.  
 8 repeat 8 aircraft being used.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 21, 1941

reports.  
 Present strength in southern Indo-China about 80,000 repeat 80,000.  
 Composed of units of:  
 Guards: 28th repeat 28th division; 38th repeat 38th division, Formosan  
 army corps; naval landing party.  
 This is given with reserve pending confirmation.  
 High Commands are:  
 Lt. General IIDA—army  
 Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH)—air  
 Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS)—navy

AUGUST 19, 1941

reports.  
 ANCHO ISLAND  
 On August 2d, 500 naval landing party left.  
 Total garrison strength now 400 repeat 400 naval landing party and 200  
 ets.  
 Present stock:  
 2,000 repeat 2,000 cases small arms ammunition.  
 900 repeat 900 cases shells.  
 At KUKOK Island are 200 repeat 200 KATSUMURA (AUE GPA) naval  
 ing party, 100 having left on July 22d.

*Extract No. 52 for Honolulu*

August 21st, 1941

----- reports.

A. Present strength in southern Indo-China about 80,000 repeat 80,000.

Composed of units of:—

Guards.

28th repeat 28th division.

38th repeat 38th division.

Formosan army corps.

Naval landing party.

This is given with reserve pending confirmation.

B. High commands are:—

Lt. General IIDA—army.

Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH)—air.

Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS)—Navy.

Message en

*Extract for Honolulu*

August 21, 1941

A. It is reported that disembarkation at *Dairen* and ports in Korea of Chinese troops from Japan is confirmed. One tank regiment with medium tanks and one motorized infantry regiment, with new equipment observed, disembarked at *Dairen* (no date given).

B. Main regions of concentration reported to be North Korea KIRIN, TUNHUA, MUTANKIANG, POGRANICHNAYA and MUTANKIANG—LIN—MISHAN areas.

C. In North China troops are being concentrated in KALGAN area.

*Extract for Honolulu*

August 21, 1941

----- reports.

A. There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO repeat KOSHIO, TAKAHACHI repeat TAKAHACHI and ZUSI repeat ZUSI and air bases at KAMAKURA repeat KAMAKURA and TOYOHASHI repeat TOYOHASHI.

B. Source states that at end of June there was considerable movement of Japanese sailors from Tokyo to Koshiro and Takehachi and that between June 24 and June 28 numerous tramloads of young men arrived at Zusi.

C. At Numazu repeat Numazu source observed soldiers wearing green bandoliers on shoulders and also several howitzers pulled by heavy trucks with camouflage netting on platforms.

D. At HAMAMOTO repeat HAMAMOTO he observed 97th repeat 97th, 72d repeat 72d and 8th repeat 8th divisions.

E. At WUSHIZU repeat WUSHIZU 22d repeat 22d Division. At OKOYAMA repeat OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA 2d repeat 2d and 4th repeat 4th divisions. New oil storage tanks in this district which is very heavily industrialized.

*Comments.*

All above observations were made at end June. Although agent has no military training he is newly recruited and I have had no opportunity of examining him. Valuation therefore C 3.

F. ----- was informed by Polish refugee journalist in Japan at end June that he had seen great earthworks, indicating underground aerodrome with planes landing, at TAKARUZUKA repeat TAKARUZUKA. Valuation C 3.

G. Area between Kobe, AWAJI repeat AWAJI and SAKAI repeat SAKAI heavily fortified. Valuation C 3.

Following from a responsible British source,

When Itagaki was appointed C-in-C, Korea, this writer took the view that he is a convinced northerner expansion, as opposed to southern expansion belief and that his appointment was therefore to be interpreted as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria, Korea being the first reserve pool in Manchuria. A technically competent observer in Hongkong now confirms this view and adds that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C, South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of the Japanese forces in China, is of the same persuasion. He is counted on not to neglect the north, therefore, however, tempting the gains in the south may be at the moment.



Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc., by a certain date, such as Sept. 15th bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners. The Japanese in the past have often revealed their long term objectives, but have very seldom talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 20, 1941.

----- reports on Indo China.

A. Japanese strength in TONKIN area (August 1) approximately 25,000 repeat 25,000.

B. Strength in southern Indo-China (August 12) approximately 36,000 repeat 36,000.

C. Collaboration between French and Japanese authorities appears close and it is believed that French troops are to be sent to the Yunan and KWANGSI borders.

D. Quantities of railway equipment is being sent to PNOM PENH for the construction of a railway to the THAI border.

AUGUST 21, 1941.

J. July 28 a transport left TOSHIYEN for Indo-China after loading 20 repeat 20 launches, 120 repeat 120 mines and a quantity of naval ammunition.

AUGUST 19, 1941.

A. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations Japanese delegates expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic Indian Ocean communications.

B. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company with a capital of a million yen to start operations around island.

*Extract No. 57 for Honolulu*

19th AUGUST, 1941.

A. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations Japanese delegates expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic Indian Ocean communications.

B. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company with a capital of a million yen to start operations around island.

*Extract No. 54 for Honolulu*

AUGUST 19th, 1941.

----- reports.

Sancho Island.

A. On August 2nd, 500 naval landing party left.

B. Total garrison strength now 400 repeat 400 naval landing party and 200 puppets.

C. Present stock : 2,000 repeat 2,000 cases small arms ammunition. 900 repeat 900 cases shells.

D. At KUKOK Island are 200 repeat 200 KATSUMMRA (AUE GPA) naval landing party, 100 having left on July 22nd.

*Extract No. 35 for Honolulu*

AUGUST 18th, 1941.

----- who was recently elected as a Sakdal candidate for next political elections, states that local Japanese agents (whose names I have given to American Military Intelligence) have recently been cultivating him closely and volunteering following information :

A. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on Formosa.

B. Attack on Philippines and Singapore simultaneously, will take place about end August.

C. Campaign in Philippines to begin with rising in Mindanao and bombing of Manila.

D. Attack on Singapore to be overland through Siam. where at least 3 repeat 3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.

E. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. This looks like a whispering campaign.

Valuation C 3.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 18, 19

----- Report that his Japanese business associates (who include heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank) appear genuinely to believe present Japanese threats of further southward expansion are merely a "matter of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does *not* intend to attack Great Britain or America.

Valuation B 2.

*Extract No. 33 for Honolulu*

AUGUST 16TH, 19

A. Local Agents Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram August 15th from Tokio instructing them:

1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.
2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty.
3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.

B. This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds).

Valuation A 1.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 16, 19

----- of German Embassy recently returned from Japan is reported to have stated:

A. Mobilization continues in Japan and it is known that certain units are being equipped for service in cold climate.

B. In the event of hostilities between Japan, America and Great Britain Japanese neutrality regarding Russia will not repeat not be maintained.

C. In this event Japan proposed to try to effect occupation of entire territory north of Vladivostok up to Amur River, northern half of SAGHALIEN and KAMCHATKA.

D. Object would be to lessen danger of air attack against industrial centers in Japan and prevent American supplies reaching Russia through these areas.

E. Japanese policy in northwards threat and southern expansion is identical to force *democratic* front to maintain forces in readiness to meet potential danger. At the same time he added that it was not yet possible to say definitely whether Japan's large scale preparations were merely to keep anti Axis powers generally on the alert in Asia or whether they mean Japan is seriously contemplating an active part in war.

F. Same source stated that anti British and anti American feelings are growing as the population is suffering from lack of foodstuffs, with it material and certain essential commodities and fear of the introduction of card rationing system in near future.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 15, 19

A. It is reported that as a retaliatory measure for British and American action against Japan Japanese military authorities discussed with Nanhai Government desirability of blockading International Settlement on line of Tientsin blockade of British Concession.

B. Japanese "business" Shanghai strongly opposed this and sent delegation of four representatives to interview General KAGESA at Nanking.

C. Latter assured delegation that if any steps were taken along lines suggested at any time, every effort would be made to safeguard Japanese interests operating in International Settlement. He further stated that they were contemplated in the near future as there was no complete accord between Japanese naval and military authorities on matters.

AUGUST 10, 19

It is reported.

A. following completion of Japanese military occupation of Indo-China Japanese military have been considering possibilities of securing control of Tientsin French Concession through puppet North China administration.

B. Local military circles consider if Tientsin venture is accomplished similar action might be taken through Wang-Ching-Wei Government at other ports.

Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all Axis interests.

Above passed for it may be worth enquiries proceeding.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 14, 1941.

Following from Free French sailors who left Saigon about August 8. Valued C 2.

S. S. Francois Louis Dreyfus is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo." Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Francisco."

Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel AMIRAL CHARNER repeat AMIRAL CHARNER and the submarine PEGASE repeat PEGASE.

S. S. SAGITAIRE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have to go to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 13, 1941.

As reported.

Japanese plans for taking over French Concession in Shanghai has been completed and provided future developments in general situation in Far East do not necessitate change in plans, Nanking Government expected to assume control in concession before October 10.

Committee studying this matter under chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Former Minister) and General KAGESA have forwarded their recommendations to the Government for consideration.

AUGUST 8, 1941.

----- reports.

On July 31 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in Po On area under the German expeditionary engineer corps" and are as soon as possible being sent to Germany.

According to a high puppet official further recruiting is being carried out.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 13, 1941.

Between July 25 and July 29 12,000 repeat 12,000 troops left Bangkok for China frontier.

Partial confirmation is afforded by official Siamese communiques which list that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary and special units left for frontier at end of July.

An order has been placed with Japanese for delivery in July 1942 of 2 repeat ships probably torpedo-boats to replace 3 vessels sunk by French.

500,000 TICULS have been paid on account of this order.

Situation C-3.

*Extract No. 27 for Honolulu*

AUGUST 12, 1941.

At a meeting held by High Command at Canton on July 27th to discuss retaliatory measures on British and American freezing, following steps were decided and forwarded to Tokio for approval:

Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.

Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of expulsion.

Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. The Government to be forced to co-operate in this measure.

Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces.

Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Puppet Government.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 12, 1941.

Y. K. Tokio despatched confidential telegram August 9 to their Japanese representative in Manila stating that Japanese Government have ordered:

S. S. ASAMA MARU (Now between Honolulu and San Francisco) to return to Japan.

B. S. S. NITTA MARU to remain in Yokohama until further notice.  
 C. Through cargo loaded at Manila for United States on these vessels discharged at Yokohama and Kobe respectively.  
 Valuation A-1.

*Extract No. 23 for Honolulu*

August 12th, 1941

To: Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD  
 Mr. R. SHIVERS  
 Col. GEO. BICKNELL

A. 372 repeat 372 Japanese residents of Philippines have booked and passages in S. S. MARECHAL JOFFRE due leave Manila for Shanghai A 13th.

B. This is about four repeat four times the usual volume of Japanese departures.

Valuation A 1.

Completely reliable source and information.

C. Okayama aerodrome,

1. Between July 7 and July 15 about 25 repeat 25 aircraft have been arriving nightly from Japan.

2. Aircraft based here July 19 are: 40 repeat 40 3 engined monoplane B; 40 repeat 40 twin engined monoplane medium B; 40 repeat 40 single engined monoplane light B; 60 repeat 60 monoplane fighters; 20 repeat 20 reconnaissance 4 repeat 4 four-engine transports.

3. This is largest aerodrome in Formosa being about one mile square.

D. July 14 6 repeat 6 fighters arrived TAIHOKU from QUEMOY Island.

E. July 10 to July 11, 15 repeat 15 fighters arrived KAGI from Japan.

F. July 15, 15 repeat 15 monoplane fighters arrived HEITO from Kwan.

G. Aircraft reported at Quemoy 12 repeat 12 fighters.

H. June 6, mines by naval units from Pescadores.

I. July 11 200 repeat 200 mines and 120 repeat 120 torpedoes landed at Canton from Japan.

At a meeting held by High Command at Canton on July 27 to discuss retaliatory measures on British and American Freezing, following steps were decided and forwarded to Tokio for approval:

1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.

2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of expulsion.

3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. The Government to be forced to cooperate in this measure.

4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces.

5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Japanese Government.

*Extract No. 59 for Honolulu*

10TH AUGUST, 1941

It is reported.

A. Following completion of Japanese Military occupation of Indo-China, military have been considering possibilities of securing control of Tientsin and Concession through puppet North China administration.

B. Local military circles consider if Tientsin venture is accomplished, action might be taken through Wang-Ching-Wei Government at other points in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of Axis interests.

C. Above passed for what it may be worth enquiries proceeding.

*Extract No. 24 for Honolulu*

AUGUST 9TH, 1941

To: Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD  
 Mr. ROBT. SHIVERS  
 Col. GEO. BICKNELL

Following is summary information to hand on HULL.

A. AMOS TYLER HULL, employed by R. K. O. Pictures.

B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period in Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japanese.

C. Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that Hull was in Japanese employ.

A. Local Agents N. Y. K. have today received telegram from N. Y. K. Tokio stating that *all* "overseas" service is now suspended.

B. "Overseas" means all sailings except Japan-China ports.  
Valuation A 1.

*Extract No. 61 for Honolulu*

8TH AUGUST, 1941.

----- reports.

A. On 31st July 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in Po On area for "the German expeditionary engineer corps" and are as soon as possible being sent to Germany.

B. According to a high puppet official further recruiting is being carried out.

It is reported that the following railways in Manchuria are now regarded as military lines on which number of passenger trains has been reduced to minimum.

A. Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara and to Korea via Tumen.

B. Harbin Peian-Helho

C. Hsingchiang-Taonan

D. Taonan-Doekk Arshan

E. Tsitsihar-Peian

F. Tsitsihar-Bukhedu-Hailar and Manchouli

G. Tumen-Mudadzian

H. Mudadzian-Tzetslamusi

I. All railways in Jehol

J. Since end of June 1941 steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang Harbin by construction of sidings and numerous small stations for storage.

K. In Kwangtung leased territories since 1940 sand bag emplacements guarding bridges station, etc. have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures.

L. Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity demands.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 7, 1941

It is reported.

A. Between July 10 and July 17 about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden proceeding north \* \* \* carried full war kit. (Note. No means of checking numbers, which should be accepted with reserve.)

B. During period named a total of 75 troop "specials" passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried artillery and tanks.

C. On departure from Mukden on July 21 source was told by Japanese station master of South Manchurian railway that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was short of cars these would be drawn from Peking Mukden, Peking Suiyuan and Peking Hankow lines.

D. On July 20 troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTZE on Peking Mukden line. Source saw great activity at Tangku Tun junction.

AUGUST 5, 1941.

I. Admiral TOYODA has already informed German Ambassador that Japan is ready to readjust its political relations with Reich as prerequisite for closer economic accord upon which will be founded future economic relations between Asia and Europe.

J. Admiral NOMURA has been instructed to work for a modification of \* \* \* American embargo policy and to offer readjustment of American Japanese relations on basis of *mutal* recognition on land sea and air of all areas defined and recognized as for spheres of influence of U. S. A. and British.

*Extract No. 21 for Honolulu*

6th AUGUST, 1941.

To Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD  
Mr. ROBERT SHIVERS  
Col. GEORGE BICKNELL

Following report on DAKAR given to ----- by Free French business man who was in DAKAR from February 5th till May 28th.

Valuation C 2:—Casual observation believed reliable.

A. *Battleship Richelieu* could proceed at greatly reduced speed, but complete repairs can not be carried out at DAKAR.

B. Other warships at Dakar:—

*Cruisers* Georges-Leygne repeat Georges-Leygne and Gloire repeat Gloire.

*Escort Vessels* D'ENTRECASTEAUX repeat D'Entrecasteaux and Bougainville repeat Bougainville.

Also about 3 repeat 3 destroyers and 15 repeat 15 submarines.

C. *Fortifications* on island of GORÉE have been modernized. Headland at end of the "CORNICHE" also fortified. Fortifications of little strength at RUFISQUE.

D. *Troops* totalled about 15,000 repeat 15,000 Senegalese tirailleurs, spahis and Colonial infantry.

*General BARRAU* repeat BARRAU in command.

*Extract No. 22 for Honolulu*

For: Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD

Mr. Robt. SHIVERS

Col. Geo. BICKNELL

Following is continuation of report on DAKAR dated 6th August.

E. Air-France Service operating twice weekly in both directions MARI-CHANE—CASABLANCA—FORT ETIENNE—DAKAR.

General BERGERET, in charge of French Aviation, visited Dakar regarding project to extend Air-France Service to Brazil, stating that this South American service could be re-established if German air service was allowed to pass through Dakar once a week.

F. Governor BOYSSON refused this and matter was shelved (Valuation for this and immediately preceding paragraph C 1).

Reliable from new contact.

G. Morocco Outgoing visas granted only after approval of German authorities. (Valuation C 1).

H. *Aerodromes* at DAKAR one on the Medina plateau at OUAKAM with 2 asphalt runways (1000 metres by 80 and 1300 metres by 150).

Other aerodrome near Rufisque.

*Seaplane hangars* at BEL-AIR, a little beyond arsenal.

Valuation C 2. Believed reliable from new contact.

I. *Munitions*. Local French officer told source that Navy has supplies but that army is short.

J. *Exercises*. Local Air forces carry out combined exercises with fleet from Monday or Tuesday, to Friday, of each week but seldom on weekend.

K. *Attitude of natives*:

Hatred of Germans indifference to British.

*French community would prefer intervention in Dakar by America to intervention by Britain.*

Valuation C 2.

Believed reliable from new contact.

*Extract No. 75 for Honolulu*

5th August, 1941.

----- organization reports on Formosa for end of June.

A. Orders have been given to recruit 100,000 repeat 100,000 men between ages of 35 and 45 for service in their labour corps.

B. Another 150,000 repeat 150,000 conscripts are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

JAPAN MILITARY, FORMOSA

KEELUNG

Supplies

1. On June 17 s. s. "Horal Maru" arrived at Keelung from Japan with about 400 cases of military uniforms and steel helmets. 200 cases were sent to Karenko per s. s. "Fukusei Maru" and the remainder to Taihoku by train.

2. On June 19 Transport No. 140 arrived at Keelung from Japan with military supplies which were sent by rail to Taihoku and Talchu. The transport left again on June 22 with a full load of copper ore.

3. On June 20 Transport No. 135 arrived at Karenko with 600/700 tons of petrol from Japan via the Pescadores (where she unloaded an unspecified amount of petrol).

## Conscription

4. The Governor of Formosa has received orders to recruit within the next month 100,000 men between ages of 35 and 45 for service in Labour Corps.

5. It is reported that an additional 150,000/200,000 recruits in Formosa are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

## Troop Movements

6. From June 23 to June 29 500 troops of the Taihoku infantry were exercised in coastal defense along the coast near Shinchiku.

7. On June 25 180 artillery arrived at Karenko from Taihoku together with 6 A. A. guns drawn by trucks and 4 A. A. machine guns.

8. On June 25 Transports Nos. 141 and 163 arrived at Keelung and embarked military supplies and provisions. They sailed together for Hainan on June 27.

## TAKAO

9. Transport No. 174 arrived at Takao on June 17 with large quantities of military personnel, equipment (uniforms, steel helmets, respirators, etc.), all of which were sent by rail to Tainan.

10. 60 German naval, military and air force experts and over 30 Japanese officers also arrived by the same vessel. Soon after landing they all embarked in s. s. "Hosan Maru" for the Pescadores. It is reported that all these men will soon be transferred to South China.

11. On June 21 260 Mountain Artillery, together with local recruits left Tainan for Koshun for exercises.

12. On June 25 6 armoured cars and 3 tanks left Tainan for Taito to participate in coastal defence exercises.

13. On June 28 about 800 recruits from the Koshun sector were sent to join the labour corps at Tainan. These men were issued with a complete set of uniforms and equipment, but no rifles. Their ages were between 35-45. On June 30 they returned to Koshun for further training.

## Valuation B. 3.

Secret booklet printed October 1940 by Chinese staff contains following information on Hiroshima Iron Works:

A. Yearly production 9 repeat 9 A. A. guns, three tanks, unknown number of Naval and Military guns. Monthly production of shells 300.

B. Raw materials are obtained from Yawata, Kyushu.

C. 2,000 repeat 2,000 men and women employed.

JULY 30, 1941.

----- organization reports for middle of June.

A. All conscripts in Formosa have been called up for military training.

B. 4,000 troops are stationed at Taichu. These are of all arms and include 6 tanks and 8 armoured cars.

C. The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine guns posts. These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each holds 6 to 8 mm. They were recently erected in great haste.

AUGUST 5, 1941.

A. It is reported that mobilization and reequipment of troops in Korea Kwangtung and Manchuria is quietly progressing in preparation of eventual movement against the Soviet.

B. There has been a "tug of war" between high ranking military officials as to when move should be launched and that question is still not settled. It is thought that the only event which would stop the move would be a decisive German defeat at hands of Soviet.

C. High Japanese official has expressed some concern over Japanese anti-aircraft defences and lack of air raid protection but no further details were mentioned.

## Report for Honolulu

AUGUST 2, 1941.

----- reports.

A. A large aerodrome is under construction near Kamakura. Note: We believe this is identical with Totsuka aerodrome.

B. Overall dimensions: 3,500 by 3,500 yards.

634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

C. Labour force 8,000 repeat 8,000 under supervision of 18 repeat 18 engineers.

D. Aerodrome expected to be completed in August.

E. 3,000 repeat 3,000 parachute troops are under training here.

F. Comment: Valuation C 3.

AUGUST 1,

----- reports on Kobe.

A. The floating dock here, capable of accommodating ships of 16,000 tons, expected to be transferred to Hainan.

B. At the end of May an "aircraft tender" was under repair in this dock.

C. Total of 2,000 repeat 2,000 workmen working day and night shift engaged on aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock.

Valuation C 3.

*Extract for Honolulu*

AUGUST 1,

JAPAN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION OF POCKET DESTROYERS

Secrecy surrounding construction of "Pocket Destroyers"

1. Following information is hearsay and is given with the utmost reserve.

2. Some old hulks have been emptied of machinery and equipment and "pocket destroyers" are being constructed *within* them.

3. As a further aid to secrecy the positions of these hulks are changed by moving them from one place to another.

*Comment*

4. This may be an exaggerated account of Japanese tendencies to secrecy, but there may be something in it, and the report is passed on for what it is worth.

Valuation C 4

AUGUST 4,

----- reports.

A. Naval guns are being made at Osaka arsenal under German supervision.

B. In May 8 warships at Yokosuka were being fitted with new guns from Osaka arsenal.

Valuation C 3.

*Extract No. 20*

To Capt. I. H. Mayfield

Mr. Robert Shivers

Col. George Bicknell

1st AUGUST, 1941

----- reports

A. On June 15th German S. S. Ramses had completed overhaul of engines at Nagasaki.

B. Guns were being fitted and they are expected to be camouflaged as deck guns.

C. Ordnance supplies will be drawn from Osaka arsenal.

D. Strength of crew 150 repeat 150.

Valuation C 3.

To Capt. I. H. M. Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. George Bicknell

1st AUGUST, 1941

*Extract No. 20 for Honolulu*

----- reports.

A. On June 15th German S. S. RAMSES had completed overhaul of engines at Nagasaki.

B. Guns were being fitted and they are expected to be camouflaged as deck guns.

C. Ordnance supplies will be drawn from Osaka arsenal.

D. Strength of crew 150 repeat 150.

Valuation C 3.

*Extracts for Honolulu*

JULY 31, 1941

A. It is stated that Japanese Government is "contemplating" taking French Concession Shanghai in name of Nanking Government. Japanese military wish to take action as soon as possible but it is not in complete agreement with Japanese Government.



nese naval landing party. Meanwhile Nanking is going ahead selecting personnel for future administration which is entitled "Shanghai Special Administrative Area."

I personally interpret Nankings action as wishful thinking but against this I have warned me that both Japanese and Nanking efforts at penetration of the region have lately been intensified.

AUGUST 5, 1941.

----- organization reports on Formosa for end of June.

Orders have been given to recruit 100,000 repeat 100,000 men between ages 18 and 45 for service in their labour corps.

Another 150,000 repeat 150,000 conscripts are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

JULY 30, 1941.

#### JAPAN NAVAL VENALITY OF JAPANESE NAVAL OFFICERS

On the 28th June the captain of the destroyer ACHI of the 13th Destroyer Division, FASAHARA Asaji ( ), who was under suspicion of having allowed smuggling in his blockade area, was found guilty and was replaced by his superior officer.

-----

The ASHI was patrolling off Hainan Island at the time.

SHINOMI (or HIIMI) Seiichi ( ), commanding the South China Fleet, is suspected by his subordinate officers to be himself financially interested in the Chinese smuggling racket.

When Chiu-Ting-Wah, the puppet magistrate of Chungshan, was assassinated recently in Macau, it was extensively rumoured that SHINOMI's personal interference with the Governor of Macau was brought about by the consideration that Chiu had previously been working hand in glove with SHINOMI in breaking the blockade which the latter himself was responsible for maintaining.

JULY 29, 1941.

----- source not well placed July 25.

Japanese army is calling up all English and Malay speaking Japanese irrespectively of age.

NOTE.—Some Straits born and educated Japanese have left for army service in Japan.

----- value 3.

30th JULY, 1941.

#### *Extract No. 73 for Honolulu*

----- organization reports for middle of June.

All conscripts in Formosa have been called up for military training.

4,000 troops are stationed at Taichu. These are of all arms and include tanks and 8 armoured cars.

The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine guns posts. They are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each holds 6 to 8 men. They were recently erected in great haste.

JULY 30, 1941.

#### *Extract for Honolulu*

----- is reported:

Japanese Government is considerably perturbed by the "insincerity" of the Chinese Government."

Japanese Government states that in spite of military "representations" by Japanese Minister at Bangkok, there has been little if any improvement in the unpromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan and that it is largely due to British and American intrigue and influence.

Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make her immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on this matter.

FEI WEN CHUAN further stated Japanese Government in carrying out her programme in French Indo-China is most anxious that its relations with France shall be clarified and that unless latter changes its attitude toward Japan her coprosperity programme Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into line.

AUGUST 20, 1941.

----- reports on oil fuel tanks in Pescadores.

A. *Ansan Naval Base*.—Large surface tank capacity 600 repeat 600 tons.  
Small surface tank capacity 400 repeat 400 tons.

B. 1 underground at Taishoku Fort capacity 400 repeat 400 tons.

C. 1 underground tank at Kelmo-U aerodrome capacity 300 repeat 300 tons.

D. Comment: It is regretted that source was unable to differentiate between types of oil fuel.

Valuation C 2.

Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell.

JULY 29TH, 1941.

*Extract No. 18 for Honolulu*

A. Following is actual text of order issued on July 28th (but not published by K. OYAMADA for administrative Commissioner Chinese Maritime Customs obtained very confidentially.

Begins:

B. Shipments of exportation and interport export for America and England and their colonies, Burma, French Indo China, Hongkong and unoccupied areas of China of following goods are temporarily to be referred to me before release:—

Machinery, provisions, oils, chemicals, cereals and fodder, fertilizer, cotton piece goods and yarn:—

Except for Japan and North China:—

Signed K. Oyamada.

(Sent to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)

JULY 28TH, 1941.

*Extract No. 19 for Honolulu*

A. June 16th 150 repeat 150 infantry transferred from TAICHU to KOGO for parachute training and on June 18th 200 repeat 200 paratroops were transferred from KOGO to ROKKO.

B. KOGO area now under martial law and entry near-impossible.

C. Recruiting for army and labour corps still being maintained.

JULY 26, 1941.

*Extract for Honolulu.*

It was reported July 24.

A. Thailand is secretly making preparations of a military character and is not releasing, as originally intended, certain classes called up over the Indo China dispute.

B. The Thai delegates who have gone to the Indo China border to take over the ceded territory have also been given a special mission which is presumed to be connected with Japanese Southward move.

JULY 23, 1941.

It has further been reported that circular has been issued to German firms by German Chamber of Commerce, on instructions from Commercial Counsellor instructing them that they *must* keep all goods purchased for export to Germany for a period of at least five months (from middle of July) since it can be expected that transport via Siberia will be resumed before expiration of that period. In the event of firms encountering difficulty over go-down storage space they are advised to ship goods to Dairen for storage. Further all purchases of goods in immediate future for export to Germany must be of "non-perishable" kind.

AUGUST 5, 1941.

## JAPAN NAVAL FLEET ORGANIZATION

Following is passed with utmost reserve:

1. In June the Japanese Navy will be divided into 4 fleets with Admiral Kato as Commander-in-Chief.

2. The 1st Fleet will be stationed near Indo-China, Thailand and Hainan.

[2] 3. The 2d fleet will be the main force for the southward advance.

The 3d fleet will be stationed to cover the Pacific flank and watch the American Fleet.

The 4th fleet will be engaged in transport (? convoy) work.

Valuation C 5.

JULY 28, 1941.

It is stated that according to information obtained from local Japanese naval authorities intended to construct a submarine base at CAMRANH BAY. Also, according to letters from Tokyo and Hanoi to localordia Club it was clear that immediate steps were to be taken:

Completely to suppress all pro Chungking elements in Indo China.

To encourage Annamite independence movement which would be definitely Japanese and anti French.

believes object of such a move is creation of internal domestic trouble throughout Indo China which will provide further excuse for expansive Japanese control.

to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)

JULY 25TH, 1941.

*Extract No. 16 for Honolulu*

----- reports.

On June 8th following units of 12th repeat 12th division total strength repeat 6,000 left Hainan for Manchuria.

h infantry regiment.

h infantry regiment.

h artillery regiment.

On June 14th HIROSE (EGZ IRX) infantry regiment of 11th repeat 11th on left Hainan. On June 30th this unit arrived Dalren and went on to TUNGKIANH in Manchuria.

----- reports that on June 24th 11th cavalry regiment of 11th division left WHAMPOA from North River area and embarked for Manchuria.

Valuation C 3.

Message ends.

to Capt. I. H. Mayfield, Mr. Robert Shivers, Col. Geo. Bicknell)

JULY 25TH, 1941.

*Extract No. 15 for Honolulu*

----- reports July 25th.

July 18th 200 repeat 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon.

July 21st Lieutenant General HOMMA (GOK TTA) commander-in-chief of Japanese army and Major General SUMIDA (IPB JYS) arrived Saigon with repeat 30 German and Italian advisers.

On mornings of both July 20th and July 21st aid reconnaissance carried on Saigon by 6 aircraft.

July 20th one cruiser, one destroyer, one unidentified auxiliary and four transport ships arrived CAMRANH BAY.

Message ends.

*Extract No. 79 for Honolulu*

23RD JULY, 1941.

has further been reported that circular has been issued to German firms German Chamber of Commerce, on instructions from Commercial Counsellor, acting them that they must keep all goods purchased for export to Germany period of at least five months since it can be expected that transport via sea will be resumed before expiration of that period. In the event of firms entering difficulty over go-down storage space they are advised to ship to Dalren for storage. Further all purchases of goods in immediate future for export to Germany must be of "Non-perishable" kind.

*Extract for Honolulu*

JULY 22

It was reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in following is now being said:

1. in MENADO. Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japan be taken off in vessels from Pelao.
2. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. eastward of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from arrives.
3. Japanese will not be evacuated as evacuation would give N. E. I. in of pending attack.

*Extract for Honolulu*

JULY 16

## HONG KONG—JAPANESE SPONSORED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Following information is dated June 20, 1941.

1. WANG KI (——), who was previously Wang Ching Wei's representative in Hong Kong is now the Police Commissioner at Canton. The post of representative has been taken over by LAM FEI (——).
2. LAM FEI (——) with 45 senior agents under him, is mainly in the collection of military intelligence in Hong Kong; they also recruit tionable characters for subversive activities.
3. The removal of the Japanese Military Attache's Department to Macau caused the Japanese great inconvenience. TAKEDA, of the Special Section, has now been attached to the Japanese Consulate in Hong Kong to control the intelligence section here.

## INCITEMENT OF DISTURBANCES AND RIOTS

4. Plans are prepared for the creation of strikes, disturbances and riots and if Japan breaks with Britain. One of the principal agents employed in this department is JOHN LUI (——), a senior member of the Shanghai Fing Insurance Co. Lui's headquarters is established at 19/20 Connaught West, 3rd floor (next door to the Ping On Hotel), where he is operating CHUN KIN FIRM (——). He left for Shanghai recently and a few days ago returned to Hong Kong; it is believed that it is his intention to go to Singapore in the near future.
5. One of Lui's close associates is the son of the Chief Detective of Hong Kong, CHENG SAI-HOI. Lui is also believed to have been the founder of the Man Alumni Association (——).
6. According to information imparted to an agent in the employment of the Japanese, FURUKAWA (——), Chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence at Macau, learned that the Japanese hope to have recruited about 100,000 refugees as sleeper agents to take part in sabotage and nuisance activities in Hong Kong in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Japan.
7. A large number of refugee street-sleepers are already receiving financial assistance from the Japanese.
8. *Japanese Agents.* Other Chinese employed by the Japanese are: TAM KWOK-WA (——), who was employed by the Special Service Department at Macau to act as Liaison between them and Agents in Hong Kong in this connection he made innumerable visits here.
- CHAU WING TING (——), who has been in the employ of the Japanese in Hong Kong for the past ten years, mainly operating in the Swatow/Amoy sector. He is believed to be residing in Connaught Road West (1st Floor—the number is at present unknown and is being investigated).

## ARMS SMUGGLING

9. Source stated that puppet officials of the Chungshan area and Japanese agents are being permitted to enter Macau with arms, and it is through this channel that a large quantity of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hong Kong.

[Extract No. 13 for H]

*Telegram from Hongkong of July 19th, 1941*

----- reports June 15th.

A. June 1st 150 repeat 150 mines and 60 repeat 60 torpedoes landed at KARENKO, E. Coast Formosa, 24° N 121° E, from Islands.

B. During June Pescadore Naval units carried out mine laying operations along the Formosan coast. (Message ends.)

[Extract No. 14 for H]

*Telegram from Hongkong of July 19th, 1941*

----- reports June 15th.

A. June 4th 6 repeat 6 twin-engine monoplane bombers arrived KARENKO from Japan en route for Hainan.

B. On June 7th 6 repeat 6 monoplane fighters arrived HEITO from Japan.

C. On June 11th 12 repeat 12 monoplane fighters left KAGI for QUEMOY. (Believed all aircraft at Quemoy had left for Hainan).

D. Aircraft based Heito June 10th:

9 repeat 9 twin-engine monoplane bombers.

18 repeat 18 monoplane fighters.

3 repeat 3 reconnaissance.

12 repeat 12 trainers.

3 repeat 3 transports (3 engine monoplanes).

E. Aircraft based KAGI aerodrome June 10th:

9 repeat 9 monoplane bombers.

18 repeat 18 monoplane fighters.

14 repeat 14 reconnaissance.

E. On June 8th 500 repeat 500 paratroops arrived KOGO from TAIHOKU for training. Present number of paratroops at Kogo now about 1000 repeat 1000. Message ends.

[Extract No. 12 for H]

*Telegram from Hongkong of July 17th, 1941*

Commissioner of Customs Hongkong reports that on July 16th the following were observed at BOCCA TIGRIS:

25 repeat 25 transports.

100 repeat 100 (approximately) landing barges (empty).

1 repeat 1 motor landing craft. Message ends.

JULY 14, 1941

*Extract for Honolulu*

----- reports.

A. On April 19 two armed merchant men arrived Kobe and unloaded scrap metal and 1,000 caskets of ashes and were loaded up with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components.

B. The cases measured about 8 x 6 feet.

C. 400 men of a naval landing party and 130 coolies who had been segregated until going on board embarked on April 21.

D. The ships left for Spratley Island on April 21.

JULY 14, 1941

----- reports.

A. On April 20, 2 repeat 2 of the German vessels lying at Kobe left for Kure.

B. Guns to be fitted and ships will be ready for sea again at the beginning of August.

JULY 15, 1941.

----- reports on French Indo China and Hainan:

A. On June 8 12,000 men left French Indo China.

B. It is rumored that they were bound for Manchuria but this is given with great reserve.

C. On June 14 the following units of the 11th repeat 11th Division, t  
 3300 repeat 3300 men left Hainan for unknown destination:  
 HIROSE (EGZ IRX) infantry regiment  
 NAKAMURA (AAW GPA) Medium Artillery Battalion  
 HIRAOKA (FEU DYJ) Transport Company  
 YOSHINO (BAD TAK) and KUNO (COP MZA) Cavalry Squadron

JULY 14

*Extract for Honolulu*

A translation of a letter from Information Section of Concordia Society  
 branch of same, dated July 2, which states that on that day the nationa  
 in connection with Russo-German war was decided at a liaison converence b  
 the Government and High Command. The following general principle  
 stated to have been decided upon.

A. Japanese Government recognizes as her main guiding principles  
 tional safety and the success at any cost of establishment of new order  
 Asia.

B. Japan must depend only upon her strength and resources and conc  
 her attention upon East Asia problems.

C. She must use every means to further her own aims but always ta  
 consideration the constantly changing international position and must no  
 herself to be detracted from her present course by any claims requests  
 gestions if even slight risk of wasting her power and resources is involved.

JULY 12,

*Extract for Honolulu*

----- reports.

A. 20 repeat 20 of these vessels are under construction at Harima sh  
 Osaka.

B. 24-hour shifts were being worked on these jobs in May.

C. Vessels are expected to be completed at end of July.

D. Specifications:

Displacement 100 tons.

Dimensions 200 ft. x 28 ft. x 5 ft. 6".

(Note that these dimensions will give displacement of well over that r  
 and are therefore given with the utmost reserve).

Speed: 30 knots.

Armament: 6 machine guns.

E. Source further stated that these ships are to be used as troop landin  
 in the Southern expansion movement.

Valuation B 3 for paragraphs A to C only.

*Extract for Honolulu*

July 9,

----- reports.

A. In collaboration with German advisers the construction of 75 rep  
 submarines is projected in Japan.

B. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 repeat 20 of these jobs o  
 which the Osaka Iron Works are to build 4.

C. Valuation C. 3.

July 11, 194

----- reports from Japan on aerial bomb factory in Himeji.

A. Name of factory is Nakabe (AAW? SRY) Heavy Industrial W

B. Labor force in mid May 600 repeat 600.

C. Monthly production 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares.

D. 4 repeat 4 German engineers are attached.

July 11,

----- reports mid May.

A. A Shadow factory situated at Kawaguchi in Osaka has now started  
 ufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the Aichi F  
 Nagoya.

B. Labor force 2,600 repeat 2,600 working ten hours per day.

C. Estimate of production is wings etc., for about 100 fighters per mo

D. 3 German advisers are attached to the Kawaguchi Factory.

*Extract from letter from Manila 7-12-41*

Commandeering of Japanese ships by the Japanese government reached significant proportions,—many vessels used wholly in Japanese commercial interests and *not* running to U. S. ports. Nothing seems to be brewing in Japan, and although anything except helpful waiting by Tokio may make no sense to us the symptoms nevertheless indicate preparations for activity against either Russian Maritime Province or Indo China. I think *not* a) because of the strength and separateness of the Russian Empire in the Far East and probably latter). It seems extraordinary that the Japanese should not now begin to turn towards America and cease their irritating gestures—but the preparations are proceeding and the removal of these profitable vessels is costing them money in the meantime.]

GERALD WILKINSON

[Copy]

*Controller.*

decides all *quantities* of all materials required by factory under his control. Controls all *purchases* of tools, machines, etc. He even control development and study of prototypes. He decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and settlement of internal disputes. He supervises allotment of salaries, wages and bonuses. His control is complete and his decisions are final.

*Trained Engineers.*

Only certificated engineers from *Imperial* Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for Naval, military or aviation factories. Engineers with certificates from *private* universities (such as Waseda) may be employed in other defence industries. Factories which are not working for national defence get no certificated engineers. Numbers are carefully fixed, e. g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 Imperial University graduates per annum. This system extremely unpopular amongst students.

*Limitation of Salaries.*

Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1440 Yen. Graduates from private university get only 1170 Yen annually. Salaries only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 1440 Yen per annum.

*Artisans.*

Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally good hands get Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this works out at lower salaries than that of certificated engineers. Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this they are often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and have no work a week or fortnight's holiday.

*Discipline.*

Factory personnel may change their factory or branch of work without consent from the controller. Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will accept no supervision. They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.

*Naval and Military Friction.*

This extends to an astonishing degree, even when the same article is being used for both services. Drawings of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy. Component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with the result that double checking and control service has to be established.

Two distinct *trial and reception* services have to be established. Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable.

*Extract for Honolulu*

July 7, 1941

Source reports that he has been informed by two separate Chinese sources that they understood Japan promised Germany, in return for recognition of Wang Ching Wei, to blockade Vladivostok and that action was likely at an early date.

July 12, 1941

----- reports on the Aichi Aircraft Factory, Nagoya.

A. Beginning of April 3 German engineers arrived at this factory from the Dornier works.

B. Name of one is given as Andernich (DJI IZU DUN).

C. They are supervising construction of a new type of fighter.

D. This is described as K.22 type twin-engine 2 seater. It is still in the experimental stage.

E. Production aimed at is 50 repeat 50 per month. (Note that production figures of this aircraft coincide with those given for dive bomber reported as being manufactured in this factory in January.)

F. Labor force 2,600 repeat 2,600 working 24-hour shifts.

*Extract No. 9 for Honolulu*

To London :

3rd July, 1941

A. A Chinese Maritime Customs cruiser which had been scuttled by the Chinese in West River area has been salvaged by Japanese and put into commission for the Kwangtung Defense Headquarters.

B. Name HIP LIK.

Length about 310 feet.

Armament one small gun at bow and stern and two machine guns.

C. Note please that this vessel has been definitely allocated to the Puppet Chinese Naval Force.

*Extract No. 10 for Honolulu*

2ND JULY, 1941

To London :

A. There is no repeat not landing ground at Boryo.

*Katosha* is evidently identical with *Kato* and there is definitely a landing ground with two hangars here.

There is also a landing ground at *Suiteiryu*, which is usually used in connection with military training at Boryo.

B. *Koko* is believed to be the same as *Kogo*, but we do not repeat not agree with longitude of the latter place as given by you (we make it 121 degrees 03 minutes East). *Koko* is believed to be the centre of parachute training in Formosa.

My immediately following telegram.

*Extract No. 11 for Honolulu*

2ND JULY, 1941.

To London :

My immediately preceding telegram.

*Shinchiku* is an entirely separate aerodrome and we believe that naval air force units are permanently based here.

C. Agreed that *Reigaryu* is the same as *Takao*.

D. *Taihoku* aerodrome is equipped for night flying and has a civil aviation school and a military aviation centre attached.

*Matsuyama* was originally a civil aerodrome but barracks have recently been built here.

E. Detailed summary and sketch maps of aerodromes in Formosa have been despatched by bag.

*Extract No. 2 for Honolulu*

18TH JUNE, 1941

A. *Controller*.—Decides all quantities of all materials required by factory under his control.

Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc.

Can even control development and study of prototypes.

Decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and adjustment of internal disputes.



supervises allotment of salaries, wages and bonuses.

control is complete and his decisions are final.

*Trained Engineers.*—All certificated engineers from *Imperial Universities* Tokyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for naval, military or aviation factories. Engineers with certificates from *private* universities (such as Waseda) may be employed in other defense industries.

Factories which are not working for national defence get no certificated engineers.

Salaries are carefully fixed, e.g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 repeat 3 Imperial University graduates per annum.

System extremely unpopular amongst students.

*Extract No. 3 for Honolulu*

18TH JUNE, 1941

*Limitation of Salaries.* Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1440 Yen.

Graduates from private university get only 1170 Yen annually.

Salaries only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 1440 Yen per annum.

*Artisans.* Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this is out at higher salaries than that of certified engineers.

Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this they are often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and taken a week or fortnights' holiday.

*Extract No. 4 for Honolulu.*

18th JUNE, 1941

*Discipline.* No factory personnel may change their factory or branch of work without consent from the controller.

Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will accept no supervision.

They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility.

*Naval and Military Friction.* This extends to an astonishing degree, even the same article is being made for both services.

Each of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy.

Component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with the result that double checking and control service has to be maintained.

No distinct *trial and reception* services have to be established.

Waste involved in this duplication is incalculable.

*Extract No. 1 for Honolulu.*

12th JUNE, 1941

JAPAN—MILITARY—BODY ARMOUR

Following item from ----- dated 19th March, 1936, may be of interest in view of recent reports of bullet proof vests, etc.

An excellent anti-bullet steel has been evolved by the Metallurgical Laboratory of the Tohoku Imperial University headed by Mr. K. Konda. According to the latest Announcement, the steel is composed of the following:—

0.15–0.35% of carbon,  
0.5–1.5% of chrome,  
0.6–2.0% of manganese,  
0.2–1.0% of molybdenum,  
0.2–1.0% of cobalt of banadium,  
0.9% of silicon  
and the remainder iron.

Series of tests for hardness proved that the metal was more efficient than the foreign anti-bullet steel. Discoverers of the metal are Messrs. K. Ono and H. Hiba.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, Aug. 9, 1941. (Honolulu Field Office.)

*Extract No. 24*

To Capt. I. H. MAYFIELD  
Mr. ROBT. SHIVERS  
Col. GEO. BICKNELL

Following is summary information to hand on HULL.

A. AMOS TYLER HULL, employed by R. K. O. Pictures.

B. Is known to have received special facilities over a considerable period of time from Japanese Military in Mongolia, Hangchow and Shanghai areas and has stated that he could secure passes at any time for any area from Japan.

C. Shanghai French Intelligence emphatic that Hull was in Japan (#1421)

*Extract No. 33 for Honolulu*

A. Local Agents Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company received August 15 from Tokio instructing them:

1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.
2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty.
3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.

B. This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly over 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds).

(Valuation A 1.)

To: Col. BICKNELL  
Mr. SHIVERS

A. Source reports that on September 20 he met a certain CHIU CHE, who is head of a certain department of the Nanking Ministry of War.

B. Latter stated, a propos of announcement over the radio of sentence passed on a Japanese in Singapore for possession of seditious literature that "General HATA had very secretly approached head of War Ministry of Japan requesting his cooperation in enlistment of Chinese agents for work in Burma and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either FUKINESE or Chinese speaking dialect of that province.

C. Chiu Che Sheng stated that a certain number of men were recruited and despatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese agent. Chinese. Those chosen, in all cases, had some previous military knowledge through service at one time or another with Chinese forces. According to CHEN KUANG is responsible directly to Japanese military H. Q. at Nanking and to all their authority.

D. Source endeavours to follow up. It is sent merely because of Chiu Sheng's statements were spontaneous but it is not known if they have any foundation in fact.

(Value 3.)

*Extract for Honolulu*

—Who was recently elected as a Sakdal candidate for next political elections, states that local Japanese agents (whose names I have given to you) Military Intelligence have recently been cultivating him closely and volun- teered the following information.

A. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on Formosa.

B. Attack on Philippines and Singapore simultaneously, will take place by end August.

C. Campaign in Philippines to begin with rising in Mindanao and then in Manila.

D. Attack on Singapore to be overland through Siam, where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.

E. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. This is like a whispering campaign.

(Valuation C 3.)

[Japanese map]

## Enclosure (B)

Translation of Data in Outer Margins of Map of Singapore Region.

- a. Top Center: Singapore, Malacca, Benkalis
- b. Top Right:
  - English colony: Straits Settlements
  - Dutch colony: Sumatra
- c. Right Upper:
  - East Asia World Map
  - West 7th Vertical Segment
  - South 7th Horizontal Segment
  - Southern part
- d. Right Lower: Form of map instituted in 29th year of Meiji (1896) for East Asia World Maps
- e. Bottom Right (scale):
  - Boundary of West Coast Provinces of Sumatra ++++++
  - Provincial Boundaries -----
  - Provincial Capitals: ○
  - District Capitals: ⊙
  - Sub-district Capitals: •
- f. Bottom Right: (Seal) Imperial Japanese Government Land Survey Department
- g. Strategic Points: •
- h. Bottom Center: 1,000,000 to 1
  - (left) Kilometers (right) Japanese "li"
- i. Bottom left: Fixed Price—20 sen
- j. Left, Bottom: Possessor of Copyright for Printing and Publishing: Imperial Japanese Government Land Survey Department.
- k. Left, Top:
  - Made Meiji 32 (1899)
  - Printed Meiji 34 (1901)
  - Railways added Meiji 43 (1910)
  - Printed Dec. 5, Meiji 43 (1910)
  - Published Dec. 10, Meiji 43 (1910)
- l. Top, Left:

| West<br>9th Vert.<br>Segment | West<br>7th Vert.<br>Segment | West<br>6th Vert.<br>Segment |                                           |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
|                              |                              |                              | South 7th<br>Horizontal<br>Segment        |
|                              | SINGAPORE                    |                              |                                           |
|                              |                              |                              | South 8th<br>Horizontal<br>Seg. (North ½) |

[2] (Surrounding place names, given to establish the identity of the region, appear in the 8 blank spaces, but are left untranslated.)

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 7

*Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War  
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*

The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941 of messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and which were not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The documents following those mentioned in *a* above are the intercepts which comprise Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred to in my affidavits.

TOP SECRET

From: Hon.

To: Tokyo

Dec. 6, 41

PA-KY

#253 release p5 ——— 123a.

1. On American continent in Oct. Army began training barrage balloons at Camp Davis, N. C., 400,500 balloons considering use in defense of E. Panama. So far as Hawaii concerned though investigations made, they set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected troops to man them. No signs barrage balloon equipment. "In a ing for maintenance balloons. No signs barrage balloon equipment. "In a it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any limits to barrage balloon fence. "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity to take advantage of a surprise attack against these places.

In my opinion battleships do not have torpedo nets. Details not known report results of investigation.

Army 7178 25877 2a Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT).

TOP SECRET

From: Hon

To: Tokyo

Dec. 6, 41

PA-K2.

#254

1. On evening 5th, among battleships which entered port—one sub tender following ships observed at anchor on 6th.

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 sub tenders, 17 destroyers, in addition cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (heavy cruisers & airplane carriers)

2. "It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet at Army 7179 25874 Trans. 12/8/42 (2-22) 3 a.

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To : Honolulu

September 24, 1941.

J-19

#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels the following lines insofar as possible.

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

260 SECRET Trans. 10-9-41 (S)

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 14, 1941

Purple

#943 (Part 1 of 2)\* (To be handled in Government Code)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he me, it is this:

\*—For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.

What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. To hold a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. He speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and America for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

FORMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura)

Tokyo

October 14, 1941

File

3. (Part 2 of 2)\*

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany win Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, MOORE and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, the whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE<sup>b</sup> told me that EDWARD GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by Isolationists. MOORE<sup>c</sup> reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he does not think that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER<sup>d</sup> reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.

\*Part 1 of 2 not available.

<sup>a</sup>Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.

<sup>b</sup>American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.

<sup>c</sup>A Washington newspaper correspondent.

FORMY 5854 23516 SECRET Trans. 10-15-41 (7)

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

Washington

October 16, 1941

File (CA)

1

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to back the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably develop between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, transmitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed

any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Agreement she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances she can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a message between me and you.

(Separate Wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a situation in affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally must help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that notwithstanding the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but that the existing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 23631 Secret

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 22, 1941.

Purple. (CA)

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am aware that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, and how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this novice and who say that things will get better for me, but alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the head of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. I send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you to the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 Secret Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

5 November 1941

(Purple-CA)

#736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an avoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 Secret (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

Tokyo  
 Hongkong  
 December 14, 1941

119 (To be handled in Government Code)

(Strictly secret outside the Department)

While the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japanese negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find itself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is: we will completely destroy British and American power in China.

We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even if they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time basis. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has been the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will maintain peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, of a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have fully realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions upon you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep it very quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

The message is directed to Nansu,\* Hokudai,\* Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkingow, and Hongkong. Hokudai\* will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsing-tai will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

1301 Secret Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)

na spelling.

Tokyo (Togo)  
 Honolulu (Riyoji)  
 December 1941

Relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain

12-3-41 (S) 8991 Secret (Y) Navy Trans.

Tokyo  
 Washington  
 December 18, 1941  
 (Ca) (Urgent)

your Honor's own information.

We have read your #1090,\* and you may be sure that you have all my sympathy for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs on a slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did

\* See JD-: 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 is available.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to restate the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.<sup>b</sup> Will you please realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for a solution of these negotiations in my #736,<sup>c</sup> and there will be no more delay. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

<sup>b</sup>—S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

<sup>c</sup>—S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

Army 24878 JD-1:6638 Secret Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu  
November 18, 1941  
J-19  
#113

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,<sup>a</sup> and the areas adjacent thereto. (Your investigation with great secrecy.)

<sup>a</sup>—Probably means Mamala Bay.

Army 25773 7063 Secret Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

From: Honolulu (Kita)  
To: Tokyo  
November 18, 1941  
J-19  
#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219<sup>a</sup> on that day.

Area A<sup>b</sup>—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tank ship departed.

Area C<sup>c</sup>—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class and one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.<sup>d</sup>

3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into the Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoy in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each at roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of the destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the East side.

Relayed to -----

<sup>a</sup>—Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

<sup>b</sup>—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

<sup>c</sup>—East Loch.

<sup>d</sup>—Middle Loch.

Army 25817 7111 Secret Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
19 November 1941  
(J19)  
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) or the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be broadcast in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.



) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger HIGASHI NO KAZEAME  
(ST WIND RAIN)

) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND  
UDY)

) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)  
his signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast  
each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy  
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.  
forward as urgent intelligence.

Supplementary Information File

(voice broadcasts)

S 25432 JD-1: 6875 Secret Navy Trans. 11-28-41

1: Tokyo

Washington

November 1941

)

ular #2354

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following  
beginning and end of our general *intelligence* broadcasts:

) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI"

) Japan Russia relations "KITA"

) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "NISHI"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning  
end.

ay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

S-25392 JD-1: 6850 Secret Navy Trans. 11-26-41.

1: Tokyo

Washington

November 1941

ple-CA)

Re my #797\*

The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan  
been made more definite" we imagine would naturally have reference to  
question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan  
withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S.  
go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for  
U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.

On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would  
difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China,  
ly on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored.  
ould be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B\*\*  
osal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance  
you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of  
proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.

The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the pro-  
posal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation  
ing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the  
negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instruc-  
, (after reading our #797\*, #800\*\*\* and #801\*\*\*\*) will please present  
B\*\* proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can  
ade.

If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be  
en off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best  
ts.

Please note what you say in your #1133\*\*\*\*\* and, #1134\*\*\*\*\*, but in these nego-  
ns consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this  
We would emphasize this.

U. S. #25040

-1: 6658

-1: 6657

D-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528.

JD-1: 6660

\*JD-1: 6661

\*\*Not yet available.

) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT).

From: Tokyo  
 To: Washington  
 November 22, 1941  
 Purple CA (Urgent)  
 #812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring a solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess. I wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for the twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we are not automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is information of you two Ambassadors alone.

—See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo  
 To: Washington  
 November 26, 1941  
 Purple

#838. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams are being sent long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will give you the following code:

| <i>Japanese</i>                                                             | <i>English</i>                              |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)-----                    | Nyuu Yooku (York).                          |
| Musabetsu Taignu Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)----- | Shikago (Chicago).                          |
| Shina Mondai (The China question)-----                                      | Sanfuranshisuk (San Francisco).             |
| Soori (Premier)-----                                                        | Ito Kun (Mr. Ito).                          |
| Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)-----                                         | Date Kun (Mr. Date).                        |
| Rikugun (The Army)-----                                                     | Tokugawa Kun (Tokugawa).                    |
| Kaigun (The Navy)-----                                                      | Maeda Kun (Maeda).                          |
| Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)-----                        | Endan (Marriage proposal).                  |
| Daitooryoo (President)-----                                                 | Kimiko San (Mrs. Kimiko).                   |
| Haru (Hull)-----                                                            | Fumeko San (Fumeko).                        |
| Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)-----                                     | Shoobai (Trade).                            |
| Jooho Suru (To yield)-----                                                  | Yama Wo Uru (The mountain to sell the mo).  |
| Jooho Sezu (Not to yield)-----                                              | Yama Wo Urer (The mountain to sell the mo). |
| Kelsai Kyuuten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)-----                   | Kodomo Gau (The child is).                  |

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

|                                    |               |
|------------------------------------|---------------|
| Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO-----         | Setagaya 4617 |
| Section Chief KASE-----            | Yotsuya 4793  |
| The Minister's residence-----      | Ginza 3614    |
| The Vice-Minister's residence----- | Ginza 1022    |

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941  
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941  
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941  
Purple. (Extremely urgent)  
#1190. (Part 2 of 2)\*

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the

responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumptions. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)

(Telephone Code)\*\*

*Transpacific Telephone*

To Kumaicho Yamamoto \* from Kurusu:

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they *will not yield*\*\*\* I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." after thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail".

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i. e. progress ?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

\*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

\*\*See JD-1: 6841, (SIS # 25344), of this date.

\*\*\*Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The interceptor read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "It is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 28, 1941

Purple. (CA)

#844.

Re your #1189\*.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you

awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to inquire #1180<sup>b</sup> and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

—S.I.S. #25441, #25442.  
—S.I.S. #25485, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.

From: Tokyo  
To: Honolulu  
November 1941  
(9)  
22

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future I would also report even when there are no movements.  
D-1: 7086 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Toyko  
To: Washington  
November 1941  
Purple-CA)  
57

Re my #844\*  
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

D-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days stating its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

D-1: 6921 Secret (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)  
Telephone Code

*TransPacific Radio Telephone*

NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short message from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a larger one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y: "Is that so?"

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspaper are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y: "We are being careful."

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech.)

JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y: "No particular—(one or two words faded out)—"

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y: "Yes."

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches. ! ! ! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K: "Let's see. . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y: "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941.

Purple. (CA)

#985. (Part 1 of 3)<sup>a</sup>

Re my Circular #2387.<sup>b</sup>

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986<sup>c</sup>.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

<sup>a</sup> Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. # 25553.

<sup>b</sup> Not available.

<sup>c</sup> See S.I.S. # 25554 and 25555.

From: Tokyo  
 To: Berlin  
 November 30, 1941.  
 Purple. (CA).  
 #985. (Part 3 of 3)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

25553 Secret Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Tokyo  
 To: Berlin  
 November 30, 1941  
 Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)  
 (Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested, (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

From: Tokyo  
 To: Berlin  
 November 30, 1941.  
 Purple.  
 #986. (Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

SECRET

From: Washington.  
 To: Tokyo  
 1 December 1941  
 (Purple)  
 #1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midwestern point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany the representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace. We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given to the matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal conditions, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.  
 To: Washington.  
 1 December 1941  
 (Purple)  
 Circular #2436

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand.



for this purpose. The Attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

25545 JD-1: 6939 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: London:  
1 December 1941  
(Purple)  
Circular #2448

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YŪ GŌ No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

Message not seen but—British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London, 26 April 1945. E. J. Layton.

25787 JD-1: 7091 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)

From: Tokyo  
To: Hsinking  
1 December 1941  
(Purple)  
#893

----- In the event that Manchuria participates in the war -----  
in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

Codes Manchukuo, etc.

JD-1: 7092 SIS 25783 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
1 December 1941  
(Purple-CA)  
#865

Re my #857\*.

1. The date set in my message #812\*\* has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124\*\*\*. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the country is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President returned so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

\*JD-1 : 6921.

\*\*JD-1 : 6710.

\*\*\* Not available.

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*Completed Translation*

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941

Purple

#1232 (Part 1 of 2)

Re my #1231.

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with the Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233\*. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the disposition of our troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the statement of the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramidized economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japan. (The Under-Secretary made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question of rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure and we want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. \*We want you to realize this as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the recent incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of this situation.

\*—Not available

\*Original translation incomplete from this point on. Trans 12/3/41.

[1] From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#1232. (Part 2 of 2)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." The Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "I cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is very difficult for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 24th representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposals have not stood. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the air, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date will naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the need to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation."

here." [2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 28th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Not available.

25680 ARMY Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Washington

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#867 (Strictly Secret)

(CORRECTED TRANSLATION)

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna".

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860<sup>a</sup> is no longer recognized.)

<sup>a</sup> S.I.S. # 25550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

#25640 Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

December 2, 1941

J-19

#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007. 27065 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941

(Purple)

#1223

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785 JD-1: 7096 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

# 662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Berlin  
To: Tokyo  
December 4, 1941.  
Purple. (CA)  
#1410

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo.  
5 December 1941  
(Purple)

#1268 Re your #867\*

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communications Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

25836 JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

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\* (Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (SIS # 25640): Directs Washington to destroy copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple  
#901 Re my #844\*.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 Secret Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

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\* See S.I.S. # 25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington that the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
December 6, 1941  
Purple (Urgent)  
#1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULF we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of the individuals.

Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)——.

NY 25846 7176 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

: Tokyo  
Washington  
November 6, 1941

le  
(Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram

## MEMORANDUM

The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

NY 1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

: Tokyo  
Washington  
November 6, 1941

le  
(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted this as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

NY 1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

: Tokyo  
Washington  
November 6, 1941

le  
(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on

fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple

#902 (Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20, 1941, still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the most essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple

#902 (Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude of imposition upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

: Tokyo  
Washington  
umber 6, 1941  
e

(Part 6 of 14)

From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, adopted by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that in accordance with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

: 1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

: Tokyo  
Washington  
umber 4, 1941  
e

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories regardless of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, has caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance of them. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

3 Secret 25843

: Tokyo  
Washington  
umber 6, 1941  
e

(Part 8 of 14)

Among the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis for the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

For example, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, has been removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations



under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple  
#902 (Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, is said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is extremely in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple  
#902 (Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China and other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country — (45 letters garbled or missing) — been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the interests to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple  
#902 (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American position. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of five of the six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the one — (50 letters mission) — suitable for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 6, 1941  
Purple  
#902 (Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application



principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in finding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. The demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to Asia.

:1 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

: Tokyo  
Washington  
December 6, 1941

le  
2 (Part 13 of 14)

In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th the result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND \* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT* \*\* be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

:1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843

probably "and as"  
probably "China, can but"

: Tokyo  
Washington  
December 1941

ple-Eng)  
Part 14 of 14

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to reserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at bay.

This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

-1: 7143 Secret (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT) 25843

668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu  
December 6, 1941  
PA-K2  
#128

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123<sup>a</sup> the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 7381 26158 Secret Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

<sup>a</sup> Not available.

(Japanese)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 7, 1941  
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)  
#907. To be handled in government code.  
Re my #902<sup>a</sup>.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

<sup>a</sup> JD-1: 7148—text of Japanese reply.

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 7, 1941  
Purple (Extremely Urgent)  
#910.

After deciphering part 14 of my #902<sup>a</sup> and also #907<sup>b</sup>, #908<sup>c</sup> and #909<sup>d</sup>, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

<sup>a</sup> S.I.S. #25843—text of reply.

<sup>b</sup> S.I.S. # 25850.

<sup>c</sup> S.I.S. # 25853.

<sup>d</sup> S.I.S. # 25858.

25854 Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

From: Budapest  
To: Tokyo  
December 7, 1941  
LA  
#104

Re my #103<sup>a</sup>.

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

<sup>a</sup> Relayed to Berlin.

ARMY 25866 7184 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

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CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 8

*Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, Jagd, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*

The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources. They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to 22 December 1941.

MOST SECRET.

To be kept under lock and key: never to be removed from the office.

*Japanese Consul, Singapore, Requests Issue of Code Words.*

No: 097975

Date: 21st November, 1941.

From: Japanese Consul-General, SINGAPORE.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 717.

Date: 17th November, 1941.

Immediate:

Some day the British authorities will prohibit the use of cypher telegrams by this office. To prepare for this eventuality please draw up secret code words and send them by Consul-General OKAMOTO as diplomatic correspondence. Please include in this secret code, words necessary for military intelligence, evacuation of residents, the closing down of this office etc. Please see the Naval Secret Code which I have received recently.

Director. F. O. (3). F. I. D. Admiralty. Colonial Office. M. I. 5.

*Japanese Code Phrases for Broadcasting in Event of Emergency*

No. 008127

Date: 25th November, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister. TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Chargé. LONDON.

No: 2363 Circular.

Date: 19th November, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

The international situation is tense and we cannot tell when the worst may happen. In such an event, communications between the Empire and the enemy countries will immediately cease. Therefore when our diplomatic relations are on the point of being severed, we shall broadcast, as the weather report, the following phrases in the middle and at the end of the news in Japanese in our overseas broadcast service:

(1) If Japanese-American relations are in question: "Higashi no kaze ame" (Easterly wind, rain).

(2) If JAPAN and the SOVIET are concerned: 'Kita no kaze kumori' (Northerly wind, cloudy).

(3) In the case of JAPAN and BRITAIN (including the invasion of THAILAND or an attack on MALAYA): "Nishi no kaze hare" (Westerly wind, fine).

The appropriate phrase will each time be broadcast twice in a resolute voice and you should accordingly [group corrupt: destroy by fire] codes documents, etc.

The above is to be treated as strictly confidential.

From: The Japanese Chargé, LONDON.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 700 Urgent of 21st November, 1941.

Reference your circular telegram No. 2353. (above).

Director. F. O. (3). F. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5

Sir E. BRIDGES,  
Dominions Office.

*Japanese Foreign Office View of Conversations With America*

No: 998151

Date: 25th NOVEMBER, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Diplomatic Representatives, ANGORA, &c

No: 2364 Circular.

Date: 20th November, 1941.

Confidential.

1. Since the formation of the new Cabinet the Government has started a conference in daily contact with Imperial Headquarters and has been able to debate a fundamental national policy to cope with the pressing situation of the day. In the morning session on the 5th instant, a decision was taken on the policy to be adopted for adjusting Japanese-American diplomatic relations.

2. The Japanese-American negotiations are to be pursued by considering the adjustment of diplomatic relations on an equitable basis. These have been in progress since the 7th, but there is a considerable difference of opinion between the two parties, and in view of the progress made so far there is some doubt as to whether a compromise will be reached. For our part, we are doing our utmost to reach a compromise, but we cannot make any further concession and the outlook is not bright. Should the negotiations break down, that part of the situation in which the Japanese Empire is involved will be critical.

The foregoing is for your exclusive information.

This telegram is addressed to BERNE, ANGORA and VLADIVOSTOK.

BERNE will repeat to VICHY, MADRID, LISBON, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, FORS and PRETORIA.

ANGORA will repeat to BUCHAREST, SOFIA and BUDAPEST.

Togo.

Director (3) P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges.

At this post there is nothing for it but to use the Navy's wireless. Details have been telegraphed by the Naval Attaché to the Admiralty. Please refer to them and make the necessary arrangements.

*Japanese Broadcasts: Reception in Rome.*

No: 098232

Date: 27th NOVEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 740.

Date: 20th November, 1941.

In regard to the general news broadcasts, not only JUO but JAP (which was changed on the 20th) were generally impossible to receive. This was due to unstable weather conditions at this time of year which made the note weak. In addition to which there was much interference from miscellaneous noises.

In view of the recent international situation the demand for [group communication ? news ? information] is steadily increasing. We foresee no difficulty about reception arrangements at this end but in present weather conditions group reception will not be possible on one wavelength only. It is essential that simultaneous broadcasts be sent on two or three wavelengths. I understand that the recently changed DOMEI broadcasts in English have begun simultaneous broadcasts, and I ask that every effort be made for these simultaneous broadcasts to be carried out.

For your information I will, till further notice, telegraph reception efficiently every three days.

HORIKI

Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. M. I. 5.

*Japanese Cypher Machines: Security Measures.*

No: 096313

Date: 29th November, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: BERNE, WASHINGTON, etc.

No: 2398 (Circular telegram).

Date: 25th November, 1941.

Most Secret:

Recently our cypher machines (the printing portion of "A" and the shift key of "B") have been designated as a State Secret. Any leakage of information connected therewith will incur the application of the National Defence Peace Preservation Law. As regards the machine in your keeping, you are strictly enjoined to take every precaution for safe and secret custody.

On the right-hand side of the number plate affixed to the printing portion and shift key, please write the words "Kokka Kimitsu" [State Secret] in red enamel.

This telegram is to be relayed, as the Foreign Minister's instructions, in the following manner:

From WASHINGTON to MEXICO, RIO DE JANEIRO and BUENOS AIRES.

By cable.

BERNE to LONDON, VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. By cable.

VICHY to MADRID. By safe hand.

HANOI to SAIGON. By safe hand.

Director. F.O. (3). M.I.5.

*Japanese Ambassador, Hanoi, Asks for Instruction in Event of Emergency*

No: 098400.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

From: Japanese [? Ambassador], HANOI.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 118.

Date: 26th November, 1941.

[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

(Secret.)

To judge from what I hear from the Military, the American answer reached us [? on the 24th]. If this is so the Cabinet Council will no doubt finally reach a decision in a day or two and determine whether it is to be peace or war. If Japanese-American negotiations are to be held we shall of course take in hand progressively the various undertakings previously planned; but if the negotiations break down, as preparations for military operations are nearing completion, an advance would be possible within ten days or so. In that event considerable modifications would be necessary in the programme of undertakings to be carried out under our present policy, and it will be necessary to initiate measures and negotiations in keeping with our military operations. What causes me most concern and [? anxiety] is whether, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, it is the policy of the Government and Imperial Headquarters to carry on military operations leaving the status of the Government of INDO-CHINA as it is at present, and on this point I require to be informed in advance: and not only so but I want to make necessary preparations with all speed. If, therefore, you have any views on the development of the Japanese-American negotiations and the prospects alluded to I beg that you will telegraph them at once. Moreover, while it goes without saying that secrecy must be preserved, nevertheless, according to newspaper reports, AMERICA has been consulting with BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, the NETHERLANDS and the Chinese in WASHINGTON, and these Governments are aware of the purport of the Japanese-American negotiations. And what is more, the Military here, as the result of comings and goings between here and TOKYO, are aware of the nature of your instructions and of the ins and outs of the negotiations: in fact I have the impression that the only people who are left in the dark are Foreign Office officials. Seeing that the situation is as tense as is indicated in your circular telegram No. 2383 [our No. 098127], should be glad to receive your instructions on these points as soon as possible, either by telegram, messenger or some other method.

## 672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.O. Admiralty. War Office (3). India (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.B. Major Morton. Sir E. Dominions Office.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

To: Japanese [? Ambassador], HANOI.

No: 93 of 26th November, 1941.

(Also in Chef de Mission cypher recyphered).

Reference your No. 118 (above).

My circular telegram \*No. 2414 gives the course of the Japanese-American negotiations and my circular telegram \*No. 2416 tells of their present condition. Even in the event of the worst happening the Imperial Government has not taken any special decision to make a change in the status of the Government of INDO-CHINA. You may therefore take it that for the present our intention is to maintain the status quo. Please do your best on this understanding.

Repeated to Paris and Berlin.

[Dept. Note \*Not yet decyphered].

### *Japan and the Axis: Plans in Event of Breakdown of Washington Conference*

No: 098413.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassadors, BERLIN and ROME.

No: 2387 Circular.

Date: 24th November, 1941.

[Very corrupt text. In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine]

For your own information only.

The Japanese-American negotiations [?] are [seem to be] approaching final stage. . . . [two lines corrupt]. In the event of the breakdown of negotiations we shall be face to face with a rupture of relations with BRITAIN and AMERICA, and the necessity is likely to arise for the sudden tightening of the relations which have hitherto prevailed for cooperation between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY. My idea is that [? you] should then propose to the [two groups] action to be taken; but [two groups] I shall ask Your Excellency to be active during this month. It is possible that circumstances may necessitate having a special interview with Führer HITLER (Premier MUSSOLINI). Please bear this in mind. [Two groups] until you approach them you must refrain absolutely from saying anything to the Germans (Italians). Take your information and in haste.

At the moment the time is not ripe for a detailed report on the Japanese-American negotiations. Please note, however, that we have taken every precaution to obviate any obstacle to the maintenance of the Three Power Pact.

This telegram is addressed to BERLIN and ROME.

Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

### *Japanese Communications by Naval Wireless in Event of Emergency*

No: 098414.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

From: Japanese Chargé, London.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

No: 778.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

In present circumstances it may happen that the despatch and delivery of telegrams may be purposely delayed or completely held up and that we shall not be able to depend on the reliability of communications. I therefore request you to take steps to [? make simultaneous use of] the Naval wireless, as in 760 [our No. 098127].

[Dept: Note: Cyphered in "X" and recyphered on the machine].

Director. F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese Plans: Instructions to Ambassador at Berlin*

35.  
 : 008452.  
 e: 2nd December, 1941.  
 m: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
 : Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.  
 : 935 Very urgent.  
 e: 30th November, 1941.

Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].  
 Reference my circular telegram No. 2387. [Our No. 008413].  
 The Japanese-American negotiations begun in April of this year under the  
 mer Cabinet have now reached a stage at which a breakdown is inevitable, in  
 e of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government. The Empire, faced with  
 s situation, has to take the most serious decisions. You should therefore see  
 arer HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP at once and give them an  
 line of developments in confidence. At the same time you should tell them in  
 fidence that the attitude of BRITAIN and AMERICA has recently been pro-  
 vative and they have continued to move troops into all parts of Eastern ASIA.  
 meet this we too have been compelled to move troops, and it is greatly to be  
 ed that an armed collision will occur and we shall find ourselves in a state  
 war with BRITAIN and AMERICA. You should add that this may happen  
 er than is expected.

Here Part II is missing. It will be sent in later if received].  
 If when you make this communication questions are asked by the Germans  
 Italians as to our attitude towards RUSSIA, you should tell them that our  
 tude towards the SOVIET is as explained to them on 2nd July of this year,  
 t we will of course not relax our restraint on the SOVIET as the result of our  
 on in the south; but that if the SOVIET, acting in cooperation with BRITAIN  
 AMERICA, take hostile action against us, we are prepared to resist it reso-  
 ly; that it is on the South, however, that we lay most emphasis, and that we  
 ose to refrain from deliberately taking positive action in the North.  
 As all this concerns our plan of campaign it of course requires the utmost  
 ecy, and you should make a special point of impressing this strongly on the  
 mans and Italians.

With regard to telling the Italians, immediately after our Ambassador in  
 RLIN has told the Germans, Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister  
 NO should be informed. As soon as the dates for the German and Italian  
 rviews are fixed please telegraph.  
 ease repeat to Rome as my instructions.

Togo.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office  
 Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese orders for destruction of cypher machine in London Embassy*

Date: 3rd December, 1941.  
 No 698509.

m: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
 e Japanese Ambassador, LONDON.  
 [ ? 2443 ] Circular.  
 e: 1st December, 1941.  
 et and Urgent.

ease take steps for the immediate disuse of the cypher machine at your  
 assy.

With regard to the steps to be taken, these should conform to the instructions  
 previously. Please exercise the greatest care and, in particular, with regard  
 e methods of dismantling and breaking up the essential parts, carry them  
 strictly in accordance with instructions.

a receipt of this, please telegraph immediately the one word "SETSUJU"\*  
 eived) en clair, and, having carried out these instructions, telegraph the  
 "HASSO"\* (Despatched), also en clair.

With regard to the cypher connected with the machine, you are, of course,  
 to burn your copy No. 26 of the YU code (machine code) (the settings for  
 on the machine for communication between this Department and the Em-  
 y in LONDON).

(Dept. Note: \*These messages received, dated 2nd December, 1941.)  
 Director (3). F. C. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (3).  
 Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.

*Japanese-Thai Relations: Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Care Thai Minister*

No: 698525.

Date: 4th December, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 1347.

Date: 20th November, 1941.

I received a visit from the Thai Minister on the 20th. He opened his remarks by saying that he also was a soldier and would like to have a frank talk with me as between men who had known each other for many years. He then referred to a recent crop of rumours to the effect that JAPAN was to invade THAILAND and to reports of large Japanese troop concentrations on the Thai frontier in French INDO-CHINA, and asked point blank whether there was any truth in them or not. I replied that I had had no news from my home Government on these matters but that my own belief was that JAPAN's actions towards all Far Eastern races were aimed at applying the principle of live-and-let-live, the fact being that in cases such as that of the recent arbitration between THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA JAPAN had done her utmost for THAILAND for this very reason and would never invade THAILAND for the purpose of aggression. But the facts were that GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA had set up the so-called ABCD front in opposition to JAPAN's establishment of a New Order, finally threatening the existence even of JAPAN herself. JAPAN of course would be compelled to continue her course brushing this aside, and that she wished to attain this and by peaceful means was obvious from the mere fact of her having sent Mr. KURUSU to AMERICA. However, if the worst came to the worst and it was unavoidable, JAPAN would have to take the necessary steps for her own existence—not that there would be any question of this happening if THAILAND soon understood JAPAN's ultimate purpose and displayed an attitude of cooperation with JAPAN; she would have to invade THAILAND only if that country should blindly follow the lead of GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA and take up an attitude of opposition.

The Minister interposed by describing the position in which THAILAND was placed and by stating emphatically that THAILAND would never oppose JAPAN as an Anglo-American cat's-paw.

When suggesting his visit the Minister said that he wished to see me urgently and OMMINISI's view that he probably came on instructions from his home Government.

The Germans are also extremely interested in Thai problems and I should be glad if you would inform me at once as to the latest situation.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese Chargé, London, Submits Plans for Withdrawal of Embassy etc. Staff*

Date: 4th December, 1941.

No: 098539.

From: The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, LONDON.

T: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 781.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

It is feared that in the event of the situation becoming critical the exchange of telegrams may become impossible. I therefore submit the following points for your consideration and request instructions.

1. In view of conditions at this post, countries suitable for protecting our interests after the withdrawal of this Embassy are BRAZIL or SWITZERLAND. I suggest that the matter be discussed in TOKYO with the country concerned, so that instructions may be sent by that Government to its Ambassador (Minister) in LONDON.

2. Is there any objection to burning the consular exequaturs at present held in custody, viz: LIVERPOOL, DUBLIN, RANGOON, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, BATAVIA, MACASSAR and VANCOUVER?



The stipulations for withdrawal of the Embassy etc. staffs and of resident Japanese should be made with the British on a strictly reciprocal basis. If could be done it would be necessary to effect the exchange at a stipulated time, each side providing a ship. An agreement would have to be drawn up regarding the dates of departure etc. to prevent anything going amiss. In the case of GERMANY the exchange took place in HOLLAND, in ITALY's case it was at LISBON. If hostages are taken there is the danger that our nationals will not be able to leave the country). The evacuees to be exchanged

1st party: Embassy and Consular staff

2nd party: Newspaper correspondents

3rd party: Japanese Staff of banks and companies

were sent out from JAPAN (the 2nd and 3rd parties are not necessarily in order of precedence). Exchange for each party will be arranged separately. In principle I do not wish to include employees locally engaged and Japanese living here of their own wish. Concerning the above negotiations should be undertaken both here and in TOKYO and, if necessary, instructions can be given to the countries who will protect our interests.

Round figures the number of persons is:

a) Officials—34 (including the Chargé d'Affaires, secretaries, military and naval attachés, advisory consuls, telegraphic attachés, chancellors, special emissaries and their families).

b) Newspaper correspondents—6.

c) Bank and Company employees—30.

Director (3). F. O. (13). F. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir R. Hopkins. M. E. W. (2). E. Bridges. Dominions Office

*Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc. in Washington Embassy*

Date: 4th December, 1941.

No: 098540.

BJ/87

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

From: Japanese Ambassador, WASHINGTON.

867 Secret.

Date: 2nd December, 1941.

Subject: Note: Compare our No. 098509].

Re: The telegraphic cyphers with which your Embassy is provided you are to use all (including the cyphers of other Ministers in your charge) except one each of the machine cypher now in use, cypher "O" and cypher "L".

You are also to discard\* one complete cyphers machine.

As soon as this is done you should telegraph the one word "HARUNO".

You should deal with files of in and out telegrams and other secret documents in an appropriate and suitable manner at your discretion.

The cyphers brought by Cypher Officer KOSAKA [? should all be burnt]. Consequently the need to get in touch with MEXICO referred to in my telegram No. 860 [not received] [last word corrupt].

Subject: Note: \*The word used, "haiki", can mean "cease to use", "abolish", "discard". It is not the normal word for "destroy".

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office Colonial Office. War Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Reports Ribbentrop's Statement on German War Plans*

No: 098541

Date: 4th DECEMBER, 1941.

To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

1393.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

Subject: (de Mission Cypher).

Re: I was to have had an evening meeting yesterday, the 28th, with RIBBENTROP at his request, but he suddenly asked me to postpone it, and it was ten minutes before we met.

The reason for the postponement was that GOERING and leading Government and Forces personalities met at the Fuehrer's official residence and held an important conference lasting for many hours. Now that the objects of the Japanese campaign have for the most part been achieved, and the results of views with the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the European countries related, they discussed the direction and policy of next year's campaign. I have no doubt that at this conference JAPAN's action was also discussed.

1. First of all RIBBENTROP again asked if I had received any news of the Japanese-American negotiations. I replied that I had not yet received official news. RIBBENTROP said JAPAN must not lose this opportunity of achieving the establishment of the New Order in East ASIA, and never there been a time when close cooperation between the three Allies was imperative. If JAPAN hesitated and GERMANY carried through the New Order in EUROPE alone, BRITAIN and AMERICA would turn the brunt of the attack against JAPAN. He insisted that, as the Fuehrer had said that the existence of JAPAN and GERMANY on the one hand and of AMERICA on the other was fundamentally incompatible, and the Germans were in receipt of reports that, owing to the stiff attitude of the Americans, there was practically no possibility of the Japanese-American negotiations being successful. I was so, and if JAPAN determined on war against BRITAIN and AMERICA, not only would this be to the common advantage of JAPAN and GERMANY, but he believed it would be to JAPAN's advantage also.

I said I know nothing of JAPAN's plans and therefore could not answer. I asked whether His Excellency really thought a state of war would arise between GERMANY and AMERICA. He replied that ROOSEVELT was discussing it and there was no knowing what he would do.

Considering that hitherto RIBBENTROP has always answered that AMERICA would avoid war, and in view of recent speeches by HITLER and RIBBENTROP, it seems to me that GERMANY's attitude towards AMERICA is gradually changing, and that she has reached the stage where she would not shun even war with AMERICA.

2. I enquired about the future of the war against RUSSIA. RIBBENTROP replied that the Fuehrer had said that it was now his inflexible determination to sweep away and crush the SOVIET once and for all. The most important military operations had been concluded, and a large part of the army would be withdrawn to GERMANY. They would, however, continue operations in the CAUCASUS and next Spring with a part of it they would make an attack on and beyond the URALS and chase STALIN into SIBERIA. I asked when approximately the attack was to be, and he said it was intended that the attack should start in May of next year.

I next observed that I gathered from what he said that they were quite determined on attacking the SOVIET, and the thing I should like done as far as possible was the creation of air communications between MANCHURIA and GERMANY. He replied that the Germans had been thinking of this for some time past, and he thought that next Summer it would not be impossible to make one hop from somewhere near the URALS to MANCHURIA.

3. I asked about plans for an attack on BRITAIN. He said that before landing in BRITAIN they would chase British influence clean out of the MEDITERRANEAN, EAST AFRICA, GIBRALTAR and the MEDITERRANEAN. I gathered from his statement by RIBBENTROP that they attach even more importance than they do to this area. I asked if they intended to carry on without, attacking the FISH ISLES. RIBBENTROP said that GERMANY was of course making preparations for this: but according to reports reaching GERMANY the international situation in BRITAIN was not any too good. For instance the split in the Conservative Party, the lack of confidence in CHURCHILL and the revolutionary ideas of BEVIN, the Labour leader, were making internal conditions quite difficult. There were of course some people who did not believe this: but the Fuehrer believed that conditions in BRITAIN were bad and thought that as a result of GERMANY's future operations, even, it might be, without an invasion, BRITAIN would be beaten.

In any case, however, GERMANY for her part had no intention whatever of making peace with ENGLAND, and the plan was to drive British influence out of EUROPE entirely. After the War, therefore, BRITAIN would be left absolutely powerless, and although the BRITISH ISLES would remain, all British territory would be split up into three under GERMANY, AMERICA and JAPAN. In AFRICA, GERMANY would, generally speaking, be satisfied

old colonies and would give a great part to ITALY. It was, he said, to ob-  
 (group corrupt) that GERMANY attached the most importance.  
 Remarking in conclusion that the very satisfactory progress of the War under  
 man leadership was fully recognised and that GERMANY naturally had to  
 and the area of operations by regarding as enemies not only BRITAIN but also  
 tries under British influence and those helping BRITAIN, I asked him when  
 thought the War would end. To this he replied that, although he hoped it  
 d be brought to a conclusion in the course of next year, it might possibly  
 nue till the following year.

also said that if JAPAN were to go to war with AMERICA, GERMANY  
 l, of course, join in immediately, and HITLER's intention was that there  
 d be absolutely no question of GERMANY making a separate peace with  
 LAND.

the end of this talk RIBBENTROP asked that the substance of it should  
 pt strictly secret, so please pay special attention to its handling.

is telegram has been given to the Naval and Military Attachés and to Vice-  
 ral NOMURA and Major-General ABE. Please have it shown to the Army  
 Navy.

OSHIMA.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office  
 Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese instructions regarding cypher machines and codes*

BJ/88.

No.: 098563

Date: 5th DECEMBER, 1941.

: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

apanese (? Ambassador), HANOI etc.

2444 Circular. Secret.

: 1st December, 1941.

structions have been sent to LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE and  
 ILA to discard the cypher machine, and BATAVIA's machine has been re-  
 d to JAPAN.

withstanding my circular telegram No. 2447 (see below), WASHINGTON  
 alning its machine and machine code.

RNE to repeat to VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. WASHINGTON  
 eat to BRAZIL, ARGENTINE and MEXICO.

: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

apanese Ambassador, ROME etc.

2447 Circular of 2nd December, 1941.

structions have been sent to the following to burn all telegraphic codes except  
 copy each of OITE and L:

th AMERICA (including HONOLULU), CANADA, PANAMA, (one group  
 pt), South Seas (including (one group: ? Portuguese) TIMOR), SINGORA,  
 ENMAI, British possessions (including Embassy in LONDON), and Dutch  
 ssions.

Togo.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office  
 Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc*

BJ/89.

No.: 098577

Date: 5th DECEMBER, 1941.

: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

Japanese Consul, MOMBASA [and other posts unspecified].

2446. Circular.

: 2nd December, 1941.

et).

mediately on receipt of this telegram you are to carry out the following  
 ctions with the greatest care and as inconspicuously as possible.

o Burn all cyphers except one copy each of "O" and "L". As soon as  
 ave done this immediately telegraph the one word HARUNA en clair.

## 678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(b) Burn all files of in and out telegrams and all secret and confidential documents.

These are precautions envisaging an emergency, and you should therefore redouble [rest of text corrupt: ? precautions in the discharge of your duties].

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

### *Japanese Code Words for Telegraphing to Notify Critical Condition of Situation*

No: 008602

Date: 6th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO,

To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.

No: 2409 Circular.

Date: 27th November, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

The following is the method of telegraphing secret code words to notify the critical condition of the situation.

Using the names on the first column a plain language text will be made up on some ordinary subject. The second column will contain the information which it is desired to send.

(Example:

"Collision between Japanese and Soviet armies" will appear in the text under date [? 15th] as "Junior Secretaries HIJIKATA and KUBOTA are ordered for duty at your post. STOP").

Further telegrams sent by this method will all end with the word "STOP" to distinguish them from other communications. The word "OWARI" [— "end"] will therefore not be used.

Arimura: cypher communications prohibited.

Asai: communicate by wireless broadcast.

Asakura: listen carefully for wireless communication by broadcast.

Asikaga: jamming by oversea broadcasts reception impossible.

Azuma: pressure on JAPAN becoming greater.

Edoguti: prepare for evacuation.

Hanabusa: evacuation preparations made.

Hanazono: proceed with preparations for requesting suitable foreign envoy (consulate) to protect Japanese interests.

Hatakeyama: diplomatic relations severed between Japan and . . . . .

Hattori: relations between JAPAN and . . . . are extremely critical.

Hijikata: collision between Japanese and . . . . armies.

Hosino: JAPAN is engaged with . . . . on the whole front.

Ibaragi: telegraph time at which rupture of diplomatic relations between JAPAN and country to which you are accredited anticipated.

Inagaki: has telegram been received on the matter of . . . . ?

Ishikawa: telegram received on the matter of . . . .

Kashiwagi: positive action has begun against . . . .

Kobayakawa: stop granting Japanese entry and transit visas to . . . . nationals.

Kodama: Japan.

Komiyama: China.

Koyanagi: Great Britain.

Kubota: U. S. S. R.

Kuribara: France.

Kusunoki: Germany.

Matsutani: Italy.

Minami: United States of America.

Miwata: Canada.

Miyazaki: Mexico.

Morokoshi: [? Brazil].

Motizuki: Panama.

Nagamine: Argentine.

azato: Thailand.  
 gō: England and America.  
 i: Dutch East Indies.  
 wa: Burma.  
 moto: Malaya.  
 mura: Australia.  
 uka: Union of [? South Africa].  
 era: enemy country.  
 i: [? the individual in question].  
 hi: year.  
 ya: next year.  
 anaka: this year.  
 akibara: month.  
 no I: [? day].  
 Zyō: time.  
 : one.  
 ku: 2  
 arō: 3  
 i: 4  
 : 5  
 Ma] Sa Roku: 6  
 etarō: 7  
 kiti: 8  
 amatu: 9  
 ni: 0 (zero).

Togo.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office  
 Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

n: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.  
 Japanese Consul-General, Singapore  
 [and other posts unspecified].

2461 Circular of 3rd December, 1941.

et:

duplicates of secret code words (including those for use in broadcasting\*) are  
 kept until the last moment. If anyone has already burnt them he should  
 rm me by telegram and they will be telegraphed again.

Togo.

Dept: Note: \*These are presumably those given in our No. 098127].

*Japanese orders for destruction of cyphers, etc.*

/90

: 098803

te: 6th December, 1941.

n: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Japanese Ambassador, London.

2445 Circular. (Secret).

e: 2nd December, 1941.

Please take the following action without delay and see to it that no word of  
 aks out to outsiders.

Except for one copy each of the O, E, H, P, G, and L codes and the Character  
 e, all telegraphic codes (including the cypher books for intercommunication  
 een the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine) to be burnt.

When this has been done, the one word "HARUNA" to be telegraphed.

The files of all incoming and outgoing telegrams and all other confidential  
 uments to be burnt.

Taking all possible care not to arouse outside suspicion, all secret documents  
 e treated in the same way.

s these are precautions envisaging an emergency, you should communicate  
 ur duties and maintain your calmness and self-respect.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office  
 Colonial Office. A Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

# 680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Japanese Chargé, London.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

No: 790 of 3rd December, 1941.

HARUNA [see paragraph 2 of telegram above].

*Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation*

No. 098604

Date: 6th December, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.

No: 2421 Circular.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

Additions to list given in my circular No. 2409 [our No. 098602].

(To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher).

|            |                                                                                                          |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kasima:    | Have residents been interned?                                                                            |
| Kanoo:     | All residents are safe.                                                                                  |
| Kikuti:    | All residents have been interned.                                                                        |
| Katuno:    | Some residents have been interned.                                                                       |
| Kawasimo:  | General Information. Wave-length changed to .<br>k/cs from ... [month] ... [day].                        |
| Kakao:     | General Information. Sensitivity bad; please<br>change wave-length.                                      |
| Tujikita:  | General Information. Please change to short<br>wave-length.                                              |
| Tabuse:    | General Information. Please change to long<br>wave-length.                                               |
| Saitoo:    | General Information. Time of broadcast changi<br>on ... [day] from ... [time] to ... [time].             |
| Kakasaki:  | General Information. Please change time of broa<br>cast from ... [day] from ... [time] to ...<br>[time]. |
| Isezaki:   | Hundred.                                                                                                 |
| Wanami:    | Thousand.                                                                                                |
| Yasu[RYO]: | 0,000.                                                                                                   |
| Uno:       | 00,000.                                                                                                  |
| Itimata:   | 000,000.                                                                                                 |

Director (3). F. O. (3). F. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office.  
(2). Colonial Office. War Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion  
Office.

*Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation*

No. 098608

Date: 6th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, RIO etc.

No.: 2432. Circular.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

As the following additions have been made for use in connection with your  
area only, please add them to the list already sent to you. (See our No.  
098602 and 098604).

|              |                                                                                              |
|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Asahima:     | The supplying of fuel to Japanese ships putting in<br>Port has been stopped from ... (date). |
| Date:        | Please telegraph what quantity of ... can<br>be bought.                                      |
| Kawahara:    | It is thought that about ... tons of ... can<br>be bought.                                   |
| Niwali Quti: | Purchase of ... impossible.                                                                  |
| Makamuta:    | Negotiations for purchase of ... in progress.                                                |
| Mukakata:    | (? Please) communicate via ... (name of country).                                            |
| Kazama:      | Communications (? to be carried out) via dip<br>omatic mission in ... (name of country).     |
| Tokusima:    | Japanese ship due ... (name of country)<br>... (month) ... (day).                            |

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India  
Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir K. Bridges. Domin-  
ion Office.

emouti: Can a Japanese ship visit . . . (name of country).  
agi: Impossible to despatch Japanese ship to . . .  
(name of country).  
agi: Japanese ship can be sent to . . . (name of  
country).  
agi: Metal.  
amura: Lead.  
umi: Mercury.  
saki: Coal.  
okata: Diamonds for industrial use.  
ni: Platinum.  
a: Copper.  
agawa: Carat.  
hata: PERU.  
uko: CHILE.  
ada: COLOMBIA.  
ekaka: (? URUGUAY).  
azu: (? PARAGUAY).  
awa: VENEZUELA.  
kaka: SAN (? DOMINGO).  
imoto: (? ECUADOR).  
eo: HAVANA.  
Ki: (? RIO).  
awa: (? BOLIVIA).  
egawa: River PLATE.  
- Ine: SANTOS.  
moto: (Bauru, sic. ? PAULO).  
pu: CURITIBA.  
amatu: (? BELEM).  
tugu: BUENOS AIRES.  
uki: SANTIAGO.  
ato: LIMA.  
awa: BOGOTA.  
a: CARACAS.  
o: ?  
amati: ASUNCION.

*Japanese-American negotiations account sent to Japanese Ambassador, Berlin.*

No. 098633.

Date: 7th December, 1941.

n: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.  
986.

: 30th November 1941.

Dept. Note: First paragraph missing).

The present Cabinet has therefore continued the negotiations (with  
AMERICA) hitherto on an equitable basis though at the same time exercising  
care to safeguard JAPAN's authority and existence.

Amongst the most knotty points in these negotiations has been the conflict in  
respective opinions regarding the question of withdrawing troops (with-  
drawal of troops from CHINA and INDO CHINA was demanded) etc., but to  
be by circumstances in the negotiations hitherto, the fundamental obstacle  
has been the traditional policy of AMERICA with regard to the conduct of  
international relations, that is to say her adherence to the same fundamental  
principles as were expressed in the recent Anglo-American talks at sea (? i. e.  
Atlantic Charter). In short, AMERICA's real intention is to veto and  
frustrate the establishment of the New Order in EUROPE and ASIA by JAPAN,  
GERMANY, and ITALY (i. e. the purpose of the Tripartite Pact), their view  
being that Japanese-American relations cannot be maintained on a friendly  
basis so long as JAPAN makes common cause with GERMANY and ITALY,  
acting on this view, they have to all intents and purposes demanded  
JAPAN's renunciation of the Tripartite Pact. This has brought the negotia-

tions to their final stage, and, as the talks of the last few days have made the matter still more clear, JAPAN has been compelled to realize that to continue the negotiations any longer cannot be expected to serve any useful purpose.

3. Again, the proposals presented by the American Government on the subject made the above attitude even clearer, the clause affecting the Tripartite Pact being worded: "It is agreed that any treaty which either of the two Governments may have concluded with a third country shall not be construed as conflicting with the principles of this treaty, in other words, with the maintenance of peace in all regions of the PACIFIC . . . ." It is apparent that the clause was planned with the object of restricting the interpretation of JAPAN's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, and thereby of making JAPAN refrain from giving support to GERMANY and ITALY in the event of American participation in the (group corrupt: ! European) war, and to judge by this clause alone it has been realised that, quite apart from all other questions, it would be impossible for the American proposals to be made (group corrupt: ! the subject of negotiations). Moreover the fact is that the American Government held discussions with GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, and the United States before presenting their proposals, and hence it can be seen that AMERICA is at present (? acting in common) with these countries and regards JAPAN as an enemy together with GERMANY and ITALY.

Director (3). P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges.

*Japanese Ambassador, Rome, reports interview with Mussolini.*

No: 098650

Date: 7th December,

From: Japanese Ambassador, ROME.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

Date: 3rd December, 1941.

(Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine).

Reference your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098452).

Accompanied by ANDO I saw the Duce, MUSSOLINI. (CIANO also went) at 11 a.m. on the 3rd. I first gave him an outline of the Japanese-American negotiations as set forth in your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098633). MUSSOLINI said he had been following the negotiations from their inception to-day with the greatest attention, and my communication had caused him no surprise. There was no doubt that the present situation was the natural result of the (? obstinacy) of the American Government and of President Roosevelt's policy of intervention. The plutocrats of AMERICA aimed at the economic exploitation of Eastern ASIA for their own benefit, and wanted to prevent JAPAN from the Axis and intervene in the European war. He had known from the beginning that JAPAN, who was faithful and loyal, would not respond to such an attitude on AMERICA's part, negotiations or no negotiations. As I and my predecessor knew, he was a whole-hearted supporter of Japanese fundamental policy for the establishment of a New Order in East ASIA, as it was in the past, so it was in the present and would be in the future. I firmly believed that JAPAN, as a natural right, would be the leader of East ASIA.

Director (3). P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges.

I then spoke on the lines of your telegram under reference ( [This passage in brackets is not clear. The sense seems to be: "With regard to paragraph 2 of your telegram, it was to be done as one copy between our Ambassador in Berlin and RIBBENTROP and talks of some sort were in progress. I should like to ask the German Ambassador about it." ] ). With regard to paragraph 2 of the telegram MUSSOLINI said that if war broke out ITALY would give no support to the best of her power; that is to say she would do her best to keep the British Navy in the MEDITERRANEAN. Moreover GERMANY and ITALY



er had recently established an air blockade and were trying to put further pressure on BRITAIN in the MEDITERRANEAN. Also with regard to [? 2 ? 3], was ready to sign to-day. I therefore asked further with regard to 2 if ITALY would do this at once if JAPAN declared war on BRITAIN and on AMERICA. He replied that in accordance with the Three Power Pact naturally she would. However, it would be necessary to do it simultaneously with GERMANY, they would have to go through the formality of consulting with GERMANY. With regard to 3, I submitted the [one group] translation in your telegram No. 237 [not received], and asked which procedure he preferred, a single copy or separate copies. He replied that it should be done simultaneously with GERMANY, but he did not much mind what form it took. If it were possible a single copy would make a greater impression of strength. He would at once consult MACKENSEN on this point. At this meeting MUSSOLINI asked me questions about the Russian question, but I therefore did not refer to it. He repeated to BERLIN.

HORIKIRI.

*Japan and the Axis, Proposed Three-Power Pact.*

No: 098651

Date: 7th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.

The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

782.

Date: 5th December, 1941.

Reference my telegram No. 775. [Not received].

Accompanied by ARDO I had an interview with the Foreign Minister CIANO on the 5th at his request.

CIANO showed me the Italian text of the draft of a Three-Power Pact to which GERMANY and ITALY have agreed, (BERLIN will have telegraphed this to me, I imagine), regarding participation in the war and not making an independent armistice or independent peace. He said that if the Japanese would agree to this it could be signed at any time. The procedure could be arranged by consultations between BERLIN and TOKYO and then all the parties could sign. He repeated by telegram to BERLIN.

HORIKIRI.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (3). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir H. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese Foreign Minister's View of Washington Conversations.*

No: 098671.

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN, etc.

2416 Circular.

Date: 28th November, 1941.

Dept: Note: Very corrupt text].

Chef de Mission cypher).

With regard to the Japanese-American negotiations, the counter-proposal made by the Americans on the 27th ignores the position of JAPAN and cannot be considered for a moment. It seems, therefore, that there is nothing for it but to continue the negotiations. The situation is that it is impossible to guarantee within a few days from now there will be no [? change in] the relations of JAPAN with BRITAIN and AMERICA.

This is for your personal information only.

Togo.

Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D.

*Japanese Broadcasting.*

No: 098673

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941

From: The Japanese Ambassador, RIO DE JANEIRO.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 482.

Date: 30th November, 1941.

Recently at this post, we have been testing general news reception.

At present it is quite impossible [group corrupt: ? to hear] the 10.30 p. Tokyo time, broadcast and, for the time being, please note that we are listening to JVJ's [group corrupt: ? JZJ's] broadcasts directed to American states at 6.30 p. m., Tokyo time. The same, I understand, applies to Argentina.

Actually, reception conditions here are considered best between 4 a. m. and 6 a. m., Tokyo time, and I consider it would be most advantageous to use this period for South American broadcasts. Two wave-lengths [of frequencies] between 10 and 15 megacycles [group corrupt: ? are suggested].

Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. M. I. 5.

*Japanese Ambassador, Bangkok, Wishes to Burn Codes.*

No: 098674

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941

From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 883.

Date: 30th November, 1941.

In view of the state of emergency, I should like to burn all telegraphic codes except those set out below. Please wire at once whether you have any objections.

YO, KA, OITE, TO, TSU, FUJI, X. [Group corrupt]. MATSU with No. 1 rules for use, directions for using "B" machine (KO-OTSU [(a)-(b)]) and machine code—one of each of the above.

I, YAKKO [—NU]—two of each.

Further, I should like to burn all shipping codes, naval codes and codes used between the three Ministries. Please negotiate with the Departments concerned and telegraph instructions.

Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (3). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.*

No. 098693

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 1416.

Date: 5th December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: See our No. 088551].

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

Reference my No. 1407 [not received].

I called on RIBBENTROP at his request at 3 a. m. on the 5th. He made a formal reply that they accepted the two points put forward by us. My following telegram gives the draft Treaty which he gave me in this connection.

OSHMA

No: 1417 of 5th December, 1941.

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

(1. The last part of the Agreement is in the same form as the Three Power Treaty.

2. The place of signature is BERLIN.)

[Dept: Note: Translation follows at end of text].

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

(Part of German text in original illegible.)

## Artikel 1

Als zwischen Deutschland und Italien einerseits und den Vereinigten Staaten Amerika andererseits der Kriegszustand eintritt, wird sich Japan sofort seinerseits als im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten befindlich betonen und diesen Krieg mit allen ihm zur Verfügung stehenden Machtmitteln führen.

## Artikel 2.

Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, im Falle eines gemäss Artikel dieses Abkommens von den drei Mächten gemeinsam gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika geführten Krieges ohne volles [gegen]seitiges Einverständnis einen Waffenstillstand oder Frieden mit den Vereinigten Staaten zu schliessen. Sie übernehmen die gleiche Verpflichtung auch hinsichtlich eines Waffenstillstands oder Friedens mit England für den Fall, dass zwischen Japan und England der Kriegszustand eintritt.

## Artikel 3.

Die drei Regierungen sind darüber einig, dass dieses Abkommen auf das strengste geheim gehalten wird. Sie werden jedoch die von ihnen in Artikel 2 übernommene Verpflichtung in einer noch zu verabredenden Form bekanntgeben, und sich Deutschland, Italien und Japan gemeinsam im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika oder England oder mit diesen beiden befinden.

## Artikel 4.

Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft und bleibt so lange wie der am 27. September 1940 abgeschlossene Dreimächtepakt in Kraft.

OSHIMA.

*Translation*

View of the increasingly obvious desire of the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND to bring to nought a just New Order with all the armed forces at their disposal and to cut off the means of existence of the German, Italian and Japanese peoples, the German Government, the Italian Government and the Japanese Government have, in order to ward off these grave threats to the existence of the peoples, jointly resolved on the following:

## Article (1).

Should a state of war arise between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES, GERMANY and ITALY for their part shall also consider themselves to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces at their disposal.

Should a state of war arise between GERMANY and ITALY on the one hand and the UNITED STATES on the other, JAPAN for her part shall consider herself to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces at her disposal.

## Article (2).

GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN bind themselves in the event of a war waged by the Three Powers against the UNITED STATES according to Article 1 of this Treaty, not to conclude any armistice or peace with the UNITED STATES without full mutual agreement.

They undertake a similar obligation regarding an armistice or peace with ENGLAND, should a state of war arise between JAPAN and ENGLAND.

## Article (3).

The three Governments are in full agreement that this agreement shall be kept strictly secret. They shall, however, announce in a form yet to be decided, the undertakings assumed in Article (2), as soon as GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN find themselves jointly at war with the UNITED STATES of AMERICA or ENGLAND or with both these Powers.

## Article (4).

This agreement comes into force immediately on signature and remains in force as long as the Three Power Pact concluded on 27th September 1940.

*Japanese Notification of "Extremely Critical" Relations with Great Britain  
United States*

BJ/91

No. 008694

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
To: Japanese Embassy, LONDON, etc.  
No. 2494 Circular.  
Date: 7th December, 1941.

Relations between JAPAN and GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES are extremely critical.

JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

[Dept. Note: This telegram was sent in plain language with the special words inserted given in our No. 008602. It was despatched from TOKYO at hours OMT on 7th December 1941, i. e. Japan Time 8.50 p. m. on 7th December 1941].

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.

*Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.*

No: 008696

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.  
No. 1004. Most immediate.  
Date: 7th December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

Reference your Nos. 1418 and 1419 [these telegrams were received in correct and fragmentary form. The former appears to deal with Russian supplies the latter with the draft treaty].

We are in complete agreement with GERMANY's counter-proposals. Accordingly there is no objection to initialling right away and formally signing as soon as the [group corrupt: ? necessary] procedure has been completed. However, the situation may take a sudden turn and we cannot tell whether a [group corrupt: ?] collision may not occur in the interval before the formal signing is performed. Thus, supposing we initial now, it must be understood that for the actual signing, the text proposed by GERMANY may not apply to the existing circumstances (for example, clauses like No. 1 will be unnecessary if GERMANY and ITALY join in the war without delay).

[Two groups] I wish you to see RIBBENTROP immediately and explain the above particulars confidentially to him. Also make clear that it is the expectation of the Imperial Government that if war breaks out between JAPAN and AMERICA before the formal signature of the agreement, GERMANY and ITALY will immediately participate.

Director (3). P. O. (3). P. L. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.

As regards the text of the agreement, [group corrupt: ? please negotiate] only for the stipulation concerning the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Respecting GERMANY, please refer to the text in my No. 997 (not received). Further, discuss with GERMANY whether the formal signing should be made public after GERMANY and ITALY have joined in the war and telegraph your reply.

Please repeat to ROME.

*Far Eastern War: Question of German and Italian Participation*

RJ/92.

No: 008722

Date: 9th DECEMBER, 1941.

Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

1432. Most immediate.

8th December, 1941.

(de Mission cypher).

1 p. m. to-day, the 7th, I received a radio report that hostilities had broken between JAPAN and AMERICA, and at once called an RIBBENTROP. He said that from reports which he too had received he thought this was true, and therefore, although he had not yet secured HITLER's sanction, the immediate participation in the war by GERMANY and ITALY was a matter of course. The secret agreement had in consequence already become —?—, and I had decided] to drop it \* \* \* [if portion is lost here] \* \* \* Form German and Italian participation. RIBBENTROP said he would discuss the same to-morrow, the 8th, about the time of publication of this declaration on.

RIBBENTROP rang up CIANO then and there and notified him of the same.

Director (23. P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir H. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Far Eastern War: Text of Japanese-German-Italian Agreement*

BJ/98

No. 008760

Date: 10th DECEMBER, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

1440. Most immediate.

8th December, 1941.

Treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

Reference my No. 1432. (Our No. 008722).

The text of the agreement, after consultation with GERMANY, is given below. Explanation follows in my separate telegram.

„Wir haben den unerschütterlichen Entschluss, die Waffen nicht niederzulegen, bis der gemeinsame Krieg gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und England zum erfolgreichen Ende geführt worden ist, haben sich die Deutsche Regierung, die Japanische Regierung und die Japanische Regierung über folgende Bestimmungen geeinigt:

Artikel 1.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden den ihnen von den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und England aufgezwungenen Krieg mit allen ihnen zur Verfügung stehenden Machtmitteln gemeinsam bis zum erfolgreichen Ende führen.

Artikel 2.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, ohne volles gegenseitiges Einverständnis weder mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika noch mit England Waffenstillstand oder Frieden zu schließen.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Artikel 3.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden nach erfolgreicher Beendigung des Krieges zum Zwecke der Herbeiführung einer gerechten Neuordnung auf engste zusammenarbeiten.

Artikel 4.—Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Urkunde dessen haben die Unterzeichneten, von ihren Regierungen gehörig ermächtigt, dieses Abkommen unterzeichnet und mit ihren Siegeln versehen. Gefertigt in dreifacher Urschrift in deutscher, italienischer und japanischer Sprache, in Berlin am . . . Dezember 1941 im 20ten Jahre der Faschistischen Ära entsprechend dem Tage des 12ten Monats des 16ten Jahres der Ära Syowa. 1441 of 8th December, 1941.

For reference to my telegram No. 1440 [see above].

From 5 p. m. to-day myself, RIBBENTROP, KASE, USHIDA, and GAU our heads together on this matter of the declaration of the non-conclusion of a separate peace with a view to imparting to this declaration the loftiest significance, and produced the text of the agreement contained in my teletype under reference. This goes beyond the adoption of our proposal in regard to the promise of nonconclusion of a separate peace (Clause II) to the following:

(a) The Three Powers' firm intention to fight together against Anglo-American aggression until final victory is expressed in Clause II.

(b) Cooperation with a view to the establishment of a new order after the war is promised in Clause III.

Thereby the significance of this war is elucidated, while at the same time Clause III has an advantage from the point of view of obtaining German and Italian cooperation when the Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere is established after the war, this, I believe, being in accord with the views of the Japanese Government. I hope therefore that the above text will be adopted unless there are any serious objections, and that the formalities for signature may be completed promptly. I would add that in the meantime the Germans have informed me that the Italian Government is in complete agreement with this proposal.

2. Ribbentrop said that he would like the publication of this agreement to take place on the 10th and immediately afterwards hoped to stage a big demonstration. He was unable at the moment to say what kind of demonstration this would be, but it was sure to be something distinctly favourable to JAPAN, and he was very anxious that signature should be on the 10th. I therefore told him that this should not be undertaken in view of formalities in JAPAN, but as it is likely to be completed to us if we play our part in falling in with GERMANY's intention I would suggest that you push on with the formalities as fast as possible with a view to a prompt signature. Should signature on the 10th not be possible please reply immediately by telegram on what date it can be accomplished.

3. Just as this very talk was in progress RIBBENTROP received the Intelligence Headquarters report of the victory in which the American battleships were sunk and was greatly delighted and praised highly the daring of our Navy.

No: 1442 of 8th December, 1941.

Most immediate. Secret.

Reference my No. 1440. [See above.]

As the matter is urgent, I have tentatively compiled the Japanese text of the agreement below. If you have no objections I should like to take this as the Japanese text of the agreement. Please telegraph your reply at once.

The Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government with the inflexible determination not to lay down their arms in the joint struggle against the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE until final victory is achieved have made the following agreement.

1. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY will conjointly prosecute the war force against them by the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE will all the while be at their disposal until victory is attained.

2. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, except by mutual consent, undertake not to conclude a separate [Dept. Note: the Japanese word used means "arbitrary" "self-willed"] armistice and/or peace with the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE or with either of them.

3. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, after victory is attained, will cooperate closely in the establishment of an equitable New Order.

4. This agreement will come into force simultaneously with its signature by the witnesses whereof, the undermentioned, having received competent authority from their respective countries, have set their seals this — day of the 12th month of the 16th year of the Showa Era i. e. — December 1941 or the — day of the 20th year of the Fascist Era, in BERLIN, the said agreement having been drawn up in Japanese, German and Italian.

*Japanese Instructions to Embassy, Rio, etc. to burn cyphers etc*  
BJ/97.

No: 098786

Date: 10th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

To: Japanese Ambassador, Rio De Janeiro, etc.

No. 2318 Circular.

Date: 8th December, 1941.

## Immediate and Confidential

On receipt of this telegram please burn the following, leaving one copy of h, NU, CITE, TSU, L and X. Depending on the situation, it will also be all at to burn the remaining codes, but please keep TSU as long as possible and ve CITE and L to the last.

Please leave one copy each of HIMOKI and the Machine Code in current use including the rules for use between our Embassy in England (sic) and us— y MEXICO does not possess these). But if in view of the situation you wish any time to destroy them please telegraph me.

With regard to the files of my telegrams and other secret documents please each developments and adopt suitable means of destroying them.

In the event of your completing the above, telegraph me the one word RYO. If you have destroyed TSU the word SHOTI, if CITE and L have n destroyed the word ANZEN.

If you have in your care telegraphic codes of other Posts please destroy them

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office. M. I. 5.

*Japanese Codes to be Destroyed at Bangkok*

No: 098800

Date: 11th DECEMBER, 1941.

m: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.

881. Confidential.

e: 2nd December, 1941.

n reply to your telegram No. 863. [Our No. 098874]. I agree with your re-  
st, to which there is no objection. But please transfer one copy of OITZ  
SINGORA for safe keeping. Please destroy the codes for use between the  
ee Ministries; also all the naval code books. The codes remaining after  
sultation with the posts concerned and the cypher machine[s] please deposit  
he special safe. Please be sure that this is carried out.

Director. F.O.(3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2).  
onial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*Japanese Broadcasting: Reception in Bangkok*

No: 098801

Date: 11th DECEMBER, 1941.

m: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.

The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

: 902.

e: 4th December, 1941.

t 10:30 p. m. J.A.P.'s selectivity is gradually improving.

We look for broadcasts at this hour and also for JUP at 6:30 p. m.

Director. F.O.(3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2).  
onial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Dominions Office.

*Japanese Consul, Dublin, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers*

No: 098831

Date: 12th DECEMBER, 1941.

m: The Japanese Vice-Consul, DUBLIN.

The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

e: 7th December, 1941. 1040 hours.

\*HARUNA,  
Japanese Consul.

Dept. Note: \*See paragraph 2 of TOKYO circular telegram No. 2445 of 2nd  
ember, 1941, our No. 098803].

Director. F.O.(3). Dominions Office.

*Japanese Vice-Consul, Ouritiba, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers, etc.*

No: 098832

Date: 12th DECEMBER, 1941

From: The Japanese Vice-Consul, OURITIBA.  
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
Date: 10th December, 1941. 2040 hours.

\*JURYO,  
Komine.

[Dept: Note: \*See Tokyo circular telegram No. 2318 of 8th December, 1941, paragraph 4, our No. 098786].  
Director. F.O.(3). M.I.5.

*Japan and the Axis: Signature of Treaty*

BJ/10  
No: 0988

Date: 12th DECEMBER, 1941.  
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.  
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
No. 1451.  
Date: 10th December, 1941.

(Dept: Note. See our No. 098760, BJ/98).  
Reference your telegram No. 1013. (Not received).

I have received the whole of the Japanese text. I called on the Foreign Minister at noon to-day, 10th, and arranged for signature on the 11th at 1100 hours Berlin time and for publication at 1600 hours. Accordingly please publish at 2300 hours in JAPAN.

Director (-). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. — Ministry. Sir B. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, BERLIN, AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THREE-POWER TREATY*

No: 0988  
Date: 12th December, 1941

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.  
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.  
No: 1016.  
Date: 10th December, 1941.

(Dept: Note: See our No. 098760).

Most immediate.

To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.

My telegram No. 1013. (Not received).

For your information, the following is a translation into German of the document giving you power and authority to sign:

(Übersetzung).

TOKYO, den . . . . Dezember des sechzehnten Jahres von Shōwa.

(Amtliches Insiegel).

Der Minister des Auswärtigen Amtes, Shigenori TOGO.

An den Ausserordentlichen und Bevollmächtigt— Botschafter in BERLIN, Herrn OSHIMA.

Seine Majestät der Kaiser haben nachdem die Beratung des kaiserlichen geheimen Staatsrates abgeschlossen ist, mit dem heutigen Datum den

Abschluss

Director.

F. —. (3).

P. I. D.

Abschluss des Abkommens zwischen JAPAN, DEUTSCHLAND und ITALIEN zu bewilligen geruht.

Sie sind bevollmächtigt, das oben genannte Abkommen zu unterzeichnen und zu siegeln.

(Translation of German given above is as follows:—



Translation).

TOKYO, the —th December, in the 16th year of the Shōwa Era.

Office Seal).

Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO,

to Mr. OSHIMA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at  
BERLIN.

Upon the advice of the Imperial Privy Council, His Majesty the Emperor is  
pleased to agree to the conclusion of a Pact, dated to-day, between JAPAN,  
GERMANY and ITALY.

You are empowered to sign and seal the aforesaid Pact).

*Japan and the Axis: Text of Three-Power Treaty*

Date: 12th December, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

No. 1010.

Date: 9th December, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.

At 9 p. m. to-day the German Ambassador called on me and we had a second  
interview when he submitted the new draft of the text. You will already have  
received this, I expect.

In regard to this text I said that this involved the 1st paragraph of Article 3  
of the Three-Power Treaty, and suggested the removal of Article 3. At the  
same time, I said, if GERMANY stuck to the retention of this Article, after the  
words "an equitable New Order" in that same Article should be added "in the  
Three-Power Treaty concluded on 27th September, 1940". Article 4 should  
therefore be amended to read "This pact shall come into force at the time of its  
signature and its period of validity shall be identical with that of the Three-  
Power Treaty concluded on the 27th September, 1940".

The Japanese text is given in my immediately following telegram. (See below.)

The remainder of the telegram gives instructions for telegraphing the texts  
in the three languages to enable the formalities in JAPAN to be concluded. See

Footnote. Note: at end of TOKYO-BERLIN No. 1011 of 9th December, 1941. (See  
below)].

TOGO.

Director (3).

D. (3).

C. D.

Ministry.

Foreign Office (3).

India Office (2).

Colonial Office.

Ministry.

E. Bridges.

Union Office.

No. 1011 of the 9th December, 1941.

Reference my immediately preceding telegram No. 1010. (See above).

To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher).

Pact between JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY.

In the inflexible resolve not to lay down their arms till the joint war against  
the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND has been successfully concluded, the  
Japanese, German, and Italian Governments have jointly agreed as follows:

*Article 1.*

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will fight together with all the resources at  
their command until victory is achieved over the UNITED STATES and  
ENGLAND.

*Article 2.*

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY undertake not to make a separate armistice  
or separate peace with the UNITED STATES or ENGLAND without full mutual  
understanding.

*Article 3.*

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will after the victorious conclusion of war collaborate closely in establishing an equitable New Order in the spirit of the Three-Power Treaty signed on 27th September, 1940.

*Article 4*

This Pact shall come into force at the time of signature.

As witness whereof the undermentioned plenipotentiaries etc.

Signed in triplicate in Japanese, German and Italian at BERLIN (date)

(Dept. Note: The German and Italian versions of the above were cable-  
sent from TOKYO to BERLIN as Nos. 1450 and 1453 respectively, dated 10th December, 1941).

**MOST SECRET.**

**TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY: NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.**

*JAPANESE BROADCASTS OF GENERAL INFORMATION REPORT*

No. 098971

Date: 16th December, 1941

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, AMGORA, etc.

No: 2548 Circular. Secret.

Date: 11th December, 1941.

From 10.30 p. m. 11th December, general information reports will be sent on the 9450 wavelength [? with the call sign] JUO.

Director.

P. O. (3).

P. I. D.

Admiralty.

War Office (3).

Air Ministry.

M. I. 5.

Sir E. Bridges.

*JAPANESE NAVAL PLANS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC*

No. 099199

Date: 22nd December, 1941

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, Buenos Aires.

No. 288.

Date: 9th December, 1941.

[The first part of this telegram recounts the events that led up to the outbreak of war from the Japanese point of view—Japanese patience and A. B. C. encirclement. Part II follows].

2. The Imperial Japanese forces, however, right at the outset and in the face of a heavy attack, have achieved the following: two battleships sunk, four severely damaged, four heavy cruisers severely damaged (three are confirmed), one aircraft-carrier sunk and over one hundred aircraft destroyed. It may be said that the main strength of the American Pacific Fleet has been practically annihilated.

From now on the Imperial (Japanese) Navy will be able to extend the scope of its (? activities) little by little to the South Atlantic and South Pacific and it is clear at least that we shall obtain command of the seas in the South Atlantic before long. Even, therefore, if economic intercourse between JAPAN and the South American States bordering the Pacific be cut off for the time being, it will not be long before communication is restored. Not only so, but intercourse with ARGENTINA and BRAZIL by merchant ships in convoy will be urged upon

o countries, while sea communication with BRITAIN, AMERICA, and Latin  
ERICA will, on the other hand, be severed (? shortly) by the Imperial (Japa-

se) Navy.

rector (3).

C. (3). (Dept. Note: Part III of this telegram missing)

I. D.

miralty.

ar Office (3).

lia Office (2).

lonial Office.

r Ministry.

E. W. (2).

E. Bridges.

mintons Office.



## INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

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| EXH. NO. | DESCRIPTION                                                                                                                                                |
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| 2.       | Table A (p. 1) showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates. (Exhibit B, p. 130.)                                    |
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| 4.       | Map of Palao Islands. (Exhibit B, p. 132.)                                                                                                                 |
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| 8.       | Photostatic copy of a portion of the <i>Honolulu Star-Bulletin</i> (undated) relating to reported talk of Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 2, p. 92.)               |
| 9.       | Copy of a routing slip of Latin American Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, dated 30 June 1941. Exhibit 2, p. 92.)                   |
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK



HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

**S. Con. Res. 27**

▲ CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL  
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND  
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
RELATING THERETO

---

**PART 36**

**PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY**

---

Printed for the use of the

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack







# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*  
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*  
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia    JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from  
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois       Pennsylvania  
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine        BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-  
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi-       tive from California  
gan       FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from  
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from       Wisconsin  
North Carolina

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COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*  
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*  
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*  
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*  
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JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*  
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LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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## JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 149

[TOP SECRET]

## RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

A FURTHER INQUIRY INTO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR  
ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

Conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, in accordance  
with a precept, dated 2 May 1945, from the Secretary of the Navy

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# PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

## FIRST DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Monday, 14 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, Investigating Officer; Mr. John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Counsel; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, U. S. Naval Reserve, Aide to Admiral Hewitt; Lieutenant John Ford Lecher, U. S. Naval Reserve, Assistant to Mr. Sonnett; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, U. S. Naval Reserve, Official Reporter.

The precept, convening the investigation, was read and is appended hereto as "Exhibit 1."

Admiral Hewitt made the following opening statement:

The precept of the Secretary of the Navy appointing Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, to conduct further investigation into the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, will be marked "Exhibit 1" in the record of this investigation.

The Secretary's precept forwarded:

(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 7 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.

(B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy, 12 February 1944.

(C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.

The Secretary's precept provides, in part:

"You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, if it may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are authorized to obtain such documents relating to said attack as may be required for inclusion in the record.

A study has been made of the enclosures. In this connection, a narrative statement of the previous Navy investigations has been prepared by counsel and is designated "Exhibit 2" in these proceedings. I find that further investigation is necessary in order:

(A) to obtain the information now available concerning the composition and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941;

(B) to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor, Cavite, and at Washington, during the period 14 October 1941 to 7 December 1941, concerning the location, composition and movements of Japanese naval forces, including: (1) examination as to the activities of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor and the information obtained by it, with particular reference to the location

of the major portion of the Japanese carriers, to the loss of radio contact with units of the Japanese Fleet on or about 1 December 1941 and to the apparently erroneous belief that on 7 December 1941 the attacking force was located south of Hawaii; (2) examination as to the preparation of ONI bulletins, such as the bulletin of 1 December 1941; (3) examination as to the information furnished by the Navy to the Army, at Washington and at Pearl Harbor, concerning Japanese naval movements and loss of radio contact with Japanese units; (4) examination as to information of Japanese naval units obtained by Army reconnaissance, with particular reference to the War Department's directions to General Short, about 26 November 1941, to conduct reconnaissance to Jaluit, to the action taken, and to the question whether Admiral Kimmel was advised of this;

(C) to determine whether or not Japanese submarines operated in and around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941, including: (1) whether a captured Japanese map, as indicated in the Army Pearl Harbor report, establishes that such submarines were in Pearl Harbor before that date, or, as indicated in the book entitled "Battle Report," that the map was [3] made on that date and erroneously fixed the positions of United States ships in the harbor; (2) what submarine contacts were made in or around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941; (3) according to "Battle Report," at about 0500 on 7 December 1941, a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting of a submarine at approximately 0350. It should be determined what was done about this and why were the net gates allowed to remain open from 0445 until 0800;

(D) to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the office of Naval Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval Intelligence at Hawaii;

(E) to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, which are set forth in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's Record, and how, where, and where they were obtained and decoded;

(F) to determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo."

(G) to determine whether or not there was a "winds code" message relating to the United States. In connection with the "winds code" message, it should be noted that according to Captain Safford the last time he saw the message was when it was sent to the Robt. Commission. It should be determined whether or not the message was there or is there now;

(H) to interview Admiral Wilkinson generally and with particular reference to combat intelligence and to the "winds code";

(I) to interview Captain McCollum generally and with particular reference to the "winds code";



(J) to determine what the original records show concerning: (1) Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal Defense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate; (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation [4] of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941, and the Secretary of War's reply; (3) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack; (4) the date when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941;

(K) to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance which Admiral Kimmel directed on or about July, 1941, toward the Philippines.

In accordance with the Secretary's precept, having found that such further investigation is necessary, the purpose of this proceeding will be to examine persons having knowledge of the facts in question and to obtain such documents as may be relevant thereto.

Counsel in this investigation will be John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting in the investigation are Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporter at this meeting is Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, was read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give your name and rank?

Captain SMEDBERG. William R. Smedberg, III, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What is your present duty?

Captain SMEDBERG. I am the Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give me the information that you now have available and can testify to concerning the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Captain SMEDBERG. A Japanese prisoner who was captured on Okinawa [5] during the Marianas Campaign has given a very complete account of the preparations and movements of the Jap Fleet from the Fall of 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941. This prisoner was a chief yeoman in the Japanese Navy, attached to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamato. He has reconstructed the events preceding and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Much of the information given by this chief yeoman has been substantiated and verified by other information which we have received, and we believe the reliability which can be placed on this information to be very high.

The best reconstruction can be found in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, a confidential bulletin dated 8 December 1944, volume 1, number 22. This gives a very complete story of the preparations for the attack and also gives a reconstruction of the Operation Order, as I remember it, on which the attack was based.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you submit a copy of this as an exhibit?

Captain SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.

(The Weekly Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 3.")

This secret Operation Order is dated 1 November 1941 and starts off with the statement that "The Japanese Empire will declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands," that "War will be declared on X-day," and that "This order will become effective on Y-Day."

It gives the composition of the striking force, which sortied from Etorofu To in the Kuriles on or about 27 November (all times and dates here are East Longitude times and dates) and headed eastward with a heavy front before turning south to the attack.

[6] The late Vice Admiral Nagumo, who was then CinC 1st Fleet, was in command and his force consisted of the six carriers, KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU, and ZUIKAKU; two battleships, the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA; three cruisers, TONE, CHIKUMA, and ABUKUMA; elements of Destroyer Squadron One, and about twenty submarines.

This document tells of the plan to coordinate midget submarine unit attacks with the Main Fleet attack and states that the Sixth Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within Pearl Harbor. The Sixth Fleet was the Japanese submarine fleet. The submarine fleet, according to the chief yeoman prisoner of war, had almost its entire strength off the mouth of Pearl Harbor, with the object of attacking those ships which attempted to escape from the plane attacks of the carrier divisions one, two, and five.

One of the documents which the prisoner previously referred to and reconstructed from memory was a Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order Number 2, dated 5 November, which stated that Y-Day will be 23 November. He also reconstructed Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order Number 3, dated 10 November, which stated, "X-Day will be 8 December." (It should be noted that 8 December is 7 December Pearl Harbor date.)

From the prisoner's reconstruction of the original Secret Operation Order Number 1, it was his belief, and he so stated, that the striking force (carrier task force) would depart its naval bases or operating areas about X minus 16 days and will proceed by way of Tanabaru Bay, Etorofu Island in the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would deliver a surprise attack.

It further stated that the commander of the surprise attack force (submarine force), having the Sixth Fleet (submarine fleet) as his main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the [7] Inland Sea on X minus 20 day to attack Pearl Harbor.

It is interesting to note here that the commander of this surprise attack force was charged with carrying out reconnaissance before the attack and also carrying out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The prisoner states that the time for surprise attacks was to be after the flights of planes have attacked Oahu.

There is on page 16 of the Intelligence Bulletin which we have been discussing a copy of a captured track chart of the Japanese carriers covering the period, showing, among other things, the departure of the carriers from their home bases, departure from Etorofu Island on November 27th, arrival to the northwest of Oahu on December 8th (East Longitude time), and a retirement initially to the northwest and then to the southwest. This indicates that the Jap aircraft

took off from their carriers about 200 miles due north of Oahu, and this information checks with the document recovered from a crashed enemy plane shortly after the raid.

Admiral HEWITT: There is reference in the exhibit just introduced, and in other publications concerning the Pearl Harbor attack, to a map which was recovered from a Japanese midget submarine, showing courses and the location of ships inside Pearl Harbor. Can you produce the original or a copy of this map and discuss it?

Captain SMEDBERG. I cannot produce the original, Admiral. My vision had not been formed up to the time of Pearl Harbor, and I have asked that the records of the Japanese Section of the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence be checked to see if it can be located—without result. I have here, however, a copy, which, I am assured by Captain E. S. Pearce, present head of the Japanese Section of the Far [8] Eastern Division of ONI, was made from the English translation of the Japanese chart taken from the captured midget submarine. This chart indicates to me the courses and times which the submarine captain laid down beforehand and hoped to follow. He hadn't gotten into Pearl Harbor, as he later testified after his capture, so that the chart could not have been prepared by him either while in Pearl Harbor or after his emergence from Pearl Harbor.

I leave you a copy of this chart as exhibit 4.

(The chart referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 4.")

Admiral HEWITT. What information can you give as to the characteristics of the midget submarine?

Captain SMEDBERG. There are several descriptions of Jap midget subs which have been developed from captured documents and prisoner of war interrogations, one of the best being found in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, volume 1, number 15, a copy of which I will bring to you for use as an exhibit.

(The Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and will be marked "Exhibit 5.")

The sum of the information on the midget sub used at Pearl Harbor is that it was carried by and launched from a mother submarine. The sub at Pearl Harbor was 41 feet in length and had a reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles maximum at its most economical speed of 4 to 6 knots. The full details are available in an Office of Naval Intelligence publication known as "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines." I will obtain this document and bring it to you for use as an exhibit.

[9] (The publication referred to was received and will be marked "Exhibit 6.")

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know any information about whether these two-man midget submarines were equipped with radio?

Captain SMEDBERG. The best information that I can recall on this submarine which was used at Pearl Harbor is that it had no radio. A much larger type midget submarine which Japan used one year later had a high frequency radio with a range of about fifty miles, but this sub was twice as long as the type used at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Exhibit 60 from the Naval Court of Inquiry record will be marked as an exhibit in this investigation.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit  
Admiral HEWITT. Have you anything further, Captain?

Captain SMEDBERG. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Then, that will be all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

Admiral HEWITT. That is all for today.

(The investigation was then, at 3:15 p. m., adjourned until  
the next day.)

## [0] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

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SECOND DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Tuesday, 15 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain McCOLLUM. Arthur H. McCollum, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you state the duties to which you were assigned in December, 1941, and the period preceding that?

Captain McCOLLUM. I was Officer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you please give us the details of your duties in that connection?

Captain McCOLLUM. My duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy and other countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation for war.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relationship of your unit with P-20-G, Captain Safford's unit?

Captain McCOLLUM. Captain Safford's unit produced a source of intelligence. Intelligence from that source was shown to me and was one of our most valued sources of intelligence concerning the Far East. Briefly, the intelligence [11] received from that source consisted of decryptions of secret Japanese code despatches, inferences drawn from the analyses of Japanese radio traffic, and inferences drawn from changes in procedure of Japanese radio traffic. There was from time to time intelligence of this same general nature received from non-Japanese sources, but the bulk of it was from Japanese sources.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the location, composition, and movements of the Japanese forces in general, what information or estimate was received from and sent to the Pearl Harbor unit and to Cavite?

Captain McCOLLUM. By the end of November we were almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Japanese naval forces, except those that were sighted by our observation posts along the China coast.

The system for serving radio intelligence consisted of a three-point system, one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; one serving the Chief

of Naval Operations at the Navy Department in Washington. All intelligence derived from radio intelligence means in either one of these three centers was passed through and back to these three centers. In other words, information from radio intelligence sources available in Manila were also available at Pearl and also available at Washington, and vice versa. That was passed as a matter of routine back and forth among the three radio intelligence centers serving between the three major command centers, Asiatic, Pacific, and Washington.

Admiral HEWITT. That applies not only to the information but also to the inferences that they drew from them?

Captain McCOLLUM. Definitely. I am not so definite about decoding of diplomatic traffic. I am not certain whether items concerning the Japanese [12] diplomatic traffic, that is, traffic in diplomatic cyphers, was invariably available to all three or not. The volume of that was very great, and, if I remember correctly, the principal headquarters for that type of traffic was here in Washington and, to my mind, it is doubtful that all decodes of Japanese diplomatic traffic were ever sent back out again. I don't think it was. I don't think it could have been with the existing radio facilities.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here a series of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, which I submit to you for your identification.

Captain McCOLLUM. I identify these. I have seen them.

(The photostats referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 8.")

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give us your comment on the salient points of this exhibit?

Captain McCOLLUM. As I have indicated before, in general radio intelligence consists of three distinct procedures. One is an actual translation of the enemy's code despatch; another is inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic and its divergence from normal.

Admiral HEWITT. What you call traffic analysis?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is traffic analysis. Another is from study of call signs, the ships' radio call, and so on.

Before Pearl Harbor we never had very good intelligence on Japanese naval type messages from decryption. With the disappearance of means which we had devised for keeping Japanese naval vessels and naval movements under observation, such as reports by merchant ships, reports by agents located in various ports in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our consular authorities, which all had been set up and was functioning—these sources [13] whereby our radio intelligence could be confirmed from time to time by actual visual sighting had disappeared by early November due to a number of natural causes. One was the enforcement of our embargoes against Japan, which in a very short period of time swept normal merchant traffic out of the North Pacific so that by mid-November it is hardly too much to say that there were no ship movements of any nature to and from Japan in the North Pacific. One other point that we watched and carefully checked, had a world-wide system for observing, was the world-wide movement of Japanese merchant shipping in all the ports of the world. Due again to the operation of our embargoes, the Japanese merchant shipping in the Americas was gone. Due to the war in Europe, the Japanese merchant shipping lines had been disrupted; so that source of intelligence had disap-

appeared. One other point, the Japanese progressive closing in of security measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get information out of Japan that would be timely in a tactical situation. So that by the middle of November it was apparent that so far as observing and locating the Japanese fleet were concerned, our major dependence was perforce based on radio intelligence without the benefit of check by visual observations from time to time.

As a result of this situation, this dispatch of the 24th of November was sent out. It was intended to point out to our major commanders that our information was unsatisfactory and that every effort had to be made by using the one remaining instrument we had to determine the location and direction of movement of Japanese naval forces.

As a result of this dispatch, we got the benefit of estimates of the situation as it applied to the location and possible movements of the Japanese fleet from both ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN. These two addresses and the code system which was sent indicates that this estimate was made [14] by the radio intelligence organizations which went under that cover call in both of these places. The estimates are virtually the same. They differ only in minor degree. You will find that you had two task forces being organized under the over-all command of Commander Second Fleet. One was thought to be fairly well located in the general Formosa-Southern Japan area; another was possibly in the Mandated Islands. There was some discussion as to whether carriers were present with this latter force or not. That was one of the points of disagreement between these two here.

Greater reliance was placed on ComSIXTEEN's dispatch because physically he was in a much better position to intercept a larger volume of Japanese radio traffic than ComFOURTEEN was and his radio intelligence organization was stronger in numbers and in continuity of operation than that of ComFOURTEEN.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, then, will you read the part of the ComFOURTEEN message which relates to the possible task force in the Mandates and then give me SIXTEEN's comments on that?

Captain McCOLLUM. This is ComFOURTEEN's:

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise AIRON TWENTY FOUR at least one carrier division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

Now, ComSIXTEEN in referring to that states as follows:

Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force and are in Mandates X our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area.

[15] Admiral HEWITT. What were the dates of those?

Captain McCOLLUM. The 26th, sir; the 24th, which was our outgoing, and ComFOURTEEN's is 260110, November, sir, and ComSIXTEEN's is 261331.

Admiral HEWITT. Which would be 27 our time?

Captain McCOLLUM. Which would be about 27 our time. These are all GCT, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Those are all GCT?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. ComSIXTEEN added to his general evaluation of the situation that he considered the evaluation reliable.

Admiral HEWITT. What further information on this subject was received in Washington during the period from November 27th to December 7th?

Captain McCOLLUM. Pursuing the directive issued, there ComSIXTEEN from day to day issued fragmentary reports concerning the movement of such Japanese naval units as became apparent to him. There was never received in Washington, to my knowledge, anything that changed the general view of fleet organization and concentration areas as set forth in those dispatches of the 26th.

Admiral HEWITT. It appears from prior investigations that on about December 1st radio contact with the Japanese forces was either greatly diminished or was lost. Can you tell us anything about that?

Captain McCOLLUM. If I might presume, sir, I don't think it exactly accurate to say that radio contact was lost. What occurred was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the fleet. In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Japanese fleet was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time must elapse before we could build up identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on. In other words, the actual radios were still going out, but we [16] couldn't get anything out of them very much.

Admiral HEWITT. Then there was no perceptible diminution in traffic?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not that I know of. There are other people possibly better qualified to advise you on that score than I am, but my impression of what had occurred was what is generally known as a general call sign change. In other words, the old call book went out and a new one was effective that date. There may have been some differences in frequencies; there probably were some two or three new allocations. But some time would have to elapse before a radio intelligence organization would be able to draw inferences from messages intercepted.

Admiral HEWITT. That was a situation which had occurred previously, was it not?

Captain McCOLLUM. It had occurred from time to time previously.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember the approximate date of the previous change?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I do not. Normally in peacetime things do not change often, possibly every six months or every year or so, but we had had partial changes from time to time as new task organizations developed presumably in Japanese forces, sir. It was a shorter period of time since the last change to this change than had occurred normally before.

Admiral HEWITT. As far as you know, had a change of that sort ever previously accompanied a major movement by the Japanese such as a movement to French Indo-China?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. There had been minor changes, but that, but a wholesale change hadn't occurred for some time previous to that that I remember now.



[17] Admiral HEWITT. As far as you know, there was no discussion or concern about apparent radio silence of any major part?

Captain McCOLLUM. There was concern not of the radio silence but the fact that we had lost at this particular time an exceedingly valuable source of intelligence which for the time being was going to be much less valuable than it had been before. It wasn't possible to connect at the time that particular change with that specific movement, except that which had been outlined. We were certain at that time there were reorganizations and regroupings of forces going on. We knew that the Japanese fleet was ready for action. We knew that it had been called home, docked and extensively repaired and was looking for action. Therefore, it was interpreted, along with this other stuff, as a possible indication of action to come.

Admiral HEWITT. Am I correct in stating, then, that as the intelligence unit in Hawaii would have this same information as ComFOURTEEN, therefore CincPac would be as well informed as to these changes of radio calls and frequencies, and so forth, as you were in the Navy Department?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated as to Japanese naval forces: "Major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greater proportion of carriers."

(The ONI Bulletin referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 9.")

Was that statement correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. This statement is correct, based on the best intelligence available at the time. It was based on the intelligence then available. At this late date I can't make a specific statement as to the [18] exact time lag, but as I remember it, this statement was based on intelligence that would be at least three to four days prior to the date of the document itself.

Admiral HEWITT. What was understood by the term "home waters" as used in that bulletin?

Captain McCOLLUM. This paper developed out of a scheme for keeping track of the Japanese fleet which had been followed for a number of years in the Far East Section of ONI, and the term "home waters" was generally understood to mean the normal cruising grounds of the Japanese fleet. That would roughly be west of the 180th meridian of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa and included the Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians.

Admiral HEWITT. In your opinion, would the recipients of this bulletin, such as the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, interpret the term "home waters" in the same way? In other words, was that definition of "home waters" generally known?

Captain McCOLLUM. Admiral, this paper was originally designed for circulation within the Department alone. At various times from 1939 on Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had visited the Department and on two occasions had expressed a desire for this document. The general basis on which the document was prepared, and the charts showing the delimitation of areas, was discussed with these officers at that time, including both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel. Whether the term was ever formally defined and a defini-

tion issued to the fleet, I doubt. If the term was ever formally defined and issued to the fleet, I doubt. However, it was well understood here in the Department and in discussions with officers from the fleet at various times, the term was understood to mean the normal cruising grounds of the Jap fleet. That is, north of southern Formosa [19] west of the 180th meridian, and including the Kurile Islands.

Admiral HEWITT. In this particular case, the information on which the estimate was apparently based, Exhibit number 8, was that the forces under discussion were generally in the Sasebo-Kure area.

Captain McCOLLUM. The major battleship and carrier strength was in the Kure-Sasebo area.

Admiral HEWITT. So that, really in this case the term apparently meant home waters in the home islands?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What information, if any, was sent out to the fleet after December 1st concerning the location and movements of Japanese fleet units?

Captain McCOLLUM. The fleet, as I explained to you, had information from radio intelligence as to fleet locations, had the same information available to them as we had here in the Department. So far as I am aware, no dispatch was sent from the Department specifically to the fleet, calling attention to the location and movements of the Japanese fleet. Such messages as they would have received would have been common not only to the Pacific Fleet but to the Asiatic Fleet and to the Department, and they consisted, after the 1st of December, of reports of our observers on the China coast and of our naval forces which had contacted a Jap task force moving south of Formosa in the direction of Hainan and from there on farther south towards the Kra Peninsula.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what was the system or whether any one was specifically charged with the duty of dissemination of information which was necessary to the major fleet commands?

Captain McCOLLUM. I can't answer that question specifically, [20] The radio intelligence organization, as I have pointed out, the main part of their information was passed automatically to the three commandants. The system in the Department at the time was that the Intelligence Division, with the information it had available to it, prepared statements of intelligence which were presumed to be factual, without making an estimate of enemy intention. This statement of fact, or presumed fact, was submitted then by the Intelligence Division to the Plans Division and to the Chief of Naval Operations, who made the decision as to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet.

Admiral HEWITT. What would be your own action in the case of receipt of information which you considered to be of serious importance? Would you attempt to call special attention to it?

Captain McCOLLUM. I would. My responsibility was definitely to bring that to the attention of my Director of Intelligence immediately and to recommend most strongly to him that he take such action as he deemed necessary further up, and in almost every case we had direct access to both Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division, and to the Chief of Naval Operations himself.

I might remark in that connection that on the 1st or December 2nd I prepared an analysis of the situation as it looked to me at that time, which I submitted to Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval

intelligence, on the morning of December 1st. I had actually prepared this the day before and had slept over it overnight. He took this up and made an appointment for us to see Admiral Stark, and about noon on the 1st Admiral Wilkinson took me into Admiral Stark's office and I read this statement and made verbal comments on my views on it, and both Admiral Wilkinson and I urged that a dispatch of warning be sent to the fleet at [21] that time. We were assured at that time that such a dispatch had been sent on the 27th of November which definitely included the term, "This is a war warning".

Subsequent to this, the situation further deteriorated and I recommended to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send dispatches out to our naval attachés and various naval agencies throughout the Far East, directing that they destroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on and so forth, and to affirmatively report when these had been destroyed. That dispatch was sent so that the fleet commanders on the chain going out and coming back would have the information that that order had been issued. Some time after the 1st, possibly around the 4th, I prepared this—

Admiral HEWITT. That is a copy of the memorandum to which you refer?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 10.")

Captain McCOLLUM. I took that, coupled with additional information, and drafted the general situation up in dispatch form, which I presented to Admiral Wilkinson with the recommendation that it be sent. Whether that was sent or not, I do not know.

Admiral HEWITT. What information regarding the Japanese naval forces was furnished to the Army during the period from October 7 to December 7?

Captain McCOLLUM. The Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division had full information on the situation. We were in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships, and they had full [22] access to all of the radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department. That was given by me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to day with officers of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division in the War Department, and that had been true for some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as withdrawing our naval language officers from Japan or sending a dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers, and so forth, as we did to the naval attaches and other places, without notifying my opposite number in the War Department what we intended to do.

Admiral HEWITT. That was Colonel Bratton?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was Colonel Bratton, or his assistant, who, I believe, at the time was Colonel Pettigrew. The people who had access to that stuff in detail were Colonel Bratton, Colonel Pettigrew, and Colonel Dusenberry, I believe.

Admiral HEWITT. Would the like apply to the information which the Army received from their sources? Was that made available to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, so far as I know, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What, in general, sources of information did the Army have?

Captain McCOLLUM. The Army had information from their military attaches and observation posts such as they had in the Far East. The Army also had a radio intelligence organization which produced certain information along this same line.

Admiral HEWITT. Which confirmed, in this case, your own information?

Captain McCOLLUM. The Army had nothing to do with the Japanese systems. They didn't touch the Jap Navy systems. They were doing work on Japanese diplomatic ciphers at that time and some on the Japanese Army system. They [23] weren't so well developed or anywhere near as good as our naval radio intelligence service at the time. But any information that they got through their service as far as I am aware, was made available to me through Colonel Bratton's office in the War Department.

Admiral HEWITT. As I understand it, there was no particular organization or system for effecting cooperation between your organization and the Army organization other than the mutual unofficial relations you established?

Captain McCOLLUM. Those relations were unofficial, but they had the official sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intelligence and of the Director of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, I think he is called, who were both not only glad of that mutual confidence and trust and exchange of information, but thoroughly encouraged it.

Admiral HEWITT. What information have you concerning the movements of Japanese submarines? What information can you give me concerning the movements of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to December 7th?

Captain McCOLLUM. I remember nothing specific, except we were suspected for some time that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. At various times through the preceding six months there had been reports of contacts by our destroyers on Japanese submarines. At one time, I think it was in July or August, we actually suggested a search of a certain spot in the ocean to the north of Midway where we believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with Japanese submarines who were observing our fleet movements. It was felt that and I feel that it was felt in the fleet, that our movements [24] were under Japanese submarine observation.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the nature of these contacts? Underwater sound by destroyers?

Captain McCOLLUM. They would be underwater sound by destroyer and sighting of a periscope and that sort of thing.

Admiral HEWITT. Sighting of a periscope?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. Whether it was actually a periscope or not, I don't know.

Admiral HEWITT. Were any of them well authenticated?

Captain McCOLLUM. One or two seemed to us at the time to be fairly well authenticated.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember the general location of these contacts?

Captain McCOLLUM. Most of them weren't close in to Honolulu, but the contact, if I remember correctly, was made in Molokai Channel somewhere off Lahuna Roads—most of this is memory—in the approaches to and from the drill grounds of the fleet from Pearl Harbor. Admiral HEWITT. I have here two charts which have been submitted as exhibits which purport to be reproductions in translated form of a chart which was taken from a Japanese midget submarine which was stranded on the north side of Pearl Harbor. One is in a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin and the other one came from another source. They appear to be generally the same, except that as to the captions in English, if you will notice, off Ford Island to the eastward, one of them says, "Attack and sink enemy ship"; in the other one it says, "Enemy ship sunk," and there are similar differences.

I would like to have you examine those and from your knowledge of the Japanese language give us your ideas on that. What I have in mind [25] generally is whether this is a record of an actual attack by a submarine or whether it might have been an attack plan with points marked at which certain actions should be taken. The original is not available to me.

Captain McCOLLUM. This, in the Pacific Fleet Bulletin dated 8 December 1944, I don't remember having seen before. This other chart, marked "secret" here, is a translation of a photostat, later backed up by the original, of a Japanese chart which, to the best of my belief, was recovered from a Japanese midget submarine that was sunk in the East Loch. I remember the original quite well and went over it personally, together with the best translators in the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, and it was my opinion at the time, and it is my opinion now, that this was an attack plan. In other words, this thing here was the planned scheme that the submarine commander was going to utilize in making his entry to Pearl Harbor.

(A copy of the book "Battle Report" was received and marked Exhibit 11.)

Captain McCOLLUM. Take, for instance, the four Japanese ideographs appearing in the photostat in the book "Battle Report." I point out these four ideographs here. In the Japanese language the use of verbs is shown in general—there are exceptions—by appending the *kana* symbols which indicate the tense. Where the ideograph alone is used it is not possible to determine the tense of the verb. Here you have only four ideographs, which might be translated present, past, future, or imperfect as the situation might warrant, because there are no *kana* symbols here showing the tense of the verb. It is not possible to infer from this as to whether this is past tense or future tense. The words "attack and sink enemy ship" [26] in Exhibit 4 are a literal translation. It is impossible to make a literal translation in English without an English indication of tense. The best you can do is to take each word for its value and put it down. In this particular instance (referring to Exhibit 4), the word "and" is interpolated.

Admiral HEWITT. You stated that to the best of your knowledge this came from a submarine which was sunk inside the Loch. The other exhibit, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, makes the statement that this was taken from a midget submarine which was stranded on the north coast of Oahu. Could there have been two charts?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. One from one submarine and the other another?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, I think so, but it would have most unusual had they been exactly the same.

Admiral HEWITT. Unless they were attack plans.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is true.

The stuff that is run in circles is stuff that was pencilled notation if I remember correctly. In other words, there was a distinction here (referring to Exhibit 4). In other words, what I am calling your attention here is you will notice certain of these things are circled like this (indicating). It is circled on this other chart (referring to Exhibit 11). I think that those circles represent pencilled notation by the submarine commander. In other words, he had his plan and these notations were aid memoirs in assisting him in carrying out this plan.

Admiral HEWITT. I notice here (referring to Exhibit 11) some characters appearing in heavy black—

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, that may be the way they are reproduced. These are hand-written characters here (indicating), written in by hand and [27] not by printing. They are both printed and typewritten stuff. Now this stuff here (indicating) is handwritten by the man himself.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what this (indicating) is about?

Captain McCOLLUM. I am not much good at this translation more, sir. I wouldn't venture a translation of that for you, sir. I can get it done for you and check it, but I am not very good at this more. This first two is Hawaii. It is something about ships anchoring off at certain times in Hawaii, I think, sir. In other words, they are sometimes anchored off in this general area or general direction (indicating). That is not shown on this (referring to Exhibit 4).

Admiral HEWITT. One more question on this exhibit (referring to Exhibit 4). With respect to the times which are noted, the time of point and arrival and so forth, there is a question in my mind what it relates to some zone time or whether it may be based on an H-hour for an attack, if it is an attack plan. Can you give me any comment on that? If it were a dawn attack, it wouldn't be Honolulu time.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. If it were any one of the standard times at all, it would be Item time. All the Japanese Navy run on Item time, which is Tokyo time. That is standard or has been standard in the past. The impression that I have from this is that it is based on a zero hour.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any information as to the probable source of the other map, in the Intelligence summary, which differs?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I haven't.

Admiral HEWITT. Now we go back to the communication question. We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court record, which contains certain decrypted communications. Can you tell us how they were obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed?

[28] Captain McCOLLUM. These that I see here are decrypted copies of Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches. These dispatches were received in the Navy Department from the intercept stations in a variety of ways, some by direct transmission in the c

l by radio, others telegraph, and others by mail. When they arrived the communication intelligence center, Navy Department, they were coded and translated. A number of copies of the translations were made, and books containing these translated dispatches were made up. Those books were distributed by officer messenger to the Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, Director of War Plans, Director of Intelligence, Chief of Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, within the Navy Department, and the Naval Aide to the President. A complete book was also taken by officer messenger to the Secretary of State. Another complete books was taken over and down to the Far East Section of the Military Intelligence Division the Army and by them was distributed to the Secretary of War, Under Secretary, and Chief of Staff, War Plans Division of the General Staff, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and, I think, to the head of what they called the Intelligence Branch of G-2, which was the Foreign Intelligence Section. The book, in whole or in part, went to the President, depending on what the Aide to the President thought out it.

Admiral HEWITT. Now will you discuss the question of the "winds" code and the messages using that code, the dispatch which previous testimony indicates you prepared and which was allegedly not sent?

Captain McCOLLUM. I don't quite understand your question.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to have you discuss the subject of the "winds" code, what it was, the messages that were received using the code.

[29] Captain McCOLLUM. All right, sir. If we may lead up a little bit, by the latter part of November it was apparent that the Japanese were doing a great many things, that they expected that war with the United States, Great Britain, or both might possibly break out at any time, and that they were taking every possible step to make sure that their intelligence organization and their diplomatic representatives would be well advised. One of the schemes for this was to use a Tokyo weather broadcast, which was normally with the ordinary voice news broadcasts that came out from the commercial or so-called commercial radio stations at Tokyo from time to time. There was a message setting forth that by arrangements of using this weather code and for having the thing repeated in certain sequence in broadcast, that in one instance it meant war with Russia; in the next instance it meant war with England, and another one was that it meant war with the United States. Those were the three possibilities.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that war or a break in diplomatic relations?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, a break in diplomatic relations. Instead of war, the term used was, "In case relations are in danger," "danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations." There is the verbatim translation; in Japanese this says, "In case there is danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations." The system followed that they used, a term which was a smooth translation and in important cases the exact condition followed that in parenthesis. That was the Navy's system. The Navy translators did that, in general.

Admiral HEWITT. Read that here (indicating), for instance.

Captain McCOLLUM. (Referring to Document 15 of the Exhibit) In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following

warning will be [30] added in the middle of the Japanese guage daily short-wave news broadcast."

There is another dispatch (referring to Document 13 of the Exhibit This (indicating) is circular 2353; this (indicating) is circular 2 It was another code. He coded it differently. It is a different mess This says, "When our diplomatic relations are becoming danger we will add the following at the beginning and end of our gen intelligence broadcasts."

Admiral HEWITT. In your opinion, that is merely a different translation of the same phraseology?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I think it is different phraseology the Japanese. In other words, I think that two different messages were sent out, and possibly more, by the Japanese Foreign Office, which may have been and probably were phrased differently in the original which gave differing translations on this answer.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether the actual message containing the phrase which indicated the emergency with any particular country was actually transmitted?

Captain McCOLLUM. About the middle of the week 1-7 December the Federal Communications Commission reported the occurrence of one of the words in a Japanese news broadcast from Tokyo which indicated war with Russia. In studying the message at the time it did not appear that this was a bona fide warning in the terms as set forth. It did not appear in the proper sequence and proper number of times in the broadcast, as I remember it, and it was thought at the time that this was a bona fide weather report which happened to be the code word for Russia. I know of no message received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December which indicated [that diplomatic relations with the United States would be ruptured]. After the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made, either late afternoon of the 7th, Washington time, or some time on the 8th, a dispatch was translated which indicated war with England. I think you have some exhibits on that point there.

(Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and marked "Exhibit 12.")

This is the Federal Communications Commission dispatch which was referred to. It is Document number 2 Exhibit number 65.

Admiral HEWITT. That, in your opinion, is a bona fide weather report?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, I think so. We don't have the verbatim Japanese of this thing about Russia here, but the translation would indicate that it was other than as given here. For instance, all this in here [indicating] is exact. Now, this translation indicates that "Tokyo today, north wind slightly stronger, may become cloudy. You see, there is too much in there. This is an abbreviated sort of an imperative form used here. And besides, the announcer in the thing starts out by saying, "This is in the middle of the news, today especially I will give a weather broadcast at this point." I mean this is what he says in this [indicating].

The Document number 2 is from the Federal Communications Commission, which came verbally to me and later on the thing written out, which was from a plain language broadcast and it was our opinion at the time; considering all of the facts, that this was probably



bona fide weather broadcast and not the warning signal. If it were the warning signal, it [32] would have applied to Russia.

The Document number 4 of Exhibit 65, which was transmitted between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, was the "winds" code message announcing dangerous diplomatic relations with England. The wording used in there meant Japan-British relations.

That is what is shown on Exhibit 12.

Admiral HEWITT. You have no knowledge of any message transmitted which indicated the breaking of diplomatic relations with the United States?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not in the "winds" code, no, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have it in any code?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. By afternoon of Saturday, December 6th, a very long diplomatic dispatch was coming in to the Japanese ambassador at Washington. On the morning of—that is Washington time—December 7th, I was on duty in my office in the Navy Department when the last parts of this very long diplomatic note were translated. Following this, a dispatch was translated, instructing the Japanese ambassadors to present this note to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, Washington time, December 7, 1941. The context of the diplomatic note as contained in the dispatch which the Japanese ambassador was directed to present to the Secretary of State indicated a discontinuance of the negotiations between Japan and the United States, with the strong inference that diplomatic relations would be ruptured.

(Referring to Documents 38 and 39 of Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record). This first one doesn't make any particular impression. There had been so many of these things along this line, including telephone conversations backward and forward, that we knew something was coming. And on the fourteen-part message, all hands were up all night, working on it to [33] get it through.

Admiral HEWITT. That was the night of the 6th-7th?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was the night of the 6th-7th, yes, sir. By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, thirteen of the parts. They were transmitted, almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to people over here in the War Department.

Early Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my office, where we had a special watch set since early November, the fourteenth part was coming in; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I were discussing the situation about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30, with Admiral Stark, the instruction which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State was brought in, shown to Admiral Stark, who immediately called the White House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to the Secretary of State and to the White House. At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands.

Admiral HEWITT. You are referring to the 1 p. m. delivery time?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. In other words, it was pointed out that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about 8 o'clock in the morning Honolulu time.

Admiral HEWITT. 7:30.

Captain McCOLLUM. 7:30, yes, sir, and very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places, and that we didn't know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had [34] been stressed to the Japanese ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which we had to move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State.

I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and was taken over, with instructions to point that out, to the Secretary of State. I was not present at that. I do not know. I would add, however, that the Secretary of State was not available at the time that the Japanese ambassador desired to deliver their note, and it is my recollection in the discussion at the time with the Chief of Naval Operations and his admirals in there that that was a deliberate move on our part.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember who it was delivered the message to the Secretary of State and the White House?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I do not, but it was probably Lieutenant Commander, now Captain, Kramer. I can't say that for sure because some of these things Admiral Turner himself would run over to see the Secretary, or Captain Schuirman would run over. The normal route would have been for Kramer to have delivered it.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall who was present when—

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes. May I elaborate a little bit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Captain McCOLLUM. By mid-November the situation in the Far East had appeared so acute that in addition to the usual duty watch in the Division of Naval Intelligence, one of the three regular officers assigned to the Far East Section—that is, Commander Watts, Colonel Boone and myself—was constantly on duty in our offices, with adequate office help, on a twenty-four hour basis.

I arrived at the Navy Department about 7:30 or a quarter of eight [35] Sunday morning, December 7th, to take over the watch from Commander Watts. Shortly after my arrival in the Navy Department, Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Intelligence, arrived and sent for me and we had a discussion concerning the situation in the Far East. After fifteen or twenty minutes of the discussion, we received word that Admiral Stark had arrived in the Navy Department and that Admiral Wilkinson and myself went down to talk to Admiral Stark. At that time he was alone. While we were in there discussing the situation with Admiral Stark, various officers of the Division of Operations came into the office. I believe Admiral Ingersoll was present, Admiral Brainard, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, and possibly Captain Schuirman. There may have been others; I don't know. Certainly, Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll were present. Whether they were present all the time, I do not know. There was considerable going in and out at that time.

About 9 o'clock or a little earlier, I received word from the outer room that one of my officers wished to see me urgently and I stepped outside and received the last part of the message, concerning the note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassador.

Admiral HEWITT. The last part of the long message?

Captain McCOLLUM. The long message. And the dispatch directing presentation on the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock Washington time. I held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance at the time, and he it was who pointed out the times at Honolulu as 7:30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on.

Admiral HEWITT. Before dawn. Wouldn't that be before dawn?

Captain McCOLLUM. Before dawn, yes, sir. That would be about 1 o'clock in the morning out there.

[36] I took that in to Admiral Stark and pointed out the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note, and it was also pointed out to other officers of the Division of Operations who were present at the time. Admiral Stark talked over the telephone, I think, with the Chief of Staff of the Army, who presently came over with Colonel Bratton. I was not there the whole time, and later on I came back in and by 10 o'clock that morning we were given to understand that a warning message had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, via Army channels. In other words, the warning was to go to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, with instructions to transmit it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, to go back to the "winds" code message, there has been other testimony in prior investigations that you, about the 4th of December, prepared a long warning message to CincPac and CincAsiatic, summarizing the significant events up to that date and quoting the "winds" message. Can you tell us anything about that?

Captain McCOLLUM. I did draft in dispatch form a general summary of the Far Eastern situation, indicating the probability that diplomatic relations might be ruptured at almost any time. I do not remember specifically quoting any "winds" message or referring specifically to a "winds" message in that dispatch. Normally I should not have done it as that would have been passed over all radio intelligence channels rather than the type of dispatch I had formulated, which was in effect a cumulation of the situation, the moves made by the Japanese and an estimate of the probable enemy reaction or probable Japanese action to the situation.

Admiral HEWITT. It embodied—

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes. In effect it embodied the contents of my [37] memorandum of the 1st of December, plus such additional factors, such as the sighting of the Jap task force, and so on, which we had at the time.

Admiral HEWITT. You say you submitted that draft. What happened to that? Was the message sent?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, that draft, I don't know. That draft was submitted to Admiral Wilkinson and before a thing of that sort left the Navy Department, it had to be passed on by higher authority. I do not believe that it was sent, but time passed and I am not certain to what became of it.

Admiral HEWITT. You say you submitted that to Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember what his comment or reaction to it was?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think he tried to get it out. As a matter of fact, hindsight now, or recollection, I am quite sure that he tried to get it out.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have any particular conversation with Captain Safford with respect to that?

Captain McCOLLUM. I don't remember having a conversation with him on the subject of the "winds" code. Safford and I discussed certain aspects of radio intelligence from time to time because when I was not clear on the possible meaning or interpretation to be placed on something from the radio intelligence viewpoint, I made it a custom to go down and see Safford and talk to him about it.

And as I say again, this "winds" message was a definite message and it was only one of various other communications we had. For instance, we had a message directing the Japanese intelligence chief for the Americas [38] to clear out of the country. We had another message directing the consuls to burn all their papers. We had constant messages regarding the presence of our ships in West Coast ports. All of those we had. The Japanese had for some years, until the dissolution of Naval Intelligence had been successful in breaking it up, a system of reporting United States naval movements out of the West Coast ports. That was done through the consuls, and starting in November the number of messages coming in showed in effect, "For goodness sake get these reports in promptly," and caused some note to be taken of them.

(Referring to Document 40) This was a sample of a routine report made by Japanese consuls throughout the Americas on the location and movement of United States warships.

(Referring to Document 46) This document wasn't available before December 7th, nor, to my memory, was one couched in quite as urgent terms transmitted to any other consulate in the United States.

However, it was evident from a study of general messages sent to Japanese consuls, particularly in our West Coast ports, that the Japanese were particularly anxious to learn the location and movements of our naval forces on the West Coast.

Admiral HEWITT. How about Hawaii?

Captain McCOLLUM. Hawaii we didn't have in that detail yet. We had some, but the general instruction covering Hawaii would cover the rest of it. The general instruction went out in a general circular and Hawaii would be included.

These dispatches were to come—the one referring to ship movements and location is under date of 18 November 1941. It is a routine ship report from the Consul General at Honolulu to Tokyo, probably intercepted [39] by the radio intelligence organization which translated it. It was translated on the 6th of December. This message must have been transmitted by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu and therefore originated at that station. It is not possible to tell from the exhibit whether this dispatch was locally acquired in Honolulu or at one of the various intercept stations located in other parts of the world.

Admiral HEWITT. What information can you give me on the interception in Hawaii of Japanese telephone and cable messages to ONI and the FBI or otherwise?

Captain McCOLLUM. I know very little about that subject, sir. ONI had been making an effort to get a workable arrangement

the telephone and cable companies, which, as I remember it, was only partially successful. Both the Federal Communications Commission, as far as I am aware, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation came much later into this field than we were, and, so far as I am aware, made no serious effort to obtain this type of intelligence until a very brief time before the outbreak of war with Japan.

Admiral HEWITT. Isn't it a fact that there was a law which forbade the commercial companies from furnishing that information?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Are there any other facts bearing on this question that have not been previously mentioned, that you think would be of assistance to me?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think, Admiral, that you have all the facts. I would like to venture some observation of the general organization of intelligence as it operated in the Navy before the war with Japan and substantially as it is operated today that I am not certain in my own mind [40] are quite clear to people that might read the records.

The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center for the fleet as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence center for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department; equipped to supply combat type of intelligence, which prior to outbreak of war is nearly always closely related with diplomatic negotiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was equipped with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which served him directly. With the exception of more static types of intelligence, such as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on, our combat intelligence was designed to function in the Navy Department to advise the Chief of Naval Operations, at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through his fleet intelligence officer, and out in the Philippines—

Admiral HEWITT. May I interrupt you for a moment? You say at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. I think you have mentioned before it was attached to the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District.

Captain McCOLLUM. It was attached to him, sir, but actually the function was to advise CincPac. Similarly, such personnel were administratively attached to ComSIXTEEN, but they worked operationally directly under CincAsiatic.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Go ahead.

Captain McCOLLUM. And in the Asiatic Fleet, which in some respects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organization, to keep the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, advised.

The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to set up certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which could [41] produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic theatre those intelligence agencies operating out there were made known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and their reports in every case were funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Our naval attaches, for instances, were under orders to submit copies of every report that they made both to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well as to the Department. So, you had in effect a three point system

in which combat intelligence common to any one of them was common to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief supreme in his own area. And that is essentially the way it was functioning throughout the war.

Admiral HEWITT. What would be the responsibility of the Asiatic Fleet, for instance, to insure that intelligence which they received was disseminated to the other commands?

Captain MCCOLLUM. They would be guided in that by the policy of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, as in turn they would be guided by the over-all policy of the Chief of Naval Operations. In general, that was for the Asiatic Fleet to keep CincPac and the Department informed. In other words, they went right up the chain of every one in the Pacific into the Department and it worked back the other way.

Admiral HEWITT. The Office of Naval Intelligence was well organized apparently for the collection and evaluation of intelligence. What means were used to disseminate the intelligence?

Captain MCCOLLUM. Reports were disseminated by letter, in book form, and by dispatch. In February, I think it was, of 1941 the Division of Naval Intelligence, if it had ever had the authority, didn't have it after that date of issuing estimates to the fleet of probable enemy intentions. [42] That was considered to be a function of a higher echelon of command within the Department, and the Division of Naval Intelligence was restricted to presenting what appeared to be the facts of a situation for determination of what a prospective enemy might do by higher authority within the Navy Department.

I might add, sir, some time prior to that, to be perfectly frank with you, we had here from time to time issued a memorandum of what we thought about the situation. About February, 1941, that was done away with and that stuff had to be cleared through Plans and I think, through Admiral Ingersoll.

Admiral HEWITT. 1941?

Captain MCCOLLUM. Yes, sir. Now, we continued from time to time to prepare stuff, but a lot of things there, who prepared it and what was put out estimates of probable enemy intentions weren't clear to the Division of Intelligence.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:20 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

43] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

THIRD DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 16 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Joseph J. Rochefort, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. From about 15 May 1941 to about the end of 1941 you were in charge of communication intelligence, assigned to the FOURTEENTH Naval District?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. As we understand it, there were two other communication intelligence units, one in the Far East at Cavite and the other in Washington, D. C.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, insofar as the Navy is concerned.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes, I am speaking of the naval communication intelligence units.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Who was in charge of the other units?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The unit in Washington was in charge of Captain E. F. Safford, and the unit in Cavite was in charge of R. J. Fabian.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what in general was the mission and scope of each?

[44] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The mission of all three stations was in general to exploit all cryptographic systems employed by foreign powers and to develop what was then known as radio intelligence but is now known as traffic intelligence organizations, and to develop radio direction finder nets.

Admiral HEWITT. That was the general mission?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the scope of each of those units? What was each one supposed to cover in area or in type of traffic or what?

Captain ROCHEFORT. During the latter part of 1941, the station at Pearl Harbor was assigned the specific tasks of attacking personnel code, administrative code, the code in use in the Marshalls Islands area, and to exploit those systems. They were also directed to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems except the five-numbered system. Cavite was charged with the exploitation of information contained in diplomatic systems and in five-numbered system.

The station in Washington was charged with the general control of all three plus Japanese diplomatic systems and such other systems as might have been directed by higher authority.

Admiral HEWITT. As head of this unit, to whom were you responsible for your work, the Navy Department, the FOURTEENTH Naval District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

Captain ROCHEFORT. My orders to that duty read to report to the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. I assumed that he was my immediate superior and I made all reports, other than purely technical reports, to the Commandant.

Admiral HEWITT. What in general was the relation of your unit [45] the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The relationship with the District Intelligence Officer was on the basis of a frank and over-all exchange of information and views on a personal basis other than any information obtained from ultra sources. The relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to exchange all information available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by him.

Admiral HEWITT. You have stated in your previous testimony that your unit consisted of an interception unit, direction finder unit, and cryptographic research group. You will explain what each of these are and how it functioned and who was in charge of each.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The station at Pearl Harbor consisted in the main of an interception unit which was stationed at Aiea radio station in charge of Chief Radioman Langford; a mid-Pacific direction finder net with stations at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, and Midway. These were controlled in Pearl Harbor under the supervision of the then Lieutenant Commander Huckins. The decryption unit was responsible for the attack, exploitation, translation, and dissemination of all intercepted traffic. I was in direct charge of this section as well as directly in charge of all sections.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, you stated in your previous testimony that your sources of information, in addition to the work of your own unit, were the other two combat intelligence units and other government agencies, such as the FBI, the Army, and the FCC at Honolulu. You also stated that the information furnished by these latter agencies was of no value prior to December 7th, and stated before the Court of Inquiry that the collaboration of these agencies was on a personal basis. Will you explain what the [46] relationships were with the FBI, the Army, the FCC, and the other intelligence agencies with whom you dealt?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. With regard to the FBI, I met with Mr. Shivers, the agent in charge, on frequent occasions and discussed the general situation, particularly pertaining to Japanese in Hawaii, but did not discuss any ultra matters. Mr. Shivers on his part kept me informed as to what he was doing, possibly with some limitations.

The relationship with the Army dealt primarily with the G-2, Colonel Fielder, and was similar in nature to that carried out with the FBI.

The relationship with the FCC was limited to technical matters, particularly those pertaining to direction finding, location of unauthorized stations, and other similar matters.

Admiral HEWITT. Your relationship with the Federal Communications Commission, did that include matters concerning getting information from commercial transmissions, telephone and cable?



Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. The reason for that was, sir, that the FCC was not authorized to handle any ultra and I knew from personal experience that all matters pertaining to the acquisition of traffic were handled by the Washington unit.

Admiral HEWITT. You stated before Admiral Hart that any message originating in one of the communication intelligence centers was automatically sent to the other two, and before the Naval Court that at Pearl Harbor they received all information of a technical nature from Washington. I would like to ask you what information was so received during October, November, and December, that is, from the other combat units and from Washington.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I could not state in detail, sir, every message because I do not have the files, but a typical message would be the receipt [47] of the so-called "winds" message from Cavite on or about November 27th and the receipt from Washington of the frequencies then employed by the Japanese in making voice broadcasts. By "winds" message, I mean the message which established the procedure for indicating war.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know of any intercept of any message using that so-called "winds" code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. What we referred to as the execute or the message indicating war based on the code established in the "winds" message has not been seen by me and I have made an exhaustive search into all available records and can find no trace of any execute of the "winds" message prior to the evening of 7 December Washington time.

Admiral HEWITT. That message related to war with England, did it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Was Pearl Harbor monitoring for that execute?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Shortly after the receipt of the message from Cavite previously referred to, we received a dispatch from Washington directing us to establish a listening watch on the most likely frequencies. I thereupon sent four language officers to the intercept station at Aiea, where they covered on a twenty-four hour basis one or more frequencies in addition to all the known broadcasts from Tokyo. Results were nil.

Admiral HEWITT. With respect to your estimate of the location of the Japanese fleet on November 26th, you stated before Admiral Hart that it was your opinion that at least two Japanese carriers were at that time in the Marshalls area. What was the basis of that estimate?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The estimate was arrived at after mature consideration by the three or four officers best qualified in the Pearl Harbor unit and embraced their considered opinion, considering all the traffic which they had studied and including the results of their past experiences with the Japanese in such operations as the Hainan occupation the previous year. It was based entirely on radio intelligence.

Admiral HEWITT. I hand you Exhibit 8. Will you identify those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes. I don't recall this one (referring to the first dispatch). I do not recall the receipt of this message from OpNav to CinCAF, ComSIXTEEN, Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo,

and CincPac, 242239. I might have seen it, but I can't recall. This (referring to the second dispatch) I identify as the so-called estimate by ComFOURTEEN, 260110, and I recognize the dispatch from ComSIXTEEN, 261331.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, with respect to ComFOURTEEN's patch of the 26th, which was based on your estimate, you testified before Admiral Hart that the Commander-in-Chief and Commander FOURTEENTH Naval District came to your office and discussed the matter at great length, at least for an hour and a half, and answered to a question from Admiral Hart as to whether you recalled the disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the area and was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, stated that you were almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief. What was said during the discussion between the Commander-in-Chief, ComFOURTEEN, and you at that time in discussing this situation?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In general terms, the Commander-in-Chief wished to know the basis for the estimate, why we placed certain units in certain areas, wished to know the distinction or difference between the estimates of ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN, and what our opinion was regarding the [49] location and direction of movement of the various Japanese forces. ComFOURTEEN inquired about the same information. Each point, as I recall, was discussed in some detail by both admirals in my office. To the best of my belief, that would be the 27th of November.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that before or after the war warning?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I am quite sure it was after the receipt of the war warning. My reason for saying that was, as I recall, the Commander-in-Chief wanted to know what Washington's reaction was and my reply was apparently the war warning or something of that nature, but that was their reply.

Admiral HEWITT. I assume, then, you saw the war warning.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, I did see the war warning. That was the war warning of the 27th, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. How many carriers did the Japanese have at that time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. They were generally considered as having seven, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your estimate as to the location of the other Japanese carriers, that is, after you placed two in the Mandan Sea?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not know, sir, where they were.

Admiral HEWITT. And that lack of knowledge was communicated to Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What conferences, Captain, did you have with Admiral Kimmel after November 27th and prior to December 7th, when he was present and what was said at those conferences?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There were several conferences in my office [50] at which the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant were present to discuss what information our unit had available and to elaborate upon our daily summaries of location and disposition of Japanese forces.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you summarize in general terms the information and deductions that were made as to the movements of the Japanese fleet during the period 27 November to 6 December?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The communication intelligence summaries as prepared by the ComFOURTEEN unit during the period 27 November to 6 December, inclusive, contained the following information:

(A) The fact that a large task force commanded by the CinC Second Fleet and whose composition was fairly definitely established and whose destination was likewise fairly well established.

(B) Several other items, including on 27 November the fact that there was no further information regarding the presence of CarDiv Five in the Mandates and that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU.

It was further stated on November 27th that carriers are still located in home waters.

On 28 November it was stated that there was no indication of movements of any combined fleet units and that CinC Second Fleet was particularly attentive in his dispatches to CarDiv Five and Seven.

On 30 November it was stated that the only tactical circuit heard was one that the AKAGI and several Marus, and that CinC Second Fleet sent a dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee, which indicated that that vessel was a member of the Second Fleet task force.

It was also stated on 30 November that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers in the Marshalls indicated at least one carrier in [51] the Marshalls, although this was not confirmed.

On 1 December all service radio calls were changed, and that this indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

On 1 December, referring to carriers, a notation was made "no change."

On 2 December from inconclusive evidence it appeared as if there might have been a split or division in the normal or combined fleet staff and that these might be two supreme commanders with staffs; also a complete lack of information in regard to carriers, and that despite the partial identification of 200 service calls, not one carrier call had been located, which was a new low ebb.

On 3 December there was no information on submarines or carriers.

Also, on 5 December it was stated that there was no traffic from the commander carriers or commander submarine force.

On 6 December it was noted that CinC combined fleet sent several messages to the carriers, to the Fourth Fleet, and other major commanders. Commander submarines originated two messages, which were his first since 1 December. He was believed to be definitely in the Marshalls.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain, referring to Exhibit 3, which is a U. S. Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, at page 13 you will find a statement of the composition of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor. Is that description of those forces accurate, to the best of your knowledge?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It is accurate, to the best of my knowledge.

Admiral HEWITT. It was a fact, Captain, that the AKAGI was one of the carriers in the force which attacked on December 7th, was it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

[52] Admiral HEWITT. And also the SHOKAKU?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. And the battleship HIYEI was also in that force was it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to the daily summaries of intelligence information in your unit at Pearl Harbor during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, Captain, what references do you have to those three ships?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On 27 November the communication intelligence summary stated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters.

On 30 November the statement was made in the above-mentioned summary that the only tactical circuit heard was one that the AKAGI and several Marus.

On 30 November it was stated that the CinC Second Fleet sent a dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee and which placed the HIYEI as a member of his task force.

Admiral HEWITT. In the light of later information, to what extent are the statements made in that intelligence bulletin correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In the light of later information, it appears that the statements made in the answer above were correct or close to correct, except the one in regard to the HIYEI.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain, what is the significance to be given to the tactical dispatch which was, according to your information, addressed to the AKAGI on the 30th of November 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Normally whenever tactical circuits are established within units of the fleet, it signified that an operation, as [53] a fleet problem or a maneuver, was about to begin and had already commenced.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your procedure, Captain, for disseminating this type of information between 27 November and 7 December and who received the information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Copies were airmailed to the other communication intelligence units. Information considered to be of great importance was sent by radio to the other communication intelligence units. A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer daily during the early afternoon accompanied by a trained RI officer for any discussions which the Intelligence Officer had wish to conduct.

Admiral HEWITT. You stated before Admiral Hart that between November 26 and December 7 very little radio information was obtained by means of radio intelligence due to the lack of traffic. The lack of traffic, as I understand it, was not over-all, but was lacking in traffic from ships at sea. Is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, except as noted in the communication intelligence summary, the volume of total traffic remained about the same or increased, but the traffic which contained as an addressee as an originator one of the major units or major vessels was almost non-existent.

Admiral HEWITT. And some of the actual traffic, as I understand it, consisted of repetitions of old messages which might, in the light of other information, have been padding, is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. There was perhaps a certain amount of padding or repeating of messages, but in our opinion at the time, and our opinion today, of all of the trained RI personnel, there was no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms.

Admiral HEWITT. You also stated in your previous testimony that [4] your unit did not assume that because you did not hear from the large Japanese ships or units that they were all in port and that it occurred to your unit that this silence definitely presaged another offensive movement and that this was called to the attention of the Commandant and the Fleet Intelligence Officer. That is correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What information was received concerning this lack of traffic and its significance from the Far Eastern unit?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall any specific message or messages from the Far Eastern unit and therefore believe that any messages they may have sent us in all probability added nothing to the picture.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the reaction of the Commandant and the Fleet Intelligence Officer to this question of lack of traffic?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Both officers were concerned and enjoined us to make every effort to at least estimate or ascertain the location of the missing units.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall on what date this was brought to their attention?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would say, sir, it was brought to their attention almost daily. It was brought to their attention daily by means of the communication intelligence summary and in addition to that telephonic conversations.

Admiral HEWITT. Did Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel or Captain Leighton know that on a prior occasion when similar traffic conditions existed it preceded the advance and occupation of Hainan?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did they make any comment to the effect that it is [55] might indicate another offensive movement?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, I think it was generally agreed that there was a definite offensive movement by every one connected with the fleet or with my organization. The only error made was in the direction.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, they probably connected that with the other indications of a large movement to the south?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. There was an air reconnaissance toward Jaluit which was ordered by Admiral Kimmel in July, 1941. Have you any information about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I have no information about any air reconnaissance on Jaluit.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relative period of silence prior to the Hainan operation as compared with the period of silence which occurred prior to December 7th and how was the first period of silence evaluated by the intelligence unit?

Captain ROCHEFORT. About the same, and the evaluation at the time of the Hainan occupation included the statement of occupation of Hainan.

Admiral HEWITT. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated that the major portion of the Japanese carriers was in home waters. Do you see this between December 1st and December 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I did not see any ONI estimate of 1 December prior to 7 December.

Admiral HEWITT. Apart from the information of the movement of Japanese naval forces and apart from the information from Japanese telephone or cable messages, what other intelligence did you receive during the period 1 December to 7 December 1941?

[56] Captain ROCHEFORT. Apart from telephonic, sir?

Admiral HEWITT. Excepting the Japanese telephone or cable messages.

Captain ROCHEFORT. We received several messages from the Warrenton and Cavite units pertaining to the destruction of Japanese cryptographic systems. We also received a report through the District Intelligence Officer that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers and presumably cipher systems. This information was passed on to all concerned.

Admiral HEWITT. The book "Battle Report" states that the United States shortly before 7 December 1941 had two task forces at sea and that Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo. What do you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my knowledge, Tokyo was not informed of the presence at sea of the two task forces?

Admiral HEWITT. Now, with relation to the communications which the Japanese consul general at Honolulu was concerned with, you previously testified you had received about 1 December and others, which some, which you were able to decode prior to the attack, were unimportant, and others were decoded after—how did you receive those communications?

Captain ROCHEFORT. They were received from an officer messenger from the District Intelligence Officer's office. I did not know, nor did I inquire, as to how he had obtained them.

Admiral HEWITT. What communications were they? Do we have copies of those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not have copies and do not know where they happened to the copies received from the DIO, FOURTEEN Naval District, but believe that duplicates will be in the Washington file but unable to identify the same.

(A certified collection of dispatches supplied by Naval Communications, Navy Department, Washington, was received marked "Exhibit 13.")

Admiral HEWITT. There are three dispatches to which I direct your attention, Captain, in that exhibit and request that you examine them and explain whether or not you have ever seen them, and give us your comments concerning them.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December, number 253. I do not recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo, December 6, number 254. I do recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245. This last message

of the group of messages received by the Pearl Harbor unit from the District Intelligence Officer and due to the difficulties inherent in the system, involving research, it was not deciphered until the night of 10 December by the Pearl Harbor unit. It was shown to the Commandant, who gave it to the Secretary of the Navy, who had just arrived. At the Secretary's direction, it was shown to no one except the Commander-in-Chief and the District Intelligence Officer, who was dictated verbally to take whatever action was necessary with the local officials, including the FBI.

This message referred to above prescribed a set of signals to be made, indicating the types of ships in the Hawaiian area, the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area, and their activities, and included arrangements for various lights in houses, on beaches, signals on boats, want ads in Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui and.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the source of that message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The source, sir?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes, of that message you just discussed.

Captain ROCHEFORT. From Honolulu to Tokyo.

Admiral HEWITT. The source from which you received it.

[58] Captain ROCHEFORT. The District Intelligence Officer, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain, that was one of the group of messages which, I believe, you said you received on or about December 2nd or 3rd, is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is correct.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall the substance of any of the other messages of that group of messages?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you at any time before December 7th receive copies of any Japanese reports concerning American ships in Pearl Harbor or American preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not to the best of my knowledge. I have here the messages we could dig up on the subject and it is not there.

Admiral HEWITT. In addition, Captain, to the message concerning the signals which you have just discussed, you examined, did you not, a message of December 6th from Honolulu to Tokyo, number 253, and a message from Honolulu to Tokyo of December 6 bearing the number 254? Would you read the two messages into the record and call attention to the date of translation?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The message number 253, dated 6 December 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo in system PA-K2, reads as follows:

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, [59] nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that they are making the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have usually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford Island, and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage of in a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

A notation on the bottom of this dispatch indicates that it was translated on the 8th of December 1941 by the Army.

The message number 254, from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 1941, also in system PA-K2, states as follows:

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port \_\_\_\_\_ and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

This message was translated on the 8th of December 1941 by the Army.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know how the Army secured those messages?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not know how they secured the messages or [60] when. Safford can answer that question, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. There has been testimony to the effect that both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation tapped telephone wires of the Japanese Consul General in Hawaii. What do you know about this?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I know nothing about it, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, concerning the movement of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to 7 December, what do you know of the captured Japanese map which apparently shows either the actual or proposed movement of a Japanese submarine?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have a copy of a chart in four sections.

Admiral HEWITT. Photographic copy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, photographic copy of a chart in four sections, which is a copy of the chart removed from the Japanese submarine which went aground off Bellows Field, Oahu, shortly after 7 December. This chart indicates courses and distances into Pearl Harbor and around Ford Island counterclockwise and also contains several notations written in pencil.

It is my considered opinion that the submarine from which the chart was obtained did not transit Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, that the marks in pencil, which had been erroneously translated as "begin firing" and "attack and sink enemy ship" or "enemy ship sunk", were actually notations made by the submarine commander prior to his arrival in the Hawaiian area and were merely his plan of approach and entry into Pearl Harbor (referring to Exhibits 1 and 4).

(The four photostatic sections referred to were received and marked respectively "Exhibit 14A," "Exhibit 14B," "Exhibit 14C," and "Exhibit 14D.")

[61] I had received a copy of the original chart from which this photographic copy has been made shortly after its being obtained from the submarine in question and did study the chart in its original form on or about 8 December. It is impossible to state with regard to the Japanese characters referring to "begin firing" and "attack and sink enemy ship" whether they are in the past, present, or future tense.



However, in view of the fact that the submarine when obtained did have its two torpedoes aboard, it would appear that the vessel did not at that occasion sink or fire any torpedo at American vessels in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. What is your deduction as to the meaning of the times indicated at the different points that the courses have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. My deductions as to the times at the various turning points are that they were the submarine commander's proposed times for arriving at such points, all times being minus 9 or Tokyo time.

Admiral HEWITT. Which is how many hours different from Honolulu time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Which is four and one-half hours ahead of Honolulu local time, which is plus 10½.

He would have been off the entrance to Pearl Harbor at 0510 Sunday morning Honolulu time and he would have arrived at the gate on or about 0530 Honolulu time.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall at about what time the actual midget submarine was sunk in Pearl Harbor and at about what part of the harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. A midget submarine was sunk in the vicinity of East Loch during the forenoon of 7 December. The exact time I do not recall.

Admiral HEWITT. Was there a similar map recovered from the submarine [62] that was sunk inside Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If so, I have never seen it, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. On the original map (Exhibit 14A) were the locations of ships plotted in pencil or in ink?

Captain ROCHEFORT. They were plotted in ink.

Admiral HEWITT. And what were the notations as to the——

Captain ROCHEFORT. The notations adjacent to each ship marker were the names of the ships.

Admiral HEWITT. Were those in pencil or in ink?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I don't remember that. There they looked to be in ink.

Admiral HEWITT. And the times of the turning point are in ink?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The times of the turning point are in ink.

Admiral HEWITT. And the remarks "prepare to fire" and "attack and sink" are in pencil?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Pencil, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That is not the photograph of the original chart, but it is a photograph of a copy of it (referring to Exhibit 14A)?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, this is a photograph of the original, I am pretty sure about that.

In connection with the track of the submarine on course 295 between times 0500 and 0510, both Tokyo time, it would appear impossible for the submarine to have steered such a course due to the fact that at that time United States vessels were anchored or moored in the area traversed by that course.

Admiral HEWITT. What do you know about submarine contacts that were made prior to December 7th?

[63] Captain ROCHEFORT. During my service in the fleet immediately preceding my detail to the FOURTEENTH Naval District, we

had at least several submarine contact reports in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to Pearl Harbor. None of these contacts developed actual submarines.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you mean by that that they were never actually determined to be submarines?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I was trying to avoid the use of the word "negative" there because we didn't know.

Admiral HEWITT. They weren't positively determined to be submarines?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Is that what you mean?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. None of these contacts were positively determined to be submarines.

Admiral HEWITT. According to this book "Battle Report," at 0500 on 7 December a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting of a submarine some time earlier. What do you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I haven't heard of such a conversation prior to this, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, it appears from previous testimony that it was believed on 7 December after the initial air attack that the attacking force was located to the south of Pearl Harbor and that certain orders were sent out to search for and intercept Japanese forces in that direction. What information do you have on that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. When the attack commenced, the unit at Pearl Harbor lost all communication with the direction finder stations, of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea; consequently no [64] bearings were received from the direction finder stations at these two locations by the communication intelligence unit. The direction finder at Lualualei, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally broadcast by radio a bearing obtained of one of the attacking units. This bearing was allegedly received by the Commander-in-Chief, being an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true. The direction finder station stated later to me that they had transmitted the bearing as 357. If a reciprocal bearing was given to the Commander-in-Chief by radio, it was the first instance, to my knowledge, that that particular type of direction finder, namely, a CXK, gave a reciprocal bearing.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, that type was capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That was the number one direction finder that we had at that time in the Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. And that is all the information on that particular occurrence that you have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is all that I have on that, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your system of communication with Lualualei?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The system of communication with Lualualei was by telephone which utilized short stretches of wire between Pearl Harbor and Lualualei, partly Army cable and partly commercial telephone lines. It was claimed at the time that the communication systems failed because of sabotage, but after considerable study and search on our part, we believed it was due to actions of our own people.

sonnel, that is, United States personnel, whereby in setting up new circuits, telephone and otherwise, our circuits were discontinued.

Admiral HEWITT. That action, then, would have been by the Army?

[65] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, concerning relationship with the Army in Oahu, what information, to your knowledge, was furnished to the Army, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The war warning was given to the Army, as was stated in the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief. In my several talks with Colonel Fielder subsequent to the 27th, in which we exchanged opinions, I gathered the impression that he was as well informed on current affairs as we were in Pearl Harbor. I did not give the Army G-2 any ultra information, first because the only ultra that was available pertained to destruction of cryptographic material and had no bearing on the local G-2 situation; secondly, because the Army G-2 in Honolulu was being furnished such ultras as was considered necessary by the War Department. It is my recollection that the Army received the information regarding burning of papers in the Japanese consulate in Honolulu at the same time that we received it.

Admiral HEWITT. Did they receive any information as to your estimates of the location and movements of the Japanese fleet?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not from me, they did not, sir. If they received such information, they would have received it from the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral HEWITT. May I ask who Colonel Fielder was?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Colonel Fielder was G-2, sir, to General Short, the opposite number to Layton.

Admiral HEWITT. The relationship with the Army, as I understand, was entirely on a personal basis? There was no official system set up for joint operations?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, there was not.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether any reconnaissance was conducted [66] by Army planes at any time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not know of any air reconnaissance conducted by the Army, except that which was being conducted during 1941 at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, which was an inshore patrol.

(Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and marked "Exhibit 15.")

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to ask you what information you had on the messages in that exhibit prior to 7 December.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The only ones that I have seen, sir, are these here because these are the only ones transmitted by Washington to CincPac and ComFOURTEEN (indicating those of 1 and 3 December). It tells London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy the purple machine, and one on 1 December about giving plans to entice the British to invade Thailand; one on 26 November covering the Tokyo voice; and one on 13 November which went to ComSIXTEEN, but it doesn't say whether it went to CincPac or not, giving the U. S. military situation in the Philippines. That is all we got.

The messages referred to above were received by the Pearl Harbor unit from the Navy Department.

In addition, I have seen the gist of the message of November 1 (contained in Exhibit 15).

Other than the above, I haven't seen any, to the best of my knowledge, of the messages contained in this exhibit.

Admiral HEWITT. There has been previous testimony relating a commercial telephone conversation between Tokyo and a Japanese resident at Hawaii some time during this critical period between 1st and 6th of [67] December. It has been termed the "M conversation" and it was more or less unintelligible. Do you know anything about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, as you know, the purpose of this investigation is to supplement previous investigations in order to obtain the facts. Is there any fact bearing on this matter, of which you have knowledge, which hasn't been mentioned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:40 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

## [68] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

## FOURTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Thursday, 17 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will each of you state his name and rank.

Captain MASON. Redfield Mason, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Commander FABIAN. Rudolph J. Fabian, Commander, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain Mason, for the benefit of the record, will you state what your duties were during 1941?

Captain MASON. I was Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you do the same, Commander?

Commander FABIAN. I had been the Officer-in-Charge of the radio unit on Corregidor and had been relieved in September, but my orders were, by the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to remain there and to assist as much as I could.

Admiral HEWITT. That was in view of the situation existing at the time?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Commander Fabian, what was the mission of the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor?

Commander FABIAN. Our mission, Admiral, was to maintain a unit for [69] study of enemy fleets and communications in order, first, to keep track of their peacetime intentions; second, to prevent against a surprise attack, insofar as possible, or an attack without a declaration of war; and, third, to keep as well up as possible on the organization, methods, and so forth, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Of the Japanese fleet?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What equipment did you have there?

Commander FABIAN. I had twenty-six radio receivers, ranging from low frequency to high frequency, had a set of business machinery and the appurtenances necessary for the interception of both high speed and low speed enemy transmissions.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have a direction finder?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir. In addition to that, we had a direction finder.

Admiral HEWITT. And what about decrypting?

Commander FABIAN. For the decryption of naval traffic, we had seven officers and nineteen men, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What, in general, were the arrangements for dissemination of radio intelligence information to the Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Army out there?

Commander FABIAN. The American Navy radio intelligence organization had a private cryptographic system which was held by ComSIXTEEN, which was our unit, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and OpNav, sir. Now, as to dissemination to the Army, locally all of our information was handled to the Fleet Intelligence Officer in Manila, who provided for liaison with the Army. Insofar as the Army in Washington, [70] was all carried on by OpNav, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have any specific tasks which were assigned by the Navy Department, any particular types of traffic watch, and so forth?

Commander FABIAN. No, sir. In general, we were assigned the mission that I indicated previously, and in carrying out that mission we covered certain circuits from which we could get most of the information we desired, sir, and the greatest volume of material. In addition to that, we provided for intercept of diplomatic traffic. In connection with the diplomatic traffic, sir, certain types were immediately enciphered and sent back to Washington as soon as it was intercepted.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that go to Pearl Harbor also, the Pearl Harbor unit?

Commander FABIAN. No, sir. To the best of my knowledge, they weren't performing any cryptanalysis or reading of diplomatic systems.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain Mason, have you got anything to add to that?

Captain MASON. I can add a little bit about the dissemination to the Army locally. The Army was furnished daily a copy of all diplomatic translations that had been made by the unit at Corregidor. The purely naval matters, when our intelligence came from pure naval traffic, inasmuch as there wasn't any translating going on as a matter of fact, they weren't furnished any copies of either dispatches that we sent to CincPac or Washington or received from them, but conferred quite frequently with the head of the intelligence department in the Philippine Army Department and always provided at least—I can't be too specific on the point of how frequently, but quite frequently—our estimate of the locations of the Japanese fleet. As I recall now, I didn't give him the source of this [71] information but graded it as "doubtful" or "possible" or whatever we thought of it.

Admiral HEWITT. Did the Army out there have any similar source of information?

Captain MASON. No, sir. That is correct, isn't it?

Commander FABIAN. They had an intercept unit, but they made no local attack, I believe, sir.

Captain MASON. It was copying Army and diplomatic traffic.

Commander FABIAN. That is right.

Admiral HEWITT. Was the exchange of information between you and the Army complete? I mean did you receive all the information they had as well as giving them all the information you had?

Captain MASON. So far as I know, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. You were in close contact most of the time?

Captain MASON. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What diplomatic codes were assigned to the unit in the Philippines for reading?

Captain MASON. There were assigned the machine cipher known as purple, machine cipher known as red, and the diplomatic code known as J with the current one being 19.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relative order of importance of those codes?

Captain MASON. You mean as we deemed it?

Admiral HEWITT. As you deemed it.

Captain MASON. Well, we considered that the information of the greatest value would more likely be obtained from the purple. It should be made clear, I think, in the record that the exploitation of this traffic [72] was for the purpose of local information chiefly, seeing that we might be the first to intercept the message and that the unit was not responsible for the recovery of the keys necessary to read it. That was done in Washington and forwarded back to it. And all purple traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in the red and J-19 codes were immediately enciphered and sent to Washington. That is whether we read it later or not.

Admiral HEWITT. What, in general, was the information obtained from the Japanese diplomatic codes during the period 27 November to 7 December?

Captain MASON. Well, we knew from purple dispatches that negotiations then being carried on in Washington between the Japanese and ourselves were not progressing satisfactorily and would probably be broken off. I think that is as general as I can make a statement.

Admiral HEWITT. You saw the war warning dispatch from OpNav on November 27th?

Captain MASON. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that contain any information which was new to you or surprising?

Captain MASON. Not of a surprising nature, no, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here a file of dispatches which has been previously submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 15." I would like to have both of you look them over and let me know which, if any, you saw. They are a file of diplomatic and consular dispatches.

Captain MASON. I have seen this file, Admiral, both Commander Fabian and I. The only message which we specifically remember having received or seen was number 15 of Exhibit 15, which we received from the British unit at Singapore and sent to OpNav, information to ComSIXTEEN, CinCPac, and [73] ComFOURTEEN, in CinCAF dispatch 281430 of November, 1941.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the gist of that?

Captain MASON. That was the setting up of the "winds" code.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here a file of Japanese dispatches which have been marked "Exhibit 13" which I would like to have you examine and state what messages, if any, you had seen.

Captain MASON. I do not recall having seen any messages in this exhibit.

Admiral HEWITT. Commander Fabian?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir. I can't specifically remember any of these, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall having seen any messages referring to the ships or locations of ships at Pearl Harbor?

Captain MASON. I do not.

Commander FABIAN. Nor I, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What Japanese naval codes had been broken at Corregidor?

Commander FABIAN. The Corregidor unit, Admiral, was working on the naval system known as JN-25, which was the system containing the greatest volume of Japanese dispatches.

Admiral HEWITT. To what extent were you successful in breaking the code?

Commander FABIAN. We were in the initial stages, sir. We had an established liaison with the British unit at Singapore. We were exchanging values, both code and cipher recoveries, but we had not developed either to the point where we could read enemy intercepts.

Admiral HEWITT. Is it a fact, then, that most of your information [74] as to the location and movements of the Japanese fleet were obtained entirely from traffic analysis rather than decryption?

Commander FABIAN. That is true, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning your estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces from 26 November to 7 December 1941, are you familiar with the dispatches contained in exhibit number 8, which I submit to you?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir.

Captain MASON. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What difference, if any, existed between the estimate of the ComFOURTEEN unit and the ComSIXTEEN unit?

Commander FABIAN. The ComFOURTEEN unit indicated a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls and also indicated that one CarDiv unit was present in the Marshalls. In the same dispatch in which they gave their estimate, they requested our comment, to which we replied that we could not confirm their thought that there were carriers and submarines in force in the Mandates. We believed that all the First and Second Fleet carriers were in the Sasebo-Kure area.

Admiral HEWITT. Then your dispatch was rather a statement that you were unable to confirm the FOURTEENTH District estimate rather than a positive disagreement?

Commander FABIAN. That is correct, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What dispatches relating to Japanese movements were sent by ComSIXTEEN or Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to OpNav or CincPac after the 26th of November dispatch?

Commander FABIAN. From the standpoint of the RI unit on Corregidor, sir, we initiated a dispatch around the 1st of December containing the [75] movement report of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, on his departure from the Empire area and his prospective movements through the various communication zones down to the Indo-China area, sir.

In addition to the dispatch just mentioned, ComSIXTEEN transmitted to CincPac, OpNav, and ComFOURTEEN, comment on AS-TALUSNA Shanghai 270830, regarding locations of enemy ships and added information indicative of a shift of 4,000 men to the Mandates.

On 30 November we originated a dispatch indicating a change of "orange" call signs, and on 1 December a message indicating enemy fleet movements or enemy ship movements, plus indication of the CincC Second's movement from the Kure-Sasebo communication zone probably en route to South China waters.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you identify these (handing dispatches to the witness) as the dispatches which you sent?

Commander FABIAN. Yes.

(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 16.")



Admiral HEWITT. What other information did you have concerning the Japanese fleet movements from 26 November to 7 December 1941?

Captain MASON. Is that other than RI?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Captain MASON. Information concerning Japanese fleet movements, other than that obtained from traffic analysis, consisted of one or two reports, the exact nature of which I am not certain, from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, and in addition a number of sighting reports obtained from our reconnaissance planes. There was one on 2 December from CincAF to OpNav, information CincPac, dispatch 020345, reporting the sighting of nine [76] submarines. I don't remember just where they were now, but it will be contained in that dispatch. Another on 2 December at 0730, the same originator and the same addressees, reporting the sighting of three submarines and twenty-one transports and the presence of enemy patrol planes over Camranh Bay. One on 6 December, same originator, same addressees, at 1255, reporting a convoy in Camranh Bay. Those are all the messages that have been found and to which I can positively testify.

I have a fairly clear recollection of another one or two, and one made by the British which included the sighting of the heavy fleet units, the battleships and the cruisers, after they had turned westward around Poulo Condore, French Indo-China, which was probably about twenty-four to forty-eight hours prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I can't recall positively, but I feel certain that our own reconnaissance planes had sighted at least the cruisers of that task force about twelve hours or more previously, which we reported also. I don't recall any other information that we had on movements during that period, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. During the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, did you have any information, by deduction or otherwise, as to the location and movements of any Japanese carriers?

Commander FABIAN. Our estimate summarized in ComSIXTEEN's 261331 indicated that we believed all carriers, all known carriers, were in the Kure-Sasebo area.

Admiral HEWITT. You mentioned the aerial reconnaissance, your own aerial reconnaissance. Can you give me an idea of the extent of that and approximate dates?

Captain MASON. I can't give the exact dates, Admiral, except that I know some of it was going on before we received the war warning and that [77] it was intensified thereafter. We flew such aerial reconnaissance so as to insure that no surface force could approach Luzon from any of what might be termed the expected directions and escape detection. Chiefly, as I recall it now, we put most stress on the lines from slightly eastward of the east coast of Formosa down through Bako, where they had a naval base, and Hainan, where they also had a naval base, and also towards Comranh Bay in the later days after the sighting of these various units moving south. We also had in the late days some sort of an agreement with the Dutch about reconnaissance toward Palau, thinking that perhaps an attack on the Mindanao and Davao area would come from that direction. I am not prepared to try to give exact details of that because I can't recall that, sir. The Dutch were flying, I am certain, something up from the general Halmahera area towards Palau and, I think, we were flying something along the general Davao-Palau line. And the British, too, in the final days were flying reconnaissance out of Singapore towards

Camranh Bay and over the Gulf of Siam. I think that is about as much as I can really recall about the reconnaissance.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall receiving any information from the British and Dutch sources?

Captain MASON. From the British, yes, sir. I have mentioned previously. They sighted the task force that was to eventually invade Malaya somewhere in the general Poulo Condore area.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here an exhibit which is a Pacific Area Intelligence Bulletin. It gives information obtained from a Japanese prisoner of war as to the composition of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor. Will you look at that and see if you had any reliable intelligence concerning any of those ships in the period 26 November to 7 December?

Commander FABIAN. No, sir. I feel sure our last definite information [78] about carriers was summarized in the dispatch I referred to which was originated on the 26th.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the "winds" code in the dispatch of 28 November which you recalled having seen, what steps were taken to monitor for the use of this code and what were the results?

Commander FABIAN. We assigned one receiver to cover the Tokyo voice broadcasts and each broadcast was listened to by a linguist. In addition to that, we assigned one receiver on a twenty-four hour basis to the Navy Morse press broadcast. The materials therefrom were copied constantly and delivered to the linguists and no indication of any of the phrases set up in the "winds" message appeared.

Captain MASON. The British unit at Singapore was also monitoring the same circuits and it was agreed that anything received by either unit would immediately be exchanged.

Admiral HEWITT. Nothing was received?

Captain MASON. Nothing was received from that.

Admiral HEWITT. This book called "Battle Report," which I showed you, contains a statement that the United States had two task forces at sea shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack and that the Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo. Have you any information as to the basis for that statement?

Captain MASON. I have none, sir.

Commander FABIAN. Nor I, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you receive any information by means of interception of Japanese cable or telephone messages?

Captain MASON. None, sir.

Commander FABIAN. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any information concerning the operation [79] of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor?

Commander FABIAN. None, sir.

Captain MASON. None, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. As you know, the purpose of this investigation is to supplement the previous investigations in order to obtain all the facts. Are there any facts bearing on this matter of which you have knowledge which have not previously been mentioned?

Commander FABIAN. None that I recall, sir.

Captain MASON. No, sir.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:50 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

[80] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

FIFTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Friday, 18 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will each of you state his name and rank.

Commander KARIG. Walter Karig, Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Welbourn Kelley, Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. You gentlemen were the authors of "Battle Report," a book published in 1944?

Commander KARIG. Yes, sir.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Turning to page 6 of that book, what was the basis of the statement that, "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion fleet to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders," and, "The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo"?

Commander KARIG. That question, Admiral, was in several parts. Can we work at it backwards? Can we take the last part of that question first?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Commander KARIG. "That Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo"?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[81] Commander KARIG. That was made in the form of a declarative sentence, and is not the most cautious kind of writing. It was based on the Robert's Report, and I would like to read two paragraphs of that report into the record, if I may.

Admiral HEWITT. Go ahead.

Commander KARIG. (reading):

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan, and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons acting for him.

It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United

States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu. They knew, from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. Their flyers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or fleet. Each seems to have been given a specified mission.

Lieutenant KELLEY. May I say something also, sir? In conversation [82] with Secretary Knox he gave us the background of the Japanese attack as he knew it—how he knew it, we don't know, and he said that his belief was there were two Japanese task forces, we have it here.

Admiral HEWITT. That was the basis for your statement, then?

Commander KARIG. Our conclusions were drawn as a deduction from the Robert's Report although there was no specific proof that the Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo.

Admiral HEWITT. Relative to the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR on pages 13-14 relative to a submarine contact, would you tell me where you obtained that information?

Commander KARIG. I will let Lieutenant Kelly answer that, Admiral, please sir.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Sir, from the skipper of the WARD, then Lieutenant W. W. Outerbridge, USN, who went to the station on Bishop's Point and got a transcript of that conversation as intercepted by the naval radio station on Bishop's Point, the conversation between the CONDOR and WARD. At approximately 0500, the following conversation between the USS CONDOR and the USS WARD was intercepted by the naval radio station on Bishop's Point:

WARD. What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine sighted?

CONDOR. The course was about what we were steering at the time, 020 magnetic and about 1,000 yards from the entrance.

WARD. Do you have any additional information on the sub?

CONDOR. No additional information.

WARD. When was the last time approximately that you saw the submarine?

CONDOR. Approximately 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance.

[83] Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the Japanese map, Plate 1, and this diagram, Figure 3, you take the position, I believe, that the Japanese submarine from which this map was obtained was in Pearl Harbor on December 7 and inaccurately charted the position of other ships in the Harbor that day. Will you tell me on what you base that belief?

Commander KARIG. Again I'll ask Mr. Kelley to answer that because he interviewed Admiral Furlong here in Washington.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Admiral, that map as contained in Plate 1 was quite widely published and was released officially by the Navy Department some time after Pearl Harbor. I don't remember the exact date. A news story widely printed at that time was to the effect that this chart was made by a submarine in the harbor. I discussed this chart with Admiral Furlong on a visit to Washington. I discussed the whole Pearl Harbor attack with Admiral Furlong at great length. I don't remember specifically saying to Admiral Furlong "Do you think this was made by the submarine?" I couldn't say that.

he said that to me. He did describe how the chart was brought into the submarine base and spread out on the deck. They all looked at it. I am sure he told me that it was from a submarine. That is, I think, pretty well known and my memory is that it came from the submarine which was sunk by the MONAGHAN and the CURTISS inside the harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. But you wouldn't be positive?

Lieutenant KELLEY. We cannot prove that.

(A photograph of a captured Japanese chart, showing courses and location of United States ships in Pearl Harbor, from which Plate V in "Battle Report" was taken, was received and marked "Exhibit 17.")

Commander KARIG. Shall we read into the record the official title of the picture?

[84] Admiral HEWITT. Will you please?

Commander KARIG. "CHART OF PEARL HARBOR FOUND IN CAPTURED JAP SUBMARINE.—This Japanese map is an excellent example of subversive Japanese activities mentioned by Secretary Knox upon his return from Hawaii. Japanese symbols drawn on the chart indicate the anchorage of ships and details of military establishments around the inner harbor of Pearl Harbor, U. S. Naval Base in Hawaii. Note misspelling of 'Southeast Loch' (lower right)."

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Admiral HEWITT. Did you see the translation with notations on that chart?

Lieutenant KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here two Exhibits, 3 and 4, of reproductions of the chart with the English translations. If you will note, the notations are different. You will notice off the position of the TENNESSEE one says, "Attack and sink enemy ship," and the other one says, "Sunk enemy ship." For your information, that confusion may be because they are translations of the Japanese ideographs, which have no tense and could mean either past or future.

Commander KARIG. They don't even have a number. It could be "enemy ships."

Lieutenant KELLEY. We haven't seen this translation.

Admiral HEWITT. You haven't seen either?

[85] Lieutenant KELLEY. Not this one, no, sir.

Commander KARIG. No, sir. The translations we supplied in the book were made by a civilian. The only translations that were made for us anyhow were made in the so-called syllabic, and not ideograph.

Admiral HEWITT. On page 26 of "Battle Report" there is the following: "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the evidence

of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw it with my own eyes. You don't know what part of the chart that was?'

Lieutenant KELLEY. It was the southeast, as I remember it, also here (indicating) about the cruisers.

Commander KARIG. That is just trusting to memory—where the cut was penciled into the chart from which the cut was made.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the times noted on the chart, what was your opinion as to the zone time that they were in?

Commander KARIG. Honolulu time was our assumption, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you read the statement on page 23 as to source of the submarine map?

Commander KARIG. On page 23, Chapter Two, part two:

At 0430 on the morning of December 7th a Japanese two-man submarine inside Pearl Harbor just off Hospital Point.

From the log of this submarine, subsequently beached outside Pearl Harbor and recovered intact, it is not difficult to reconstruct its survey of the harbor leg by leg.

Admiral HEWITT. By the "log" of this submarine, do you mean the chart which has been under discussion?

Commander KARIG. Yes, sir. The only copy of the Japanese chart from which we worked in preparing the text of chapter two was Exhibit 17, supplied [86] by the Pictorial Section, Office of Public Relations.

Lieutenant KELLEY. That is not a complete chart as taken from the submarine.

Commander KARIG. Nor did it show that part of the chart shown below—

Lieutenant KELLEY. Below the Hospital Point entrance.

Admiral HEWITT. The Army Pearl Harbor report, apparently based on testimony of an FBI agent, states that the difference between the charted positions of the United States ships and the actual positions on December 7th shows conclusively that a submarine had been in the Harbor prior to December 7th. Did you investigate the location of ships in the Harbor prior to December 7th?

Commander KARIG. No, sir.

Lieutenant KELLEY. No, sir, we did not. The information was not available to us.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know the location of the original map?

Commander KARIG. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. If you have anything else or any other information or any leads that you can give that would permit me to obtain additional information about this affair, I would be very glad to have it.

Commander KARIG. We have nothing further. That is, first-hand information.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:40 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m., Monday, 21 May 1945.)

[87] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SIXTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 10:30 a. m., Monday, 21 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. William W. Outerbridge, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. You were the Commanding Officer of the WARD on the morning of 7 December 1941?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And during the early hours of that morning, you had several actual contacts with submarines? Is that so?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Several actual contacts?

Admiral HEWITT. Well, reported contacts.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. We had one alert and one actual contact and then later, after the attack, we had several outside.

Admiral HEWITT. There has been reported and logged the conversation which you had with the CONDOR along about 0520 Honolulu time and later there is in evidence the report of your actual attack on the submarine. Will you give me your story of the events of the morning, beginning with the report from the CONDOR about 0400?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. That doesn't appear on this record, but she signalled us by flashing light that she believed she had seen an object that looked like a submarine proceeding to the westward, and I believe she [88] had just come out and was sweeping, magnetic sweep out in the channel, but she said, "The submarine is standing to the westward."

Admiral HEWITT. What was her location?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. She was in the channel, sweeping with her magnetic sweeps.

Admiral HEWITT. The approach channel to Pearl Harbor?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Outside of the actual channel, between the reefs, but on the approach channel to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Swept channel?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Swept channel, yes, and we went to General Quarters and proceeded to her position, as close as we could get to her without fouling her sweeping gear, and then we stood to the westward, slowed to ten knots, and searched. It was a sonar search. We couldn't see anything.

Admiral HEWITT. About what time did you get that signal?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. We got that signal about 0358, visual signal about 0358, and we searched for about an hour and didn't find a thing; so I got in contact with her again and asked her for a verification. Then she said—this is in the record here. We asked her for "What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you sighted?" and she said, "the course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance, apparently heading for the entrance." Well, I knew then that we had been searching in the wrong direction. We went to westward and, of course, there was still doubt as to whether she had actually seen a submarine because there hadn't been any other conversation except by flashing light with us, and I wondered whether they were sure or not; so I did ask them, "Do you have any additional information on the sub?" and they said, "No additional information." I then asked them, "When was [89] the last time approximately that you saw the submarine?" and they said, "Approximately time 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance." Then we thanked them for their information and asked them to notify us if they had any more information and then we just kept on searching in our area, in the restricted area outside of the buoys. That was the end of this incident for the first search.

Admiral HEWITT. You made no report of that to higher authority.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. No, sir, I didn't make any report of that.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your evaluation of that?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Well, at the time I thought perhaps it was a submarine, because they didn't report it. This conversation was taken over another circuit entirely. This is not in either his log or mine. They didn't report it and I thought if he didn't report it, I must not think it is a submarine. It was his initial report and I thought it may not be. It may have been anything; it may have been a buoy. Since then, I don't believe it was a buoy. I believe the Commanding Officer of the CONDOR saw a submarine. I don't know where he is. I think he was killed, killed in action. But at that time I didn't know whether or not it was a submarine.

Admiral HEWITT. You say you think the Commanding Officer of the CONDOR was killed?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I believe he was killed.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember his name?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. No, sir, I don't know, but I met some people who told me about him.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, now about the later contact.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. The later contact—I turned in again and was sleeping in the emergency cabin, as usual, and Lieutenant Goetz [90] had the deck. He was a j. g. He called me and said, "Captain, come on the bridge." The helmsman was the first one to see this object and he saw this thing moving. It looked like a buoy or him, but they watched it and after they had watched it for a while they decided probably it was a conning tower of a submarine, although we didn't have anything that looked like it in our Navy, and they had never seen anything like it. I came on the bridge as fast as I could and took a look at it. I don't know where it appeared to them at that time but at that time it appeared to me to be following the ANTARES. The ANTARES had been reported to me and at that time I thought



the ANTARES had been heading into the harbor. She also had a tow, towing a lighter, and it appeared to me the submarine was following astern of the tow.

Admiral HEWITT. Astern of the tow?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. It may or may not have been. I think other people can testify it was standing in to Honolulu. To me it appeared to be following the ANTARES in and I thought, "She is going to follow the ANTARES in, whatever it is." It was going fairly fast. I thought she was making about twelve knots. It seemed to be a little fast to me. I was convinced it was a submarine. I was convinced it couldn't be anything else. It must be a submarine and it wasn't anything that we had and we also had a message that any submarine operating in the restricted area—not operating in the submarine areas and not escorted—should be attacked. We had that message; so there was no doubt at all in my mind what to do. So, we went to General Quarters again and attacked. That was 0740-0640.

Admiral HEWITT. And you attacked and you reported, I believe that—

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we reported.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you identify those exchanges of messages? Will [91] you identify the messages on the radio log?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. The Executive Officer was on the bridge at the time. We made the attack and we dropped depth charges in front of the submarine. The first report was, "We have dropped depth charges upon sub operating in defensive sea area." I thought, "Well, now, maybe I had better be more definite," because we did fire and if we said we fired, people would know it was on the surface, because saying it was a sub and dropping depth charges, they may have said it might have been a blackfish or a whale. So I said, "We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area," so they would feel, well, he shot at something. We sent the message at 0653, the second one.

(The radio log of the Naval Radio Station, Bishop's Point, Oahu, containing the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR and the WARD's report of attack upon a submarine, was received and marked "Exhibit 18.")

Admiral HEWITT. What do you feel was the effect of your attack?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I think we sank the submarine.

Admiral HEWITT. What do you base that on?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. On the gun hit, only on the gun hit.

Admiral HEWITT. There was a gun hit on it?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. There was a gun hit on it, and I looked these submarines over and there is no hatch between the conning tower and the tube of the submarine, where I believe it was hit, right at the waterline, the base of the conning tower.

Admiral HEWITT. And the submarine disappeared after that?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, it disappeared.

Admiral HEWITT. That was before you made the depth charge attack?

[92] Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we fired at the submarine before we made the depth charge attack, and as she was going under the stern, we dropped over the depth charges.

Admiral HEWITT. Your depth charges were close to her?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Definitely?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Definitely, they were there. I didn't make a kill—

Admiral HEWITT. Whom were those reports addressed to?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I believe it was Commander Inshore Patrol. We were working for inshore patrol, but the interpretation is here.

Admiral HEWITT. You got the calls?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we got the calls.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember what they mean?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Those were the only reports of that attack made?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, two messages on that.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your action after the completion of attack?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Well, I saw one of these large white sampan lying to out there in the defensive area.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that against regulations?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. That was against standing rules. They were supposed to be in the defensive area, but he was in there. So, I turned around and went after him and we chased him out towards Barber's Point. He was going pretty fast.

Admiral HEWITT. He tried to get away from you?

[93] Captain OUTERBRIDGE. It appeared that way to me. I could have stopped much sooner, but he appeared to be going around Barber's Point. When we did catch up to him, he came up with a white flag. I thought that was funny. I thought, "We will send for the Coast Guard." That was what we always did when we caught a sampan in the defensive area. We sent for the Coast Guard and they were very prompt. They sent a cutter out to take him.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you identify for the record those two messages you sent about the sampan, which are on the Bishop's record?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. "We have intercepted a sampan into Hahaione. Please have Coast Guard send cutter to relieve us of sampan. And, "We have intercepted sampan and escorting sampan into Hahaione. Please have cutter relieve us of sampan." We sent that. That is a little garbled, but that looks like it.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the time of it?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. That was 0833 and 0835.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, then, I understand that several days ago you saw a midget submarine which was recovered off Bellow's Field. Is that correct?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Admiral HEWITT. Was the appearance of the conning tower similar to the one that you saw?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the condition of that submarine off Bellow's Field? Did it have its torpedoes?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, it was in good condition and I was inside and there was a torpedoman—I believe he was a chief torpedoman— [94] working on the torpedoes, trying to get them out without exploding them, and I saw the torpedoes inside.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, I think, that is all I had planned to ask you. I am naturally interested in any information you can provide on this Pearl Harbor attack. Is there anything that you might think would be pertinent to this investigation that you can volunteer?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Well, I suppose it would be a matter of opinion, which probably wouldn't do you much good, but I was even a little surprised at the attack which followed. I mean I had no idea that the air attack was going to follow. We brought the sampan in and we got another submarine attack. We dropped four depth charges on another submarine in the area. We got depth charges that morning and at 11 o'clock we ran out. When the attack started, we were still at General Quarters. We hadn't secured from the attack. We were still at General Quarters and we saw the planes coming in, but not until after the bombs began to fall, because the bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor, and the Exec and I were standing on the bridge. Lieutenant Commander Dowdy was the Exec and he said, "They are making a lot of noise over there this morning, Captain." I said, "Yes, I guess they are blasting the new road from Pearl to Honolulu." He said, "Look at those planes. They are coming straight down." I looked at them, and he said, "Gosh, they are having an attack over there." I said, "They certainly are," and that was the time the attack actually began.

Admiral HEWITT. That was about 0750?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. 0750, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That must have been about the time, judging from this report here, that you were engaged in bringing the sampan in.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we were still standing in with the sampan.

[95] Admiral HEWITT. You mentioned just then several other submarine attacks that you had the same morning.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That was after the ones you have already discussed. What were they?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. They were good metallic contacts, although I was a little surprised at them at first, before things began to pop. I didn't think we would get so many, but we did get a lot of them. We got good metallic contacts and the only thing to do was to bomb them. They gave us a good sharp echo. We bombed them until we ran out of depth charges and went in and got some more.

Admiral HEWITT. That was in the same general area?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Right in that defensive area.

Admiral HEWITT. Off the entrance to the swept channel?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. There was another thing we saw. That was a lot of explosions along the reefs. I thought that they were explosions of torpedoes fired into the reefs. I didn't see any other submarines the whole morning. We didn't actually see any, but we did see a lot of explosions that looked like shallow water explosions of torpedoes.

Admiral HEWITT. What would make you think they were torpedoes rather than bombs?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. They were right along the coast, along the reef, and I didn't see any planes overhead. They were inside the coast

in Pearl Harbor, bombing Pearl Harbor, and I didn't think they would all miss that far. I thought they would do better than that. They did do better than that in general.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall approximately how many different [96] contacts you bombed?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I think we had three or four that morning, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. After the one—

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. In the first ten days we had eighteen contacts, day and night, but we didn't actually see any more submarines. I heard that they were there, but we didn't actually see any more. We don't know what the effect of the attacks were on the submarines. There was one other one, on the 2nd of January. We were with the division, making the attack, and the ship astern of us, after I got the report, told us that she saw a submarine come up under our starboard depth charge. I hadn't, up until then, claimed any hit for it. We had a pretty good contact. It was our turn to make the run. We made the run and kept on going, and that is what the Commanding Officer of the ALLEN said. That was the 2nd of January. But we didn't actually see that from the ship.

Admiral HEWITT. That is of general interest to show the probable submarine activity out there on the first day.

I think that is about all I have, then. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[97] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain SAFFORD. Laurance F. Safford, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you state your duties during 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. 1941, I was the Chief of the Communications Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the mission of that activity?

Captain SAFFORD. Our mission was twofold: Intelligence, intelligence on foreign nations, particularly Japan—in fact, almost exclusively Japan; and security, to furnish our own codes and ciphers and to supervise the security of our own communications of the U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relation between that activity and the Commander, now Captain, McCollum's unit, which, I believe, was known as Op-16-FE?

Captain SAFFORD. We were furnishing intelligence or information to Op-16-F2, who evaluated the information and combined it with other intelligence and were responsible for its dissemination. My section had no authority or responsibility for the dissemination of anything except what we called technical information; that is, the codes and ciphers, Japanese frequencies, and so forth, which would aid us in our work, which would aid the organization in its work, rather.

Admiral HEWITT. It appears from your testimony before Admiral Hart that there were three main radio intelligence units, one in the Navy Department, which was concerned with intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments; the second at Pearl Harbor, with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor, which dealt with the dispositions and plans of naval forces [98] the Pacific and surveillance of naval Japanese communications, exclu-

sive of diplomatic communications; and the third at Corregidor, which early in 1941 had been concerned primarily with diplomatic communications, but which, in the fall of 1941, shifted its main attention to Japanese naval communications.

The so-called Japanese "purple" code was a diplomatic code, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It was a machine, sir, a very complicated electrical machine.

Admiral HEWITT. But it was used for—

Captain SAFFORD. It was used for diplomatic purposes to the higher embassies, or more important ones, such as Washington, London, and they also held it at Singapore and Batavia, Tsinking, and a few other places which I would hesitate to say from memory; also Berlin and Tokyo.

Admiral HEWITT. The unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the problem of intercepting Japanese communications using the "purple" code?

Captain SAFFORD. It never was, sir. They hadn't been assigned any diplomatic circuits since about 1932.

Admiral HEWITT. Was the unit at Corregidor ever assigned the problem of intercepting communications in the "purple" code?

Captain SAFFORD. The unit at Corregidor had been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems for several years and continued to do that up to and including December 7, 1941. Their main attention was on the local Asiatic circuits for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but very late in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering the Berlin-Tokyo circuit because we couldn't get adequate coverage from all other stations combined. [99] These were forwarded to Washington and weren't touched locally.

Admiral HEWITT. What in general were the arrangements for the exchange of information among the three units, that is, Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and Washington?

Captain SAFFORD. If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the intercept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for the "purple" machine and keys for another system which we called Jig-19, and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of duty.

With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few. Pearl Harbor's main mission was in attack on the Japanese flag officers system. This particular code and cipher had been in effect since about 1 December 1940 and remained in effect for some time after Pearl Harbor. We were also attacking this code with another group in the Navy Department and, I believe, the British were working on

it. We never succeeded in a solution. From about 1926 to December, 1940, most of our knowledge about the Japanese Navy came from this code. We thought it the most important system the Japanese Navy was using and we had our most skilled and most experienced officers and men working on it. After the attack on Pearl Harbor about December 10th, the Hawaiian unit [100] discontinued their attack on this code and put all their attention on to a less system which used numerals and was held by all ships, or practically all ships, of the Japanese Navy. We continued attack on the Jig-19 officer cipher back in the Navy Department until the system went out of use.

Will you repeat the question so I know what I am answering?

Admiral HEWITT. I can ask another amplifying question here. Was there free exchange of intelligence information between the Corregidor unit and the Pearl Harbor unit?

Captain SAFFORD. There was in so far as it pertained to the projects they were assigned. Corregidor and the Navy Department changed by radio information on the "purple" machine and on what we called the Jig-19 system and other diplomatic systems, but Pearl Harbor was not addressed in these messages.

Admiral HEWITT. What about the information gained from breaking the code, information as to enemy movements and locations?

Captain SAFFORD. The information gained from breaking enemy messages, dissemination was a function and responsibility of Naval Intelligence. We were bending over backwards not to try to take over the functions of Naval Intelligence in this respect, and at the same time we were insisting that Naval Intelligence keep out of the communications field of activity and disband the amateur intercept stations which various ambitious District Intelligence Officers had set up without authority from the Navy Department. We insisted that both parties adhere strictly to approved war plans.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, then, am I correct in stating that enemy intelligence, intelligence as to movements or locations of enemy ships which was gained by the Corregidor unit would necessarily be passed by them to the Pearl Harbor unit?

[101] Captain SAFFORD. It would normally be passed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, or to the Fleet Intelligence officer, and they would make further dissemination.

Admiral HEWITT. Before Admiral Hart, you testified that on November 26th estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and disposition of the Japanese fleet. Can you identify this exhibit number 8 as—

Captain SAFFORD. These are the messages referred to.

Admiral HEWITT. Is it correct, as Captain Layton testified, that the principal difference between the estimate was that ComSIXTEEN's unit couldn't confirm the supposition by ComFOURTEEN's unit that Japanese carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates?

Captain SAFFORD. To my mind, the chief difference between the two reports was that ComSIXTEEN gave a great deal of supplementary information which was not available to ComFOURTEEN. The only respect in which ComSIXTEEN disagreed with ComFOURTEEN was in his statement, "Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications are that

all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."

Admiral HEWITT. Is it correct that both units believed that the major portion of Japanese carriers was in home waters?

Captain SAFFORD. It is correct for that particular date.

Admiral HEWITT. Is it also correct that, as you previously testified, ONI sent a dispatch on November 24th to CinCAF, indicating that the SIXTEENTH District intercepts were considered most reliable, and requesting that future reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

[102] Admiral HEWITT. Is it also correct that ONI did not advise the FOURTEENTH Naval District that they, ONI, considered ComSIXTEEN's report to be more accurate because of the geographical location of the ComSIXTEEN unit?

Captain SAFFORD. That was not stated in the dispatch.

Admiral HEWITT. It has been testified previously that on or about December 1, 1941, radio contact with the Japanese forces was either lost or greatly diminished. Did you know about this at the time and, if so, when did you learn it?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not believe that statement is correct. We received an immediate report from one of the two stations that the Japanese had changed their call sign system for forces afloat at midnight on December 1, 1941, and until they made a reasonable number of identifications, any information on the "Orange" fleet through radio alone would be rather limited. The Daily Communication Intelligence Summary which was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, by our unit in Pearl Harbor contained detailed information as to not hearing messages from various ships and particularly the Commanders-in-Chief, Second and Third Fleet, but that an unusual number of messages were being broadcast or otherwise addressed to these forces, and that they believed that these fleets had already commenced or were about to commence their southward movement. This information was not forwarded to the Navy Department at that time, so far as I know, and we did not get the details until copies of these summaries were received by air mail some time after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you introduce such information as you have on those communication summaries that you mentioned?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. This exhibit, we have copies of Communication Intelligence Summary at Pearl Harbor for the period 1 November 1941 [103] to 6 December 1941, inclusive. The Navy Department copy could not be located in 1944. When Commander Rochefort reported for duty in 20-G shortly before the Navy Department Court of Inquiry under Admiral Murfin, he made a thorough search personally throughout the records of 20-G and could find no trace or record of this paper; so he sent a dispatch out to Pearl Harbor and had them prepare copies out there, which they forwarded to him for use with that investigation. I signed for one of those copies and prepared additional copies for the use of this investigation. It is obvious that there are two or three clerical errors or typographical errors in copying because some of the sentences seem to be incomplete or else somebody used a very queer style of English. I

think they tell the story, with one or two exceptions where we to guess.

Admiral HEWITT. We will receive that copy and mark it as an exhibit, subject to correction when the originals are obtained.

(The document referred to was received and marked, "Exhibit 1")

Admiral HEWITT. We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Communication record, which concerns a series of decoded Japanese diplomatic consular dispatches. Will you look at those and tell me, if you know how they were obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed?

Captain SAFFORD. They were initially obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and foreign points, mostly radio intercepts and occasionally land wire or cable. Some were photographs of station copies as they passed through the various commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-five per cent were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed Japanese systems. The principal was the "purple," [1918] which is a complicated electrical machine solved by the Army and Navy machines made both by the Army and the Navy and two machines in fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig-19 at that period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep abreast of the Jig-19 than it did the "purple" once we had the machine reconstructed. In all these systems, "purple," Jig-19, and minor systems, we had an exchange between Washington, Singapore, Corregidor, and London. We pooled our efforts on that.

Admiral HEWITT. How were these messages evaluated as to their importance and what distribution was made?

Captain SAFFORD. They were translated in the translation section of the Navy Department unit and the War Department unit and a senior translator decided which were of relative unimportance, not worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with financial matters and visas and things like that; and the others were all typed smooth and turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, respectively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared briefs or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the messages and they were distributed to the higher officials in the War and Navy Departments and to the Secretary of State and to the President. [1918]

In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usually saw them; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the War Plans Division. The Secretary of the Navy also saw them and usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide to the President saw them and took them in to the President.



In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief Signal Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of Staff, War Department, and also to the Secretary of War.

Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request of the President and after conference agreement between Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs was dropped and the original messages were prepared in folders and each day the folder was taken through. By agreement, all dissemination to the White House was handled through the Navy Department, and in return all dissemination to the State Department was handled through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything the Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy; and they put on a serial number. Ours were JD-1 and the Army's were SI-X, with a serial; so they were substantially duplicates unless something went wrong.

In addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to references, and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything that was referenced to anything bearing on this subject was put on the off side of the page, so that you had the message on one side and the references on the other side, the left hand side, of the folder. Then, anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And Kramer went with them and stood in the [106] doorway or outside and if there was any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody who was interested in the subject. Kramer also went to the White House, I believe twice. Normally he would explain things to the Naval Aide to the President and the aide would depend on his memory to answer any questions the President might want to ask. The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning.

Admiral HEWITT. If the information contained in these messages was disseminated to naval agencies outside the Navy Department, that was the responsibility of the Director of Naval Intelligence or the Chief of Naval Operations himself, is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. Well, Kramer was serving under me and had space in my section. He was officially attached to the rolls of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence and our foreign translators were paid from ONI funds. I think Naval Communications furnished one officer and two or three yeomen because Intelligence couldn't furnish enough people to help them out. We did that as a favor in cooperation. Kramer had to do a job. But when any information was passed over to Kramer or Op-20-GZ, Naval Communications' responsibility was finished. From that time on it was the clear responsibility of Naval Intelligence and we were very careful not to cross the line.

One thing I would like to add. There was only one copy of it sent around. It made the rounds and everybody took a look at it. The one exception was on the night of December 6th, when the mes-

sage was so important and time so short that Kramer made individual copies for each person who was to see it.

Admiral HEWITT. Here are some additional messages, which have been introduced as Exhibit 13, also relating to Japanese movements and the [107] "winds" code.

Captain SAFFORD. These are the same as the others, except they are mostly, I notice, in the minor systems.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you examine the messages which are marked relating to ship movements, and give me your comment as to how they were translated, how they would have been translated, and appear to be a reason for the delays in effecting translation?

Captain SAFFORD. The JD serial 7029 was an Army translation. I believe the long delay is due to the fact that the Army forwarded it from Honolulu by air mail, but only the Army can give the positive answer to that. Number 7029, dated November 20, 1941, was translated on December 4, 1941, by the Army.

The next is JD serial 7179, dated 6 December 1941, translated December 8, 1941, by the Army. That message was in one of the minor systems, which is known as PA-K2. The notation shows it intercepted at Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by teletype. The War Department unit at that time was observing normal office hours and secured from work at noon on Saturday, December 6, 1941, with the intention of doing no work until 8 o'clock on Monday, December 9, 1941. The Army unit received an urgent call from the Navy about 3 p. m., Saturday afternoon, December 6, 1941, and there were certain officers over there, working overtime to get back work caught up. They telephoned and got some of the Army people back and they assisted the Navy throughout the night of December 6th in translating the very long and very important fourteen-part message which has been referred to in earlier investigations. I believe that this message, JD 7179, simply laid in the basket until they got all these urgent messages over and then it was decrypted and translated as a matter of routine. We had a rigid system of [108] priorities, first by systems and second by the priorities the Japanese assigned to their own messages, and a message like this in the normal course of events would only be looked at after the most urgent messages had been caught up to date.

The JD serial 8007, dated December 2, 1941, and translated by the Army on December 30, 1941, was intercepted at Station 5, which is at Honolulu. This is an Army translation and I believe the Army was investigating this themselves to see if they can determine what was the trouble. Superficially, it was intercepted at Station 5, which is at Fort Shafter, and I think it was forwarded by air mail and just delayed in the excitement. The Army gave instructions to encipher and forward by radio Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted at Fort Shafter, beginning December 3rd or December 4th, as I remember. This order was faithfully complied with, but the messages of an earlier date went by air mail as in the past. That is how I account for this delay, though it is only my supposition. May I add, that there was a notation on the message which said, "This message was received here on December 23."

Referring to Exhibit 63, JD serial 7086, message was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on 29 November 1941 and translated by the Navy.

Department on December 5, 1941. This message was intercepted at Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by air mail or ordinary mail, because it doesn't have the "TT" which means teletype. Station 2 is an Army unit at the Presidio. Seven days is about the average time of solution or translation of Jig-19 messages. They normally weren't forwarded by teletype and also got second priority in translation. This delay is average and not unusual.

The next is JD serial 7063, dated November 18, 1941, translated December 5th by the Army. Again, I can't account or give the exact reason for the delay. It was intercepted at the Navy station at Bainbridge Island, [109] Station S, was not forwarded by teletype. Part of the delay was caused in transmission; part possibly by delay in solving the message or solving the Jig-19 key. This was one of the longest delays we had in the Jig-19 system, but it was by no means unique.

The next is JD 7111, dated November 19, 1941, translated December 6, 1941, by the Army. This message was intercepted by the Army station at San Francisco and was not forwarded by teletype. It is my estimate that the long delay in this message was waiting for enough messages or a long enough message in this particular system to be received so that we could solve the cipher. Sometimes we would get Jig-19 key in a day and sometimes we would have to wait a week or ten days until we were able to break it.

We have one more, JD 7381, dated December 6, 1941, and translated December 12, 1941. This was also an Army translation; so I can only guess at the reason for the delay. It was intercepted at Station 5, Army station, Fort Shafter. It is in the PA-K2 system, which probably had the last or next to the lowest priority in decipherment and translation. The system had been in effect for several years and there was no difficulty at all in reading messages in it. But with one or two exceptions, the message was so unimportant they were never typed smooth for distribution.

Incidentally, if I may look through, there was one other message about the same time which I would like to look for, because there were two messages—the only two messages to or from Honolulu at that time went on the air twelve hours and eighteen hours respectively before the attack on Pearl Harbor and there simply wasn't time enough to get those messages into the War and Navy Departments and have them translated and get any information out. So, though they may have been several days late, we couldn't have possibly made the grade on it. This (indicating) may be one [110] of the messages I am thinking about. I am not certain of it. I looked that up way way back. It is possible that the other message I referred to hasn't been submitted in evidence.

An additional fact was this: As I said before, the Army were covering the even days and the Navy the odd dates; that is, the filing date. And if the Army had been standing continuous watches, the way the Navy had been since the 1st of February 1941, they might have picked up these messages in time to have done something with them, but when they came back on the Navy's call, they only handled the messages the Navy was looking at and the other messages didn't get looked at until Monday at best. However, I do not believe we

could have handled these messages in the minor systems within a few hours of the time they were on the air.

Admiral HEWITT. Were any of the codes used by the Japanese reports on United States ships being read at Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. They weren't, sir, and if they were, it was known to us.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether or not Pearl Harbor had any of these Japanese reports?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know at the time and I only have a second-hand now and would prefer not to attempt to answer that question. If I might add for my own answer, we had at Pearl Harbor a copy of the old keys in what we called our radio intelligence publication on Japanese diplomatic systems. We had two or three spares there and we sent them all out the printed changes, but we didn't keep them up to the minute and they did not get the daily changes by radio which went out to ComSIXTEEN and they went out to London, and therefore, if they got into those and were to read anything, it was only one some of the minor systems, such as the [111] LA system which had been in effect since 1925, the PA-K2.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether or not any of these patches which indicated interest in locations of ships in Pearl Harbor and which were translated before December 7th were ever sent to CinCPac?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge, none of them were. That would have been Naval Intelligence's province and they would know better than I would, but I have no personal knowledge of ever sending them, and I did look through the outgoing messages files once and do not recall seeing anything like that.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the so-called "winds" message which appears from your previous testimony that in all the Navy received four reports of the establishment of that code and that two reports said that the use of the code would signify a break in diplomatic relations and the other two said that it would signify war; that efforts were immediately made to monitor for a message using that code; that the FCC intercepted some messages, set forth in Exhibit 65, which did use the words relating to the United States; that you said that at 10:00 on December 4th, Lieutenant Murray or Lieutenant Commander Kramer came in with a pencilled message which used the words relating to the United States; that you said that you had not seen a copy of this message since December 15, 1941; that at that time you checked the various papers which were being assembled by Kramer, which included the "winds" message relating to the United States, and you turned the messages over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Robert's Commission; that you are certain that the "winds" message had been distributed both in the Navy and to the Army; that no copy could be found in the Navy's files and that the Army had been unable to furnish a copy; that on the afternoon of December 4th, Commander McCollum prepared a patch [112] summarizing the situation to date with direct reference to that "winds" message, and which said that it was considered to be the signal to execute Japanese war plans; that you said that you were present when Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Nimitz

discussed the advisability of sending McCollum's dispatch; that Admiral Wilkinson wanted to send it but Admiral Noyes did not want to send it; that you understood that Admiral Wilkinson was going to try to get the dispatch cleared; and that you believed, until you read the Robert's Report, that the dispatch had been sent. You further indicated that you had conducted some investigation into this matter; that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood told you that he knew the disposition of the copies of the message but did not care to tell you; and that you, through very second-hand and devious sources, learned what happened to the Army copies.

What investigation into this matter did you conduct?

Captain SAFFORD. The statements there are substantially correct. In the fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses, that my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could follow as testimony. That was the time when I studied the Robert's Report carefully for the first time and noted no reference to the "winds" message or to the message which McCollum had written and which I had seen and I thought had been sent. And then I began talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who I knew had been mixed up in it to see what they could remember to straighten me out on the thing and give me leads to follow down to where I could put my hands on official messages and things so that it would be a matter of fact [113] and not a matter of memory. I also talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around at the time and had anything in this thing, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come together. The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral HEWITT. When and where did you have the conversation with Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood as to the disposition of copies of that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That was not a conversation. I wrote him a letter about the thing because that was looked for throughout a period of six months repeatedly. Various people looked for it in the Army and finally couldn't find it, and I asked him if he knew anything about it. He said yes, but he didn't care to tell me about it then; but when he came back to the States, I asked him about it and found out he hadn't understood. We were working at cross purposes. I found out he was referring to the false "winds" message which we had thrown in the wastebasket. This is document number 2 of Exhibit 65, which was telephoned from the FCC to Lieutenant Brotherhood, who was on watch. Kramer identified that as being not what we were looking for and threw it in the wastebasket.

Admiral HEWITT. Is that the message, then, which Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood referred to when he said that he did not care to tell you what the disposition of it was?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the one.

Admiral HEWITT. It was the result of a misunderstanding?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the result of a misunderstanding. We were talking about different things. He didn't want to get particularly [114] unofficially, he didn't want to get Kramer any trouble on the thing. He didn't mind telling me first-hand what he got back here.

Admiral HEWITT. Then you have no information that the Army ever got copies of the "winds" message relating to the United States to which you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no information which would be acceptable as evidence before this Court. I heard the story and I believe it true, but it is very third-hand.

Admiral HEWITT. The information that you have, even though second- or third-hand, may be of assistance in furnishing a lead. You tell us your information?

Captain SAFFORD. The information that I got was that when copies of the "winds" message had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Mars.

Admiral HEWITT. You don't recall the direct source of that information?

Captain SAFFORD. I would prefer not to give the direct source, but I think it may be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation.

The investigation then, at 12:27 p. m., recessed for lunch until 1 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: The same parties as during the morning session.

Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, resumed his seat as witness.

Admiral HEWITT. Before proceeding any further, I would like to make sure that the message now under discussion was actually a message relating to the breaking of diplomatic relations or war with the United States [115] rather than the false message which indicated war with Russia.

Captain SAFFORD. I am certain that Colonel Sadler did not make them confused.

Admiral HEWITT. In order to clear this matter up and to permit further investigation of the allusions to high officers in the Army, I feel that you should give me the complete story of the source of this information.

Captain SAFFORD. That story came through Mr. W. F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst in the War Department, the man who was responsible for the solution and reconstruction of the "purple" machine, although at the time of Pearl Harbor he was working on German systems rather than Japanese and was not directly concerned with anything that took place at that time, but he did have a faint interest in the Japanese section.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you give me his name?

Captain SAFFORD. William F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst, War Department. I have only answered half that question, incidentally. The other is more direct.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes. Will you go ahead?

Captain SAFFORD. There is another angle, which is very much different than this destruction. When Colonel Bratton first learned of the "winds" execute message, he was not entirely satisfied in his mind and telephoned to Admiral Noyes, requesting to be furnished

original intercept so that he could verify the translation. This was customary in highly important messages because the Japanese language was very tricky and sometimes the translations varied, in which case both translations were sent to higher authority and they could have their choice. Admiral Noyes refused to comply with this request, told Colonel Bratton that the Navy translation was correct and the Army would not be given a copy of the original message. For this reason, [116] Bratton did not take very much stock in the "winds" execute message; at least, he did not take it as seriously as Colonel Sadler and the officers in SI-X.

Admiral HEWITT. You are speaking again of this execute "winds"—

Captain SAFFORD. I am talking of the "winds" execute.

Admiral HEWITT. For the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. For the United States. And that story should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation. I might add, furthermore, Captain Schukraft knew that the "winds" execute had been received and that it meant the United States, although he may never have seen the original message or known the exact wording.

Admiral HEWITT. Who was that?

Captain SAFFORD. Captain Robert F. Schukraft. He is now a Colonel, U. S. Army.

Admiral HEWITT. What were the names of the four watch officers in your section through one of whom this or any similar message must have passed?

Captain SAFFORD. They were Lieutenant—do you want their then ranks or present ranks?

Admiral HEWITT. It is immaterial as long as we can identify them.

Captain SAFFORD. Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn, U. S. Navy; Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood; Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering; and Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, U. S. Naval Reserve. The first three are in Washington. Murray is with the Allied Military Government somewhere in the Pacific.

(The witness desired to augment his testimony relating to the question beginning on page 111 and continuing on page 112.)

[117] Captain SAFFORD. To supplement the very long summary in the previous question, Lieutenant Commander Kramer of Murray or both came in with a teletype message on which was noted in pencil the translation and meaning of the Japanese words which constituted the war warning. Kramer has informed me within the past month that a copy of the "winds" message and other papers relative to the break in diplomatic relations with Japan were not turned over to the Robert's Commission but were given to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal about 9 December 1941 while he was Acting Secretary in the absence of Mr. Knox, who had flown to Hawaii. So far as Kramer knows, this folder was never turned over to the Robert's Commission. I had stated it was my impression—not that it was a fact, but it was my impression. Kramer said that he went over this folder with Mr. Forrestal and spent about two hours explaining the significance of the various messages. Kramer did not recall the "winds" execute specifically.

Admiral HEWITT. What did Kramer tell you about his recollection of the "winds" message?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer's recollection of the "winds" message now is that it came in, that he and the watch officer, whom he is certain of, came up to my office and showed it to me, and then the watch officer took it upstairs to deliver it to Admiral Noyes in accordance with instructions that the Admiral had given Kramer. There were posted in writing at the watch officer's desk at that time, though I had forgotten that point. Kramer says that we walked down the corridor together to his office, discussing the message. It was the custom to talk over ultra secret matters with Kramer, walking up and down the corridor. We were so horribly overcrowded. His office had about five people in it and his had an equal number. He had to go out in the corridor to get any privacy. I recall that the message was [118] fouled up somehow and did not contain the exact form which we expected and Kramer remarked, "You always count on those monkeys to do something that you don't expect." That is a little off from what he told me. That is my recollection getting mixed up in that. And Kramer now is not certain whether the United States was specifically mentioned or not, but it is certain there was a "winds" execute message which we were expecting and that it came in the middle of the week before Pearl Harbor. I wouldn't say exactly what date. In fact, I had to check up some outgoing messages to make sure whether it was Thursday or Friday and Kramer couldn't remember whether it was Wednesday or Thursday.

Kramer informed me that no written copy was furnished the Admiralty and no written copy was distributed in the Navy Department in the customary manner because Admiral Noyes had given specific orders not to do so and that he would handle dissemination of this message himself.

I would like to add, McCollum's message of warning was very long. The part referring to the "winds" message was very short but was the last item in the message.

That covers all the discrepancies on that I had any reason to correct.

Admiral HEWITT. You testified before Admiral Hart that:

The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the "winds" message when it should be sent. This was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, the broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the [119] continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The "winds" message was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the "winds" message was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations which were listening for it.

Now the question is: What was the frequency and time of day and the condition of radio propagation which resulted in the message being received only by one or two of the Navy stations on the East Coast of the United States?



Captain Safford. That is a question I cannot refer to, having no station log available. It now appears more likely that it was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than late the night before, because the watch officers who were on at that time only recollect the false "winds" message and not the true "winds" message. There is a possibility that it was heard by the Dutch at Java, although such information as I had available indicated the Dutch did not get it, and it also could have been heard by the Australians and may have been the basis of the story that was told to Senator Ferguson by the Australian Minister to this country, who was, I believe, Minister of National Defense in Australia at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

I can illustrate some of the vagaries of high frequency radio by two or three actual examples of about that time, if I may refresh my memory here.

Before giving these examples, I would like to state that radio communications over long distances in a north-south direction is much easier and more reliable than in an east-west direction, and our reception of the [120] Tokyo radio was always in an east-west direction.

The long fourteen-part Tokyo serial number 902 or JD serial 7143 was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. This message, incidentally, was received by Radio San Francisco. Part 2 of this message and the message immediately before, which was Tokyo serial number 904 or JD serial 7144, were also copied at Cheltenham, Maryland, were forwarded to the Navy Department by telegraph, and were used for the actual description of those messages. This is verified in the GY log for 6 December 1941. The other thirteen parts of Tokyo serial number 902 were uncopiable at Cheltenham, that is, they were either not heard or were failing so hard they couldn't make an intelligible message. Part 2 of the very important part 3 Tokyo to Berlin, number 985, JD serial 6943, that was dated around the 1st of December, were missed, but the first and third parts were copied solid. Incidentally, this came from England and not from this country.

As I have stated earlier in my testimony, we had to call on Corregidor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits as the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii, and England could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage.

I would like to add that all hands had been very nervous about our ability to receive this "winds" execute when it should come in, because we were not certain of the power or the frequency, of the time or anything, and every day I would come in and I would ask Welker, in charge of GX, or the watch officer, if we had it and we would call the Army or they would call us to see if we had it, and I think on one occasion Kramer came down and said that Admiral Wilkinson wanted to know if there was any chance of our missing it and I told him then I didn't see how we could because there were so many stations, so widely scattered, listening for it. When the message first came [121] in to me, my heart sank like an elevator to think that the Japs really had the nerve to attack the United States, because as soon as I saw it, to me it was war and nothing else. And then later, particularly when I talked with Welker, we had a great sense of relief because the

thing had come in and we hadn't missed it. We had done our part properly. We had gotten the warning to higher authority and we were very thankful that we had put these East Coast stations on it, though it seemed like a wild goose chase. It was like the center fielder backing up the second baseman. It was a wild chance, but it paid us dividends. That was our feeling on the thing.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any record at all of what East Coast stations the message could have come in from or did come in?

Captain SAFFORD. We were intercepting foreign transmissions from Winter Harbor, Maine, which was a main intercept station and always attempting to copy Tokyo; Cheltenham, Maryland, which was also a main intercept station and guarding it regularly at that time; Jupiter, Florida, which is primarily a direction finder station but had an intercept unit attached; and Amagansett, Long Island, also a direction finder, but with an intercept unit attached.

Admiral HEWITT. You have no knowledge, then, of what station this message came in from?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no knowledge which station it came from, though I would give first guess to Cheltenham and second guess to Winter Harbor, because they had much better facilities than the others.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether the logs of these stations have been searched for any record of this message?

Captain SAFFORD. We searched for the logs of those stations and the Navy Department they had been destroyed during one of their numerous moves [122] and no record kept of them. They simply couldn't be found.

Admiral HEWITT. When was that search made?

Captain SAFFORD. This search was made in November or December 1943, and again in the spring of 1944—I wouldn't place that any closer—after we got notice that Admiral Hart would conduct his investigation. The logs of Winter Harbor, Maine, were destroyed in the spring of 1943 simply to make room; they destroyed everything for about six months back. Cheltenham's logs were destroyed when the intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved up to Chatham, Massachusetts, which was some time earlier than that. I cannot say offhand what happened to the logs of the other two stations, but they could produce nothing.

Admiral HEWITT. We have here in exhibit 65 four documents which are copies of weather messages which were intercepted by the FBI. They indicate war with Russia rather than war with the United States. What is your explanation of that?

Captain SAFFORD. I never saw these documents until the day or day before I went on the stand before the Navy Court of Inquiry under Admiral Murfin. The document number 1 was the information which Major Guest gave the FCC in requesting their cooperation. I did not know about this request or else had forgotten it completely. Welker might know something about it. Document number 2 was obviously a part of a true weather forecast and bears no relation to the "winds" execute we were expecting. However, it was telephoned in to Brotherhood and this is what he was referring to by the "win" message. Not having a copy of the message before our eyes, we were working at cross purposes there.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, one of you was referring to one message and the other to the other message, the one about Russia?

[123] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, to this one here.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood said he called Admiral Noyes and Admiral Noyes said, "That is a funny direction for the wind to blow from, isn't it?" and Brotherhood said, "Yes," and the Admiral said, "I don't think there is anything in it. Don't take any further action until tomorrow morning," and then Kramer took one look at it and said, "That is not what we want," and threw it in the wastebasket.

For the sake of the record, this was received—it was intercepted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, and was telephoned to Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, from the Washington office of the Federal Communications Commission. This message came in twelve hours or more after what I referred to as the true "winds" execute had been intercepted and received.

Now, document number 3 was intercepted by the FCC and telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, December 5, 1941. That also is apparently a part of a true weather forecast because it mentioned south and south did not come in as part of the "winds" code. We only had the three directions: north, east, and west. If it had been a "winds" code message, it would have referred to Russia because it does specifically mention north.

Admiral HEWITT. But does it follow the form which was specified for the "winds" code message in the dispatch which established that code as to the location of the reference in the broadcast, and so forth?

Captain SAFFORD. In document number 3 the reference to north wind does not follow the form or location specified in their set up, but, for that matter, neither did the true "winds" message. The Japanese followed that [124] one up, though I can't remember just how it was. I know in discussing it afterwards, Welker and I congratulated ourselves that we had required all plain language to be forwarded to Washington to be looked over here instead of telling the stations what to look for and relying on them to segregate true from false.

Admiral HEWITT. What is your recollection of the wording of the true message?

Captain SAFFORD. May I get into number 4 before I get into that?

Admiral HEWITT. Oh, yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Document number 4 is a true "winds" execute message, the way we expected to see it, but mentions England only. It was sent about twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, what is your recollection of the wording of the so-called true "winds" message?

Captain SAFFORD. My recollection was that they sent the voice form by Morse code and made some other departure from what was expected. Murray says that in addition they sent the negative form of "north wind cloudy."

Admiral HEWITT. That isn't quite clear to me. What do you mean there? You say they sent the negative form of the north wind. If that was south wind—

Captain SAFFORD. No, it wasn't south. The three winds were specifically named; that is, *Kita*, north, or Russia; *Nishi*, west, or England;

that included the Netherlands East Indies; and *Higashi*, east, or the United States. They had the other expressions in Japanese which accompanied these words in the voice form of the message.

The "winds" execute message as translated gave east wind, war with the United States; west wind, war with England, including N. E. and the [125] negative form of north wind, meaning no war with Russia, or which could have been interpreted as no war with Russia.

Admiral HEWITT. Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court record indicates that a "winds" code execute message relating to England was received and transmitted to Lieutenant Commander C. C. Dusenberry, U. S. Army Service Corps, at approximately 8 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, December 7, 1941. If a "winds" code execute message relating to the United States and England had been sent on December 4th, as previously testified, why was a "winds" code message relating to England alone sent on December 7th?

Captain SAFFORD. This message was broadcast about twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which had been announced on the radios of the world. It may have been to remind the Japanese consulates, and so forth, that Japan was still going to attack England, British possessions and it may have been to amplify the hidden word message received in Washington a little before 11 o'clock, Eastern Standard Time, December 7, 1941, which was translated differently by the Army and Navy but seemed to stop short of war. I am referring to Tokyo circular number 2494 or JD serial 7148.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you describe to me what is meant by hidden word code?

Captain SAFFORD. The hidden word code was set up by Tokyo circular number 2409, dated 27 November 1941, JD serial 6985, and subsequently added to by three or four other messages. It provided a means of sending out secret information in ostensibly plain language, certain words being given as a secondary or hidden meaning constituting the true message. This system was designated or indicated by adding the word "stop" in English as the last word of the message, whereas the rest of the message was in Japanese. The hidden word message of December 7th referred to had thirteen [126] words of text, exclusive of the indicator "stop" and the signal "Togo." Three of these words constituted the true message, namely *Koyanagi*, *Hattori*, *Minami*. This message was translated in such a hurry Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, that the third word, *Minami*, was overlooked and the message delivered to the Chief of Naval Operations and the President merely said, "Relations between Japan and England aren't in accordance with expectations." The Army translation was considerably stronger and added "America." We did not get this information until 1944. I do not know when the Army discovered that *Minami* had been omitted.

Admiral HEWITT. And the significance of *Minami* was United States?

Captain SAFFORD. United States. In fact, we didn't know it until the Army pointed it out to us. I would like to add one thing more. While the Japanese set up a very elaborate system for reporting military movements, declarations of war, smuggling of critical materi-

and so forth, this one message is the only time that I recall that they ever used the hidden word code.

Admiral HEWITT. It was not used, then, so far as you know——

Captain SAFFORD. So far as I can recall offhand, it was never used again. If it were, it was nothing important and it was just lost in the maze.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, thank you very much, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. May I add one more thing to this hidden word?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes. Add anything that you think would be pertinent and of value.

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to add this: The hidden word set up was translated by the Navy on December 2, 1941, and from that time on we could not be certain whether the Japanese decision as to peace or war would come in the hidden word code or in the "winds" message, and apparently [127] they used them both. As a matter of fact, they did use them both.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much, Captain.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:30 p. m., adjourned until 12:30 p. m. the next day.)



[128] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SEVENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 12:30 p. m., Tuesday, 22 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain KRAMER. Alwin D. Kramer, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your duty or assignment in 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I was attached to Op-16, Far Eastern Section, but working in Op-20-G.

Admiral HEWITT. Under Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And you were the head of the Translation Section?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, Op-20-GZ.

Admiral HEWITT. And on some occasion you evaluated messages as well as translated them, evaluated them as to their possible importance?

Captain KRAMER. For information I expressed my opinion on them, yes, sir, which can be construed as an evaluation. The evaluation was normally done by Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my opinion about it, too.

Admiral HEWITT. You were in this section that was headed by Captain Safford, but you were also responsible, I believe, to Captain McCollum of ONI?

[129] Captain KRAMER. I was primarily responsible to Captain McCollum of ONI, yes, sir. That arrangement may seem a little unusual, but it was one that had been in effect since the early 20's for several reasons. One was since all the language talent available in the Navy at that time were language officers who had been to Tokyo in that three year language course and as a result were well known to the Japanese and were normally in social contact with the Japanese in town here, naval attaches and assistants and the embassy people, it was felt preferable to have them attached to the office of Naval Intelligence than to a section of Naval Communications. That was one reason. There were a number of others.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes. Well, that is very logical. Exhibit 63, 64, and 65 of the Naval Court's record and exhibit 13 of this record—have you had an opportunity to examine those?

Captain KRAMER. I looked at them briefly yesterday afternoon, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to ask you if you can identify messages in exhibit 63 and exhibit 64 which establish or give the name of the code called "winds" code.

Captain KRAMER. There are two messages in 63, numbers 13 and 15. Both concern the setting up of that plain language so-called "winds" code, one applicable to Morse code transmission, the other to voice broadcast. In exhibit 64 there is also one that I saw in 1941, namely, number 2. The dispatch marked number 3 from ALUSI, Batavia, I do not recall having seen.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what steps were taken to listen for and monitor any message using the "winds" code?

Captain KRAMER. I was familiar only in a general way with [130] allocations of circuits to be monitored by our intercept system and the Army intercept system. I do know that because of considerable interest in this particular "winds" code message, an unusually wide coverage was directed; but regarding the details of which stations were so ordered to watch for it, I cannot give any testimony from first-hand knowledge.

Admiral HEWITT. Are you familiar with the messages in exhibit 64 setting up the so-called hidden word code? If so, will you explain what this code was?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I am familiar with these messages marked number 6 in exhibit 13. As the messages themselves indicate, it was a system set up by the Japanese Foreign Office where, in the case of disruption of encoded traffic, they could make use of plain language words to get across hidden meanings as set forth in the code. We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic at the time the thing was set up, which was about the end of November, but traffic did not appear in this system until the 7th of December, and the latter part of December, '41.

Admiral HEWITT. How was the use of the hidden word code indicated in a message?

Captain KRAMER. That we did not know until the first traffic appeared. Based on experience, we assumed that it would be an innocuous sounding Japanese Romaji message.

Admiral HEWITT. I think in one of those messages, at least, if my recollection is correct, it says look for the hidden meaning if the English word "stop" is used at the end of the message instead of the Japanese word.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct. That refreshes my memory now. I remember, now that you remind me of it, that these reams of plain language traffic that we were getting in several weeks before Pearl Harbor were searched [131] for that indicator. They were, however, I didn't recall specifically because I didn't do the searching. It was done by the GY watch officers.

Admiral HEWITT. I believe that about the middle of the first week of December there was a teletype message which, to the best of my recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that, to the best of your recollection?



Captain KRAMER. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of thinking it over since that time. I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of '44. However, after being given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 7 December '41, I believe about the middle of the week 1-7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the *qui vive* about for a week or ten days. That is the last I saw of such a message.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Captain KRAMER. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message. The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, "*Higashi no kaze ame*," specifically referring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now than I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on that is the fact that [132] in thinking it over, I have a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches from the fleet commanders or going out to them from Operations.

Admiral HEWITT. Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view of that, there was no indication—

Captain KRAMER. I would like to continue that statement, Admiral, by saying: For that reason, I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

Admiral HEWITT. Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?

Captain KRAMER. I just don't recall.

Admiral HEWITT. Reference to one or more of the messages supplied by the FCC is in exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of those may have been seen by you?

Captain KRAMER. This document 1 is not a message and document 4 is the one of the 8th of December about midnight GMT. I may have seen these specific messages. I cannot be certain, however, because we saw a great many messages of this kind in looking for this particular type of "winds" code message. When we started monitoring all Japanese plain language some weeks before Pearl Harbor, the volume of material coming in was simply tremendous, swamping. We had only three linguists at the time for translation purposes, with a pretty heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the negotiations. Consequently, we felt the extra burden or having to scan all this Japanese plain language stuff and there were many instances of [133] weather occurring in that, but because of the fact that the particular code thing we were looking for, we felt it was incumbent on us to ex-

amine it all. The reason I cannot state specifically that these particular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the same nature as many I did see.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall any message which arrived in the forenoon of 7 December using the hidden word code?

Captain KRAMER. I didn't recall it until I looked over these exhibits yesterday afternoon. I had been under the impression since the beginning of last summer that it was a "winds" message.

Admiral HEWITT. The one you saw, this hidden word, you decided that was the message—

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. Now that I have reexamined the exhibits, I recognize that as being a hidden word message.

Admiral HEWITT. My understanding is that when that was decoded, the word *minami*, which related to the United States, was overlooked, so that the translation merely referred to England. Is that your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. Last summer when that question of the morning of 7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my recollection had been that it was a "winds" message. It wasn't until I saw the exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection was refreshed to the extent that I thought it was one of these hidden word messages rather than the "winds." I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the fifteen-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thank you to the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff for another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the United States.

Admiral HEWITT. I show you a copy of a Tokyo dispatch dated 7 December and ask if you can identify it.

Captain KRAMER. I believe this is the one I saw that morning, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you read it for the benefit of the record?

Captain KRAMER. It is a message from Tokyo to the legation in Panama, classified urgent, serially numbered as a circular number 2494, the initial 9 in that figure group indicating circular, and reading

*Koyanagi rifiyori seirinotugoo arunituki hattori minami kinebunko seturitu ktkino kyokaingaku sikyuu denpoo aritast stop—Togo.*

It is to be noted that this is a "stop" message; therefore of the hidden word code. My recollection of the handling of this particular message that morning was as I have earlier indicated and on seeing this message now, my recollection tends to [135] be confirmed in that the initial word of the message referred to England. The fifth word of the message referred to estranged relations. May I have my previous answer read.

(The former answer referring to this message was read.)

Now on seeing the message, I can see that the initial word refers to England and the seventh word of the message, at the beginning of the second line, refers to the estranged relations. It was on the basis of those two words that I hastily dictated something to go along with the folder I was already on my way out with and did not note the omission in translation of an additional code word appearing in this message until return to the office and reexamination of the morning's traffic an hour or more later. My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring back to document 11 of exhibit 13 there, can you identify that as the original translation which you made that you dictated hurriedly?

[136] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I do. In this connection, however, I might add that I do have a recollection of making an insertion in, I believe, the file copy of this message of the words "United States," with a view to making a distribution of a corrected copy, but that no actual corrected copy was distributed because of the attack taking place about 1:30.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall, during the latter part of December, '41, during the absence of Secretary Knox, assembling a collection of intercepted traffic bearing on Pearl Harbor and discussing this with Mr. Forrestal?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I do.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall whether or not this message of 7 December, this hidden word message of 7 December, was among that group of messages?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot specifically recall, Admiral, but I am almost certain that it was. We broke out a sizeable folder of that

traffic for Mr. Forrestal, and I recall going through it rather hastily in the course of three-quarters of an hour or so, giving him the general tenor of the way the things shaped up from this traffic because of the fact that Mr. Forrestal hadn't normally seen this material before that time.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to the so-called one p. m. message document 41 of exhibit 63, which you have previously mentioned, would you tell me what you remember about delivery of that message?

Captain KRAMER. I have already touched on what took place in my office as regards the haste of getting this out to recipients on my return from the State Department about 10:30. While the folders for recipients were being made up, I recall drawing a navigator's time circle to see if this one p. m. Washington time tied up at all with the developments in the [137] Malay area, which we had been following in considerable detail the previous week. I recall being impressed with the fact that one p. m. here was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where we knew the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Bharu with the connivance of the Thaiian Chief of Staff. That further tied up with the movement of a large Japanese convoy down the coast of China the previous three or four days. For that reason, I felt that on the way over to the State Department it might be well to point that out for Mr. Knox's benefit, and when the folder for Mr. Knox was turned over to Mr. Hull's private secretary, I did point that out and repeated that material to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office with a similar folder for Mr. Stimson as well as Mr. Hull.

Admiral HEWITT. Then you knew the fact that this particular time was before daylight in the Far East but shortly after daylight in the Hawaiian area was significant?

Captain KRAMER. My mention of the time 7:30 at Pearl Harbor was incidental in passing this explanation on for Mr. Knox's benefit. I mentioned that point too because of the fact that I had just completed two years sea duty operating out of Pearl Harbor, was thoroughly familiar with the 10½ time zone, and more or less automatically inserted Hawaiian time into that time circle.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you call the attention of any one else to the significance of this time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I think that I repeated that item perhaps to eight or ten different people, including people in my office, I believe Commander McCollum, and I am not certain but possibly to Admiral Wilkinson; several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton, and, I think, Captain Safford. But I don't believe that I mentioned it specifically, [138] although again I may have, on delivery to the CNO's office.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to refer you now to the intercepted Japanese messages which referred to ships and the location of ships in Pearl Harbor, in particular documents 14, 15, 22, and 24 of exhibit 13. The notations on those messages indicate whether they were intercepted by the Army or the Navy and give the times of translation.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you explain or discuss the time lag between the dates of the interception and the dates of translation of these messages?

Captain KRAMER. Numbers 14, 15, and 24 are Army translations. Number 22 was a Navy translation which, however, was intercepted by an Army intercept station, station number 7. Date of origin was 3 December; date of translation 11 December. I recall seeing this message for the first time Monday morning, the 8th of December. In view of what had happened the previous day and further in view of the rather badly garbled and partly unrecovered form of the message we had, it took about two days before this translation was completed. At that time, namely, when the translation was completed, a message giving the essential points in it was sent to Pearl Harbor or was sent to CinCPac, suggesting that it be passed on to the District Intelligence Officer. Even in this form here, there are several gaps and undecipherable spots, after having worked on it for a couple of days and comparing additional copies of this message with the one we were working on.

Admiral HEWITT. Would some of the time lag possibly have been due to the volume of traffic which was being intercepted and decoded?

Captain KRAMER. I will refer specifically to number 22 again, but I think it applies to all four of those. The time lag in the case of message number 22, the so-called "lights" message, between the date of origin [139] and the date we got it I cannot account for specifically, but can give this background on this type of code. The machine systems, when the key had been recovered and was being used again, were usually very promptly decoded, a case in point being the previous afternoon, when between 3 o'clock in the afternoon and about 8:30 in the evening thirteen parts of that fourteen-part note were coming in at intervals and the whole job was completed, as regards decrypting, translation, and typing, by 9 o'clock, when I commenced delivery after calling Admiral Wilkinson. In the case of the codes, however, as compared with these machine ciphers, it depended on the volume of traffic whether or not a key for that day's traffic was broken. Sometimes, with luck, a day with a small amount of traffic could be broken. Many days, however, never were broken. This particular exhibit 22, I can't state from first-hand knowledge whether such factors entered into the delay or whether the delay was due to lag between time of origin and transmission by the Japanese consulate or lag between time of intercept and delivery here.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any other information which has not been brought out before which you think would be interesting or pertinent to this investigation.

Captain KRAMER. I think that I have covered my part of this thing fairly completely, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[140] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. George W. Linn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. What duty were you assigned during 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. I was in OP-20GY, which was a decrypting section of the Communications Intelligence Section, and I was assigned, I think it was probably about February or March—a watch was started, a twenty-four hour watch started, and I was assigned to

that watch and later became the senior officer of that watch. At that time, maybe a month or so, before December 7th, I was taken off the watch list and put on days, principally for decrypting reasons. I have more experience than most of the others and Captain Safford was to be sure we would get the keys in this machine cipher as soon as possible during the night so that we would have them the next morning. So that took me off the watch list. Then—I am not sure of this date—a couple of days before the 7th of December we started Christmas leaves and one of our watch officers started his leave. I went on the watch list in his place, and that put me on watch from 1600 to 2400 on the 6th.

Admiral HEWITT. How many watch officers were there stationed at that watch during the first week in December?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Well, at the early part of the first week there were the four watch officers, including the one that I replaced. I was about the 4th or 5th on—I am not sure about this date—there were three others besides myself.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you give me their names?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherton [141] Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, all Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you know of the existence of the "winds" code at the time?

Lieutenant Commander ETA shrdl

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Well, I saw the translations of the document that set up the "winds" code and I knew that steps were taken to get the raw material in and the watch was assigned the task of looking over that raw material outside of normal working hours. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who was in Op-20GZ at that time, handled himself during the day, anything that came in during normal working hours. At night the watch looked over this raw material. It came in mainly from the West Coast, plain language Japanese; came in by teletype.

Admiral HEWITT. Then if anything came in on that subject, it would have been seen by you or one of the officers that you have mentioned.

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Yes. If it had come in outside of normal working hours, some one of the officers should have seen it. I myself have no knowledge of it. I will say this, that we wouldn't of necessarily know about it—

Admiral HEWITT. But one of you—

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. If it did come in. But the man who received it would.

Admiral HEWITT. What I am trying to bring out is it must have gone through one of the officers that you mentioned, one of those watch officers, outside of working hours; is that right?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. That is right.

Admiral HEWITT. And Commander Kramer during the day?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Yes. Well, he was in during the evening shift. [142] It is pretty hard to draw the line. Commander Kramer worked sometimes as late as 9 o'clock. It is pretty hard to draw the line at 1630.

Admiral HEWITT. What I am trying to bring out is if an executive message having to do with that "winds" code had come in, it would have been seen by at least one of those officers?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Yes, if Commander Kramer wasn't there at the time. We were the GY watch and we had the responsibility for anything that came in if it came in through Naval Communications or anything else. The only way in which they might not would be if something came in at 8 o'clock and he just took the raw material and handed it to Commander Kramer without looking it over.

Admiral HEWITT. Then Commander Kramer would have seen it?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. He would have had it himself. That is right.

Admiral HEWITT. Are you able to state positively that you never saw any intercept which used the code words indicating the breaking of relations with the United States or war with the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Prior to December 7th, yes. I have seen the one from the FCC, but that was afterward. That was a part of the previous investigation. I didn't see anything before that I remember. My memory in some phases of this is good and others not too good at all. I knew nothing about the FCC being mixed up in this until at the time of the inquiry, when I saw that copy.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[143] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Francis M. Brotherhood, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. It appears from previous testimony that during 1941 you were connected with the security section of Naval Communications in Washington and that you have some knowledge of the so-called "winds" code. What were your duties in 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Admiral, I was one of the watch officers in charge of the decryption and preparation of diplomatic dispatches, especially the Japanese.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you tell us what you know about the "winds" code and the efforts to monitor for the "winds" code? State what your understanding of the "winds" code is and what steps were taken to listen for a message using that code.

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Some time in the month of November, Admiral, we got a dispatch which we succeeded in breaking out, that told us that the Japanese were planning to inform their consular officials around the world by voice radio from Tokyo to the effect that they intended to break relations with certain countries, among them the United States, Russia, and Great Britain. I don't remember whether any one else was included. It would be in the way of a weather broadcast. A certain weather expression was to indicate that Japan planned to break diplomatic relations with the United States, and another expression meant that they planned to break with Great Britain, and still another that they planned to break with Russia. As one of the watch officers through whom they hoped to have the message transmitted to the authorities at the Navy Department, I had been [144] drilled as to what to watch for and had very specific instructions as to how to handle any such dispatch that was intercepted.

In connection with the intercept facilities, I wasn't a part of the people that set up the intercept organization, but it was my understanding at the time that whatever facilities the Navy had that could be diverted to the reception of voice signals as against conventional

radio telegraphic signals had been diverted and had been set up for the purpose. We regarded the possible intercept of such an exercise order as being of great importance. We had been instructed further that the FCC had been informed of what we were looking for, that under certain circumstances we might hear from them, and the Army, who was working this diplomatic project with us jointly, and my understanding at the time was that they were also diverting certain facilities in an effort to get this broadcast. That is the background, as I understand it.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall what, if any, messages were received using this "winds" code?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. I was on duty there the evening I believe it was, the 4th of December—I rightly don't remember this moment whether it was the 4th or the 5th—when the FCC called and asked for some one to whom they could deliver a certain dispatch and the officer of the FCC at the other end indicated to me something that I understood what he was driving at, and I said, "I am authorized to take it," and I did so and it was an expression that just didn't quite fit the code. In other words, it was not what we were looking for. I would say not what we were looking for. In other words, it did not indicate that we might expect a break in relations on the part of Japan with the United States, but it was suggestive of a break in relations with Russia. However, as I remember the [145] dispatch in question, without refreshing my memory here, it was accurate in its fitting the formula insofar as Russia was concerned. At the time, I myself was not in position to evaluate the value of the dispatch. I had only my orders to pass it on, which I did. However, I did so with a reservation in my own mind that it was not fitting the formula setting up this dispatch.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you examine this exhibit number 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and see if any of those fits the message which you just described?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. This one (indicating) is somewhat like the message that I have just described, although this is in English a translation of what I actually received.

Admiral HEWITT. That is document number 1?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. This is document number 1.

Admiral HEWITT. Look at the others also. What about document number 2? Could that have been the message to which you referred?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. That doesn't strike me, Admiral Hewitt, as being the one.

Admiral HEWITT. Number 1 to which you refer is not a message but it might be the code?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir, but that was the point made, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I will rephrase the question. Document number 2, then, as I understand it, refers to the north wind, but in referring to the north wind, it did not follow the form which had been more or less specified in the message that set up the "winds" code, is that correct?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir. That was the impression I had at the time.



[146] Admiral HEWITT. Will you discuss to whom this message was delivered?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Admiral Hewitt, my instructions were to first get in touch with the communication watch officers upstairs and pronounce the words that I had heard from whoever sent them to me, in this case the FCC, and I would receive further instructions. The communication watch officer instructed me in these words: "You want to see the Admiral." I called the Admiral on the telephone directly and without delay got him on the other end of the wire and told him verbally what I had received. The reaction on the part of Admiral Noyes, who was then the Director of Naval Communications, was that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction, and he used words to that effect. As I said, when I telephoned this thing through, I didn't think personally, although I was not supposed to think in the matter—I didn't think it was in the nature of an execute. Admiral Noyes further gave me to believe from what I heard him say over the telephone—I can't quote his words, but the impression I got was, however he would pass the information on for what it was worth.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall what conversation you had with Captain Safford concerning this?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Admiral Hewitt, I haven't had my memory refreshed on that conversation, although Captain Safford says that I called him that morning and told him such a dispatch had arrived. That was in accordance with my instructions, too.

Admiral HEWITT. But you can't remember now actually whether you did it or what was said?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. No, sir. If I hadn't seen Captain Safford here a half hour ago, I wouldn't be able to say that I had called him, but Captain Safford said I did and I believe I had called him.

[147] Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall ever seeing any message which referred to the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. No, Admiral, I do not.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you give me the names of the other officers who stood the same watch that you did?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir. I relieved Lieutenant Commander Linn, Lieutenant Commander George Linn, at midnight—well, 1201, December 7th—and I was relieved in turn by Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering some time after 7 the same morning, and the other officer, whom I did not see that day, was Lieutenant Commander Murray. I don't remember his initials.

Admiral HEWITT. Were there any officers who stood watch earlier?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Well, sir, we had another member of the group. There were five of us. The other member of the group managed to get in his Christmas vacation that week—I mean his annual leave—so he was not present, and that was Lieutenant Commander Brown.

Admiral HEWITT. The only other officer besides those you have mentioned who would have direct knowledge of such messages or through whom such messages would pass would be Commander Kramer, is that right?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Well, Commander Kramer should certainly be considered, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. As I understand it, he would have the message that came in during the day and one of these watch officers, or you watch officers, would be sure to see any messages that came during the night outside of working hours. Is that correct?

Lieut Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir. That would also be true during the day time. We had a teletype set up there in which all this if it was intercepted by any of the outside stations, was being transmitted to us.

[148] Admiral HEWITT. I think that is all then. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Alfred V. Pering, Lieutenant Commander USNR.

Admiral HEWITT. What were your duties during 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. I was the watch officer in Op-20G.

Admiral HEWITT. And you were carrying out that duty during the first week in December, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Who were the other watch officers?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, Lieutenant Commander Murray, Lieutenant Commander Linn. At that time there was a four section watch.

Admiral HEWITT. You knew of the existence of the "winds" of communication?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Yes, sir. We had instructions to look for a certain set of conditions in plain language Japanese which was intercepted.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you ever see any intercept using that which referred to the breaking of relations with the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. I did not, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you see any referring to breaking relations with any other nation?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. No, I saw none.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[149] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Frederick L. Freeman, Lieutenant, US Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What were your duties during 1941, Mr. Freeman?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. I was in the section that was identified as section GI of Intelligence, which was a correlating section and disseminating section. We disseminated intelligence received by us from field radio intelligence units to ONI. We wrote up our own reports on the basis of information sent to us and delivered them to ONI.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you stand a watch in connection with your duties?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. We had been on a watch basis, sir, for a month, I would say—I don't recall exactly how long, but it was about that long—before Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. What other officers shared that watch with you during the first week of December, 1941?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Lieutenant M. W. Lyon, Chief Yeoman—he is Ensign now—Nine, and Chief Yeoman Stalter.

Admiral HEWITT. You were acquainted with the so-called “winds” code then?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Yes, sir, I was.

Admiral HEWITT. What do you know about the efforts made to monitor, intercept, a message referring to that code or in that code?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Well, I am aware that we made every effort. We were expecting the signal to execute and I know that every effort was made, all stations were alerted to listen for it; but from personal knowledge I don't know that we ever actually got the signal.

[150] Admiral HEWITT. You never knew personally of any intercept?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall what discussions you may have had with Captain Safford concerning this?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. I had a discussion with Captain Safford some time last year about it and he was requesting me as to my memory of the circumstances, as to whether or not we had gotten such a message. I was standing duties adjacent to the section that was responsible for decrypting, and so forth, at that time and we worked fairly closely with them and he thought that I might personally recall having seen the message executing.

Admiral HEWITT. But you never did?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. I never did, no, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)



[151] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

EIGHTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 23 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Admiral HEWITT. Careful consideration has been given to the evidence concerning the so-called "winds" message with a view to determining whether or not Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN, formerly Director of Naval Communications, should be called as a witness. It appears from the testimony of Captain Safford that he *thought* that a "winds" message relating to the United States was received about 4 December 1941 and was shown to him by Captain Kramer and a watch officer and then delivered to Admiral Noyes. It appears from the testimony of Captain Kramer that he believes that there was some such message at about that time, but that he cannot recall whether or not it referred to the United States, and he is under the impression that it referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it *may* have referred to the United States also. Captain Kramer believed that the message in question was delivered to Admiral Noyes. There is yet no other evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the United States was received.

Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such message and that he did not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although he had some recollection of a "false alarm." Accordingly, I find that no useful purpose would be served [152] by calling Admiral Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in this record. This decision will be reconsidered should further evidence be developed indicating that a useful purpose would be served by reexamining Admiral Noyes.

(The extracts of testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, follow.)

[153] EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LEIGH NOYES BEFORE NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY

37. Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which has been familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to examine it and state whether you had seen this document on or after the date of its translation, which is noted in the right-hand corner as being 28 November 1941?

A. Yes.

38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document when it was brought to your attention?

A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations at this point.

39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these steps to get intercepts from your stations, will you state whether any of the code words appearing in document 15 were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or plain English?

A. They were not.

40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2 and Document No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications Commission. I want to know whether you were ever acquainted with the information contained in the intercepts prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941.

A. I have no recollection of ever having seen this document.

41. Q. Either 2 or 3—either document?

A. No, sir.

42. Q. Had you ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3 prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge.

43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an officer in your Division made any telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter contained in the intercepts of document 15, that you have previously been shown?

A. No.

44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, having been informed by some officer in the Navy Department that there had been received in the Navy Department certain information about winds, and that your reply was, "The wind seems to be blowing in a certain direction," or words to that effect? Do you have any recollection of such a conversation?

A. I do not."

78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was there brought to your attention a dispatch that had been prepared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Eastern Division in which there was a summary or resume of intelligence information to be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

[154] A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communication intelligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence. I told him that in my opinion estimates of the situation should come from the Chief of Naval Operations.

79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not.

80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department in regard to releasing this dispatch?

A. I cannot. I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except that they were properly released.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was prepared and being considered for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, do you remember whether any reference was made to the winds code system?

A. I do not.

82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office in the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execution signal was received?

A. We had a special 24-hour watch for all communication intelligence messages.

83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words and phrases which were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal?

A. I couldn't say.

84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and these had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would be particularly anxious to know of this execution signal.

earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was established?

A. No, I couldn't say.

85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that the execution of the winds code system was received and that a thorough search in the Navy Department files had failed to receive a copy of the execution signal. Would the Director of Naval Communications files be the normal place in which the record would be kept?

A. If it was received by naval means, yes; if not, no.

86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of the Director of Naval Communications the normal repository of such messages?

[155] A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the Office of Naval Intelligence.

87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been received by naval intercepting means and therefore the record of this message would naturally be kept in the files of the Director of Naval Communications, would it not?

A. Yes.

88. Q. Can you explain why this document is missing from the files of the Director of Naval Communications?

A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think that any such message was received by naval means.

89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form of the winds message? Is that the way you want to leave your testimony on that subject?

A. That is right; yes.

136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of the "Winds Message": Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant Commander Kramer came in with the execute of the "Winds Message" and said, "Here it is"?

A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which afterwards turned out not to be correct. That information was taken to mean that an execute of this "Winds Message" had been received. It turned out not to be correct.

141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form." I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just testified that you received some information. From where did this information come?

A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, that there was a false alarm about it.

142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that particular subject, did it?

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.

143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution of the "Winds Message"; is that right?

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so-called "Winds Message" was finally received.

Reexamined by the court:

144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

[156] 145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

146. Q. Yes.

A. No.

147. Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message from Alusna Batavia to OpNav, No. 081080, and ask you whether or not you have seen that dispatch, or whether you recognize it, and if so, at what time did you see it?

A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it.

149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court, please?

A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department."

150. Q. And continue for the first three lines.

A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end."

151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations?

A. It was his interpretation apparently of the same message that had already been received.

152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the War Department of the Japanese code would have reached about the same conclusion, in that they had the same words to work from?

A. This was not necessarily—

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the following statement: I call the court's attention to the fact that this was not a translation made in the War Department. This came from Batavia that way.

The witness made the following statement: Somebody in Batavia had given that information.

153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same code system which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the "Winds Code" system?

A. Probably. We discussed it with the War Department. They did not have much confidence, as I remember it, in the information from there as against rechecking that was done in Washington.

154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds Message" was received; that is, who gave it to you?

A. No.

155. Q. But you do recollect that you did hear about the execution of this broadcast 7 December 1941?

A. It has been stated and it has been testified to that there were six copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my recollection for three years back as against my assistants. These people who handled the details were subordinates, and their recollection of details is probably better than mine.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it, what this report of the execution of the "Winds Message" was?

A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe there have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that it was not finally found to be correct.

157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Admiral, is the wording of the report which you received and which later you determined to be false?

A. I don't know.

158. Q. Do you know from whom it was received?

A. I don't.

[158] Two witnesses entered and each was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Leo Reierstad, Lieutenant Commander USNR.

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Joseph M. Conant, Lieutenant (jg) USNR.

Admiral HEWITT. Lieutenant Commander Reierstad, what are your duties?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. I am in charge of the translating unit Op-16FE.

Admiral HEWITT. That involves translating Japanese?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What are your qualifications in Japanese?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Well, I am a graduate of the Naval School of Oriental Languages and Japanese language and then I had nine years of residence in China, during which time I studied Chinese, which, of course, has some relation to the Japanese language as far as the written form is concerned.



Admiral HEWITT. Lieutenant Conant, will you answer the same questions with regard to your duties and qualifications?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. I am a translation sub-section head under Lieutenant Commander Reierstad and my qualifications are solely that I graduated from the Boulder Language school.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you examined this exhibit number 14, which I present to you?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. This looks like the one that we had and actually examined.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you examine it closely enough to tell whether this is the same one or a copy of it? This is a photographic copy.

[159] Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you state whether this is the one that you looked over to translate?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, that is the one.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I present you with exhibit number 4 and ask you to testify if the printed part of the exhibit, with the additional pencil notations, is your translation of the exhibit number 14?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. It is.

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. How does your translation compare in general with this exhibit number 3?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. This (referring to exhibit number 3) we haven't examined prior to this time, sir. Admiral, I point out here, sir, that this translation, which is a possibly correct one, also might be translated "establish position." I should like to make clear that the time element, whether it is past, present, or future, is not definitely ascertainable from the characters as appearing here.

Admiral HEWITT. That would also be true where this caption is "enemy ship sunk" in exhibit 3 and in exhibit 14 it is "attack and sink"?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. That is also true. Simply on the basis of the original Japanese it is not possible to say definitely whether it is past or future action. "Attack and sink enemy battleship" could be correct, or "enemy ship attacked and sunk" would also be correct, in our opinion.

Admiral HEWITT. I call your attention to the fact that the entrance channel is marked here by rings through a lighthouse here and through the Sugar Mill stack at Waihapu, that a vessel entering the channel at these [160] outer buoys should be on this range (indicating). Will you confirm my idea that possibly this notation "position established" could be a note to get on that range at that point?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. I would say definitely. Wouldn't you, Conant?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, I would say that.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you state the date on which you last looked over exhibit 4 and added the pencil notations?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. 22 May was the last time we handled this chart and put our final remarks on.

Admiral HEWITT. Are you willing to certify as to the accuracy of this translation within the limitations of tense which you have already expressed?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. And we would like to add within limitations of this being a photostatic copy and certain parts of being impossible for us to accurately discern.

Admiral HEWITT. But to the extent that there is a translation on exhibit 4 it is accurate?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes sir.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, your translation is not complete but what you have translated is correct?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir, with the further qualification of course, that the Admiral just made, that we cannot undertake to state whether this is past or future tense.

Admiral HEWITT. In the book "Battle Report" on page 26 there is a statement, referring to this chart or another photographic copy of the same chart: "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the evidence [161] of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw with my own eyes!'" Could you find anything on this chart which might be the basis for that statement, any notation on this chart?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. In this connection, sir, all we can say is on the basis of the photo copy made available to us for examination there is no evidence we have been able to locate of any Japanese writing that could be so translated.

Admiral HEWITT. Calling your attention to the notations which are in ink near the times 0115 and 0410, one is translated as "fight". Could that possibly refer to the initiation of a general attack at zero hour for an attack?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. In my opinion, it definitely could.

Lieutenant (j. g.) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. It is very possible, but again there is the way of saying whether that is a future action or a past action.

Admiral, there is just one idea that occurred to me, whether it might not be worthwhile in connection with this project to get the original and to also make from the original a study of the calligraphy which appears here in different places to establish first of all whether it was all written by the same man, if possible, whether some of it might not have been written in considerably greater haste. A good deal of information could be obtained from a study of that kind. Don't you think so, Joe?

Lieutenant (j. g.) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. The interesting thing here is, Admiral, that all of these signals appear to have been written in pencil. If anything had been fixed up in advance, I think that that happened would have been written on in ink, if we assume that these other things were also written [162] on in ink, well in advance. Also the question of the effect of what damage on some parts of the document as against the others which would make some of these stand out more clearly.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witnesses were excused.)

The investigation was then, at 2:30 p. m., adjourned until 11 a. m. Friday, 25 May 1945.

[163] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

NINTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 11 a. m., Friday, 25 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. You were Assistant Chief of Staff in the Operations Office of CinCPac?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Prior to 7 December 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. You are, of course, familiar with exhibit number 8 of the Naval Court's record, Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 on the security of Pearl Harbor. One of the assumptions is—

That a declaration of war may be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

And also at the end of the letter a statement was made that—

It must be remembered, too, that a single submarine's attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

Is that correct?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Exhibit 52 of the Court of Inquiry's record, which [164] is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, established the task groups then in effect?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Task forces, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. You can identify that?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Also we have exhibit 69A and B of the Court of Inquiry, which purport to be memoranda gotten up for the Commander-in-Chief by Captain, now Admiral, McMorris. Can you identify those from your recollection?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, that exhibit, those two memoranda, as I understand it, were somewhat in the nature of a check-off list of steps to be taken—

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir. They were given to the Duty Officer.

Admiral HEWITT. —a running check-off list of steps to be taken in case war was declared?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, before the Roberts Commission you stated that as far as you recalled, the question of an air raid on Pearl Harbor was not discussed between 27 November and 7 December. Is that in accordance with your memory?

Rear Admiral DELANY. You mean a surprise attack—

Admiral HEWITT. It says:

The possibility of an air raid on Pearl Harbor was not discussed between November and 7 December.

Rear Admiral DELANY. I take it that you mean a joint discussion as a matter within the Staff or personal discussion. "Never from the point of view of what happened"; yes, sir, I confirm that statement.

[165] Admiral HEWITT. The question was:

Had you any discussions between November 27 and December 7 as to the possibility of Japanese naval action or air action?

Never from the point of view of what happened.

Then the next question was:

The possibility was not discussed, the possibility of an air raid?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, that is still my—

Admiral HEWITT. But it was not specifically discussed after the rival of the war warning on November 27th?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, sir. The same answer there; not in the light of what happened, an attack of that nature.

Admiral HEWITT. What I was trying to bring out was whether the possibility of what actually did happen was discussed during that critical period from November 27th to December 7th in the Staff or Admiral Kimmel.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, within the Staff, even before that time, and when this order was formulated, it was stated in there that the possibility of an air raid existed; but with the information we had, it wasn't discussed as a matter that was actually going to happen. There always was a possibility of it.

Admiral HEWITT. About that time was an estimate of the Pacific situation made?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. In which various enemy courses of action were considered?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that in written form or was it just a mental estimate made by the Commander-in-Chief or some of the members of the Staff?

[166] Rear Admiral DELANY. Well, Admiral, I think that the war plans that came out of the Pacific Fleet, and I think must have been filed here, gave consideration to that.

Admiral HEWITT. The Pacific Fleet war plans.

Rear Admiral DELANY. There was a Rainbow plan and ship raid plans.

Admiral HEWITT. Let's refer to that.

Rear Admiral DELANY. I can't give you the contents of those plans after all this time, but I know there was a running estimate of the situation and plans based on those estimates.

**Admiral HEWITT.** You expect it to appear in the assumptions to the war plan, do you not?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** Yes, sir.

**Admiral HEWITT.** Looking at this Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1), they are general assumptions:

That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Elre), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

*Note:* As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account—

and other general assumptions of that nature, and one special assumption—

That the [167] Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

Now, I might read the following into the record, I think. In Chapter III, paragraph 1331, of this reference, the Estimate of Enemy Action includes the following:

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

- a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
- b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
- c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
- d. The principal defensive efforts to be:
  1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
  2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.
  3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

[168] b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probably main in Halmahera).

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval force in that area.

[169] e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

Those are the essential ones. Take this sub-paragraph "f" here: "Raider and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area."

That would seem to indicate that a raid on the Hawaiian area by forces other than submarines was not seriously contemplated then.

Rear Admiral DELANY. That is right; to the extent that it actually happened, that is correct, and I think it might be pertinent to say that I believe that that plan was submitted to the Navy Department, and approved by the Navy Department. I don't know the date because I am not familiar enough with the thing three years from then to now, but I know that those things were submitted to the Navy Department.

Admiral HEWITT. I read from the letter of distribution of this book:

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect pending the receipt of such approval.

You don't remember whether that—

Rear Admiral DELANY. I don't know that the thing was actually approved, but the concept of the whole thing was that it was to be approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, because it is intimate in that letter that approval hadn't yet been received and if the occasion arose before the approval was forthcoming, it would be placed in effect anyhow.

[170] Admiral HEWITT. So as to have something ready?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, I gather a picture of this, from reading your testimony and so forth, that you had a great many warnings of different sorts. You knew about that time that the relations were strained—there was a good deal in the papers about it, as I recall, and you had the messages of November 24th, particularly, and November 27th. The message of November 24th, with which you are undoubtedly familiar, was from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Naval Districts concerned. The one of the 24th was: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." This says any direction but puts emphasis on attack on the Philippines or Guam.

Do you recall what discussion was held of that and what other directions besides those indicated, the Philippines or Guam, were considered?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir. I think that the fact that the aircraft carriers were sent out to place planes on both Midway and Wake

and that patrol strength at Midway was increased is indicative of the fact that we thought that the attack would not probably be limited to the Philippines and Guam but it would extend farther to the eastward as far as Midway and Wake.

Admiral HEWITT. What made you feel that it might not be extended farther east or probably wouldn't be?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Well, Admiral, I think Intelligence indicated that there weren't any forces in that area.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you glance over these intelligence summaries [171] (exhibit 19) and see if you can recall whether those or something like that were the ones that were available to you?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, these are summarized in the daily conferences in which the Intelligence Officer of the fleet presented the—

Admiral HEWITT. The general tenor of those was that there was considerable movement of forces in the direction of Indo-China and the Kra Peninsula and to the south and southeastward generally but there might be some forces in the Mandates, particularly submarines.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. There was a question whether or not there might be a carrier unit there, is that correct?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And that the main body of the carriers was in home waters?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What did you generally understand out there by "home waters"?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Generally to the westward and southern of the Philippines and in the homeland itself.

Admiral HEWITT. Close to the homeland?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, then, you got this war warning dispatch on November 27th which contained the words, "Thit dispatch is considered a war warning," and went on, "The negotiations have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected in the next few days," and went on to mention these forces to the southeast. What was the general feeling out there as to what that dispatch meant? That was considered a war warning. Was that [172] taken particularly seriously?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Very definitely so, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I mean it meant more than the other warning dispatches that they had had before?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, and the operating forces at sea were all put on condition watches, darken ship, required to steam continuously in anti-submarine defense dispositions.

Admiral HEWITT. As a matter of fact, that had been the case for almost—

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, but it had been tightened up after this thing here.

Admiral HEWITT. Now as to the message addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, "Execute defense deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL 46." You had at that time two carrier task forces out there delivering planes?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral Hewitt. So that you did have some forces to the ward?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral Hewitt. But, as I understand it, there was nothing done in the matter of defensive deployment which was considered possible or necessary. Am I correct in that?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Well, so far as the relations between Army and Navy were concerned, there were conferences and I believe that the same concept existed then as existed previously, that the greatest danger in the Hawaiian area lay from submarine attack and sabotage in view of the intelligence information that we had.

Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether an attack of the nature which [173] actually was carried out was ever investigated carefully as a possible course of action? Was there an investigation which you figured out the distances and times necessary to cover the distance of a carrier running from the home waters—

Rear Admiral DeLANY. As I recall, it wasn't possible, between the time of the attack and the receipt of the war warning, in the event that the intelligence was correct about the fleet being in home waters.

Admiral Hewitt. Well, the home waters would have been anywhere in the home islands?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral Hewitt. Well, the evidence indicates that that force actually left the harbor up there at Etorofu Island on the 27th, which was the date of the war warning. I haven't laid this thing out myself yet to figure out the speeds and so forth, but apparently it demonstrated that it could be done. I just wondered if they had been laid down and thought of—

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir, I am sure—well, I know that the Operations Section and with the plans that had been put on a piece of paper.

Admiral Hewitt. That would have been McMorris's job, wouldn't it? He would have known the details of that and what study was made of it?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral Hewitt. Speaking of the conferences and so forth between the Army Staff and the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, also with C-14, FOURTEEN's I suppose, as to courses of action and defensive measures, did you have a staff command post or communications center or an operations room which was to be put into effect in case of strained relations, or was there ever an exercise, joint exercise carried out?

[174] Rear Admiral DeLANY. In all the exercises that were conducted prior to this, there was a joint setup as much as was possible with the facilities and communications and other requirements in effect, because as required by the Commander-in-Chief out there, there had been numerous air raid exercises and the Army's installation was fairly well complete, as I recall it, for their own particular control of planes, but the hookup into a central joint operational room had not been made.

Admiral Hewitt. Was it planned?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, there were complete plans for the installation of a complete warning net on the island and the joint



rangement up there in the caves in the hill was all down on paper and the thing was definitely an accomplished plan.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that include a command post, or whatever you want to call it, for ComFOURTEEN?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And CinCPac, too, if he was there?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, because the whole joint defense of the island was planned in those arrangements.

Admiral HEWITT. But it had never actually been tried out in an exercise?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Not with that installation as existed subsequent to the 7th of December, because there just weren't any materials available to establish this radar warning set hookup or anything like that. I think all the material was ordered according to plans, but it never had been delivered, never had been set up, by the 7th of December.

Admiral HEWITT. There is a lot of testimony through here in various places of efforts which were made to get the various things which were needed to improve the defenses. We have the letters which were written about the [175] deficiencies in defenses in the first part of 1941, the requests for planes; of course, the supply of additional planes, except in the operations, would not have been your function, but do you happen to know whether that was kept after, the importance of that was realized?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, I am positive of it. The Commander-in-Chief made a trip back here in the summer of '41. The thing was completely outlined in that, and I believe the records show the efforts that were made by everybody to get more planes, more anti-aircraft batteries, more communication facilities. We took pains to get officers who had been familiar with the defense of Great Britain out into the Islands to instruct and lecture and guide everybody in their island defense installations. That had been going on for months.

Admiral HEWITT. I recall a reply to the request for additional planes, made by the Navy Department, which stated in effect that the planes weren't available. Was any reason ever given for the non-availability of these planes, why they weren't available? Was it because they did not exist or because they were distributed elsewhere?

Rear Admiral DELANY. As I recall it, it is the latter case; they were being distributed elsewhere.

Admiral HEWITT. And shortly after the attack took place, additional planes were sent very promptly, is that correct?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes. There was no question of their ability to deliver planes to us after the 7th of December.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall where those came from?

Rear Admiral DELANY. They came from continental United States. I don't know where they started out from initially, sir. That same thing is true of [176] a lot of material that wasn't available before the 7th of December, that flowed out to us out here.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to Exhibit 8 of the Naval Court's record, Assumption B, that indicates that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor is possible, does it not?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. And that letter was issued on October 14, 1941.

Rear Admiral DELANY. I believe that the letter was originally issued in March or April, 1941, because reference (a) is PacFleet let 2CL-41. "Reference (a) is revised herewith." This is a revision. The original order, which was almost identical with this, was issued, I believe, in March, 1941.

Admiral HEWITT. And this revision was issued on October 14, 1941.

Rear Admiral DELANY. That is what the date says; yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. So that from the date of the first letter up to and including October 14, 1941, I take it it was an assumption that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, I think it is correct to say that.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether there was any written estimate or assumption made after October 14, 1941, which changed or modified that assumption in any way?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, because I think it was as correct in March, 1941, or October, 1941, as it is on the 25th of May, 1945.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains communication intelligence summaries, and particularly to the summaries for the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall that on or [177] about December 1, 1941, there was a change in the radio call signs of the Japanese?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, I can't answer that.

Admiral HEWITT. Would it refresh your recollection if you examined the communication intelligence summary for December 1, 1941, contained in that exhibit?

Rear Admiral DELANY. The question now was what? (The question asked was read back as follows:)

Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains communication intelligence summaries, and particularly to the summaries for the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall that on or about December 1, 1941, there was a change in the radio call signs of the Japanese?

Rear Admiral DELANY. My answer is still that I do not remember now whether I knew it then or not. I mean this doesn't refresh my memory. I do not recall whether I knew that or not.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall that there was any noticeable discontinuation in radio traffic from Japanese fleet units after December 1, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I believe that the subject was mentioned at the morning conference by the intelligence officer in the fleet there.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall the substance of that discussion at that time?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, I can't. I don't recall it at all.

Admiral HEWITT. But you do recall that there was some discussion of the change?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, I recall there was a discussion, cause, as I say, this information here, particularly this one here about the carriers [178] are still located in the home waters, was covered by the intelligence officer out there on all the discussions around that time. Whether it was the 27th of December or the 27th of November, or the 1st of December, or anything like that, I am not prepared to say now.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall whether or not Admiral Kimmel was present during the conference concerning the change in Japanese radio traffic which you have just mentioned?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, because the conferences that I mentioned were held in his office and included the Admiral, the Chief of Staff, Plans, Operations, and Intelligence Officers.

Admiral HEWITT. I take it, then, that both you and Admiral McMorris as well as Admiral Kimmel were present at each of those conferences?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I would say, generally, yes. I can't answer that I was there every morning.

Admiral HEWITT. There were daily conferences, Admiral?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. And were such conferences held daily, to the best of your recollection, during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I think so, yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, referring, Admiral, to Exhibits 69A and B of the Naval Court record, would you examine those and give us the dates and tell us what they are?

Rear Admiral DELANY. As I recall these—this is dated the 30th of November 1941, and they are the check-off lists that were prepared to be in the possession of the duty officer out there in the event that war would occur in the next twenty-four hours.

Admiral HEWITT. And the second one, 69B, is dated what date, Admiral?

[179] Rear Admiral DELANY. 5th of December.

Admiral HEWITT. Admiral, will you point out where in those exhibits 69A or B any provision is made in light of Assumption B of the October 14th letter, namely, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Well, If I may be frank again, you read this the same as I can; I don't think you will find it in that. This daily reconnaissance of Task Force Two and Three all provides for reconnaissance, but it is not stated any place in here that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. What reconnaissance is provided for in those exhibits, Admiral?

Rear Admiral DELANY. There is no reconnaissance provided in here until—

Admiral HEWITT. Until war has broken out?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Probably so, yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Was there any discussion of reconnaissance during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. The usual reconnaissance was conducted, yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Was there any discussion of increasing the reconnaissance.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, the planes on Midway were increased. The planes were put on Wake.

Admiral HEWITT. What reconnaissance was being conducted during that period, sir?

Rear Admiral DELANY. The usual reconnaissance within the area.

**Admiral HEWITT.** That is, I take it, a reconnaissance of the fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu and reconnaissance from Midway and Wake?

[180] **Rear Admiral DELANY.** Yes, sir, and partially to the northward. There was always an anti-submarine reconnaissance around the island.

**Admiral HEWITT.** How far out was that?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** It depended on the number of planes available and the condition of the planes. The reconnaissance to the northward was usually conducted as part of the training and testing of planes that were on the roll call.

**Admiral HEWITT.** That was done by the PBY's?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** Yes, sir.

**Admiral HEWITT.** Admiral, would you say that the information, particularly from radio intelligence, which was available from November 27th to December 6, 1941, at Pearl Harbor indicated that Japanese naval forces were on the move and that the direction of some of those forces could not be known or was not known?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** It is perfectly possible for them to be on the move without our knowing anything about it.

**Admiral HEWITT.** Do you recall whether or not the radio intelligence indicated that they were on the move?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** I think the intelligence indicated there was a move to the southward.

**Admiral HEWITT.** Do you recall what the intelligence indicated in the week preceding December 7, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of the major portion of the Japanese carrier fleet?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** As I recall it, the information was that the carriers were in the home waters and the report, that was not well founded, that there was a possibility of some of the smaller carriers being around [181] Truk or some place like that.

**Admiral HEWITT.** Was there any discussion during the period November 27th to December 7th concerning the desirability of reconnaissance from Oahu in the direction of Truk?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** There was a lot of discussion about the desirability of the reconnaissance and the reconnaissance would have been conducted had there been planes available to do it and at the same time maintain their material condition, which was considered of vital importance.

**Admiral HEWITT.** In your opinion, as far as the plane reconnaissance was concerned, if you had employed all the planes for reconnaissance, that could not have been maintained very long, and if you were to use sufficient planes, the maximum number of planes, for daily reconnaissance, the sectors to be covered would have been entirely limited and just a choice?

**Rear Admiral DELANY.** Yes, sir. There weren't enough planes for a complete 360° search around the island, and even in the limited sectors in any direction that you would have chosen, the number of planes and replacement pilots available was such that the search could not have been kept up for a very long time because of the material condition of the planes, the scarcity of relief crews, and the fact that everybody there was convinced that you had to give continued thought

to maintaining the number of planes that you had in the best material condition so that if something did break, you would have them available, and by saying "break," I mean some information coming to us that would require the use of these planes.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The meeting was then, at 12:10 p. m., adjourned until a time and place to be set.)



[182] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 2 p. m., Tuesday, 29 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you please state your name and rank.

Captain LAYTON. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Staff, CincPac.

Mr. SONNETT. And what is the nature of your present duties?

Captain LAYTON. I am assigned as Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, 1941, what was your assignment?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet Intelligence Officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. And for how long prior to December 7, 1941, were you in that assignment?

Captain LAYTON. One year to a day.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Captain, the nature of your duties as Fleet Intelligence Officer for the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. With your permission, I will refresh my memory [183] when appropriate.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes, do.

Captain LAYTON. I will read from the Staff Instructions, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, dated 1941:

214. *Intelligence Officer*—25.

(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).

(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.

(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).

(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.

(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.

(h) In charge of censorship.

(i) Internal Security of ships.

(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. *Assistant Intelligence Officer—26.*

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

- (a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
- (b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.
- (c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
- (d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and situation plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

[184] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, in the discharge of the Staff instructions which you have just quoted, what sources of information did you have?

Captain LAYTON. Principally from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Operations, Navy Department; also from communication intelligence sources, from American Naval Attaches and observers, and information obtained by them through foreign observers and masters, plus information passed to me from British intelligence sources in the Far East, and in some instances information from consuls or State Department representatives in the Far East.

Mr. SONNETT. Of those sources of information, Captain, which would you characterize as your principal source of intelligence information during the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Principally dispatch reports from Naval Attaches and observers in the Far East, and daily communication intelligence analyses of traffic flow and delivery, and reports from ONI on Japanese naval organizations, activity, movements, and intentions.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 27, 1941, and enclosed intelligence bulletin number 45- and ask you if you can identify that.

Captain LAYTON. I can. I wrote it; I prepared it; I proof-read it and had it released by the Admiral.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what that document is, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. That document shows a summation of the effort made in the CincPac Intelligence Section to assemble all pertinent and timely information on the Japanese naval organization and Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands.

[185] Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit, Admiral? Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 21.") Captain LAYTON. That is as of 27 November 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 21, which is the document we have just identified, Captain, will you state the highlights of the information therein contained concerning the Japanese carrier force?

Captain LAYTON. Previous bulletins from OpNav and previous intelligence bulletins on the Japanese fleet organization disseminated by CincPac had carried the Japanese carrier division attached to the First and Second Fleets, two divisions to each fleet respectively, plus their plane guard destroyers. Some time between April and July 1941, as I recall it, a reorganization within the Japanese Fleet took place in which a Commander of Number One Air Fleet was detached. He acted as a type commander such as our ComCarrier Division, Pacific, in those days.



From all sources available, it was believed that the Japanese Carrier Fleet, as we called it then, was organized as follows: KAGA, Flagship; Cardiv 1; AKAGI and KAGA plus Desdiv 7, plane guards of four destroyers; Cardiv 2, consisting of the SORYU and the HIRYU with Desdiv 23; (4 destroyers) as plane guards; Cardiv 3: RYUJO and HOSHO with Desdiv 17 of 3 destroyers as plane guard; Cardiv 4: ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU with Desdiv 3 of 4 destroyers as plane guard; Cardiv —, consisting of the carriers KORYU and KASUGA (MARU)—totaling ten carriers and sixteen destroyers.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you Exhibit 3 of this investigation and ask you if you can identify the document.

[186] Captain LAYTON. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state what it is, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It is CinPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, the successor to the previous Fleet Intelligence Bulletins I previously identified. It serves the same purpose of keeping the Fleet informed of all matters of general interest regarding the enemy, his techniques, practices, and in some cases historical examples.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of that bulletin, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. 8 December 1944. It is Volume 1, Number 22.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the contents of Exhibit 3 describing the composition and movements of the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, will you state whether or not you are familiar with the information therein contained?

Captain LAYTON. I am.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have a hand in the preparation of that bulletin, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. I did, with one exception. There is an error. It is not "Cardiv 5 less HOSHO." The HOSHO did not belong in Cardiv 5.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Captain, referring to page 13 of Exhibit 3, will you state exactly what the error is to which you have just referred?

Captain LAYTON. That states, "SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Cardiv 5 less HOSHO)." That is an error in that the words "less HOSHO" should be omitted.

Mr. SONNETT. With that exception, Captain, I take it that the information contained in the exhibit concerning the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor is corrected?

[187] Captain LAYTON. Again may I suggest that the last line, stating, "elements of Desron 1; and about twenty subs" is incorrect, inasmuch as I do not believe that twenty subs ever sortied from Etorofu as was stated. I believe that a minimum of three and a maximum of six accompanied the task force in their trip from Etorofu to a position north of Oahu, arriving there the morning of December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. The information contained in Exhibit 3, Captain, was obtained from what source?

Captain LAYTON. This came principally from the interrogation of a prisoner of war who had the position of secret yeoman to the Operations Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet; also from interrogation of other prisoners of war who were a part of the task force, and from captured documents, diaries, maps, and other information.

Mr. SONNETT. Are you able to state, Captain, on the basis of the information which you have received since the attack, with the exceptions you have just noted, the information contained in Exhibit 3 is or is not correct?

Captain LAYTON. With the exceptions I have mentioned above, the information in Exhibit 3 referred to previously is correct. I have since seen in the original Japanese a photostatic copy of Combined Fleet Operation Order Number 1 from the NACHI sunk in Midway Bay, and while it does not lay down specifically each ship by name, it lays down the forces in such terms that, putting it with other unit designations and compositions, I am positive that this force was sortied from Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, on or about 27 November 1941, and is composed of the ships listed herein, with the exceptions I have named.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Captain, would you state [188] the information on page 13 of Exhibit 3 concerning the composition of the attacking Japanese forces correctly so that we have in the record a correct statement of the available information that you now have?

Captain LAYTON. Task title, Striking Force; Commander, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo; Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; Cardiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; Cardiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; Batdiv 3, first seaplane carrier, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; Crudiv 8, TONE and CHIKUMA; eleventh Fleet of Desron 1 headed by Desron 1 flagship, the light cruiser ABUKUMA, some submarines, five or six tankers.

Mr. SONNETT. On the basis, Captain, of the information which was available when Exhibit 3 was prepared and on the basis of other information which you have subsequently received, can you state the movements of the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. To my best recollection, about 20 or 22 November the forces of the striking force departed Saeki Anchorage near Bungo Channel and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, where they assembled and fueled, departed on or about 27 November 1941, East Longitude date. According to the diagram on page 16 of Exhibit 3, they proceeded on an easterly course to a little east of the 155th meridian, whence they struck southeast to a point to the north of Oahu, arriving December 8, 1941, East Longitude date. A subsequently prepared map, which was on exhibit in San Francisco, incidentally, shows an easterly course to a position almost north of Oahu, with a subsequently southerly course to a position just north of Oahu.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you recall on or about November 27, 1941, that a dispatch was received which has been referred to as a warning?

Captain LAYTON. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state when and how you learned of the [189] dispatch and what action was taken concerning it that day?

Captain LAYTON. In mid-afternoon I learned that such a dispatch had been received and was shown the tape copy in the communications office. Subsequently, Admiral Kimmel sent for me and told me he wanted me to take this dispatch to General Short. I asked him if he wanted me to take this dispatch, as I had done on previous occasions, and show it to him or should I give him a paraphrased copy that

He directed me to make a paraphrased copy and return that paraphrased copy with the dispatch to him for his perusal, which I did. This paraphrased dispatch was prepared and shown to the communication officer to obtain his concurrence that the phraseology did not destroy the import of the original dispatch nor change in any way its import.

When this was completed, I went outside the Admiral's office and awaited an opportunity to enter as there was a large conference with closed door, which meant no admittance. At the first opportunity, I entered and asked if the Admiral desired to see the paraphrase. He examined the paraphrase and about that time, as I recall it, the Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, Captain Earle, arrived in civilian clothes and requested the Admiral's pardon for being in civilian clothes, but stated in substance that he had a very urgent message which General Short had delivered to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to be further delivered for the perusal of the Commander-in-Chief. He presented the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, who showed it to the Chief of Staff and others. Their remarks were in the general tenor that, "This is the same dispatch in substance that we have just received." I should add that the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District, stated that General Short had requested that no copies be made of their dispatch. There was some discussion then concerning this [190] dispatch and the Army dispatch, their similarity, when Admiral Kimmel turned to me, handed me the paraphrase, and said, "Get this to General Short right away." At the same time, he delivered the dispatch from General Short to the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District, and we left the Admiral's cabin.

Outside was the officer who had brought General Short's dispatch, Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, the Naval Liaison Officer with Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. The Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District, urged me to give Burr the dispatch Admiral Kimmel had given me for delivery to General Short so that they could be delivered simultaneously and by the officially accredited liaison officer, to which I assented. I did not immediately check on his delivery, but I subsequently checked and was told by Lieutenant Commander Burr that it had been delivered.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you Exhibit 8 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of various dispatches, and ask you if you can identify those as copies of dispatches which you saw.

Captain LAYTON. I don't have a good recollection of this, but I think we received it.

Mr. SONNETT. That is referring to the dispatch on November 24, 1941, from OpNav to CincAF?

Captain LAYTON. Info ComSIXTEEN; ALUSNA, Chungking; ASTALUSA, Shanghai; ALUSNA, Tokyo; CincPac.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the other two dispatches in that exhibit, Captain, will you simply state as to those whether you can identify them?

Captain LAYTON. The dispatch from COMFOURTEEN dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, was sent by the communication intelligence unit, 14th Naval District, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, transmitted through [191] me to Commander Rochefort, as a result of the daily traffic analyses, intelligence reports which

the Admiral had seen, and of the discussions we had had concerning the formation of these forces and their movement to the south, amphibious warfare being noted as paramount.

Mr. SONNETT. How about the third one, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. ComSIXTEEN's dispatch of 26 November time date group 261331, I recognize as the dispatch reply by ComTEEN to the dispatch sent by ComFOURTEEN on 260110 in which they gave their estimate of the Japanese naval organization and movements as pertaining to the time in question. We specifically noted that time that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the suggestion by ComFOURTEEN that submarine and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and noted their best indications were that all First and Second Fleet carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area.

Mr. SONNETT. Would it be correct to state, Captain, that the dispatches to which you have just referred summarized the intelligence available to ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN concerning Japanese naval movements during the preceding month or so?

Captain LAYTON. I would say that. Additionally, I would say that the information also made available to CincPac and CincAF as of those times because those units each served the Commander of that area and all of that information was made available to the Fleet Commanders.

Admiral HEWITT. What was understood by the term "First and Second Fleet carriers" contained in the ComSIXTEEN dispatch?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that ComSIXTEEN was referring to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated by ONI on 29 July 1941, in which, as I have previously stated, there were two carrier divisions attached to each of [192] the First and Second Fleets. ONI listed Cardiv 3, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, with Desdiv 34 plane guard (four destroyers), and Cardiv 5, RYUJO and HOSHO with a destroyer plane guard, division number unknown, as attached to the First Fleet. ONI listed Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA, and Desdiv 23 of four destroyers as plane guards, plus Cardiv 2, SORYU, HIRYU, with Desdiv 23 of four destroyers as plane guards, attached to the Second Fleet. This would be a total of eight carriers assigned to the First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers being listed as assigned to any other fleets.

Mr. SONNETT. So that in substance, Captain, the ComSIXTEEN dispatch of November 26th, in stating that all known First and Second Fleet carriers were believed to be in the Kure-Sasebo area, was understood by you to mean that they estimated that all known Japanese carriers were in that area?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, all known operating carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. And that estimate differed with the ComFOURTEEN estimate in that ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that at least one Japanese carrier was in the Marshalls at that time?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Subsequent to those dispatches of November 26th, Captain, it was the fact, was it not, that daily communication intelligence summaries were delivered by the radio intelligence unit to me and to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. They were delivered to me for my presentation to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have copies of the daily summaries which were so presented through you to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I have.

[193] Mr. SONNETT. I note, Captain, on the photostatic documents which you have presented, commencing with October 14, 1941, and ending with December 1941, initials in the lower right hand corner. Can you identify those initials?

Captain LAYTON. Those are Admiral Kimmel's initials.

Mr. SONNETT. And do they appear on the original?

Captain LAYTON. They do.

Mr. SONNETT. I also note that certain of these daily communication intelligence summaries have portions underscored. Can you state who underscored those portions?

Captain LAYTON. Certain of the underscoring was performed by Admiral Kimmel as he read them. Certain other marks, including marks by direction finder bearings and positions of ships, were made by myself in plotting them.

Mr. SONNETT. To the best of your knowledge, Captain, are the photostatic copies which you have presented true copies of the original daily communication intelligence summaries presented to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. This is the original copy. They only presented one copy and this is the original. They kept a copy in combat intelligence, 14th Naval District, but this is the original copy as prepared.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the document you have before you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the document or collection of documents which I show you and which you have supplied are photostatic copies of the original?

Captain LAYTON. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark them as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[194] (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 22.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, and to the daily communication intelligence summaries from November 27 to December 5, inclusive, 1941, will you give us in general the substance of the movements of Japanese forces therein noted?

Captain LAYTON. On 27 November 1941, there was some tactical traffic intercepted from the carriers. There was other traffic addressed to the commanders to play the leading roles in the days that followed on the Southern Expedition; that is, Chiefs of Staff, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force were addressed by Southern Theater Commands. It is to be noted that the Commander Combined Air Force commands all naval shore-based air and all naval tender-based planes. He does not have any connection whatsoever with the carriers except in inter-joint force maneuvers.

(The following was read:)

That is, Chiefs of Staff, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force were addressed by Southern Theater Commands.

(Continuing)—Bako, Pescadores, Hainan Island, and Saigon. Destroyer Squadrons 4 and 5, who were earmarked for the southern move-

ment, were also addressed, with information to Chief of Staff, S Fleet.

Direction finder net was active and it was noted that the Ma Island stations were also sending bearings in after having silenced for several days.

It was noted that Destroyer Squadron 3, earmarked for the south move, could not be positively identified in the Hainan area but believed to be in company with Cruiser Division 3 there.

[195] It was noted that there was no further detected movement from the Kure-Sasebo area.

There were four enciphered addresses noted. An enciphered address always indicates a new command who has no position in the call sign book, so that these then were placed in a fairly simple code. From these forces one was aware of newly formed units becoming active and generally in an operational or maneuver stage and administrative or routine appearance. These were the number 8 at Taihoku, Formosa; in care of the Yamashita unit addressed for delivery via the RYUJO; Koroku (Naha, Okinawa) air base commander; the military stores depot chief at Keijo, Korea.

It was also noted that there was nothing to indicate the movement yet of the CinC, Third Fleet (corresponding to our Command Amphibious Force).

It was noted that the commander of the Mandates was addressing dispatches to his defense forces there; that Jaluit was sending messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units; that there was communication between Jaluit, the Saipan Command, and the Commander of the Mandates Field; that there was still in progress there was inferred by communications seen the civil engineering units at Imieji, Jaluit and Eniwetok.

Traffic analysis located the Chitosa Naval Air "Corps" in Saipan and Naval Air Squadron number 24 in the Marshalls. It was noted that there was no further information on the presence of Cruiser Division 5 in the Mandates. It was, however, noted that an aircraft in the Formosa area (Takao) addressed the carriers SHOKAKU and KORYU. It was stated that [196] "Carriers are located in home waters." No information of further movement of the shore-based air forces to Hainan.

Of significance was the location of the Commander of the submarine forces in the Chichijima area.

The unit at Cavite informed us that they had noted Army enciphers being handled on Navy circuits for the past couple of months during which an Army officer named Oka was in communication with these naval circuits with the Combined Army Forces, Imperial Headquarters.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that by dispatch, Captain Layton?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you identify the dispatch?

Captain LAYTON. I don't have the time-date requirement.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you supply us with a copy of each of the patches to which you make reference in your testimony?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. Also that this officer, Oka, was associated with the Combined Army, Taiwan, and the Combined Army Force Sama (Hainan).

On the 27th of November the Naval Attache at Shanghai in his dispatch 270855 reported the sightings by master of a foreign vessel which left Hong Kong en route Shanghai of many transports proceeding south singly or in small groups—they averaged three or four ships on each watch Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday—and that the military wharves at Shanghai were abnormally empty of stores.

Dispatch from OpNav, addressed to CincPac and CincAF, information Cinclant, dispatch 272337, which was a war warning and stated that OpNav had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that negotiations between Japan and America regarding the stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had ended and an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected within the [197] next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Navy task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. It directed appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 and said to inform only the district and Army authorities. It stated the War Department was sending a similar warning, and directed continental naval districts, plus Guam and Samoa, to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, if I may interrupt you for just a moment, the daily communication summary to which you have just referred, that was for 27 November 1941, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. That was.

Mr. SONNETT. When was that delivered to you, Captain, and by you to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, it was delivered to me in the morning of the 28th of November, 1941, and, as was my custom, I presented it to Admiral Kimmel at about 8:15.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that presentation to Admiral Kimmel of available intelligence information done daily during this period?

Captain LAYTON. This was done daily throughout the period of my association with Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. And in addition to the communication intelligence summary of 27 November, to which you have referred, and to other daily communication intelligence summaries, I take it you also would present whatever other intelligence information you then had available?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary [198] of 27 November and to the statement that "carriers are still located in home waters," will you state what was comprehended by the term "home waters"?

Captain LAYTON. "Home waters" was the term used to consist of Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay Area; in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that include Etorofu?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. Locations in northern Japan, including northern Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the high north area.

Mr. SONNETT. To what point east of Japan would the scope "home waters" extend?

Captain LAYTON. Forty, fifty, sixty miles perhaps; maybe more about the same distance that our fleet operations would take us west to San Clemente or San Pedro or San Diego.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that definition of "home waters" which you gave, Captain, the accepted definition in the radio intelligence and in CincPac headquarters?

Captain LAYTON. It was. It was also understood by Admiral Kimmel, who had queried me on these standard phraseology terms in writing those traffic intelligence summaries.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summaries for 28 November and there on up to December 5th, Captain, will you give us the highlights of those?

Captain LAYTON. The highlight on 28 November was the action shown by what was believed to be the Tokyo intelligence broadcast net, plus the direction finder net, and it was stated and underscored that the Japanese radio intelligence net "is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval [199] Communications and *IS GETTING RESULTS*."

It was noted that Tokyo originators were sending high precedence traffic to the Commander-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force, the three commands for the south movement. Previous indications that Palao was concerned with this south movement were shown by a typical dispatch where the Chief of Naval General Staff addressed the Chiefs of Staff (normally Chiefs of Staffs are addressed in operational matters) of the Combined Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet (Mandates Fleet), Third Fleet (Amphibious Force), French Indo-China force, Second Fleet, Resident Naval Officer, Palao.

It was noted that no Combined Fleet units movements were detected that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was sending his radio dispatches to the Third Fleet and the Combined Air Force; and that he, Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was paying particular attention in his communications to Crudivs 5 and 7, Desrons 2 and 4, Cardiv 5. It is to be noted in the original it stated "attention Cardiv 5 and 7." This was corrected in pencil to read "Crudiv 5 and 7."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know when that correction was made, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall, but it was either prior to sending to Admiral Kimmel or upon his noting that there was no Cardiv and therefore there was something wrong. I think it was before.

The impression was gained this date that the First Base Force, is, the first section of the Amphibious Force, consisting of about a minelayer division, two minesweeper divisions, one gunboat division, one subchaser squadron of four subchaser divisions, and twenty transports, was not present at that time with the bulk of the Third Fleet in Sasebo but could not be exactly located elsewhere.

[200] It was noted that the Army commander on Formosa was holding communications with the Commander-in-Chief of the Amphibious Force, generally a sure sign of amphibious operations.



It was noted that two Third Fleet units had arrived in the Pescadores but were apparently to return to Kure from Bako.

Nothing significant was noted in the Mandates on the 28th of November summary.

It was observed that Sama, Hainan, addressed the Omura Naval Air Corps in several messages which were for information to Saigon and Tokyo. This would indicate the future location of the Omura Air Corps to be Saigon in the near future.

Takao, Formosa, was addressing French Indo-China forces, the Combined Air Force, and the Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and Second Fleet.

It was noted that the Takao Naval Air Corps was addressing the Sukugawa Air Corps and the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps.

It was noted that a representative of the Hainan office, which had moved to Saigon, was sending messages to the naval bases at Sasebo and Kure.

Additionally, the Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet was addressing the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet, the two prime movers in the southern movement, indicating his assistance in some degree.

No submarine traffic of note was observed.

On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, and stated:

Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source X Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one [201] December without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at Songkhola X (Singora).

This dispatch from CincAF, addressed to OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN for action, established the "winds" code in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net and the other from Japanese language foreign broadcasts for more generalized receipt.

ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area.

OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPas, ComSIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that the total troops in South Indo-China totalled 70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently augmented and are

being trans-shipped south. Among recently landed artillery are tank guns; that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500. These were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum, that the Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Japanese would advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landing movements were noted south; that during last few days about 10,000 men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500 would go by special train; that in Tongking there were approximately 100 Jap troops and at Gillam there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to all warehouses by noon November 25th.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to November 29, 1941, Captain, will you point out the highlights of the communication intelligence summary of that day, together with any dispatches of interest received that November 29, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Communication intelligence summary noted Tokyo intelligence sending eleven messages during the day to commanders, both afloat and ashore, and that the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to major commanders. It noted that the direction finder net controlled by Tokyo was active during the night, with much activity, and that the Jaluit radio direction finder station included Commander Submarines as an information addressee in a dispatch, indicating, as has previously been shown, that Commander Submarines was somewhere in the approaches to or to enter the Mandated Islands and likely the [203] Marshall Islands. A new air group, the 103rd Naval Air Group, was noted as originating a dispatch whose address was composed completely of enciphered calls, confirming that he was new as he had no call sign book. One of the addresses was a new organization, the 11th Air Fleet. It noted that this address had appeared before and therefore was a mistake, that the use of the word "fleet" was not a mistake. A correction was added that its composition was unknown.

The highlight from an operational point of view was the confirmation of the arrival of Air Squadron Seven in the Takao area. This unit consisted normally of three CHITOSE class seaplane tenders.

It was noted that the presence of Cruiser Division 4 in the Takao area could not be confirmed nor denied, but dispatches and their analysis indicated the following units under the immediate command of CinC Second Fleet, who, it had been shown previously, was in command of the Southern Invasion Force. The commands under his command were CarDiv 3, SubRon 5, SubRon 6, CruDiv 5, CruDiv 7, DesRon 2, DesRon 4, Third Fleet (Amphibious Force), and the First Indo China Force.

It was further noted that associated with the Third Fleet were several battleships. It was further noted that the Commander-in-

Third Fleet, sent a message to ComDesRon 5, Number Two Base Force (consisting of one minelayer division, with at least five other men-of-war, and seventeen merchant ships suspected of being transports and cargo carriers), Number One Base Force, Defense Division One, and ComDesRons 2 and 4.

It was noted also that CinC Third Fleet held extensive communication with CinC Second Fleet and Bako.

Fourth Fleet was noted as relatively inactive, and that the Commander of the Submarine Force had his traffic routed through Saipan, noting that the previous day's traffic had been routed through Chichijima, indicating [204] a southerly or southeasterly movement.

It was noted that ComCruDiv 7 made a movement report type of dispatch from the Sama, Hainan, area and the direction of this movement was not indicated.

The communication intelligence unit at Cavite sent a dispatch on the 29th of November which noted recent developments from radio intelligence: encrypted addresses noted in traffic the last two days, "Commander First Patrol Force"; headquarters this unit apparently at either Yokosuka or Palao; "Fifth Air Battalion" at Takoa; "Commander Airborne Troops," location undetermined; "French Indo-China Billeting Detachment" in Saigon area; "Third Fleet Headquarters" probably at Yokosuka. The CinC Third Fleet shifted his flag from the ASHIGARA to the NAGARA. The CinC Southern Expeditionary Fleet shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI (tentative identification).

New arrivals in the Takao area that may be placed in the first section of the task force he referred to in his 261331: DesRon 4, Air Squadron 7, and one command that appears to be a submarine squadron. It appears that the HIYEI and KONGO are definitely associated with these units in the first section, but no movement has been noted on these.

CinC Second Fleet told the key radio stations today and also CinC Combined Fleet that he would leave the Kure zone 0400 hours today, that he would leave Sasebo zone midnight the 1st and enter Bako zone midnight the 2nd.

On the 29th we received OpNav's 290110, addressed to Commander North Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Frontier, information CincPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, which stated that the Army had sent to the Western Defense Command:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility [205] that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X this policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X prior or hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X report measures taken \* \* \* should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan X limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers' X WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier X undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

He referred in this dispatch to OpNav's 272337, but in error it as referring to his 272338, which was the war warning.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for 29 November 1941 and to the dispatches just mentioned to you, Captain, is it correct that the only reference to carriers was reference in the communication intelligence summary to the effect that CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commanding Officer, Second Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the composition of CarDiv 3 at that time, Captain? At that time we believed CarDiv 3 to be composed of the RYUJO and HOSHO plus three plane guard destroyers.

[206] Mr. SONNETT. So that, aside from that information, was, on 29 November, no other information relating to Japanese carriers?

Captain LAYTON. There was no other information relating to Japanese carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to 30 November 1941, will you give me the highlights of the communication intelligence summaries and any dispatches received that day?

Captain LAYTON. In general the traffic volume was less, indicating less circuit activity and that back-dated traffic, some as far back as 26 November, was being transmitted. This sort of practice generally indicated a reduction in the urgency of the general over-all picture, plus the possibility of the importance of the re-transmitted dispatches. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUS.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the significance of the use of the term "tactical" in that connection, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. The term "tactical" implies the use of radio by the vessel itself, calling up directly other vessels and working them directly rather than working vessels through shore stations via the broadcast method, which is the common practice by the Japanese communication.

Mr. SONNETT. Did it connote any operation of the carrier AKAGI?

Captain LAYTON. No. If the AKAGI had been working with other carriers, it would indicate that they were exercising or operating with them. Working with MARUS would indicate more that she was making arrangements for fuel or some such administrative function. A carrier would rarely address a MARU except an oiler or repair vessel or a transport or craft tender in matters of administration and function rather than in the tactical concept of operations.

[207] It was noted that one urgent dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Chiefs of Staff of the following fleets: Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, Combined Air Force, First Marine Force, China Fleet, and Fifth Fleet. The last fleet, the Fifth Fleet, was a new fleet of which little or nothing was known, but it was inferred from long practice that it most likely was a minor force concerned with the northern area.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the northern area to which you referred, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. North Japan, from Ominato on Honshu northward.

Mr. SONNETT. And therefore including the Kuriles?

Captain LAYTON. Including the Kuriles. The traffic on the 30th located the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet at Kure. By that same message the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet was not shown in any location, but other indications suggested he was at sea.

It was noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, sent a dispatch to his "usual addressees" of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but he also included therein the battleships KONGO and HIYEI, which placed them as members of the CinC Second's task force.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, if I may interrupt you for a moment at that point, the HIYEI was one of the battleships which was part of the force which later attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And on 30 November 1941 that battleship was at sea, having left Etorofu Island?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. I believe—

Mr. SONNETT. Therefore, is the statement contained in the communication intelligence summary correct or incorrect?

[208] Captain LAYTON. I believe the statement in the communication intelligence summary is correct in this regard. It is very likely that the HIYEI is a bad identification for the HARUNA, which, with the KONGO, took part in the southern expedition. It is believed that this mis-identification, which frequently occurs with ships of one type and within one organization, is an error in fact but not an error in substance.

It is noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was no longer adding the activities at Palao in his addresses and had not done so for the past two days.

It was noted that the Resident Naval Officer at Palao was holding traffic with Taiwan Army Headquarters.

Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, was seen addressing two messages to ComDesRon 2, ComDesRon 4, ComDesRon 5, ComCruDiv 5, First and Second Base Forces, and Defense Division One, being sent for information to CinC Second Fleet. The location of the CinC Third Fleet was not indicated, but there was a strong impression that he was underway.

It was noted that the Jaluit radio addressed the Commander Submarine Force and Naval Air Squadron 24 in one dispatch. The continued association of Jaluit and the Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from Japan through the Chichijima area to the Saipan zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units had arrived in the Marshalls some time previously, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that this bore out ComFOURTEEN's unit's previous contention that there was a submarine concentration in the Marshalls, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force.

It was stated that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama Naval Air [209] Corps, being in the Marshalls, pointed toward air-submarine operations from the Marshalls.

It was also noted that the presence in the Marshalls of a unit of plane guard destroyers would indicate the presence of at least one

carrier in the Mandates, although the presence of that carrier not confirmed.

Continued activity was observed with dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets from the Pescadores, activities including also the combined Air Force and Hainan as addressees; also that the Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet was becoming more and more an originator of dispatches to the task force, which was then believed southbound. The CinC China Fleet made a movement report to the South China Fleet as an information addressee, indicating intention to proceed south.

Mr. SONNETT. I note, Captain, that on the original of the communication intelligence summary of November 30, 1941, which you have before you, that various portions are underlined in red and in pencil. Can you state who made the underlining?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that I did. I am not positive.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that made before or after the submission of the summary to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I believe it was made after the submission, although it may have been before.

Mr. SONNETT. I note also on the November 30th communication intelligence summary that in the left-hand lower corner of the summary there are other initials. Would you state whose initials they are?

Captain LAYTON. They are Admiral McMorris' initials. He was at that time head of the War Plans Section.

[210] We received a dispatch late the 30th from ComCincPac, addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same garble table pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' signs hadn't changed.

We received a dispatch, time 301709, from OpNav, addressed to CincAF, information CincPac, referring to his dispatch 3004, which he had directed CincAF to cover by air search the Manila-Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch in order to ascertain the destination of the overseas extensions, based on the information that Japan was about to attack Japan on the Kra Isthmus. He was told in this dispatch that if the condition was approaching Thailand, he was to inform MacArthur.

In this dispatch, 301709, he referred to the above dispatch and requested priority dispatch of any contacts, and in case of no contacts being made, to report once a day if the information was all negative.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you an original memorandum, December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel. Can you ask you if you can identify it.

Captain LAYTON. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what that document is?

Captain LAYTON. This document was prepared by me late the afternoon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel. As my yeoman was absent, the write-up of this memorandum was delayed until December 1st. Admiral Kimmel's directions recall them, were that he wanted the following day, Monday, December 1, a list of Japanese fleet [211] locations, and Monday thereafter. After this was written up, certain substant

and additional information was obtained from the officer who wrote the daily communication intelligence summary as to any future indicated movements and these changed movements were made in red pencil prior to being submitted to Admiral Kimmel. There was, however, one typographical error that was not found until Admiral Kimmel read the paper, in which a typographical error meaning "2 OCL" became "20 CL," which Admiral Kimmel pointed out to me and in his handwriting wrote, "2-OCL" at the side on page 4.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark this document as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 23.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring to Exhibit 23, which is the memorandum you have just identified, do I understand your testimony to be that it was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have a discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning this memorandum after he had read it?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I note on page 1 of the exhibit the word "Japan" written in pencil opposite certain ships listed under Yokasuka area and similarly the word "Japan" written in pencil opposite certain ships listed under the Kure-Sasebo area. In whose handwriting are those words?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel's.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, will you state the information therein contained concerning the location of Japanese carriers?

Captain LAYTON. On page 3, under the Bako-Takao area, was carried [212] Cadiv 4: 2 CV plus 4 DD; and Cardiv 3: 2 CV and 3 DD. On the last page the supposed carrier KORYU(?) plus plane guards, 1 CV, 4 DD, was carried under the Marshalls area. On page 2 under the Bako-Takao area was carried the KASUGA MARU, 1 XCV.

Mr. SONNETT. Summarizing the information, then, Captain, in this exhibit concerning the whereabouts of Japanese carriers, it appeared that there were Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4 plus the KASUGA MARU thought to be in the Bako-Takao area and the KORYU thought to be in the Marshalls area, is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. There is no reference in this memorandum, Captain, to Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Was there any discussion between you and Admiral Kimmel concerning the whereabouts of those carrier divisions?

Captain LAYTON. There was. Admiral Kimmel noted almost immediately that neither Carrier Division 1 nor Carrier Division 2 was listed in this memorandum, and asked me where they were. I said that I had no recent good indications of their locations, but that if I had to guess, I would estimate them in the general Kure zone.

Mr. SONNETT. Did he inquire whether it was possible that those carriers weren't in that zone but were in the Hawaiian area?

Captain LAYTON. Not in those words.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in the waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units feel pretty confident of [213] their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and we wouldn't know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that I hope they would be sighted before now," or words to that effect.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, it appears on each of the pages, at the bottom, there is an X mark. Can you explain that?

Captain LAYTON. That X mark was not on this memorandum until the morning prior to its being photostated. I presume that it was placed there by the photostat personnel, as it appeared when brought from them.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 1, 1941, Captain, was that received after the delivery of your memorandum of December 1, Exhibit 23, and your discussion with Admiral Kimmel, to which you have just testified?

Captain LAYTON. It is my recollection that the 1 December summary was delivered prior to the submission of my location Exhibit 23.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you examine the communication intelligence summary for 1 December 1941 and give us the highlights of that document?

Captain LAYTON. The summary, dated 1 December 1941, confirms previous information from ComSIXTEEN that all service radio forces afloat of the Japanese Navy had changed promptly at 1 December, minus 9 time. Previously service calls had changed a period of six months or more. Calls having last changed on November 1941, it was noted that service calls lasting only one month indicated progressive steps in preparing for active operations on a large scale. The latter part of this [214] sentence is underlined in red pencil and, to my best recollection, was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

It was noted that the Japanese were adopting more and more radio security provisions by passing old traffic for a period of two or three days prior to the change of calls to defeat the traffic analysis and to attempt to match in a previous call with a new call. This could be done on a series of passing old dispatches.

They had noted also that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more radio security provisions. It was also noted that there had been made to deliver all dispatches using the old calls prior to the change so that there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and resultant confusion and compromise of new call signs. To clarify this, I would say that if your call sign is A and it is changed to Q and a message addressed to you as A, which we knew to be sent to Q, we know that your new call sign is Q. Also it was observed that the large volume of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume of traffic to make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. This is an old Jap trick.



Traffic analysis showed nothing to indicate that the First Fleet was outside of Empire Waters. I should say that "Empire Waters" is synonymous to "Home waters." The Second Fleet was believed to be proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area towards South China and Indo-China, and certain units of the Second Fleet task force were already in the Indo-China area. Specifically prominent were Cruiser Division 7 and Destroyer Squadron 3. The Third Fleet traffic showed nothing new in the way of associations, but its associations with South China and Indo-China forces continued. There were no changes in the Mandates or in the Fifth Fleet or in the Combined Air Force.

[215] It was noted that large numbers of the submarines of the Submarine Force were believed to be to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima-Saipan line, and that the flagship of the Submarine Force was somewhere in that general area.

Under "Carriers" it was stated there was no change. This was presumed to mean no change since the previous report, since there had been no report of carriers recently and the last report said in the Empire area, with the exception of Cardiv 3, with the possibility of one carrier in the Mandates.

Mr. SONNETT. Before you go into the dispatches, Captain, I have one question on this. What, if any, discussion do you recall, Captain, with Admiral Kimmel concerning the significance of the change in Japanese service radio calls referred to in the summary of 1 December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Our discussion merely reviewed what I have previously read in testimony, that it was an unusual step, that it was an advance in radio security, that they were doing everything they could to defeat our radio intelligence, that they were apprehensive that we would know of the move that was underway. Unfortunately, we didn't know the extent of the move completely. But under the conditions obtaining there, we discussed radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and yet the overall picture that it will produce. Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact that a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never be detected except by visual or other sighting.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again to the communication intelligence summary for 1 December 1941, concerning the Fifth Fleet it was stated, "Nothing to report." I believe you testified that the Fifth Fleet was the [216] fleet in the northern area of Japan.

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I said the fleet in the northern area. The Fifth Fleet was a new organization of which nothing was known, but from past indications it was believed that the Fifth Fleet was a force assembled for operations in northern waters, as had been done in previous years. There had been a Fifth Fleet prior to that during a maneuver, which was based in the Ominato-Hokkaido area, but, as I recall it at this time, there was no positive information on the Fifth Fleet; and further, Admiral Kimmel had asked me several times to check with the communication intelligence people to see if there wasn't something that we could ascertain regarding this force, its intentions or its composition. You go way back in here and you will find there was considerable discussion when this first came up, but we did not know anything about that fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Then, the statement "nothing to report" concerning the Fifth Fleet meant that you had no information concerning the fleet and did not mean that you had information indicating no change.

Captain LAYTON. It would mean that there was no information rather than that the information showed no change. If you will, he said under "Combined Air Force" "No change." It would mean that the normal traffic pattern was followed and there were no unusual associations. And also recall that this was a day of call sign change when the identification of these units would be most difficult and an analyst cannot on a flood of new call signs really make any comments; so he was satisfied with the words "no change" and satisfied with the words "nothing to report" as meaning we had nothing to report.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches for 1 December from Captain?

Captain LAYTON. We had a dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December, [217] addressed to CincAF, ComSIXTEEN, inform CincPac and ComFOURTEEN. It referred to the intrigue in the land, on which conferences in progress in Bangkok—Japanese conferences in Bangkok were considering plans aimed at forcing the Japanese to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as a countermeasure to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Since Thailand intended to consider the first invader as her enemy, the Japanese believed this move in Malaya would force the British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would then declare war and request Jap help. This plan apparently had the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff, King. It observed that Thai Government circles had been sharply divided between the pro-Japanese and the pro-British factions until 25 November, but now Wanitto and Shina, who favored joint military action with Japan, had silenced the anti-Jap group and intended to force the Premier, Pibul, to make a decision. The Japanese ambassador in Bangkok expected early and favorable developments if possible.

On 1 December, ComSIXTEEN informed CinC, Asiatic Fleet, which readdressed it for information to CincPac, ComFOURTEEN and OpNav, that Japanese radio station JVJ press tonight in Tokyo at 1700 hours (presumably minus 9 time) stated: "All listeners be sure and listen in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be important news." ComSIXTEEN suggested frequencies 7327, 9432, 12275. All times Tokyo, minus 9.

ComSIXTEEN also sent a dispatch on 1 December that radio intelligence had showed that among the arrivals in the Takao area during the past two days were Comdesron 5 in the NATORI, and the NAKA was to join Desron 4 there; units of number Two Fleet and CHOGEI, the latter being considered a tender for submarine divisions, had arrived in the Takao area, and that all units were under command of the CinC Third Fleet. ComSIXTEEN noted that the CinC Second Fleet in the ATAGO had shifted from Kure to the Sasebo [218] communication zone, apparently en route to South China waters.

Referring to ComSIXTEEN dispatch in which Japanese radio station JVJ requested all listeners to "be sure and listen in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be important news," the imp

received was that the "winds" code was about to go on the air, meaning by that the fake weather broadcast at the beginning and end of news broadcasts to signal the rupture of relations between either Japan and America or Japan and Britain or Japan and Russia. The monitors were told of this and placed on the double alert, but nothing came of it.

**Mr. SONNETT.** Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 2nd, Captain, will you give us the highlights of that?

**Captain LAYTON.** Of interest was the Japanese were having difficulty in routing their traffic due to the change of calls and the probable unfamiliarity of operators with the new calls and the location of the units thereof.

Also it was noted that ComSIXTEEN had reported the Second and Third Fleets to be in the Takao area and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic for these fleets. The broadcast was not heard in Hawaii, but it was observed here in ComFOURTEEN that there was one indication that these two fleets weren't close to Takao. For instance, in several instances Takao forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was summarized as the belief that a large fleet, made up of Second, Third, and First Fleet units, had left the Empire waters and was either not close enough to Takao for good communications or was proceeding on a course not close to Takao.

It was noted that Radio Shanghai handled considerable amounts of traffic which obviously were originated by and destined for units in the Takao area.

[219] It was noted that the Chief of Staff, South China area, continued to appear in Shanghai. It was observed that ComSIXTEEN had reported nine submarines proceeding south of Camranh Bay. These were assessed to be Subrons 5 and 6, which units normally operated with the First Fleet, but which had been repeatedly shown to be included in the Second Fleet task force for southern operations.

Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared to remain relatively quiet. Inconclusive evidence suggested there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that there may be two supreme commanders with staffs. Lack of identifications was noted as precluding precise information on the Second Fleet, but it contributed to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet was underway. Cruiser Division 7 and Destroyer Squadron 3 were unlocated since the change of calls.

There was nothing to report concerning the Third Fleet, but the association of the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet, that is, the Fourth Fleet, continued. Some traffic for the Fourth Fleet was still seen going through Truk.

Under "Carriers" it was stated:

Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

It was noted that the Combined Air Force, the shore-based air force, continued to be closely associated with the Second, Third, and Indo-China Fleets, and that some units of the Combined Air Force, which previously [220] had been shown in the Takao area, had de-

parted. The direction was not given, but it was inferred as south from their previous associations had been south.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall what, if any, discussion you had with Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of information concerning carriers?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe that there was any amount of discussion at this time, because in the past when call sign changes had been made, there was a blank—

Mr. SONNETT. Was the fact, as stated in the communication intelligence summary, evident, that the failure to identify one carrier indicated that carrier traffic was definitely at a low ebb?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel read that. Whether he commented on it, I do not recall.

Mr. SONNETT. If so, he did no comment to you?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall that he commented, but, if so, he would have commented to me, I presume.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your own analysis or evaluation of the fact, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. At that time, as best I can recall it, I laid out the fact that there was a lack of identifications and in the past there had been many times when carrier calls didn't appear, as you know, on previous days carrier calls didn't appear when there was identified traffic. There have been many times and sometimes over a considerable period when the carriers just did not appear because they weren't operating. When they are tied at the buoy in Yokosuka, Kure or other naval ports that have wire communications to the mainland, they receive their traffic by land line or on the teletype. They would use high power. They wouldn't be called on broadcasts because their operations were all local. They would also receive and pass considerable local traffic.

[221] Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether the previous Japanese advance into Hainan was preceded by a similar lack of carrier traffic?

Captain LAYTON. No. On the contrary—do you mean Hainan or French Indo-China?

Mr. SONNETT. French Indo-China.

Captain LAYTON. On the contrary, in the French Indo-China operations of January and July, 1941, Carrier Division 2 appeared in the traffic, and also at this occasion of the formation of this Southern invasion force under CinC Second Fleet, with the amphibious forces under CinC Third Fleet, plus the shore-based air force and other major commands, it was noted definitely that Cardiv 3 and possibly Cardiv 4 were associated with this force, Cardiv 4 being much more associated and some lack of close association seen. It was also noted that prior to the apparent formation of this task force, Cardiv 3 had been in the Takao area, or Nansei Shoto area, and that Cardiv 3 had returned to the Empire. Having been in that area, and Cardiv 3 was definitely southbound and since Cardiv 4 was likewise suggested as possibly being associated, it was on this basis that I placed Cardiv 3 and Cardiv 4 in my estimate as in the Southern Force. It was believed that had the carriers been intending to operate they would likely have appeared in the traffic.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, you are speaking now of December 2, 1941.

Captain LAYTON. Had other carriers, other than those I have

tioned, other carrier divisions, intended to operate, it would have been suggested in traffic. It is to be noted here that Commander Carriers is not associated in any of these dispatches.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am getting at, Captain, is when you say it was believed, do you refer to December 2, 1941?

[222] Captain LAYTON. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And at that time you believed that were the carriers thought to be in home waters in operation, that would have shown up in the traffic?

Captain LAYTON. If the carriers had been operating in active status in home waters, they would have been shown in traffic.

Mr. SONNETT. That was your belief at that time?

Captain LAYTON. That was my belief at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary of December 2, 1941, referring to the Second Fleet, it stated, "No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." Was the lack of traffic concerning the Second Fleet, therefore, a reason for believing that the fleet was underway?

Captain LAYTON. There was no lack of traffic; there was lack of identification. The amount of traffic handled in the rough on Second Fleet circuits, the presence of the call signs on the frequencies used by those people, indicated that they were underway. It wasn't a case of radio silence. Certain units used certain frequencies, just as our Navy does, and the Second Fleet, and certain of its units, was using certain frequencies and traffic was on these frequencies. We had no identification of calls, but the fact that the traffic was on the circuits would suggest that the Second Fleet was underway and probably in company since they weren't handling it by broadcast methods. I would have to talk to the men who wrote this to know what he thought when he wrote it.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am getting at is your evaluation of the radio silence or complete blank of information as it was stated in the December 2, [223] 1941, summary as to carriers.

Captain LAYTON. The difference between the statement here and the statement as it reads, "No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days"; this is referring to the Second and Third Fleets.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you compare this with the statement concerning the carriers, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today"?

Captain LAYTON. I took that to mean that he had no information on the carriers that day.

Mr. SONNETT. In the one case did you believe that the Second Fleet units were underway and in the other case did you believe that the carrier units were not underway and for the same reasons?

Captain LAYTON. I will repeat. The Second Fleet units were using their radios. They were using their radios on known frequencies. They were handling a normal pattern of traffic. A normal number of unidentified calls on these circuits appeared. It was my belief that even though these people were not identified as names, they were units operating normally and at sea. Under "Carriers" there was a complete blank of information, meaning since there had been no identified calls, there was a complete blank of information. The carrier circuits

were definitely not up, that is, there were no calls identified on carriers that would be called carriers. The difference between a unit operating at sea and a unit operating in home waters under an umbrella of broadcasts. The things on broadcast can go to shore stations and shore landing forces and air forces and carrier forces and everything else, and there is no way of identifying who they are, but if a unit is identified under its tactical circuits at sea, that is a force. If a unit is operating under a broadcast, you wouldn't hear them. [224] If units are operating in local waters and using only their local circuits of power or voice, for instance, you cannot hear it at the intercept station. You cannot hear it at Cavite. It is too far away. Whenever they come into local waters, they have always gone to local maneuvering circuits which applies to all vessels in that area. That is the impression I received from reading this, as best I recall it, on 2 December.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, on or about December 2, 1941, have the impression that the operations of carriers or any other types of ships of war might be conducted in a period of radio silence?

Captain LAYTON. Radio silence is a means that can be used by a force at any time, and that fact had been known to me for a considerable period. It was not particularly apparent to me on December 2 any more than it was on July 16th, for instance, but that fact had been discussed. I don't believe there was any thought of radio silence in my mind in reading this paragraph, nor do I think that the paragraph was written to imply that there was any radio silence of carriers. I know, in fact, now that there was, but at that time, in trying to explain, as best I can, the reaction that I obtained in reading this summary and discussing it with Admiral Kimmel was, for one thing, that it was only the second day of a change of call signs which will run through somewhere around 20,000 calls. It is beyond the capabilities of our organization at this time to be able to tabulate and fit these all in one day. You never could do it if you had all the men in the world, but there isn't any way of doing it. It is only after many days of work that you can lay the traffic down and identify it. Even in those days you see, commanders had several call signs, but the ships had only one.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, was it not the fact that on December 2, 1941, the radio intelligence unit here had identified over 200 service calls [225] partially since the change on December 1, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. They stated that they had identified partially over 200 service calls.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it not further the fact that the radio intelligence unit said that in view of that fact and the further fact that they hadn't recovered one carrier call, it was evident that carrier radio was at a low ebb?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Did that signify something unusual, then, that day concerning carrier radio traffic?

Captain LAYTON. Not at all, because in the previous days, summaries, there was no significant carrier traffic noted or no remark about that effect. You see, the summary brings out things that are significantly noted, new associations, or if there is undue activity, if people are heard, they put them down, because with this I kept a location sheet. This was the only way that anyone could try to keep track of the Japanese Navy. We had no espionage system that

tell us when they went in and out of Kure or Sasebo or anywhere else. This was the only way we had of doing it; so when they had the identification for one of the Jap ships, if he was working with Yokosuka, they would say so, just as they had the AKAGI in there working with MARUS, so that we could keep track of as many major ships as possible.

The fact that they didn't appear tended to indicate that they were in an inactive status as they had returned in late October from operations in the Nansei Shoto. It was sometimes the custom of the Japanese after operations to take their carriers into the general Inland Sea area, put their air groups shore-based and you wouldn't hear from the carriers for [226] a considerable period of time.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you interpret this note on the carriers, then, as meaning that there was lack of traffic on the carrier frequencies?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir, lack of traffic on the carrier frequencies and lack of carriers' call signs appearing on any frequencies even in administrative types of dispatches about paymasters or personnel changes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, whether or not you had any discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning that fact specifically?

Captain LAYTON. I believe I said before that I do not have any recollection that it was brought up, and I have not.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches for December 2nd, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. ComSIXTEEN on the 2nd of December reported to OpNav, CincPac, CincAF, and ComFOURTEEN that the CinC Second and CinC Third Fleets were in the Takao area and Commander Southern Expeditionary Force was in the Sama area. The Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, incidentally, was the Commander who had taken charge at the demonstration off French Indo-China and had remained back in that area as a Fleet Area Commander. ComSIXTEEN noted that broadcasts to fleet units were now being sent by Takao or Bako Radio in addition to Tokyo. ComSIXTEEN also said in this dispatch that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had on the 8th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes.

On 2 December we received a dispatch from CincAF, timed 020345, addressed to OpNav, info CincPac, that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines, speed 10, course south, at 0230 Greenwich, latitude 13-10 north, longitude 110-00.

And in a dispatch at 020730 CincAF reported to OpNav, info CincPac, that bearing 070 from Saigon, distant 180 miles, three I-61 class [227] submarines had been sighted in cruising formation, headed south at 15 knots; that twenty-one transports were anchored at Camranh Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.

At 012200 the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, reported to OpNav, info CincPac, CincAF, ComSIXTEEN, Naval Attache, Chungking, Naval Attache, Tokyo, as follows: that between Wednesday and Saturday there had arrived there (Shanghai) 14,000 troops plus others on two special trains. He was unable to get an accurate check on numbers. "Equipment with arrivals include field artillery and tanks. Those (troops) sailing from Shanghai week ending 22nd believed to have included Fourth Division."

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 3, 1941, Captain, will you give us the highlights of it?

Captain LAYTON. Highlights were that the volume of traffic normal, with the receiving conditions good. It was observed that "present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained." It noted the extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands and stated that it slowed up the identification of these units, stating that very few units had been positively identified so far.

It was noted that the Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three navy dispatches to CinC Combined, CinC Second, CinC Third Fleets. Tokyo Intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same commanders.

It was observed that the presence of the CinC Second Fleet in the western waters was not revealed in the radio traffic, but the impression was gained that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, that was not verified by radio intelligence means.

It was noted that some of the Fourth Fleet units were in the Marshall Islands area and included some of the Fourth Fleet staff. [228] stated that the identity of these units was not known.

It was noted that the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit addressed several messages to CinC Fourth Fleet.

It was also noted that some Swatow units were addressed at Saigon, indicating movements south of certain of the South China units at Saigon.

It was noted that Bako Radio originated many dispatches to the Resident Naval Officer at Taihoku, Formosa, and the Task Force Commander.

It stated, "No information on submarines or carriers."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches of December 3rd?

Captain LAYTON. On December 3rd, OpNav addressed CincAF, ComSIXTEEN, information CincPac and ComFOURTEEN, and Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy their purple machines. The Batavia machine had already been sent to Tokyo. On December 2nd Washington had been directed to destroy their purple machine and all but one copy of other systems. It stated that the British Admiralty that date had reported that the Japanese Embassy in London had complied with its orders to destroy it.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the purple machine, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It was an electric coding machine.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning the destruction of the purple machine by the Japanese?

Captain LAYTON. All I recall of it is that Admiral Kimmel sent me when he received this dispatch I have just mentioned, or one similar to it, and asked what was the purple machine. I told him that I did not know, that I would find out. I then approached Lieutenant Colonel the Fleet Security Officer, who had come from Washington, and asked him, and he told me it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding machine.

[229] Mr. SONNETT. Did you communicate that to Admiral Kimmel?



Captain LAYTON. Which information I communicated to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, evaluation was made of the fact that the Japanese were going to destroy the purple machine?

Captain LAYTON. It indicated that the Japanese were preparing for any or all eventualities and most of the addresses were in the southern area, with the exception of Washington and London.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you know whether or not the Japanese Consul in Hawaii had a purple machine?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know, but I have subsequently discovered that he did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know at this time whether or not the Japanese Consul in Hawaii was destroying or burning papers?

Captain LAYTON. He was not at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 3, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe it was the 3rd. I thought it was a little bit later. It may have been the 3rd. I don't recall which day I was informed that he was burning his papers, and I said, "That fits the picture that the Japanese are preparing for something, destroying their codes."

Mr. SONNETT. Was it brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention that the Japanese Consul in Hawaii was burning papers?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, whether or not the Army in Hawaii was advised of the information concerning the Japanese destruction of the purple machine or of the Japanese destruction of records in Hawaii?

[230] Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, Commander Rochefort told me that he had informed his opposite number in the Army the Japanese were destroying their secret and confidential papers not only in Hawaii but in other places. I don't know whether he told them that they were destroying the purple machine. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't think that he would. I don't know. It is my best recollection that I told Colonel Raley that the Japanese were destroying their important papers and code books and everything else not only here but everywhere else. I didn't want to mention the purple machine because I didn't want to explain what I meant.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any other dispatches, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. OpNav sent another dispatch, containing the same information, time 031850, addressed for action to ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, CincAF, and it said:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington X and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

We received a dispatch from the Naval Attache, Singapore, time 020335, on the 3rd, which stated that CinC China had issued the following to British and Allied merchant ships in that area: All ships north of Hong Kong proceed south thereof, Crown Colony's and all ocean-going ships to Singapore, proceeding to Singapore,

and bring such shipyard equipment as possible X except for coast Malaya and West Borneo no vessels leave near northbound without permission XX Dutch issued orders none their ships go north their islands without authority.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the intelligence summary for December 4, 1941, Captain, will you give us the high lights of that?

[231] Captain LAYTON. It was noted that Takao Radio instituted a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that Radio Tokyo used. This was rather an important move from a communication point of view in that you had two complete broadcasts which carried the same indicators but had different serial numbers. It also indicated that Takao had now assumed the position that Tokyo had been in two weeks before of handling major fleet traffic on high frequency circuits. It was noted, however, that only few messages had been placed on that broadcast. Moreover, it was noted that there was a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to naval commanders, and, among others, there was a Tokyo intelligence patch in seven parts addressed to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, the Third Fleet, the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and Sama, Hainan. In all, Tokyo radio intelligence sent out twelve dispatches to the major commanders.

It was noted that the outstanding item of the day's traffic was the lack of messages originating from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. It was noted that these were previously very talkative but were now very quiet. While the fleet calls were not as yet identified, the lack of traffic from these commands could not be ascribed to that. They are still prominent as addressees. It was believed now that the CinC Second Fleet was in the vicinity of Takao and that the conflicting evidence before was due to the lack of broadcasts that had been brought up. CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for action and for information to the Third Base Force at Palao, CinC Second Fleet, and CinC Third Fleet, thereby renewing Palao's association with the South Sea Invasion Force.

CinC Fourth Fleet sent a message to the Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information Eleventh Air Corps, China Fleet, Air, and Air Squadron Twenty-four, the Third Base Force at Palao and the Fourth Base Force at Truk. This undoubtedly had to do with air movements or preparations. They couldn't find any further in the day's traffic to check on the present of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls, as has previously been stated. Jaluit Radio was associated with the Commander Submarine Force and with the Radio and with an unidentified call which was believed to be a tanker.

There was an impression, a definite impression, as I recall it, from this summary that these commanders, who had previously been active in originating dispatches, from the dispatches which tied their groups, suddenly now became quiet, but they were still addressees of many intelligence reports; they were the addressees of many other dispatches from Empire and shore-based originators.

Now you do get the impression they are at sea and maintaining radio silence. They are in the traffic, but they don't send the traffic themselves. I would like to state here that the Japanese then hadn't found out the hidden little trick of putting it from no originator. We told them that in the war, which they dutifully followed thereafter, not to our chagrin.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches for December 4, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch, time 0304, received on 4 December, stated that an unidentified modern ton cargo ship converted as a seaplane tender. It had a flush raised forecastle, raked bow, cruiser stern, armed with one 4.7 inch gun on an elevated platform forward and one also on the poop. Also Japanese naval craft sighted were as follows: On the 15th off Shanghai were seven transports; on the 20th northeast of Amoy was a 1,000 ton seaplane carrier, having eight [233] catapults. Assistant Naval Attache's dispatch from Shanghai, 020702, received 11 December, in general stated that local Nazis of military age were being sent to Japan for training and believed to be for duty on German vessels interned there. Eighty men, average age thirty, were known to have departed the past ten days; also that the officials in the Shanghai area were exerting pressure on the French Concession to discharge Anglo-American volunteer members of the police forces, who were to be replaced by Germans and Italians. He confirmed previous movements of the large liners KAMAKURA MARU, KITA MARU, and the ARGENTINE MARU, had been carrying building material, personnel, oil, and supplies to the Caroline Islands; that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit, and that the following three islands were being specially developed: Katherine, Koro, and Mejit.

Received from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, time 030630, received 11 December, a dispatch to the effect that two escort vessels had recently completed in the Yokohama dockyard; that one trans-loaded with aircraft plus another one carrying naval personnel departed Yokohama 27 November.

SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 5, 1941, Captain, will you give us the highlights of it?

Captain LAYTON. It was noted that the traffic volume was extremely heavy and all circuits were overloaded. There were several new intercept schedules heard, and Ominato Radio was working with Otsu and Bako, and that the Takao broadcast was handling traffic for the Second and Third Fleets, and that the Tokyo broadcast was handling traffic for those units. It was observed that some traffic for the broadcast was several days old. It was adduced that this indicated uncertainty of delivery [234] existing in the radio operation. It was also seen that there were many messages of high intelligence which appeared to have caused a jammed condition on the circuits. They quoted a plain language dispatch sent by Captain, OKAWA, from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, and which was addressed to Fujihara, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, which

in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important and but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued.

SONNETT. Captain, what was the OKAWA? Do you know?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know.

It was noted that neither the Second Fleet Commander nor the Third Fleet Commander originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed and are receiving their traffic over the broadcasts. It was believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or

farther south since the Takao broadcast handled nearly all their traffic.

It was stated that no traffic from the Commander Carriers of Submarine Force had been seen either.

Third Fleet. It was noted that the Commander Fourteenth Army was aboard the RYUJO MARU in the Third Fleet and that a number of MARUS had been addressing the CinC Third Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. What was a MARU, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. A MARU is any Japanese merchant vessel. Rather than saying merchant vessel or Japanese merchant vessel you say MARU, because all Japanese merchant vessels have MARU at the ends of their names; so that is another little standardization that we use.

The Flag Secretary of the Fourth Fleet and the Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed in Jaluit, strengthening the [235] impression that the CinC Fourth Fleet was in the Marshalls. Again we had an association between the Palao Radio, the Resident Naval Officer at Palao, and Commander Second Fleet by being addressed by the Commander South China Fleet.

Sama, Hainan, addressed much traffic to CinC Second Fleet, and Bako in the Pescadores sent considerable traffic to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander of the Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of his air corps. Shiogama Air and at least two other unidentified air corps appeared to be moving, probably to Indo-China.

On December 5th we received no intelligence traffic from any source whatsoever.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 6, 1941, Captain, do you know whether that was delivered to Admiral Kimmel before or after the attack on December 7th?

Captain LAYTON. It was delivered to me after the attack on December 7th and Admiral Kimmel did not see it and was too busy to read it. It contained no positive information of anything we didn't already know and, in fact, contained nothing of what we then did know.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any dispatches received prior to the attack on December 7th?

Captain LAYTON. On 7 December there was a dispatch and I believe it was received after the attack, but I am not positive. It may have come in in the early morning and I didn't see it until afterwards. It was a dispatch which ComSIXTEEN sent to OpNav, information CinCPac, CinCAF, and ComFOURTEEN. They estimated the South China Air Force Headquarters were now in the Saigon area; at least four groups of planes, strength unknown, were at that station; that heavy concentration of aircraft were at Formosa and [236] based at Takao, Taichu, and Kagi naval air stations; that eight MARU air tenders, that is, converted ex-merchant marine, probably freighters to seaplane tenders, were in the South China area, five of them being in the Takao general zone, one near Saigon, and two near Sama, Hainan; that the direction finder bearings indicated the AKAGI was moving south from the Empire and now was in the Nansei Shoto, Okinawa, area. "Estimates based on call recoveries

since 1 December and may be considered conservative." This estimate is based on call sign recovery since 1 December and may be considered conservative. The large volume of high precedence traffic from air activities in the Saigon area indicates extensive air operations may be imminent.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any other dispatches received before the attack?

Captain LAYTON. These are dispatches I have in my file, and whether they came in to us before, I don't know. A dispatch, time 060550, from Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, and dated 7 December 1941, reported that approximately 14,000 troops who had arrived in Shanghai by rail the latter part of the week before had embarked and departed south; that the equipment included ninety armored cars, and that the Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai had been augmented by a thousand persons brought from Nanking and Hanchow. The Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, remarked that there was "no apparent reason for this increase unless policing of additional local areas is contemplated."


A dispatch received on 6 December 1941 from CinC Asiatic Fleet, addressed to OpNav, information CinCPac, ComSIXTEEN, and ComFOURTEEN, stated that the CinCChina reported:

25 Ship convoy with escort 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers lat 8 north 106 east at 0316 GCT today X Convoy 10 ships with [237] 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers 7-40 north 106-20 east 2 hours later X All on course west X 3 additional ships 7-51 north 105 east at 0442 course 310 X This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron X By scouting force sighted 30 ships and 1 large cruiser anchored Camranh Bay X

A dispatch from the Naval Observer, Wellington, time 050600, received on 6 December 1941, which said that the naval intelligence, New Zealand, had informed our Naval Observer there in confidence and not for transmission that the Jap Consul in Wellington had received orders to destroy his codes. A reply, using the code word set up for that, indicating compliance therewith, had been sent to Tokyo. Also he reported that the Japanese consuls in Australia and New Zealand had been directed to forward all possible geographical data. He enjoined secrecy in this matter to keep the source still available to the British.

Admiral HEWITT. We will adjourn at this time until 9:15, tomorrow morning.

(The investigation was then, at 5:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:15 a. m., 30 May 1945.)



## [238] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

## ELEVENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:15 a. m., Wednesday 30 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, entered and, after having been warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as witness.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you Exhibit 15 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a certified copy of an OPNav dispatch of November 24th, and ask you whether you recall having seen that.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral, before this investigation?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The dispatch referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 24.")

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is the dispatch that Admiral Kimmel had me take and show to General Short in person the day it was received. I gave it to Admiral Short for his perusal shortly after 12:15, as he was then listening to the news, which, I believe, ran from 12 to 12:15, at his headquarters. He read it and asked me what naval air strength we had at Guam [239] and I replied that as far as I knew, we had no naval air strength unless there was a transient patrol plane or so passing through. He asked me concerning the former landing field at Guam and I told him that while I did not know at first hand, it was my impression that some time after 1930 and probably before 1932 the shore-based Marine observation group that was stationed at Guam had been withdrawn and the airfield had been allowed to revert to its original state, that is, unimproved and not kept up. General Short then asked about the defenses of Guam. I told him again I did not know at first hand, but when in Tokyo on duty at the American Embassy, I had seen a copy of a memorandum or *aide memoire* submitted to the Japanese Government, informing them that all coast defense guns on Guam had been withdrawn and that Guam was to be considered thereafter as an undefended island. While I do not recall the date of this note, it is my impression it was somewhere around 1933, possibly 1934. General Short made some remark to the effect about appeasing Japan both in the past and in the present and returned the note to me and thanked me for bringing

it. I returned the note to CincPac Headquarters and reported that I had completed the mission sent on.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the sentences in exhibit 24 of this investigation, which is the OpNav dispatch of November 24th, follows:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

will you state, Captain, what conversation you had with Admiral Kimmel concerning your evaluation or estimate of that portion of the dispatch?

[240] Captain LAYTON. I don't recall that Admiral Kimmel asked me specifically for my evaluation of that special part of the dispatch. I do recall that in general a statement was made to the effect that that was borne out by the present information we had in hand; an aggressive move was then under way. I believe that the fact the Philippines and Guam were mentioned was given particular attention, although I do not believe it was stressed in my presence. I know that when dispatches of this nature or other important dispatches having to do with fleet movements or dispositions were received, the Admiral, the Chief of Staff, War Plans Officer, Operations Officer, and the Aviation Officer were closeted with the Admiral for sometimes hours at a time. During these conferences, I was seldom, if ever, present.

Mr. SONNETT. Did the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations expressed in this dispatch, namely, that the movements of the Japanese naval and military forces and statements of the government indicate a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, coincide or agree with your own estimate of the situation at that time?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, and it is more than three and half years since then, and it is very difficult to recall what you thought after this period, and particularly when I have been engaged in fleet intelligence work daily since then—I believe that my impression was that they have the same information we have; they note this southern movement as we do, and they have found in their judgment that the Japanese may not leave us on their flank either. That had been the subject of conversation, as to whether the Japanese would proceed with the indicated movements, leaving us on their flank, or would they have to take us out on the way down. It was my personal impression, and I so stated, that Japan had never yet, with [241] the conception of Russia, left a strong enemy on a flank.

Mr. SONNETT. It appears from the exhibit, Captain, that an attack on American territory, namely, the Philippines or Guam, was regarded as a possibility by the Chief of Naval Operations. Was that in accord with your estimate at the time?

Captain LAYTON. The possibility of a Japanese attack on the Philippines or Guam was in accord with my belief at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you express that belief to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe that my belief was specifically requested as you have so stated it. I believe he asked me to the extent that, didn't this bear out what we were thinking at the time, namely,



would they or would they not leave us on the flank when they moved south? By the possibility of the Japanese leaving us on their flank, I meant, and it was understood, I believe, that the Japanese in their move into French Indo-China and Thailand or even across into Burma to cut the Burma Road, as was conjectured by some observers, would consider our position in the Philippines as a direct menace and threat on their immediate flank; that should they leave us on their flank, our position in the Philippines would be a threat to their line of communications should we decide to take action in assistance to Great Britain or French Indo-China or the Thai operations, as the case might be.

Mr. SONNETT. By that, Captain, do you mean that you expected an attack on the Philippines or Guam in the event of Japanese war with the United States?

Captain LAYTON. I did not expect the attack, but I was not unaware of its possibilities. In other words, the whole problem was would the Japanese leave us on their flank? If they would leave us, they wouldn't [242] attack. On the other hand, if they left us there, we would be a threat. So, since the Japanese have rarely left a strong enemy in an immediate flank, they might attack so as to protect their own wing, their own line of communications, as a measure of security.

Mr. SONNETT. What directions of movement were considered in your estimate other than Japanese movement or attack on the Philippines or Guam?

Captain LAYTON. My estimate was there were two task forces under CinC Second Fleet, one proceeding down south from the Formosa-Hainan-Bako area into the South China Sea and aiming at the Kra Isthmus or its vicinity, the Gulf of Siam. The other task force was proceeding via Palao in the Western Carolines with the intention perhaps of threatening Timor, Celebes, or other Dutch holdings in that general zone.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you at that time, Captain, believe or estimate that in the event of war with Japan, an attack on Hawaii was a possibility?

Captain LAYTON. I did not believe it a possibility at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief believed at that time that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised) of October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you were familiar with that.

Captain LAYTON. I had seen it.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to paragraph 2 (b) of that letter, does it not appear that the security of the fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian area was predicated at that time on two assumptions and that one of the assumptions was that a declaration of war might be preceded by [243] a surprise attack upon ships in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is what this letter from the Commander-in-Chief says.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, was that not, Captain, an estimate, then, of CincPac concerning the possibility or indicating the possibility of a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor prior to a declaration of war?

Captain LAYTON. I presume it was. I was not consulted on the writing of that letter; therefore, I cannot speak at first hand. Its face value would say that that was true.

Mr. SONNETT. Did your own estimate agree with that of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on that subject?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. That had been discussed in the past. As a matter of fact, that point of Japan's actions was informally discussed with Admiral Kimmel on the occasion some months before Pearl Harbor when I presented him with a translation of a Japanese novel which purported to tell for the layman what would be expected during a Japanese-American war, and in which were laid out three problems for the American Commander-in-Chief, who, they presumed, would proceed from the West Coast and be based in Pearl Harbor. One problem was the possibility of a surprise task force raid on the Hawaiian Islands. Another possibility was an expedition or raid in the Aleutian Islands. As I recall it, the third proposition was an amphibious expedition against the Hawaiian Islands. Under the first of these, the surprise raid by a task force on the Hawaiian Islands, they listed in this book the possible composition of such a task force, listing fast carriers, KONGO class battleships, and NACHI class cruisers, stating that because this force was fast and America had no fast battleships, it could run away from any superior force; because the force was strong, it could close with [244] any inferior force and destroy it.

This very point was informally discussed and the Admiral asked me what I thought concerning such a proposition. As I recall it, I stated that that was a potentiality the Japanese always had and that I hoped that our air search would find them before they got too close. He then excused me and thereafter sent for other officers. Whether they discussed this point or not, I do not know, as I was not present.

Mr. SONNETT. It was, Captain, I take it, a part of your duties to maintain an estimate of the situation so far as possible enemy action was concerned, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. It was, to maintain the enemy forces section of the estimate. In other words, an estimate of the situation is built up from all material, political, economic, military, and so forth. Particularly, an estimate regarding a nation is a very large and a very bulky document; yet it is a result of considerable information and clear thinking. My job was to keep up that part of the enemy forces, which my 1 December memorandum purports to be.

Admiral HEWITT. Does that include possible enemy courses of action?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe so, sir. I would have to get out the War College book. Unless it has been changed—this was written when the old gray-covered book was in use. I would have to check to see.

Admiral HEWITT. It is not your recollection that it was your duty to formulate possible enemy courses of action?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir, I don't think that was part of it. This was only formulation of enemy forces. I think possible enemy courses was part of the Plans Division. I furnished them with the psychological and other things for the broad estimate of the first part

[245] Admiral HEWITT. The composition and position of the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. The composition and position of the fleet was my section, too, of the estimate. It was at best, of course, the best information that we had, but was lacking considerably in detail, particularly on land forces and certain of the air forces, although our day to day check on the intelligence, even though at times it was a little contradictory, when the end averaged out, was we knew there was a considerable concentration of air, for instance, in the Southern Formosa-French Indo-China-Hainan area, and at the same time there was a concentration of some submarines in the Marshalls. There was a concentration of considerable naval force—as a matter of fact, a large naval force—in the South China Sea area which was amphibious in nature. And my estimate showed that remaining in the Empire were only the battleships of Batdivs 1 and 2, the cruisers of Crudiv 6, which were put down as tentatively moved to the Mandates, which they did, Desron 1, and probably or possibly Cardivs 1 and 2, plus Cruiser Division 8 also. Of the Pearl Harbor task force, with the exception of the first section of Batdiv 3, that is, the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA, and the two carriers that we carried down in the Hainan area, the Pearl Harbor task force was carried as in home waters.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 23 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which is the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, Annex number VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, dated 28 March 1941, and Addendum 1, Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan number A-1-41. I refer you to the summary of the situation set forth in the Addendum and to the possible enemy action also set forth in the Addendum, and ask whether that was in accord with your estimate during the year 1941.

[246] Captain LAYTON. I don't recall ever having seen this document, as it was produced in another command. It was not submitted to me, nor was I consulted regarding it; therefore, anything I say now concerning this document would be as I learn it at this instant.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether the summary of the situation as expressed in that document, Addendum 1, was in accord with your views as of October 1941?

Captain LAYTON. In general, I would say that the sub-paragraphs listed therein had been in my mind, probably not in the same phraseology but all the points listed therein had been matters that had been previously discussed and which I was well aware of.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, does that apply, Captain, as well to the statement in the Summary of the Situation contained in Addendum 1 to the effect that, "It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence services"?

Captain LAYTON. I did not write that sentence and I would not write it in that way, although I would say the same thing. Since my interest was purely intelligence, my statement would be, as I have said before, any force under sealed orders can sail without any warning, unless you have an efficient espionage and spy system which can give you all the information, and it can arrive at any point, unless it is detected by visual or other sighting. That is the same language being used there, only differently phrased.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to the paragraph of Addendum 1 entitled "Possible Enemy Action," sub-paragraph (a), as follows:

A declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area; (2) a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships [247] installations in Pearl Harbor; (3) a combination of these two.

I also refer you to sub-paragraph (b), reading as follows:

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside 300 miles.

Do those statements accord with your estimate of possible enemy action as of October or November, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Those statements are in accord with other considerations of possible enemy action which I had thought of. Paragraph wherein carriers would have to come within 300 miles, was not one of my thoughts. That is, the 300 miles was a matter of air operational range, and I merely thought that carriers would approach within launch range, and had expressed the hope that such a task force would be found by our air search prior to getting to within striking range.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the so-called war warning of November 27, 1941, Captain, which was exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, is that the dispatch to which you referred in your testimony yesterday?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit in this case?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 25.")

Mr. SONNETT. Was that the dispatch, Captain, which you paraphrased and which paraphrase you were instructed to deliver to General Short, about which you testified yesterday?

[248] Captain LAYTON. This is a copy of the dispatch which Admiral Kimmel directed me to paraphrase and deliver to General Short on the late afternoon or early evening of 27 November.

Mr. SONNETT. Exhibit 25, the war warning, Captain, has as its statement the following:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

What, if any, discussion of that phrase did you have with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I had no discussion with Admiral Kimmel about that phrase. After Admiral Kimmel received this dispatch, he called in closed conference, as I have previously testified. He sent for me and told me to deliver this dispatch to General Short. He acquiesced to a paraphrase being delivered to General Short and I retired to make the paraphrase. When I brought the paraphrase back, the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought in an urgent dispatch from General Short, which was handed to Admiral Kimmel. During my wait in the Admiral's cabin to receive the Admiral's approval of my paraphrase and receive it for delivery to General Short, I asked no questions that I recall. I did not take part in the discussion. I feel sure.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Captain, evaluate that dispatch as indicating that war with Japan was apt to break out in the near future?

Captain LAYTON. I felt that.

Mr. SONNETT. At that time, Captain, was it the fact that your estimate of the location of the Japanese carriers, briefly, was as follows: That one carrier was possibly in the Marshalls and that, according to ComSIXTEEN, the First and Second Fleet carriers were in home waters?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that was a fact.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 8 of this investigation, Captain, and to the ComSIXTEEN dispatch of 26 November, does it appear that ComSIXTEEN [249] was of the opinion that Carrier Division 3 was expected to operate in the Mandates?

Captain LAYTON. It was my opinion on reading this dispatch where ComSIXTEEN said:

and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as second section X estimated units . . . second section Crudiv Five and Cardiv Three Ryujo and one maru x Desrons two and four X Subron five X Desdiv twenty-three X first base force of third fleet X third base force at Palao X fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet

referred-to units to operate from the Palao area of the Japanese Mandates and not the central, northern, or eastern Mandates, that is, the Eastern Carolines, Marianas, or Marshalls.

It is to be noted that ComFOURTEEN's dispatch 260110 had stated there is believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airon twenty-four x at least one carrier division unit x plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

I believe, and it was my interpretation at the time, that the ComSIXTEEN dispatch placing Cardiv 3 in the Mandates was in accordance with our existing information that Cardiv 3 would operate to the south with the Southern Invasion Fleet and possibly based out of Palao, while the presence of one carrier unit in the Marshalls was still a potentiality, and that while there was a disagreement on the latter point, there was no disagreement on the former point.

Mr. SONNETT. The ComSIXTEEN dispatch of November 26th, Captain, contained in Exhibit 8, states, among other things, our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area.

What carriers were comprehended by the description "First and Second Fleet [250] carriers"?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that the ComSIXTEEN dispatch, speaking of First and Second Fleet carriers in home waters, referred to Cardiv 1, AKAGI and KAGA, and Cardiv 2, HIRYU and SORYU, plus their plane guards, and possibly another Cardiv consisting of two carriers or possibly one carrier or, in other words, the one I called Cardiv 4 on my December 1st estimate and placed with Cardiv 3 in the Bako-Takao area.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to Exhibit 23 of this investigation, which is your December 1, 1941, estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, will you state whether, having refreshed your recollection, that was delivered on December 1st or on December 2, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I believe, having considered this throughout the evening, that it was on December 1st that Admiral Kimmel told me to prepare a location sheet of the Japanese Fleet, and that it was that evening I prepared it and so dated it in my rough draft; that it was

most likely, and I believe most probable, the 2nd of December when the rough draft was written up into the smooth copy and the date of the day before had been written on there; and that it was on the 2nd of December and not the 1st of December that this delivery was made to Admiral Kimmel. Two dispatches which I referred to in my testimony yesterday from CinC Asiatic Fleet regarding the sighting of submarines and transports along the French Indo-China Coast and in Camranh Bay, respectively, are penciled notations on this memorandum. Their time group indicates they were written as of the late afternoon and early evening of 1 December, Honolulu time and date, and, as these corrections were made the following morning after its typing in the smooth, I am sure in my recollection that it was done when these dispatches reached my desk and prior to its submission to Admiral Kimmel. [251] So, I believe the date of the 2nd is thereby fixed and I wish to have all previous testimony corrected.

Mr. SONNETT. As of the date of the delivery of your estimate, which is Exhibit 23, just to summarize the situation as to Japanese carrier Captain, you placed Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 in the Bako-Takao area and possibly the KORYU in the Marshalls area, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. I placed Cardiv 3 and 4 plus their plane guard destroyers and the KASUGA MARU (XCV) in the Bako-Takao area, and the "KORYU (?)" plus plane guards in the Marshalls area. The "KORYU (?)" was to indicate that while this was a carrier or a converted carrier, the name might be incorrect, but it was still a carrier unit with a flight deck and planes.

Mr. SONNETT. I note that in your December 1st estimate, Captain, which is Exhibit 23, you start out by saying, "From best available information units of the orange fleet are *thought* to be located as listed below." What was the significance of underscoring the word "thought"?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, the tenseness of the situation could not be underestimated in my mind. The fact that all of this information, with possibly one or two exceptions of sighting of transports and light cruisers and the submarines, was based on traffic analysis of the enemy naval radio circuits, which by itself, by its very nature is inconclusive, sometimes contradictory, and very often incomplete. On the other hand, it does depict a picture, barring planned deception, and the picture, as I saw it, was as I laid it down to you. But I underscored the word "thought" because I had no direct evidence. I had kept track in the best way possible of every single unit, of every single command, and I wanted it plainly indicated that this was *thought* and that [252] somebody else in drawing an estimate with the same material might vary in small details but would not vary over the big picture.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, in your December 1st estimate, Captain, placing Carrier Division 4, which consisted of the ZUIKAKU and the SHOKAKU, in the Bako-Takao area, that was later discovered and in fact was an error, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. It was, but it was based on previous radio intelligence indications wherein it was noted that Cardiv 4 was associated with Cardiv 3 and had previously operated in the Takao area with Cardiv 3, had previously operated with Commander of the Combined

Air Force in joint operations, Commander of the Combined Air Force being the commander of the naval shore-based aircraft, and who was then an important command in the southern invasion units. Since this small indication existed and since this was not only one, but had occurred on two occasions, I felt that they possibly were there; and that again is my thought with very small indications.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am getting at, Captain, is that as to Carrier Division 4, then, on the basis of whatever information radio intelligence could provide, it was your estimate, subject to the limitations of radio intelligence, that Carrier Division 4 was in the Bako-Takao area?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, subsequently it has been ascertained that they were then on the high seas, heading for Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. But radio intelligence couldn't detect that fact at that time?

[253] Captain LAYTON. Nor could it detect that far in advance.

I would like to invite your attention at the present time to one phenomenon of this whole campaign. All those units that moved to the south, air submarines, carriers, cruisers, battleships, destroyers, auxiliaries, plus those commands concerned thereto, appeared in traffic, appeared in substantial traffic. They were addressed in intelligence dispatches. There were no other commands so addressed so constantly as a rule. In other words, there may be one exception. The commander of the Carrier Fleet, who became the commander of the Pearl Harbor task force, was not so addressed and hadn't been so addressed and hadn't appeared in the traffic since mid-November.

I would like to point out another fact, that in the previous Japanese naval activities in the Far East in connection with Thailand and French Indo-China, we had received substantiating information from OpNav from most secret sources which outlined exactly what was taking place. The radio intelligence picture of the fleet activities was confirmed also from newspaper accounts later published as the presence by name of various units there. In the time of which we now speak, the time of this estimate of 1 December 1941, we had what we called the framework of an intelligence picture. There are in intelligence many pieces like a jigsaw. The intelligence officer attempts to find the framework or border to find the scope of the intelligence picture and therefore to fit pieces together and form a part of the pattern or all of it if possible. In this, since we had no other source of information, we had received no dispatches that would indicate to us the possibility of the framework being larger than it was. The framework fitting into this pattern neatly, my attention was focused toward the south, and I believe that will explain why I was [254] inclined to include Cardiv 4 on the very briefest of evidence when there was no other evidence of any kind.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the absence of evidence, Captain, concerning Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 was so noticeable, I take it, that you did not include in your written estimate of December 1st any statement as to your belief concerning their whereabouts?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to explain how this estimate was made and I think you—

Mr. SONNETT. Can you answer that question?

Captain LAYTON. To say "yes" or "no" doesn't fit the picture. I would like to explain how this estimate was arrived at. I had a list of all Japanese units and commands. I went through my tickler read scratch file where by sightings or by radio intelligence the indication of this unit or this command or of his whole command might be indicated or located. I then filled in after each unit or each ship the latest information, as it was run up day by day, of its location and then filled in the picture, as you say, but since I did not have any information on Cardivs 1 and 2, I omitted them because on all of the units, and that includes all the Japanese Fleet, there had been statements in the radio intelligence summaries as to their location or assumed location, but there had been no statements as either assumed location or their indicated location. Therefore, I left Cardivs 1 and 2 out of my thought because I really did not know. I presumed and estimated they were in the Kure area on no evidence at all.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Cardiv 1 consisted of the AKAGI and KAGI, which was the flagship, and Cardiv 2 of the SORYU and HIRYU, did they not?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

[255] Mr. SONNETT. And at the time of your December 1st estimate, they, along with Cardiv 4, were on the high seas, headed for Pearl Harbor, as we have later learned?

Captain LAYTON. True.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to your conversation with Admiral Kimmel, which, I take it, was December 2nd, concerning your estimate dated December 1st, you testified yesterday that Admiral Kimmel asked you a question about the fact that Cardivs 1 and 2 weren't listed in your written estimate.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when I said, "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

Mr. SONNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, which consists of the photostatic copies of communication intelligence summaries, and the summary for December 2, 1941, that is the summary



is it not, which as to carriers indicates "almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today"; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is what it states.

Mr. SONNETT. And the summary for the following day, namely, December 3, 1941, states, "No information on submarines or carriers"; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Do I accurately summarize the situation, then, Captain, by saying that at that time you did not have information showing you the location of the carriers, but you did have a lack of information concerning the location of the carriers?

Captain LAYTON. There was no information on the location of the carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 4th and December 5th, Captain, is it true that the communication intelligence summaries made no mention of carriers?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring back to the war warning of November 27th, which is Exhibit 25 of this investigation, you will note the following direction contained in the warning: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46." Do you note this?

[257] Captain LAYTON. I do note it.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar, Captain, with the tasks assigned in WPL 46?

Captain LAYTON. I was at that time familiar with the general tasks. The task assigned the intelligence organization in WPL 46 was in general to receive the intelligence afforded us by OpNav.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall the tasks assigned in Pacific Fleet Operation Plan Rainbow Five and described as Initial Tasks, namely, tasks to be taken when Japan was not in the war?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall it. It was not a part of my duties and I do not recall having been consulted regarding deployment or operation of our forces at any time, except that on occasions in the past when there had been submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel asked me if I thought it was a Japanese submarine and I told him I thought it was and that we had had various unconfirmed reports from unreliable observers to the effect that there had been submarines reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor, and the Naval Attache, Tokyo, reported a rumor there that a submarine had returned from a cruise of reconnaissance there of Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands and the West Coast.

Mr. SONNETT. I would like to come to that submarine matter, Captain, again in a minute. I want at this moment to—

Captain LAYTON. I merely want to point out as far as operations or plans went, I was not frequently consulted, nor was I supposed to be that I know of, but the Admiral would ask me once in a while about matters concerning the Japanese, if I thought that was a Japanese submarine or what.

Mr. SONNETT. Then, I take it, Captain, that you do not recall [258] that one of the initial tasks assigned in the Pacific Fleet War Plan was "Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers . . . and prevent the extension of enemy military

power into the western hemisphere by patrolling with light force and patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necessary.

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall that specific paragraph. I might have seen it, but again that was not in my immediate province, though all the tasks of all the members of a staff or command are interlocking in a degree, sometimes larger, sometimes much less.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I refer you to the Staff Instructions, Staff of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, paragraph 214(a), which relates to the Intelligence Officer and which reads as follows: "Dissemination of Enemy Information and evaluate same, disseminate to various members of staff, indicating where action is required." Did you indicate at any time prior to December 7, 1941, that any aerial reconnaissance from Oahu was ever required by reason of enemy information?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall specifically telling the Admiral that he should conduct aerial reconnaissance as I was aware that reconnaissance was being conducted by Pat Wing 2.

Mr. SONNETT. What reconnaissance was being conducted by Pat Wing 2, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It was not my duty to check on aerial reconnaissance by our own forces and therefore I did not know the extent of the degree. That was the duty of the Fleet Aviation Officer.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you ever inquire of the Fleet Aviation Officer what reconnaissance was being conducted?

Captain LAYTON. I did not.

[259] Mr. SONNETT. Did it occur to you in the week preceding December 7, 1941, that at any time during that week aerial reconnaissance might be advisable?

Captain LAYTON. Aerial reconnaissance was being conducted as far as I knew and it would have been presumptuous of me to go and check on another officer's performance of his duty. Furthermore, it would not have tended toward good staff relationship, nor good command relationships, for people to go and check on the performance of duty of other people not in their section and to whom they were not directly or indirectly responsible up or down. The Fleet Aviation Officer was a subordinate of the Operations Division whose duties were laid out in the Staff Organization as conducted by operations. May I say that the Operations Officer was shown my periodic summaries of information received and at this time I would like to introduce in evidence my photostatic copy of my original file thereof.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 26")

This consists of reports commencing 6 October 1941 and starts with serial number 82 and ends with intelligence report dated 2 December 1941, serial number 102. I would like to describe briefly this intelligence report book was handled and disseminated. From time to time, as information was assembled or as intelligence was evaluated from assembled information, I prepared and assigned reliability to various items, which I called intelligence reports which were typewritten on a standard form. Since this material had already been seen by the Admiral and the Chief of Staff, boxes 00 and 01 were crossed out in the form when printed. The other boxes in the form consisted of staff numbers 11, 12, and

being the Operations Officer and the two Assistant Operations Officers, respectively; numbers 16, 17, 18, and 86 being the War Plans [260] Officer and his three assistants, the latter, 86, being the Fleet Marine Officer. Numbers 20, 21, 25, and 26—20 and 21 were the Fleet Communications Officer and the Fleet Security Officer, respectively; 25 was myself, the Intelligence Officer, and 26 my assistant.

It is to be noted in this exhibit that periodically staff boxes will not be filled. This was due to the habit of certain officers of only initialling the top page, having read those from his last initial up. For example, certain information from the most secret sources received at CincPac were by direction of OpNav available only to the Admiral, his Chief of Staff, Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as he designated. To insure that the Plans and Operations Divisions and the Communication Officer and the Security Officer were fully aware of information at hand and to protect sources of information from too wide knowledge of their basic source, this material was paraphrased by myself and its source sometimes disguised, but the picture remained unchanged.

For instance, on 25 November 1941, serial number 93, reliability rating A1, which meant communication intelligence, the following report was written and submitted and initialed:

(Attached as page 260A).

[260A]

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

SECRET

Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 93. Date, 25 Nov 1941.

For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force composed of the following:

Second Fleet—Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st Defense Division)—Combined Air Force—Desron Three—Airron 7—Subron 5—possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet). These units are linked with the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The Commander Second Fleet has intensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which is at Palao.

The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that certain units have moved on to Hainan.

The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and may be enroute South China. A strong concentration of submarines and aircraft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv and one-third of the submarine force.

Com14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in SouthEastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

|    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |              |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--------------|
| 00 | 01 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 25 | 26 | 90 | 95 | 86           |
|    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | (initials) P |

[261] On 26 November 1941, intelligence report, serial number 94, reliability A, as follows:

(Attached as pages 261A, 261B, and 261C.)

[261A]

TOP SECRET

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

*Secret*

Reliability Rating, A. Serial No. 94. Date, November 26, 1941.

A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few days as follows. He considers it reliable:

1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being directed by CinC 2nd Flt in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects:

Section I to operate in South China Area.

Section II to operate in the Mandates.

2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Flt.

*Section I*

*CruDiv 7* (From 2nd Flt) 4 CA's—KUMANO, MOGAMI, MIKUMI, SUZUYA)

*Airon 6* (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's—KAMIKAWA MARU, FUJIKAWA MARU, KENJO MARU)

*1st Defense Division* (From 3rd Flt)

*Subron 6* (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4SS)) (note 4 SMs)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Crudiv 6* may be included here (From 1st Flt) (4 CA's—KAKO, FURUTAKA, AOBA, KINUGASA)

*Section II*

*Crudiv 5* (From 2nd Flt) (3 CA's (maybe 4)—MYOKO, NACHO, HAGURO)

*Cardiv 3* (From Carrier Flt) (2 CV's—RYUJO?, HOSHO)

*RYUJO and 1 Maru* 1 CV

[261B] *Desron 2* (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs (12DD's))

*Desron 4* (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs (12DD's))

*Subron 5* (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's))

*Desdiv 23* (From Carrier Flt) (4 DD's)

*1st Base Force* (From 3rd Flt)

*3rd Base Force* (At PALAO)

*5th Base Force* (At SAIPAN)

*Other lesser units* (Names not known)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Butdiv 3* may be included here (From 1st Flt) (4 BB's—HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA (HARUNA may be undergoing major repairs))

3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Flt in doubt but it is assumed they will be stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south.

4. Indications are that today (Nov. 26th) *Desron 3* (1st Flt), *Crudiv 7* (2nd Flt) and *Subron 6* (6th Flt) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air Force from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOIHOW, PAKHOL, SAIGON and other bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN.

5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CV's in the MANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Flts are still in the KURE-SASEBO area. (cont.)

[261C] 6. He believes that:

CinC Combined Flt is in NAGATO (BB)

" 1st " " " HYUGA (BB)

" 2nd " " " ATAGO (CA) (in KURE area)

" 3rd " " " ASHIGARA (CA) (in SASEBO area)

" 5th " " " CHICIJIMA area

" 6th " " " KASHIMA (CL) (in YOKOSUKA area but this is unreliable)

7. CinC 2nd Flt, CinC 3rd Flt and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force apparently have the major roles.

8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet (probably torpedo boats).

9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expeditionary Force.

00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : 86 :

(Initials) P

[262] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring to serial number 94 of Exhibit 26, which you have just read into the record, explain the connection between that intelligence report and ComSIXTEEN's dispatch of November 26, 1941, which is contained in Exhibit 8.

Captain LAYTON. These intelligence reports are evaluations of reports received from all sources. This specific intelligence report, number 94, is my rewrite and reterming into standard phraseology the language, as I understood it, from Com SIXTEEN dispatch 261331. Also, intelligence report serial 93, which I read previously, is my interpretation and rewrite into standard phraseology of ComFOURTEEN's dispatch of 260110.

I would like to read intelligence report number 92, dated 25 November 1941, reliability A1.

(Attached as page 262A).

622A

TOP SECRET

#### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

*Secret*

Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 92. Date, 25 November 1941

Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.

00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 18 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : 90 : 95 : 86

(initials) P

[263] It will be noted that these intelligence reports are in some cases merely a paraphrased version of intelligence dispatches which I read into the record in connection with the communication intelligence summaries previously and are to complete the record for the purposes of dissemination of information within the Staff, regardless of its dissemination by copies of communication messages.

I would like to read into the record serial number 97, of 28 November, 1941, reliability A1.

(Attached as page 263A.)

[263A]  
Secret

TOP SECRET

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 97. Date, 28 Nov. 41.

Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure will be carried out by Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic relations are on the verge of severance:

On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times at the beginning and the end will have this significance:

("EAST-EAST-etc.")

HIGASHI HIGASHI: Japanese-American  
("North-North-etc.")

KITA KITA: Russia  
("WEST-WEST-WEST")

NISHI NISHI: England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and NEI)

On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used:

"HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (AMERICA) "Easterly winds with rain"

"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI (Russia) "Northerly winds—cloudy"

"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England) "Westerly winds, clear"

The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.

00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 :

(Initials) P C

[264] It is noted that the last intelligence report submitted was serial 102, dated 2 December 1941. Subsequent to 2 December 1941 there was a hiatus of information that could be evaluated into intelligence other than that which tended to confirm previous indication of the southern movement.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I believe you have a collection of paraphrased dispatches containing other intelligence during the period October to December, 1941, do you not?

Captain LAYTON. I have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 27.")

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state briefly, Captain, without reference to the contents, but generally, the nature of the documents contained in Exhibit 27?

Captain LAYTON. These are paraphrases of official dispatches received from various intelligence agencies—for instance, Naval Attache, Singapore; Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai; Assistant Naval Attache, Pekin; Naval Attache, Chungking; Marine Detachment, Wake; OpNav, and Naval Attache, Tokyo—in which various items of intelligence information were passed to CincPac and of which I kept paraphrased copy for reference purposes to assist in making enemy location reports and other matters.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Captain, then, that these dispatches contained in Exhibit 27 were among the material which you considered in the preparation of your intelligence reports contained in Exhibit 26?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

[265] Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall that toward the end of November, 1941, there was some discussion of a proposed army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands?

Captain LAYTON. I do recall conferences which I attended with then Lieutenant Colonel Raley concerning a projected army reconnaissance by B-25's over Japanese positions in the Marshalls and also Truk.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you tell us how that discussion came to take place and what happened with respect to that reconnaissance?

Captain LAYTON. Either Admiral Kimmel directed me to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or my opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to me and informed me of this pending reconnaissance and requested my assistance toward delineating the appropriate objectives for the reconnaissance and to furnish the reconnaissance pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing and to assist in the successive projected reconnaissance.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what happened with respect to the reconnaissance, Captain? Did it take place or not?

Captain LAYTON. The reconnaissance unfortunately never materialized because the planes, except one, did not arrive. There was a delay from time to time due to, as Colonel Raley explained to me, uncompleted camera installations in the B-24's at Hamilton Field. I was never informed that the one plane which did arrive had arrived, but I learned later it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field on December 7th. We were very anxious that this reconnaissance be made at the earliest possible date and the Admiral, upon receipt of my memorandum stating the conferences concerning this reconnaissance had been held, asked me how soon I thought they could hold it, and I gave him Colonel Raley's answer to [266] me; that is, it was being delayed due to non-installation or non-completed installation of cameras, and that it would be made as soon as they arrived here and were briefed but that the time was still not definitely fixed.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that, Captain.

Captain LAYTON. I can. It is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, relating to him the general circumstances of the conference concerning the projected aerial reconnaissance by Army planes over the Mandated Islands, particularly those in the Marshalls, plus Truk and Ponape.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWETT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 28.")

Mr. SONNETT. In your discussions with Admiral Kimmel wherein you advised him that there was some delay on the part of the Army in getting the planes ready, was there any consideration given to the use of naval planes for such reconnaissance?

Captain LAYTON. It was not discussed with me. I presume it was discussed with the Aviation Officer.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know why such naval planes could not have been used for that reconnaissance?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know, except what I think. I think that had we used the only naval planes available, that is, PBY Catalinas, they would by their appearance over the Marshalls, the Japanese Mandated Islands, have been the overt act that the Japanese

could claim we had committed and would be a violation of the existing directives of OpNav, while the Army planes were ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin, Australia en route [267] the Philippines.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it also true, Captain, that the Army planes would have special equipment for this reconnaissance that the Navy planes did not have?

Captain LAYTON. It was my personal belief that the first PB-1A got near the Marshall Islands would be shot down by the fighters that I felt positive were there, whereas the Army B-24 photographic planes would have good armament, good defensive armament, and would also be very fast and would fly very high. Its chances of successful reconnaissance flight were considered to be better than three to one. As I remember it, the Army reconnaissance planes were to be armed and they were to fire on any plane that interfered with them in the accomplishment of their mission.

I was particularly anxious, and I am sure Admiral Kimmel was anxious, that this reconnaissance be carried out because it would check on other information as to the presence or absence of air strength of carriers, also submarines, and naval concentrations, that is, Four Fleet units, in the Marshalls area, including also Truk and Pohnpei. It was felt that this was an ideal opportunity to establish the credibility of existing intelligence on Japanese naval disposition and developments in the Mandated Islands to be reconnoitered.

Mr. SONNETT. Apart from the proposed reconnaissance by the Army which you have just discussed, Captain, what other information intelligence was exchanged between the Army and Navy, to your knowledge, during the period October to December, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. The Army-Navy liaison, as I understood it, was established as a normal policy through the shore establishment, that is, the Fourteenth Naval District and the Army forces there, as a normal [268] measure. In addition, about four or five months before December, 1941, the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Raley, Air Corps, U. S. Army, called on me and stated that he had come to me to establish Army liaison on a continuing basis as his superiors considered the Bomber Command of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Navy to be the offensive weapons for the execution of war plans and the Hawaiian Department as a defensive garrison, and that, therefore, the liaison should be established on the level of air force and fleet.

From that time on I furnished Colonel Raley with various items of intelligence, particularly in the early period, stressing air field facilities in the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, where the Hawaiian Air Force was the responsible agency toward ferrying planes to the Philippines via Australia. I furnished him with the confidential and secret sections of the Dutch Airways Guide we had received from Ceylon Asiatic. As the trend of events commenced to develop in mid-November, I told Colonel Raley these events in general. I also told Colonel Raley, without divulging the source and by disguising the actual existence, of the general trend of movements of naval vessels to the south. Since some of the material I gave Colonel Raley was of the utmost secrecy, I cautioned him that I would give him certain very secret matter provided he made no written record of it and would



communicate such only to his Commanding General and on the understanding that he in turn would make no written record of it. I induced him of the intrigue in Thailand, which I previously discussed, which the British were to be brought in on a false pretext and then lured the invader so that Japan could then be called upon as an ally to protect the British troops and thus facilitate their quick entry into the area.

Q59] I feel sure that I told him that we were listening for a radio broadcast from one of our spies, as I put it, which would give indication through a weather report that relations between Japan and America might be terminated, or words to that effect. I do not distinctly tell him of the destruction of the purple machine. I think that I did, but I do not distinctly recall it.

A. SONNETT. You have testified, Captain, that liaison was established with the Hawaiian Army Air Force. Was there any liaison with the Hawaiian Department, that is, directly with General Short? A. CAPTAIN LAYTON. I do not know. I took messages to General Short. General Short consulted with the Admiral, and the normal liaison with G-2 of the Hawaiian Department would be with the District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteen Naval District, they being on the same plane and echelon of command. Furthermore, the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate of the Hawaiian Department in those days and was directly under General Short. Therefore, when the Hawaiian Air Force came to me to establish liaison on fleet level, and I understood they were establishing the Army liaison, I presumed it was as far on that level as was intended to go.

A. SONNETT. I take it from your testimony, Captain, that you were familiar with the establishment by the Japanese of the so-called "Japs" code.

A. CAPTAIN LAYTON. I was.

A. SONNETT. Would you state when you learned of the establishment of that code and what the code was?

A. CAPTAIN LAYTON. A dispatch from CinC Asiatic Fleet, dated 28 November 1941, and addressed to OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, for action, states as follows:

Q] Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russian X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya X On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentence repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be XX American Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze X Unquote X British and ComSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts.

This was made the subject of my intelligence report, serial number Reliability A1, dated 25 November 1941, and was shown as customary to all staff members concerned. It is noted that on the photograph of this the initials only of then Captain DeLany, then Commander DeLany, then Lieutenant Commander Collins, then Captain McCorrigan, then Commander Murphy, and then Colonel Pfeiffer, appear. It is the habit of certain staff officers not to initial each page but to sign up from their last initial and then initial the top page they had

Mr. SONNETT. What efforts were made, Captain, to monitor for any message employing the "winds" code?

Captain LAYTON. Upon receipt of this message, I contacted Commander Rochefort and asked him what measures were going to be established. He said he had already set up a monitoring procedure wherein all our Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the results, if any?

Captain LAYTON. Almost each day thereafter I would check with [271] Commander Rochefort or he would call me and say, "Nothing so far." Up to the attack on December 7, 1941, we received no such intercept, nor did we receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified before Admiral Hart, Captain, in substance that on or about December 9, 1941, you received certain information from Captain Rochefort which had been secured from intercepted cables of the Japanese Consul General and that prior to December 9, 1941, you had received no such information from any source. Is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall the substance of the information which you did receive on December 9th from Captain Rochefort?

Captain LAYTON. The information was decryption of the Japanese Consul's cypher and it laid out various procedures and signals and also reports of movements of naval vessels into and out of Pearl Harbor and also made reference to the presence or absence of aircraft carriers, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 22 of Exhibit 13, and ask you whether that is the message to which you refer, Captain.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, what other messages of the Japanese Consul were shown to you by Captain Rochefort on or about December 9, 1941?

Admiral HEWITT. We will recess at this time.

(The investigation then, at 11:42 a. m., recessed until 2 p. m., at which time it reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties as during the morning session.)

[272] Captain Edwin T. Layton, U.S.N., resumed his seat as witness.

(The last question was read.)

Captain LAYTON. I have here a file of dispatches which are copies of consular dispatches which then Commander Rochefort delivered to me by safe hand on or after December 9, 1941. It may have been December 10th. I cannot remember exactly.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those as an exhibit, Admiral, and substitute a photostatic copy, when a copy is made, for that exhibit so that Captain Layton can retain his copies?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 29.")

Mr. SONNETT. I note, Captain, that the exhibit 29 just marked consists of copies of six dispatches. Were these the only intercepted Japanese consular messages or messages to the Japanese Consul in Hawaii that you received?

Captain LAYTON. These were the only ones received and they were received some time on or after 9 December 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, what, if any, efforts were made previously by any one to secure such messages and what were the results of such efforts made?

Captain LAYTON. I don't know at first hand, but when these messages were delivered to me, I asked then Commander Rochefort the background of them, and, as I recall it, a prominent executive of RCA, I believe perhaps Mr. Sarnoff himself, visited the Hawaiian Islands sometime prior to or just about the 1st of December and that some approach had been made—by whom I was not told—to obtain the files of the [273] consular messages, which by law our intelligence service could not touch. As I understand it, this high official, possibly Mr. Sarnoff, was sympathetic but said his hands were tied by the law the same as ours were, but would inquire upon his return to the States as to his receiving immunity, Presidential or otherwise, from prosecution in order that the intelligence services could have access to these quoted dispatches and attempt to decrypt same. As I recall it, the story went he sent a special message to Honolulu, saying in effect that this immunity had been obtained and he, the holder of those in Honolulu, could turn them over to the appropriate source. I do not know who obtained them, but Commander Rochefort led me to believe that they had been worked on from the time they were received and that they could not break the cipher but were continuing and that after December 7th efforts continued and finally the cipher key was decrypted and the messages reduced to plain Japanese and translated and then delivered to me.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, the previous investigations disclosed that ONI and the FBI were tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul prior to the 7th of December, 1941. Were you aware of that fact?

Captain LAYTON. I was aware without them having definitely so informed me. Wire tapping was also against the law. I knew that they had a source of information that was what they called "inside of the horse's mouth."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what information was secured by them from that?

Captain LAYTON. Nothing of importance as far as fleet movements went. There were certain times when the District Intelligence Officer would inform me that the Consul General had had an urgent meeting with the representatives of the NYK Line in connection with evacuation of [274] Japanese on the TAIYO MARU. There was considerable unrest and uneasiness on the part of the Japanese about the measures being undertaken by the United States, particularly those respecting inspecting mail, and that they were considerably relieved when they learned that second class and third class would not be inspected. It was presumed from my conversations with the District Intelligence Officer that all secret communications that they had wanted to send first class, they would thereafter send parcel post.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you learn at any time whether or not as a result of tapping the wires of the Japanese Consul it was learned that Japanese agents were reporting on the location and movements of United States ships in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. There was no such report made to me at a time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know whether or not as a general proposition Japanese agents were engaged in such activity?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know at first hand that they were or would have had them arrested. It was a matter of common knowledge, without legal foundation, that the Japanese were engaged in espionage. It was suspected that the Japanese Toritsuginin, or "honorary consuls," in fact, some hundreds, were recommended by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District for arrest and prosecution under the federal statute for being the unregistered agents of a foreign government. I was interested in this because the District Intelligence Officer had informed me of this situation and so recommended. It seems that this measure was also accorded support by the FBI representative, Mr. Shivers, but it is my understanding that it was utterly opposed and disapproved by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, General Short.

[275] Mr. SONNETT. Concerning the operation of Japanese submarines in or around Pearl Harbor, Captain, what reports did you have prior to December 7th of the operation of such submarines in Hawaiian waters?

Captain LAYTON. Shortly after I joined the staff of the Commander in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, there was a submarine reported off the Pearl Harbor entrance and the destroyer which made the contact was known to be a very efficient anti-submarine destroyer. That was late December, 1940. The McDOUGAL made the contact. There had been other contacts made, both off the west coast of the United States, and as I understand it, off Hawaiian waters. These contacts were developed on a purely underwater search basis and at no time was a definite submarine sighted, nor could any actual evidence be obtained that it was in fact a Japanese submarine. However, subsequent to this first contact, to my personal knowledge there were several other contacts, one of them again obtained by the McDOUGAL's screening group and held down by the McDOUGAL for some forty-four hours. The Captain of the McDOUGAL has told me that the first fourteen hours of this contact was a definite submarine, that the remaining hours of this contact was a temperature gradient and therefore a false contact which had permitted the supposed Japanese submarine to escape undetected by sonar search. However, during the early part of this contact, three destroyers passed over the position of the alleged submarine and obtained soundings of forty-six fathoms. The water there was thousands of fathoms deep.

There were additional reports, from unreliable sources unfortunately, that there had been rumors of Japanese submarines reconnoitering Pearl Harbor and the West Coast. The Naval Attaché in Tokyo, so reported such a rumor in which, as I recall it, a Japanese submarine was supposed [276] to have returned from reconnoitering duty off the West Coast and off Pearl Harbor.

Additionally, there were reports from, I believe, the Naval Observatory in Cuba or Naval Attaché in Cuba. It may have been South American but he reported that he had information to the effect that there were sunken submarines which could be raised and manned by crews located

off Molokai. These submarines were supposed to have been brought in and beached in not too deep water off Molokai, with a small hose leading up to a buoy, which was covered with kelp, and then led off ashore and was camouflaged, while the crews thereof were ashore disguised as fishermen on the island of Molokai; that at a given time they would proceed and connect up air leads to this hose and thereby blow the ballast of these sunken submarines and would then man them at the appropriate time. It was inferred that these were smaller than the normal type submarines.

By letter, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was directed and carried out a complete and thorough investigation of the coast line and off-shore areas of the island of Molokai and other islands. The report was negative. By direction, Commander Patrol Wing 2 was directed to make a close aerial reconnaissance of these waters under various conditions of light to detect if there was a possibility of this report being correct. Their report was also negative. This, as I recall it, may have been the summer or fall of 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. To sum it up, then, Captain, there was no actual evidence prior to December 7, 1941, of the operation of submarines in or around Pearl Harbor which established conclusively that they were there?

Captain LAYTON. There was no positive evidence beyond any shadow [277] of doubt to establish that they were in fact there, but Admiral Kimmel, I am sure from his remarks to me and his questions to me, felt, and I did also, that at least some of these contacts were true contacts; in other words, actual Japanese submarines. In fact, at one time when the cruiser AUGUSTA returned from the Asiatic Station, it was directed by Admiral Kimmel to pass through a position to the north or northwest of Oahu, I believe about 600 miles, and search out an area where a Japanese naval tanker was known to be passing at that general time and to ascertain if it was fueling submarines. I believe, although I am not sure, that a special aerial search was made in that area at that time. This was all very secret operations and I did not know it until after it was completed.

Mr. SONNETT. The previous investigations, Captain, have disclosed that on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese or midget submarine was attacked and sunk in Pearl Harbor and also that another Japanese or midget submarine was grounded off Bellows Field and was subsequently recovered. Were you familiar with the recovery of those two submarines?

Captain LAYTON. I am. They were recovered under my direction, but not under my personal supervision.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state approximately how long after December 7, 1941, the submarine recovered off Bellows Field was examined?

Captain LAYTON. The submarine grounded off Bellows Field on the morning of 9 December, as I recall it—it may have been the 8th—at which time we dispatched the Repair Officer of the Submarine Base, then Commander Eddy, to examine it and particularly to bring back any documents he could obtain from this submarine. He came back that evening and reported that it was too small a submarine for him—he was a large man—to get into and that the electrician's mate, who was rather small, too, could not get in either. He [278] said, however, that he could salvage that submarine with some assistance

and I directed him to proceed forthwith with the salvage. With the assistance of some Army engineers, I believe, and Oahu Land and Railroad Company's super heavy duty, many-wheeled, trailer trucks, the salvage was finally effected, but only after dismantling the submarine into two sections, it being too heavy in one section to be moved. It was then and throughout that time under guard and was brought to the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base, at which time a very small engineer was able to obtain all the documents and equipment remaining on the submarine. They consisted of maps, recognition pictures, a log book, and various types of equipment, such as line, palm-leaf writing, needle, morphine syringe, first aid kit, emergency rations, and including a small cuspidor type head.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you several documents, Captain, and ask you whether you can identify those.

Captain LAYTON. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what they are?

Captain LAYTON. The first one is a series of two panoramas marked with II No. 27, entitled in Japanese, "View of Pearl Harbor from Northeast High Ground, Number 5." The lower one states in Japanese II No. 28, "View of Pearl Harbor from Aiea Northeast High Ground, Number 6." That is a rough translation.

I also recognize these panoramas as having been sold commercially in Honolulu, having been approved for publication by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, at some time unbeknownst to me. I believe the Commandant at that time was Admiral Bloch.

On the reverse of this panorama view is a short log in Japanese. [279] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, you speak and understand Japanese, do you not?

Captain LAYTON. I am a qualified interpreter and translator of Japanese.

I would like to note for the record that in Japanese naval chronicles all times remain Tokyo time, minus nine, and all days remain the same. Longitude, Tokyo, dates, regardless of crossing the 180th meridian. So all times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor time.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit, Admiral, and constitute a photographic copy?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 30.") Captain LAYTON. I would like to invite your attention to the fact that there are several English words in lead pencil and in red ink on this so-called log. These were inserted by amateur translators in an endeavor to decipher it shortly after its receipt.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you whether the photograph is a true and correct copy of Exhibit 30, is it the so-called Japanese log.

Captain LAYTON. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the photograph as Exhibit 30A, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 30A.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a document, Captain, and ask you whether [280] it is a correct translation of the Exhibits 30 and 30A

Captain LAYTON. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as 30B, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was receiving and marked "Exhibit 30B.")

Captain LAYTON. The next document is a panorama sketch, apparently a copy of panorama photograph or sketch, taken from seaward, and looking at the mouth of Honolulu Harbor from a position five nautical miles to the south of Pearl Harbor. They have written in red, "Looking at the mouths of Honolulu and Pearl Harbors from a position five miles south of the mouth of Pearl Harbor."

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the original as Exhibit 31 and substitute a copy thereof?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 31.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you two photographs, Captain, and ask you whether together they constitute a true and correct copy of the panorama sketch to which you have just referred?

Captain LAYTON. They do.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the photograph as 31A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The photographs were received and marked "Exhibit 31A.")

Captain LAYTON. May I indicate two translator's errors? Where he has "Rodgers symbol symbol," which is translated "Rodgers V place," and "Hickam symbol symbol," translated "Hickam V place," the two symbols stand [287] for "airfield."

I know the third document, recovered from the midget submarine that grounded at Bellows Field, as being a Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor on which courses and times are noted, as well as certain abbreviated signals, and a course and time projected track or tracks going around Ford Island, leaving it port hand to and returning out Pearl Harbor entrance.

Mr. SONNETT. May we deem this original map marked as Exhibit 32?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The map was received and marked as "Exhibit 32.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a photograph and ask you whether it is a true and correct photograph of the original map, Exhibit 32.

Captain LAYTON. It is a good reproduction of that map, except for the colors. It is to be noted that the times apparently scheduled for inbound, starting at 0040 and proceeding up through the channel and around Ford Island, leaving it on its port hand, up until 0515, when he is just south of Peninsula Point, are in blue crayon; all positions plotted thereafter are in red crayon, starting at 0520 and ending at 0600. It should be noted that the speed inbound is relatively slow and the speed outbound is much faster.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as Exhibit 32A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 32A.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, can you tell by examining Exhibits 32 and 32A whether this chart represents an attack plan of the submarine from which it was recovered, or does it represent a log of an actual trip of [282] the submarine from which it was recovered?

Captain LAYTON. I give as my professional opinion as a seaman that it is a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearing and distances as indicated hereon. It is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine. He had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the CO<sub>2</sub> absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of an engineer and auxiliary gang.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I call your attention to the Japanese symbols appearing on the exhibit under the time 0450 and ask you if you can translate those for us.

Captain LAYTON. These four symbols are Chinese characters which translates "Enemy ship—the first two—and the work "sink." The word "sink" can be "sink," "sank," or "sunk," or any combination thereof because no verb suffixes are appended to show tense.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you examine this submarine after it was recovered?

Captain LAYTON. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you find whether or not it had torpedoes aboard?

Captain LAYTON. His torpedoes were still aboard, although he tried to fire them.

Mr. SONNETT. How many were aboard, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Full allowance, two, one atop the other.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again to the symbols appearing on the exhibit under the time 0450 and bearing in mind that the submarine had two torpedoes aboard when recovered, would you say that that symbol could not [283] be translated as "Sunk enemy ship" if referred to action by the submarine?

Captain LAYTON. Based on my knowledge now from Japanese captured documents and material, I give as my professional opinion that that symbol does not represent the captain of this midget submarine recording that he himself sank an enemy ship there.

I would like further to invite your attention to this track. This track is carefully laid out both by course and by distance, course in degrees and distance in meters, and time in minutes and seconds. A close examination of this time in minutes and seconds will show that the speed was varied from point to point to be able to make his arrival at these points at a predetermined time. I point out for your attention the time 0450, which would be 0920 Pearl Harbor Time. At Honolulu Time the attacks were still taking place, salvage ships were being rushed into this area, a tremendous amount of activity was taking place, and I doubt that a midget submarine captain, as but he was navigating his ship, would be able to so meticulously follow his course all the way around, keeping track of the time spent from point to point. On the other hand, if he had been there at that time he would have moved out at a predetermined course at best speed. He would not have cared what time he rounded these points but rather that he rounded them and got away. Therefore, that is on which I base my judgment that this is a predetermined track and not a navigational track.



It is to be noted that on his track there are frequently written in Arabic numerals two different times for the same distance. The first is generally preceded by "Bi Fu" and the second one is preceded by "Bi," the second one being the greater number. It is believed that these [284] symbols and these different times represent different pole settings of his propulsion electric motors in accordance with the state of his battery, and while the track was designed for one, the other was an emergency figure so that he would know when to turn submerged were his battery lower than he had thought, due to the fact that, going slower, his battery would last longer, and also therefore the time was greater.

I would like to invite your attention to positions made on this chart both on the right-hand and left-hand sides of the Pearl Harbor channel as you enter it. Near the time 0530 position is a position I-16. South of that position along Waipio Peninsula is a symbol and the mark I-20. South of that position and still just off the Waipio Peninsula cut is a symbol which reads I-22. On the right-hand side of the channel just southwest of the fuel dock and on the channel edge and just to the north of 0410 position of the submarine track is a circular symbol which reads I-16. Just between the 0410 and the 0115 track positions is a large circle and indistinctly can be read the symbol I-24. It is my estimation—since the I-16, 18, 22, and 24 all carried midget submarines, belong to the class of submarines carrying midget submarines, and since, as I recollect it, the submarine recovered from Bellows Field was marked I-18—that these were the positions for these midget submarines to lie in wait during that period indicated as 0115 to 0410 in blue on the right-hand side of the channel and that these symbols do not represent their mother submarine, but rather the midget submarine, which apparently carried the same number as its mother.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, will you state again the date on which you obtained Exhibits 30, 31, and 32?

Captain LAYTON. I cannot give you the exact date, but it was some [285] time between three and ten days after the 7th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you receive these exhibits before the submarine sunk in Pearl Harbor was recovered?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. The submarine sunk in Pearl Harbor was not recovered, nor was any attempt made to recover it, for a considerable time after Pearl Harbor Day due to the requirements for all salvage equipment and personnel to work on damaged and sunken ships in an effort to extricate trapped personnel. As I recall it, the salvage of the midget submarine to the north or west of Ford Island was not accomplished until three weeks and possibly a month or more after December 7th. When salvaged, an attempt was made for two days to obtain intelligence material from this submarine, but as it was full of silt and all material had been completely destroyed by the effect of silt, mud, and decaying human bodies, the submarine was found to have no further intelligence value and was disposed of by burial into the submarine sea wall face as a fill.

Mr. SONNETT. So that nothing by way of documents was recovered from the submarine which had been sunk in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Nothing in the way of documents and nothing in the way of material because even electrical leads and pipes had been

completely disintegrated. The submarine had also been depressed and rammed, and was practically in two smashed bits.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it ascertained whether the submarine which had been sunk in Pearl Harbor had fired its torpedoes or not?

Captain LAYTON. It had. It had fired both of them. Report reached me on the 7th of December indicated that one had been fired and had exploded on the beach of Ford Island between the RALEIGH and CURTIS, as I recall it. The other, I believe, was fired and landed in the mud and [286] silt in the vicinity of the UTAH berth and didn't explode. Attempts have been made to recover that torpedo as a safety measure, but no success was achieved. In the UTAH berth area there is very, very deep mud and silt and I believe it has buried itself completely.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, in respect of Exhibits 30, 31, and 32, which are the original documents recovered from the submarine off Bellow Field, I understand it is your desire to leave these documents in the possession of CinCPac Headquarters.

Admiral HEWITT. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you desire further, Admiral, that any particular precaution be taken to preserve them?

Admiral HEWITT. I think that attention should be called to the condition and that special efforts should be made to preserve the documents as being of future value.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to the 7th of December, it was testified by Commander Wright, who was then assigned to the Communication Intelligence Unit, that radio bearings were received that day by the unit which were conflicting but that one hearing placed the attacking force as due north and that he transmitted that information to you. Will you tell us whether or not that was correct and, if so, what you recall about that report?

Captain LAYTON. On the morning of 7 December 1941, we received several bearings, commencing about 10 o'clock, from the direction finder, which gave two-way or bilateral bearings. They were in general either 357 or 178. These came from Heeia, whose communication to intelligence unit, Fourteenth Naval District, hadn't been completely disrupted. Some time in the afternoon and, as I recall it, it was about 2 o'clock, I [287] received a report to the effect that they had gotten a bearing with the CXK, the only direction finder that can make a unilateral or a one-way bearing and that that bearing was about 350 or 000. The CXK was at Lualualei, whose communications with Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, had been completely disrupted, and although that bearing had been obtained about 10 o'clock it could not be transmitted by telephone or other means and was finally sent by officer messenger in a car to other location to be transmitted by telephone. It may have been brought all the way to Pearl Harbor by messenger; I don't know, but telephones were out all over. Even at that time we had received a series of bearings by the bilateral, that is the one from Heeia, two ways, all the way from 350 to 180. We had received conflicting and very erroneous information that the carrier had been sighted to the south. When the bearing came through from the CXK as bearing north, it tended to confirm an overlay that had been furnished me by Colonel Raley, Hawaiian Air Force. This overlay was made from a navigation chart of a Japanese fighter that had

been shot down at Hickam Field and indicated radial lines radiating out from a position to the north of Oahu. This, of course, did not prove that they were north, but indicated, along with the CXK bearing, that they were to the north of Oahu. I communicated this information to the Assistant Operations Officer, then Commander Goode, who said all I had for him was bum dope. I believe that information was used for a late afternoon search by the only remaining planes, which, as I recall it, were two or three PBY's and one B-17. No contact was made.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I have no further questions for Captain Layton.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to mention that incorrect report of the sighting of the carrier south of Barber's point.

[288] Captain LAYTON. I don't have any records on that, sir, because that came in by—there were several incorrect sighting reports that day. The Fleet Communication Officer knew that the Army command radio system was being used for sightings and combat intelligence. He designated an APD, the BALLARD, I believe, that was alongside the Sub Base dock to get on that circuit and pass to CinCPac Headquarters radio the information received on the Army command channel. It was soon apparent, although it didn't become apparent for some little time, that this was the greatest collection of erroneous, foolish, fantastic reports that was ever passed on a radio circuit, and until these were observed to be so fantastic, so exaggerated, and so imaginary—until this was discovered to be so, they were passed in plain language to our fleet at sea, and the communication log can be examined to get them in great detail. I recall they were transmitting that some six or eight transports and destroyers were off Barber's point and a cruiser and destroyer were sent over to knock them off. It was fantastic that they could get in without anybody seeing them, and they reported nothing there. They reported two cruisers, four or five transports and destroyers unloading troops, first wave now hitting the beach at Barber's Point, and again we sent the RALEIGH and some destroyers over, and again they reported nothing there, but in approaching those areas she had a torpedo fired at her, which lead to the rumor that that had been a Japanese trap. There were also reports that the Japanese had dropped paratroops on the north of the island and also that these paratroops were wearing blue coveralls with red insignia on the sleeves. I believe it was on that same circuit that we had a report that two aircraft carriers were bearing 200 degrees from Diamond Head, distant 200 and some odd miles, and ships were sent to search that area. We also had a report that was an [289] erroneous transmission from one of our vessels about the fact that he had two aircraft carriers in sight that was later corrected to have no aircraft carriers in sight. This may have been the vessel that was sent to investigate the previous report. I am not sure.

These reports are only a few of the conflicting and fantastic and highly imaginative reports that we received until they were evaluated as being what they were and we ceased to broadcast these to our fleet because it was causing them as much confusion as it was causing us. With these sorts of reports being passed into the Operations Division of CincPac, you can imagine that the Assistant Operations Officer

could well say "All you have is bum dope" when I told him that bearing of the carriers was now reported as being to the north. That was just one more report that they had.

I would like to state in this connection that I have never received from the Army then or since as to what direction these planes were picked up on the radar or which direction they went out on the radar on the morning of 7 December, as I have read in the Roberts Report that such a report was made, and had we had a radar report to confirm which direction they came from or went to, all of our uncertainty as to their exact location would have been dispelled.

Admiral HEWITT. You never had any information from radar at all?

Captain LAYTON. I didn't even know they had the radar until I read the Roberts Report, Admiral. I didn't know the Army had radar until I read the Roberts Report of the Pearl Harbor investigation.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you an original chart and ask you if you can identify it.

Captain LAYTON. This chart of the Island of Oahu, as shown is the best. [290] It shows landing beaches and gun emplacements, with their ranges, and having navigational or predicted navigational tracks with times and courses thereon, was also recovered from the midget submarine that beached itself or was beached on Bellows Field beach.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as Exhibit 33, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you if you can identify it as a true and correct copy of Exhibit 33.

Captain LAYTON. It is a true and correct copy except for the reproduction of colored pencil that the Japanese used. The time 0620 to the south and west of Barber's Point is in red. The time 0621 just below the course symbol 250 is in red. The position at the extension to the northeast of that line, which is in a position southeast of Pearl Harbor entrance channel, is also in red; that position is 0621. The position just to the left of 0620 is 0621 and is in blue. Just to the left of that and in blue and smudged is a position that is actually 0-30, but could be 0230 in blue. It is badly smudged from oil. These charts were all recovered from the oily bilges of the midget submarine. Just to the south of the 0745 position in red is a 2230 position marked in blue. The translation says midget sub released at that position. Actually, it says "tube released"; so the tube may be an abbreviation or slang expression for the midget sub. The true translation, however, is "tube."

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the photograph, may we mark it "Exhibit 33A"?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[291] (The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33A.")

Captain LAYTON. Just south of Diamond Head crater is a position 0740 in blue; also marked in blue with a circle on the map is Lualaba radio towers, as is Hickam Field and Barber's Point light. There is a blue smudge just off Sand Island, but I do not believe it is a position.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you verify, Captain, the translations stated in Exhibit 33A, which is a photograph of Exhibit 99?

Captain LAYTON. With the exception noted of the word "tube" being used for a midget sub—it may be the slang expression for midget sub—the translation appears to be correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Calling your attention to the translation "got underway" appearing under the time 0745, can you state whether that is correct, or could it as well be translated "get underway"?

Captain LAYTON. My translation of this is "proceed" and it has no verb suffix, so could be "proceed," "proceeding," "to proceed."

Mr. SONNETT. That same problem of tense applies to the other translations, does it not, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It does. Omitted near the position Kualiki is the Japanese saying "four barracks." There is some Japanese referring to a circle of the Ewa Plantation area which is badly smudged and does not lend itself to good translation. It is noted on this chart that there are four course lines laid, three approaching Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. They are 45 degrees, 40 degrees, and 331 degrees, and the retiring course from the Pearl Harbor channel buoys is shown as 151. The course to the east from the 0621 position in blue, passing through the 0740 position in blue, is 107 degrees and passes Diamond Head Peak 3,600 meters abeam.

[292] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I note on this Exhibit 33 that there are some words in English, as well as on previous Exhibit 32. Were those words on the exhibits when you received them?

Captain LAYTON. They were. The English words written in lead pencil on this exhibit are all believed to have been written by the Japanese owner and were on there when it came in my possession. On the translation in a position just to the southwest of Barber's Point is the legend "midget sub?" This on the original is written in large characters and says "tubes five" or "five tubes," which we assumed to mean five midget subs. The 0845 position I referred to, in red, is a navigational position about a mile and a half southwest of Barber's Point light and is connected to a position near the 0745 position in red by a line in lead pencil.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may the record show that Exhibits 30, 31, 32, and 33, which are the original documents obtained from the submarine, are being turned back to Captain Layton?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Have you got anything further now?

Mr. SONNETT. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much, Captain.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:55 p. m., adjourned until 1:30 p. m., 31 May 1945.)



[293] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWELFTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 1:30 p. m., Thursday, 31 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Charles H. McMorris, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it appears from the previous investigations that from February, 1941, until the end of 1941 you were the War Plans Officer for CincPac, is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a pamphlet, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify what that is, and, if so, I will ask you to read certain portions of it into the record.

Vice Admiral McMorris. This pamphlet is entitled "Staff Instructions, Staff of CincPac, 1941."

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar with that, Admiral, at the time?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Presumably so.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 34.")

[294] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to the provisions of this exhibit, which is exhibit 34, which contain the definitions of the duties of the War Plans Officer, and ask if you would read those into the record. I believe it is paragraph 207.

Vice Admiral McMorris (reading):

207. War Plans Officer—16.

(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.

(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.

(c) Member of Schedule Board.

(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.

(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters—via District Commandant if appropriate.

(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.

(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.

(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.

(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate command and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Does that accord, Admiral, with your recollection of your duties as War Plans Officer for CincPac?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a document entitled "U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five, (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46)" and ask you if you can identify that as a copy of the Pacific [295] Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 35.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 35, which is the exhibit you have just identified, it appears, does it not, that on page 24 the tasks assigned by the Navy Basic Plan are outlined?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And among those tasks, Admiral, is sub-paragraph (h), which I would like to ask you to read into the record.

Vice Admiral McMorris (reading):

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the phrase "territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area" included Hawaii, did it?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 25 and to page 26 of this exhibit, Admiral, it appears that the tasks formulated by the Pacific Fleet to accomplish the assigned missions are set forth, are they not?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Those tasks, Admiral, of the Pacific Fleet are divided into Phase I—Initial Tasks—Japan not in the war; and Phase II—Initial Tasks—Japan in the war. There is also a Phase II containing succeeding tasks?

[296] Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you read into the record from Phase I of the Initial Tasks subdivisions (b), (g), and (m)?

Vice Admiral McMorris. (reading):

(b) Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

(b) Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of strike groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.

(m) Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Mr. SONNETT. Does sub-paragraph (m), Admiral, contemplate that a surprise attack by Japan against Hawaii should be guarded against as a task of the Pacific Fleet?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, a carbon copy of a letter dated September 9, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-



mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and ask you whether you can identify it.

Vice Admiral McMorris. This is a copy of a letter which approves Pacific Fleet Operation Plan Rainbow Five, WPPac-46.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the letter as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36.")

Mr. SONNETT. Can you also identify, Admiral, a letter of July 25, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations on the same subject?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a letter submitting [297] Pacific Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow Five to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as exhibit 36A, Admiral, and substitute a copy? There is a carbon annexed to that.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36A.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to paragraph 5 of exhibit 36A, Admiral, do you know the basis for the statements made in that paragraph, and, if so, would you state the basis for the statements?

Vice Admiral McMorris. The primary offensive operations as required by the Departmental Plan were for offensive operations in the Marshall Islands with a view to causing the Japanese to withhold as much of their force as possible from operations in the South China Sea. That paragraph pointed out certain handicaps that would exist in carrying out those operations. It expressed concern particularly as to the limited number of destroyers and other anti-submarine vessels. It also noted that transports weren't available to carry assault and occupying forces to the positions that might be attacked or seized, and it also pointed out a lack of suitably trained and equipped Marine forces for such operations. There was no doubt in my mind at that time that the deficiencies mentioned were very real and that while they wouldn't prevent the operations directed, they would make their execution extremely difficult and far more hazardous than would be the case if the deficiencies could be rectified.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 23 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which consists of Annex number VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District, 1939, dated 28 March 1941, and also consists of Addendum I to [298] Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941, and ask you whether or not you can identify those.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel that these can be identified as the papers which those headings purport them to be.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether you reviewed those papers at or about the dates which they bear or at some subsequent time?

Vice Admiral McMorris. While I now have no specific recollection that I reviewed these particular papers, by their very nature I entertain no doubt that I did review them.

Mr. SONNETT. Particularly, Admiral, I take it, in view of the fact that the review of such plans of subordinate commanders was one of your regular duties as War Plans Officer?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Those were part of my regular duties and in recollecting very definitely the duties in that connection, I know I could see a number of such papers and had many discussions of this and kindred subjects. I feel it would be virtually impossible for such a paper to have been issued without my having seen it.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the second of those two papers, that is, Addendum I, you will note that it contains a so-called "Summary of the Situation." Will you examine that and state whether your own summary of the situation at that time was in accordance with the summary contained in the exhibit?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is substantially correct.

Mr. SONNETT. May we read that into the record, Admiral, for the sake of clarity of the record, at this point?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[299] Mr. SONNETT (reading):

1. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating area organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raid force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

Admiral, the reference to Orange in the Summary of the Situation is to Japan, is it not?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to page 3 of that Addendum under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and (c) and (d) under Possible Enemy Action and ask if you would examine that to see whether that accords with your own estimate of the situation at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. That section indicated possible enemy actions. To that I subscribed in a greater or less degree. I did not subscribe to some of those possibilities as being probable. In fact I personally felt they might be quite improbable.

Mr. SONNETT. Again, Admiral, for the sake of clarity of the record may we read in those four?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT (reading):

III. *Possible Enemy Action.*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

[300] (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

Admiral, while we are on the same subject, let me also refer to the last sub-paragraph under Possible Enemy Action and read that to you so that we may have your comments concerning that as well.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

Now, Admiral, you indicated previously that you felt that the possible enemy action as set forth in this exhibit was not probable at or about the time of this exhibit in March of 1941?

[307] Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you agree with the estimate in paragraph (a) 2 to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor"?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I agreed with the thought there expressed, but considered such an attack more probable, much more probable, in the approaches to Pearl Harbor rather than in Pearl Harbor itself.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which purports to be Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask if you can identify that.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a Fleet Letter issued at that time concerning the security of the fleet at the base and in the operating areas.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that that would have come under your official cognizance as War Plans Officer for review?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I recall reviewing this. It was prepared in the Operations Division, but a paper of this nature would unquestionably have been reviewed by myself, and while I have at this time no specific recollection of the details in preparation, I do recall that some of the earlier drafts were modified in accordance with suggestions made by myself.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the document before you, there are two assumptions set forth, are there not, upon which the plan was predicated?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read, Admiral, assumption 2 (b) into the record?

[302] Vice Admiral McMorris (reading):

2. (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:
  - (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
  - (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
  - (3) a combination of these two.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Admiral, at or about that time, name October 14, 1941, agree with assumption 2 (b), which you have just read?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 15 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated November 24, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated November 27, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, also to exhibit 19 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is an OpNav dispatch of November 27, 1941, and ask you whether you recall having seen that dispatch at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, I believe you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that no formal written estimate of the situation was maintained during this period of late November and early December, 1941, but that a mental estimate was maintained, is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your estimate of the situation and of possible courses of enemy action during the period November 27 to December 6, 1941?

[303] Vice Admiral McMorris. It is not possible now to go back with too great a degree of exactness the deductions and estimate made at that time, but substantially I estimated that the Japanese were at the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. Somewhat earlier I had estimated that they would take such action with the expectation that the United States, unless attacked, would not enter the war in support of Great Britain, and that the Japanese were likely to proceed on the assumption that the American people would be unwilling to support a war that to them would appear primarily for the defense of Great Britain's colonies. By the time in question, however, I had come to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling to leave their line of communications across the Philippines exposed to American attack in case the United States did determine to come into the war.

I estimated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct possibility, but were even probable.

As our defenses at Guam were negligible and as the construction work at Wake was not very far advanced, I estimated that measures would be taken by the Japanese to seize those positions when the

initiated the war. As the defenses of Midway were markedly stronger than those at the other two places mentioned and as the Japanese were probably familiar with the details thereof, I estimated that heavy raids on that place were initially probable, but that immediate efforts towards seizure were far less likely.

I estimated that there were likely to be heavy submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto. I believed that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces operating at sea and that there was likelihood of attempts being made to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel. It seemed not unlikely that the war might be [304] initiated by an attempt to torpedo a valuable ship making ingress or egress to Pearl Harbor Channel.

I estimated that vigorous enemy submarine activity would take place in the approaches to our important Pacific Coast ports.

Those are the highlights of the estimate at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, was it your estimate also at that time, namely, after the receipt of the so-called war warning of November 27th, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility but not in your opinion a probability?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That expresses the view that I had.

Mr. SONNETT. What action, Admiral, was taken as a result of the war warning of November 27th and of your estimate which you have just stated?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. As I now recall, there was considerable discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff as to action to be taken and determination was reached that the naval organization was already substantially on a war footing and no material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area. There was considerable discussion as to continuation or modification of training schedules, and the conclusion was reached that it was essential that the training continue until it was necessary to move the principal elements of the fleet for offensive operations. It had been determined before that reconnaissance in force would be made into the Marshalls as a preliminary towards seizure of positions therein with the utmost celerity when war came.

The limitations in supplies and facilities at Wake and Midway, as well as certain island outposts, had precluded stationing there requisite defensive forces until such action became virtually mandatory. This applied particularly to defensive aircraft. The only two carriers in the Hawaiian [305] area were dispatched to those places, with fighter aircraft, one going to Wake, the other to Midway. They were accompanied by cruisers and destroyers on those expeditions.

Consideration was given to sending other additional personnel to those places and consideration was also given to the withdrawal of civilian personnel who were working under contractors and developing the defenses of those two places.

It was determined, all things considered, that the best thing to do was to consider the construction work and that existing limitations of the two islands would not permit increase in personnel. It is my recollection that some small number of men and certain specialized equipment were dispatched to Wake, but it is possible that the ship carrying those elements sailed before the receipt of this dispatch.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, conferences or conversations were Admiral, between you and Admiral Kimmel during this period November 27th on concerning reconnaissance from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I have no specific recollection in that connection, but during this period, this was a matter that was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and myself and with the two of us and other members of the staffs and with other senior naval officers present in Pearl Harbor. The details I no longer remember, but I do remember some of the considerations that were in mind and, in general, the decisions determined upon. The number of patrol planes here was small. A certain number of them were earmarked for advancement to Midway and a certain time to Wake for support and assistance in the reconnaissance of the Marshalls at an appropriate time. My recollection is that about this time there was some augmentation of the number of patrol craft at Midway.

[306] In case war should start, most of the fleet shore-based aircraft were to be moved to the island outposts, Midway, Johnston, and Wake, but since the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier had no aircraft of its own, some of the fleet aircraft were to remain under the operational control of the Coastal Frontier Command.

In order that the patrol craft might be ready for prompt movement to distant service where repair and upkeep facilities were limited, and negligible, it was deemed highly important that as many as possible be kept ready for flight on short notice and not tie up an undue number of engines requiring engine overhaul because of excessive use.

At this time the patrol wings in the Navy as a whole were increased and the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in giving essential advanced operational training. After discussion and consideration, the determination was reached to continue the training as much as possible.

It was believed by myself and, I believe, generally by other officers that entered into the discussions that it was highly important to maintain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas.

Considering the requirements for anti-submarine patrols, the necessity for maintaining patrol aircraft in prompt readiness for distant service, and considering the impelling necessity for continuation of the training program, it was determined that the arrangements that were actually in effect were the best that we could do. This in effect was a calculated risk. Subsequent events proved that the calculations weren't good. Calculations at the time, however, did show that in the very limited sectors could be continually patrolled with the force available. It may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness of search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the approach of the Japanese carriers on the morning of December 7, 1941 [307] would have been detected as the arc of their approach could quite possibly have been unguarded.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the various considerations concerning reconnaissance which you have just described were, I take it, your considerations at the time?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes, I think so. I might say that the passage of time and various discussions of this matter, it is sometimes difficult to say whether those specific things were in your mind at that time or that possibly other considerations were in mind

dition. I feel safe in saying, however, that while the considerations which I have just mentioned are my best recollection now, it is not only possible but highly probable that they were in my mind at that time and were voiced in discussions with the Commander-in-Chief and with others concerned.

Mr. SONNETT. It is the fact, Admiral, I take it, that you do not recall any formal conference or detailed discussion with the Commander-in-Chief on that subject?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. It would be better to say that it was not a practice to have formal conferences. There was not a formal conference, but there were numerous conferences and discussions, and while I cannot say that this specific question was the subject of any one conference, it undoubtedly was a matter that was discussed during this period, and the action taken was after consideration and evaluation of the factors involved in the light of information and circumstances that existed at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am trying to get at, Admiral, is you have no independent recollection of any specific discussion with Admiral Kimmel after November 27th on the subject, but you feel it must have been discussed?

[308] Vice Admiral McMORRIS. While I have no specific recollection as to time or date or subject matter of a conference, I can say definitely that during this period this subject matter was discussed between myself and others and the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you tell us what Admiral Kimmel said at any such discussion, Admiral, concerning reconnaissance from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No, I cannot, but manifestly the conclusions that he reached did not result in any distant search being maintained, but rather that the search at the time was against submarines in localized areas.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, any discussion with Admiral Kimmel after the war warning of November 27th and prior to December 7th concerning a projected reconnaissance flight by the Army over the Mandated Islands?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No, I do not. I do recall that General Martin was very loathe to have the fighter aircraft over water at all, and while I do not recall any discussion of Army flights over the Mandated Islands, it doesn't mean that such discussions may not have taken place, but certainly no action was ever taken leading to anything of that sort; so that, if such discussion did take place, it must have been concluded that such would be unfeasible.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, which is a memorandum from Captain Layton to the Admiral on November 28, 1941, and ask you whether, after examining it, it refreshes your recollection at all concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That does refresh my recollection to some extent because I was thinking at the time in terms of visual reconnaissance by a number of planes. I do now vaguely recall some discussion with regard to photo reconnaissance, but the recollection is vague in the extreme.

[309] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall the extent of the sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes available during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is a question that cannot be categorically answered. Various combinations of diagrams were given consideration and had a search been determined upon, it would have necessarily finally been based on the radius of flights and how long a period of time the searches would continue and whether or not the needs of training and engine overhaul would be completely ignored. As a practical measure, had such searches been instituted at all, they undoubtedly would have been a compromise among the different requirements involved, just as a compromise was actually reached in limiting the searches to the fleet operating areas.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you stated a moment ago that various diagrams were given consideration. When and by whom were they considered?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That I cannot now answer. There were undoubtedly some drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the Aviation Officer, possibly or even probably by the Operations Division. I do not recall whether any were brought over by the patrol wing commander. The extent to which any were directly presented to the Commander-in-Chief or which he may have noted within my office or the Operations Office, I cannot now answer.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral Bellinger was the Air Officer at that time, was he not, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMorris. He was in command of the patrol wing of the fleet that was stationed here at that time, and the senior naval officer in the patrol craft.

Mr. SONNETT. He testified, Admiral, before the Naval Court of Inquiry [310] that during the period in question, November 1941, on, continuous daily patrol could have been flown by dividing the combat crews into three groups, using twenty planes daily covering 144°, which could have been continued for an underterm of a number of days. Does that accord with your recollection as to the capabilities for reconnaissance during that period?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I would say that that wouldn't be wrong if that were the only consideration to be given, namely, to conducting a search, but the Commander-in-Chief had not only that consideration to weigh, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for important service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being brought in.

Mr. SONNETT. How many naval aircraft were available at that time at Oahu? Do you recall, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation which consists of a series of photostats of a document entitled "Communication Intelligence Summaries" and I direct your attention to those particularly for the period 27 November 1941 to 5 December 1941 and ask you whether you recall having seen those at the time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall being familiar with information of that general nature at that time, that frequently I did not myself read them but heard them either read or orally presented by Captain Layton, and I judge that those are the principal intelligence information that was available at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the summary for November 30, 1941, Admiral, and to the lower left-hand corner, is that your initial impression?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I don't know. It may well be.



Mr. SONNETT. Do you recognize the initial in the lower right-hand corner?

[311] Vice Admiral McMorris. That appears to be Admiral Kimmel's initial. I certainly had access to all such material at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to the initial on the 23 November 1941 summary at the lower left-hand corner and ask you whether that is your initial.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Probably.

Mr. SONNETT. And to the one for November 22, 1941, Admiral, the lower left-hand corner.

Vice Admiral McMorris. The same comment holds. That is probably my initial.

Mr. SONNETT. Is that also true of the one for November 30th, Admiral, that it probably is your initial, or aren't you sure about it?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, that is probably.

Mr. SONNETT. In the November 30th summary, Admiral, it is indicated, is it not, that the radio intelligence unit was of the opinion that there was a Japanese carrier in the Mandates?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, discussion did you have with Admiral Kimmel concerning that belief?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not now recall any. It is quite possible, however, that discussion did occur.

Mr. SONNETT. Would it be an accurate statement, Admiral, to say that you had received during that period either these communication intelligence summaries or the substance of them?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That would be accurate.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation, which consists of photostats of various dispatches, and refer you particularly to the dispatch of ComFOURTEEN of 26 November and ask whether you recall having seen that at the time.

[312] Vice Admiral McMorris. I have now no independent recollection of that message, but would say that I probably did see it at the time. I almost surely saw it at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. That indicates, Admiral, does it not, that there was believed to be, among other things, at least one carrier division unit in the Marshalls?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you, Admiral, exhibit 23 of this investigation, which is a memorandum of December 1, 1941, from Lieutenant Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, to the Admiral, and ask you whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Again I now have no independent recollection of seeing that, but would say it is improbable that I did not see it.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that on or about December 1, 1941, there was a change in the service calls of the Japanese fleet?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I remember that about that time there was a change in their call signs.

Mr. SONNETT. And do you further recall that in the succeeding days prior to the attack there was a blank of information as to the Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that specific information was lacking, but my general impression now is that we believed at the time that we had a fairly good idea of the general location of the major elements of the Japanese fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Where did you, during the period November 27th to December 6, 1941, believe the Japanese carriers were, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Again, it is difficult to say what the specific beliefs were at that time, but generally in home waters or toward Formosa.

[313] Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the communication intelligence summaries, exhibit 22, will you point out where in the summaries is the information on which you based that belief?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Before looking, I may say that it may or may not be specifically in here.

Mr. SONNETT. I should add, Admiral, if it is not there, would you state whatever the information was on which you based the belief?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Nor would I be able to answer a question of that nature.

To answer the question now would be an attempt to take the record here and justify the conclusion reached. The information is at best very vague. It would take a considerable number of quotations to give them as they come.

24 November:

Large numbers of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as the addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC Third Fleet.

25 November:

One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

26 November:

The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a large number of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC Second and Third Fleets in particular. . . . Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share.

[314] Again on the 26th of November:

The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at its high level.

27 November:

Bako addressed the Chief of Staff, Third Fleet, information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five dispatches to the major commands.

Same date:

**COMBINED FLEET**—There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Force, and Bako.

Again:

**THIRD FLEET**—Still holding extensive communication with Bako, South China Fleet and French Indo-China. . . . There is nothing to indicate any movements of the Third Fleet as yet.

28 November:

Tokyo originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. . . . The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet, and RNO Palao.

Again, same date:

**COMBINED FLEET**—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet originated his usual number of dispatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, were Crudivs 5 and 7 and Desrons 2 and 4 and Subron 5. No traffic today from the Takao (CA).

[315] Again, same date:

**THIRD FLEET**—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander-in-Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in Sasebo but it is not yet located elsewhere. \* \* \* Two Third Fleet units arrived at Bako and are apparently returning to Kure from Bako.

29 November:

Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, sent one message to Comdesron 5, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesrons 2 and 4. He held extensive communications with the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet and Bako. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

30 November:

One urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force.

30 November:

No information obtained as to the location of the Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

1 December:

**FIRST FLEET**—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire Waters.

**SECOND FLEET**—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area.

**THIRD FLEET**—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces continues.

[316] 2 December:

**SECOND FLEET**—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

Same date:

**THIRD FLEET**—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

**CARRIERS**—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

## 3 December :

The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence Unit originated nine dispatches to the same addressees.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takeo the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

## 4 December :

There were a large number of urgent messages today, [317] most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven-part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and Sama. In this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

## Same date :

The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CINC Second Fleet and CINC Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CINC Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which the CINC Second Fleet is still copying. The CINC Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force, Palao, CINC Second Fleet and CINC Third Fleet.

## 5 December :

Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic only by broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commanders of Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen, either.

## 6 December :

Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Commander of the Fourth Fleet and the major commanders.

[318] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, as to the 6th of December summary, I would like to call your attention to a pencilled note at the bottom which indicates that that summary was not received until after the attack. I just wondered whether you could confirm that or not, or whether you have any recollection of it.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I have no recollection.

Mr. SONNETT. I also would like to refer you, Admiral, back to the December 3rd intelligence summary, which closes with the statement, "No information on submarines or Carriers."

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, may I show you exhibit 21 of this investigation, a photostat of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin number 45-41, and ask you whether you saw that on or about that date?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. It is highly probable that I did during that period.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 1 of the bulletin, do you recall the following statement:

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, ONI Serial number 27-41, supersedes and revises the former report on this subject,

The subject being the organization of the Japanese fleet.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and sea-plane tenders into separate forces and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China.

And then the major fleet commands are listed, the seventh being the carrier fleet, aircraft carriers of five carrier divisions.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Item 7, just to avoid confusion, because they give the numbers of those.

[319] Mr. SONNETT. Right, sir; item 7 listed as the carrier. Do you recall having had that information, Admiral, at that time?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel sure I must have had it.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring back to page 8, Admiral, of the bulletin, there is set forth, is there not, the composition of the Japanese carrier fleet?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes. It indicates here ten carriers and sixteen destroyers.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, is it the fact, Admiral, that after December 1, 1941, and prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, you had no intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of those carriers?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Of a carrier fleet as such we did not, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any information concerning the movements of any of the carriers of the Japanese carrier fleet after December 1, 1941?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Not specifically.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any in general? If so, what?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Without now being able to indicate anything specific, the general organization as set forth in the paper in question was to a large extent a type organization, and while there was a lack of reference to specific carriers or to carriers as a whole, I did not reach a conclusion that they were operating independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Admiral, reach the conclusion that, as stated in these communication intelligence summaries, after December 1, 1941, there was no information as to the carriers?

[320] Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that during that period there were one or two vague indications associating them with the Second and Third Fleets, which was logical, and some possible associations with Palao, and at least one instance with the Marshalls.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Admiral, referring to exhibit 23, which is now Captain Layton's estimate of December 1, 1941, of the location of the Japanese fleet, do you find any reference in that estimate to the location of Carrier Divisions Three and Four of the Japanese fleet?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I note under "Kure-Sasebo" in red pencil "Four CV." I note under heading "CinC 2nd Fleet with units at

Takao" Cardivs 3 and 4, and I note under the summation four at that place. I note under "Marshall Area" one CV.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to exhibit 21, that indicates on page 8 Carrier Division One of the Japanese fleet consisted of AKAGI and the KAGA and Carrier Division Two of the SORU and HIRYU. Do you find in the December 1st estimate by Captain Layton, exhibit 23, any indication as to the location of any of four carriers comprising Carrier Divisions One and Two?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I do not find in that paper the name of any specific ships, carriers or otherwise.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find on page 3, Admiral, under "Bako-Tal area" Carrier Division Four and Carrier Division Three?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find any place in the paper Carrier Division One or Carrier Division Two?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No.

[321] Mr. SONNETT. Did you participate, Admiral, in any conference with Admiral Kimmel concerning the December 1st estimate of Captain Layton?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I do not recall, but if there were a discussion on that, it is improbable that I would not have been present.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I take it, Admiral, you recall no specific discussion of the lack of information concerning Carrier Divisions One and Two of the Japanese fleet on or about December 1, 1941, and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I do not so recall, but I do recall that during that general period, the information as to locations of Japanese fleet units far from as specific as was desired, but I do not recall the lack of information, taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand, that we were extremely disturbed.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring back to exhibit 17 of the Naval Com record, the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, should like to call your attention to the following portion of the dispatch:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL-46.

I should like further to call your attention to the Initial Tasks of the Pacific Fleet and in particular items "b," "g," and "m" of Phase I initial tasks, to be taken when Japan was not in the war, and to ask you what was done by way of a deployment preparatory to carrying out those tasks. I will read them again so that you will have them clearly in mind. (Reading):

b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the [322] Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval force south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

The question, Admiral, is—

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I know the question.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the war warning, what appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out those tasks was executed?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That question has in effect been answered in my reply in this testimony to an earlier question regarding that dispatch. In substance there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movements of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the language which I have quoted from the war warning dispatch was a direction, was it not?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, then, that it was your view that either you had already in effect an appropriate defensive deployment or that what you had in effect on November 27th plus the steps you mentioned amounted to an appropriate defensive deployment. Is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct, and in addition thereto, considering the other tasks assigned in case of war, the direction to take defensive dispositions carried with it the implication that offensive dispositions weren't to be taken. The primary offensive task of the [322] Pacific Fleet, and one that in my view would require very prompt action, was employment of our forces against the Marshalls in order to force the Japanese to withhold a portion of their forces from operations against Malaysia.

This so-called war warning order, mentioning specifically "defensive" dispositions, was issued while important conversations were going on in Washington with a view to prevention of war. It seems clearly to indicate that our forces should not be exposed in the Marshall area or close approaches thereto preparatory to an assault, as detection there might prejudice efforts to maintain peace. Since the fleet was in effect cautioned against offensive dispositions, by specific directives to take defensive dispositions, and since the fleet had to a large extent been already disposed in a defensive manner, it was felt that the directive in question was being complied with.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to the fact that the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet contained in Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five were divided into two phases: Phase I, Japan not in the war, and Phase IA, Japan in the war; and that Phase I did not provide for any raid or any offensive action toward the Marshalls or elsewhere, but did provide for protecting the communications and territory of the associated powers, the prevention of the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and also provided for guarding against surprise attack by Japan.

What specific deployment was made to accomplish those tasks?

Vice Admiral McMorris. The disposition of the major portion of the fleet in Hawaiian rather than in coastal waters was a major action [323] in that regard. The reenforcement hitherto mentioned for Midway and Wake were elements of that disposition. The employment of the fleet units underway at sea and the Hawaiian area with appropriate screens and with patrol of the area by patrol aircraft were other elements of that disposition. The maintenance of a full supply of ammunition and the requirement that all ships at all times must have a certain minimum quantity of fuel on board (my recollection)

tion is that that requirement was seventy per cent, although it may have varied somewhat with the class of the ships) was a support act to make the dispositions effective.

Mr. SONNETT. It would, Admiral, have been an appropriate move would it not, in order to accomplish the initial task "m," namely, guard against surprise attack by Japan, to have established an air presence from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes, that would have been an appropriate act, but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court's record, the so-called war warning, it started out, did it not by stating:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment et cetera, and language that we quoted before.

[325] Now, had you received a dispatch prior to that time stating that this was a war warning or that an aggressive move was expected, other than the dispatch of November 24th, which stated in part, "... a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility"?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. We had received no communication which used the term, "This is a war warning." However, in January of 1941, while I was under orders to duty as War Plans Officer, Pacific Fleet, but before I had reported as such and before Admiral Kimmel had assumed command, I did participate in a conference with Admiral Richardson, then the Commander-in-Chief, and War Plans Officer and with Admiral Kimmel and with the Chief of Staff of the two admirals mentioned, concerning the probability of war with Japan; and throughout the year until 7 December there were various communications by letter and by dispatch and by interchange of personal letters between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, regarding the probability of war with Japan; and the situation was tense throughout the year, much so that the dispatch in question occasioned no surprise, did it convey any considerable amount of additional or startling information.

Mr. SONNETT. The conference to which you refer just before you reported as War Plans Officer, I take it, occurred in late January or early February of 1941, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Late January, 1941, and as a result thereof a joint letter was sent by Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you at that time see the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 24, 1941, which was exhibit 9 before the Naval [326] Court of Inquiry, a copy of which I now show you?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I saw that letter in late January or early February, 1941.



Mr. SONNETT. Did the statements of the Secretary of the Navy in the letter, which I will now read in part, accord with your own views?

(Reading:)

If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. . . .

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS I had no fault to find with the views expressed therein, although not completely in accord as to the elements of danger as listed in importance there.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you also in accord with the statement of the then Secretary of the Navy, which I will quote: "The countermeasures to be considered are: (a) location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched," and the further statement referring to (a) as follows: "The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet, but quite possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war"?

[327] Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Those views appeared to be sound.

Mr. SONNETT. And I take it, Admiral, from your previous testimony that certainly as late as October 14, 1941, when the fleet security letter was issued, you still thought that an air attack was possible although you were of the view that it was not probable?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I felt that an air attack was possible but not probable and that the fleet should not take as its sole object of existence the defense of itself against a surprise attack, but that it should also carry on other fundamental duties.

Mr. SONNETT. Those duties, Admiral, were the duties we referred to before, set forth in the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, were they not?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes, and with reference to that plan, I presume that that included the training and otherwise readying of itself for operations, but whether or not those duties are specifically indicated there, they would be implicit in any orders or plans that might be issued.

Mr. SONNETT. In that connection, Admiral, I call your attention to initial task "k" of the Phase I tasks, reading, "Continue training operations as practicable."

It is the fact, Admiral, or it was the fact, as you earlier testified, that patrols, or aircraft reconnaissance rather, was being conducted from Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period, November 27, 1941, on, was it not?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Only to a very limited extent. The aircraft that were at the outlying bases other than Midway were entirely defensive. The aircraft at Midway were partially defensive and par-

tially [328] for patrol. The amount of gas and the facilities at Midway were extremely limited and necessitated the most conservation of the available supplies and of the aircraft themselves in order that engines might not be worn out before a crisis period arose. Again, it may be remarked in passing that had the maximum search been instituted from Midway and Pearl Harbor the 27th of November warning, the situation with regard to air engines by the 7th of December would have been in a highly critical situation.

Mr. SONNETT. By the first week in December, 1941, Admiral had had, of course, the war warning and you knew that Japanese forces were on the move, according to intelligence, and you also knew that the Japanese were destroying codes and the like, as I recall from previous testimony; is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. You also knew, I take it, Admiral, and were aware of the fact that the Japanese in the past had attacked without declaration of war and indeed your security orders and war plans were based on an assumption that they might do that, is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. The factors which you have mentioned were constantly in the mind of myself and, I am sure, were in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that one of the things that you were thinking about during that first week of December was the proposed reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands, which was one of the tasks set forth in Phase IA of the Pacific War Plan, is that correct?

[329] Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct. During that period, I daily, or at most on alternate days, furnished the Commander-in-Chief an informal typed memo of the action that I felt should be taken by the important elements of the fleet if war ensued in the following twenty-four hours.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibits 69A and 69B of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether those are the memoranda to which you referred.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. These are typical, but I believe there were additional ones.

Mr. SONNETT. Those are dated, Admiral, November 30th and December 5, 1941, respectively, are they not?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any provision made in those for reconnaissance from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Admiral, to task "g" of Phase IA of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet—that is, the Phase I tasks are those to be taken initially when Japan is in the war—task "g" reads as follows: "Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases." Why was no provision made for carrying out that task?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. There was actually in effect in the Pacific Fleet air patrols against enemy forces, but the patrol was against submarines which was regarded as the greatest element of danger. On the outbreak or commencement of war, certain of the patrol craft were

pass to the [330] operational control of the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and such searches would have been conducted by him. However, the number of such aircraft so assigned was very small and it was expected that they would largely be used for anti-submarine patrols as was in effect at the time. Although the operations of that nature were under the general supervision and direction of the Operations Division rather than the Plans Division of the Staff, I was fully aware of what was being done and was completely in accord and had given the weight of my advice in that direction to the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. SONNETT. In advising the Commander-in-Chief during the critical period of 1941, did you evaluate and consider at any length the intelligence information showing that you had no information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers from December 1st on?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Certainly the negative as well as the positive information available entered into the conclusions.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. In your testimony before one of the previous investigations you stated that in your opinion the island defense was adequate and in case of an air attack the chance to inflict damage was small. The question arose in my mind as to what you based that opinion on.

Vice Admiral McMorris. It might be somewhat difficult to give the train of thought that led to those conclusions, but I felt that with the defenses here, with the anti-aircraft power and with the fighter strength, that a large proportion of the attacking planes would be destroyed and that the accuracy of the bombing would be such that no large number of [331] hits would be obtained. Notwithstanding the success of the British attack at Taranto (I believed there were peculiar conditions that existed there), I did not believe that there was a serious hazard from aerial torpedo attack in Pearl because of the necessity for attacking planes to come very low. I believed that a considerable proportion of them would be destroyed by AA fire, aside from the local fighter protection, and that the shallowness of the water and the short distance the torpedoes would have to run would mean that the torpedoes themselves would not inflict great damage. Manifestly, my conclusions were entirely wrong in all those respects. They were reached, however, from reading available information and acquaintance with the torpedo performance in our own Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have any knowledge as to the readiness of the Army anti-aircraft defenses, whether they were actually alerted and occupied their positions?

Vice Admiral McMorris. No.

Admiral HEWITT. But your assumption was that they were in readiness?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct, and perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent there. I had been around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I knew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their anti-aircraft practices and knew the quantity and general disposition of

their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely together for more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. Nevertheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state [332] of readiness being maintained or the watches being kept.

Admiral Hewitt. It was brought out in the other investigation that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were cordial and they saw each other frequently and kept each other informed as well as possible. I wonder whether that extended to elements of the staff, whether there was much interchange of information.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I think there was such interchange of information rather habitually on an informal basis. I myself frequently saw members of General Short's staff. I know General Martin, I believe, and Admiral Bellinger had not infrequently attended meetings; perhaps they shouldn't be characterized as conferees. I know that there had been called for the morning of the 8th of December a meeting between a number of General Short's officers and District officers to meet with Captain DeLany, who was the Operations Officer at the time, at his call to see if there could be brought about an improvement with regard to communications and arrangements for coordination if meeting attack. I cite those things merely as illustrative. There was a considerable amount of interchange of information and discussion with one another. At that time it is certain that the two services acted semi-independently, but the local plan of defense which Admiral Kimmel had approved, had been drawn up by the Commander of the Hawaiian Department's staff and by the Commander of the Sea Frontier's staff.

Before I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, I was Operations Officer for Admiral Andrews, who was the Commander of the Hawaiian Fleet Detachment, and was Senior Officer Present in the Hawaiian Islands when the fleet came out in 1940 some time. During that period, I frequently visited Fort Shafter, the military establishments in Hawaii, and discussed defensive [333] plans with the Planning Officer of the District Commandant. I witnessed a number of firings by the elements. On more than one occasion the G-3 officer of the Department was my guest at our own firings, and after I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, that association continued, and I feel that I was not excused from having contact with the Army personnel on their problems.

Admiral Hewitt. When you discussed the considerations of the principal danger being from submarines, that would apply to ships in the operating areas and to ships entering and leaving the harbor, would not apply to the ships inside the harbor?

Vice Admiral McMorris. No, sir, it did not apply to ships inside the harbor. There had been considerable fear that submarines outside the channel entrance might sink a ship in the entrance. Consideration was given to defensive mining and to the establishment of listening posts a little farther offshore. The thought of defensive mining was abandoned because the shelf was narrow and there was a fair amount of current along there. Almost every one reached the same conclusion that the defensive mines would be more harmful than the submarine menace might be. And there was grave concern over the lack of anti-submarine craft either in numbers or in

Nevertheless, it was felt that the chance of a submarine getting within Pearl Harbor was very, very remote. Actually, of course, when the attack came about, we found we were unduly complacent.

Admiral Hewitt. Well, the submarines that got in Pearl Harbor weren't sea-going submarines; they were midgets.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct, sir. That was our first acquaintance with the midgets.

34] Admiral Hewitt. I think that is all I have. I want to thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

The investigation was then, at 5:20 p. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., 2 June 1945.)



[335] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

THIRTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:45 a. m., 2 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Beacher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH. William W. Smith, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you were Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941, to December 7, 1941, were you not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 34 of this investigation and ask you whether you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. This is Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet, issued July 14, 1941, signed by me.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, that was issued by you on or about July 14, 1941, with Admiral Kimmel's approval, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the purpose of the instructions, I take it, was to summarize the duties of various members of the staff of CincPac?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you examine, Admiral, paragraph 112 on page 1 and read paragraph 112 into the record?

[336] Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer, Admiral, to paragraph 200 on page 3 and similarly read that into the record?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

200. CHIEF OF STAFF—01—*Personal Aide.*

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785—788.)

(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.

(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.

(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.

(e) Signs correspondence as follows:

(1) Routine Matters.

(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.

- (3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
- (4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
- (5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information or guidance.
- (6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers.

[337] Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 35 in this investigation and ask you if you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what it is, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rail Five, otherwise known as WPPac-46.

Mr. SONNETT. That was distributed to the fleet on or about June 1941, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it was.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 36, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in which the Chief of Naval Operations states that he has reviewed the plan of exhibit 35 and accepts it.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that in accordance with your supervision, at least generally, the preparation of the war plan of exhibit 35, and that you were familiar with its provisions.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I had very little to do with the preparation of it, but I did supervise it and read it before it was presented to the Commander-in-Chief for signature.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you examine Part 1 of the plan, about page 12, relating to the composition of Task Force Nine, was the patrol plane force, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. How many patrol planes were listed as comprising that task force?

[338] Vice Admiral SMITH. All units of Aircraft Section Force, 107 VP. The rest of them are ships: Two AV, two AVP, two AVD; and ten utility planes, VJR.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 19 of the exhibit, Admiral, you find stated the basic concept of war in the Pacific as set forth in the basic plan. Will you read that into the record, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in the manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States will not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will rely on the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States will not intend to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the United States Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 22 of the exhibit, Admiral, you find concerns the initial Japanese deployment estimated in the plan. Will you read sub-paragraph "f" into the record?



Vice Admiral SMITH (reading) :

1334. . . .

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area.

Mr. SONNETT. What, Admiral, was comprehended by the term [339] "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific"?

Vice Admiral SMITH. We expected raids on Wake and Midway, possible raids on Wake and Midway, and the Philippines, but everything tended to give us the opinion that the first strike would be down towards Singapore.

Mr. SONNETT. You are speaking now of your intelligence, Admiral, primarily?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am trying to get at at the moment is the understanding which you had of the estimated Japanese initial deployment covered by the statement that raiding and observation forces would be widely distributed in the Pacific and submarines in the Hawaiian area.

Vice Admiral SMITH. We were particularly guarding against their submarine raids in the area and perhaps we were influenced by the fact that within fifteen days after Admiral Kimmel took over as Commander-in-Chief, we had several alarms in the operating areas to the south of Oahu. In one case the destroyers had sound contact with what they believed to be a submarine for a period of more than thirty-six hours. No bombing attack was made on it. One experienced destroyer officer stated that he personally heard propeller noises. Looking back on it, we doubt very much that it was a submarine; it was probably due to different temperatures of water, because one month later when the moon was the same we had the same experience. But we were always guarding against a submarine attack. We believed that that was Japan's first attack to be made upon us and we made every effort to guard against it.

Mr. SONNETT. While you are on the subject of submarine contacts, Admiral, will you state what other contacts you recall prior to December 7, 1941, in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands?

[340] Vice Admiral SMITH. There were many of them, but they were probably large fish. The first one that I recall was in the summer of 1940 when I had the cruiser BROOKLYN and had the gunnery school on board and I came into Pearl Harbor every two or three days, and as I approached the entrance, I received orders to black out, that a submarine had been detected off the entrance, and I remained outside. Within a few hours a dispatch was received from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, stating the contact was false, that it had been a fish. And those continued all during 1941 at intervals. Whether they were real submarines, I don't know. In most cases we decided they were not.

Mr. SONNETT. With particular reference, Admiral, to the months October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, do you recall any contacts in that period?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Returning to the war plan, Admiral, will you examine at page 24 paragraph 2101, which appears to contain an Outline Tasks, and read into the record sub-paragraph "h"?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in den the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, then, that Hawaii was one of the territories of the Associated Powers covered by that paragraph?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to page 25 and read into the record [341] paragraph 2201?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption A-2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption A-1 and divided the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

- a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.
- b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
- c. PHASE II, etc.,—Succeeding tasks.

Mr. SONNETT. Paragraph 2202 sets forth, does it not, initial tasks to be performed by the Pacific Fleet before the Japanese got in the war? Will you read that?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- b. Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
- c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
- f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
- g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of strike groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.

[342] h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

- i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible radio bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.

j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

k. Continue training operations as practicable.

l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 32 of the exhibit and paragraphs 3141 to 3143, those paragraphs set forth, do they not, the initial tasks assigned to the patrol plane force before Japan was in the war?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read those into the record, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

3141. Task Force Nine will perform the task assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Annex I, Admiral, as to Phase I, namely, when Japan is not in the war, would you read into the record paragraph 2? Annex I, I take it, is the Patrol and Sweeping Plan?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read into the record paragraph 2 of that plan?

[343] Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

(c) Covering.

(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

(e) Routing shipping.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to paragraph 3 of the Patrol and Sweeping Plan, it sets forth, does it not, specific tasks of the various task forces?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it does.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read the specific tasks set forth for Task Force Nine? I think it is on page I-16.

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

[344] (5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep en-route.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces, thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 8 of the war plan, does it appear that the plan was to become effective on W-Day?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as

W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

Mr. SONNETT. To attempt to summarize, Admiral, for the sake of the record, does it appear from the plan that it might be put into execution on a day other than the date hostilities with Japan commenced or on a day other than M, or mobilization, day?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It could have been put into effect on any date by the Navy Department.

[345] Mr. SONNETT. Do you find any provision in the plan, Admiral, which requires the designation of W-Day to require the approval of the Navy Department?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I would have to read the entire plan to answer that question. My recollection is that we had it in some form.

Mr. SONNETT. Apart from that question, Admiral, and referring specifically to the Phase I initial tasks, namely, those to be performed when Japan was not in the war—those, you will recall, are set forth on pages 24 and 25 of the plan—is it correct that the Phase I initial tasks were entirely defensive in nature?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, they are entirely defensive, and training, of course, which is very important.

Mr. SONNETT. Do any of the Phase I initial tasks, when Japan was not yet in the war, require, or did they require, a directive from the Navy Department to be discharged?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is my impression, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you specifically by way of illustration to Initial Task 1-m, which is "Guard against surprise attack by Japan. Was that a task which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was required to carry out, irrespective of any Navy Department directive?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, that was constantly in his mind.

Mr. SONNETT. And similarly, Admiral, referring to Initial Task 1-g, to protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific, that, too, was a task which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had irrespective of the Navy Department, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it was.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you Annex VII, Section VI, to the [346] Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and Addendum I thereto, which was exhibit 23 before the Naval Court of Inquiry, and ask you whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I do not recall the details of this plan, but I remember it as having been signed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and by General Short. We had it in our office.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to Addendum I, which is annexed to that document, and will you state, Admiral, what Addendum I is?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It is a "joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of a sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall having seen that at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I can't recall when I first saw it, but I did see it.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the summary of the situation contained in Addendum I, will you read that into the record and then state whether it was in accord with your views at the time?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

[347] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that in accord, Admiral, with your views at or about that date, March of '41?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I would say that this is an estimate of the situation in which all possibilities were considered. I would also state that I know of no one in this area who really believed there would be a hostile air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, but we guarded against it. I believe that prior to this date—I know that prior to this date, in fact the 15th of February, we issued an order, 2CL-41, which was later revised in the middle of October, that provided for this very thing, for both air and submarine attack, and also that our ships were so moored at all moorings in Pearl Harbor—in the first place, the heavy ships had to be headed out before they were moored, and they were so moored that it provided in all four areas there was an arc of fire from every direction from which planes could come from a 360 degree arc. And I remember that we knew at that time the Army plan was to throw a cordon of light anti-aircraft guns around Pearl Harbor, but we felt that the guns of the fleet, in case of a surprise attack, would be much more effective than anything the Army had. It was for that reason that we moored the ships as we did.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you refer to exhibit 8 of the Naval Court record and state whether or not that is the Pacific Fleet letter on the security of the fleet at base and in the operating areas which you just mentioned?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, that is. It is a revision of a similar letter issued on the 15th of February, 1941.

[348] Mr. SONNETT. And that revision was issued on October 14, 1941, was it not, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read assumption 2 (b) of the Pacific Fleet confidential letter into the record, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

2. . . .

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
- (3) a combination of these two.

Mr. SONNETT. So that, I take it, Admiral, it was your view that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, yes, but a remote possibility, I would say.

Mr. SONNETT. And that was the basis for the fleet letter on security and of the war plans?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. That possibility, also, Admiral, reflected your knowledge, did it not, of the fact that historically the Japanese had attacked without declaration of war.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you, Admiral, refer to exhibit 15 of the Naval Court record, which is exhibit 24 of this investigation, and state whether or not you saw that dispatch at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall whether I saw it at the time. I think I did. I am familiar with the dispatch.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, will you just briefly describe what that dispatch is?

[349] Vice Admiral SMITH. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and the Commandants of Districts 11, 12, 13, and 15, with information to Cinclant and Spenavo, London, and it states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X . . . Action advises to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, will you refer to exhibit 17, Admiral, of the Naval Court record, which is exhibit 25 of this investigation, and state whether or not you saw this dispatch at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I saw it on the date it was received, the 27th of November.

Mr. SONNETT. Again, for the sake of the record, will you state what that dispatch is?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It starts out by saying: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," and then unfortunately it tells us what the attack is coming from or what will be attacked.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read that language into the record, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive movement of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task force indicates an amphibious expedition [350] against either Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and Army authorities A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British."

Mr. SONNETT. That is the so-called war warning of November 27, Admiral, is it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer now to exhibit 18 of the Naval Court record, the following exhibit, and state whether or not you saw that dispatch at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, I remember this very well.

Mr. SONNETT. Again, will you state what that dispatch is?

Vice Admiral SMITH. This dispatch was received by the Army from the War Department, as well as by the Commander-in-Chief from the Navy Department, and we were in conference for several days on it as to how to carry it out. It required us to move to replace our planes in the outlying islands, Midway and Wake, by Army planes, as I remember.

It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly [351] to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of that dispatch, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. November 26, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I believe you stated that several days were spent in conference on that subject?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the conferences were between General Short and Admiral Kimmel?

Vice Admiral SMITH. And their staffs.

Mr. SONNETT. And their staffs?

Vice Admiral SMITH. And the Commanding General of the Army Air Force.

Mr. SONNETT. As I recall your previous testimony, Admiral, you indicated that it was in connection with that subject that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had the closest to a dispute that you ever saw between them?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state just what that was?

Vice Admiral SMITH. During the discussion, we informed the Army that the planes they placed on Wake would have to remain there for the duration of a war, if any, because it was impossible to put a ship in there and take them out and Army planes are not equipped to land on a carrier, although they can take off from a carrier. Admiral Kimmel then asked, "What may I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" and General Martin of the Army Air Force replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles offshore," to which Admiral Kimmel replied, "Then they are [352] no damn good to me," or words to that effect. General Short stated, not angrily at all, that, "If I man these islands, I must command them," and Kimmel replied, "Only over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases." General Short replied, "Mind you, I do not want these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put troops and planes on them, then I must command them." And that was the extent of the controversy.

Mr. SONNETT. Actually, Admiral, subsequently Marines were used instead of Army personnel, were they not, to reenforce the islands?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Before Pearl Harbor, Admiral Halsey was on his way with the ENTERPRISE to land an additional squadron of Marine planes, but the plan, as I recall it, went further than replacing planes; the troops were involved also, because I remember that the Army had no guns and it was necessary for us to leave our guns there.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it then, Admiral, that at or about the time of the receipt of the so-called war warning of November 27th, General Short and Admiral Kimmel were engaged in considerable discussion about this proposal to reenforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, they were.

Mr. SONNETT. What conferences and discussions were held, Admiral, after November 27th concerning the so-called war warning message?

Vice Admiral SMITH. A conference was held in Admiral Kimmel's office that afternoon. Admiral Bloch was not present since he was visiting his wife in the hospital. He was represented by Captain Earle. The conference was held, to my recollection, about 5 p. m. I do not recall whether General Short was present at that one, but I know that the Intelligence [352] Officer was given a copy of the dispatch to take over and make certain that General Short got it. I am quite certain a conference was held the next day. In the meantime, on the evening of the 27th, the Army was on the march. I manned the public utilities, reservoirs, and so on, to protect them against possible sabotage, which apparently was what the Army feared most in these islands. How many conferences were held later, I do not recall, but by that time we were conferring at least every other day. I was present at most of the conferences. But one night I recall that Admiral Kimmel at 6 o'clock called up General Short at General Short's home and General Short said he was about to go up to the north side of the island and Kimmel said, "Stay there; I am coming over to see you," which he did. What that conference was about, I don't know, but I imagine it was on this same subject. I was not present at that.

Mr. SONNETT. How was the so-called war warning of November 27th evaluated by Admiral Kimmel, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH. There were several considerations. One was that negotiations had been resumed on the arrival of Kurusu. There was a report that Admiral Hart's seaplanes had discovered large Japanese forces moving south. The Intelligence Officer placed the position of some Japanese forces somewhere supposedly in the Marshalls. The Combined Fleet, as I recollect it, was in home waters and the carriers were supposedly in home waters also. Therefore, we felt, not knowing whether the United States would be in the war or not—many of the directions we received, mostly in personal letters from Admiral Stark but which are on file, cautioned us not to take any action that might foment a war. The people of the United States were divided in their opinions apparently. We believed that their [354] attack would be on the Dutch and British to the south and that if they did attack us, it would be in the Philippines. We had no assurance from our



government that the United States would go to war if the Dutch and British were attacked. We were in constant training, intensive training, to prepare for war, but there was nothing in that message that led us to believe that Pearl Harbor was threatened with an air attack. We did expect a surprise submarine attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the November 24th dispatch from OpNav, that dispatch started, did it not, as follows:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility? Upon receipt of that dispatch was it found that the views of yourself and Admiral Kimmel were in accord with the situation as stated in the dispatch?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, but the words, "In any direction including an attack on the Philippines and Guam" implies that they are not coming any farther east than the Philippines or Guam.

Mr. SONNETT. Of course, it was true at that time, Admiral, that it was your estimate, as set forth in the various war plans, that a surprise attack on Oahu by air was a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Always, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And this dispatch said, did it not, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That's right.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the so-called war warning of [355] November 27th that started out, did it not, sir, by stating, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

Vice ADMIRAL SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Had you ever received a dispatch before that time in such language?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, and as I have previously testified, if they put a period after the words "war warning," it would have been a much more effective message. We had received many letters from the Chief of Naval Operations—in fact, almost weekly warnings—and Admiral Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had received similar warnings. Perhaps we received too many of them. But we hadn't received one saying, "This is to be considered a war warning," not previously.

Mr. SONNETT. The second sentence of that November 27th dispatch, Admiral, was as follows, was it not:

Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that substantially in accord with your own views at the time of receipt of the warning, namely, that within a few days Japan would strike somewhere?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, but I have a vague recollection that on the same date that this was received we had some other word, possibly in the local paper, that negotiations had been resumed, and, of course, they were resumed.

Mr. SONNETT. Of course, Admiral, I take it that you do not mean to state that as between a newspaper account—

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, no.

Mr. SONNETT. And an OpNav dispatch, you would lend more credence [356] to a newspaper account?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, no. Something had happened—it must have been another dispatch—by which we learned that negotiations had been resumed.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, the receipt of dispatches during the first week of December, 1941, advising that the Japanese were destroying their codes?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And that, I take it, confirmed the impression that war was imminent with Japan?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, and we had directed Guam to destroy its codes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, what specific steps were taken between November 27th and December 7, 1941, as a result of this warning?

Vice Admiral SMITH. We continued our intensive schedule of training, having always at least one task force operating and usually two. We notified all task force commanders of the receipt of the message and called attention to our order 2CL-41 of October 15th and 12th. We had our destroyers—the big ships were always protected by destroyers against submarine attack. We carried out our searches in the operating area. I am quite certain we had alerts in the harbor just for training. We prepared to carry out the war plan if ordered to do so.

Mr. SONNETT. Which of those actions, Admiral, was not in effect before November 27th?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Before November 27th, on any suspicion of sighting or on sound contact with anything that could be an enemy submarine, a signal was sent out immediately and all forces in the operating area [357] ceased whatever training they were doing; the destroyers went at high speed to protect the carriers and battleships, carrying out the provisions of existing directives. This happened on many occasions, sometimes when the entire fleet was at sea.

Early in Admiral Kimmel's administration he reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that he had on one occasion issued orders to depth charge a suspicious contact in the operating area and had changed those orders. The Chief of Naval Operations in his letter stated, "Thank God you didn't," or words to that effect. Before the 27th of November, Admiral Kimmel, with no instructions from the Navy Department, issued orders that any submarine within a radius of one mile, I believe it was, possibly three miles, of the entrance to Pearl Harbor would be depth charged by the offshore patrol. After November 27th, it is my recollection that he issued orders to depth charge submarines in any area in which we were operating.

Mr. SONNETT. As to the air patrol of operating areas, Admiral, that had been in effect, I take it, prior to November 27th?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, yes, that had been in effect, I should say during the entire year of 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And that air patrol of the operating areas was continued after November 27th?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, will you just state generally what the operating areas were?

Vice Admiral SMITH. The operating areas were to the south of Oahu for approximately thirty miles and extending east and west. Some ships were operating around Maui. Those were the general operating areas. Occasionally we operated to the north of Oahu, and shortly before Pearl Harbor we had a fleet exercise for the entire fleet to the north of Oahu, [358] and it was very intensive, darkened at night, as we had been for some time, and, of course, on occasions like those the air searches were to the northward to protect the fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any air search from Oahu to the north after November 27th and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I cannot recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether the operation to which you just testified occurred after November 27th and before the attack?

Vice Admiral SMITH. There were no operations to the north between 27 November and 7 December 1941, although I believe we would send a destroyer at night to make a trip along the north shore, with the possibility that the destroyer might find a submarine lurking there or communicating with the beach. I know that that was done early in the war and I believe that it was done after November 27th.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified before the Naval Court that, in substance, as Chief of Staff you did not maintain a current written estimate of the situation, but that you did maintain a current mental estimate, and that the situation was discussed daily and that daily the War Plans Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer presented their estimates to Admiral Kimmel. Is that correct?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Correct, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the War Plans Officer?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Captain, now Vice Admiral, C. H. McMorris.

Mr. SONNETT. And the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Was Lieutenant Commander, now Captain, Layton.

Mr. SONNETT. And that practice of furnishing a daily estimate was followed from November 27th to December 7th?

[359] Vice Admiral SMITH. Followed long before that.

Mr. SONNETT. And also during that period?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Before the Naval Court, Admiral, you stated in answer to a question as to the adequacy of the state of readiness existing on December 7th, in substance, as follows: That in your opinion the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages and then you said: "You must remember that what we were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. We were thinking about the fleet and the readiness of the fleet. I believe that the state of readiness is indicated by the fact that how quickly the gun crews responded to the fire which was absolutely unexpected. We exercised as much security as we could in port. We realized that the Army defenses were not adequate, that ships were stationed in sectors and every sector was always occupied for anti-aircraft fire, but we also had to get that fleet in readiness to go back to sea. It happened at a time when two task forces were in

port. Usually only one was in port. Sometimes three were at sea depending upon the exercises that were projected by the Commander-in-Chief. The readiness of the ships—they were ready for anything but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out and how to get out and go into battle. They were not thinking about the defense of Pearl Harbor.”

Is that a correct statement of your views during the period after November 27, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it is.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, then, that the primary emphasis, Admiral, during that so-called critical period after November 27th was on preparation for offensive action by the fleet?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, to get ready, yes.

[360] Mr. SONNETT. And that your thinking was primarily on that score?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, among the intelligence which you received prior to the attack, do you recall any information received from intercepted telephone conversations of the Japanese, or from intercepted cable messages from the Japanese?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. Those cable messages were brought to me two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. We, so far as I know, had intercepted no important messages concerning enemy movements.

Mr. SONNETT. Either telephonically or by cable?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you state for the record your estimate of the situation and of possible enemy courses of action during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I believe I have stated before we thought that the enemy would take his first action to the south against the British and Dutch, possibly the Philippines. Early in 1941 I recall an officer messenger coming through from Admiral Hart's flagship in which he gave his estimate of the possibility that the Japanese would go south and would bypass the Philippines and not attack there at all; would get Hong Kong and places to the south before that. I don't say that we agreed with that, but it was my estimate, and I believe the estimate of the staff, that their activities would be confined to the Far East to take everything they needed there before any action was taken to the eastward; and always, because of their previous history, the possibility of a very strong submarine attack to disable our heavy ships.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, in the Pearl Harbor area?

[361] Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it also, Admiral, that it was your estimate after November 27, 1941, that an air attack at Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. A possibility, but certainly not a probability.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and ask whether you recall having seen those.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall ever having seen this dispatch but this intelligence is of the nature given to the Commander-in-Chief by our Intelligence Officer, who worked very closely with the In-

telligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, and I recall this particularly, that "our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 21, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall ever having seen this.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, having received at or about that date, which, I believe, is November 27th, information to the effect substantially that the Japanese had organized their carriers into a separate force, that they were estimated to have five carrier divisions, consisting of a total of ten carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I do not recall that. We knew how many they had, but I don't recall any special organization they had formed.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your recollection as to the number of carriers that the Japanese had?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Eleven, including the small ones.

Mr. SONNETT. And they were organized into divisions, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, as I recall it.

[362] Mr. SONNETT. How many carriers to a division?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I think two.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral exhibit 22, photostatic copies of communication intelligence summaries, and call your attention particularly to those during the period November 27th to December 6, 1941, and ask, first, if you can identify the initials appearing in the lower right-hand corner of those summaries.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you examine those, Admiral, and state whether or not you received them during the period November 27th to December 6, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't remember just when this was received, but I assume it was received on or after 27 November. I would say that the Intelligence Officer held his stuff very, very close and, as I have stated, I was usually present in his daily meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, but there was so much administrative work going on that frequently I was called from the office for some other purpose. However, I was familiar with these estimates, traffic analyses.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your estimate, Admiral, from November 27th to December 6, 1941, as to the location of the Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. About as stated here, some in the Marshalls and the remainder in home areas. As this states, "An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and the SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any combined air force to Hainan."

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you examine the summaries after November 27th and up to December 6, 1941, and point out the information which was the basis for your belief that the carriers remained in those [363] locations?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising

maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up with, "They are believed to be in home waters."

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any such statement in the summaries, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. On the 27th, "Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any combined air force units to Hainan." The 29th, "The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in the Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches indicate today that the following units are under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet." That includes several submarine divisions and destroyer squadrons and [364] two carriers, Cardiv 3. On the 1st of December, "Carriers no change."

Mr. SONNETT. On the 1st it was noted that there was a change in Japanese radio calls, Admiral, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes. I didn't know about that before. In fact, that impresses me more than anything I have read here, and it is followed by great confusion because they cannot locate anybody.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you note their statement, Admiral—I think it is on the 2nd—concerning the blank of information as to carriers and tell us what your evaluation of that was?

Vice Admiral SMITH. On the 2nd:

*COMBINED AIR FORCE*—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third, and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

Mr. SONNETT. Just after that, Admiral, the next paragraph.

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall having seen that, Admiral, at the time?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I do not. It is too long ago. I do not recall.

Mr. SONNETT. And on the 3rd, if you will just note the reference to carriers.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't see anything on the 3rd of December—

Mr. SONNETT. On the last line, Admiral.

[365] Vice Admiral SMITH. "No information on submarines or carriers." Then on the 4th—

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall having noted the lack of information on the 3rd as to carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall it. On the 4th it gives the information that the Second Fleet, which includes the carriers, was in the vicinity of Takao.

Mr. SONNETT. What was that, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. On the 4th, speaking of the Combined Fleet:

The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet. . . . These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet is still copying. CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to the Third Base Force, Palao, and CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet as information addressees.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether the lack of information as to Japanese carriers which is set forth in the communication intelligence summaries after December 1, 1941, was discussed between you and Admiral Kimmel?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. My recollection is that he questioned the Intelligence Officer on it, in fact, every day, but I don't know that we discussed that or what it might possibly mean. It is more likely that he might have done it with the War Plans Officer. He frequently sent for the War Plans Officers while I was doing something else. He may have discussed it with them.

[366] Mr. SONNETT. In that connection, Admiral, I show you exhibit 23, which is a December 1, 1941, memorandum from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to the Admiral on the location of the Japanese fleet, and ask whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I recollect that this report was called for by the Commander-in-Chief. I probably saw it at the time. In fact, it was submitted frequently.

Mr. SONNETT. That, I take it, was a special report by the Fleet Intelligence Officer at the Commander-in-Chief's request?

Vice Admiral SMITH. To the Commander-in-Chief. That was not distributed to the staff. It may have gone through the War Plans Section.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you saw that estimate at the time, that is, about December 1 or 2, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. It looks very familiar to me, but my recollection is that I saw more than one of those, and this particular one I don't recall. Undoubtedly I saw it.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that at that time it was noted by the Commander-in-Chief that this estimate did not account for the whereabouts of Japanese Carrier Divisions One and Two?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No.

Mr. SONNETT. You recall no conversation with Admiral Kimmel on that point?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No.

Mr. SONNETT. And you did not, I take it, participate in any meetings between Admiral Kimmel and Layton at which that point was discussed?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I don't remember.

Mr. SONNETT. What discussion, Admiral, if any, during the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall with Admiral Kimmel concerning [367] aircraft reconnaissance?

Vice Admiral SMITH. He had frequent conversations with Admiral Bellinger, who is much more capable of answering that question than I am. Just on which days those conferences were held, I don't know, but they frequently discussed the practicability of more extensive use of patrol planes, and it is my recollection that Bellinger outlined his limitations to Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, that he was limited by the number of engines he had. He was trying to get leak proof tanks installed. It was a question of whether he should put it all into training or wear out his planes, of which he had not too many.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any such discussion, Admiral, after November 27, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I could not. I could not be certain about that.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a route sheet and correspondence to which are annexed aircraft schedules, together with a photostatic copy of an outgoing dispatch from CincPac to ComPatWing Two, dated 22 November 1941, and ask whether you recall those.

Vice Admiral SMITH. My recollection is that the Fleet Aviator discussed this with Kimmel. He would never prepare a dispatch of this kind without bringing it to Admiral Kimmel's attention. And I undoubtedly released the dispatch, but I wouldn't have done so had Kimmel not known what was going on.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, those schedules, Admiral, set forth the utilization of the patrol planes of the fleet from November 17, 1941, up to and including December 31, 1941, do they not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

[368] Mr. SONNETT. And the schedules as submitted were approved on November 22, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark a photostatic copy of the route sheet and schedules together with a photostatic copy of the dispatch approving them, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And for the sake of the record, Admiral, the document I show you is a photostatic copy of the original document you have before you, is it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 37.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, these schedules do not provide for any reconnaissance from Oahu, do they?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It is not so stated here and it probably came under "training" because it is certain that the searches were conducted daily in the operating area. It would appear that no particular squadron was assigned that duty and that was probably part of the training.

Mr. SONNETT. These schedules, Admiral, were approved before receipt of the November 24th and the November 27th, or war warning dispatches, were they not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel after November 27th concerning the necessity or desirability for revision of these schedules?



Vice Admiral SMITH. I do not recall. So many things happened that I cannot remember that. I think it is more likely that Admiral Bellinger [369] or Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, the Fleet Aviator, would be able to answer that question.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion during the period November 27th to December 6th of any proposed Army reconnaissance over the Mandated Islands?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Two planes had long been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations to make a flight from Hawaii over the Mandated Islands, to land, I believe, in New Caledonia, then to proceed to Australia and to Manila. The purpose of this flight was photographic reconnaissance and the planes were ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations not to circle the Mandated Islands but to proceed directly over them, then furnish the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with copies of the photographs. One of the planes had arrived in Pearl Harbor, but, as I recall the conversation between Admiral Bellinger and the Commander-in-Chief, they had failed to bring their camera with them or some item of very important equipment. To the best of my knowledge, the second plane never arrived and the flight was never made before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. These were Army planes, Admiral, were they not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, they were Army planes.

Mr. SONNETT. And when you said that the reconnaissance had been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, did you mean the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It probably was the Chief of Staff. I dare say that it resulted from a conference because their orders were to deliver the photographs to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel, the copies; so I imagine the Navy must have been in it.

[370] Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, Admiral, and ask you whether you recall having seen that at or about November 28, 1941.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall having seen this paper, and I doubt if I did see it. However, I knew about the flight as projected. I was of the opinion—I still am of the opinion—that the flight was ordered long before November 28th, but the planes weren't ready.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you testified before the Naval Court, in substance, that you thought that the intent of the war warning message of the 27th was to get you on your toes out here and to get you ready to execute the war plan. Is that correct?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And you recall that the November 27th message directed that an appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 be executed? Do you recall that provision of the exhibit?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, will you state what discussion was had with Admiral Kimmel concerning the steps to be taken to constitute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the initial tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the war plans?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I cannot remember in detail, but I do recall conferences over the charts, Admiral Kimmel taking the type commanders personally to the War Plans Office and going over all these

islands of the Marshalls and Carolines; discussions of what might be found there; whether they would be soft or difficult; that that had been going on for months.

[371] Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 35, the Pacific War Plan, you will recall, Admiral, that the initial tasks assigned the Pacific Fleet were in Phase I, namely, Japan not in the war and Phase Ia, Japan in the war; that under Phase I, one of the tasks was: "g. To protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and to prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necessary"; and "m. To guard against surprise attack by Japan."

What, if any, consideration was given to the steps to be taken to carry out those initial tasks which were to be taken before Japan got into the war?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Well, the ships had already been designated for each task long before 27 November. All that was needed was the word to carry out the plan.

Mr. SONNETT. As I recall your earlier testimony, Admiral, Phase I initial tasks required no Navy Department direction to be carried out?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Well, certain parts of it.

Mr. SONNETT. Specifically, the portions I just called to your attention, namely, to protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and also to guard against surprise attack. Was there any consideration given as to the means or methods to be employed to carry out the directive?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Certain of those items were already being done without the plan being in effect. For example, we had submarines stationed off Midway and Wake, fighting planes out of Wake and patrol [372] planes operating from Midway. Whenever a task force moved with a carrier, they always had their planes in the air on a search. We always, over our ships, launched our planes for protection against submarines. We had been doing that a long time.

Mr. SONNETT. I note that one of the Phase I initial tasks to be taken when Japan was not in the war, as set forth in the war plan was "h," namely, to establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. That was, of course, done, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That was done.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What I would like to get at is what was done in connection with the other similar Phase I tasks in connection with the patrolling by light forces and patrol planes and guarding against attack by Japan.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I would say that the only thing that was done was the guarding with patrol planes in the direction of Japan or to the northward. I have forgotten just where in the phase it con-

but remember we had to send cruisers and submarines to the north and southeast Pacific, Samoa. That was not considered a necessary preliminary to the mobilization.

Mr. SONNETT. Would the establishment of aircraft patrol from Oahu have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it would.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibits 69A and 69B of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you can identify those.

[373] Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what they are, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. This is a memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief, prepared by the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris, dated 30 November 1941. It is a recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief on steps to be taken in case of an American-Japanese war within twenty-four hours of the date of the memorandum. This is followed by a second memorandum of the same nature, dated noon, December 5, 1941, recommending steps to be taken in case of an American-Japanese war within the next forty-eight hours.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you see those at or about the dates they bear, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I believe so.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find in either of those memoranda any provision made to carry out the initial tasks laid down in the war plans concerning aircraft patrol?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you participate in any discussion with Admiral Kimmel or with Captain McMorris concerning the adequacy of the steps recommended by him in those memoranda?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recollect having done so.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel during this period November 27th to December 7, 1941, of the lack of information reflected in the intelligence summaries as to Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. There were frequent discussions, but lack of sufficient information from the Navy Department. We believed at that time that our intelligence was adequate. We received very little from Naval Intelligence. It is possible that the Intelligence Officer of the [374] Fourteenth Naval District and the Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief received more information than I know of. Occasionally a paper from the State Department would pass over my desk on conditions in Japan, but I never saw anything alarming in one of those papers. I believe they came out monthly. There may, of course, have been other reports of the State Department of a more secret nature that weren't issued to us at all. If there were, they weren't shown to me. I do not recall any discussion of the adequacy or inadequacy of our own intelligence staff. The same two officers are continuing the same jobs; so they are apparently considered satisfactory now.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, was it the fact that, so far as your intelligence was concerned relating to the movements of Japanese naval vessels, your reliance was on the intelligence submitted by the Fleet Intelligence Officer primarily?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Which was most current?

Vice Admiral SMITH. And based upon the analysis of radio traffic. At that time, to the best of my knowledge, our people were unable to decipher Japanese naval codes. They did decipher commercial codes, the movements of commercial ships.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to your previous testimony that your estimate was that a surprise attack by the Japanese on the fleet in the harbor by air was possible but not probable, will you state the basis for that estimate?

Vice Admiral SMITH. There was a great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the Navy Department, our [375] intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even by a neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was for this reason that we did not fear an air attack.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation then, at 12:05 p. m., recessed until 1:30 p. m. at which time is reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties.)

[376] Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, Commander Burr?

Commander BURR. Harold S. Burr, Commander, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Donald Woodrum, Lieutenant, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, what is your present assignment?

Commander BURR. I am Acting District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And yours, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I am attached to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your assignment in 1941, Commander Burr?

Commander BURR. I was Naval Liaison Officer for the Command at the headquarters of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and on the complement of the District Intelligence Office.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give us an outline of what your duties were as Liaison Officer, generally?

Commander BURR. Sir, it was a new job and I was sort of a hand man, trying to help the Army with its problems involving the Navy, seeing that officers in the Army were placed in touch with appropriate officers in the District in order to accomplish missions of mutual responsibility or interest. It was a very broad field.

Admiral HEWITT. I suppose also you advised them about naval affairs insofar as you could?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

Q Mr. SONNETT. Did you know in 1941 then Lieutenant Commander Layton?

A Commander BURR. I did.

Q SONNETT. And what was his assignment at that time?

A Commander BURR. I understood it to be Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Q SONNETT. Do you recall on or about November 27, 1941, receiving from Lieutenant Commander Layton a message for delivery to General Short?

A Commander BURR. I think it was received directly from Lieutenant Commander Layton, but I am not sure. It was at CincPac and he and others were there at the time. The Chief of Staff, Fourteenth District, was there, and I couldn't swear it was Commander Layton, although I am sure he is acquainted with the message.

Q SONNETT. I show you exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry asking whether the message which you received at that time was a copy of this or substantially a copy of this message.

A Commander BURR. I would say it appears to be substantially the

Q SONNETT. Will you state what you did with that message at that time, Commander?

A Commander BURR. I was instructed to deliver that message to General Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. It took several hours by the time I received it, but I drove directly to Fort Shafter and attempted to locate General Short. No one seemed to know where he was at the time. I knew that the message was urgent; I looked for the Chief of Staff, who was next senior, and I couldn't find him. The Senior Officer Present was Colonel Donnegan, then Lieutenant Colonel William Donnegan, head of G-3, which, I believe is the next senior officer. So I showed the [378] message to him and explained my eagerness to reach General Short, and, as far as I can recollect, he stated that he would see to it that General Short saw it and that since he was apparently the action officer, he would proceed to act on the message at that time.

Q SONNETT. Did you leave the message with him?

A Commander BURR. Reluctantly.

Q SONNETT. Did you subsequently ascertain whether the message had been delivered to General Short?

A Commander BURR. Yes, sir, I checked with Colonel Donnegan and learned that it had been delivered to General Short.

Q SONNETT. When were you told by Colonel Donnegan that it had been delivered to General Short?

A Commander BURR. On or about the 28th, the following day.

Q SONNETT. I think, Admiral, that is all on that particular point.

A Admiral HEWITT. I think that is all.

Q SONNETT. Lieutenant, during 1941 were you familiar with the one line taps which were on the line of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu?

A Lieutenant WOODRUM. After about October I was made familiar with them.

Q SONNETT. Do you have in the files of the District Intelligence transcripts of the telephone conversations so intercepted?

A Lieutenant WOODRUM. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to taps on the line of the Japanese Consul, were there telephone taps on the line of the Japanese Vice Consul as well?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. There was a tap on the private line of the [379] Japanese Vice Consul in the Consulate itself.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the telephone taps by ONI on the business phones of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul, did you for a time have taps on their home phones?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Yes, we did. We had a tap on the home phone of the Consul General until about September and on the Vice Consul until we shut down.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you discontinue tapping the telephone wires in question, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. December 2, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state in general the nature and type of information which was acquired from the telephone taps you have described?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. There was very little of military significance. There was a great deal of information concerning the routine activities of the Consul and some information concerning the activities of the local Japanese population.

Mr. SONNETT. Could you prepare and submit for this investigation Lieutenant, copies of the transcripts of telephone conversations intercepted from October to December 2, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those as exhibits when received, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit 38.")

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Lieutenant, the reasons for the discontinuance of the telephone taps by ONI on or about December 2, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I have no personal knowledge of the reason [380] for removing the taps on December 2nd, but this is my general understanding of the reason that action was taken at that time. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with our cognizance, had placed a tap on the private phone of one Kenzi Kimura, the general manager of the NYK office in Honolulu. This occurred some time in November, 1941. Late in November, 1941, a member of the District Intelligence Office learned from a contact at the telephone company that workmen had uncovered the FBI tap on Mr. Kimura. The member of the District Intelligence Office assumed that FBI had made this tap without the cognizance of the telephone company inasmuch as the NYK office was on the ground floor of the same building in which the FBI office was located and the tap was in the basement of that building. During a subsequent visit of an FBI agent, the representative of the DIO informed him of this fact in a spirit of cooperation, with the thought of warning him that his taps had been uncovered and security violated. I was present at this meeting when the FBI agent was so informed. It is my understanding that a representative of the FBI thereafter approached the telephone company and demanded to know why their representatives were revealing FBI secrets to the Office of Naval Intelligence. The result of this approach by the FBI was t

give one or more employees of the telephone company a realization that this sort of activity was going on, whereas they previously, to our knowledge, hadn't known of it.

When Captain Mayfield learned of the FBI action, he ordered all taps to be removed. It was my understanding that the reason for this was his concern at the violation of security caused by this incident and his concern that some incident of possible international import might result from such revelations. The telephone tapping work done by ONI was kept extremely secret. Only a handful of persons in the District [381] Intelligence Office, who were directly concerned with the information gained thereby, were even aware that such work was being done. Many persons attached to the office weren't aware that such work was being done and great care was taken to prevent their obtaining that knowledge. I was told that even the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was not aware of this activity in order that he might be spared any possible embarrassment arising from his knowledge thereof.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether after December 2, 1941, the FBI tapped any of the Japanese telephone wires?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I don't know.

Mr. SONNETT. Did they have access to the trans-Pacific telephone conversations?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I have seen transcripts of taps they made on conversations between Honolulu and Japan during the months of November and December, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Among those conversations was the so-called Mori conversation, was there not?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Yes, there was.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state when the Navy first received a transcript of that conversation?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. It is my understanding that this conversation took place on the evening of December 5, 1941, and that Captain Mayfield was notified by FBI, either immediately or the following day, that a suspicious conversation had taken place and that a translation and transcription was being made by the FBI translator at that time.

It is my further understanding that a written translation of the conversation was received at the District Intelligence Office some time [382] on December 6, 1941. At that time it was studied by Commander Denzel Carr, who thereupon desired to hear the original recording of the conversation. Arrangements were made with the FBI to have him do this, but as it was late in the evening already by the time this was done, it was agreed that he would go down the following day and listen to the recording. At a time subsequent to the Japanese attack, within a day or so, Commander Carr did go down and listen to the recording. At that time he stated to me that it was his opinion that Dr. Mori was not attempting to send information from the Islands, but on the contrary was greatly surprised and mystified by the whole tenor of the conversation. It was further Commander Carr's opinion that Dr. Mori hedged and hesitated to give anything in the way of specific military information. A study of the transcript reveals that strictly military subjects were discussed only briefly and that Dr. Mori gave little or no specific military information.

Mr. SONNETT. You have supplied us with a copy of the Mori conversation, have you not?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. We have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 39.")

Lieutenant WOODRUM. The man who made this telephone call was subsequently interned for accepting the telephone call.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, was there any telephone tap by ONI or FBI which came to the attention of Naval Intelligence prior to December 7, 1941, wherein military information was furnished by person here to any outside source?

[383] Lieutenant WOODRUM. You mean furnished here to the Consulate?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, any way. Furnished to any Japanese representative. Let's put it that way.

Lieutenant WOODRUM. There are only two instances to my knowledge in which this occurred. In one instance, in 1940—I would have to look up the right date—Japanese Vice Consul Okuda telephoned a Buddhist priest at Lahaina on the Island of Maui by the name of Vriji Hirayama and requested Hirayama to keep the Consulate informed of any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In another instance, in 1941, a woman very much agitated called the Consulate and blurted out that the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor. The person answering at the Consulate hung up without reply, and it was the evaluation of the listeners that the woman was under some sort of emotional stress and that the people in the Consulate suspected some sort of a trick.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, certain cable messages sent by the Japanese Consul over commercial cable lines were intercepted and received by the Office of Naval Intelligence, were they not?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have copies of those messages available?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can't state exactly which messages were made available. We have now copies of messages sent by the Consulate between December 1st and December 6th.

I might explain the background of that. At various times effort had been made to secure copies of the coded messages sent by the Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. These efforts were unsuccessful. There are three cable companies in Honolulu and it was known [384] that the Consulate alternated between each of the three, using each one for a period of one month. It is my understanding that Admiral Bloch requested David Sarnoff, who was visiting in the Islands at that time, to make available to the naval service copies of messages handled by RCA Radio. Sarnoff agreed and ordered the local office to do this. On December 1st, following their usual custom, the Consulate began using the facilities of RCA. On the morning of 5 December the District Intelligence Office received the first copies of these cables, and it is my understanding that these were immediately sent out to Commander Rochefort's unit. It is also my understanding that these were not decoded until after the Japanese attack and that even then it was necessary to use a Japanese



nese code book that had been picked up in the effects of the Consulate after it was raided on December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have the messages which were so delivered to the District Intelligence Office on December 5, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. We have copies of messages sent by the Consulate between December 1st and December 6th, decoded copies.

Mr. SONNETT. Decoded copies?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Decoded copies.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you supply us with a decoded copy of each message sent by the Consul between December 1st and December 6th which was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack on December 7th?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can't say from my own knowledge which was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. No record was kept, I take it, of the messages turned over on December 5th?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I know of no record.

[385] Mr. SONNETT. Can you supply us, then, with copies of each of the messages that you have decoded, sent by the Japanese Consul between December 1st and December 6, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can, and we have supplied you with some of those.

Mr. SONNETT. And you will supply us with a complete set of them?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those, Admiral, as an exhibit when they are received?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit 40.")

Mr. SONNETT. Aside from information received through telephone taps and from the interception of Japanese cable messages, was there any other information received by the Office of Naval Intelligence indicating Japanese interest in movements of United States ships or preparations to meet attack in Pearl Harbor, or any military subject?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Over a period of years there was considerable information gathered by the Naval Intelligence service concerning Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. There are voluminous reports available concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It was well known that officers attached to these groups made "sightseeing trips" of the islands, including such vantage spots as Aiea Heights.

Mr. SONNETT. Did any of the information in the possession of [386] Naval Intelligence prior to December 7, 1941, indicate that the Japanese had a specific interest in the location or movements of United States ships in Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. The only instance I know of is the one heretofore cited of the conversation with the Buddhist priest on Maui.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any information showing specifically that the Japanese were interested in the anti-aircraft defenses in or around Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I know of none.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any information indicating specifically that the Japanese were interested in the question of anti-torpedo in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I know of none prior to December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing else.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:27 p. m., adjourned until 4 p. m. of 4 June 1945.)

[387] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

FOURTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 4 p. m., Monday, 4 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, sir.

Brig. General POWELL. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA.

Mr. SONNETT. General, what was your assignment in November and December, 1941?

Brig. General POWELL. Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

Mr. SONNETT. And you were stationed where?

Brig. General POWELL. Fort Shafter.

Mr. SONNETT. Did the Army operate a radio intercept unit at Fort Shafter?

Brig. General POWELL. Yes, it did.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, decryption of intercepted Japanese messages was done at Fort Shafter, General?

Brig. General POWELL. None whatsoever.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you documents 14, 15, and 18 of exhibit 13, which are dispatches or messages between Tokyo and Honolulu relating to preparations for defense of Pearl Harbor and to the Japanese interest in [388] those preparations, and ask you whether you recall having seen those messages or any of them before.

Brig. General POWELL. I never have seen them.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, General, that the intercepted messages of the Japanese were sent from Fort Shafter to Washington for decryption?

Brig. General POWELL. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. And what methods were used to send the material to Washington?

Brig. General POWELL. Messages with a certain indicator, which I don't recall, were sent by radio, and all others were sent by air mail.

Mr. SONNETT. I think that is all, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., 5 June 1945.)



## [389] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

## FIFTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:30 a. m., Tuesday, 5 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, sir.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Theodore S. Wilkinson, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you were Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941, were you not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. When had you assumed that position, Admiral?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. October 15, 1941, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state generally the structure of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The Office of Naval Intelligence was composed of two main branches, foreign intelligence and domestic. The domestic had to do with internal subversion, espionage, and other activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national, and particularly naval, welfare. It included several branch offices in principal cities of the United States, one of which was Honolulu. The foreign intelligence was organized under a number, approximately eight, of regional groups of which [390] the Far Eastern was one. Under the administration of ONI and directly of foreign intelligence were the Naval Attachés and Naval Observers stationed throughout the world.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was in charge, Admiral, of the foreign branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Captain Heard, I believe, at that time, though there had been a change either just before or after.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Commander McCollum.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you state in general the sources of information which the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence had?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Naval Attaché reports from Japan and China, Observers' reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station, collateral items of interest produced by the investigations of the domestic branch of

ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio intelligence matters as available in Washington, and also from a center set up in Manila.

Mr. SONNETT. And Pearl Harbor, Admiral?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The State Department reports from diplomatic agents and reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches and radio intelligence.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state your recollection as to the responsibility of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of ONI for the dissemination of the information in its possession?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The responsibility of the Far Eastern section derived from the responsibility of the office as a whole. In general, the [391] duties of any of the foreign sections were to receive, collate, and analyze information obtained either by the agencies of ONI or received from other sources and to disseminate that information in one of several ways. The usual means of dissemination of technical information was transmission by mail of copies or abstracts of pertinent reports. There was a periodical publication, bi-weekly, I remember, to all flag officers, containing political and operational intelligence, which contained a Far Eastern section, and in which latter the Far Eastern Division of ONI would incorporate any information of value. A third means of dissemination, although not strictly dissemination, was the limited distribution within the Navy Department of highly confidential radio intelligence and all urgent or important operational information. The radio intelligence was incorporated in a secret book, which was passed by hand by a responsible officer to approximately four of the Navy Department's heads and to the President and the Secretary of State. The urgent operational information was reported to me and either by myself in company with Commander McCollum or by himself directly to the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. There was also, as the situation got hot, a daily one or two paragraph summary of the Japanese picture which was given to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans. The immediate report I have mentioned above was also made to the Director of War Plans. These reports or analyses usually contained some deduction as to future moves to be expected which we offered for such value as they might have to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans.

Mr. SONNETT. As to the dissemination of information, Admiral, on the side of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it that it was the responsibility of ONI to disseminate information on the Japanese situation to the Pacific Fleet?

[392] Vice Admiral WILKINSON. That point was never fully terminated. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the situation, but I was told that the deductions of future movements were the function of War Plans rather than of Intelligence, and this understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, when at one time I said that I thought it was my responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of enemy prospective movements, but in the Navy system War Plans did that. I told him that I would prepare that analysis myself in my office in order that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit, and in consequence such analyses as I made weren't ter-

mitted to the fleet, but were given to the Chief of Operations and to War Plans. The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My understanding at the time was, and still is, that I would report to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced from all sources and that they would forward to the fleet such items as they felt should be so forwarded.

Mr. SONNETT. Would it be an accurate summary, then, Admiral, to state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI, but the evaluation of Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from those movements would be the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The latter part of your question, yes. The first part, the day by day information of the Japanese movements would not, according to my then and present understanding, be sent out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their evaluation.

[393] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 9 of this investigation, which is a copy of the fortnightly summary of current national situation, issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and dated December 1, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that as a summary set up by you.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, that is a summary of which I was recently speaking.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 9 of the exhibit, paragraph C summarizes, does it not, the Japanese naval situation as seen by the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I recall this, and, in fact, the entire issue, as I read over the text of each issue before authorizing its publication.

Mr. SONNETT. Who prepared, Admiral, the portion of the exhibit to which I have called your attention, namely, relating to the Japanese naval situation?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The Far Eastern Section.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of clarity of the record, Admiral, as well as to refresh your own recollection since it has been some time ago, would you read the first paragraph of C into the record?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The heading is—

#### THE JAPANESE NAVAL SITUATION

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in [394] the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 10 of this investigation, a memorandum for the Director by A. H. McCollum, dated December 1, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I recall it vaguely, but I presume that was given to me in view of its form.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and whether you recall having seen those or any one of them?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall having seen any. I do not ordinarily see any of the so-called COPEKS, due perhaps to the very limited distribution, although I believe that the Far Eastern Section was given access to them by inspection at the office of record. I do not believe that they were furnished a copy.

Mr. SONNETT. The situation as to Japanese carriers, Admiral, set forth in exhibit 9, the ONI fortnightly summary for December 1, 1941, is summarized, is it not, in the statement as follows: "Although the division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers"?

[395] Vice Admiral WILKINSON. That was our best knowledge and belief at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, upon what information that statement was based?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. On the digest of all available information, radio intelligence and sighting, whatever we had.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall how this exhibit 9, the fortnightly summary of December 1, was sent out? By air mail?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. By air mail, I believe.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, it was sent out on or about the date it bears, namely, December 1, 1941?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. It is my impression that it had been received in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. What information, Admiral, do you recall or know after December 1, 1941, concerning the location or movements of Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. My remote recollection at this time is that we had little, if any, information as to the carriers. We had fairly complete knowledge of the movement down through the South China Sea and around Indo-China, but the movements in the Pacific Ocean as a whole, including both battleships and carriers, were completely veiled. There may have been one or two carriers involved in the South China Sea movement, but the carrier force as a whole was not definitely located.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation which consists of photostatic copies of daily communication intelligence summaries at Pearl Harbor, and call your attention to the summary particularly for the period December 1 to December 5, 1941, and if you can recall having had any of the information contained in these summaries during that [396] period of time.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Not directly, but as digested through the Far Eastern Section. I note particularly the fact that parts of the Japanese fleet were apparently in radio silence, of which I was aware.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall any discussion with the Chief of Naval Operations or with the War Plans Officer concerning the lack of information as to parts of the Japanese fleet during the first week of December, 1941?



Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I think we reported daily that a large part of the Japanese fleet was apparently at sea with its whereabouts not known. We also reported, however, that the only indications we had been able to pick up of any movement were those toward the south, including through the South China Sea, and our conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent. I recall that Admiral Turner also concluded that an attack would be made on the Philippines.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion during that period of time, Admiral, concerning the question whether or not any aerial reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No discussion of which I was a part. That was in the line of operational intelligence, procured by our own operations, which I considered was a function of the Office of Operations proper, although, of course, I was interested in the results of such searches for their own value and for their consolidation in the general picture.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there, Admiral, during the month or so preceding December 7, 1941, any discussion in which you participated concerning the likelihood of a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Unfortunately, no.

[397] Mr. SONNETT. At that time, Admiral, what was your estimate as to the possibility or probability of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I thought it was improbable and I thought it was impracticable in view of the air searches which I had known were being conducted when I had last left Hawaii in May and which I presumed, in the lack of any other knowledge, were still being conducted.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Admiral, have the view that such an attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. A remote possibility, but to my mind I thought it would be detected and driven off before it could be effective.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which consists of certified copies of Japanese diplomatic dispatches, and ask if you would examine that.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Well, not recognizing this exhibit specifically, I was familiar with the various decrypted dispatches which were available in the Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state how such Japanese dispatches were obtained?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. They were obtained by radio interceptor, if they were sent by cable, I believe that we got copies of the cable; I am not sure. The text was then given to a large decrypting unit under the immediate control of the Director of Communications, although ONI cooperated by assignment of certain technical personnel. The Army had similar experts and there was a division of labor between the two departments in connection with the decryption of all foreign texts. In general, I recall that the Navy, which had made a longer study and was more familiar with the Japanese language and codes, took care of most of the Japanese work, while [398] the Army looked after other nations.

The products of the decryption of the Japanese dispatches were embodied in a secret book which originally was shown in full to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War Plans, myself, and the President and the Secretary of State. At some time—I don't know precisely whether before or after December 7th—I believe only abbreviated summaries were shown to the President and Secretary of State. Also there was some arrangement that the Army would look after the State Department and that the President would be served on alternate days by the Army and the Navy, but I am not sure of this in my recollection. At any rate, the books contained, as I recall, the product of both the Army and the Navy work.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I note that various of these Japanese dispatches are indicated to have been in the so-called purple code. Will you state generally what the purple code was?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall, although I vaguely remember that it was a diplomatic code.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether the Japanese purple code was being decrypted at any other place besides Washington?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to a dispatch dated 19 November 1941 from Tokyo to Washington, which is indicated to have been translated on November 28, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that dispatch or having had that information.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I recall the "east wind," et cetera. I do not recall the specific Japanese words.

Mr. SONNETT. That dispatch, Admiral, was a dispatch setting up the so-called "winds" code to be used by the Japanese in daily Japanese language short wave news broadcasts, was it not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, what efforts were made to monitor for any message using the "winds" code?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is that the Japanese broadcasts were all monitored, and I do not recall any specific effort in connection with this, but since it was to appear in the regular news broadcast, it presumably would be detected therein.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether or not any message using the "winds" code was ever intercepted?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The method was not to use the "winds" code in a whole message, but simply to put in a word which of itself was the "winds" code. I recall that at some late stage, along about December 6th or 7th, I heard, either then or immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, that there had been such a word in one of the broadcasts. I don't recall when.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that the Japanese also had established a code known as the hidden word code?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No, I recall no mention of it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you document 6 and document 7 of exhibit 13 of this investigation. The first is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 27, 1941, establishing a hidden word code and the second is a message of 7 December 1941 from Tokyo, and ask whether you recall having seen either of those messages.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall either one of them.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which consists of various documents supplied by the Federal Communications Commission, and ask whether you recall having seen any of [400] those documents.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No, I do not recall such.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, who it was who indicated to you some time around December 7, 1941, that a "winds" code message had been received?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I recall some mention of it, but not until after the attack, but I no longer attributed importance to it since the overt act had occurred. It may possibly have been the last message of the exhibit you just showed me, which, you will note, was received on December 8th.

Mr. SONNETT. But you don't remember who it was that mentioned it to you?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall, but presumably it would have been Commander McCollum, who was in touch with the Army, to whom the reports of that exhibit were made.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, during the first week in December, 1941, that Commander McCollum prepared a long dispatch, summarizing the situation, which he desired to have released and sent out and which dispatch he discussed with you?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. From time to time Commander McCollum and I, or he after consulting me, would prepare dispatches to be submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations for release. I do not specifically recall this dispatch, but if you have any evidence of it, I could probably refresh my recollection.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, Captain Safford, who testified during this investigation and who testified in previous investigations, stated that on or about December 4, 1941, he was present when you and Admiral Noyes [401] conferred concerning the desirability of sending out a dispatch which had been prepared by Commander McCollum and that you were in favor of sending out the dispatch but Admiral Noyes was not in favor of doing so and that you indicated you would take it to the Chief of Naval Operations to try to get it released. Do you recall that incident at all?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. It is quite possible that I did take it to Admiral Ingersoll, but I do not recall it specifically.

Mr. SONNETT. And I take it, therefore, Admiral, that you do not recall the contents of any dispatch which McCollum had prepared at that time?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Not at that specific time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether in any dispatch prepared by Commander McCollum prior to the attack there was specific reference made to any Japanese broadcast using the "winds" code words relating to the United States?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. I know the "winds" code words were discussed in Washington, but I do not remember any dispatch sent outside. There was, of course, at that time considerable reluctance to any widespread information which would indicate our operations and our success in breaking Japanese codes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you document 38 and document 39 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask whether you recall having seen those intercepted Japanese messages.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I saw this in several successive as it was received, decrypted, and passed out in the secret book spoke of.

Mr. SONNETT. The first, Admiral, for the sake of the record dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, advised that the [402] Japanese had deliberated on the American proposal of the 26th of November and had drawn up a memorandum for the United States which would be in a separate message of fourteen parts?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And also directed that the long message to the United States should be presented at a time to be specified in a separate message, is that correct?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the second, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, consists of the fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, does it not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. As I recall, the date is the Longitude date and the first thirteen parts were available to us on the date of December 6th, and the fourteenth part not till the morning of December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I also show you document 41 of exhibit of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, a message from Tokyo to Washington, December 7, 1941, directing the Japanese Ambassador to submit to the United States Government the Japanese reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th, Washington time. Do you recall having seen that message?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall having seen it, but I heard it mentioned on the 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, any discussion on December 7th concerning the significance of the time set for delivery of the Japanese reply, namely, 1 p. m. Washington time, and the relation of that time to times at Pearl Harbor and in the Far East?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I recall the discussion of the relationship [403] between the times, but whether that discussion was before or after the actual attack I do not at this moment recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state, Admiral, who participated in the discussion and what was said?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Perhaps I had better mention the discussion of the fourteenth part. On arriving at the Office of Naval Intelligence shortly after 8 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, December 7th, I saw the fourteenth part and went to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where, as I recall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral Turner were present. There was a discussion of the tone of the fourteenth part presaged, if not actually promising early overt acts, which still, to our best knowledge and indications, would be directed against Thailand and the Malay Peninsula and possibly the Philippines. As I recall, Admiral Stark said he would confer at once with General Marshall. At that time the 1 o'clock message may have been in hand, but I do not believe so and I do not recall now having heard it discussed until after the actual attack. At which time, in answer to the question, the discussion may have been with Commander McCollum or almost any one on the basis of



menting upon the fact that the two times apparently had been simultaneous.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 and exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you recall having seen those dispatches at or about the dates they bear.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall having seen either. They were apparently prepared by the War Plans Section, Op-12. The second I knew had been sent in substance; the first I don't remember.

Mr. SONNETT. The second is the so-called war warning, is it not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[404] Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, discussion, Admiral, was there on the morning of December 7, 1941, concerning the necessity or advisability of informing Admiral Kimmel or other fleet commanders of the prospective 1 p. m. delivery of the Japanese reply?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't remember a discussion of the 1 p. m. delivery. I remember a discussion of the immediate transmission of the status of negotiations indicated by the receipt of the fourteenth part, and my impression at the time was that Admiral Stark was to confer immediately with General Marshall for a joint decision as to notifying the Army and Navy forces in Hawaii and in the Far East.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what, if anything, was done after Admiral Stark and General Marshall conferred on that point?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Only by hearsay.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, on December 7, 1941, what telephonic connections existed between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know. It was in the province of Communications.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know at that time whether or not either the Navy or the Army had a so-called scrambler telephone?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. My impression is the Army had one. I am not sure.

Mr. SONNETT. Was any consideration given at that time, namely, December 7, 1941, to the necessity or advisability of telephoning to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or to other fleet commanders concerning the delivery of the Japanese reply?

[405] Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know, but my recollection is that Admiral Stark was to confer immediately with General Marshall with the view of getting the information and presumably a warning out by the fastest means of communication that were then available.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 14, document 15, and document 24 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which are intercepted Japanese communications between Honolulu and Tokyo, and ask whether you recall having seen those prior to December 7, 1941, or thereafter, and, if so, when.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall seeing these specifically, but I am certain that I did not see them before December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, in the interest of clarity of the record, could we have these three dispatches copied into the record at this point?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The dispatches referred to follow as pages 405A, 405B, and 405C.)

238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[405A]

[Copy]

A true copy. Attest:

BEN HAROLD,  
Ship's Clerk, USN

From: Honolulu  
To: Tokyo  
December 6, 1941  
PA-K2

#253 Re the last part of your #123.<sup>a</sup>

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered five or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training in the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa,<sup>b</sup> there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

25877

ARMY 7178

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-7)

<sup>a</sup>—not available.  
<sup>b</sup>—Kana spelling.

[405B]

[Copy]

From: Honolulu  
To: Tokyo.  
December 6, 1941  
PA-K2  
#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered Pearl Harbor were ——— and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

25874

ARMY 7179

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-7)

A true copy. Attest:

BEN HAROLD,  
Ship's Clerk, USN

[405C]

[Copy]

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu  
December 2, 1941  
J-19

#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, aircraft carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications

they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.

27055

ARMY 8007 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

A true copy. Attest:

BEN HAROLD,  
Ships Clerk, USNR.

[406] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, these three dispatches indicate specific Japanese interest in the preparations for defense of Oahu against air attack, do they not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And it appears that they were translated by the Army after the attack, although they were dated prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. On the fact of them the note as to the date of translation would so indicate it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you know what the explanation may be for the delay in translating these messages?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. Possibly circuit delays in the original coded text reaching Washington. Possibly a jam in the decoding office, caused perhaps by the long diplomatic message which was then being decoded about December 6th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that prior to this time there were other messages available in Washington showing that the Japanese were interested specifically in the location and movements of American ships in Pearl Harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No, not prior to that time.

Mr. SONNETT. May I call your attention, Admiral, to documents 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of exhibit 13 and ask whether they refresh your recollection on that point?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The first three of these I do not recall and they were apparently dated and translated before my taking over the office. Number 7, dated November 20th and translated December 4th, requesting an investigation of the fleet bases, I should have seen but do not now recall. The same applies to number 9, dated November 18th, [407] translated December 5th, requesting data as to vessels anchored in a certain area in Pearl Harbor and in Manila Bay. Number 10, dated November 18th and noted as translated on December 6th, giving specific information about movements of ships, I am sure I did not see before December 7th and I do not recall having seen it thereafter. The remainder were translated after the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it your belief, Admiral, prior to the attack on December 7, 1941, that the Japanese agents in or around Pearl Harbor were interested in United States ships in the harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I believe they were and I believe they were reporting them, but my belief was that they were concerned in the presence of the fleet with a view to its availability for distant operations rather than its susceptibility as a target.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to document 11 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and document 14 and ask whether you recall having seen those documents,

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I believe I recall them both.

Mr. SONNETT. Those messages, Admiral, indicated that the Japanese had established deadlines beyond which there would be no further diplomatic negotiation with the United States, did they not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And referring, Admiral, particularly to the message of November 22, 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, translated on the same date, it indicated that Tokyo had fixed the 29th of November as a deadline and that that deadline absolutely could not be changed after that things were automatically going to happen, did it not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[408] Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to document 18 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court record, a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 28, 1941, translated November 28, 1941, do you recall having seen that at or about that time?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, that message indicated, did it not, that Tokyo regarded the November 26th note of the United States as a humiliating proposal?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And that with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal, the negotiations would *de facto* ruptured, but that Tokyo wanted them to be careful to avoid giving the impression that negotiations were broken off?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, what consideration was given to the question of the necessity or desirability of sending to Admiral Kimbrell copies of these various Japanese messages which were intercepted?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know. That was in the province of the Chief of Operations. As I have said, there was great reluctance to disseminate the knowledge of our code-breaking activities.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you please state what the arrangements were for the exchange of intelligence with the Army?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. There was a complete liaison between the decrypting agencies and complete exchange of actual texts immediately after their transcription into a smooth copy. The two Far Eastern Sections of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence were in daily and, in fact, hourly contact by telephone and by frequent exchange of visits. The head [409] of Military Intelligence, General Miles, was in constant telephonic and other contact with me and, in fact, he was at dinner at my house when the first thirteen parts of the diplomatic message were brought to us at approximately 11:30 the night of December 6th, at which time we both ascertained that they had been shown to higher authorities in our two Departments.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, what information concerning the location or movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished by the Navy to the Army?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Why, I think everything we had, this process of interchange between the two Far Eastern Sections. I know that we got information that they picked up with respect to Japanese Army movements and activities and, of course, from time to time some of our agents would report something having



do with the Japanese Army and some of theirs something concerning the Japanese Navy, but all information was constantly interchanged.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not any information of significance came to your attention prior to December 7, 1941, which had been obtained from either tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese in Honolulu or from interception of their cable messages here?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. Shortly after the attack we got word of the so-called "flower" telephone message, and I know that the local intelligence representative, the District Intelligence Officer, had endeavored to obtain copies of cable messages, but had been denied them because of the United States law concerning the integrity of civil communication.

Mr. SONNETT. You do not know, Admiral, then, whether or not, in fact, any copies of Japanese cable messages were secured at Honolulu prior [410] to December 7th?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not believe there were.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I don't think I have anything further. Thank you very much.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't think I have anything to add.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you have anything to add? I would be glad to have you do it.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 11:35 a. m., adjourned until 10 a. m.. 6 June 1945.)

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[411] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SIXTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 10 a. m., Wednesday, 6 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name, sir.

Mr. STREET. George Street.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your occupation, Mr. Street?

Mr. STREET. District Manager, RCA Communications, Incorporated.

Mr. SONNETT. For how long have you been employed by RCA in Honolulu?

Mr. STREET. I have been with the company for over twenty-five years and have been in my present position for almost ten years.

Mr. SONNETT. During 1941, Mr. Street, did you know the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Mayfield?

Mr. STREET. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall that on or about the first week of December, 1941, certain messages were, at the request of the Navy, turned over by you to Captain Mayfield?

Mr. STREET. I do recall, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Were those messages of the Japanese Consul sent from [412] Honolulu?

Mr. STREET. Yes, there were several.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any record, Mr. Street, of the messages which were turned over at that time to Naval Intelligence?

Mr. STREET. Not now. They were legally destroyed.

Mr. SONNETT. Does your company have at any place copies of those messages?

Mr. STREET. To the best of my knowledge and belief, copies of all messages transmitted to and from Honolulu will be in the files of our company at 28 Geary Street, San Francisco.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Mr. Street, that when you said copies of the messages had been destroyed, you mean they had been destroyed locally in the Honolulu office?

Mr. STREET. Locally, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Pursuant to the authority of the Federal Communications Commission?

Mr. STREET. Yes, pursuant to the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission. It was simply a matter of my lack of storage space.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Mr. Street, whether or not, to the best of your recollection, all messages sent by the Japanese Consulate during the first week of December, 1941, were turned over to Naval Intelligence?

Mr. STREET. They were.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Street?

Mr. STREET. Here are three copies of press messages filed from Honolulu on December 4th and 5th which I do not recall were given to Captain Mayfield previously.

[413] Mr. SONNETT. Can you identify the senders of each of those messages?

Mr. STREET. The message of December 4th, addressed Yomiuri Tokyo, was filed by Mrs. M. Mori, Correspondent. The two messages of December 5th, addressed Asahi, Tokyo, were filed by Mr. Onoder Correspondent.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral, for Mr. Street.

Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 10:20 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., 7 June 1945.)

[414] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SEVENTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, at 9:35 a. m., Thursday, 7 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rate.

Radioman HUMPHREY. Richard W. Humphrey, radioman third class, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, 1941, you were on duty at the radio station at Bishop's Point, Oahu, were you not?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I was.

Mr. SONNETT. Under whose jurisdiction did that station come?

Radioman HUMPHREY. At that time it came under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you acquainted with one C. E. Gibson?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I was.

Mr. SONNETT. And also one R. B. Moyle?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I was.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state where, to the best of your knowledge, they are now located?

Radioman HUMPHREY. To the best of my knowledge, Moyle was last known to be on a train in Florida as a shore patrolman and Gibson was a flag radioman aboard an LST.

[415] Mr. SONNETT. Who was the duty officer on December 7, 1941, at that station?

Radioman HUMPHREY. The duty officer was Lieutenant Commander A. E. Kilhefner.

Mr. SONNETT. And do you know where he is now located?

Radioman HUMPHREY. To the best of my knowledge, he is now located at a naval air station in Brazil.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time did you come on duty on December 7, 1941?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I came on duty approximately ten minutes until 8 o'clock.

Mr. SONNETT. In the morning?

Radioman HUMPHREY. In the morning, yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which is a copy of the radio log of the station for December 7, 1941, consisting of two pages, and note on the reverse side of each page a certification of that log by you, is that correct?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That is correct. I certified that this is a copy of the log that we kept at the Section Base.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the log has at the left-hand side times from 1445 to 1830. Those are Greenwich times, are they not?

Radioman HUMPHREY. They are. That is Greenwich Civil Time.

Mr. SONNETT. And that would be comparable to 0415 to 0800, local Pearl Harbor time?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the entries in the log from 1445, Greenwich time, to 1508, Greenwich time, that would be from 0415 to 0438 [416] would it not, Pearl Harbor time?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. And do you find there a record of a conversation between the WARD and the CONDOR?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, in substance, will you state what that conversation was?

Radioman HUMPHREY. In substance, it is a conversation between the two ships, trying to determine the position of a submarine operating in a restricted area.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there any indication that that conversation was addressed to your station or to the Inshore Patrol or to any one else for action?

Radioman HUMPHREY. No, there is no indication of any such thing. It is purely a conversation between the two ships.

Mr. SONNETT. In the event that your station had taken any action by way of reporting that conversation to the Inshore Patrol by radio would that have appeared subsequently in the log?

Radioman HUMPHREY. Had we relayed this conversation to the Inshore Patrol by radio on this frequency, it would have appeared in this log.

Mr. SONNETT. And you find no record of such action in the log?

Radioman HUMPHREY. No such entry in the log.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 2 of the log, there is a report, is there not, by the WARD of having attacked a submarine?

Radioman HUMPHREY. There is.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time, both Greenwich and local, was that report logged?

[417] Radioman HUMPHREY. That is 1721, Greenwich time, and the message was transmitted again at 1723, Greenwich time, which makes it 0653, local time.

Mr. SONNETT. And that message was addressed by the WARD to whom?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That was addressed by the WARD to Commander, Inshore Patrol.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(A brief recess was taken.)

[418] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Captain DYER. Thomas H. Dyer, Captain, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Captain?

Captain DYER. I am Officer in Charge of the Cryptanalytical and Decrypting Section, Fleet Radio Unit, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Mr. SONNETT. In December, 1941, were you associated with that unit or its predecessor?

Captain DYER. I have been associated with that unit and its predecessor since 2 July, 1936.

Mr. SONNETT. Who else, Captain, besides yourself was engaged in decryption work at that unit during December, 1941?

Captain DYER. Lieutenant Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN, was my principal assistant; Chief Yeoman Arnold M. Conant, Chief Radioman Woodward—I will have to look up his initials for you—several other enlisted personnel and several Reserve officers who had recently reported for duty and were under training, whose names I do not now recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander Wright is now at Bainbridge Island, is he not, Captain?

Captain DYER. I have been so informed.

Mr. SONNETT. And I think you also told me that you had been informed that Woodward is now in Washington?

Captain DYER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Washington, D. C.?

Captain DYER. Washington, D. C.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall where Conant is?

Captain DYER. He is also in Washington, D. C.

[479] Mr. SONNETT. Who was engaged principally in the translation of the decrypted communications in that unit in December, 1941, Captain?

Captain DYER. Captain A. B. Laswell, U. S. Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Commander R. Fullenwider were the principal translators.

Mr. SONNETT. The entire unit, Captain, was under the command of now Captain Rochefort, was it not?

Captain DYER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been testimony, Captain, in previous investigations that during the first week of December, 1941, certain communications of the Japanese Consul were delivered to ONI and by ONI to your unit for decryption and translation. Were you aware of that at the time?

Captain DYER. The only Japanese communications of which I am personally aware were received subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor and were decrypted and translated during the ensuing week.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, whether at any time prior to December 7, 1941, cable messages to or from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu were received by the Navy?

Captain DYER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SONNETT. And I take it that the first time you ever saw a translation of such a message was after December 7, 1941?

Captain DYER. Was either the 9th or the 10th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 29 of this investigation, Captain, which consists of various translations of Japanese messages supplied by Captain Layton, and for your information state that he testified before Admiral Hewitt that he received those on or about December 10th from Captain Rochefort. Do you recall having seen those at or about that time?

Captain DYER. I can definitely recall some of the items and I [420] reasonably sure I saw all of them at about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation, Captain, which consists of two investigation reports made by ONI at Honolulu, the second of which is dated 14 February 1942, by Lieutenant Stevenson, and which sets forth various messages in translated form, which, according to the report, were learned in their translated form on December 1941, and ask you whether you recall having seen these messages at or about that time, namely, December 11, 1941.

Captain DYER. I am sure I saw some of the messages at about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you have a file with you of decrypting and translations of Japanese messages?

Captain DYER. I do have a file of certain Japanese diplomatic translations. Here it is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this, Admiral, as an exhibit with understanding that the Captain is going to photostat today the beginning of it up to the point indicated by the paper clip and let us have that to take with us tomorrow and will photostat the balance and send it to you at Washington?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. The beginning of the file contains various of messages referred to in the ONI report and also some of the messages set forth in exhibit 29 which Captain Layton supplied.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The file referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 41.")

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Captain, and as illustration I take it, of the other translations and decryptations, will you refer to the [421] pencilled translation of a message dated 6 December 1941, bearing number 02530, and state whether that is a translation of one of the Japanese messages to which you referred?

Captain DYER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. That translation bears the symbol, Captain, H. Would you state what that indicates?

Captain DYER. That is the designation for one of the many Japanese diplomatic systems and indicates the type of cipher.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a sheet of paper containing various letters and ask you if you can state what that is.

Captain DYER. This paper represents a portion of the decrypting process which was applied to the message you just showed me.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The paper referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 42.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, would you similarly photostat this afternoon exhibit 42 so that we may take a photostat and return the original as an exhibit?

Captain DYER. I will.

Mr. SONNETT. And would you, Captain, while we are thinking of it, annex to both exhibit 41 and to exhibit 42 a certificate stating that the photostats you supply are correct photostats of the original from which you have?

Captain DYER. Yes.



Mr. SONNETT. The PA code then, Captain, was a code which required decryption first into plain Japanese and then translation into English [422] from the Japanese?

Captain DYER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state who did the decryption and translation of this message?

Captain DYER. I am practically certain that the decryption was done by Chief Radioman Woodward. I do not recognize the handwriting and have no way of identifying the translation.

Mr. SONNETT. The decryption in question, Captain, appears in the file, I take it, in written out form immediately behind the translation into English to which we have been referring?

Captain DYER. That is true in the majority of cases.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you have any other file or, to your knowledge, is there any other file in the unit here containing decryptions or translations of Japanese messages which were sent prior to 7 December 1941?


Captain DYER. I believe there is no other file in existence, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.

[423] (The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 11:50 a. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., Friday, 8 June 1945.)



[424] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

EIGHTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:45 a. m., Friday 8 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Captain FINNEGAN. Joseph Finnegan, Captain, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Captain?

Captain FINNEGAN. Attached to the Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you first become attached to the fleet radio unit?

Captain FINNEGAN. Under regular orders on the 15th of February, '42.

Mr. SONNETT. And had you previously reported to that unit under verbal orders?

Captain FINNEGAN. On either the 9th or the 10th of December, 1941, under verbal orders of Admiral Kimmel, I reported there for temporary duty.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to that time what was your assignment, Captain?

Captain FINNEGAN. Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral David W. Bagley, Commander Battleship Division Two, USS TENNESSEE.

Mr. SONNETT. You are a translator of Japanese, Captain, are you not?

Captain FINNEGAN. Yes.

[425] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what your training and experience have been in the translation of Japanese?

Captain FINNEGAN. I took the regular Japanese language course, attached to the American Embassy in Tokyo, 1934 to 1937, followed by fourteen months of work in radio intelligence.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation, which contains twenty-eight pages of Japanese language and work sheets and translations supplied by Captain Dyer of the fleet radio unit, and ask you whether you can identify any of the handwriting in that exhibit as your own.

Captain FINNEGAN. Pages 7 and 8 and 22.

Mr. SONNETT. Page 22, Captain, is a translation of a message, is it not, dated 3 December 1941 from *Kita*? Would you state for the record what your translation of that message was?

Captain FINNEGAN. "WYOMING and two seaplane tenders departed the third."

Mr. SONNETT. Pages 7 and 8, Captain, which you identified, constitute a translation of a message from *Kita* to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, bearing number 02530, does it not?

Captain FINNEGAN. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Is it correct, Captain, that the translation of the 6 of December message, pages 7 and 8, is a translation of the handwritten message appearing on page 9 of the exhibit?

Captain FINNEGAN. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I refer you to document 14 of exhibit of this investigation, which appears to be an Army translation of the same message, does it not?

Captain FINNEGAN. It is a translation of the same message and it is marked Army.

Mr. SONNETT. And it bears a translation date indicating translation by the Army on December 8, 1941?

Captain FINNEGAN. It does.

[426] Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Captain, to the last sentence in paragraph 1 of the Army translation, which reads as follows: "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against the places," and I refer you also to the last sentence of the first paragraph of your translation, page 7 of exhibit 41, reading: "The whole matter seems to have been dropped."

I further invite your attention to the Japanese language message on page 9 of exhibit 41, and ask you to reexamine it and to state whether your translation or the Army translation is correct as to the sentence to which I have directed your attention.

Captain FINNEGAN. Without hesitation, I believe that the Army translation is correct. The position of the sentences doesn't mean anything. You can't compare the last sentence with the last sentence. The last part of the rough work sheet, that is, pages 9 and 10, is fairly garbled or missing groups, but it is quite easy and very logical to fill in the missing groups in garbles, and I would say without hesitation that the Army translation is most probable and probably correct.

Mr. SONNETT. How long had you been away from Japanese, Captain, prior to the time when you translated this message?

Captain FINNEGAN. A little more than three years.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, when did you translate this message?

Captain FINNEGAN. I don't remember the exact date. It was probably the 10th, but certainly not before the 9th of December, 1941.

[427] Mr. SONNETT. Did you translate any Japanese messages at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain FINNEGAN. No, I didn't even enter the combat intelligence office.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know of any translation of any of the Japanese consular messages by anybody else prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain FINNEGAN. I do not recognize any of the messages in the file as having been made before that time and it is my distinct impression that all of these were received about the same time and translated if not on one day, within two days of pages 7 and 8, within a period of forty-eight hours, I would say.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[428] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. Monroe Harmon Hubbell, Lieutenant Commander, UNSR.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. At present I am Officer in Charge, Distribution Section, Officer Division, Naval Personnel Office, Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. What were your duties on December 7, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. I was Commanding Officer of the USS CONDOR, AMC-14.

Mr. SONNETT. On the morning of December 7, 1941, were you engaged in sweeping off the mouth of Pearl Harbor?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. We were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall a blinker signal to the USS WARD given by you that morning?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. At about what time was it?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. At approximately 0350.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the substance of the message you sent to the WARD at that time?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. It was indicated to the WARD that we had sighted what appeared to be a periscope of a submarine.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you subsequently have a radio conversation on the TBS with the WARD?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and ask if you find there recorded the radio conversation which you had with the WARD [429] that morning.

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is the substance, to the best of my recollection now.

Mr. SONNETT. And will you state for the benefit of the record the substance of your radio conversation and the time at which it took place?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. It was at approximately 0415 and it had to do with an inquiry from the WARD as to the location and course of the submarine that we had sighted.

Mr. SONNETT. What did you advise the WARD as to the location and course of the submarine?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. As I remember, it is substantially what is stated here, that we gave them the course that we were steering at the time and indicated that at the time the periscope was sighted, that it was not a positive identification, but under the conditions of visibility, it appeared that the course was approximately the same as ours and that shortly thereafter the course of the submarine changed abruptly and our own course changed rather abruptly. At the time the periscope was sighted, it appeared to be heading directly for the entrance buoys.

Mr. SONNETT. Other than your report to the USS WARD, did you make any report of this incident to the inshore patrol or any one else?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. No. The identification at that time was not positive enough to consider making a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat there.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the Commanding Officer of the WARD take it?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, we have a certified copy of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard Duty Officers' information sheets, particularly as of December 6, 1941. [430] I think this might be a good point to receive it as an exhibit for the record if that meets with your approval.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 43.")

Mr. SONNETT. May we note for the record, Admiral, that exhibit provides in part: "The anti-torpedo net will be closed from sunset to sunrise. To be opened and closed only upon orders from the Captain of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or the Yard Duty Officer"?

Commander, at my request you have endeavored to find out, have you not, at what time sunrise occurred at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And what information did you receive on that?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. The word received was that sunrise was approximately 0727. That is within a few minutes of the actual time.

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract from the signal log of the USS YNG-17?

Commander, what was the USS YNG-17?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That was the gate vessel at the entrance to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. May we receive this, Admiral, at this point?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 44.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract of the quartermaster's log of the USS YNG-17 for the same dates. May we receive that also as an exhibit?

[431] Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 45.")

Mr. SONNETT. Directing your attention to exhibit 45 and to the entries for December 7, 1941, commencing at 0232, Commander, would you read those into the record for the sake of clarity? Then I wish to ask you a question about that.

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. (Reading.)

0232 Gate closed.  
0447 Commenced opening gate.  
0458 Gate opened. White lights.  
0508 CROSSBILL stood in.  
0532 CONDOR stood in.  
0618 Hoisted ball.

Mr. SONNETT. The entries in the log, I take it, Commander, or to your entering after the CROSSBILL at or about 0532 on December 7, 1941, are in accord with your own log and recollection substantially.

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And that is Honolulu time?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the meaning of the entry at 0618 after you stood in "hoisted ball"?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. To my present recollection, that indicated that the gate was open.

Mr. SONNETT. It appears that the next entry on the log is "0800 Japanese air raid." When does it appear that the gate was closed from that log, Commander?

[432] Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. The log indicates that the gate was closed at 0846.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the entry in exhibit 45, Commander, indicating that at 0532 on December 7, 1941, the CONDOR stood in to Pearl Harbor, can you recall what the conditions of visibility were at that time?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. To the best of my knowledge, they were very good. They were approaching daylight conditions.

Mr. SONNETT. We have one more certified extract of the log, Admiral, which is an extract from the log of the signal tower at the Navy Yard, which, if you approve, we should receive at this point.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 46.")

Mr. SONNETT. May we note, Admiral, for the record at this point that exhibit 46, the log of the signal tower, has an entry at 2250 on December 6, 1941, that the LITCHFIELD cleared and the gate was closed, and that the next entry is 0600, December 7th? There apparently were no entries kept during the morning of December 7, 1941, up to 0600.

I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation then, at 10:12 a. m., adjourned until 3 p. m., Saturday, 9 June 1945, to meet at San Francisco.)





[433] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

NINETEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Office of the Commander Western Sea Frontier, Federal Building, San Francisco, California, at 3 p. m., Saturday, 9 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Allan A. Murray, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, what is your present assignment?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, I am on the Staff of the Military Government Staging and Holding Area, Monterey, California.

Mr. SONNETT. What were your duties during December, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. I was one of four watch officers who stood a twenty-four hour round-the-clock watch on the wires coming in which brought in all of the messages, and so forth, that were handed to us for working over.

Mr. SONNETT. In what section, Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Op-20-G.

Mr. SONNETT. That was at Washington?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is right; Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the commanding officer of that section?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Captain Safford.

Mr. SONNETT. And who were the other three watch officers?

[434] Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. There was Brotherhood, Pering, and Brown. Then there was George Linn, who was the senior officer and normally did not stand watch, but when any one was on leave, Linn stood watch.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you standing a watch during the first week of December, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Part of the week, yes. You see, we worked a certain number of watches and then we had forty-eight hours off.

Mr. SONNETT. Who else was on watch that week of those you named?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, Brown was on vacation, so Linn was taking Brown's place, and otherwise the setup was the same.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask you whether you have ever seen that message before.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, but I did not see it in English. You see, I saw it in Japanese *kana* and at that time Commander Kramer was the language officer and, of course, I don't know enough about

the language to read the whole message, but he took out transcripts of this, such as these words here of the four winds, and handed those words and told us the meaning of those and told us to wait out for those words.

Mr. SONNETT. That was an intercepted Japanese dispatch setting up the so-called "winds" code, was it not, Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is my understanding of it. Anything that I say on this, gentlemen, it is more or less second-hand information because I am not a language expert and the only thing I can say about it is what they told me and my instructions in regard to it.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what your instructions were, Commander, in regard to the "winds" code?

[435] Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, my instructions were more or less the same as they had always been and that is anything of any importance that came in was to get hold of Commander Kramer and Commander Kramer always left word where he was going. He was very faithful in that respect and never moved from one place to another without calling up and telling us where he was; so we knew where he was most of the time. But our orders were in addition to that, if we couldn't get him on the phone, to go and take a car and get him by any means possible in the event of anything of any importance; and if any of those had come in, that is exactly what we would have done.

Mr. SONNETT. That translation of that message was on or about November 28, 1941, was it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Approximately, yes; about a week before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. And is it the fact that efforts were made to monitor for any Japanese message using the so-called "winds" code?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. As far as I know, every effort was made using even the Coast Guard to get every possible message that they could get in the hope that they might come through, because it was my understanding—I don't particularly understand this English version here—it was my understanding it would be added in in the plain text news broadcasts that were made. Now, I guess that is essentially what it says here. It says, "In the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave news broadcast." I guess that is the same, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. So far as you know, was any Japanese broadcast or message ever intercepted by any one using the "winds" code word relating to the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Let me explain the whole situation in that, [436] as I mentioned to you before. It never came in on my watch and I was very particular about it and the staff that I had on there, after they had gone over it, I went over it myself to be sure so that I don't think it is possible it could have gone through on my watch. I was on the day watch of the 4th and the 5th; then I went off on forty-eight hour watch. Now, then, when I came back after Pearl Harbor happened, it is my memory, and I am pretty clear about it, that Linn mentioned that it had come in, but it had come in at a time when they couldn't use it. Now, that is exactly as I remember it, but it did not come in on my watch and I am absolutely certain that up until 4 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th it hadn't come in because if it had come in on any one's watch other than mine, I could

tainly would have known about it because all watch officers passed along the log and all events of preceding watches.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 65, Commander, of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which consists of documents received from the Federal Communications Commission, and direct your attention particularly to documents 2, 3, and 4 and ask whether any of those came to your attention.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Document 4 I never did see. Document 3 I couldn't say because it is in English and I practically never saw any of these messages in English. And Document number 2 the same. Document number 1, I remember that, but I don't remember it from the Army. That was our own organization that gave us that.

Mr. SONNETT. Document number 1, Commander, for the sake of clarity of the record, sets forth the Japanese language to be used for the three signals, does it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And you had the substance of that information, for [437] which you were watching?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. But we had it in Japanese and not in English.

Mr. SONNETT. In Japanese?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes. The first document you showed me there, I remember now that those words used there in Japanese were the words we had on a slip of paper and told to watch for, but we had none of these in English.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, you said that on or about December 7th Linn stated to you it had come in?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. After December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. After December 7th?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state exactly what he said, as best you recall?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, it was in connection with that multi-part message that came in. You see, I was off. I was to go on again at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor Day. I was sitting home, listening to my radio, when I heard the flash and I jumped into a taxicab and reported immediately. It appears then that the word that was passed on to me from the preceding watch officer was that during the night of the 6th a multi-part message had come in, which I understood later was the message that was handed to the Secretary of State the follow day—the multi-part message had come in and they had all gone to work and sweated over it and then during the course of that conversation, Linn mentioned to me—I am quite sure of this, but I can't swear to it—that the "winds" code message had come in, but I don't know whether the Army got it or whether we got it or who. You see, the Army and the Navy there were working two teams and the [438] way the set up was, that on one day—odd or even day; I can't remember which—the Navy handled it; the other day the Army handled it. Now, of course, we, to be perfectly frank about it—we went ahead on our own anyway and I think it was due to the fact that we went ahead on your own that we got a little bit of jump on that multi-part message. You see, actually that multi-part message came in on the day that was supposed to be handled by the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, on December 6th?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, but in view of the urgent circumstances, we went ahead on it anyway, that is, our organization did, I am quite sure that Linn was on that watch because Brown-watches got mixed up and Brown normally either preceded me or followed me and the fact that he was on vacation, I am quite sure that it was Linn that got that multi-part message.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, when Linn said to you that this message came in, did he indicate when it had come in?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you understand that it had come in about the same time as the multi-part message?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No. My understanding was that it came in later, because the impression I got from him was that they got it too late to do anything about it.

Mr. SONNETT. That would be, then, on December 7th?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Apparently that would be it.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Commander, document 6 and document of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask whether you have seen these documents before.

[439] Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No, I don't ever remember seeing that. That is the first one.

Mr. SONNETT. That is document 6, is it, of the exhibit?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, that is 6.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Commander, can we say what that document is? That is an intercepted Japanese dispatch of what date?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. 27 November.

Mr. SONNETT. And it indicates that a code is set up?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, yes, yes. This designation here J-1 I recognize, too. That usually carried instructions of this kind.

Mr. SONNETT. The dispatch stated, did it not: "With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of dispatches using *ingo denpo* (hidden word or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully?" That it lists a series of code words, does it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, it gives the code word and the meaning that the code word will have.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar with the establishment by the Japanese of the so-called hidden word code as indicated in the exhibit?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No, I wasn't.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to the next document, which is

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That I could have seen. You see, again, if I had seen that, gentlemen—well, it was in code—

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Commander, would you read that into the record, too?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. "Relations between Japan and England are not [440] in accordance with expectations."

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of it?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. 7 December.

Mr. SONNETT. From whom and to whom?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. From Tokyo, a circular.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not, Commander, Linn was referring to that message of December 7th when he said to you that a message had come in employing the "winds" code?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, I am not sure what he was referring to, except this, that we all had the "winds" code on our mind and we even dreamt about it at night. We just were on our toes and on edge, looking and waiting for that thing, and as soon as he said it came in but too late to use, well, there was only one thing that came to our mind, and I will be perfectly frank about it. It was no definite specification made on it or anything further said.

Mr. SONNETT. If a "winds" code message had come in relating to England on December 7, 1941, would it have been translated the same as document 11 of exhibit 13?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Would it have been translated the same as 11? You mean written up in that form?

Mr. SONNETT. In substance, would it have conveyed the same meaning?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. I believe it would, yes, but again I have the language difficulty to contend with and I can say it is my belief that it would have been that way.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, what I have in mind is, Commander, the "winds" code established a code the use of which would signify a break in diplomatic relations between this country, England, Russia, and Japan.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes.

[441] Mr. SONNETT. That was also true of the hidden word code, was it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. As indicated?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the message you have before you, which is document 11 of exhibit 13, conveyed the substance of the message which could have been sent in either the "winds" code or the hidden word code?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Right. In other words, it infers a warning that something is going to happen.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I think that is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[442] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Commander WRIGHT. Wesley A. Wright, Commander, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Commander?

Commander WRIGHT. I am Officer in Charge of the naval radio activities, Bainbridge Island.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your assignment on December 7, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. Assistant Communications Officer, Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, on temporary duty in combat intelligence unit, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, had you been on that duty?

Commander WRIGHT. Since March 31, '41.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was in charge of that activity, Commander Wright?  
 Commander WRIGHT. Then Lieutenant Commander J. J. Rochford.

Mr. SONNETT. And what were your duties in that unit?

Commander WRIGHT. Assistant Cryptanalyst.

Mr. SONNETT. Who else was engaged in cryptanalysis activities at that unit at that time?

Commander WRIGHT. Lieutenant Commander T. H. Dyer was the senior cryptanalyst and myself and we had an ensign, a Reserve, who had been there since December, '40—I think it was Wurner. We had a lieutenant, Reserve, by the name of Underwood; a chief yeoman by the name of Woodward; Chief Yeoman Rorie.

Mr. SONNETT. Is this all in decrypting?

Commander WRIGHT. All of those up to Rorie were actually engaged in decrypting and clerical.

[443] Mr. SONNETT. Woodward?

Commander WRIGHT. No. Rorie. Woodward was entirely in charge of crypting and language assistance. Chief Yeoman Conant. Lieutenant Hopewick was available for decrypting work. His primary duties were with the IBM machines. I believe that is all.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, you recall, I take it, that during the early part of December, 1941, certain messages of the Japanese Consul in Hawaii were secured and worked on by your unit?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall approximately when those messages were received in your unit?

Commander WRIGHT. I am afraid I couldn't answer that definitely. I have discussed these things so much since that I know we got them on the 5th now, but that would be absolutely hearsay.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, I show you exhibit 29 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of translated dispatches and from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu during the first week of December, 1941, and ask you whether you recall that they were among the dispatches received and translated at that time.

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, I believe they were among the dispatches that were delivered to us by the naval intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you exhibit 40 of this investigation and call to your attention the second ONI report contained in that exhibit dated 14 February 1942, and ask you whether the translated Japanese messages set forth in that report were among those received prior to December 7, 1941.

Commander WRIGHT. I would say that they were all received together. [444] It is my recollection that we got them all on the 5th. It would have been very difficult for us to get one that was sent on the 6th—no, not necessarily; if it was sent the 6th Tokyo time, we could have got it on the 5th. I would state that I am fairly positive on those up to and including the day of the 5th. Those that are dated the 6th, I am not so sure about them; but I don't remember the second package coming in.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, did you work on the decryption of any of those messages which came in up to and including December 7, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. Not directly, no. In a supervisory capacity, I watched Woodward's work.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it Woodward, then, who did the bulk of the decryption?

Commander WRIGHT. Woodward, I believe, did all of the decryption with some clerical assistance.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation, Commander, which consists of twenty-eight pages of photostats of handwritten and typed decryptions and translations, and ask you whether you can identify the handwriting on any of those pages.

Commander WRIGHT. No, I am afraid I couldn't recognize the handwriting positively. I am quite sure that between Woodward and Laswell—they are in Washington—they can all be identified. They are both there in Washington, and Laswell was the translating unit out there at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Commander, whether any of the messages to or from the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii which were delivered to the Navy prior to December 7, 1941, was decrypted and translated before the attack?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I don't know whether any were or not. I have been under the impression that there were none delivered to Layton previously, but if he has testified differently, he is probably correct. I wouldn't [445] have been involved in it myself.

Mr. SONNETT. My question wasn't whether they were delivered to Layton, but whether there was any decrypted and translated prior to the attack.

Commander WRIGHT. I don't know. Again, I think Laswell and Woodward can give you a better answer.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, were you familiar with the establishment of the so-called "winds" code by the Japanese on or about November 28, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, it came to my attention at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, document 15, and ask you whether you were familiar with that dispatch of the substance of it.

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. That is the so-called "winds" code, is it not?

Commander WRIGHT. That is setting up the wind warning.

Mr. SONNETT. Are you familiar with the efforts which were made to monitor for any Japanese message employing that code?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes. As I remember it, immediately after the receipt of this message, we set a watch, a twenty-four hour watch, on those broadcasts at the radio station, one language officer on for every four hours.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the results, if any?

Commander WRIGHT. No message of that nature was intercepted by our unit.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know of the receipt by any one of a "winds" code message relating to the United States prior to December 7, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I do not know of such. That is, the execute.

Mr. SONNETT. Did any information ever come to your attention which was received as a result of tapping the telephone wires of the

Japanese [446] Consulate, that is, prior to December 7, 1941.

Commander WRIGHT. No.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, 1941, Commander, you were on duty at the unit at Pearl Harbor, were you not?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And during the course of that day, it has been indicated by previous investigations, there were various radio bearings received as to the location of the attacking force. You testified before Admiral Hart that there was an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the southward. Is that your recollection?

Commander WRIGHT. I would say there was a general impression that the enemy forces were to the south.

Mr. SONNETT. There was one bearing, was there not, which was in direct conflict with the other bearings and indicated that the attacking force was almost due north?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, but the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of that bearing were such that it was never given the prominence that it possibly might have had.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state fully what those circumstances were, please?

Commander WRIGHT. The large direction finder which we then had had out at Lualualei, CXK, the only means of communication we had between Lualualei and our unit there at Pearl Harbor was by an Army mega-telephone and all those mega-telephones were put out of commission and we had no communication contact with the station; we finally raised the station by radio from Admiral Kimmel's headquarters and received one bearing by radio which indicated a northerly direction.

[447] Mr. SONNETT. About what time of day was that? I don't remember?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I am afraid I don't. I would say offhand maybe 10:30, 11 o'clock.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken as a result of having obtained that bearing?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I don't believe it made—it had influence on the opinion at all that the forces were to the south.

Mr. SONNETT. Was the direction finder at Lualualei a one direction or reciprocal—

Commander WRIGHT. The CXK is unilateral.

Mr. SONNETT. Unilateral?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, it gives a true direction.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any other CXK's being used in the area at that time?

Commander WRIGHT. No, the only other one we had at that time was in Mare Island.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any information received from the Army on December 7, 1941, as to the radar bearings of the attacking forces? Do you know whether any information was received?

Commander WRIGHT. To the best of my knowledge, there was none received by our unit.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, I call your attention to documents 1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 of exhibit 13 of this in-



vestigation, which are all copies of Japanese dispatches relating to ships and defense preparations in the Pearl Harbor area, and ask you whether prior to December 7, 1941, you saw any of those dispatches.

Commander WRIGHT. No. To the best of my recollection, none of these [448] messages were transmitted to or received by our unit prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Commander, specifically to document 14 of this exhibit, which is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 6, 1941, in the PA-K2 system, dealing with barrage balloons, and also call your attention to pages 7 and 8 of exhibit 41, which is a pencilled translation, and ask you whether those are translations of the same message.

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, undoubtedly two different translations of the same message.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention to the last sentence of the first paragraph of document 14, which indicates that it is an Army translation, does it not?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the last sentence reads: "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places." I call your attention to the last sentence of the first paragraph of page 7 of exhibit 41, which reads: "The whole matter seems to have been dropped"—which indicates a different translation of that portion of the message, does it not?

Commander WRIGHT. It certainly indicates a different interpretation of the Japanese in that portion.

Mr. SONNETT. Have you any information about the difference in translation, Commander?

Commander WRIGHT. None at all.

Mr. SONNETT. And you do not know, I take it, who made the translation contained on pages 7 and 8 of exhibit 41?

Commander WRIGHT. Not offhand. I would guess it was Fullenwider, [449] but it is either Laswell or Fullenwider or possibly Rochefort. I would guess from this one it was possibly Fullenwider.

Mr. SONNETT. The messages in exhibit 13 to which I have called your attention just now, Commander, indicate that many of them were translated by the Army, do they not?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know how the Army received those messages in the first place and, secondly, what their procedure was for decrypting and translating them?

Commander WRIGHT. Roughly, as I remember it, we had a joint source of obtaining all the diplomatic traffic. We had our own intercept stations and they had their own intercept stations. We pooled the intercepts. Then they had a day by day arrangement whereby the Navy didn't necessarily work on all the traffic for that day, but the Navy was responsible for all of the translations for that day and the Army was responsible—if it were the odd days, then the Navy would be the even days; but both units works on all of the messages. The Army on there just indicates that it was the Army's date to be responsible for that particular message.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state from those particular exhibits v Army intercept station intercepted them, that is, referring to the s ship movement and defense preparation messages?

Commander WRIGHT. In general, I would say that the numeral dicated Army and the letters indicated Navy. I am not sure of t You can get better information on that from the people that wer Washington at that time. Murray, I think, would probably know That is what it looks like to me, that the letters were Navy and numerals Army. The letter "S" would indicate that the message intercepted at Bainbridge Island.

[450] Mr. SONNETT. Was any decryption done at Bainbr Island, Commander? Do you know?

Commander WRIGHT. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Where was the decryption done of the Japa messages which were intercepted?

Commander WRIGHT. In accordance with the assignment of c analytical tasks, all of the decryption of diplomatic traffic was c either at Washington or at Cavite.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Commander WRIGHT. I have nothing. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:52 p. m. adjourned until 2 p. m., 19 June 1945.)

[451] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTIETH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2:15 p. m., Tuesday, 19 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Beecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, please.

Captain EARLE. John B. Earle, Captain, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your assignment on December 7, 1941, Captain?

Captain EARLE. Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And for how long had you been in that assignment?

Captain EARLE. Since June 9, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified previously, as I recall it, Captain, that in the several months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor you had about ten or fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor. Can you recall what those reports were?

Captain EARLE. Very indefinitely. They generally came from sampans—from fishing boats; occasionally from Army lookout posts; and now and then from planes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, the nature of the last report received prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain EARLE. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you recall specifically any report of submarine sighting or contact in the months of October, November, and up to [452] December 6, 1941?

Captain EARLE. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, whether prior to December 7, 1941, there was any report of a submarine just off the entrance to Pearl Harbor?

Captain EARLE. As I recall, there had been such a report, but whether it was official and not simply unofficial, I can't say at this time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether that report was a contact or sighting, Captain?

Admiral HEWITT. You mean destroyer contact.

Mr. SONNETT. Destroyer contact or sighting.

Captain EARLE. I can't recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Did any report of a submarine contact prior to December 7, 1941, involve a depth charge on the submarine or suspected submarine?

Captain EARLE. My recollection is not sufficiently accurate to say whether or not I can recall that point. I have a vague recollection of

something of that kind, but not sufficiently accurate to make a definite statement.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall, Captain, whether any report prior December 7, 1941, involved firing upon a submarine or a suspected submarine?

Captain EARLE. I am almost certain that there was no such report.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and direct your attention particularly to the conversation recorded at about 0520 Pearl Harbor time of that date between the WARD and the CONDOR, and ask whether that conversation or the fact of such a conversation came to your attention prior to the attack on December 7th?

Captain EARLE. It did not.

[453] Mr. SONNETT. You will note on the second page of this exhibit, Captain, a report by the WARD of its attack upon a submarine. That report did come to your attention prior to the attack as I understand your previous testimony.

Captain EARLE. That report did come to my attention but not in the wording that it is included in the log of the section base.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state, Captain, the report of that conversation which was received by you on December 7, 1941, and state the time approximately at which you received it?

Captain EARLE. About 0710 I was informed by the Operations Division Officer, Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, that he had received a message from the WARD to the effect that "We have attacked and fired on a submarine."

Admiral HEWITT. Nothing about depth charges?

Captain EARLE. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. That report, Captain, was a more specific report, was it not, than any previous report concerning submarine contact which had been received by you?

Captain EARLE. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What action was taken on the report?

Captain EARLE. As I recall it, I immediately told the watch officer to inform the Commander-in-Chief's Operation Officer and to take steps to get the relief destroyer ready to proceed out of the harbor, get the message checked and verified and attempt to find out what further action was being taken by the WARD. I then called the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, informed him of what had been done, and talked the situation over with him for some time with a view to deciding what other action should be taken. Our reaction was that it was probably a mistake as we had had numerous reports of sighting of submarines, but that if it were not a [454] mistake, the WARD could take care of the situation and the relief destroyer could lend a hand, while the Commander-in-Chief had the necessary power to undertake any other action which might be desired. Mainly we were trying to definitely determine what had happened.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Captain, that no further action was taken on that report prior to the air attack on December 7th?

Captain EARLE. No other action was taken by me. I believe that in addition to that, that Commander Momsen, who was the Operations Officer, was contacted and told to take station. We were vague

alarmed but could see no specific threat involved except that by the possible position of an enemy submarine in that area.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask whether you saw that and were familiar with that prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain EARLE. It is my recollection that I saw this before December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to page 6 of that exhibit, Captain, sub-paragraph (m) (3), would you read that into the record, sir?

Captain EARLE. "It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

Mr. SONNETT. Were you in agreement, Captain, there with that statement of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the fleet?

[455] Captain EARLE. Most certainly in agreement, based upon the belief that such an attack might take place after the declaration of war.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring, Captain, to page 1 of that letter, you will find two assumptions stated. Would you read assumption (b) into the record? I suggest doing it that way because it has been some time since you have seen that exhibit, and also it will be clearer in the record.

Captain EARLE (reading):

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

(1) Sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) To block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by;

(1) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Captain, coming back to the previous question, it appears, does it not, that one of the assumptions of the security letter was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise Japanese attack? Having that in mind and turning to the statement that you previously read concerning the presence of a submarine, will you state why, on the morning of December 7, 1941, upon receipt of the report from the WARD, it was not believed that a large Japanese force might be in the offing and why appropriate action was not taken on that belief?

[456] Captain EARLE. In the first place, we were not sure of this supposed contact. It still seemed to have a possibility of being in error. This was particularly strengthened by a later report received from the WARD which said that she was proceeding to escort a sampan toward Honolulu. We couldn't imagine that the WARD, having actually attacked a submarine, would leave her post to proceed to Honolulu if it were a real attack. In the second place, we had no

force immediately available to resist any attack as far as the District was concerned, except the relief destroyer, and we felt that by referring the matter to the Commander-in-Chief, that we had done all that possibly could even if the attack were real.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to the previous submarine contact reports, that is, prior to December 7, 1941, were any air searches conducted as a result of those reports?

Captain EARLE. It is my recollection that there were air searches but we in the District had no control over these air searches and had no airplanes ourselves, so that we assumed that when information was referred to the Commander-in-Chief, that all necessary action would be taken.

Mr. SONNETT. With respect, Captain, to the question of aircor reconaissance, it appears from the previous investigations that sometime in July or August of 1941 Admiral Bloch suggested to Admiral Kimmel that reconaissance be conducted on a sector towards Jalapa. Have you any information in connection with that?

Captain EARLE. I have not.

Mr. SONNETT. And you do not know what the reasons were for the suggestions made by Admiral Bloch?

Captain EARLE. I do not recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a certified collection of documents [457] which contains Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Air Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, this being dated 28 March 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen this at or about the time it was issued.

Captain EARLE. I do not recall definitely having seen this document, but inasmuch as when I reported as Chief of Staff in Japan I was shown all of the existing orders, it is very probable that I saw this.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, this contains various other documents which we don't presently need, but since it is certified, I wonder whether we shouldn't take it now as an exhibit and we can refer to it with the Captain. Some of the provisions will be of interest.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 47.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 47, Captain, which we have been discussing, it appears that it was approved April 2, 1941, signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short, does it not?

Captain EARLE. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Paragraph 2 of the exhibit provides for joint operations and paragraph 4 for joint anti-aircraft measures, including arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, and other items. Would you, referring to this exhibit, Captain, discuss what joint exercises and drills were held with the Army as a general practice in the months preceding the attack under the joint anti-aircraft procedure?

Captain EARLE. As I recall, definite problems were prepared for training purposes which would serve to develop the control features of the base anti-aircraft defense and at the same time develop necessary coordination between the operations of the Army and Navy air components. Frequent [458] drills—I should say at least once every ten days—were held in which planes would fly over

l Harbor area both day and night and the ships in the harbor  
ld stimulate anti-aircraft fire on these planes. The entire Pearl  
bor area was divided into sectors and there was a naval sector  
mander on a ship who was responsible for controlling the indi-  
al fire of that sector and make the necessary reports. In addi-  
to the above, a problem was developed about once a month or  
in which a definite target for aircraft was placed on a certain  
ing from Pearl Harbor at a certain time and the warning was  
in to both the Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier  
nit was on such and such a bearing, distance so much. At that  
the various provisions of air control were used in that, fighter  
es were sent aloft and bombers were actually sent out to inter-  
and attack the simulated target offshore. I am not certain  
tly how many drills of this type were had before Pearl Harbor  
December 7th, but I should say at least three.

r. SONNETT. When was the latest of the three, Captain?

r. SONNETT. I am sorry, but I couldn't say exactly.

r. SONNETT. Can you recall whether any such drill was held be-  
n November 27th and December 7th, that is, roughly in the two  
ks preceding the attack?

aptain EARLE. I cannot recall.

dmiral HEWITT. What was the command staff setup for carrying  
joint operations as between the District and the Army command  
ch exercises?

aptain EARLE. You mean before Pearl Harbor?

dmiral HEWITT. Any such exercise, before Pearl Harbor and what  
set up after?

aptain EARLE. My recollection is colored from operations that took  
place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire  
blem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet  
the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an  
ny had been sighted on a certain bearing, this word was given to  
fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made  
ween the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate  
r operations, including orders as to—detailed directions as to  
ction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.

o amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post  
perations center actually set up for these drills before the war.

Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval  
rict, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary  
munication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle  
e drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the  
t time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just  
r, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations  
e. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite  
s had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the

It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint com-  
d post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage.

fter the war started, a joint command post was set up immediately  
e Operations Office of the Fourteenth Naval District and operated  
e for several months while the Army moved their principal com-

mand center to the Crater. Shortly after their move, the Navy move its command center next to the Army center in the Crater.

Admiral HIWITT. That is, Fourteenth Naval District——

Captain EARLE. Fourteenth——

Admiral HEWITT. Or District and the Commander-in-Chief?

Captain EARLE. No, District; just the District.

[460] Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, Captain, the Fourteenth Naval District had a Liaison Officer with General Short's headquarters, did you not?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. What, in general, were his duties, Captain?

Captain EARLE. He was sent up to the Army to report to the Commanding General for duty as Liaison Officer and to perform such duties in that connection as would be required.

Mr. SONNETT. Exhibit 47, Captain, the Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, provided in part that the Army would expedite the installation and placing in operation of an aircraft warning service. During the period of completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warnings of hostile attack as might be practicable. What steps were taken, in general, Captain, by the Navy to carry out that agreement?

Captain EARLE. In the first place, communications were established with the Army over radio nets and teletype system so that any information that came in could be sent promptly to the Army station interested. The communication activities were informed that prompt reports must be made concerning any possible enemy activity. The few destroyers assigned to the District had the necessary instructions as to reporting contacts. There were no planes attached to the District, but it is my recollection that fleet planes were instructed to forward immediately any information to that extent. The District Communications Officer was thoroughly aware of the necessity for getting prompt information of enemy contacts to the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. To what extent, Captain, were you or Admiral Bloch kept informed concerning the reconnaissance being performed by the fleet planes in the months preceding the attack?

[461] Captain EARLE. I can't speak for Admiral Bloch, but as far as I am concerned, I had no information unless I came by it casually, following some special report of a sighting.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a collection of dispatches relating to submarine contacts reported in November and December, 1941, some of which were sent for information to ComFOURTEEN, and ask you whether these are the type of reports of submarine contacts received prior to the attack to which you referred previously in your testimony.

Captain EARLE. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 48".)

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring again to exhibit 47, which is Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, it appears that the Army was to expedite the installation and placin



in operation of an aircraft warning service. It appears from previous investigations that some request was made of ComFOURTEEN for Navy liaison officers to work with the Army aircraft warning service. Do you have any knowledge or information concerning that?

Captain EARLE. The only information I have is that there was a naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their warning system installed and operating, who came to me at one time and asked for help and I told him to apply to the District Communications Officer, who would be glad to give him every possible assistance. This officer also mentioned that a certain number of naval liaison officers would be necessary at this warning center, to which I replied that we had no spare personnel in the District for that purpose as [462] we were extremely short in every department. The officer then stated that he would see what he could do to get liaison officers from the fleet, and it was my impression that no further action would be taken by the District unless the fleet found it necessary. It might be of interest to note that after Pearl Harbor liaison officers were supplied, but they all came from ships that had been damaged or sunk in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. While we are on the subject of the Army radar system, Captain, do you recall what reports you received from the Army relative to the bearing of planes or bearings of planes, received on December 7th, showing in which direction they departed from Pearl Harbor?

Captain EARLE. So far as as I know, I never saw such information.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, the District Intelligence Officer was Captain Mayfield, was he not?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. And the radio intelligence unit was under then Lieutenant Commander Rochefort?

Captain EARLE. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you receive the daily communication intelligence summaries prepared by the radio intelligence unit, such as those contained in exhibit 22 of this investigation (handing the exhibit to the witness)?

Captain EARLE. No, I did not. These summaries were considered of such secret matter that the Commandant of the District wished as few as possible to see them.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not such summaries came to Admiral Bloch's attention?

Captain EARLE. I do not, but I imagine they did.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any information prior to December 7, 1941, [463] concerning any telephone taps on the lines of the Japanese Consul or Vice Consul in Honolulu?

Captain EARLE. I have no information on that subject.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not any cables of the Japanese Consul in Honolulu were intercepted prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain EARLE. I do not know.

Mr. SONNETT. At any time prior to December 7, 1941, did there come to your attention, Captain, any messages of the Japanese Consul relating to ship movements in Pearl Harbor or preparations for defense in Pearl Harbor?

Captain EARLE. There did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, with respect to the dealings of the Fourteenth Naval District with the Army, do you recall what information, if any, was supplied to the Army, particularly relating to movements of Japanese naval forces?

Captain EARLE. I do not know of any information of that character being furnished the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, immediately prior to and between the 1st and the 7th there were various dispatches received at CincPac Headquarters relating to the destruction of ships by the Japanese. Did you have any knowledge of those dispatches?

Captain EARLE. I believe that I saw such a dispatch over at the Commander-in-Chief's office.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether that information was communicated to the Army?

Captain EARLE. I couldn't say. The Fourteenth Naval District didn't communicate it to the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. I think that is all, Admiral.

[464] Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:20 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m., Wednesday, 20 June 1945.)

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-FIRST DAY

ursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. at 10:10 a. m., Wednesday, 20 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, please?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Oliver H. Underkofler, Lieutenant, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Where were you assigned on December 7, 1941, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Communication Office, ComFOURTEEN.

Mr. SONNETT. What duties were you performing on the night of December 6th or morning of December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. I was the communication watch officer on that watch.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, of ComFOURTEEN?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time did that watch commence, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. The communication watch officer's watch started at 0800 on the 6th and was supposed to conclude at 0800 on the 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to yourself, who else was present at that time, during that watch?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Ensign Kennedy, now lieutenant.

Mr. SONNETT. And his first name?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. I believe it was Gordon F., but I am not sure.

666] Mr. SONNETT. On the morning of the 7th until approximately 0630 was Kennedy present with you, listening to the reports that came in, and in a position to hear them?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. No, sir, he was in the coding vault, which was at the far end of the Communication Office and was separated from the Communication Office by a bulkhead, with a port in the bulkhead about twelve inches square; so he was in no position to hear the radio.

Mr. SONNETT. You were standing what you termed a loudspeaker position, were you not, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you describe what that consisted of?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It was a watch on the inshore patrol frequency, was established each evening at the time the minesweepers went out and commenced sweeping the channel, and we stood watch on that circuit until we received a report from the minesweepers that the channel had been swept and was clear, at which time we secured the watch.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which consists of an extract of the radio log of the Bishop's Point Radio Station for December 7, 1941, and call your attention to the conversation between the WARD and the CONDOR, having call sign DZ5Y and DN3L, at about 1450 Greenwich time, and ask whether or not that conversation came to your attention.

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you explain why it did not come to your attention, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. On this loudspeaker watch that was set up there was no one assigned to sit by the radio and listen to it. Any one who has stood loudspeaker watches is aware that you listen to it subconsciously, [467] the same as you would any other noise in the vicinity. If your call is given, you hear it just like if an alarm clock had been rung and you immediately answer the call. If we hadn't been called that morning, we would have paid no attention to the conversation that was carried on.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you remember what your call was?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. SONNETT. By looking at exhibit 18, can you refresh your recollection, particularly the second page?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. From the appearance of the log, it would seem that DW2X was a call for ComFOURTEEN. Those calls were assigned by the District and changed about once every two months, and we made no attempt to memorize them.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again to the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR at about 1450 Greenwich time, what time would that be, Pearl Harbor time?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Pearl Harbor time before the war was plus ten and a half hours, which would make that 4:20.

Mr. SONNETT. Is it the fact that you were not called by either the WARD or the CONDOR and given a report of the sighting of the submarine referred to in that conversation?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 2 of exhibit 18, there appears to be a record of the report by the WARD of an attack on a submarine at 1723 Greenwich time, which, I take it, is about 0653 Pearl Harbor time, a record of the report by the WARD of an attack on a submarine. Did that report come to your attention?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It did.

[468] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the circumstances and what action was taken by you?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. There were two dispatches that came through to ComFOURTEEN and I was broken out of the bunk as the first one came in and by the time the second one had come in, which came in immediately following, I was alert and received the message and delivered it to the duty officer at ComFOURTEEN.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time on the morning of December 7th had you turned in, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. At approximately 0230.

Mr. SONNETT. And from that time until you were awakened at about 0630 or thereabouts, I take it, you were asleep?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the supervisor, if you recall, who was awake during that period of time?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. I do not recall who was on watch. I don't recall a single man that was on watch that morning.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether the conversation between the WARD and the CONDOR at about 0420 Pearl Harbor time came to the attention of any one who was standing that watch with you?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. To my knowledge, it did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Would the fact of such a conversation have been reported to you had it come to the attention of some one standing that watch?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, I am sure it would.

Mr. SONNETT. It has been testified previously, Lieutenant, that efforts were made to verify the WARD's report. Have you any knowledge of that?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, sir.

[469] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what you know about that?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. On receipt of the dispatch from the WARD at approximately 0653 Hawaiian time, the dispatch was delivered to the duty officer of ComFOURTEEN, who relayed it to the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District. I was directed to get a verification from the WARD by the duty officer and presumed that this order emanated from the Chief of Staff. I asked if it should be encoded and was instructed that it should be. The message requesting verification was enciphered in a strip code and was delivered over the voice circuit, voice radio circuit, to the WARD. A reply to the request for verification was delivered to ComFOURTEEN by radio and was deciphered at approximately the same time as the first attack by air.

Mr. SONNETT. You stated that you were instructed by the duty officer to have the report of the WARD verified. Did you receive that instruction upon delivery to him of the report by the WARD or subsequent to the delivery?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It was subsequent to the delivery.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall approximately how long afterwards?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That has been some time ago and the best of my remembrance, it was between ten and fifteen minutes.

Mr. SONNETT. You kept no log at the Communication Office on the morning of the 7th, did you?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. There are several different types of logs. We did not keep a log of the inshore patrol frequency over which these messages to the WARD were handled.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified, Lieutenant, that you were instructed to request the WARD for verification and to encode your request and that you did so in a strip code. Will you state what that means and the amount of time required to transmit such a message in that code?

[470] Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Use of the strip code is a substitution method, a substitution of letters method, so that when that message has been encoded, it consists of five-letter groups that are

not in any particular arrangement; in other words, indiscriminate letters in the five-letter groups. It is a slow system to use, that is, to encipher or decode in, and was used because it was the only thing that the WARD had. The transmission of such a message over a voice circuit requires that each letter be given in its phonetic equivalent, which is a slow process. The reply, of course, was also enciphered and was delivered the same way, which was a lengthy process and took considerable time. I can't tell you how many minutes.

Admiral HEWITT. The original report from the WARD was delivered in clear, was it not?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. That is all.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

Admiral HEWITT. We will recess at this time until 11 o'clock.

(The investigation then, at 10:30 a. m., recessed until 11 a. m., which time it reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties.)

[471] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Patrick N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you have a statement, do you not, setting forth your duties during December, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we have it copied into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

(The statement referred to follows as pages 471a to 471h, inclusive.)

[471a] On December 8, 1941, and, for several months prior thereto, my duties were as follows:

(1) Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander, Patrol Wings One and Two. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings One and Two.

(2) Commander, Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two plus other units as assigned by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet for the conduct of specific operations.

(3) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities for this function included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

(4) Liaison with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In connection with the above duties, I functioned under the following seniors:

(a) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as type commander for patrol wings, was based at San Diego.

(b) Commander Scouting Force, the Force Command of which Patrol Wings One and Two were a part.

(c) Directly under Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet in my capacity as Commander, Task Force Nine.

[471b] (d) Under Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force when performing my duties as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(e) Commanders of Task Forces One, Two, and Three for Operation of patrol planes assigned those forces for specific operations.

A change in my status was contemplated in the then current Navy Orange War Plan. Under its provisions, the units of my command were expected to make an early move to bases on the outlying islands Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra.

My own headquarters were to be shifted to Midway. That my responsibilities in this connection were by no means considered light is evidenced by the fact that, just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, this War Plan was being played as a chart maneuver. Further, the squadron, VP-22, designated for maintenance in the highest practicable degree of readiness to expedite the initiation of the war plan move to advance bases was, in fact, transferred to Midway in October 1941.

Reverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March, 1941, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet directed me to report to the Commandant 14th Naval District to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force who, incidentally, was senior to me.

The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the operation plan of [471c] the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined the proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In so far as Naval and Marine Corps air units were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when applicable. Orders from Army sources covering the functioning of their units in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides for these aircraft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based upon the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, and signed by General Martin and myself.

That estimate was based on the conditions as they existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the naval air situation between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of sufficient significance to warrant a reestimate and my information of the Army Air Force indicated an analogous condition.

The estimate, I believed,—and still believe—to be sound. But the orders based on that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction. And the missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command.

Specifically, the organization was designed to function through "mutual cooperation" between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack. As such, the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in the event of an actual emergency or when proper authority so directed.

The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made "available" to it by the various Air Commands of both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported as [471d] available were subject to the operational control of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force or the Army Pursuit Commander in the prevailing category of readiness, only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.

The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills was for the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, to send dispatch reading, "Drill, Danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, Drill". This placed the Search and Attack groups in a functioning status. On receipt of this message, I, in turn, as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units, which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At this point, during such drills, searches were immediately started by planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and their efforts were supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were reported ready for flight.

The term, Command Naval Base Defense Air Force, was actually a misnomer due to the limited composition of that portion of the Air Forces under my operational control, which included only aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detection devices, or anti-aircraft guns.

The term, Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, was even more of a misnomer as it implied authority over operating units to a degree which did not exist. This authority was non-existent until an emergency was apparent, or until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base Defense [471e] Air Force in a functioning status, and, when so called into existence, was limited in scope, in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based upon mutual cooperation. In addition, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the Search and Attack Groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force and was non-existent so far as Army Pursuit aviation and Navy Fighter aviation

were concerned which were to function under Brigadier General H. C. Davis, U. S. Army.

To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, attention is invited to the report of a Joint Army-Navy Board dated 31 October, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Area. Paragraph 4 (a) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin as senior Army member and myself as senior Navy member read as follows:

"4. The problem confronting the board as pertains to Army Aviation is summed up by the Army representatives as follows:

(a) The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out his mission is:

- (1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation.
- (2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation."

It was pointed out that, under the Army 54th Group program, 170 B-17's and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill [471f] the above missions.

Naval plans called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directly under the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District to supplement or function in place of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO, which might be ordered to advance bases on the outlying islands of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra.

Further, the planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the Naval Base Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18's were being replaced by the more modern B-17's and in Patrol Wings ONE and TWO PBV-1, 2 and 3's were being replaced by PBV-5's. The new types were subject to the usual shake-down difficulties and maintenance problems.

In the case of the Naval PBV-5 planes, there was an almost complete absence of spare parts and, in addition, a program of the installation of armor and fireproof gasoline tanks was in progress. Considerable difficulty had also been experienced with the cracking of engine nose sections in the first planes of this type received and the installation of modified engine nose sections was in progress.

The major effort of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO during 1941 prior to December 7th was expansion training, operational training, security operations development and equipping of air facilities—all in preparation for war. Aviation training facilities and output in the Navy at that time were considerably behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. There was particular stress was placed by higher authority on the need for expansion training. This necessitated a planning [471g] of operations whereby a squadron could be required to conduct training for the qualification of additional combat crews not only for their own aircraft, but to form nuclei for new squadrons being commissioned back on the mainland as well. The highest priority was placed upon this feature.

Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was being made to increase the readiness for war. Squadron and patrol plane commanders were indoctrinated with the necessity of keeping their planes so equipped and their crews so trained that at any time during a flight they could be diverted from their peacetime objectives to combat missions.

The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the patrol planes constantly scouting to maximum range, and the bomber aircraft standing by for attack missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein the Naval Base would have been greatly reduced in material readiness and their combat capability approaching an operational fatigue point while the Army pilots would have been in need of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bell estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and necessity for specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.

The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force did not have the authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except [471h] in the



of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of the attack on December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority. Orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill" was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning.

[472] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 34 of this investigation, which consists of Staff Instructions, Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, and call your attention to paragraph 224, dealing with the Fleet Aviation Officer. That sets forth, does it not, the duties of the Fleet Aviation Officer?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That sets forth the duties of the Fleet Aviation Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It has no bearing on my responsibilities and duties as Commander Patrol Wing Two or Commander Task Force Nine or any other duties I had in connection with my job in the forces of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibit 9 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which is a certified copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and ask whether that letter had ever come to your attention prior to December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't want to take your time up reading it, but I have never seen it before.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 47 of this investigation, which contains Annex number VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated March 28, 1941, and ask you whether you were familiar with that.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the circumstances under which you had connection with that document, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In connection with the preparing of this document, it came about as a result of a directive from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and my relation to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I functioned under him and in connection with the working out of a plan to bring an organization into [473] existence, this document was one of the preliminary features. It was not prepared by me, but some portions of it I did have a chance to criticize and advise in connection with its preparation.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any discussions of that document with Admiral Kimmel that you recall, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not with Admiral Kimmel but with Captain Gill, who was the Plans Officer of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and I am sure I discussed some of the points with Admiral Bloch, who was the Commander Naval Base Defense Force under that setup.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion of that document with any other members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. From time to time during the setup of this organization and even after it was in effect, I discussed general aspects of it with Admiral Kimmel, not particularly with reference to this paper, but with reference to subjects which had a bearing on it such as unity of command.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 47 and to page 4, is stated, in part:

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an aircraft warning service. During the period prior to the completion of the AW installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel as to that feature of the Navy's obligation under this agreement?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you some certified copies of documents and ask you whether you can identify those.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I identify those as having been prepared by my organization.

Mr. SONNETT. And the next, too, Admiral, is Addendum I. Can you similarly identify that?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I identify that as an estimate of the situation which was prepared primarily by my organization with the concurrence of the Commander, Army Air Force, in the Hawaiian area.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you personally participate, Admiral, in the preparation of that estimate?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 49.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, for the sake of the record and in order to refresh your recollection of the document, would you read paragraph the Summary of the Situation, and paragraph 3, Possible Enemy Action, into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

1. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval Installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating area organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

[475] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

III. *Possible Enemy Action.*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Substantially, Admiral, a basic premise of that estimate [476] was that a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor without declaration of war was a possibility, was it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It was.

Mr. SONNETT. And the second basic premise was that in the event of such an attack, it was probable that the attack would be by air?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to the section of that joint estimate entitled Action Open To Us, would you read sub-paragraph (a)?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

*IV. Action open to us:*

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there any provision, Admiral, under the section dealing with action open to use for reconnaissance of a sector of less than 360 degrees?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In this estimate it is not stated that less than 360 degrees might be used effectively, but, of course, it was taken into consideration in all thought and ideas.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, partial reconnaissance, Admiral, was, of course, one type of action open to the fleet, was it not, in order to meet the situation estimated in that joint estimate?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, in a degree.

Mr. SONNETT. And that was true, Admiral, both at the date of that estimate—which was about March or April of 1941, was it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. March 31, 1941.

[477] Mr. SONNETT. And similarly remained true throughout the rest of the year up to the time of the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, because at no time were we able to cover 360 degrees to the range that we thought was necessary—at any time up to July, 1942, and even later.

Mr. SONNETT. The point I wanted to get clear, Admiral, is although it is not listed in your joint estimate as a possible course of action, nevertheless was a possible and feasible and a practical operation open to the fleet to conduct partial reconnaissance from Oahu, covering certain selected sectors?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. This estimate was not to restrict any effort to accomplish the main idea of the estimate.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, did you have any discussion of that estimate with Admiral Kimmel at any time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember discussing it with him prior to issuing it, but I am certain that he saw it because he talked to me about it, not in detail but in general, and I talked to him in general and sometimes in detail concerning the features of it.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, of course, prior to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Prior to December 7, 1941, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion of that estimate with other members of Admiral Kimmel's staff?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I feel practically sure that I discussed many times with his aviation aide. I don't remember any details of any of the discussions.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there at any time, Admiral, any request on the part of Admiral Kimmel or any member of his staff for clarification or any disagreement [478] as to your joint estimate?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not to my recollection. As a matter of fact, he more or less complimented me on it and particularly so, I remember, when he had returned to Honolulu after a trip to Washington, where some mention apparently had been made of the general plan; not of the estimate in particular, but the general plan to attempt coordination.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, the Naval Base Defense Air Force plan?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And this estimate, of course, was the basis upon which that plan was written?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 35 of this investigation which is the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan distributed to the fleet in July of 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that prior to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I am familiar with this Rainbow Five plan and we were in the midst of a chart maneuver of this plan by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to December 7th and it hadn't been completed up to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit and I think you will find there set forth the tasks assigned by the Navy Basic Plan to the Pacific Fleet. I call your attention particularly to subparagraph h and ask if you would read that into the record.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

[479] Mr. SONNETT. And will you refer now, Admiral, to pages 25 and 26 and you will there find that the initial tasks of the Pacific

are divided into two phases, do you not, phase IA and phase I?  
 ce Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

r. SONNETT. Admiral, will you read into the record phase I-b,  
 and I-m of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet?

ce Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.  
 Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and pre-  
 vent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by  
 working with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking  
 forces as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the  
 equator as far west as longitude 155° east.  
 Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

r. SONNETT. Admiral, it was, therefore, an assigned initial task  
 of the Pacific Fleet to guard against a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor,  
 is it not?

ce Admiral BELLINGER. Evidently, yes, from the point of view  
 of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, took upon himself to try  
 to bring about a coordinated organization to take care of such an attack.  
 However, I would like to refer you to a statement by the Commander  
 of the Hawaiian Air Force. I was on an Army-Navy board to en-  
 deavor to adjust the control of certain airfields that were in the island  
 of Oahu and in connection with this board's report there is a state-  
 ment as follows in paragraph 4: "The problem confronting the Board  
 pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representa-  
 tives as follows: The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the  
 Pearl Harbor naval base against all attacks by an enemy. The con-  
 dition to be [480] made by the Hawaiian Air Force in  
 carrying out this mission is to search for and destroy enemy surface  
 vessels within radius of action by bombardment aviation; to detect, in-  
 spect, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit  
 aviation." It is therefore indicated to me that the Army also assumed  
 responsibility for the air defense of the Pearl Harbor naval base.  
 r. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, what is the date  
 of that report?

ce Admiral BELLINGER. The date of that report is 31 October 1941.  
 The board members are listed as Major General F. L. Martin, USA,  
 Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN, Brigadier General H. C.  
 Hodson, USA, and Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, USN.  
 The report was signed by General F. L. Martin, Major General, USA,  
 Rear Army Member, and P. N. L. Bellinger, Rear Admiral, USN,  
 Rear Naval Member.

r. SONNETT. Admiral, it was true, was it not, that under the Joint  
 Initial Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation to conduct  
 long range reconnaissance?

ce Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

r. SONNETT. And that obligation, of course, remained right up to  
 the time of the attack?

ce Admiral BELLINGER. It did in the setup, although I would like  
 to draw attention to the fact that, How was the Navy going to do  
 and carry out the war plan, Rainbow Five?—because the available  
 forces couldn't be in two places at one time.

r. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 12 of the war plan, I  
 have you will find set forth the composition of Task Force Nine.  
 Would you read that into the record?

[481] Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

*TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft Scouting Force*

|                                       |        |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
| All units of Aircraft-----            | 107 VP |
| Scouting Force-----                   | 2 AV   |
|                                       | 2 AVP  |
|                                       | 4 AVD  |
| Utility Squadron from Base Force----- | 10 VJR |

Mr. SONNETT. Could you state just in general, Admiral, what 107 VP's were?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The 107 VP's were supposed to be fly boats, twin-engine. As a matter of fact, we did not have that many planes on December 6th and our total number, as I recall, was eight one, in varying degrees of readiness.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a carbon copy of a letter dated 20 December 1941, from Commander Task Force Nine to Command in-Chief and ask you whether you can identify that as a copy of a letter sent by you.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I do identify it as such.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 50A.")

Mr. SONNETT. Incidentally, Admiral Bellinger, to this letter have annexed copies of various dispatches referred to in the fifth paragraph of the letter. Would you take a look at those and see if you can identify those, too, so we can make them part of the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the dispatches, Admiral, as exhibit 50A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[482] (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 50A.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 50, Admiral, which is the letter you have just identified, at page 2 you give a total of seventy-two patrol planes in the air or ready for flight in four hours or less and subsequently you show that there were nine planes undergoing repairs making a total of eighty-one planes. Now, is that the correct figure of the number of patrol planes which you had in Task Force Nine?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is the correct number, to the best of my information.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, with respect to the number of planes which you had in Task Force Nine, which you have stated to be eighty-one patrol planes, what efforts had been made to obtain additional planes?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. There is a letter on record, the first letter wherein I tried to paint the picture out there. That letter was dated January 16, 1941, and was the start. There was a lot of effort made on my part to improve the situation out there, covering the over-all situation. Planes are no good unless you have places to operate from and facilities to operate on and spare parts. I will give you a copy if I have it here, but it is all in the files somewhere. It wasn't so many numbers of planes in this case—the numbers were more or less controlled by the Navy Department—as it was of getting those that were assigned to us in a condition of readiness and operating ability to the maximum extent. If you really want to know what I have done

on this subject, I will have to go through the records, because there was an awful lot of letters written.

For instance, I would like to invite your attention to one letter dated 22 October 1941, and I am asking in that letter for "180 long-range, [483] high speed, landplane bombers, equal or superior to the B-17-E, and 180 interceptor fighters of the best performance available." That was in addition to any that we had, and that was in this letter, which is file 0026 of 22 October 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a photostatic copy of a letter with several endorsements thereon and ask you whether it is a copy of the letter to which you have just referred.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. And you, I take it, can also identify the endorsements, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 51.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to exhibit 51, which is the letter you have just identified, that letter was concerned, was it not, with the aircraft requirements for offensive action?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Both offensive and defensive.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention particularly, Admiral—

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Suppose I say this: Both offensive and defensive, primarily offensive, because the flying boat was known to have very little offensive power unless used under special conditions.

Mr. SONNETT. That appears particularly from the sentence in paragraph 1 reading, Admiral: "It is respectfully submitted that the Fleet is not adequately prepared for a campaign in the Pacific until, in addition to present types of aircraft, it is provided with an air striking force of high speed, long range [484] landplane bombers at least equal in performance to the B-17-E"; so that that letter was not concerned with increasing the present types of aircraft primarily used for reconnaissance, but rather was primarily concerned with getting additional planes to be used primarily offensively, is that correct?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct. It was designed primarily to bring about a more acceptable situation for the United States Navy in the Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken upon the recommendations made by you in exhibit 51?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. There were no actual results obtained from it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a letter dated January 16, 1941, and ask you whether it is a copy of a letter sent by you.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit and we will return the exhibit to Admiral Bellinger after we have had it copied?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 52.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, this exhibit 52, your letter of January 16, 1941, summarizes the situation as to the aircraft as of that time, does it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It did.

Mr. SONNETT. And points out various deficiencies and requirements for the patrol wings?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it the fact, sir, that during the year 1941 prior to the attack, there were additional planes sent out to the Pacific Fleet?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, there were additional planes sent [485] and also a newer type of plane, but I would like to draw attention in this letter, which is dated January 16, 1941, in paragraph 2 (b) the following quotation, which is referring to an OpNav confidential letter: "In about one year practically all Fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing Two will have armor and fuel protection," and the planes which were discussed in this letter actually arrived on the following dates: VP 11, with twelve planes, arrived in the Hawaiian area on 28 October 1941; VP 24, with six planes, arrived on 28 October 1941; VP 12, with twelve planes, arrived on 8 November 1941; VP 23, with twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 1941; VP 14, with twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 1941. Most of these planes and squadrons were replacements, and, I believe, some additions, to the old planes which we had prior thereto. But note that they arrived about a year after the above-quoted statement was made, as predicted.

Mr. SONNETT. As I figure it, Admiral, that makes a total of fifteen new planes delivered in October and November, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And those, added to the planes you had and kept, made a total of eighty-one—

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. From November to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. But remember that practically all of the planes weren't additional groups or squadrons of planes; they were replacement planes with the newer type of PBY-5 type.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, after the attack on December 7, 1941, understand that additional planes were sent out to Pearl Harbor?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, there were.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall in round numbers how many additional patrol planes and where they came from, if you know?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. They came from the Pacific Coast and the Atlantic Fleet and I think there were about forty-odd planes.

[468] Mr. SONNETT. Do you know why those forty-odd planes could not have been sent prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I sent a squadron commander, who departed from Pearl Harbor with his squadron for replacement planes to Washington to find out what was the situation with reference to the Pacific and why were we the last ones to be re-equipped, and the answer he gave me upon his return to Pearl Harbor was that the Atlantic Fleet had priority.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring again to this period from the 1st of November up to the time of the attack on December 7th, you had a total of eighty-one patrol planes in Task Force Nine, as I understand it?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.



Mr. SONNETT. Now, do you recall the number of Army planes which were suitable for long-range reconnaissance and which could have been made available during that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I do not know the exact number or even an accurate approximate number because it was very difficult to get that information from the Army. It appears that their situation was changing quite rapidly and continually as their planes of the long-range bomber type were being sent to the Philippines.

Mr. SONNETT. Did they report some six or eight available during that period of time, B-17's?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In accordance with the operational directives prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and myself, a report of planes that were available—that could be made available to the other command, was sent to the appropriate command every day. I have here a copy of a dispatch from the Headquarters, Hawaiian Air Force, to Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, as of 5 December 1941, which indicates [487] that there were eight B-17's, twenty-one B-18's, and six A-20's which were to be considered available when made available.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the range of the B-17's was sufficient for long-range reconnaissance from Oahu, was it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It was, in the conception of long-range at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. About what was the range of the B-17?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Without bomb load they were supposed to be able to cover a sector of radius about 800 miles.

Mr. SONNETT. And of the B-18's, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In this B-17 situation I just spoke about, the range applied without bomb load or not more than one-half bomb load. That meant they had to put an extra gas tank in the vacant bomb bay.

The B-18's were supposed to have a reconnaissance radius of approximately 300 miles.

Mr. SONNETT. And the A-20's?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. About 150 miles radius.

Mr. SONNETT. Also for the sake of the record we might also get the range of the PBY-4 and 5, Admiral, if you will state that.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. PBY-5's and 4's had a radius of approximately 700 miles.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it was the fact, was it not, that after the attack on December 7th, long-range reconnaissance was conducted, using the PBY's, the B-17's, the B-18's as well?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct, except the B-18's did not have long-range. I made a mistake some time back. I said PBY-4's and 5's. I should have said PBY-3's and 5's. The PBY-3's had a practical operating radius of [488] approximately 600 miles.

Admiral HEWITT. We will adjourn for lunch at this time.

(The investigation then, at 1 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., at which time it reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties as during the morning session.)

Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, after having been warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as witness.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you have produced a letter of December 1940, from Commander Patrol Wing Two to Chief of Naval Operations, together with various endorsements. Are those copies of documents which were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as exhibit 53?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 53.")

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I would like to add that there are many other letters relating to deficiencies that were sent in with the idea of trying to increase the effectiveness of the patrol wings in the Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring back to the Pacific Fleet war plan, paragraphs 3141 and 3143, at page 32, sir, set forth the initial tasks assigned to the patrol planes. Would you read those into the record, please, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

[489] 3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

Mr. SONNETT. Would you refer, Admiral, to Annex I, the Patrol and Sweeping Plan, and read paragraph 2 into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

2.

*Phase I*

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

(c) Covering.

(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

(e) Routine shipping.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you also examine paragraph 3 (d) and read that into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

3. (d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

[490] (2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Navy Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1.)

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the Phase I initial tasks assigned to the patrol planes were tasks to be performed when Japan was not in the war, were they not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to page 15 of the War Plan, will you read into the record the general assumption on which the war plan is based?

[491] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. "That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand."

Mr. SONNETT. As to the second general assumption, Admiral, namely, that the United States was at war with the Axis powers, including Japan, was it in your mind, as set forth in your estimate, that war with Japan was apt to commence by surprise attack without declaration of war?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, that was the estimate, the basis of the estimate.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the plan, then, might have become effective as to Japan in the event of a surprise attack by Japan without declaration of war?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you saw that at or about the time of its issuance.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you read assumption (b) of that letter into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

That a declaration of war may be preceded by;

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

[492] Mr. SONNETT. You will note subsequently in the letter, Admiral, that there are provisions for air patrol. Would you refer to provision (B) concerning air patrol and read that into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

(2) Air Patrols:

- (a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
- (b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°-20' No. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.
- (c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than

described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the mentioned therein.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, were those provisions for air patrol carried out between October 14, 1941, and December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Prior to December 7, 1941?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I am practically sure they were.

Mr. SONNETT. And in addition to the air patrol provided for in security letter, patrols were run from Midway and Wake, were they not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The patrols run from Midway and Wake were for a certain period of time, as specifically directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

[493] Mr. SONNETT. Was there any discussion, Admiral, during the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, of the necessity or advisability of a partial patrol or reconnaissance of Oahu as a fleet security measure?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Patrols had been ordered to be run during various periods of time during 1941 and they were carried out as directed.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion of the question of partial reconnaissance during the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not other than the ones that had been directed by this letter.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, the fleet security letter?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The fleet security letter.

Admiral HEWITT. Which were merely of the operating area.

Mr. SONNETT. Merely of the operating area.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Wait a minute. October, November, and December?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember the exact date that the last patrol, other than was directed in this letter, was ordered carried out. It may have been in October. Actually there had been operations, training operations, simulating air attack, where carriers entered the training phase to simulate an attacking force and patrols had been carried out in connection with that effort, but from pure security considerations, I am in doubt as to when the last one had been ordered ordered.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any reconnaissance from Oahu, other than of the fleet operating areas, during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not other than the movement that took place [494] between Wake, Midway and the Hawaiian Islands. The planes making those trips were directed to observe. However, as a part of planned internal Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises covering the period 1 to 4 Dec. 1941 and not as a part of any directed fleet reconnaissance, to the best of my remembrance, scouting flights were conducted daily covering a sector of approximately 90 degrees to a distance of 300 miles by probably one squadron for the sector per day. Each day there was a different sector. These scouting flights were solely for training in connection with the Wing Tactical Exercises. Usual

lane Tender was employed as the objective of search and a sled  
d by the Tender served as a bombing target. I cannot recall the  
rs utilized in the above exercises.

. SONNETT. There has been previous testimony, Admiral, to the  
that some time around July or August, 1941, Admiral Bloch  
sted Admiral Kimmel to direct a reconnaissance on a sector to-  
s Jaluit and that this was done for several days. What do you  
of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. On what? Jaluit?

. SONNETT. Yes, on a sector towards Jaluit.

Admiral BELLINGER. It may have been done. I do not remem-  
but I did not know the originator of the idea, nor any reason con-  
ng such idea. I am not sure that it was done towards Jaluit.

. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to page 6 of the fleet security  
as revised on August 14, 1941, to sub-paragraph 3, and ask if  
ould read that into the record.

[4a] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. "It must be remembered too,  
a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a con-  
ble surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied  
carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble  
ask Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions  
nt in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that  
e located by air search or other means."

. SONNETT. There were various submarine contacts reported  
to December 7, 1941, were there not, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, not to my knowledge.

. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether there was any air  
directed prior to the attack for the purpose of attempting to  
any alleged reports of the presence of submarines?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were sound contacts, as I remem-  
nd [495] the question was raised, Were they submarine  
cts? and, as I remember it, there was considerable local effort,  
with reference to patrol planes and to surface craft, to verify  
sound contacts, but to my knowledge, no submarine was ever seen.

. SONNETT. Who directed the patrols in those cases?

Admiral BELLINGER. When the Commander, Scouting Force,  
e Senior Officer Present, he directed it until the Commander-in-  
Pacific Fleet, was present; then he directed it.

. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel  
th Admiral Bloch concerning the submarine contacts prior to  
ber 7, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. I remember discussing it with many  
e, but I don't know that I remember discussing it with Admiral  
personally or Admiral Kimmel personally. It was a question,  
t a submarine or was it not?—and that appeared to be a moot  
on among those who had actually made the sound contact.

. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 37 of this investigation,  
consists of a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 19,  
from the Commander Task Force Nine to the Commander-in-  
U. S. Pacific Fleet, and which annexes a schedule, and which  
t also contains a photostatic copy of a mailgram dated 22 No-  
r 1941 from CincPac to Compatwing Two, and ask you whether  
cognize those documents.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you state what the schedules annexed to your letter of November 19, 1941, show as to aircraft patrol from Oahu?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. They do not directly show any patrol search operations. However, in advance base operations my policy was, and as written down for the guidance of the patrol wings, that when any squadron was based at [496] an advance base, that they would carry on patrols for security reasons; and also, in connection with this schedule, although it does not show the morning patrol that was required in this security letter of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, it was an understood fact that those patrols would continue and did continue.

Mr. SONNETT. Those were patrols of the operating areas, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Those were patrols of the daily assigned operating areas.

Mr. SONNETT. That mailgram, Admiral, from CincPac to you, was the approval by the Commander-in-Chief of those schedules submitted by you, is it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a series of photostatic documents and ask you whether you can identify them.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, they represent the watch and duty schedules and the general employment of Patrol Wings One and Two and those planes considered part of the Fleet Air Detachment.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

58 (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 54.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 54, which you have just identified, Admiral, and to the schedules for the period November 27th to December 7, 1941, will you discuss any provision of the schedules relating to aircraft patrol from Oahu?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Where you note the nomenclature "DP" it refers to the dawn patrol, and each day a squadron was assigned to that duty.

[497] Mr. SONNETT. And again, Admiral, for the sake of the record, the dawn patrol was the patrol of the operating areas?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. As illustrative, Admiral, of the schedules in question, would you, referring to December 7, 1941, schedule, read into the record the assignments of the patrol squadrons?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7th, Patrol Squadron 2, first division, was secured; Patrol Squadron 22, second division, secured; Patrol Squadron 23, first division, secured; Patrol Squadron 2, second division, secured; Patrol Squadron 24, tactics with submarines and the Pearl Harbor ready duty division; Patrol Squadron 11, tactics with submarines and Kaneohe ready duty division; Patrol Squadron 12, secured; Patrol Squadron 14, dawn patrol; division making dawn patrol secured upon completion, other division normal duty, 7 to 13, except Saturdays and Sundays. Not listed in the above squadrons was Patrol Squadron 21, which was on advance base duty at Midway. Patrol Squadron 22 had returned from Midway on 5 December after

a tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October. This squadron had had strenuous duty at those bases and was in a state of rehabilitation and maintenance.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring back, Admiral, to your letter of November 19, 1941, forwarding the schedule for the planes to the Commander-in-Chief for approval, which letter is part of exhibit 37, the letter reads in paragraph 1, "Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of Task Force Nine for the remainder of the second quarter." Do you recall, Admiral, what the changed conditions were that you referred to in that letter?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I can't remember positively. It may have been because of the assignment of Patrol Squadron 22 to the Midway-Wake area or it may have been due to a change in directive from the Commander-in-Chief, [498] Pacific, wherein the task force organizations were changed. At one time patrol squadrons were assigned to the various task force commanders, One, Two, and Three, and their schedule of employment was more or less controlled by those task force commanders.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, and others, dated November 24, 1941, and ask you whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know that such a dispatch or some such dispatch had been received about that time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not till subsequent to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, and others, dated November 27, 1941, which is the so-called war warning, and ask whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know that such a dispatch had been received?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not until subsequent to December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to exhibit 19 of the Naval Court of Inquiry a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 28, 1941, sent for information to CincPac, among others, and ask whether you saw that dispatch or knew of it prior to the attack on December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation, which consists of daily communication intelligence summaries, and ask whether you saw those prior to December 7, 1941.

[499] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I don't remember seeing any of these.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 26 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of intelligence reports by Lieutenant Commander Layton between October 6, 1941, and December 2, 1941, and ask whether you saw any of those prior to the attack.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 23 of this investigation, a memorandum, dated December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to the Admiral on the subject of the location of the Orange fleet, and ask whether you saw that prior to the attack.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I don't remember ever seeing it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall anything concerning a proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands which was discussed toward the end of November, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Towards the end of November, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. I do not recall such proposition.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, a memorandum by Lieutenant Commander Layton on that subject, and whether that refreshes your recollection concerning the matter.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember any specific plan or even a proposal.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, during the last half of November and to December 7, 1941, what was your estimate of the location and movements of Japanese ships, particularly Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I didn't know where they were.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you receive any intelligence on that subject—

[500] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. During that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Or have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch on that subject during that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. I recall no such discussion.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know before the attack that a direction had been issued to CincPac on or about November 27, 1941, in substance to the following language: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46"?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion between November 27 and December 7, 1941, concerning deployment of fleet or aircraft?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I am trying to remember the date on which a conference took place in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet office wherein several of the fleet commands, myself included, and the Army and also the District Commandant were present, and that was in connection with the movement of Marine planes to Wake and Midway. Now, the reason for that—a specific dispatch or even a discussion of the reasons for it, other than general bolstering up defenses, was discussed, as I remember.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 18 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, a dispatch of November 26, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac, and ask you whether you saw that dispatch.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember seeing this dispatch, I think I attended a conference which evidently was in connection with this dispatch, that is, in carrying out some of the details of the dispatch.

[501] Mr. SONNETT. There is one other dispatch I would like to call to your attention, Admiral, and that is exhibit 13 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated October 16, 1941, to CincPac, among others, and ask whether you remember having seen that.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I don't remember ever seeing that dispatch prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Admiral, to the following portion of that dispatch: "In view of these possibilities, you will take



due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." Do you recall being consulted as to any preparatory deployments after October 16, 1941, and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. If I was called in in connection with any deployment, the reasons for it weren't connected with this dispatch, that is, they weren't explained to me as having any relation to a particular dispatch as I hadn't seen the dispatch.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 19, which was the November 28th dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, which you previously testified, Admiral, you hadn't seen, that provided in part that CincPac was directed to "Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 in so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." Do you recall any conference or discussion as to the steps to be taken in order to be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL 46?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, a hypothetical question. Had you known of these dispatches which have just been shown to you prior to the attack and bearing in mind that the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet and specifically [502] of Task Force Nine included reconnaissance from Oahu, would you have recommended that such reconnaissance or partial reconnaissance be instituted?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That question was asked me once before and I will have to give you almost the same answer, which is that God only knows what I would have done, but I hope I would have recognized the situation.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state for the record what reconnaissance could have been run from Oahu with the Navy planes available during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Admiral HEWITT. Do you mean what patrol could have been maintained on a continuous basis?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I think he will develop that in his answer, Admiral. As I recall his previous testimony, he said they could have maintained a 360 degree reconnaissance for a limited time; they could have maintained 144 degrees by dividing the crews in three indefinitely. That is my recollection.

Admiral HEWITT. Of course, on 27 November they had no idea that the attack was coming on the 7th. They had no way to time it. They had to make plans for patrol indefinitely.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is a very difficult question to answer. You must remember that between 28 October and 23 November, of the eighty-one planes available later, fifty-four of these had arrived and they were the PBY-5 type and the spare parts for those planes weren't available. Also, the number of plane crews available scarcely exceeded—if I remember correctly, did not quite equal the number of planes we had available. A lot of things can be done in an emergency and when pressure is on. That was demonstrated in the Battle of Midway; the flying time carried on by plane crews under stress exceeded by far what was thought the human equation could stand.

[503] Normally speaking, considering eighty-one planes available and considering the fact that we hoped the planes wouldn't break down and be put out of commission from lack of spare parts, it was practical, of course, to utilize one-third for daily patrol, covering sectors that were estimated to be the most vital. However, you must

remember that the time of starting these operations and the duration of them would have a tremendous effect on the force that would be available at any subsequent time for further projected operations. But, normally speaking, I would say that a plane and a plane could have been used one day in three.

Mr. SONNETT. And how large a sector could be covered in that fashion, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Normally speaking, we considered eight degrees for 800 mile radii of operations to be what one plane would cover, and multiply that by the number of planes and you have the number of degrees of the sector.

Admiral HEWITT. You did testify before to 144, based on eight planes, which is one-third of 144.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Did I say 800 miles? Make that 700 miles and the eight degrees.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to your memorandum or letter of December 20, 1941, which is exhibit 50, it appears that nine planes were undergoing repairs on December 7, 1941, and that eleven planes were at Midway, which, I take it, would leave approximately sixteen planes available at Oahu.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Sixty-one, and that is including the squadron that had just returned from Midway, having also served there at Wake. They were in commission. They had just returned. They weren't listed, as I remember, [504] as being in a state of overhaul, but they were due for considerable checking.

Mr. SONNETT. With those sixty-one planes, Admiral, and dividing the sixty-one planes into three, I take it that reconnaissance could have been run from Oahu, therefore, covering a sector of approximately 160 degrees?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is possible, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, eliminating the squadron which had just returned, Admiral, would you have given you about fifty Navy planes available, I take it?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Forty-nine.

Mr. SONNETT. Forty-nine. And with the forty-nine planes available, you could have had a daily reconnaissance covering about 160 degrees?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, that is possible.

Mr. SONNETT. Would that have been not only possible, Admiral, but practical or the practicable measure and for how long could it have been continued on that basis?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is a very difficult question to answer. Even after December 7th when everything else was subjugated and carrying on patrol for the security of Oahu, I received letters from the Bureau of Aeronautics indicating that they couldn't support the continuous and tremendous operations of this kind, with reference to engine changes and spare parts, and were endeavoring to inveigle me into reducing the search operations. This was not an official letter. This was a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and it was the result of an official dispatch which I had sent, demanding spare parts.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Admiral, assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct

reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, could you have it and if so, for how [505] long could you have conducted it?

Admiral BELLINGER. In conducting the 360 degree search, it would have meant that planes proceeding out on search would have to depend on a visibility greater than would have existed. It would have been possible to do it perhaps four or five days.

Mr. SONNETT. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?

Admiral BELLINGER. It could have been done until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that would have made it impossible. Perhaps it could have been carried on for two weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very rough and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight.

Mr. SONNETT. If in addition to the forty-nine available Navy planes at time at Oahu, you had the eight available Army B-17's and twenty-one available Army B-18's, could you have covered 360 degrees from December 1 on and if so, for how long?

Admiral BELLINGER. In the first place, the Army weren't equipped or able to carry on these searches in the way we would have expected them to carry them on, and that statement is made as a result of experience which showed up that situation subsequent to December 7th. Later, after more experience and training of the Army personnel had been obtained, the Army did enter this search plan with a few planes each day. The B-18's, as you remember, would only have been capable of proceeding out 300 miles, which would have yielded very little in timely information. Certainly any assistance that the Army in the B-17's would have enabled more patrol and search of greater areas.

Mr. SONNETT. Would it have been feasible, Admiral, to have used the forty-nine available Navy planes at Oahu on December 7, 1941, and thereafter entirely for search and to have relied on the Army B-17's and the twenty-one Army B-18's for an attacking force?

Admiral BELLINGER. Would it have been possible?

Mr. SONNETT. Feasible.

Admiral BELLINGER. The attack force was always made up of either the Army's B-17's or whatever other types they had that might have been utilized for that purpose, such as B-18's or even A-20's if the ships came in that close. Even carrier planes were held as striking forces. No patrol planes were ever held for striking, except in special instances for night torpedo attack. They were used to the fullest extent for searching.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the forty-nine available Navy patrol planes which were available around the beginning of December 1941, could have been devoted entirely to searching?

Admiral BELLINGER. They could have been as far as they were able to be used, but the question would always have been: Is this the way to start?

Mr. SONNETT. It has been previously testified, Admiral, that certain types of aircraft were regarded as more dangerous than others. What sectors would they have been assigned to?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The northern sectors were considered to be the most vital, primarily on account of the prevailing winds. For instance, when the carrier launches her planes, later she has to recover them and it is a rather good thing to be going away from trouble when you are recovering planes.

Mr. SONNETT. It was, in fact, from the north that the Japanese task force attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It was.

[507] Mr. SONNETT. Had you been directed on or about December 1, 1941, to institute a partial reconnaissance with the available planes, would you have covered the northern sector?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, without any information, the normal plan on December 7th was to utilize planes that we had for the northern sector. We did later send planes to the southward because of information from the Commander-in-Chief's office which indicated a radio bearing in that direction.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you define, Admiral, what you mean by the northern sector?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. More towards the northwest than the northeast.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that from December 2nd, approximately, to December 7, 1941, you were ill?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I had the flu.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, you weren't at your office during that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I was not at my office, but I was in touch with the office and with things going on.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any conferences with Admiral Kimmel while you were ill or with any member of his staff that you recall?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. I had conferences with my Chief of Staff.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Ramsey?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, as best you recall it, have any conferences with Admiral Kimmel in November and up to December 7, 1941, concerning the question of possible reconnaissance or the desirability of reconnaissance or any related subject?

[508] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not with respect to Oahu. The conference I attended, and I think it was the last conference I attended, was in connection with the reenforcement of Wake and Midway.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any other conference with Admiral Kimmel or members of his staff after that conference and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, although I am not positive that I did not see him between those dates.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that had a complete reconnaissance been undertaken in November or December 1941, prior to the attack, it would have meant a cessation of the training activities being carried on by patrol wings. Would it have been feasible to conduct reconnaissance and to have the reconnaissance as part of the training?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In the first place, I might say that the for expansion training had been stressed a great deal, expansion meaning the development of air combat crews to augment to replace those crews that were then in the squadrons. When the December 7th attack was made, all training ceased for the time being. All effort was put on search operations by all the patrol planes. The question came up how could we continue this expansion training when every one realized was such a necessity? If we endeavored to have combat air crews in planes that were on patrol, it meant an expenditure of personnel and extra weight. It meant also that except for maintenance and the general operation of radio and engineering, very little else could be done. It was not actually qualifying personnel to take over the job in the patrol plane, nor to give them the qualification of an air crewman in a specific job. Finally we had to devote certain days to this training and take them out of their operating status on the other off days in order to accomplish some of this expansion training. I would say if all effort had been placed [509] on searching, the expansion training would have suffered considerably, as it did after December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, if you had been told on or about November 1941, that war with Japan was expected to break out momentarily, did you have considered that a valid reason for discontinuance of training?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. You will have to look at it from this angle, when you once start, then you freeze the situation and you aren't moving it. We didn't have in the Navy a training establishment that could carry on this training, which up to that time had been done in the squadrons, and the question should be viewed from the angle: are you willing to freeze as is, with no question of expansion, and the consequences or proceed with your efforts to expand? Because aviation was known to have to expand tremendously and the training of personnel was one of the very serious problems connected with it. The discussion of this subject had gone to considerable lengths concerning where this training was to be accomplished, whether it should be done by the fleet, as an operational training program by the fleet on the Pacific Coast, or whether it was to be set up at a shore establishment.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to the four or five days prior to the attack when you were ill and you were getting reports from Captain Ramsey, did he at any time report to you that he had had any conferences on the subject of reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel or any member of his staff?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Is there any other statement that you care to make in connection with the matter under investigation?

[10] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. I would like to state that in preparation for meeting an air attack such as occurred on December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, unity of command must exist; the organization must be in effect, manned, functioning, and operating twenty-four hours every day. There must be reconnaissance, radar nets, and complete information in regard to shipping and control of aircraft.

entering and leaving the zone. All that must be in effect and functioning properly prior to the attack. No mutual cooperative organization set up on paper and developed through intermittent drill worth much.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:48 p. m., adjourned until 9 a. Friday, 22 June 1945.)

[511] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-SECOND DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 9 a. m., Friday, 22 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name, please.

Mrs. EDGERS. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your occupation, Mrs. Edgers?

Mrs. EDGERS. Research Analyst, Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. And in what section do you work?

Mrs. EDGERS. In the Office of Communications right now.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your occupation in December of 1941?

Mrs. EDGERS. Research Analyst in the ONI. That is Naval Intelligence.

Mr. SONNETT. And that office was engaged in the decryption and translation of intercepted Japanese communications at that time?

Mrs. EDGERS. The particular branch I was working with was.

Mr. SONNETT. What are your qualifications in the Japanese language, Mrs. Edgers?

Mrs. EDGERS. My knowledge of the Japanese language is about as good as it can be. I have a diploma from a Japanese school to teach Japanese to Japanese people up to high school.

Mr. SONNETT. You lived in Japan for some time?

Mrs. EDGERS. Over thirty years.

[512] Mr. SONNETT. And when did you leave Japan?

Mrs. EDGERS. In the year before Pearl Harbor, which would make it '40.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Mrs. Edgers, document 22 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, which bears a notation that it was translated by the Navy on December 11, 1941, and ask you whether prior to December 7, 1941, you had any connection with that message.

Mrs. EDGERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, please, fully what your connection with that message was?

Mrs. EDGERS. Well, at the time it was my work to roughly translate any message which was put on my desk and this was among the messages that were put on my desk on December 6th, Saturday morning, and at the time I had only been working in this section for about a little over two weeks; so, at first glance, this seemed to be more interesting than some of the other messages I had in my basket, and so I

selected it and asked one of the other men, who were also translating working on other messages, whether or not this shouldn't be done immediately and was told that I should and then I started to translate.

Mr. SONNETT. About what time on that day did you complete your translation, Mrs. Edgers.

Mrs. EDGERS. Well, it so happened that there was some mistake in the message that had to be corrected and so that took some time. That was at 12:30 or perhaps it was a little before or after 12:30; whatever time it was, we were to go home. It being Saturday, we worked until noon. I hadn't completed it, so I worked overtime and finished it at 1. I would say that between 1:30 and 2 was when I finished my rough draft translation.

[513] Mr. SONNETT. That is, on the afternoon of December 6?

Mrs. EDGERS. Of the 6th, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Mrs. Edgers, would you describe briefly what that message is?

Mrs. EDGERS. Well, without reading it over again now, just because of the fact that the message did keep in mind, I would say that it was a message saying how they were going to communicate from Honolulu to the parties interested the information on our fleet movements from Honolulu, and apparently it was something which they had had previous arrangements, but they had changed some of the minor details of how to go about it. I think there was something to do with lighting a window of a certain house, and there was also something about newspaper advertising.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether that translation which you completed in the early afternoon of December 6, 1941, was brought to the attention of now Captain Kramer?

Mrs. EDGERS. It was brought to his attention naturally because it was—well, in any case, he knew that I was working on it and I knew it, as a matter of fact, in the hands of the chief whose job it was to edit messages and write them up, or ones that were more complicated and more important like this, the officer-in-charge looked it over and edited it.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Kramer was your superior officer in that section, was he not?

Mrs. EDGERS. My supervisor, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the name of the chief to whom you referred?

Mrs. EDGERS. Chief Bryant.

Mr. SONNETT. B-r-y-a-n-t?

Mrs. EDGERS. I don't remember how he spelled his name, but he had been [514] in the section for some time. He left immediately after the war for sea duty. He put in a request.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you before you left on the afternoon of December 6, 1941, show all or any part of your translation of this message to Captain Kramer?

Mrs. EDGERS. I am sorry. I will have to say I don't remember whether I did or didn't show any or all of it, although I am sure I did have occasion to see part of it, but he knew I was working on the message and I believe that is probably the reason he came back again, no doubt later, as I understand it, to work on it.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.



Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much, Mrs. Edgers.

(The witness was excused.)

[515] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name, please, sir.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your occupation, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency.

Mr. SONNETT. War Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And during 1941 what was your occupation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was Principal Cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. SONNETT. How long have you been in that work, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Since 1915.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 4 of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask you whether you can identify that dispatch, and also show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask whether you can identify that.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. These are translations of messages which were processed jointly by the Army and Navy Signal Intelligence Services.

Mr. SONNETT. Those were Japanese messages which set up the so-called "winds" code, were they not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any knowledge or do you have any knowledge of the efforts that were made to monitor for any Japanese message employing the "winds" code?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I know that when these code messages were translated, that steps were taken to monitor all the circuits over which an execute message [516] might appear, both in the Army and the Navy and also by the Federal Communications Commission.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, did you learn whether or not any such execute message was intercepted by any one?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. After December 7, 1941, did you have any information as to whether or not any such message was intercepted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Indirect information in the way of statements by Captain Safford of the Navy and Colonel Sadler of the Army to the effect that there had been such an execute message.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Mr. Friedman, as best you recall it, when and where you had the conversation with Captain Safford to which you refer and what was said by him on that subject during the conversation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have had several conversations with him. I am unable at the moment to indicate the dates. The first one was certainly a year and a half ago and I haven't had any conversations with him now for some six months, I dare say. In the course of the earlier conversations, Captain Safford indicated that there was—there had been a "winds" execute message; that no copies of it were to be found in the Navy files, and that nevertheless there had been testimony to the effect that it had been intercepted. His story was that it was iner-

cepted by one of their East Coast stations, he believed, and promptly forwarded into Washington, and I don't recall now who got it. Colonel Sadler indicated also—

Mr. SONNETT. Before you come to your conversation with Colonel Sadler, Mr. Friedman, in his conversations with you, did Captain Safford state the substance of the "winds" code execute which he thought had been received prior to December 7, 1941?

[517] Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, he indicated that it not only had an affirmative for break in relations between Japan and the United States but it also had a negative for a break in relations between Japan and Russia.

Mr. SONNETT. Now turning to your conversation with Colonel Sadler, will you state when you had that, approximately, and what he said at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Approximately a year and a half ago I had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who came to duty in Washington at that time, then, and we talked about Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had been the head of our communications service at the time, and he indicated that he had tried his best to urge that some specific warning message be sent out to the Department commander. He indicated that the "winds" code execute message had come in on the—some time on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't think that he was clear himself as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly, he was either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in—"it's in," as I recall it, the expression used—or it may be that the Navy source called AG-2 and indicated that they had had word that the message was in, and that Colonel Sadler was then called to AG-2 to corroborate the interception of the message.

At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese word, that was used and when Colonel Sadler couldn't indicate the word, because he hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried to get a verification from him. I think he said that they tried to get a verification from whom it was—Admiral Noyes—but they weren't successful, whereupon the AG-2 authorities simply passed the matter over. There was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message.

Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy, but that he had been [518] told by somebody that copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence—nothing more than that; highly inconceivable that such a thing would happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain Safford, I probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started. I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea that he would repeat it.

Mr. SONNETT. Other than what you have already testified to, Friedman, did you have any information from any source as to the existence of a "winds" code message relating to the United States?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. You mean a "winds" code execute?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not of my own direct knowledge at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, has anybody else in the Navy, other than Captain Safford, ever stated to you or indicated to you that such a message existed?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have not talked with anybody else in the Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. So that either directly or indirectly, I take it, you have no information from naval sources as to the existence of a "winds" code execute relating to the United States, aside from your conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which consists of a statement by the Federal Communications Commission and has annexed to it various documents. Will you examine those and state which of those messages, in your opinion, was a genuine execute of the "winds" code?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have examined these messages anterior to this questioning and came to the conclusion that only the last, which is labelled document number 4, gives evidence of being an authentic "winds" code executive message. [519] It conforms to the form established in the "winds" code, except that there is no repetition of the *nishi no kaze hare* at the end of the message as there should have been.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the date of the "winds" execute message to which you have just referred, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. According to the statement, the date is December 8, 1941, between 0002 and 0035, GMT, which would be December 7, 1941, Washington time.

Mr. SONNETT. And that message uses the code words, Mr. Friedman, relating to what country?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. A Japanese-British break.

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Friedman, I show you documents 6 and 11 of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask whether you can identify those documents.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I can. The one dated 27 November 1941 from Tokyo to Washington established a hidden word code system whereby the Japanese hoped to be able to pass secret information to case of a closure of communications between Tokyo and places in the Western Hemisphere.

The other document, Tokyo circular telegram of December 7, 1941, I identify as being a message in the hidden word code.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you just read the text of that message into the record?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The English text is:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear from the document who translated that version of the message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It does. It says on the bottom "Navy translation."

Mr. SONNETT. And the date?

[520] Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that message translated by the Army also, to your knowledge?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know whether it was translated at that time by the Army also, but I have had it translated since then.

Mr. SONNETT. And what translation was made by the Army of the message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The one to which you refer now?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, there is quite a story about that.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you tell us that story, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw this message in the form, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," and although I was ill, I saw clearly enough that the message on its face was absurd. Any fool would realize that on December 7th Tokyo was not going to send a message out saying "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations" when the die had already been cast, and I came to a tentative conclusion that there was something wrong with that message and I asked Colonel Svennsson about the message and told him that I felt that there was something wrong with it and suggested that it be re-translated. Colonel Svennsson looked it up and told me that it was not a good translation. When I went into the details, I discovered a very surprising situation. The translation of the message conforms to the translation set up in the 27 November 1941 code, but the translation in that code was not good.

This is the situation. The word that was set up, *hattori*, meant, according to this translation, "relations between Japan and blank" not in accordance with expectations," whereas it should have read "Relations between Japan and blank are on the brink of catastrophe" or some strong expression [521] of that sort. Moreover, I found that the message of 7 December 1941, which mentions only relations between Japan and England, had another defect in that the original intercept included the word *minami*, meaning the USA, as well as the word *koyanagi*, meaning England.

That double error produced a concatenation of circumstances that I thought later was just an additional one in the series of accidents that contrived together to prevent due warning, because had the message originally been translated accurately "on the brink of catastrophe" "on the verge of disaster," and so on, had that come in, it would have got immediate attention. That was a few hours before. Also if it had mentioned the United States, it should have.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, the error in translation in the original hidden word code, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 2, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And by whom was it translated?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that translation distributed to the Army prior to the attack?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, the error in translation in the original code was not detected until you detected it, as you have just testified?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you detect the errors of the code and in the translation of the December 7th message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I can't place it accurately. It was a few days after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you communicate your discoveries to the Navy as to the errors?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

[522] Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not the discoveries which you had made as to these messages were communicated to the Navy at any time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Friedman, referring to documents 14 and 15 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, will you examine those and state whether or not they came to your attention at any time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They were not brought to my attention at the time of their translation, but I have seen them since.

Mr. SONNETT. Both of those are Japanese messages from Honolulu, relating to the status of defenses at Pearl Harbor and vicinity, are they not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read, Mr. Friedman, into the record the last sentence of the first paragraph of document 14?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The last sentence of the first paragraph reads: "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."

Mr. SONNETT. And that message was dated what date, sir?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 6, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the date of translation of that, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It is stated December 8th.

Mr. SONNETT. And by whom translated?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It doesn't state, but on the basis of the division of labor that had been established between the Army and Navy, whereby Army processed messages bearing in their pre-handle even dates, I presume that this message was processed by the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there an indication on the message as to where and by whom it was intercepted, Mr. Friedman?

[523] Mr. FRIEDMAN. There is. Exhibit 14 bears on it an indication that it was intercepted by Station Two, which is the Army monitor station at San Francisco.

Mr. SONNETT. And does it also indicate how it was forwarded to Washington?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It is indicated as having been forwarded by teletype.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Mr. Friedman, you referred to exhibit 14, but what you meant to say was page 14 of the exhibit before you, which is exhibit 13?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you turn to page 15 of that exhibit and state whether or not you can identify that message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I identify it as being a message presumably processed by the Army since it bears the date December 6, 1941, an even date.

Mr. SONNETT. A message from—

Mr. FRIEDMAN. A message from Honolulu to Tokyo.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read the second paragraph of that message into the record?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The second paragraph reads: "It appears that air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm."

Mr. SONNETT. And what is the date of translation of that indication?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 8, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear where and by whom the message was intercepted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was intercepted by Army Station Two at San Francisco and was forwarded by teletype.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, both of those messages of December 6th, Friedman, were in the PA-K2 code, were they not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They were.

[524] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state briefly and generally what that code was and its relative difficulty?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That code was a high grade code involving key columnar transportation of code text, distributed in a form established by the Japanese when they set up the cryptographic system. It represents what we call a rather good form of enciphered code.

Mr. SONNETT. As of the first week of December or, more specifically, as of December 6, 1941, do you know how rapidly that code could have been read by the Army?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. We were in position usually to process this traffic fairly readily in view of the fact that we had reconstructed the entire code or practically the entire code and were able to reconstruct from time to time as was necessary the transportation keys for the super-encipherment.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit, Mr. Friedman, and state whether you can identify that message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I have seen this message before.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the date and—

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The date is December 7, 1941. The message is from Tokyo to Honolulu.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the subject matter, briefly, of the message, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The matter directs the Japanese in Honolulu to keep Tokyo informed day by day of the presence in port of warships and airplane carriers and cruisers and indicates that it is of the utmost importance to let them know.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there any reference also to barrage balloons?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. They were to wire in each case whether or not [525] there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor and if there are any indications that they will be sent up, and also whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Mr. SONNETT. When was that translated and by whom, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. This message was translated by the Army on December 30, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. It bears a notation that the message was received December 23rd, does it not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear where and by whom the message was intercepted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The message was intercepted by Station Five, which is an Army station at Honolulu.

r. SONNETT. Can you explain, Mr. Friedman, the delay between date of interception, which presumably was December 2, 1941, and date of translation, December 30, 1941?

r. FRIEDMAN. There were insufficient facilities and personnel to process all of the traffic which might be processed. Naturally, that is a situation which is beyond control of the Army because it depends on the funds that are provided by Congress, and so on, for this sort of work. And in any case, to be able to process all the traffic that may have been intercepted would have required a very large organization, which we didn't have at the time. We set up priorities for the handling and processing of traffic according to the best standards that we could establish at the time. We naturally would process messages in the Purple system first because we had found from experience that that contained the most important information, and then we would process cryptographic systems of next importance, and so on.

Now, in the case of this particular message of December 2nd, I have no doubt that Honolulu intercept station had accumulated a large amount of traffic which had to be forwarded and we didn't have the radio circuits and facilities adequate to be able to forward the intercepted material by radio. In any case, a good deal of, of minor importance, there is no use in forwarding by radio, which is a relatively expensive method as compared with forwarding by air mail, for example.

r. SONNETT. The note on that message would indicate that it was received here on the 23rd of December, would it not?

r. FRIEDMAN. It does.

r. SONNETT. So that it took approximately seven days between the receipt of the message by the War Department in Washington and the time of its decryption and translation?

r. FRIEDMAN. That is correct.

r. SONNETT. Now, would the interval between December 2nd and December 23rd indicate that the message had been forwarded from Shafter by mail?

r. FRIEDMAN. It would indicate that that was the case.

r. SONNETT. What was the order of priority, Mr. Friedman, after Purple code, insofar as dispatching those messages to Washington?

r. FRIEDMAN. I am unable to state from memory. That is a matter of record. I could find it.

r. SONNETT. Where did the J-19 code come from? Do you recall?

r. FRIEDMAN. It was below Purple, definitely, below Purple, and presumably, according to my recollection now, it would be either on the same level with the PA-K2 or slightly below it.

r. SONNETT. Now, this message of December 2nd was in the J-19, was it not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was.

r. SONNETT. Referring to the months prior to December 7, 1941, Friedman, did you have any personal connection with the decryption of Japanese communications?

r. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I had been asked by the Chief Signal Officer to take a hand in our attempts to solve the Japanese Purple system.

r. SONNETT. Will you state approximately when that occurred, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The first time we were able to hand in a completely deciphered text was some time in August of 1940; it might have been late in August of 1940. We had been on the problem for eight or twenty months, something like that.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the purple code of the Japanese was, I take it, from your testimony, solved by the unit under your direction?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct. As Chief Cryptanalyst, it was usually my responsibility to solve the things that superiors asked me to solve.

Mr. SONNETT. After you worked on the purple code of the Japanese, did you continue your close connection, personal connection, the decryption of Japanese communications and, if so, up to what time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. I regret to say that the solution of the Japanese purple machine had apparently taken such a toll of my nervous energy that I was suffering from nervous exhaustion and was not understood quite well that things weren't well with me, nevertheless I felt under extreme necessity of keeping going and did so until some time in December of 1940, when I had a complete collapse. I returned to duty some time in April of 1941, but in view of the fact that it was going to take considerable time to recover my health, the Chief Signal Officer indicated that I was to take it easy, and [528] one of the things of doing that was to keep me more or less out of the high pressure cryptanalytical processing and let me devote my attention to some of the signal security matters where it was a slower pace. I wasn't happy about that.

Mr. SONNETT. So that, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, you weren't actually working directly on the Japanese material?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. I think that is all, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[529] Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Safford, I show you exhibit 13 of this investigation, which consists of a collection of intercepted Japanese messages in translated form, and call your attention to the fact that on each page of the document indicates that it was translated by the Navy or the Army and that after the date there appear symbols in parentheses, letters such as the letter "S" or "X" and in other cases there appear numbers. Will you explain what they signify?

Captain SAFFORD. The letter "S" was the Navy intercept station at Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Mr. SONNETT. And the letter "X"?

Captain SAFFORD. The letter "X" was a photograph taken by the Navy, in this particular case at Washington, D. C.

Mr. SONNETT. And the letters "NR"?

Captain SAFFORD. "NR" merely meant Navy radio.

Mr. SONNETT. The number 7?

Captain SAFFORD. Number 7 was an Army intercept station at I-1 Hunt, Virginia, just outside of Washington.

Mr. SONNETT. Number 2?



Captain SAFFORD. Number 2 was an Army intercept station at the Presidio in San Francisco, California.

Mr. SONNETT. And the letters "STT"?

Captain SAFFORD. "S" was Station S and "TT" stood for teletype. Any message forwarded by teletype was marked "TT" at the bottom.

Mr. SONNETT. Did the Army follow the same practice?

[530] Captain SAFFORD. The Army followed the same practice at least in one case, because it is marked.

Mr. SONNETT. The letters "AR"?

Captain SAFFORD. Army radio, and you also have one more, number 5, which is the Army intercept station at Fort Shafter, T. H.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the document bearing number 14 and the document bearing the number 15 of that exhibit, will you state where they were intercepted, when and by whom translated?

Captain SAFFORD. They were both intercepted at the Army intercept station in San Francisco and forwarded by teletype. They were presumably intercepted on the 6th of December, 1941, which is their filing date. They were both processed and translated by the Army, and they were translated on December 8, 1941. About sixteen or seventeen months ago we sighted the original work sheets for these two messages, including the intercepted message, and found or learned that number 14 went on the air about eighteen hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor and number 15 went on the air about twelve hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, that is, to the nearest hour. The Army have all these papers in their custody.

Mr. SONNETT. Both of those messages were in the PA-K2 Japanese code, were they not?

Captain SAFFORD. Both were in PA-K2; that is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the difficulty of that code in terms of the time which would have been required for the Navy to have deciphered those messages after they were available to the Navy for such purposes?

Captain SAFFORD. The actual time of decryption for number 14, including typing in smooth, would have been about an hour or an hour and a half, and number 15 about half that time. However, in the Navy PA-K2 was given precedence [531] in processing after all the purples and after all the J-19's and it would not have been touched as long as there were any J-19's on hand being worked on by the two girls, who only performed day's duties and did not work on Sundays and handled only the PA-K2's and only the routine decoding of J-19 after J-19 had been solved by the men who were standing continuous watch.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit and state when and by whom the message was intercepted and forwarded?

Captain SAFFORD. The message was intercepted at Fort Shafter. It was processed and translated by the Army on December 30, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of the message, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. The message was dated December 2, 1941, and was in J-19. The message bears a note: "This message was received here on December 23."

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear when that message was received in Washington?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, December 23rd. That is from this notation

Mr. SONNETT. In what code was that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That was in J-19.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state how long it would have required the Navy to have decrypted and translated that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That would have required from twelve hours to five days, depending upon luck and upon the volume of traffic we had available to work on. At this particular time most of the J-19 system had been destroyed and the volume of J-19 traffic dropped off to a limited extent.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, when you say "this particular time," do you mean early in December, '41, before the attack?

Captain SAFFORD. Early in December, 1941, before the attack, I would like to add that there were very few purple keys which we had to solve, maybe two or three per cent, and there was an appreciable percentage of J-19's, maybe [532] ten or fifteen, which we completely failed to solve due to insufficient traffic or extremely bad luck.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the afternoon of December 6, 1941, the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, will you state whether the Navy decryption unit was working and, if so, on what?

Captain SAFFORD. A continuous watch was being maintained and that watch gave priority to purple and did nothing else so long as there were any purple messages to be solved. However, during the night of 6-7 December 1941, they did get caught up and they took out something in other systems, which is a matter of record in the GY log, according to my memory. I don't know how many messages we entered into the log because it showed they got caught up to date and were keeping up with the stuff regardless of the extra flow of work.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the so-called fourteen-part message was intercepted beginning on December 6, 1941, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. That was all in English?

Captain SAFFORD. That was all in English.

Mr. SONNETT. And required, therefore, neither decryption nor translation?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, it required decryption. It was in purple.

Mr. SONNETT. But in English?

Captain SAFFORD. But in English, so didn't require translation.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that decrypted promptly on the afternoon of December 6th and the evening?

Captain SAFFORD. They began to work on that immediately after the message came in and they had found out by telephone conversation with the War Department that the Army weren't going to work over that weekend. As a matter of fact, some of the parts of it were logged out in the GY log to the Army and then recalled [533] when they found out they were going home at 12 o'clock. It was the Army's responsibility whereby the Navy took odd days and the Army took even days.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the fourteen-part message, which is document 39 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, was dated December 6, 1941, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. So that under the agreement between the Army and the Navy, the Army was responsible for the decryption of that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there also received on that day a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated December 6th. in the purple code, being message 901, advising that the reply would be in fourteen parts and that time of delivery would be fixed in a separate message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that message decrypted by the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that was decrypted by the Army. It will bear their notation on the bottom if it was.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 38 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask you if you can determine from that who decrypted and translated the message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, that was processed and translated by the Army during the late afternoon and early evening of 6 December 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, will you explain, Captain, how it was that the Army came to work upon those messages when it appears from your earlier testimony that they had planned not to work that afternoon and evening?

Captain SAFFORD. About 3 o'clock, about 3 p. m., the afternoon of [534] December 6, 1941, Commander Kramer returned to the Navy Department and saw on hand roughly twenty intercepts in the purple machine. These turned out to be one long message and several short ones, and realizing that he had more than we could handle, he called up SIS in the War Department and asked for assistance. He found an officer down there making up some back work and this officer called Major Doud and Mr. Rowlett and they also called two young ladies who were Civil Service employees. All four came from their homes and got back to the War Department about 4 p. m. One of the girls, a Miss Ray Cave, a typist, came over to the Navy Department and assisted in the smooth type-ups. The others worked over in the Munitions Building. One other Army officer who was present in the Munitions Building also assisted, but he was under instruction, I believe, and not very much help. I don't recall his name. He is of no importance.

Mr. SONNETT. Which parts of the first thirteen parts of the fourteen-part message were worked on by the Army on the afternoon and evening of December 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. I will have to see that GY log to verify this. As I recall it, it was parts 9 and 10 they actually worked on, but the smooth typing was done over in the Navy Department and it was marked as a Navy translation. There was no actual translation, of course, because it was in English.

Mr. SONNETT. And the balance, I take it, of the thirteen parts were actually worked on by the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. The balance were actually worked on by the Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to part 14 of the message—

Captain SAFFORD. May I add there were also three or four purple messages of relative unimportance which the Army handled at the same time.

[535] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state generally what those messages were, if you recall them, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. One message said that this long one was most secret and not to let an ordinary typist type it; it would have to be

done by the coding officer, and take great pains not to let it leak. Then there were two congratulatory messages and one ordering somebody to be recalled to his post of duty if they knew where he was, and another one ordering one of their intelligence agents to ski in Latin America.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to part 14 of the fourteen part message which was from Tokyo to Washington, dated 7 December, in purple code and bearing number 902, that was decrypted, I take it on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. That is part 14?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. That was decrypted on the morning of the same time prior to 7 a. m. It was received in the Navy Department around 5 a. m., as well as we can determine.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to a message of December 7, 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, bearing number 907, which directed the ambassador to submit the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th, that, I take it, was decrypted on the 7th. Do you know at what time that was decrypted?

Captain SAFFORD. That was decrypted on the 7th before 7 a. m. It was sent over to the Army for translation. Brotherhood, who was on watch, translated it himself and knew what it said, but he was not sufficiently skilled in the Japanese language at that time that he could trust his translations, and he sent it over to the War Department for translation as per orders.

Mr. SONNETT. This bears the note at the bottom: "Transmitted 12/7/41 (S)." What does that signify?

[536] Captain SAFFORD. That means that was translated on December 7, 1941, and the "S" means it was intercepted at Bainbridge Island, Washington, by the Navy radio station there, and that it bears the notation that it was translated by the Army. It was decrypted by the Navy in this case, but the actual translation was done by the Army, and it was typed smooth by the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. That message was decrypted at about what time on December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. Before 7 a. m.

Mr. SONNETT. And the message consisted of one sentence, did it or not?

Captain SAFFORD. It consisted of one sentence.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any qualified Japanese translators on duty in the Navy Department at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. There were not.

Mr. SONNETT. But Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, who was on duty, attempted a translation?

Captain SAFFORD. Attempted a translation and realized it was important and stayed on himself after his watch had expired until Commander Kramer came down to the Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, at what time was the translation received from the Army of this message?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know for certain, except it was received back at least by 10:15 a. m. and possibly shortly after 9 a. m. What the various people say doesn't agree and we have no written record.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time did Commander Kramer arrive at the office on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. He arrived some time prior to 9 o'clock; about 8:30 as well as I can judge.

[537] Mr. SONNETT. Was he shown the decrypted message in Japanese, that is, of message 907, directing the delivery of the reply at 1 p. m.?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know. Kramer said he never knew about the existence of that message until after he had made his first trip to the State Department.

Mr. SONNETT. December 7, 1941, being an odd day, was the day on which the Navy had the responsibility for the decryption and translation of Japanese messages?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. If that was so, why was there no Japanese translator on duty in your section at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. Because Kramer had worked overtime from 4 p. m. until about 1 a. m. after putting in a normal day's work and he was ordered to report to Admiral Stark with translations the next morning at 9 a. m. and realized that he wouldn't be available. Kramer normally took the Sunday duties himself. Kramer made special arrangements with the Army whereby they would provide a translator for Sunday in view of the fact we had handled their work the day before. At that particular time one of our civilian Japanese translators was in the hospital, where he died about two months later, and another one was not available for some reason which I can't recall at the moment.

Mr. SONNETT. The other one being Mrs. Edgers?

Captain SAFFORD. Mrs. Edgers was not good enough to be permitted to handle purple translations. I counted her out.

Mr. SONNETT. You mean her ability to translate Japanese was not adequate?

Captain SAFFORD. Was not adequate at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' history?

[538] Captain SAFFORD. She was the sister of Mr. Woodruff, one of our best translators here. Mr. Cate was the one who was in the hospital and died. I don't know what the status of Woodruff was except there was some reason he wasn't immediately available. And Doctor Hoffman had been taking Sunday duties for a long period and by some local arrangement Kramer had taken them over himself, partially because he was a little mistrustful of the doctor's evaluations of the importance of things, not his translations, but his ability to evaluate, and since Kramer would be making the distribution, it was better for him to come down himself.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' qualifications as a Japanese translator and her previous study of the language?

Captain SAFFORD. As I recall, she had been with us about three months, three to six months. She was employed by ONI and ONI was entirely responsible for translation.

Mr. SONNETT. But did you know, Captain, that she had been licensed to teach Japanese in Japan up to the grade of high school?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know what her personal qualifications were, but on translating this technical stuff, regardless of their education, it took long experience in working with this particular type of stuff before we dared trust their translations.

Mr. SONNETT. In other words, then, your statement concerning Edgers' qualifications was not so much, I take it, her qualification as a translator but rather her experience with the work?

Captain SAFFORD. And her technical vocabulary. Every one we had to go through a probationary period of about a year before we dared turn them loose on really important stuff.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring, Captain, to the question which have [539] previously gone into, namely, the "winds" execute message relating to the United States, did you ever have a conversation with Colonel Sadler of the War Department concerning the existence of such a message?

Captain SAFFORD. I never talked to Colonel Sadler about that.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether on or about December 4, 1941, you received a call from Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood which he advised you of the receipt of a message apparently related to the "winds" code?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot recall anything distinctly about it. I would want to say in testimony. I have had a vague idea that there was another "winds" code message and the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which contains documents supplied by the FCC, and to specially document 2 of that exhibit, do you recall whether or not Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood advised you of that message on or about December 4, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall ever having seen this message knowing of it in this form until I saw the FCC transcript.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you first see that, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. Some time after August 19, 1944, the day before I went on the stand.

Mr. SONNETT. Up to that time, namely, August of 1944, had you known that the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted any messages which apparently employed the "winds" code?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, I had known of it for several months.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, prior to 1944 had you known?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, no, no, not prior to 1944, no.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral, at this time.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. I don't think of anything further.  
[540] Captain SAFFORD. I would like to add the following information: In May, 1945, or late in May, 1945, I had a conversation with Mr. Walter Foote, formerly American Consul General at Batavia, Java. Mr. Foote is the man who sent in a Dutch version of the "winds" setup message. Mr. Foote said that he sent this message at the urgent request of Mr. Lovink, who was technical adviser to the Dutch government on Asiatic affairs. Mr. Foote is certain that the Dutch did not hear the "winds" execute message and that he would have been informed if they had heard it.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 11:41 a. m., adjourned until 1 p. m., Tuesday, 26 June 1945.)

[547] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-THIRD DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 1:30 p. m., Tuesday, 26 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Joseph H. Rochefort, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding. Two witnesses entered, read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and rank, please?

Colonel LASSWELL. Alva B. Laswell, Colonel, USMC.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Farnsley C. Woodward, Lieutenant (jg), USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Colonel, will you state what your assignment was in December of 1941?

Colonel LASSWELL. I was a translator with the communication intelligence unit—I believe we called it combat intelligence unit at that time—Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And Lieutenant Woodward, would you state your assignment in 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. My assignment in 1941, I was attached to the same organization and I had several duties among which was cryptanalysis.

Mr. SONNETT. During the first week of December, 1941, certain messages were received by that unit for decryption and translation, which were messages of the Japanese Consul, were they not?

[542] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. And the three of you were on duty at that time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Colonel LASSWELL. Yes.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been previous testimony that those messages were received on or about December 5, 1941. Is that in accordance with your general and several recollections?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Colonel LASSWELL. I can state that certain messages were received on the 5th, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. To the knowledge of any one of you, were such messages received by your unit prior to December 5, 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, there were not.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No.

Colonel LASSWELL. I know of none.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant Woodward, I show you a statement the letterhead of RCA Communications, Inc., listing various messages, and ask whether you have examined that document and checked the messages listed thereon.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 56.")

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Woodward, this document, which is exhibit 56, sets forth messages sent by the Japanese Consul General in December and November, [543] 1941, from Honolulu, does it not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the file which I show you, Lieutenant, can you identify the documents contained therein?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what they are?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, they are deciphered messages of which there is a translation that were taken out by me and translated by some one else.

Mr. SONNETT. And those are coded messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. Is that correct?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Those messages are among those listed on exhibit 55, which is the RCA statement?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state when copies of the coded messages contained in that document first came to your attention?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Around possibly 1:30, 2 o'clock Friday afternoon, December 5, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And each of the messages in the folder, according to the best of your recollection, was received by you on that day?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. At about that time?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Subsequent to the receipt of those messages, Lieutenant, did you endeavor to decrypt the messages?

[544] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I did, as soon as it was determined that the other messages that we had received along with these, what they were, plain language and so forth, we immediately went to work and worked pretty far into the night on that Friday evening.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 56.")

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, exhibit 56, which is a folder containing photostatic copies of coded messages, also contains some plain language and some translations. Are the translations contained in exhibit correct translations of the Japanese messages, to the best of your knowledge?



Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. To the best of my knowledge, but I am not a linguist.

Mr. SONNETT. Colonel Lasswell, have you verified the translations in this exhibit 56 and can you state whether or not they are correct?

Colonel LASSWELL. I can state only that those which I made are correct, to the best of my knowledge and ability.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Colonel, exhibit 56 and ask if you will identify the translations contained therein which were made by you.

Colonel LASSWELL. None of these.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know who made the translations of the messages which are set forth in exhibit 56?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I couldn't be positive about that, no.

Mr. SONNETT. Were the translations taken from the files of the Navy Department?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. The translations that are in that book were taken from the files here, a copy of which was put in with this.

[545] Mr. SONNETT. When you say "here," you are referring to—

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Washington.

Mr. SONNETT. Washington?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the messages contained in exhibit 56, which you testified were received on December 5, 1941, there were certain other messages received, were there not, at that time?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. There were.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you describe what those messages were?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, they were plain language and they were in some less secret systems, none of which are in this book.

Mr. SONNETT. What did the plain language messages relate to?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I do not know. I didn't translate them.

Mr. SONNETT. Colonel, did you have any connection with the plain language messages received on or about December 5, 1941?

Colonel LASSWELL. Yes, I hastily read a number of them, many of which dealt with the exchange of certain amounts of money as transportation expenses, etcetera, of personnel connected with the consular department, passing through Honolulu. Many of them were concerning the transfers and movements of certain consular personnel.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any of the plain language messages which were so received prior to the attack of December 7th which dealt with defense preparations or movements of ships at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel LASSWELL. There was no such information, to the best of my knowledge, contained in any message there.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the plain language messages and the coded messages contained in exhibit 56, I believe you said, Lieutenant, there were some other coded messages in less difficult codes?

[546] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state what they were?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, you mean the gist of them?

Mr. SONNETT. Both the gist of them and the code.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the code was a simple code that they had used for years, with which we were very familiar, but as far

as the contents of the messages themselves are concerned, I know because I went to work right on this stuff.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the code in question?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. LA.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar, Colonel, with the messages in LA code so received prior to the attack?

Colonel LASSWELL. Yes, quite a number of them I hastily. However, we placed, understandably, most of our attention on other documents in hand, but we did decrypt and read enough of to know the general content.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state what generally was the content of the messages in the LA code so received?

Colonel LASSWELL. The messages encrypted in what was known as the LA code were almost similar or very similar to those in plain text. The degree of secrecy of that is apparently very little above the text.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it it was also true, then, of the LA code messages that there was no message relating to the defense preparations at Pearl Harbor, to movements of ships, or to indicating in any way the possibility of any attack?

Colonel LASSWELL. None that I know of.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Lieutenant, referring to exhibit 56, there are various photostatic pages followed by a translation and [547] then a blank white page. The white pages are blank, separate the various messages, do they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And the translation at the back of each group of photostats is a translation of the coded and of the Japanese language preceding it?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state when the messages contained in exhibit 56, or any of them, were first translated or decrypted?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, except that on the morning of December 9th about 2 o'clock the first break was found; some time between December 9th and the 10th they were all taken out and possibly translated.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you explain, Lieutenant, what you mean by saying that at that time the first break occurred?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, we were fortunate enough to discover what they had done in enciphering, which was a breach of the normal way of enciphering the messages.

Mr. SONNETT. In what code were those messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. PA-K2 system; PA base with a transposition system.

Mr. SONNETT. Between December 5th, when those messages were received, and December 9th, when you first succeeded in breaking the code, I take it that efforts were made to break that code and decrypt the messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Very much so, some fourteen to sixteen hours a day.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you work on that project yourself or did you have assistants?

[548] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I worked myself on them; after getting them, I turned them over to translators for translation.

Mr. SONNETT. And the translators, in addition to Colonel Laswell, were now Captain Finnegan and who else?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That I can't be sure.

Colonel LASSWELL. There were quite a number of officers there. The ones that were used on that project, to the best of my memory, would have been Allyn Cole, John Chivley—those were the only two I remember employing.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Besides yourself and Finnegan.

Colonel LASSWELL. Besides myself and Finnegan.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the PA-K2 code, the Japanese had the so-called J-19 and the purple codes which they used, did they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They did.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you ever at Pearl Harbor work on any of those codes, that is, purple or J-19?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Were the Japanese code messages received on December 5, 1941, forwarded to Washington by your unit?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Copies of them were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether that was done before or after the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That I do not know. I couldn't say.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not Washington had from other sources copies of such messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I couldn't be sure about that either.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, when, prior to December 5, 1941, had you last engaged in attempting to break Japanese diplomatic code?

[549] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. From the period of 1938 in around April till June, 1940.

Mr. SONNETT. Where was that work done?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Shanghai, China.

Mr. SONNETT. Was any such work carried on in the Pearl Harbor unit during the period of time you were there prior to December 5, 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. And when did you arrive at Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. August 13, 1940.

Mr. SONNETT. So that, I take it, no attack was being made on Japanese diplomatic codes during the latter part of 1940 and up to the time of the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Except commencing on December 5, 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you another folder of photostatic copies of dispatches and ask if you can identify that.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes, I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what that document is?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, this document contains encoded messages, which also contains the take-outs—we call them take-outs—and translations.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, messages of the Japanese Consul at Honolulu?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. When were those coded messages first in your possession?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These messages were received on the night of 7 December 1941.

[550] Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 57.")  
Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 57, which you have just identified, Lieutenant, I take it these messages were also in the PA-K2 code?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were, with the exception of the last batch at the bottom. That is not. That is in J-19 and 22.

Mr. SONNETT. And those messages weren't decrypted and translated at Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. In this exhibit is it also true that the photographs of documents relating to the one message are followed by a translation and then a blank sheet of paper? Is that correct?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. I note in exhibit 57 that the first message was one from Honolulu, *Kita* to Tokyo, dated December 4, 1941, in the PA-K2 bearing the number 249. Can you explain why that message was not among the messages received on December 5, 1941, which are set forth in exhibit 56?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I can't explain that.

Mr. SONNETT. The messages received on December 5, 1941, which are contained in exhibit 56 are those which after careful examination by Lieutenant, of all of these messages you identify as the only ones received prior to the attack, of the coded messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Of the coded messages, yes, sir, except the LA's, the ones in the LA system.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 55, Lieutenant, which is the [551] Communications statement, listing messages of the Japanese Consul General in November and December, 1941, will you state whether each message there listed whether a copy of the message is contained in 56 or 57?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Copies of all the messages in exhibits 56 and 57 are on this list. Do you want me to identify each?

Mr. SONNETT. Would you?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the cable radiogram numbers are merely stamped on the blank by the company. Those numbers have been matched with the internal secret message serial number of the Japanese, where showing, and copies of all of these are in the folder as such, labelled at the bottom accordingly.

Mr. SONNETT. I note that there are more cable messages shown in exhibit 56 than there are documents contained in exhibits 56 and 57.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the reason for that is because one document carrying a number, say 245, embodies two messages. The same message, I should say, one and two different addressees and two separate cable numbers, and there may also be some three or four addressees shown for some message.

Mr. SONNETT. The messages set forth on exhibit 55, Lieutenant, were, as you previously testified, in several of the Japanese diplomatic systems such as the PA-K2 and the J-19 and others perhaps. I believe you also testified that you translated after the attack—

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I didn't translate.

Mr. SONNETT. That you decrypted after the attack the messages in the PA-K2 system. For the sake of the record, will you identify by date and number the messages which were in systems other than the PA-K2 and which you did not decrypt at Pearl Harbor?

[552] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the cable numbers, number 38 was a question; I don't know what that is. The cable numbers 156 and 160 were the same message going to two addressees, and the secret message, serial number was 241, that was in system J-19. Cable number 161 or radiogram number—whichever you want to call it—was secret message serial number 242, was in system J-22, not translated, but the gist—we didn't translate it at all. Number 362 and 363 and 411 in question. This system is not known and those, I didn't know what they are because I can't find them. Number 362, 363, and 411 weren't worked on by me at Honolulu and I find no record of them here.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the November messages of the Japanese Consul set forth at page 2 of exhibit 55, will you state whether any of those messages were in the PA-K2 system and were worked on at Honolulu by you?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They weren't.

(Brief discussion off the record.)

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Rochefort, I show you exhibit 23 of this investigation, which is a December 1, 1941, estimate of Japanese fleet location by Lieutenant Commander Layton and ask whether or not you saw that document prior to the attack on December 7th.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I cannot say that I saw this particular document, but undoubtedly participated in its preparation.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Lieutenant Commander Layton or with Admiral Kimmel or any other member of his staff concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese Carrier Divisions One and Two? You will note that the exhibit contains no reference to those carrier divisions.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, I do not, other than we did not know where CarDivs One and Two were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall in general what information your unit had after December 1, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

[553] Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my belief, our estimate did not vary after our dispatch of November 26th; in other words, one Cardiv somewhere in the Marshalls and the other Cardivs unlocated.

Mr. SONNETT. You were, I take it, delivering daily to Lieutenant Commander Layton the daily communication intelligence summaries which you have previously identified?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation and ask you whether those are photostatic copies of the communication intelligence summaries so delivered by you.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, they are.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much gentlemen.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:08 p. m., adjourned until 2:30 p. m., 4 July 1945.)



[554] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 2:30 p. m., Wednesday, 4 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Please state your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Gilbert E. Boone, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present duty?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. The section head of Op-20-GL.

Mr. SONNETT. And that is a sub-section of Op-20-G?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. What is Op-20-GL?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. It is a research and collateral section.

Mr. SONNETT. Who has custody of the records of Op-20-G?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Op-20-G's records are divided in custody, each sub-section or section retaining for operational purposes such records as they require.

Mr. SONNETT. When they are through with the operational use of the records, what happens to them?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Operational records no longer used for that purpose are turned over to my custody in Op-20-3GL.

Mr. SONNETT. At our request, Commander, have you made a search of the Op-20-G files to attempt to collect all messages received by Op-20-G from [555] November 27th to December 7, 1941, relating to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I directed a search from such cognizant sources.

Mr. SONNETT. And have you with you, Commander, a collection of the dispatches which you succeeded in locating on that subject?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I have, right here.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 58.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a collection of photostatic copies of documents, Commander, and ask if you can identify what they are.

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. They are photographic copies of Japanese plain language dispatches intercepted at Station S.

Mr. SONNETT. And forwarded to Op-20-G?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Forwarded to Op-20-G. They are of December 3 and 4, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And those are news broadcasts from what so Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Jap press. That would probably be To Domei, wherever Domei might originate. This one (indicating Domei from Tokyo.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Ex 59.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a collection of carbon copies of memoranda Commander, and ask if you can identify them.

[556] Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28) survey relating to Japanese diplomatic traffic of 1941. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 September 28) is a rough count of the work sheets held in G sub-section of GL, of various Japanese diplomatic system. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 September 23) is a survey of messages received Op-20-G from 1 to 8 December 1941 by stations and listing time.

Mr. SONNETT. And you have indicated in pencil the location of station listed on that?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Over here, giving the identity, right. will note one in here, Army, where Army is printed out, it may have been Army teletype; it may have been delivered—the message have been delivered, just a copy or it may have been some other method, but Army was the source. There is one other where we have p and X, they are two practically synonymous uses. The Army one; we used the other. We may have used both simultaneously.

Mr. SONNETT. That symbolizes that the message was obtained by photographing at the cable office in Washington?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. That is right. Well, that may not have necessarily Washington. It may have been any place we could get it.

CT. FJPZ-2 (1944 January 19, enclosure F) is a memorandum which was made in response to an attempt to locate odd group of files.

Mr. SONNETT. And those are correct copies of memorandum in files in Op-20-G, are they not?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we receive that, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Ex 60.")

[557] Mr. SONNETT. I show you a memorandum dated 29 June 1945 and ask if you can identify that and state who prepared it, Commander.

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. The number is CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 June 29) and it was prepared by a sub-section head under my cognizance. Its purpose was a survey of the work sheets processed by the Navy of the Japanese purple system.

Mr. SONNETT. May we receive this, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 61.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 58, Commander, which is a collection of dispatches produced by you from the Op-20-G files, did you examine every source known to you wherein you might find



patches relating to Japanese fleet movements after November 27th and prior to December 7, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I have examined all possible cognizant sources, to my knowledge.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[558] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, please, sir.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Irving H. Mayfield, Rear Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, what was your duty in December of 1941?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I was District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And for how long had you been District Intelligence Officer?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Since March 15, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. What, in general, Admiral, was the mission of the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The mission, in general, was that of general intelligence matters in cooperation with the other federal and local intelligence organizations, particularly with respect to espionage and counter-espionage and such other intelligence matters as might be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or District Commandant.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the other local intelligence agencies, Admiral?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There were two other local federal intelligence agencies, namely, Military Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was in charge of the Military Intelligence?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, it was Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, who was not the G-2 on the Department Commander's staff, but was the assistant who had charge locally of matters pertaining to local intelligence. The FBI was Mr. Robert L. Shivers, who was later relieved—the exact date I do not remember—by a Mr. Thornton of FBI.

Mr. SONNETT. That was subsequent to the attack of December 7, 1941?

[559] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Subsequent to the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, in general, Admiral, what were the arrangements for the exchange of intelligence among the three local federal intelligence agencies?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The general directive from the Chief of Naval Operations, as I understood it, was complete cooperation between the three federal investigative agencies in accordance with the delimitation agreement and modifications thereto signed in Washington. There was, to the best of my knowledge and belief, complete, whole-hearted, unreserved cooperation between Naval Intelligence and the other two federal investigative organizations.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it as a matter of general practice, Admiral, that the information in the possession of the District Office of Naval Intelligence was communicated to the other agencies, that is, the FBI and G-2 of the Army?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Every bit of the information received by my organization was available to the other two organizations and under the scrutiny of the information, it appeared of interest to either of them and they were given copies.

Mr. SONNETT. There was, Admiral, a unit known as the radio intelligence unit of Com 14, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort, was there not?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Commander.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Commander Rochefort.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There was.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Admiral, what the relations were between your office and that unit?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I received from and gave to Commander Rochefort's unit all possible assistance. However, his unit operated entirely separate [560] and distinct from my organization. I had no authority whatever over his unit.

Mr. SONNETT. To whom did his unit report, Admiral?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I believe directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, though perhaps through the District Commandant.

Mr. SONNETT. What, in general, Admiral, was the mission of the unit headed by Commander Rochefort?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It was my understanding that this was a highly specialized unit operating under the Chief of Naval Operations and I am unable to give definite information as to its mission or the work performed by it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, did you know to whom the unit headed by Commander Rochefort reported the results of its activities?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I believe to the Chief of Naval Operations or to such other officers and officials as might be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether the unit reported to the District Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not know what reports were made by Commander Rochefort to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, but I do know that personal cooperation and relations between Commander Rochefort and Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, appeared to be cordial, thorough, and cooperative.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the relations, Admiral, between the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The relations between the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer were, to the best of my knowledge, cordial close, and cooperative. I was in more or less constant communication by telephone and by personal visit with Commander Layton and [561] it was my endeavor to supply with every bit of information reaching me which I believed would be of interest or value to him.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, from your testimony that you did not receive, directly or indirectly, reports as to the location or movements of Japanese fleet units made by the intelligence unit under Commander Rochefort?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to the effect that during the first week of December, 1941, certain cable

ages sent by the Japanese Consul were secured from the local office of the RCA Communications Company at Honolulu. Do you have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding that?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Admiral, fully your knowledge of those circumstances, including the efforts which had been made previously to secure such messages?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Shortly after taking over the duty of District Intelligence Officer, I discussed with the representative of Military Intelligence and the Special Agent in Charge of FBI methods of obtaining from the cable and radio communication companies access to their files for the purpose of obtaining copies of dispatches which might have intelligence value. We had endeavored to approach the managers of these companies or some of their employees, seeking a method whereby we could obtain copies of such dispatches. We had had no success.

By agreement with the other two organizations, I had concentrated particularly on RCA. It was not until the visit of Mr. Sarnoff that I was able to secure access to RCA files. The Japanese Consulate General alternated among the different companies on a monthly basis in sending its traffic. [562] RCA did not handle the traffic during the month of November, but did handle the traffic of the Japanese Consulate General beginning on the 1st of December. I, therefore, was able to secure the traffic sent and received by the Japanese Consulate General from and after 1 December 1941.

Since the turning over of this traffic to me was considered an unusual and perhaps an illegal matter, the detailed arrangement, to the best of my recollection, was as follows: The manager of RCA daily would have copies made on a blank piece of paper, giving little information as to origin or addressee of this traffic. This was a measure of protection for him which I considered justifiable. I did not consider that written records of receipt and delivery of these copies of messages should be kept. I called personally at the office of RCA at the beginning in the forenoon, late forenoon, and received from the manager a blank envelope containig copies of these messages. To the best of my recollection my first visit was about the 3rd of December. The envelope I received contained plain sheets of paper with the messages written thereon. I immediately forwarded these messages by officer messenger to Commander Rochefort. As I did not keep a written record of receipt and delivery of these messages, I am unable to give exact dates of receipts and deliveries to Commander Rochefort.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there more than one delivery of messages to him prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. That I cannot state definitely, but I believe there was.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the day before the attack, Admiral, that is, December 6, 1941, have you any recollection whether or not messages were obtained that day from RCA and sent to Commander Rochefort?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no definite recollection as to that date.

[563] Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall at what time of these messages were picked up at the RCA office?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Usually in the late forenoon, or 11 o'clock.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to the attack on December 7, 1941, Admiral you receive from Commander Rochefort any translations of the messages which you so obtained and delivered to him?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, I do not or if I did receive any such translations, they did not appear to have any military or intelligence value.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 56 of this investigation which has previously been identified by members of Captain Rochefort's unit as containing messages which were received on December 5, 1941, by that unit, and ask if you can identify those or any of these as messages which you so prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no recollection and do not believe that I ever saw the translations of any of these messages prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you, Admiral, exhibit 57 of this investigation, which has heretofore been identified as messages which are translations of messages, which messages were received after the attack, on the night of December 7th, by Commander Rochefort's unit, and ask whether you recall having seen the translations of any of these messages prior to the attack.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no recollection of ever having seen the translations of any of these messages prior to December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that it is not possible for you to recall any of the actual messages themselves which were received on December 5th or prior to the attack in code?

[564] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. No. When these dispatches came to me from RCA, I would simply look at them and see that they were code dispatches which had been sent to me by RCA; so I simply sent them on out to Rochefort without any attempt to recognize the code groups or addressees or anything else, because supposedly it was nothing but traffic from and to the Japanese Consulate General.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation which contains two Office of Naval Intelligence reports made at the Fourteenth Naval District, and ask whether those reports were submitted to and approved by you.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. They were submitted to me, approved by me, and bore my signature when they left my office.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance, Admiral, of the report, which is dated February 9, 1942?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The first report reports on a message received by the Japanese Consul General, transmitting to Tokyo a proposed system of signalling by lights and other methods, which signals would be available for use to report departures of naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system was conceived and submitted to the Japanese Consul General by Otto Kuhn, a German subject resident on the Island of Oahu. This message presumably was sent on the 3rd of December, 1941 and I believe to have been one of the messages delivered by Commander Rochefort on the 4th or 5th of December. The translation of this message was given to me at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

Admiral Bloch, District Commandant, on the morning of 11 December, at which time I received certain instructions from him, the one on which is set forth in the report.

Mr. SONNETT. In substance, Admiral, was there any evidence obtained to indicate that that system of signaling had been used?

65] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Although my office made every effort, as did the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we were unable to obtain any definite information that any part of the proposed system of signals had ever been used.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state what action was taken with respect to Kuhn, who conceived this system of signalling?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Mr. Kuhn was tried and convicted. I believe his sentence was commuted to a long term of imprisonment.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the second of the ONI reports, Exhibit 40, which is dated February 14, 1942, will you state whether the report was submitted to and approved by you, and the substance of it?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. This report was submitted to me, approved by me, and bore my signature when it left my office.

Mr. SONNETT. It appears in that, Admiral, does it not, that various messages sent by the Japanese Consul on December 3rd and subsequently are translated and digested in the report?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the report, Admiral, will you state briefly what messages of the Japanese Consul are set forth prior to December 4, 1941?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There appears in the report a statement that the Japanese Consul General sent a dispatch on 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. On 4th of December, another dispatch, reporting the arrival of the HONOLULU. And another, on the 5th of December, which reported the arrival of three battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers, and a statement as to vessels of certain classes of U. S. men of war in Pearl Harbor in the afternoon of the 5th, presumably December 5th.

66] Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to the first page of the report, does it appear when the messages referred to subsequently in the report were received by your organization from RCA?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It appears in the report that my office received on the morning of December 5th certain communications sent and received by the Japanese Consul General during the period 1 to 4 p.m.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the communications set forth in the report, however, are only those of the 3rd and 4th of December, are they not, Admiral, that is, prior to the morning of the 5th?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear in the report when the Japanese Consul's messages of the evening of December 5, 1941, was received by your organization?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does not appear in the report as to when my office received a copy of the message sent by the Japanese Consul General in the late afternoon of 5 December.

Mr. SONNETT. Similarly, Admiral, as to the message of December 6th referred to in the report, does it appear when that message was received by your office?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does not appear in the report as a copy of this dispatch was received by my office.

Mr. SONNETT. The message of the 6th, Admiral, was in substance what?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. "Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th."

Mr. SONNETT. Is there another message also set forth for December 6th in the report?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There is.

Mr. SONNETT. And that in substance is what, sir?

[567] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It relates to arrival of the WYOMING and the number of various types of U. S. men of war in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear at what time that message was received by the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It is stated in the report that this message was filed at 6:01 p. m. on December 6th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether after 6:01 p. m. on the 6th preceding the attack your office received any messages from the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not remember that any messages were received and am of the opinion that none were received since it was an agreement with the manager of RCA that these messages would be delivered to me or my authorized representative during the late afternoon of each day. This arrangement was at the desire of the manager of RCA and was for his own security inasmuch as he was vice consul and instructions and desired to have these messages copied and delivered to me or my representative only in such manner as would best protect and guard and protect him as well as me.

Mr. SONNETT. So that under your arrangement with the RCA manager, you would have received the messages filed on the afternoon of the 6th the following day, that is, on the 7th?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find, Admiral, a message filed on the 6th translated and set forth in the report, relating to the use of balloons?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There appears in the report a dispatch relating to the Army's use of balloons and the report states that the dispatch was delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 12:48 on December 6th.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, therefore, that under the arrangements which you have described, you would not have received that message until the 7th?

[568] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And you have no recollection of having received that message at any time before the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have none, no recollection, and I do not believe that I did receive it before the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you an original report from the District Intelligence Officer, dated April 19, 1942, to the Director

Naval Intelligence, and ask whether you can recognize that as a report forwarded by you.

Read Admiral MAYFIELD. I recognize this report as having been made from my office by one of my assistants, approved and signed by me.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, sir, generally what the report deals with?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. In general, the report deals with coded dispatch traffic of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

Mr. SONNETT. As set forth in the incoming and outgoing logs of the Japanese Consul, sir?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. This report encloses copies of translations of the incoming and outgoing message log books of the Japanese Consulate General.

Mr. SONNETT. They were recovered, Admiral, were they not, after the attack and reconstructed?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my knowledge, they were recovered after the attack by either the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Military Intelligence. The report states that both of these organizations sent to me copies of the outgoing log book, but that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was the only organization sending me a copy of the incoming log book.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, this is the original report, which has been [569] provided to us by the Director of Naval Intelligence. I wonder if we could have it marked as an exhibit with the understanding that we will have it photostated and we will substitute a photostatic copy, so that we can return this to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Admiral HEWITT. All right; yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 62.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it appears from prior testimony that for some months prior to the attack of December 7, 1941, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consulate General were tapped at Honolulu. I show you exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation, which have been identified as transcripts of the conversations recorded by ONI representatives and obtained via the lines of the Japanese Consul General and Vice Consul during the period October 1, 1941, to December 2, 1941. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, were the telephone lines in question tapped, Admiral?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no personal recollection of the date on which these interceptions began. That should be shown in the records of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Admiral, it is clear from the exhibits, is it not, that certainly by October 1, 1941, these telephone lines were being tapped?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, sir, was it true that the information obtained from the telephone taps on the Consulate's lines was brought to your attention as a matter of regular routine while the taps were in effect?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. My consent had to be obtained before the interceptions were started. Thereafter, copies of the interceptions were [570] only brought to my attention when they appeared

to contain items of particular interest. All bits of information obtained from these interceptions were used to supplement information already on file in my office concerning people or locations on which we had dossiers or for use in starting new dossiers. Copies of the transcripts were delivered to FBI daily.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, did any information come to you prior to December 7, 1941, of military significance which had been obtained from tapping a telephone line to the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. None that I recollect and I do not believe that any information received by this method was considered of military or naval importance by me or my assistants.

Mr. SONNETT. You have, Admiral, examined at my request, have you not, exhibits 38A and 38B, the transcripts from October 1, 1941, to December 2, 1941? Can you state whether, having examined the transcripts, there appears to be anything of military or naval significance contained therein?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not believe there is anything of military or naval significance contained therein.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Admiral, why there are no transcripts after December 2, 1941, and up to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. On or about December 2nd, it was reported to me by one of my assistants that employees of the telephone company had discovered a jumper put across the connection in a junction box by a member of the FBI organization and that an employee of the telephone company had reported this discovery to one of my assistants. It was further reported to me that one of my assistants reported this matter to one of the agents of the FBI. It was further reported to me that a member of the FBI organization, name unknown to me, had taken the matter up with the telephone company. What [571] representative of the telephone company I do not know. To the best of my recollection, I discussed the matter with Mr. Shivers and the reports made to me did not agree with the reports made to him by his assistants. My organization long before my arrival had worked up a contact with an employee of the telephone company and through this contact was able to obtain any telephone interception desired by my office. Because of the highly explosive nature of such practice, I did not desire to enter into an argument or controversy as to the merits or demerits of the case since I was afraid that by so doing, the fact that such interceptions were being made might be discovered and thereby jeopardize the future of any further interceptions. Furthermore, since the interceptions to that date had revealed nothing of particular value, I considered the wisest thing to do was to cease all interceptions of whatever kind and so instructed my assistants.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investigation—

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I would like to add that later along, the exact date I do not remember, but I believe after December 7th—the whole matter was satisfactorily straightened out and we were again able to resume interceptions.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investigation, which has been previously identified as a transcript of the conversation called Mori conversation. Will you state whether that conversation and transcript came to your attention and fully the circumstances surrounding that?



Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, a transcript of this exhibit was brought to me by Mr. Shivers on the morning of December 6th. I believe it was very late in the forenoon. We discussed the transcript and were unable to determine that it did have any definite or particular significance. It was thought desirable to have Lieutenant Commander Carr [572] listen to the recording and give us his further opinion as to the value of the contents of the transcription before decision was arrived at as to whether or not it should be reported to the Commandant of the District.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it brought to the attention of the Commandant or to any other superior officer prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, it was not.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not it was brought to the attention of General Short prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the transcript of the telephone conversation between Mori and a person in Japan which you have before you, it appears, does it not, that after a question from Japan concerning the United States fleet and the number of ships present, the person in Japan inquired what flowers or whether the flowers were in bloom and that that question was answered by Mori, who pointed out that poinsettias and some other flowers were in bloom?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does. The question from Japan asks, "What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply from Honolulu was to the effect that flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, but that hibiscus and poinsettias were in bloom.

Mr. SONNETT. When you studied that transcript on December 6, 1941, Admiral, did that particular portion of it come to your attention?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It did.

Mr. SONNETT. What were your thoughts concerning it at the time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Our thoughts at the time were that it was somewhat curious but that it was a disconnected conversation in which Mori seemed to be somewhat at a loss, and, according to my recollection, that was [573] the reason for our desire to study it further and have Doctor Carr listen to the recording itself.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any knowledge at that time, or have you now any knowledge, as to the establishment by the Japanese of a code in which by the broadcast or trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation references to flowers would signify movements of United States ships from Pearl Harbor?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I think that is rather a complicated question to answer, did I have then or do I have now.

Mr. SONNETT. Would the answer be different?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Let's make it did you have then? Then we will ask you the other.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I did not have knowledge of any such code at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Have you knowledge of any such code at this time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Of my own personal knowledge of the existence of such code, I have none. I mean I have heard or read something about it, but then—

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I think you might just state that.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have heard or read something to effect that such a code may have been in existence. I have no personal knowledge of the existence of such a code.

Mr. SONNETT. As to those portions of the transcription of the conversation, Admiral, which referred to the flying of airplanes and what evaluation did you make of that inquiry at the time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. My evaluation at that time was that such information as to the number of planes or approximate number of planes flying was a matter of common knowledge. They could be seen and heard by any one.

[574] Mr. SONNETT. Did you attach, Admiral, any particular significance to the fact that the inquiry was made by a person then in Japan?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Not particularly, except that the whole message seemed a bit queer and I desired to have a further statement of it made before making any report.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to effect that some time during the summer of 1941 Admiral Bloch, on the basis of some intelligence or information which he received, asked Admiral Kimmel to establish an air reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit. Do you have any information as to that reconnaissance and the reasons for it?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not. Such matters were not directly in my sphere of activity.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, did you have any knowledge prior to the attack of the establishment by the Japanese of a so-called "winds" code and of any message which may have been received using that code?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I had not.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, conversations did you have, Admiral, with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort during the period November 27th to December 7th, 1941, concerning the likelihood of war between Japan and the United States?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not remember, nor do I believe, that I had any conversations on this subject with Admiral Kimmel. I have conversations with Admiral Bloch and Commander Layton on intelligence matters, with particular relation to counter-espionage work, but I have no recollection of any statement to me that war was imminent. I do recollect that we discussed the increasing tensions particularly with relation to counter-espionage measures.

[575] Mr. SONNETT. Were you advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941, of the so-called war warning?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, I was not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any conversation with any of the officers mentioned concerning the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:15 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., 6 July 1945.)

## [576] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

## TWENTY-FIFTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 2:15 p. m., Friday, 6 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, there has been testimony before this investigation that during the first week of December, 1941, you examined an intercepted Japanese broadcast which apparently used the "winds" code words relating to Russia and that after your examination of that, you stated that the broadcast was not a "winds" code message, and that you threw the message into the wastepaper basket. Do you recall any such incident?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall any specific incident of that kind, but during that week and some days before that week, there were literally hundreds of such so-called weather messages which were actually simply weather broadcasts. We were getting thorough coverage on Japanese plain language broadcasts, both *kana* and Roman letter news broadcasts. They were coming in from various stations by the hour, every hour. It threw a considerable extra burden on our limited number of translators to scan those things, but nevertheless it was done religiously, looking for one of these "stop" messages or an actual war warning message. Of those hundreds that we saw during that week or ten days, those that were not applicable, of course, we destroyed.

[577] Mr. SONNETT. I show you document number 2 of exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain, and ask you whether that refreshes your recollection as to the receipt on the night of December 4, 1941, of a message apparently using the words relating to Russia.

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall specifically having seen this, though I well may have. It appears to be one in that category of simple weather broadcasts.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring to the previous testimony concerning the receipt of a "winds" code message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, since your last testimony in this investigation, have you obtained any additional information concerning the receipt or non-receipt of such a message?

Captain KRAMER. No first-hand information. Simply I do have some more specific recollection of it than I did when the matter was first broached to me at Pearl Harbor during Admiral Murfin's

inquiry. That refreshing goes to the extent that I have already testified about, namely, a positive recollection of having accompanied the GY watch officer with a "winds" message to Commander Safford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I understood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special setup that he had for that type of message.

Mr. SONNETT. And you have now no clear recollection, Captain, as to which country the message referred to?

Captain KRAMER. No positive recollection. It may have been one or all three of the nations covered by that Japanese code setup. The fact that we jumped on the ball on that message, however, would appear to me to have been applicable to at least England and probably the United States as well, but I have no first-hand recollection of it.

[578] Mr. SONNETT. Do you mean to imply, Captain, if you found a message in that code relating to Russia during that period you wouldn't have given it as speedy treatment as you would if it related to England and the United States?

Captain KRAMER. Of course, we would have, but there isn't the slightest indication that the Japanese had any intention of attacking Russia.

Mr. SONNETT. Other than, of course, the FCC intercept telephone call to Lieutenant Brotherhood on the night of December 4th, which apparently related to Russia?

Captain KRAMER. That, however, was simply another weather broadcast.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, after the attack on December 7, 1941, Captain, and up to the time of your testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, did you have any occasion to refresh your recollection as to the existence of a "winds" code message?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever. I did not testify before the Roberts' hearing or before Admiral Hart. In other words, I was not called on to testify regarding anything concerning Pearl Harbor until the court of Admiral Murfin's.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to your testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, was your recollection refreshed by any communication from Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. In the late fall of '43, he wrote me a personal letter under classified mail, asking certain questions covering the events leading up to Pearl Harbor in connection with what he stated was a study he was making of the subject. I answered those specific questions.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to the receipt of that communication from [579] Captain Safford, had you any recollection of the circumstances surrounding the receipt of any "winds" code message during the first week of December, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I had no occasion to recall such message. His letter, however, did refresh my memory on that one of the middle of the week.

Mr. SONNETT. And as of now, since you have testified previously in the Naval Court of Inquiry and this and have refreshed your recollection, I take it, to the fullest extent possible, your best recollection is that there was a "winds" message, but you cannot say with certainty what the contents were?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to the so-called hidden word code, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation, which contains a certified photostatic copy of a Japanese message and a translation of that message, and ask whether you recall having seen those.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, on the morning of 7 December.

Mr. SONNETT. The translation indicates that relations between Japan and England are not in accord with expectations, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the Japanese word of code contained in the exhibit which signified that relations were not in accord with expectations?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall the exact Japanese nomenclature used, but the phrase "not in accordance with expectations" is a literal translation of the Japanese. It is typical of their way of talking in certain locution.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 6 of exhibit 13 of this [580] investigation, Captain, at page 2, and ask whether the Japanese word in question is not there indicated to be *hattori*?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been, Captain, other testimony before this investigation to the effect that the word *hattori* correctly translated meant that relations were on the verge of a crisis or perhaps that hostilities were imminent. Would you say that translation is a correct translation of the word?

Captain KRAMER. It is not a literal translation, which is the point I just made. It can be inferred, however, and I have testified to that effect previously, both here and before Admiral Murfin, that such phraseology could have the implication of our words "relations are reaching a crisis," with all its implications, that is, either a minor crisis or a major crisis. In this case it referred simply to the fact that negotiations concerning an understanding with the United States were at an end or that relations were to be broken or it could even mean that the crisis was so severe that war was imminent. But those were all simply implications to be drawn as a matter of interpretation from the Japanese text.

Mr. SONNETT. The code in question, Captain, that is, the hidden word code, was established by Tokyo, was it not, on November 27, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. That is the date of this message, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And as of that time, of course, war with Japan was expected by those in Naval Intelligence, including yourself, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. I wouldn't say that it was expected, no. There was a definite crisis in the offing, however. There was no indication from this source, which is the source with which I mainly had to deal—in other words, I didn't see our other secret dispatches. There was no [581] slightest indication in this source that Japan intended any overt act against the United States. There were positive indications of a break with England in this traffic.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall the receipt prior to November 27, 1941, of intercepted Japanese communications indicating that the Japanese Government had established a deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations and that unless successfully completed by the time

of the deadline, that things were going to happen automatically there after?

Captain KRAMER. The deadlines were set for the latter part of November, initially around the 20th, and later delayed at the request and insistence of Kurusu and Nomura until around the 25th or 26th of November. A few days after that deadline there was a message from Tokyo which directed their Washington envoys to continue the appearance of negotiation, which added up to the fact that from the Japanese point of view the negotiations were *de facto* terminated. There was a further positive indication at the end of November in a message Tokyo sent to Berlin in which for the first time during 1941 they outlined the course of the negotiations with the United States and used the phrase in that message which means, "Sooner than anyone imagines Japan will be at war with the Anglo-Saxons." That is the closest there is in this traffic to anything indicating likelihood of war with the United States, with, of course, the possible exception of which I am unable to testify from first-hand recollection on, of the "winds" message of the first week of December.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you documents 10 and 11 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court, which are two deadline messages, and call your attention to the following appearing in the second message: "The time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After [582] that things are automatically going to happen." I call your attention further to the fact that that message was translated on November 22, 1941. What did you understand by the sentence, "After that things are automatically going to happen"?

Captain KRAMER. This is the first time I have seen this one since the date of dissemination, the 22nd of November, '41. My recollection is a little vague on our interpretation at the time, but that it was intended to mean—well, it intended to mean—that Japan was going to war with us would be a little far fetched. It appears to be now.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, would you say, Captain, that they intended to mean—

Captain KRAMER. I might continue this. Undoubtedly it intended to mean that a course of action or policy by the Japanese already decided upon was intended to be carried out. Just what that consisted of is a matter of interpretation or guessing.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar with any of the messages sent out during November to the Pacific Fleet and elsewhere, indicating that an attack by Japan on United States possessions was regarded as likely?

Captain KRAMER. I do have some slight recollection of being told of such a message. That, however, was the type of message normally originated by the War Plans Division or CNO and which I did not see and had no hand in drafting.

Mr. SONNETT. Coming back, Captain, to the second deadline message, to which we just made reference, would you say that the Japanese intended to mean more merely than that relations between the United States and Japan were not in accordance with expectations?

Captain KRAMER. That phrase "not in accordance with expectations" [583] should not be interpreted as mildly as the English appears to indicate. It is simply a literal translation of the Japanese phraseology, which can have more dire implications than the simple English terminology.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to document 6 of exhibit 13, which is the message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code, it appears that it was translated by the Navy. Did you translate the message, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. One of my professional translators did it, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Was the translation reviewed by you?

Captain KRAMER. Normally all translations were reviewed by me to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon who translated them as well as the importance.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to exhibit—

Captain KRAMER. As well as depending on the shape in which the message arrived. Sometimes a badly garbled message would call for more careful editing than one that was in good, clear text.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 20 of this investigation, Captain, which contains the photostatic copy of the Japanese message employing certain of the hidden code words, and to the translation annexed thereto, reading, "7 December 1941. Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," I believe you testified previously that in the hurry of the morning of 7 December 1941, you saw the Japanese message and while you were about to leave to deliver other urgent messages, you hurriedly translated the Japanese message in the form in which it appears in this exhibit, namely, that relations between Japan and England were not in accordance with expectations, but that you did not note the word *namami* which also related to the United States. Is that a correct summary of your testimony?

[584] Captain KRAMER. That is correct. I might amplify that by stating that when the oversight was noted in reviewing the messages after returning from the State Department and White House, namely, about 12:30, I made some phone calls in that regard and arranged, as occasionally we had done in the past, sending around a corrected translation. That procedure was not unusual, particularly in the case of garbled messages of importance, of sending around a better version. If a later better copy of a message was intercepted or on later editing a revised version of the translation was warranted, a corrected translation would be sent around. Sometimes such correction was phoned to recipients if it involved negotiations coming up before such dissemination could be made. That was the procedure intended in the case of this message and carried out to the extent of making a couple of phone calls, with the intention of disseminating a corrected translation early in the afternoon.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Captain, to the photostat of the Japanese message, which indicates that the first word of the message, *nananagi*, is underscored. That word referred to England, did it?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, it did.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you further to the fact that the fifth word, *nananagi*, is underscored, and that word meant either that relations weren't in accordance with expectations or that there was some sort of crisis, depending on the translator?

Captain KRAMER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And to the sixth word, *minami*, which is also underscored, and which referred to the United States, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, was the underscoring of that message, of those three words, made by you?

[585] Captain KRAMER. My understanding of this particular photostat you have is that it is from the log of station S, which was received some time subsequent to Pearl Harbor. Consequently, this was not the one from which we worked. As I recall it, it was a teletype version that was handled on the morning of the 7th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. Does anything on that photostatic copy, Captain, indicate where that message was intercepted by the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. Simply the station indication "S." I believe that was Cheltenham, but I am not certain offhand without refreshing my memory.

Mr. SONNETT. And it would have been sent in by Cheltenham to the Navy Department by teletype?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any recollection whether or not you underscored the code words of the message with which you worked?

Captain KRAMER. I did no underscoring or writing at all in connection with that. I dictated on my feet while the book concerning the 1 o'clock delivery and other late urgent messages was being made up and added this to the folder as I was about to leave the office.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to the translation annexed—

Captain KRAMER. I might amplify that further as, a point I haven't mentioned before, feeling that despite the urgency of that 1 o'clock delivery message, that delay to get this one into that folder was warranted; otherwise delivery probably wouldn't have been made until after noon since the meetings then in progress at the State Department and in CNO's office would probably have been adjourned and the recipients not accessible, out to lunch or one thing and another.

[586] Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear from the photostatic copy of the message, Captain, in exhibit 20 the time at which the message was intercepted on December 7th?

Captain KRAMER. This time group and the frequency (indicating).

Mr. SONNETT. Indicating what time, sir?

Captain KRAMER. Greenwich time, I believe.

Mr. SONNETT. What time, Greenwich time?

Captain KRAMER. Presumably this would be 0708, Washington civil time, converted into 0808 by daylighting saving hour if it was intercepted at Cheltenham, on frequency 7630.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it there is no indication of the time when the message was received in the Navy Department and came to your attention?

Captain KRAMER. I see no indications on here, no.

Mr. SONNETT. At approximately what time do you recall seeing and translating the message, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. It was about 10:30.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7th?

Captain KRAMER. Between 10:30 and twenty minutes of 11.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, '41?

Captain KRAMER. On December 7th, yes, as I was about to leave for the State Department on the second trip.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the translation contained in the exhibit, which is a certified copy of the translation as contained in



the Op-20-G files, you will note that there is no pencilled correction inserted concerning the United States.

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. You will recall in answer to a previous question, [587] Captain, you said that on discovering the error after your return from the State Department on December 7th, you made a pencilled correction in the copy. Can you explain why the photostat of the file does not show the correction?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot explain why that corrected copy is not currently in the files, other than that the explanation may be due to the following: The fact that sixteen, I believe, copies of this traffic were prepared, eight of which went to Army; eight retained by Navy. The originals, ribbon copy, normally went to the Secretary of the Navy; five other copies to other recipients; and two copies normally retained in section GZ, one a serially numbered numerical file which was our basic file, second copy filed by subject. That second copy was occasionally used for special dissemination to counter-intelligence people, for example. When the ribbon copy and the other disseminated copies were returned to GZ, as all papers were, the ribbon copy normally then became the primary file copy for permanent record. It could well be that since those other seven copies, six or seven copies after return in the course of a few days or a week or two to GZ, were destroyed and not more than two copies normally retained in GZ files, that the copy with the correction on it, which I have referred to, could have been destroyed with the other surplus copies. Since I have been back in Washington, since March of this year, I recall having seen a photostat of such a corrected copy with inserted pencil correction in it in the hands of Captain Safford.

Mr. SONNETT. Did Captain Safford indicate to you whether the corrected copy in his possession was a copy which had been corrected before the attack, or was it a copy which he had since corrected?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain of that point.

[588] Mr. SONNETT. Turning, Captain, to document 22 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which is a certified copy of the message from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 3rd, establishing the signal system to be used from Oahu, that document indicates, does it not, that it was translated on December 11, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Right.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been previous testimony in this investigation to the effect that on December 6, 1941, that message was translated in rough form by Mrs. Edgers, a civilian translator in Op-20-G at the time, and that it came to your attention on the afternoon of December 6, 1941. Will you state what you recall of that incident?

Captain KRAMER. It is possible that it was put on my desk on the afternoon of 6 December '41. I do not recall, however, having examined it in detail until Monday morning, the 8th of December, at which time it was in a highly garbled state still, and, in fact, it wasn't until another copy of the intercept came through and charts of Oahu and Maui were broken out and another day or two of study had been made that we were able to get out a translation that was quite legible. Even this copy still has a few garbles in it, namely, under paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5(b). If that were finished on Saturday afternoon, as you state it was, the reason that it was not

further examined in detail was undoubtedly due to the fact that starting around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, we began getting this series of important machine messages from Tokyo and turned to all hands on completing that and calling the Army for help on some of the parts. I might state in passing that we were working our professionals overtime as it was on that Saturday afternoon. Normally working hours called for Saturday afternoon off, securing at 1 o'clock but I had held several [589] of the translators on through the early part of the afternoon, completing a number of things that were being worked on and keeping them also as a stand-by in case something more important came in that afternoon. Despite the fact that it was working overtime, we normally kept one translator on in Saturday evening, using for Sunday coverage, which was also a holiday in those days, the fifth linguist we had, a Seventh Day Adventist, who normally did not work Saturday and was used therefore on Sunday.

Mr. SONNETT. You stated, Captain, in your testimony that the message did not come to your attention in detail until Monday, December 8, 1941. Can you recall whether or not it came to your attention at all on the afternoon of December 6, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall it, no. The reason I am pretty certain of that is the fact that when I did see it on Monday morning we immediately turned full energies on to getting it completed in its complete form.

Mr. SONNETT. During the afternoon and evening of December 6, 1941, Captain, the important message on which your unit was working was the first thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part report. Was it not?

Captain KRAMER. That was the principal one, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, that was a message in the purple code, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. But was in English, not Japanese?

Captain KRAMER. That is also correct, but there are many Japanese procedure abbreviations and introductory phrases used at the beginnings and ends of messages, which called for some linguistic work on it.

Mr. SONNETT. Is it your testimony, Captain, that the first thirteen parts required translation as well as decryption?

[590] Captain KRAMER. Not so much translation as clearing up garbles. In the hurried version that we disseminated that Saturday evening, there were still many garbled spots; one place where there was as much as ten or a dozen lines missing.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the purple code was a machine code, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And was the decryption of the message in the purple code also a machine operation?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state just generally what that consisted of?

Captain KRAMER. It is closely analogous to running a message through our ECM. It requires initially the setting up of the machine to handle that day's key. If the key hadn't previously been

covered, it would involve research work by a cryptanalyst to recover that day's key.

Mr. SONNETT. Once the key was recovered, was the decryption of a message an automatic process?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And then the resulting product of the machine decryption, which as to the thirteen parts was in English, would require examination and writing out, I take it, by your unit?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct. Another limiting factor was the number of machines we had to work on that traffic. At that time, my recollection is that the Navy had only one purple machine, while the Army had two, and it was for that reason that we sent some of those parts to the Army that evening to run through.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you working at your section on the afternoon [591] and evening of December 6, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, as I have just indicated.

Mr. SONNETT. And certain of the portions of the thirteen part reply, that is, parts eight and nine, were translated or decrypted by the Army, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. That would be indicated from this copy of that message, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the Army unit was working on the afternoon or evening of December 6, 1941, as well as the Navy, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, and to the message which directed that the Ambassador submit to the United States Government the Japanese reply at 1 p. m., when did you first see that message?

Captain KRAMER. On my return from the State Department at about 10:30 on Sunday morning, 7 December.

Mr. SONNETT. That message indicates that it was translated by the Army, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know at what time that message was available in decrypted form in the Navy Department prior to your seeing it?

Captain KRAMER. So far as I am aware, it was not available in the Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear from the exhibit who intercepted the message?

Captain KRAMER. Navy intercept station "S" intercepted it, from this copy.

Mr. SONNETT. And that station "S" was what station?

[592] Captain KRAMER. Cheltenham, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. And messages intercepted by the Cheltenham Navy station were forwarded to the Navy Department, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the message was available in the Navy Department for decryption some time on the morning of December 7, 1941, before you saw it?

Captain KRAMER. However, the fact that the Navy intercept station intercepted it did not necessarily mean that the Navy unit would handle it. The division of effort between Signal Corps and the Navy unit was on the basis of odd and even day keys in which the traffic was sent.

Mr. SONNETT. That division of effort, Captain, was not being adhered to rigidly, was it, on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. In general it was adhered to completely, except when one unit or the other called on their opposite numbers for assistance due either to volume of traffic or for other reasons.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 6, 1941, the Navy decrypted eleven of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply intercepted that day, is it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes; thirteen, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. Two were decrypted by the Army, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. As I recall, they all came in on the Navy intercept.

Mr. SONNETT. But two were decrypted by the Army?

Captain KRAMER. All station "S" intercepts were thereafter received by the Navy Department direct from station "S." The fact that the Army decrypted them would indicate that we had sent them over there, those particular parts over to Army, to run through their machines.

[593] Mr. SONNETT. So that on the 6th of December, 1941, both the Navy and the Army were decrypting the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, do you recall whether it was the Navy's obligation to decrypt that message that day or the Army's obligation?

Captain KRAMER. The fact that our Navy unit was going ahead with the decryption would indicate to me that it was a message for which the Navy was responsible, being in the key that the Navy was handling that day.

Mr. SONNETT. On the morning of December 7th the 1 p. m. delivery message was received in the Navy Department, as you previously testified. Do you know whether or not it was decrypted in the Navy Department that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there a translator on duty at the Navy Department on the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to your arrival?

Captain KRAMER. There was none actually in the Navy Department but there was one available on telephone call who could be down here within ten or fifteen minutes after being called by the GY, was the officer.

Mr. SONNETT. And who was that, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Myself. That was a standard arrangement that had been in effect for over a year. Probably six or eight times in the course of the year I had been called down at various times in the evening morning to examine something apparently hot that had come in.

Mr. SONNETT. On the night of December 6th and the morning of December 7th it was realized by you and others in the section that a very [594] critical message was coming in, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. If you are referring to the fourteenth part—

Mr. SONNETT. I am referring to the entire message. On the night of December 6th it was realized by you and others in the section that a very critical message was coming in, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. If you are referring to the fourteenth part which we had already received the first thirteen parts—

. SONNETT. During the afternoon and evening of December 6, a very critical message had been received, had it not?

ptain KRAMER. That is correct.

. SONNETT. Did you expect at that time that further critical messages would be received?

ptain KRAMER. The fourteenth part of that Japanese reply we were expecting momentarily, yes.

. SONNETT. You knew that the time of delivery of the fourteenth reply was to be fixed in a separate message, did you not?

ptain KRAMER. Correct.

. SONNETT. And, I take it, all hands were on the lookout for the message of delivery?

ptain KRAMER. That is right.

. SONNETT. Now, in view of that situation, why was there no translator on duty in the Navy Department during such times as you were not be present?

ptain KRAMER. There was in effect a translator on duty in the Navy Department, as I have indicated. The time between the receipt of a message by teletype and its decryption by machine would normally be more [595] than the time it would take me, on being called, to get down here; so, in effect there was a twenty-four hour translator on duty.

. SONNETT. When you left the office on the night of December 6, did you issue instructions that you were to be called immediately upon the receipt of any Japanese message?

ptain KRAMER. I did, as I had normally done frequently before. I was about 1 o'clock Sunday morning.

. SONNETT. Who was on watch at that time?

ptain KRAMER. I don't recall who specifically at the moment. There were three or four watch officers so familiar to me that I am certain which one was on duty.

. SONNETT. The message directing delivery of the Japanese reply received at 1 p. m. on December 7, 1941, was a one sentence Japanese message, was it not, in the purple code?

ptain KRAMER. Directing delivery, yes. A short message, yes.

. SONNETT. Will you examine the message, Captain, and state how long it would have taken for you to translate that message once it was decrypted and available in Japanese?

ptain KRAMER. Probably about two minutes.

. SONNETT. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, when you discovered the necessity for correction of the translation of the hidden word code message, you testified that before 1 o'clock you made several phone calls. Who did you call and what did you say to them?

ptain KRAMER. As I recall, I phoned all the recipients but contacted only two due to the absence of the others, and indicated that the United States was to be inserted in GZ file number such and such.

. SONNETT. Who was it that you called, Captain?

[6] Captain KRAMER. Just which ones I did contact I am not certain, but I believe one was Captain McCollum and the other was Mel Bratton.

. SONNETT. Do you recall about how long prior to 1 p. m. those calls were made?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain. It was about 12:30, though.  
Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. I have nothing further either. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[597] Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, for the sake of the record, I would like to review with you the various exhibits relating to the messages to and from the Japanese Consul in the first week of December, 1941, which were received at your unit both before and after the attack.

I show you exhibit 56 of this investigation and ask you to state what that exhibit contains.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. It contains four coded messages, numbers 245, 46, 47, and 48, and some additional coded messages that are in a system, in the LA system.

Mr. SONNETT. When were those messages received by your unit at Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. About, I would say, around noon or 1 o'clock on the 5th of December, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Were efforts made to decrypt and translate the messages received at that time?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. There were.

Mr. SONNETT. And those efforts were made by you with the assistance of others in the unit, were they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Which of the messages in that exhibit did you succeed in decrypting and translating prior to the attack on December 7th?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, I myself did not decrypt anything prior to the attack on December 7th, but this was taken out and decrypted [598] and translated after it was determined what it was in the LA system, which was seen to be junk, and I immediately went to work on the other.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, various of the messages in that exhibit were decrypted and translated prior to the attack, were they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you identify which messages they were?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I can. They were all in the LA system. Number 125; and there is one which there is no original for, no message itself, just the decryption with the translation here; that is number 362; and also number 321; and also 852 and 124, which is the same as 852. It looks to be an answer to and request to re-send or something of that sort.

Mr. SONNETT. Re-transmission?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. A re-transmission. It is the same text, more or less.

Mr. SONNETT. To each of the copies of those messages contained in exhibit 56 you have affixed, have you not, a note stating when it was received and that it was decrypted and translated prior to the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes, I have.

Mr. SONNETT. And those messages are bound into the exhibit on the left hand side of the exhibit, are they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified that you yourself did not do the decryption of those messages in the LA system, but that after it was discovered what system they were in, some one else did the decryption?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was it that did the decryption?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That I can't say because we were located [599] in different parts of the building and the nature of my work at the time kept me at one end, where they just turned this stuff over to me and let me go to work on it where I was.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the balance of the messages in the exhibit, which are affixed to the right-hand side of the exhibit, they were among the group which was received on the 5th of December, 1941, also, were they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. And were efforts made to decrypt those?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Who made the efforts?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. With what results?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Negative.

Mr. SONNETT. In what code has it since been discovered were those messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were discovered to be in the PA-K2 system.

Mr. SONNETT. Were any of those decrypted and translated prior to the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They weren't.

Mr. SONNETT. About when were they decrypted and translated?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. The night of the 8th and 9th of December. Well, there is only one here that shows it and it was taken off on the 10th. All of these messages were decrypted by the 10th that could be. There is a couple in there that can't be.

Mr. SONNETT. But none of those on the right-hand side of the exhibit, in the PA-K2 code, were decrypted prior to the attack?

[600] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you photostatic copies of documents and call your attention particularly to pages 7 to 12 and ask whether you can identify those.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These are merely copies of the messages that are in exhibit 56 on the right-hand side of the page.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, messages which were received on the 5th of December but weren't decrypted until after the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any other messages, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, received prior to the attack of December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Not that I know of. If there were, they weren't turned over to me.

Mr. SONNETT. The balance of the messages contained in the folder which I have just shown you were received at what time, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These were all after the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. You have noted in red crayon, have you not, time of receipt of the various messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. The date of the receipt, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as exhibit 56A, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exh 56A.")

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to exhibit 57 of this investigation, which contains a series of messages which I believe you previously identified, and ask whether you can state when they were received first by your [601] unit.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. None of these messages were received prior to 7 December. All subsequent to the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Were they subsequently decrypted and translated?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. And translations are set forth in the exhibit, are they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a folder of photostatic copies of documents containing translations of Japanese messages and ask whether you can identify the documents contained therein.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. This document contains messages that were received subsequent to the 7 December attack, received on the night of the 7th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. And were decrypted after the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes, some of them taken as long as the 23rd of January.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as exhibit 57A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exh 57A.")

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you a similar folder of photostatic copies of documents, consisting of messages and translations, and ask whether you can identify those.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These messages were received after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Sources, of course—one source was the Army out there. I just don't know who they are. I really don't know who had it. But they were messages that were more or less all diplomatic circuits.

[602] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark that as exhibit 57B?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exh 57B.")

Mr. SONNETT. The messages contained in exhibit 56 and at pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56A were received by your unit from what source? Do you know?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Who delivered these messages to you?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Commander Rochefort.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)



Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark as an exhibit the precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 6 July 1945 which amends the prior precept so as to require a statement of findings and conclusions by you?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 1A.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have some further documents, Admiral, which we should like to have marked as exhibits at this time.

The first is a certified collection of documents obtained from CincPac Headquarters, relating to the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. May we mark that as exhibit 63?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 63.")

[603] Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, certified copies of other documents from CincPac Headquarters, including a copy of the Secretary of War's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated February 7, 1941, dealing with air defense at Pearl Harbor. May we mark that as exhibit 64?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 64.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified copy of CincPac secret letter, dated 7 August 1941, on the organization of the Orange fleet. May we mark that as exhibit 65?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 65.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified map, showing the location of the ships present at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and annexed overlay. May we mark that as exhibit 66?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 66.")

Mr. SONNETT. Also, Admiral, a certified copy of the telephone log of the radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing the calls made and received on December 7, 1941, as to Japanese fleet locations.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 67.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, photostatic copies of memoranda relating to the interview or interviews of the Japanese captain of the captured submarine, which photostats were supplied by Captain Layton. May [604] we mark that as exhibit 68?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 68.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have a copy of Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June 1945, which contains, at page 28, a description of the midget submarines and how they were carried to Pearl Harbor. May we mark that as exhibit 69?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 69.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, copy number 5 of a selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches which were received from

CincPac Headquarters, relating to miscellaneous subjects. May we mark that as exhibit 70?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 70.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have a similar collection of dispatches, relating to the proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941, supplied by CincPac Headquarters.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 71.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have a collection of dispatches of December 7 and 8, 1941, from CincPac, also supplied by CincPac Headquarters.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

[605] (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 72.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have further a certified copy of CincPac second letter, dated 12 December 1941, and reporting on the damage to ships at Pearl Harbor as a result of the attack and giving other details in connection with the attack. May we mark that as exhibit 73?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 73.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a photostatic copy of the War Diary for the period 7 December to January 1, 1942, of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. May we mark that as exhibit 74?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 74.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have the photostatic copy of the War Diary of the USS WARD, the War Diary of the Officer-in-Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District, the War Diary of the USS CONDOR, and a certified collection of excerpts from the diary of the Officer-in-Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District, and from the WARD and from the CONDOR. May we mark all of the latter all as one exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 75.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have a photostatic copy of a first endorsement and second endorsement on Com 14 letter of December 30, 1941, relating to the early morning submarine attack or contact of 7 December 1941. May we mark that exhibit 76, Admiral?

[606] Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 76.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, a final exhibit we would like to mark is a collection of correspondence, the basic letter of which is from CNO to FOURTEEN to CNO, and endorsements, relating to combined operating center for the Army and Navy. May we mark that as exhibit 77 and substitute a photostatic copy?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 77.")

Mr. SONNETT. That is all, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The investigation was then, at 3:57 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m., 11 July 1945.)

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

### TWENTY-SIXTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 11:15 a. m., Tuesday, 11 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR. Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was binding.

SONNETT. Commander, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation which includes a translation of a message from Tokyo, dated December 1941, translated by the Navy 7 December 1941, and bearing number JD-1: 7148, and ask whether pursuant to our request you searched the files of Op-20-G for copies of that message.

t. Comdr. BOONE. I have searched the files under my cognizance.

SONNETT. And those files include all files which, to the best of your knowledge, would contain a copy of that message?

t. Comdr. BOONE. That is correct.

SONNETT. How many copies of the message did you find in your files?

t. Comdr. BOONE. I found three.

SONNETT. The message is translated, is it not, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations"?

t. Comdr. BOONE. Correct.

] Mr. SONNETT. Did you find any copy of that message in your search which contained a correction in pencil or otherwise indicating the insertion of the word "United States" after the word "England"?

t. Comdr. BOONE. I did not. I found no pencilled corrections in the text.

SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

] Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation, which contains a photostatic copy of an intercepted Japanese message dated 7 December 1941 and another document which purports to be an English decryption and translation of that message. Are you familiar with those?

Captain SAFFORD. I am.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the translation of that message contained in the exhibit, Captain, do you know whether on or prior to 7 December 1941 that translation was corrected so as to indicate relations were strained not only with England but with the United States as well?

Captain SAFFORD. I only know what Kramer told me two or three months ago after his return from the South Pacific waters. I pointed out to him an apparent error in the translation which had been turned in to higher authority and Kramer informed me that he had corrected the error himself prior to delivery and had added in in pencil correction, added "United States." I have a vague recollection of having scribbled in pencil "& U. S." after "England" on one of the original flimsies on file in 20-G, but I thought that had been added a few days after December and disregarded it completely.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a typewritten translation similar to one contained in exhibit 20, containing various notes, together with a copy of the intercepted Japanese communication contained in exhibit 20, and ask you whether these documents were produced by you?

Captain SAFFORD. These documents were produced by me. One is a photographic copy of the Station "S" log, which is on file in [610]. The other is a copy of JD-1 serial number 7148 which was added by me in 1944 to explain as well as I could in Kramer's affidavit the reason for an apparent oversight in omitting "United States" from Kramer at that time was in the South Pacific and nobody else knew anything about the circumstances. Lieutenant Commander Kramer checked over the original intercepted message with the hidden word code, as contained in JD-1 serial number 6985, and discovered that "United States" should have been in the original translation. The first word of the hidden word message, "*koyanagi*," means "England." This can be verified from the original thing. The fifth word, "*hachibu*," means "relations between Japan and the following countries are approaching in accordance with expectations," according to the Navy translation, or "relations between Japan and blank are approaching a crisis, we are on the verge of danger," according to the Army translation. The last word, "*Minami*," means "America." The last word, "stop," in English means "This is a hidden word message." The other Japanese words of the message are mere padding to make it appear superficially a normal plain language Japanese message.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, when Linn discovered the omission of the United States from the translation of that hidden word code message?

Captain SAFFORD. Some time in January, 1944.

Mr. SONNETT. And that discovery, I take it, was the basis of the note—

Captain SAFFORD. That was the basis of the notes on this paper. I noted the time so it wouldn't be forgotten.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the papers produced by Captain Safford as an exhibit, Admiral?

[611] Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 8.")

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have in your possession, Captain, or do you ever have, to the best of your recollection, a translation of the hidden

code message referred to in exhibit 78 and in exhibit 20 which contained a pencilled correction adding the United States to the translation?

SAFFORD. To the best of my recollection, I did, in the spring of 1944, but I thought that had been added subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor and therefore it was disregarded. I recommended that both of the flimsy copies bearing this translation, which should be in Op-20-G's custody, be examined to see if my memory in this respect could be verified.

SONNETT. Where was the copy which you examined in the spring of 1944 and which contained the correction?

SAFFORD. I had borrowed all the files from Op-20-G covering this period of time. I cannot say whether it was in the file in which the messages were arranged by serial order or JD number or whether it was the one in which they were arranged strictly chronologically.

SONNETT. There has been testimony before this investigation, sir, that no copy of the message can be found in the Op-20-G file which bears such a correction. Do you know what might have happened to such copy?

SAFFORD. It is possible that it might have been erased before being turned over to Op-20-G in an attempt to remove what was considered an embarrassment after the attack on Pearl Harbor. I do not recall making such erasure, but it is still possible that it was done. I would not add that it looked bad for the section and I was not trying to do anything to make it look better for us.

2] Mr. SONNETT. Did you recognize the handwriting in which the correction was made?

SAFFORD. I did not.

SONNETT. Referring to the copies of the Japanese message contained in exhibit 20 and in exhibit 78, can you state who underscored the word "*minami*" and the other words there underscored, and when?

SAFFORD. These three words were underscored by Lieutenant Commander Linn or myself in January, 1944, so as to distinguish or designate the hidden words in this particular message. The translation was made from the teletype copy and I believe that the teletype copy could not be located among the work sheets. I can even say that for certain.

SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much. (The witness was excused.)

3] (The investigation was then, at 11:32 a. m., recessed until 7:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.)

Present: Same parties.)

SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark as exhibit 79 in this investigation a photostatic copy of page 44 of a volume containing translations of the files of operations orders, orders, memoranda, and serials dealing with Navy operations plans, recovered from the Japanese at NACHI?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 79.")

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark as exhibit 80, Admiral, copy number 3 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre, and after marking it, return it to the files from which we received it?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 80.")

Mr. SONNETT. And may we also mark, Admiral, a certified collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with the organization of the Japanese Fleet and Japanese Fleet locations as estimated during November and up to December 1, 1941?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 81.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, after review of the questions for further investigation which you proposed to the Secretary of the Navy and which were approved by him, I believe that we have covered all the points [614] required for further investigation and accordingly recommend that the investigation be now closed.

Admiral HEWITT. The investigation may now be considered closed.

(The investigation was then, at 7:50 p. m., closed.)

## EXHIBITS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

[See Index of Exhibits, supra, pp. 2-4]

### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,  
*Washington 25, D. C., 2 May, 1945.*

Confidential

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.

Subject: Further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.

(B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy, 12 February 1944.

(C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.

1. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. Prior to the enactment of said law, the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 had been investigated by a Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 18 December 1941, and by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944. The report of the Commission is Enclosure (A). The record of Admiral Hart's examination of witnesses is Enclosure (B).

2. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeler, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1941, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings, a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Enclosure (C) is the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which contains the Court's findings and opinion.

3. Upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, the Secretary has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

4. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that the investigation directed by Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.

5. The Secretary's present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed, in the light of all the evidence then at hand.

## 360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

6. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, if it may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are authorized to obtain such documents relating to said attack as may be required for inclusion in the record.

7. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter. Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be of equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will conduct your examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal formal requirements. Upon completion of your examination you will submit the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy.

8. You are being ordered to report to the Secretary of the Navy for temporary duty for this purpose, and will request such additional orders from him as you may find necessary.

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### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 1A

Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Confidential

From: The Secretary of the Navy

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN

Subject: Further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy, 12 February 1944.
- (C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.

1. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. Prior to the enactment of said law, the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 had been investigated by a Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 18 December 1941, and by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944. The report of the Commission is Enclosure (A). The record of Admiral Hart's examination of witnesses is Enclosure (B).

2. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus A. Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeler, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings, a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 8 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.



Enclosure (C) is the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which contains the Court's findings and opinion.

3. After examination of the record of proceedings and the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy has found that the evidence obtained by the Court does not warrant and will not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

4. Upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, the Secretary has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

5. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that the investigation directed by Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.

6. The Secretary's present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed, in the light of all the evidence then at hand.

7. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, as may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are required for inclusion in the record.

8. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter. Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will conduct your examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal or formal requirements. Upon completion of your examination you will submit the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy.

9. You are being ordered to report to the Secretary-in-Chief, United States Fleet, for temporary duty for this purpose, and will request such additional orders from him as you find necessary.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 2

### NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

With Cross-References to Admiral Hart's Investigation Together With Addendum Thereto (Admiral Hewitt's Findings and Conclusions)

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# FOREWORD

Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. The Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. N. (Retired), Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. N. (Retired) and Vice Admiral Adolphus W. S. N., (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. N., as Advocate, was appointed on July 13, 1944. The Court was directed to meet on July 17, 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of going into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred by any part of any person or persons in the Naval Service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend what further proceedings should be had.

The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on July 31, 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on October 20, 1944. During its investigation the Court took the testimony of thirty-nine witnesses, and received seventy-five exhibits. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."

By letter dated October 21, 1944, the Secretary of the Navy requested the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to advise as to whether the records of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bear such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations advised, by letter dated November 3, 1944, that a substantial part of the records of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such a relation to the national security and present military operations as to make it essential that that information not be released publicly.

After thorough review of the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, the Secretary concurred with the views of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, as expressed in his letter of November 3, 1944, and accordingly has directed that in the best interests of the present and future military operations of the United States, the existing "TOP SECRET" and "SECRET" classifications of the record must be continued. The Navy Department has stated that the record of the Court will not be made public while the war is in progress.

The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by the Secretary of the Navy is that the evidence now available does not warrant will not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

The Secretary in his findings upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness, the possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. Some of the testimony will be much delayed because certain witnesses who were actively engaged in combat against the enemy are not available and will not be available within the predictable future. The present decision of the Secretary will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed in the light of the evidence then at hand.

The Secretary made this personal statement to the press on December 1, 1944. "In reaching the above conclusions and decisions I am fully mindful of the weight and legitimate public interest in the Pearl Harbor attack. However, there is one consideration which is paramount to all others, and that is: What will best serve the continued successful prosecution of the war? The actions I have taken in my judgment, are taken in the light of that consideration, and I accept full and complete responsibility for them."

In connection with the Secretary's further investigation, the following statement has been prepared, narrating the evidence obtained by the Court of Inquiry. It is believed that all significant evidence so obtained has been included. Because reference is made to "TOP SECRET" material, this statement has been classified "TOP SECRET."

On June 15, 1944, two days after the enactment of Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), completed an examination of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which had been directed by the Secretary of the Navy in a precept to Admiral Hart, dated February 12, 1944. In the course of his examination, Admiral Hart took the testimony of forty witnesses, some of whom also testified later before the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, and received forty exhibits. Various of the witnesses before Admiral Hart furnished information which does not appear in the Record of Proceedings of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hart has been digested. The following narrative statement of the evidence obtained by the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry has been cross-referenced to the evidence obtained by Admiral Hart. The left-hand "pink" pages refer to the record of the examination of witnesses conducted by Admiral Hart. It should be noted that the record of proceedings before Admiral Hart has been reclassified as "TOP SECRET."

JOHN F. SONNETT

#### ADDENDUM TO FOREWORD

After reviewing the evidence obtained in the prior investigations and examining the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Secretary of the Navy has determined in his Third Endorsement dated 1 December 1944, that it was necessary, by precept, dated 2 May 1945, appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, as investigating officer, with John F. Sonnett as counsel, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR, as assistant counsel, to examine such witnesses and to obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order to fully develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation by Admiral Hewitt was completed on 12 July 1945.

A digest of the evidence obtained in the further investigation by Admiral Hewitt has been prepared, and keyed into the following Narrative Statement in the manner in which the evidence adduced before Admiral Hart was treated. The left-hand yellow page, under the left-hand pink pages, contain the evidence adduced before Admiral Hewitt, keyed on the white pages at the points indicated by the yellow crayon.

The findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt are attached to the following Narrative Statement as Addendum I.

JOHN FORD BAECHE,  
*Lieutenant, USNR.*

TOP-SECRET

## NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF NAVAL PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

[The digest of testimony from the Hart Inquiry will be found set forth in bold face type at the pertinent point. The digest of testimony from the Hewitt Inquiry will be found similarly indicated in italic type]

### I. BACKGROUND

#### A. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET AND PACIFIC FLEET

At the time of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (page 273). Admiral Kimmel's predecessor was Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN. He had occupied that post from January 1940, when he had relieved Admiral Bloch, until February 1, 1941 (page 1053).

#### B. BASING OF FLEET AT HAWAII

According to Admiral Richardson, in May 1940, while the Fleet was in Hawaii as part of the Fleet exercises, he received directions to announce to the press that "at his request" the Fleet would stay in Hawaii to carry out further exercises. He did not think that Hawaii was a proper base for the Fleet and so advised the Chief of Naval Operations (page 1057). The reason for basing the Fleet at Hawaii, as he understood it, was so that it would act as a restraining influence on the Japanese (page 1058). (See also Exhibits 26 and 27.)

Admiral Stark testified that the Fleet, which was normally based on the Pacific Coast, was kept at Pearl Harbor in 1941 as a deterrent to Japan, and for training for its task, which included the security of the Fleet when at anchor; Admiral Richardson had advised basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast and did not agree that the Fleet should be based at Pearl Harbor (pages 21, 22, 91). The President he said, made the decision as to the base of the Fleet (page 91). The ships, however, were allocated or based, prior to December 7, 1941, in accordance with Admiral Stark's views and recommendations (page 189).

Admiral Turner said that CincPac recommended several times that the Fleet be returned to the West Coast; Admiral Stark discussed this with the President, but made no recommendation to the President, who would not approve the change (page 1020).

Admiral Turner said that the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Pearl Harbor had been discussed a number of times and each time the decision was reached to leave the Fleet there (p. 261).

It appears that there were some differences of opinion on the part of various other Naval witnesses as to the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Admiral McMorris, for example, said that he personally felt that Hawaii was a proper base for the Pacific Fleet (page 896).

Admiral McMorris said that he had always held the view that he would have based the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the Pacific coast, although, he said, there was considerable difference of opinion about that (p. 248).

Admiral Pye said that he had expressed the opinion that it was unwise to base the battleships there (page 439).

Concerning the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that there were several reactions, first, that it might incite Japan and second, that it was a poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared

to move to the westward in time of war due to poor logistics support. There was, however, one great advantage which was that the expenditure of money on the ships for repair and overhaul in Pearl Harbor permitted expansion of the Navy Yard at a greater rate (p. 151).

And Admiral DeLany testified that he personally saw no reason for keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 496).

Admiral DeLany thought that it was inconsistent to place the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan and at the same time being advised whenever they asked for material that the war was in the Atlantic and also to get units of the Pacific Fleet moved to the Atlantic. He thought that Admiral Kimmel discussed this very thing during his trip to Washington in the summer of 1941. He thought that there was some effect on morale because of the indecisiveness about whether the Fleet was going to stay at Pearl Harbor or be returned to the West Coast but there was no effect on the material condition of the Fleet. The fact that the Fleet was based there resulted in the development of a number of wartime practices which were beneficial to the Fleet when war came (p. 82).

Admiral Smith testified that during 1940 the Fleet was told to remain at Pearl Harbor and everyone thought this meant a probability of war in the Pacific, but he knew of no military reason for keeping the Fleet there. In his opinion neither the development of the Navy Yard nor fleet logistics was a sufficient reason for keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 528). The objections in 1940 were: (1) no protected anchorage, (2) no air cover, (3) single channel entrance to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was not due to administrative difficulties facing the Fleet which resulted from the fact that the Fleet had been based at Pearl Harbor for a long time (p. 64).

Admiral Smith said that the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor rather than on the mainland did not affect the matériel conditions or readiness of the Fleet for war; he said that Admiral Kimmel often discussed the question of the conditions of the Fleet and that they felt that it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro; he said there might have been a question in the minds of some of the officers as to why the Fleet was being kept out there; a great many felt that the Administration was keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in the Pacific; the movement of a part of the Fleet undoubtedly had some effect upon the minds of the personnel of the Fleet (p. 39).

Admiral Smith said that to his absolute knowledge, Admiral Kimmel never made a recommendation during 1941 that the Fleet should be returned to the California coast either by letter or dispatch. Admiral Smith never heard him say that the Fleet should return to the coast although Admiral Kimmel knew that his predecessor had recommended it. Admiral Smith said that if Admiral Kimmel ever made any such recommendation it might have been in July 1941 when he made a trip to Washington accompanied only by Captain McMorris, but that Admiral Smith thought he would have heard about it (p. 40).

Admiral Smith said that the transfer of certain units to the Atlantic affected the mental attitude of some officers in that the danger of immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them if the units had not been transferred (p. 40).

Admiral Smith said that in his opinion the general warmindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii (p. 40).

Captain Murphy indicated that previously he had been War Plans Officer for Admiral Richardson; that at that time he had advocated basing the Fleet on the Pacific coast instead of Pearl Harbor.

Captain Glover's view was that the Fleet was kept in Hawaiian waters for the purpose of assisting in the protection of the United States east of the 180th Meridian and also to be in a position from which raiding operations could be projected (p. 176).

Admiral Halsey said that he thought that the closer the Fleet was to the Japanese, the better off they were and therefore, he thought that Manila was the first best base, then Pearl Harbor the second. (p. 295)

It may be noted that according to Mr. Grew no official representations were made to him by Japan with respect to the United States keeping the Fleet in Pearl Harbor (page 1065).

Admiral Schuirmann said that so far as he knew, there was no open disagreement between the State and Navy Departments as to the disposition of the Fleet. He said that the State Department generally favored the retention in the Pacific of the greater portion of the United States Fleet (p. 407).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled during the winter 1940-1941 that the question was raised about continuing to base the Fleet at Hawaii and that it was considered that that was the most advantageous point and that the Fleet should be kept there. He recalled no discussion of the particular point of the Fleet's security at Hawaii in that connection and recalled no protest by Admiral Kimmel and no pressure by the State Department to keep the Fleet there (p. 418).

#### C. AIR PATROL FROM HAWAII IN 1940

Admiral Bloch testified that in June, 1940, General Herron, then Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, came to Admiral Bloch and stated that he had received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the effect that he must be on the alert against a raid from the west by a hostile nation (page 1139). Bloch told him that he had no patrol planes for the purpose and suggested that they go to the Senior Officer Present, who was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment. They did so and Admiral Andrews instituted a dawn-to-dusk patrol, informing the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, who was then at sea. Admiral Richardson flew in to discuss the matter and finally sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, asking for information about the situation, to which the Navy Department never replied. Admiral Bloch did not recall for how long they continued that reconnaissance. To the best of Admiral Bloch's recollection, the long distance reconnaissance established by Admiral Andrews in 1940 was for three days and then was discontinued by Admiral Richardson (page 1149).

Admiral Bloch said: "Sometime in the summer of 1940, the date I cannot recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my office and stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch, that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had received a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about, but he wanted my advice. And I said, 'Well, I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet. While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here, Vice Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch.' We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this, and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral Richardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in and as he had never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a reply to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army had this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected. The Navy was in a position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief got information about it here in Washington, but so far as I know, we got nothing there." (p. 13-4)

Admiral Richardson said that in June, 1940, he received a warning from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to the effect that there was a possibility of war, and as a result of this he increased the air patrols which he had established. He reported, he said, this warning to the Navy Department and asked for information, but received no reply (page 1056). He asked the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether this was a real warning, but was informed that the Commanding General had no idea, and he acted as though it were such a warning. It appears that in personal letters he had also received warnings of the possibility of war which, he said, were not definite or clear cut (page 1055). In view of these warnings, and his belief that when war came it would come as a surprise, which was based on 20 years' study of the

Japanese, he felt that he had to maintain as adequate a patrol as he could with the available means (pages 1053, 1060).

The air patrol directed by Admiral Richardson during 1940 was a patrol of particular sectors which was daily rotated. As Admiral Richardson recalled it, this patrol covered 170° to 350° to a distance of 300 miles. A dawn and dusk patrol was also established. He regarded the Southwest sector as the sector from which an attack most probably would come (pages 1053, 1055).

Admiral Richardson did not recall the number of patrol planes which were available to him. He stated that toward the end of his command it was planned to restrict the air patrol to adequate searches of operating areas, and that it was Admiral Kimmel's intention to continue this same patrol in effect when he assumed command (pages 1055, 1053).

Admiral Bellinger's recollection was that under special conditions and orders there had been a dawn patrol of 6 to 12 planes flying to 300 miles (page 682). This patrol was discontinued after the time that Admiral Kimmel took command as CincPac. It had covered a constantly changing sector (page 683).

#### D. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK AND THE STATUS OF DEFENSES PRIOR TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S COMMAND

Shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, as appears from a dispatch of January 21, 1941 (Exhibit 76) from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincUS and others, it was thought that the international situation was continuing to deteriorate and that the Pacific Fleet should be in a waiting attitude or execute the tasks assigned to it in the area eastward of 160°, depending on the action which might be taken by the Japanese.

At this time Admiral Bloch, as ComFOURTEEN, complained of inadequate local defense forces and pointed out that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and that for such reconnaissance requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat. This was set forth in a letter of December 30, 1940, by Admiral Bloch.

According to Admiral Bloch, in the fall of 1940, he became convinced that the Army's defenses against aircraft attack were insufficient. He discussed this matter with the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson. As a result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson asked the then Commanding General, General Herron, to go around with him and to interview first hand the officers and find out what equipment the Army had. At the conclusion of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave Admiral Bloch a memorandum informing him of the numbers of aircraft, guns and planes which were at Oahu. As the result of this information and of his conversation with Admiral Richardson, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Navy Department concerning the inadequacy of the defenses. This letter was forwarded with a strong endorsement by Admiral Richardson. (The letter is Exhibit 23.) That correspondence was the basis of the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 4, 1941 (p. 3). (That letter and the reply of the Secretary of the Navy constitute Exhibit 40.)

Admiral Richardson's endorsement on this letter (January 7, 1941, Exhibit 28) stated that the Army's equipment was inadequate to meet a surprise attack; that the defense of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor would have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor; that plans for cooperation with local defense forces were being made; that constant readiness of fighter squadrons was not contemplated; that there did not appear to be any practical way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor; and considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of the enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of fleet operations, it was not regarded as necessary to lay such nets. This endorsement urgently recommended that local defense forces be provided ComFOURTEEN.

On January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 9) and discussed in some detail the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the adequacy of the local defense forces. The Secretary of the Navy's letter stated that the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, had been reexamined because of the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and because of reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. The letter stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl



Harbor \* \* \*. The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

The letter continued that defense against all but the first two of the dangers appeared to have been provided for satisfactorily. As to an air bombing attack or an air torpedo plane attack, it was stated that both types were possible and might be carried out successfully simultaneously or in combination with any of the other possible operations. Attacks, it was said, would be launched from a striking force of carriers and other supporting vessels. The counter-measures to be considered were the location and engagement of enemy carriers before the attack could be launched; the location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire, the concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; and the protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. The letter pointed out that the location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched were largely functions of the fleet, but quite possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning and prior to a declaration of war; and, then discussed the status of the Army's preparations, such as pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft information service, and anti-aircraft batteries.

Various proposals were made in this letter, including proposals that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii, and that local joint plans be drawn for effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire, against surprise aircraft raids; that the Army and Navy forces agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids on Pearl Harbor; and, that joint exercises designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continued to exist.\*

#### E. JOINT ESTIMATE OF RICHARDSON AND KIMMEL AS TO SITUATION AND DEFENSES

The views of both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, at that time, were set forth in a letter which they prepared and sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70). This stated that if Japan entered the war or committed an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific would be primarily defensive. Certain assumptions were then outlined, upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated. These included:

- (a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy,
- (b) War with Japan is imminent,
- (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.
- (f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible.

Their letter continued, that the tasks to be undertaken by the Fleet in connection with such assumptions included the taking of full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port. The letter pointed out that the Fleet was handicapped by deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and stated that, among other things, it would be necessary to expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One; that it would be necessary to establish an inner air patrol; to arrange for alertness of a striking force of planes; and to augment Army anti-aircraft defenses with batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor; also that it would be necessary to assist in local defenses of the Fourteenth Naval District, which task would require the increase of district forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels would become available to the Commandant. Various other measures were discussed, including those to be taken if Japan entered the war, among which was reconnaissance of the Marshalls.

The letter then discussed in some detail the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu among which were the inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns, the small number and condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking

\* The Secretary of War's reply to this will be found at page 402.

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groups of Fleet planes and the use of Fleet planes for local patrols, the lack of patrol vessels for ComFOURTEEN, and the lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. It stated that it was considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies.

Admiral Smith said that about a week before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, and Admiral Smith were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in a conference with Commander McCrea, who was returning from a mission to CincAF. At that time, Comdr. McCrea furnished Admiral Hart's estimate of each one of the Japanese naval leaders, which was the best estimate that had ever been received; this included information concerning the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto to the effect that he was efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous; Comdr. McCrea's information was copied down and put in the secret file (p. 45-46).

### F. THE GREW REPORT OF RUMORED JAPANESE ATTACK AND ONI EVALUATION

On the day when Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Naval Intelligence wrote to him concerning the rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (See letter of February 1, 1941, Exhibit 67). The letter referred to the report from Ambassador Grew, based on information from the Peruvian Minister, that in the event that trouble broke out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese would make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. This information the Peruvian Minister had transmitted, although he considered it fantastic. The letter of Naval Intelligence stated that no credence was placed in these rumors and that based on known data regarding the disposition and employment of Japanese forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appeared imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Admiral Schuirmann said that a low evaluation had been given to Ambassador Grew's report (referring to page 113 "PEACE AND WAR") that in case of trouble the Japanese planned a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. He recalled no discussion of that report with the State Department. He said that he did not think that a particularly high evaluation had been placed upon that information by the Ambassador or his staff and could not explain the prominence given to this report in "PEACE AND WAR" (p. 411).

Ambassador Grew said that the information of Japanese intention to open war by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that he transmitted to the State Department on January 27, 1941, was a rumor from reliable sources (the Peruvian Minister—page 1066). This was only such report of this rumor (page 1062). He also said that in making his later reports during 1941, including a report of November 3rd, he advised that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness.

Admiral Turner said that he usually attended the State Department conferences. He never heard of Ambassador Grew's statement that Hawaii might be attacked suddenly, until it came out in the newspapers (page 1019).

Captain Smith-Hutton, Naval Attaché at Tokyo, said that since there was so much secrecy of Japanese movements, it was highly improbable that the plan, if real, would have been known in diplomatic circles (page 1080).

## II. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL—HIS REORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET AND HIS STAFF

### A. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, assumed duty as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on February 1, 1941. He served as such until December 17, 1941, when he was retired on his own application (page 273).

It may be noted that Admiral Stark had recommended Admiral Kimmel for this assignment. In the fitness report on Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 25), which Admiral Stark prepared after the issuance of the Robert's Report, and in which he stated that an adverse report had been made on Admiral Kimmel, he also stated that he had always considered Admiral Kimmel to be an outstanding officer and still did (page 86).

It may also be noted that in his statement to the Court, Admiral Pye volunteered that he thought that the appointment of Admiral Kimmel as CincPac was excellent, and that he performed his duties as such in an excellent manner (page 446).

**B. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET**

Admiral Kimmel testified that he reorganized the Pacific Fleet (page 274). The organization established by him existed, he testified, throughout the entire duration of his command in substantially the same form as is set forth in Pacific Confidential Letter 14CL-41 of October 31, 1941 (Exhibit 52) as follows:

*Task Force One* (Commander Battle Force) consisting of six battleships, Cruiser Division One—less the LEXINGTON. Cruiser Division Nine, and part of Destroyer Flotilla One, etc;

*Task Force Two* (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force) consisting of three battleships, Carrier Division Two, Cruiser Division Five, Destroyer Flotilla Two,

*Task Force Three* (Commander Scouting Force) consisting of Cruiser Division Four and Six, the LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group Twenty-one, and Destroyer Squadrons, etc;

*Task Force Four* (Commandant 14th Naval District) which comprised that portion of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases, and Rear Admiral Bloch, who was ComFOURTEEN, was also designated in other directives as Naval Base Defense Officer;

*Task Force Seven* (Commander Submarine Scouting Force);

*Task Force Nine* (Commander Patrol Wing Two); consisting of Patrol Wings One and Two.

*Task Force Fifteen* (Commander Base Force).

It may be noted at this point that this directive also provided that current assignment schedules for the task forces would remain in effect; that the Commanders of Task Forces Seven and Nine were to submit revised schedules for the period November 15th to December 31, 1941, at the earliest practicable date. It was indicated that those schedules were to contemplate various arrangements for further training.

**C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STAFF**

Rear Admiral Pye was Admiral Kimmel's next senior in command, and was Commander of Task Force One;

Admiral Herbert F. Leary during 1941 was in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, and under the command of Admiral Pye. (p. 363)

During 1941, Admiral Walter S. Anderson was Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet. His superior was Admiral Pye. He was Admiral Pye's most important subordinate commander. (p. 390)

During 1941, Admiral Joel William Bunkley was Commanding Officer of the USS CALIFORNIA which was attached to the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Bunkley's ship was Admiral Pye's Flagship. (p. 413)

Admiral Halsey was Commander of Task Force Two; Vice Admiral Friedman of Task Force Three;

Admiral John Henry Newton, during 1941, was in command of Cruisers and Scouting Force. His superior was Admiral Brown. (p. 314)

Rear Admiral Bloch of Task Force Four; Rear Admiral Withers of Task Force Seven;

Admiral Bellinger of Task Force Nine; and, Rear Admiral Calhoun of Task Force Fifteen.

Admiral Bloch testified that during 1941 he was ComFOURTEEN,

From March 15, 1941 until the end of the year, Captain Irving H. Mayfield was District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He had had no previous experience in Intelligence work except two weeks temporary duty in Washington and two years as a Naval attache in Chile.

After July 1, 1941, Lieutenant William B. Stephenson, USNR, was designated as head of the Counter-Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District (p. 323).

Until June 9, 1941, Captain J. B. Earle was in command of Destroyer Squadron Five, thereafter he was Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District (p. 368).

Commander Wesley A. Wright was Assistant Communication Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was on temporary duty with the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit. He had had no experience in traffic analysis, which includes the location of forces by instruments, but had had about nine years' experience in other closely related branches of communication intelligence work (p. 379).

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Commander Local Defense Forces, Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, Commander Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, Commander Task Force Four, as Naval Defense Officer. He performed his duties in cooperation with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that he and Admiral Kimmel worked harmoniously together and conferred four to five times weekly. Admiral Kimmel, he said, made an honest effort to keep him fully informed. He was conscious that in Japanese-United States relations were strained. He did not disagree with decisions made by the High Command of the Fleet. He was not called upon to make any independent decision (page 393).

According to Vice Admiral Bellinger his duties, in general, were as:

(a) Commander Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two plus other units as assigned by CincPac for specific operations. His senior officer was CincPac.

(b) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander Patrol Wing Two. The larger command included the patrol squadrons, aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings One and Two. His senior officer was Commander Aircraft Scouting Force based at San Diego.

(c) Commander Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. Administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on Naval Air Station.

(d) Liaison with ComFOURTEEN for aviation development with the district including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Island.

(e) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, and when performing these duties, his senior officer was Admiral Bloch (pages 660-61).

Captain Logan C. Ramsey, who also testified, was Operations Officer to Admiral Bellinger between November 1 and December 7, 1941 (page 574).

Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun said that he was Commander Base Force, United States Fleet, during 1941. His duties included logistic support of the Pacific Fleet assisting ComFOURTEEN with services in Pearl Harbor, command of the security measure until August or September when relieved by Admiral Bloch and he was Senior Patrol Officer in charge of all naval shore patrol (page 931).

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, during 1941, was Chief of Staff to CincPac.

*Vice Admiral Smith testified that he was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941 to 7 December 1941 (page 335), and that his duties were prescribed by Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet (Exhibit 34), issued 14 July 1941 which he himself signed and issued with the approval of Admiral Kimmel, under "112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay."*

*"200. CHIEF OF STAFF—01—Personal Aide.  
(See Navy Regulations Articles 785-786.)*

*(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.  
(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.*

*(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.*

*(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as the strategic and tactical problems of the Fleet.*

*(e) Signs correspondence as follows:*

*(1) Routine Matters.*

*(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, from material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a procedure has been established.*

*(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.*

*(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.*

*(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.*

*(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers" (NCI Rec. p. 336).*

(page 528).

Admiral Smith, on December 7, 1941, was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet which position he assumed on February 1, 1941. Previously, he served a year and a half as Captain of one of Admiral Kimmel's cruisers while Admiral Kimmel was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet. As Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith supervised all divisions of the Staff (p. 32). Everything which transpired between the Staff members and the Commander-in-Chief was brought to Admiral Smith's attention. (p. 33)

Admiral Smith said that he felt that entirely too much of his time was taken up with administrative matters; when the Commander-in-Chief and Staff moved ashore, Admiral Smith found it difficult to keep a day-by-day routine going; possibly he was to blame himself for this situation, but he attempted to reduce the paper work. However, the Commander-in-Chief kept him too long in the Commander-in-Chief's office, and he knew that because Admiral Smith told him so; Admiral Smith believes that they spent entirely too much time on staff discussions. (p. 60) Admiral Smith stated that because of his preoccupation with day-to-day matters he was not as free as the Commander in Chief to think of future events.

Admiral DeLany was Chief of Staff for Operations for Admiral Kimmel from February 1 to December 7, 1941 (page 496). Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris War Plans Officer during the last half of 1941 (page 887).

On December 7, Captain Vincent R. Murphy was on the staff of Admiral Kimmel as Assistant to the War Plans Officer, and on that day was Staff Duty Officer (p. 195).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was War Plans Officer for CincPac from February, 1941 until the end of 1941 (page 293). He stated that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Staff of CincPac, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

- "207. War Plans Officer—16.
- "(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.
- "(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
- "(c) Member of Schedule Board.
- "(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.
- "(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters—via District Commandant if appropriate.
- "(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
- "(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.
- "(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.
- "(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet." (page 294)

Captain E. T. Layton testified that between October and December 7th, he Fleet Intelligence Officer for CincPac (page 904).

Captain Layton testified that for one year prior to 7 December 1941, and subsequently, he had been Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, (page 82) and that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

- "214. Intelligence Officer—25.
  - "(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
  - "(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential or current estimates (monograph material).
  - "(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
  - "(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
  - "(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
  - "(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
  - "(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.
  - "(h) In charge of censorship.
  - "(i) Internal Security of ships.
  - "(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.
  - "215. Assistant Intelligence Officer—26.
- In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:
- "(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.

"(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.

"(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.

"(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies" (page 183).

Rear Admiral Kitts was Fleet Gunnery Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was in charge of training (pages 511-12). (3)

On December 7, 1941, Admiral Arthur C. Davis was Fleet Aviation Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He had been performing these duties for about a year and a half (p. 96). His duties primarily were concerned with technical training and logistics matters (p. 97).

On December 7, 1941, M. E. Curtis, Captain, U. S. N., was Pacific Fleet Communication Officer and had served in that capacity for about two years.

#### D. GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 142 AND 143

General Order No. 142, dated January 10, 1941, of which the Court took judicial notice, assigned a dual status to the Commandants of various Naval districts, including the Fourteenth, in that as Commandants they were to operate under orders of the Navy Department, and as officers of one of the fleets they were to operate under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of the Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank made them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the fleet. The question when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief. It was further provided that as Commandants they were to be governed by all instructions relating to the duties of Commandants of Naval districts and the units under their command would be those prescribed in existing regulations and instructions, and would include the local naval defense forces. Their duties as officers of a fleet were to be guided by such instructions as the Commander-in-Chief of that fleet might consider desirable.

General Order No. 143, dated February 3, 1941, which the Court also judicially noticed, provided for the organization of naval forces of the United States, which included the United States Fleet, composed of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets. These were described as administrative and task organizations normally operating under the instructions of the Navy Department. The United States Fleet was said to be an administrative organization for training purposes or as a task organization when two or more fleets were concentrated or operating in conjunction with each other. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, was to prescribe standards and methods of training. It was also stated that the Commandants of Naval districts had administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for naval local defense forces.

### III. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS—HIS STAFF AND DUTIES

#### A. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN, was Chief of Naval Operations through the period when Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

#### B. ADMIRAL STARK'S STAFF

Admiral Stark's principal advisers during this period, he said, were Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral R. Turner, head of War Plans.

Captain Robert O. Glover was in the plans division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was assigned various planning duties. (p. 171)

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, head of Central Division, Admiral Wilkins, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

From May until October, 1941, Admiral Howard F. Kingman was head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI, and from October on was Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. As head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch he had general supervision of the activities of the several districts' intelligence organizations. (p. 335-6)

Captain L. F. Safford was in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications during 1941. (p. 355)

heads of the Divisions of Ship Movements,

During 1941, Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard was Director of the Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. (p. 399)

The duties of the Ship Movements Division were summarized by Admiral Brainard as follows:

"The general functions of the Ship Movements Division involved preparation of the publications "Operating Force Plan," "Assignment of Vessels to Fleets and Forces," "Assignment of Vessels to Districts," assignment of home ports; and collaboration and coordination with the Fleet Maintenance Division of overhauls, schedules of Fleet activities as submitted by the Commanders of the forces afloat, these tentative schedules being submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and circulated for the approval or modification by the divisions under the CNO, and final approval; then returned to the forces afloat by the Chief of Naval Operations; scheduling and itinerarizing of NTS ships, the recording and accountability of ship locations in rather detailed form as the result of position reports and location reports from the ships operating individually and from Fleet units, as reported by Fleet Commanders. During the period of my incumbency, a War Information Room was started under the late Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton for the purpose of plotting and keeping track of all combatant ships of the navies of the world. Also a section of Convoy and Routing, as now called, whose duties were the plotting and as close an accountability as possible to keep track of the merchant shipping of the world. Positions of our own naval vessels also was obtained through a movement report system. Information on merchant shipping and foreign shipping and men-of-war was obtained through the various sources of ONI, naval observers at ports of the world, Naval Attaches, Maritime Commission, and other such sources. The acquisition of small craft was accomplished by the NTS Section which, later, grew into a sizeable division, and the assignments to Districts and Sea Frontiers was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations as set forth in the publication previously mentioned as prepared and distributed by this division." (p. 399-400)

Admiral Brainard said that the assignment of important naval units was determined by echelons higher than his division. (p. 400)

Admiral Brainard said that the Ship Movements Division was primarily record keeping division and something of an information bureau, available to proper authorities, as regards the location of shipping and that he and his division did not participate in questions of broad general policy. (p. 402)

Maintenance, Fleet Training, and his Flag Secretary (pages 2, 18).

During 1941, Captain John L. McCrea was an aide to Admiral Stark. He was assigned special duties by Admiral Stark.

During 1941, Captain Charles Wellborn, Jr. was Administrative Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations (p. 383).

Admiral Royal Ingersoll said that he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and as such generally acted for the Chief of Naval Operations in matters of policy had been established, and in an advisory capacity. He knew fully what was going on in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (page

During 1941, Admiral Ingersoll was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. He described his duties as follows:

"As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been

considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent." (p. 417)

Concerning Admiral Ingersoll's familiarity with matters coming before Admiral Stark, he said:

"Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secretary of State of which he did not tell me all the details." (p. 417)

Vice Admiral R. K. Turner said that between July and December 7, 1941, he was Director of War Plans in the office of CNO. He was a professional adviser to CNO in the preparation of plans for war (page 988).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was Director of the Central Division during 1941 and was the liaison with the State Department.

The liaison between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State Department was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows:

"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meeting with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time, the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling." (p. 257)

Admiral Turner summarized the situation in regard to the State Department by stating that on the whole, he was satisfied and had no complaint or criticism on the attitude of the State Department. (p. 258)

Captain Wellborn discussed the general exchange of information with the State Department. (p. 385)

The records kept of the meetings with the State Department officers were described by Admiral Schuirmann as follows:

"A 'Liaison Committee' consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was



ommenced; prior to that time I would make notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a précis of the meetings. At times there were 'off the record' discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these 'off the record' discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials." (p. 405)

"Memo: The examining officer has identified the records mentioned by the witness as being contained in file titled 'Record of Liaison Meetings and some other special papers,' now on file in the Central Division (Op 13) of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, Navy Department." (p. 405 and 406) Admiral Schuirmann said that he had some informal memorandums which would be in the files of the Central Division. (p. 406)

Liaison was made by personal visits, conferences, and by telephone. He dealt with Dr. Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton, Joseph Ballantine, Under Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary Hull. Incomplete minutes were kept by the Central Division of State Department meetings. ONI kept him informed, he said, there was no established system for getting information to him. He also received information, for some time prior to the attack, during daily morning conferences conducted by the Secretary of the Navy, at which the War Plans Division, who kept a current estimate, was present (pages 195-198).

#### C. THE DUTIES OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The duties of Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, are set forth in Article 392 and Article 433, Navy Regulations, of which the Court took judicial notice at pages 74-77, as follows:

Article 392:

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate from among officers of the Line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years. He is charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet, the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the coordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission and to be commissioned. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

(b) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title of Rear Admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 June 1922. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are perceived under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such. (c) The Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office is authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifteen officers and one above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be removed from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be retired with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest grade or held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations.

(d) During the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under Secretary of the Navy, serving, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy."

Article 433:

The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations shall include the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Division of Fleet Training; the operation of the Communication Service, of naval districts, of vessels assigned to the

Naval Reserve, and of mines and mining; the operations of the Marine Corps except when operating with the Army or on other detached duty by order of the President; and the operations of Coast Guard vessels when operating with the Navy; and the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization of the fleet, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and training of the fleet for war; ocean and lake surveys; with the collection of foreign surveys; with publication and supply of charts, sailing directions, and nautical rules; dissemination of all nautical, hydrographic, and meteorological information to ships and aircraft, and with the upkeep, repair, and operation of the Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office.

"3. He shall so coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel and material thereto so as to insure at all times the maximum readiness of the fleet for war.

"4. He shall keep all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department informed in regard to action within their cognizance that is at any time necessary or desirable to improve the war efficiency of the fleet, and shall arrange for the coordination of effort of his office and of the bureaus and other offices of the Navy Department in relation thereto.

"5. He shall under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy direct the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy, including the time of their assignment for docking, repairs, and alterations, and shall prepare schedules and orders in regard thereto.

He shall keep records of service of fleets, squadrons and ships.

"6. He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features and design of all new ships and as to any alterations of a ship which may affect her military value; as to the location, capacity, and protection of navy yards and naval stations, including all features which affect their military value; also, as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, visual signal stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunitions, fuel, stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

"7. He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the department in regard to insular governments and foreign relations, and all correspondence in regard to these matters shall be presented for the Secretary's action through his office.

"8. He is charged with the preparation, revisions, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, general orders, tactical instructions, drill books (except such as are issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the individual instruction of officers and enlisted men), signal codes, and cipher codes.

"9. In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war, he shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the Department and the Marine Corps Headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance. After the approval of any given war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices, such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans and their maintenance in constant readiness.

"10. In carrying out his duties he shall utilize the facilities of the appropriate bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.

"11. The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer."

The Court of Inquiry also took judicial notice of General Order No. 170, dated March 23, 1942, which provided that the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations were combined and placed under one officer with the title "Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations."

#### IV. THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT—HIS MAJOR MISSIONS

##### A. THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Major General W. C. Short, USA, became Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in February, 1941, and was relieved December 16, 1941 (page 220). General Marshall testified that he considered General Short a very superior officer (page 853).

Colonel W. C. Phillips, USA, became General Short's Chief of Staff on November 5, 1941, prior to which he had worked through the various staff sections.

stated that General Short discussed all important communications with him. He was relieved December 18, 1941 (page 477, 493).

**B. GENERAL SHORT'S MAJOR MISSION**

General Marshall said that he wrote to General Short on February 7, 1941, when General Short took command. The reason for the letter was a conference he had had with Admiral Stark on the inadequacy of Army equipment for the protection of Pearl Harbor (pages 865-6). His letter stated that Kimmel had written Stark about it but did not realize that the Army was tragically lacking in AA material, and that Hawaii was on a better basis than other places. The fullest protection for the fleet, he stated, is "*The rather than a major consideration for us.*"

Captain Wellborn said that generally it was the Navy's view that there was no more important commitment that the Army might have than the defense of Pearl Harbor, but that this view appeared not to be completely concurred in by the War Department. (p. 386)

The Navy itself, he said, made demands for other places that made it difficult to meet their demands for Hawaii. He was doing everything to build up the defenses but could not perform a miracle; Short was to make this clear to Kimmel; he was sending planes, some of which were not up to Jap speed, et cetera; he was trying to augment the machine guns. The Navy had approached the Army for barrage balloons and probably the first test would be in June in Hawaii.

General Marshall's letter also stated (page 867), "The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real peril in the Hawaiian Islands."

In this letter he also said that Short should keep clearly in mind, "that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel." (Page 867.)

**V. RELATIONS IN GENERAL BETWEEN NAVY AND ARMY COMMANDERS**

**A. IN WASHINGTON**

General Marshall said that he held frequent consultations with Admiral Stark and that their relations were excellent (page 856).

**B. IN HAWAII**

The Navy and Army witnesses were unanimously of the opinion that relations between the Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii were satisfactory.

Admiral Pye stated that the cooperation between General Short and Admiral Kimmel was greater than had ever existed previously between such commanding officers (page 441).

Admiral Delaney stated that there was complete cooperation between the higher echelon of the Army and the Navy at Pearl Harbor (page 507).

Admiral Smith testified that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were very close and that there was a free exchange of military information (page 536).

Admiral Smith said that "Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him; both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific as Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relation such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there were excellent." (p. 35)

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel never felt that Admiral Bloch was General Short's opposite number, rather Admiral Kimmel felt that he was General Short's opposite; he felt that when he was present he was the

man who should deal with the Army and with everything himself; he took that responsibility although that might not have been indicated on the official documents. However, Admiral Smith did not recall that this was Admiral Bloch in any state of uncertainty; Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch. (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that the method of command in effect in Hawaii between the Army and Navy was the method of mutual cooperation, in that CincPac had the predominate interest which General Short recognized and that the Navy was not very much impressed with the Army's provisions for defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by the Fleet itself, "which it was." (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that "Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and that when he was in port, he had the responsibility as he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a feeling that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordinate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually, however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say." (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that the primary reason why the Army and Navy business was conducted by Admiral Kimmel and not by Admiral Bloch was that after Admiral Kimmel moved ashore in the summer of 1941 and was there all the time practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature. That responsibility included the responsibility for the safety of the Fleet for it was realized that the only defense would be by the Fleet and that there was no defense ashore except the net or the gun. (p. 37)

However, Admiral Smith thought that it was Admiral Kimmel's intention in issuing his security order that the tasks therein prescribed for the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District involving coordination with the Army, should be performed directly by Admiral Bloch. (p. 37)

Admiral Calhoun said that Kimmel and Short were on excellent terms and cooperated fully (pages 936-937).

Admiral Kitts said that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were cordial and cooperative (page 523.)

According to Admiral McMorris, the relations of Kimmel and Short were cordial and cooperative, as to the development of plans for local defense and utilization of fleet units in port for local defense, there may, from time to time have been differences of opinion, but relations were habitually pleasant (page 90)

Admiral DeLany said that the relationship between the Army and Navy out there was one of complete understanding and was very close. (p. 78)

*Vice Admiral McMorris testified with respect to whether the cordiality in relations as they existed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short extended down to elements of the staffs, that there was much interchange of information on a habitual informal basis; that he himself not infrequently saw members of General Short's staff. He stated that he knew that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger had meetings not infrequently.*

*He stated further that prior to joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, he was Operations Officer for Admiral Andrews, who was Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment and Senior Officer Present in Hawaii until the Fleet came out sometime during 1940; that during that period he frequently visited Fort Shafter and discussed defensive plans with the Army officers, and that after joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, his association at Fort Shafter with the Army continued. He stated that he felt he was not exceptional in that respect (p. 532-533).*

Captain Ramsey said that he did not usually attend Army-Navy conferences but sometimes went with Admiral Bellinger. In general, cooperation between the Army and the Navy was very good (page 587).

Commander Rochefort, in charge of combat intelligence at 14ND, testified that relations between the Army and Navy were satisfactory and they worked closely together (page 476).

Admiral Bloch testified that his personal relations with General Short were friendly and his official relations were good. They had no serious disagreements and cooperated fully (page 408).

Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command and with the exception of possibly a couple of trips at sea and one trip to Washington,

was there the entire time although his intention, in the event of hostilities, was that he would go to sea. (p. 7) Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel's presence ashore did not make him either unhappy or embarrassed. His relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good and his relations with the Commanding General were cordial and their cooperation, he thought, was good. But the Commanding General had a right to go to Admiral Kimmel directly and he also had a right to discuss matters with Admiral Bloch and on one or two occasions Admiral Bloch didn't know whether General Short had discussed particular matters with Admiral Kimmel or whether he was coming to Admiral Bloch in the first instance. This, however, did not cause any disagreement because Admiral Bloch talked everything over fully with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch did not think that there had been any doubt in his mind as to where he stood in the picture. (p. 7)

Admiral Bloch had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly concerning the matters in connection with the Joint Coastal Defense Plan. Among these were Captain J. B. Earle, Chief of Staff and Commander C. B. Momsen, the War Plans Officer and Captain Graham, the District Communications Officer. They had no serious differences of opinion with the Army. Some matters were referred to Washington but they were always settled. Admiral Bloch thought that their preparations were being prosecuted very vigorously. (p. 8)

General Marshall was informed that relations between Short and Kimmel and he were excellent (page 856).

According to Admiral Kimmel his relations with General Short were "O. K." in all respects (pages 367-8).

General Short testified that in matters of cooperation with the Navy he dealt with Admiral Bloch on routine matters and with Admiral Kimmel on matters of importance. He frequently conferred with both. There were no regular conferences, but conferences were held from time to time. He and Admiral Kimmel were friendly personally and officially (pages 220-21).

Colonel Phillips said that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were very good, and that General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch conferred frequently, and that relations between them were cordial and cooperative (pages 482, 493).\*

## THE WAR PLANS RELATING TO HAWAII AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

### A. THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF HAWAII

*In the Hewitt investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:*

1. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five:  
On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36).

*According to this plan the day of execution was to be designated as W-Day, and the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day, which might or might not coincide with W-Day. The plan (Exhibit 35) provided in part:*

### "INTRODUCTION

#### "CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." (Exhibit 35)

In connection with the relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subsequently that there may be questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by one or the other, particularly after November 27, 1941, their exchange of information, and the degree of cooperation which existed in connection with the Army radar system at Oahu.

**"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS**

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

"a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Government in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

"NOTE.—As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . . (Ex. 35)

**"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION**

"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces in the Far East." (Exhibit 35)

**"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION****SECTION 8. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION**

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaya (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advancing bases.

"3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

"a. Capture of Guam.

"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

"e. Reinforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

"f. Possibly raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in

Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probably main base in Halmahera).

"d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 35)

## "PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

### CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

"a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

"b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155° East;

"e. Defend Samoa in category 'D';

"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';

"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)

### "CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

"a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

"b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.

"c. PHASE II, etc.,—Succeeding tasks.

"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.

"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.

"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-Day.

"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-Day.

"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° East.

"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

- "i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- "j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
- "k. Continue training operations as practicable.
- "l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
- "m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan." (Exhibit 35)

#### "PHASE IA

"2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- "a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
- "b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
- "c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the Northern Pacific.
- "d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by cover operations.
- "e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
- "2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser sweeps against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
- "f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
- "g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
- "h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and the West Coast.
- "i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
- "j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.
- "k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
- "l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Islands as soon as possible." (Exhibit 35)

#### "PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

##### CHAPTER I. PHASE I

##### "SECTION 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

- "3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.
- "3142. On W-Day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Conduct administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
- "3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Appendix I)." . . . (Exhibit 35)

#### "PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

##### CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND II

##### SECTION 1. PHASE I

|                                 |
|---------------------------------|
| United States Pacific Fleet     |
| U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship |
| Place                           |
| Date                            |

"Operation Plan

"No. 1-R5"

- "1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.
- "2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces as required.



of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." . . . (Exhibit 35)

"ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." . . .

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

"2. Phase I.

"This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

"(c) Covering.

"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

"(e) Routing shipping." . . . (Ex. 35)

3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities permit and the situation at the time makes practicable.

"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer the patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

"(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

"(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1)." . . . (Exhibit 35)

Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 14ND-JCD-42.

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND-JCD-42), as signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Ex. 80). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until such time as the method of unity of command were invoked. (Ex. 80)

It will be seen that under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

The tasks assigned were as follows:

Tasks.

"a. JOINT TASK. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. ARMY TASK. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

"c. **NAVY TASK.** To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." (Ex. 80)

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu) (Ex. 80)

"17. **ARMY.** The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT shall provide for:

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage except within naval establishments.

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU-D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.e.

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"m. Any measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

"18. **NAVY.** The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:

"a. An inshore patrol.

"b. An offshore patrol.

"c. An escort force.

"d. An attack force.

"e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

"f. Installation and operation of an under water defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

"i. Distant reconnaissance.

"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

"l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

"m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

"p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto." (Exhibit 80)

3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

This provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action.

It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable." (Ex. 47)

4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by

a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for an extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 800 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using. (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred. (Exhibit 49)

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an anti-combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)

5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

*Security measures were prescribed covering:*

*A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.*

*B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.*

*C. Sortie and entry.*

*D. Operating areas.*

*E. Ships at sea.*

*F. Ships in port.*

*The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them; and provided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; and that COMFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.*

*Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:*

*"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."*

*The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.*

*The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of Inquiry).*

The war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy-WPL-46 (Exhibit 4); in United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP-PAC-46 (Exhibit 5); in "Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularly, in Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND-JCD-42 (Exhibit 7); and in Operation Plan No. 1-41, issued by Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer (Exhibit 53).

In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and issued about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral Smith said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk. With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could have been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was not yet up to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had really not been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a lever to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development. (p. 160)

Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 163)

The record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include, copies of Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 23, 1941 (Exhibit 23), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.

Paragraph II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. . . .

Paragraph III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade. It also stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and the Army Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to depend on Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy. (p. 144)

Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the Army's Air Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early information and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they should not expect such information. (p. 131)

ADMIRAL HEWITT'S EXAMINATION

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District in December, 1941, was shown Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which deals with joint Army and Navy measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti-aircraft exercises and drills in the months preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle stated that definite problems were developed for training purposes, which would serve to develop the control features of anti-aircraft defense and also develop the necessary coordination between Army and Navy operations. In addition, about once in every ten days a drill was held in which planes flew over Pearl Harbor during either day or night and ships in the harbor simulated anti-aircraft fire. The Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors, with a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible for controlling the fire from that sector and making required reports (p. 457-458).

Captain Earle stated that about once a month a drill was held which entailed locating an aircraft target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warnings being sent to both Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was located at a certain distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then be sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target. Captain Earle believed that at least three of these drills were held prior to 7 December 1941, but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any was held between 27 November and 7 December (p. 458).

Questioned regarding the command set-up for the joint exercises, Captain Earle said (p. 458-459):

"My recollection is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an enemy had been sighted on a certain bearing, this word was given to the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations, including order as to—detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.

"To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage."

Exhibit 47 provided in part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft warning service, the Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt to give such warnings of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle said that to implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications with the Army over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information received could be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications activities to make prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few destroyers assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts; and since there were no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes to forward immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 460).

Captain Earle said that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval District assigned a liaison officer to General Short's headquarters for general liaison duties (p. 460). Captain Earle stated further that there had been a naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system installed and that at one time this officer came to him and asked for assistance. This officer also stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the warning center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications Officer would be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no spare personnel in the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at the center (p. 461).

The above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch General Short.

Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement between General Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint Planning Committee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not act formally as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff acted informally with sub-committees appointed for the majority of the detailed work. (p. 368)

Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as Chief of Staff it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as time went on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish joint action. (p. 369)

Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the portions relating to planning. (p. 369)

Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army's system was in operation, Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of information, but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question of assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar officer that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they would be glad to turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)

Captain Earle's recollection was vague as to other provisions of the Joint Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and the use of barrage balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan for the coordination of Fleet anti-aircraft fire with Army anti-aircraft fire in the Pearl Harbor area. Captain Earle discussed generally his recollection of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 372-3)

To the agreement was annexed Addendum One, dated March 31, 1941. Addendum One was a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

Concerning the estimate in Admiral Bellinger's air plan that the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack, Admiral Pye said that the estimate did not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than to do something else. (p. 160)

In paragraph I of the addendum there was a "Summary of the Situation." The summary indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiated hostile action; that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence service.

Paragraph II of the addendum was a "Survey of Opposing Strengths." It indicated, among other things, that Orange might send into the area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. Also that the most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their action. The aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the addendum dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two. Further, it appeared that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would



an air attack, which would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. That a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. It was also stated that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier." It was further stated that in a dawn air attack there was a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the addendum dealt with "Action Open to Us." This stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. It contained other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the Island, and stated that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained the "Decisions." The primary decision was that this force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. There were a number of subsidiary decisions, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and was to include various units in accordance with current conditions of readiness. These units included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons, among others.

Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53). The Task Organization prescribed was (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention to, among other things, the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL Harbor Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

#### "ASSUMPTIONS

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nations of such powers may attempt:

"(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

"(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

"(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

"(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

"(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

"(3) A combination of these two—possible."

A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan was Annex "A" to Operation Plan 1-41, a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was Annex "Baker," a detailed Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan was Annex "C," a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan was Annex "D," and a detailed Communications Plan was Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker," the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, was dated April 9, 1941, prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch.

According to Admiral Bloch, after Admiral Kimmel assumed command and before information was received about the correspondence between the

Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War dealing with the Pearl Harbor defenses, Admiral Kimmel reviewed certain information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that since the ships had aircraft batteries, they should be used to the fullest extent to increase volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor. He also decided that since the Navy also had a number of planes on shore many of which were carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they also should be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned Admiral Halsey and Admiral Ballinger to Admiral Bloch to talk over with the Army the coordination of action of the airplanes. Conferences were held with Army authorities and an agreement reached with the Army under which all fighter planes, including Navy fighter planes on shore at the time of attack, would be placed under the Army's command and that all bombers would be turned over to the Navy. (p. 4)

Admiral Bloch said that generally speaking, he took no exception to the Air Defense Plan which had been worked out by Admiral Ballinger and General Martin. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel had a copy of the Joint Air Operations Plan; that it was fair to assume that he must have known about the plan; and that General Short also must have known about the plan. (p. 89)

Admiral Smith said that the Commander-in-Chief was apprised of all the plans made by the Army and by Admiral Bloch. However, Admiral Smith did not recall the Joint Defense Plan, Exhibit 5. (p. 37)

It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with, among other things, the Joint Estimate, dated March 31, 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating area. The plan was effective upon receipt and would become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by radio patch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum T to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter, such as "E", signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5", signifying that a certain number of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan stating the number of planes and readiness.

General Short testified that the local joint defense plan was in effect prior to the attack, but was not in operation because, he said, it was predicated on the Rainbow Plan which had not been executed, and, therefore, the action taken under it prior to the attack was only drills (pages 259-260).

Admiral Bellinger testified that about March 1, 1941, CincPac directed him to report to ComFOURTEEN to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Force. He did so and worked with Major General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. The operations plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans, the most important of which was the plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which outlined the proposed employment of all units made available to that force (page 661).

Army and Navy orders, he said, were based on the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941. He believed this estimate was sound, but that unit command was missing (page 662). The plan was to function through mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in an emergency or when proper authority directed. The composition varied with the planes made available by the various Army and Navy commanders; the determining factor of availability was the daily employment schedule of planes belonging to various units. Available planes were subject to operational control only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.

The normal procedure for vitalizing this organization for drill was an "air readiness" dispatch from ComFOURTEEN, as Base Defense Force Commander; then Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Commander, would send a dispatch to all units which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuits, ordering them

all available planes in highest readiness; searches would immediately be made then, and an attack on enemy surface forces when located (page 662). The authority of "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Officer" was non-existent until an emergency was apparent or appropriate authority placed that in a functioning status, and when called into existence covered not pursuit, only the search and attack groups of that force (page 663). The planes are present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on naval base (page 663).

Admiral Kimmel, he said, made final approval for naval aircraft operation. ComFourteen could vitalize the NBDA Force. ComFourteen worked CincPac. NBDA Force was not composed of all aircraft but only of that reported available (page 665).

In his estimate, he said, that "it appears possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence service" was an estimate of hostile action and not of Japanese plans (page 666).

In summary, the NBDA Force would come into being in the event of: (a) an actual emergency, (b) an actual emergency, (c) orders from higher authority based on information as to the imminence of attack (page 678).

Admiral Bloch said that the agreement with the Army concerning the use of aircraft was effective from the date of signature and would be put in execution in the same manner as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. (p. 7)

#### B. TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE WAR PLANS IN GENERAL

Admiral Bellinger stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation for meeting such an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operating twenty-four hours a day, must be fully manned and functioning. Reconnaissance, radar nets, complete information regarding shipping, and control of all aircraft in the zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must be in effect and functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be expected from a mutual cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed only through intermittent drills (p. 610).

It appears from the testimony of various of the witnesses that (1) the decisive theater, as laid down in the war plans, was the Atlantic, and that the military strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive; (2) that the primary responsibility for defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's, and that the Navy was to assist the Army in that task; (3) that the method of command at Pearl Harbor was one of cooperation between the Army and Navy and not unity of command; (4) the principal mission which had been assigned to the Pacific Fleet was to train for war with Japan; and (5) that the war plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the fleet technically mobilized. The decisive theatre the Atlantic; defensive strategy in the Pacific.

Admiral Bloch said that "Rainbow I" contemplated the United States at war with the Axis Powers, including Japan, without any assistance except perhaps some of the South American Republics; JCD was based on that plan; "Rainbow 3" was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis nations, including Japan; he believed that the provisions of "Rainbow 5" were about the same as in the earlier plans insofar as they related to the Fourteenth Naval District. No. 1 was a purely defensive plan. No. 3 had certain offensive tasks in it, and he did not recall the tasks assigned by "Rainbow 5." (p. 23)

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, on December 7, 1941, was assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and was under the command of Captain Morris. He was responsible for the preparation of the written war plans for the Pacific Fleet which were required to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect. He had reported for that duty on February 1, 1941. (p. 66)

Admiral McCormick said that the commitments of the Pacific Fleet for the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 Plan, in general were to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in special categories such as Guam, which was regarded as more or less indefensible; to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by

raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea communications; and to raid or interrupt Japanese communications east of longitude 180. This provided, therefore, for the use of task forces composed of combatant ships for offensive operations consisting of raids, and if the use of a covering force were taken into account it might be said that the whole of the Fleet would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase. (p. 66-7) In his opinion, had the three carriers which were attached to the Fleet been available, they could have raided an island in the fringe of the Marshalls without undue risk. There were only two carriers available around December 7th, but it is Admiral McCormick's belief that Admiral Kimmel intended to carry out the plan even with the two carriers which were then available. The operating schedules were more or less built around the war plans insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned. (p. 67)

Captain Glover worked on portions of Rainbow 5, which was completed in May. The plan contemplated, he said, the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. (p. 161) According to Captain Glover, the plan gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. Also, to divert the enemy strength from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. Captain Glover's concept of the plan was that initially, the attitude of the Pacific Fleet was to be defensive and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive. The movements which he had mentioned were to be classed as raids rather than movement of total force and he considered that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids. (p. 173)

Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL-46 represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time and a calculated risk in the Pacific and that the plan was elastic.

Captain Glover referred to a memo, dated August 21, 1941, to the Plans Section of the War Plans Division re: "Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5." This indicated that the Plans Section was charged with preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect and continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice might be given in regard to matters relating to the execution of the plan.

No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according to Captain Glover. (p. 174)

Admiral Turner discussed the background and form of WPL-46, known as Rainbow 5. (p. 251-2) Admiral Turner said that the contributory plan of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was approved by the Navy Department in about September, 1941. Concerning the offensive tasks of the war plan, Admiral Turner said, "So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether by writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it. While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement, that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific." (p. 252)

Captain Wellborn said that his recollection was that generally the officers concerned with the preparation of the war plans were of the view that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic. (p. 383-4)

Concerning the concept that Germany was the principal enemy to be first disposed of, Admiral Ingersoll said: "Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japa-

entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major effort would be made in one ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representation made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL-46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan." (p. 422)

Admiral Stark testified that the over-all military strategy which regarded the Pacific as the decisive theatre had been established by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (pages 80-1). Despite this, however, the Atlantic did not have exactly priority over the Pacific, and he did not believe that men had been transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic (page 529-30).

Admiral Smith testified that he thought the CNO considered the Atlantic more important than the Pacific since in May, 1941, the best BB's, four CL's, and two divisions of DD's were secretly transferred to the Atlantic (pages 529-30).

Admiral Smith said that in May, 1941, the YORKTOWN, Battleship Division Three Cruiser Division Eight, and two squadrons of destroyers were detached and sent to the Atlantic; these he said were equipped with all of the modern devices that they had tried to get for them while they were attached to the Pacific Fleet. (p. 38)

Testimony concerning the primary responsibility for defense.

Both Admiral Stark (page 193) and Admiral Kimmel (page 294) testified that the basic responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's. Admiral Kimmel said, had the duty of locating and engaging enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the Navy was to support the Army. The Army had the duty of repulsing air attack by artillery, the Navy to assist. Under the joint plan, the Army operated all pursuit planes and the Navy all fighters and patrol planes (page 295).

Admiral Pye stated that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor, assisted by the Navy in such manner as possible (page 438).

Admiral Bloch stated that the method of command was joint cooperation and the Army's task under JCD-42 was to hold Oahu against attack and support the naval forces (page 385, Exhibit 7); the Navy's task was to patrol and defend the coastal zone and to support the Army (page 386).

Admiral Bloch said that it might be stated that the Navy had no responsibility because there was nothing said in the Joint Coastal Defense Plan to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity to help out on account of the fact that he had means that he could use. (p. 1)

Admirals Ingersoll, Delaney, and Smith testified that under JCD-42 the Army was responsible for the defense of Hawaii (pages 848, 505, 551).

Admiral Kitts testified that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 521). The Navy's function was to support the Army. When the fleet was in port, the guns of the Fleet were made available to Army command through the Base Defense Officer (page 521).

Admiral McMorris said that the Fleet was not charged with its own defense in Pearl Harbor.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the phrase "territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area," as used in sub-paragraph (h), page 24, of the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, (WPPac-46)", (Exhibit 35), included Hawaii, and that the duty prescribed in sub-paragraph (m) of Phase I of the Initial Tasks which was to "guard against a surprise attack by Japan," contemplated that it was a task of the Pacific Fleet to guard Hawaii against the surprise attack by Japan. (Page 295-296).

Vice Admiral McMorris further testified, with reference to the statement in the "Summary of the Situation" appearing in Addendum I to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941, to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor," that he agreed with the thought there expressed but had considered such an attack much more probable in the approaches to Pearl Harbor than in Pearl Harbor itself. (Page 299-301).

Vice Admiral McMorris also testified that at or about the time of the issuance of the Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, he agreed with the assumption therein stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by either a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor or a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, or by a combination of both of those two forms of attack. (Page 301-302).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection whether he entertained no doubt that he had reviewed, Annex VIII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier or Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and also that he had reviewed Addendum I of Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941. (Page 297-298).

but CinPac was concerned over the safety of the Fleet and felt a responsibility for urging the strengthening of the defenses (page 899).

Admiral McMorris said that Admiral Kimmel had felt an overall responsibility for safeguarding the Fleet, although he did look to ComFOURTH Fleet and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to protect Hawaii. (p. 239)

General Marshall said that the Army was responsible for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack; the Navy was to do long distance patrol and to search for and to attack hostile surface ships (page 855). The mission of the Hawaiian Air Force was to defend Oahu against air attack in cooperation with fleet aircraft and to attack hostile vessels (page 863).

Colonel Phillips testified that the Army's mission was the defense of the islands but that the Navy was jointly responsible (page 479).

(3) Command by joint cooperation, not unity of command.

Admiral Bellinger said that one of the main impediments of the air organization and of the air organizations was the provision requiring agreement between the Commanding General and the Navy Base Defense Officer in the event of a hostile raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action; the set-up which existed was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent or take action in an air attack; it was not the primary objective of either the Army or the Navy; there was no unity of command or control. (p. 119-120)

He said that if the Commanding General or he had seen an emergency situation, he felt that the Commanding General would have cooperated with any specific instance. Drills had been arranged previously by special arrangement with the Army. (p. 120)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not talk over with Admiral Kimmel the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese nor was the wording of his estimate discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and that Admiral Kimmel knew the course, that Admiral Bellinger was not satisfied with the organization's set-up because it was based on too much cooperation and on the assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and that no such organization is any good unless it functions on a 24-hour basis. Therefore, he said, insufficient personnel to have an organization functioning on that basis. (p. 122-3)

Admiral Bellinger said that when the situation in the Pacific grew more tense, those portions of his estimate dealing with a carrier raid came back to his mind; he remembered discussing the subject matter with a Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented Admiral Bellinger on the organization that had been set up, and Admiral Bellinger told him that that was all right but it would not work in case of an emergency and indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and additional facilities and equipment. (p. 123)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not think that any joint plan based on cooperation alone would or could function properly in an emergency and mentioned his more or less dissatisfaction with the general set-up of this defense, both personally in conversation with Admiral Kimmel and also one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of the Navy. (p. 124)

Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which in part was as follows:

"Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non-existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty-four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little, if any more, in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position." (p. 134)

Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had been discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.

Admiral Pye said that for at least ten years before the attack, he felt that there was need for unity of command at Pearl Harbor; for more than a year before the attack, he had advised several Commanders-in-Chief that coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officers on their staff so that it would be better arranged at least. (p. 168)

Concerning the absence of unity of command, Admiral Stark testified that thought had been given to unity of command for the whole area, but that no satisfactory solution had been reached (page 29). He said that the President or Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War could have put unity of command in effect. Admiral Stark and General Marshall could have, subject to approval, he said, of the Secretaries. Local Army and Navy commanders could have done so by agreement. Admiral Bloch probably could not have acted independently of Admiral Kimmel (page 39). He occupied, under directive, a dual status when directed by OPNAV or on "M" day (page 41).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not discuss with the Army the desirability of invoking unity of command. Unity of command would have made operations easier. ComFOURTEEN could not, he said, have invoked unity of command without reference to him, and he would have referred the matter to the Navy Department (page 296).

Admiral Ingersoll said that unity of command at Hawaii was not discussed at the Secretary's and CNO's conferences when he was present (page 848).

Admiral Turner and General Marshall both said that there had been discussion of unity of command, but that no decision had been reached (pages 858, 1009).

Admiral Turner said, "That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL-46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore." (p. 271)

(4) The principal mission which had been assigned was training for war.

Admiral Ingersoll said that he was familiar with the problems of the Pacific Fleet in 1941. The Pacific Fleet was assigned its missions in the War Plans, and until war broke out its major mission was to prepare for war (page 820).

Admiral Smith testified that the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet during 1941 was training for war with Japan (page 529). And this was not changed prior to December 7th (page 539).

(5) The plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the Fleet technically mobilized.

Admiral Stark admittedly sent out no order to mobilize under WPL-46 (page 102).

Admiral Pye discussed the various phases of mobilization at page 440.

Admiral Smith's testimony concerning WPL-46 and the assigned tasks Pacific Fleet appears at pages 541-2. He said that the War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department before the attack (page 561).

Admiral Delaney said that no "M" day was set prior to December 7, 1941 (505). He did not consider the Fleet mobilized because of deficiencies in material.

Admiral McMorris said that the War Plans, which were not executed prior to December 7th; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to the way and Wake and a minimum number to be left under control of the sea forces based on Pearl Harbor (pages 901-2).

Admiral Bloch also said that no parts of JCD-42 (Exhibit 7) were executed prior to December 7th; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to the arrangements for tactical control of aircraft in case of attack (page 386).

Admiral Turner, on page 1011, discussed the Rainbow War Plans and their development; WPL-46 was a realistic plan. Mobilization without war, he said, is not practical in a democracy as the authority of Congress to mobilize is contingent upon a declaration of war. The Fleet was, however, so mobilized that the only thing left to be done by mobilization was the taking over of merchant ships which can only be taken after war is declared. Execution of a part of WPL-46 would have been an act of war. Provision for the execution of a part of the plan was put in to provide for war with Germany without war with Japan (page 1011).

Admiral Ingersoll (page 844), read Articles 3721 and 3722 of WPL-46 (Exhibit 4). Mobilization of the Fleet, he said, was not ordered because the Fleet was already mobilized. In this connection, the Government did not want to take any action that could be considered an overt act, and mobilization was considered an act preliminary to war (page 845).

Admiral McMorris said that no technical execution of WPL-46 was necessary, he thought, to put the Fleet on a war footing; it was on a war footing (page 901).

It may be noted that Admiral Kimmel was aware, at the end of November 1941, early in December, that WPL-46 was not yet in effect and that one of the steps which his War Plans Officer recommended be taken, in the event of American-Japanese war, was to send dispatches to Task Force Commanders advising that WPL-46 was effective (Exhibits 69A and 69B).

#### C. ADEQUACY OF FLEET GENERALLY TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS

Admiral Stark testified that certain units were detached from the Pacific Fleet during 1941 for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic. The units transferred in June were three BB's, four CA's, one CV, and one DesRon, which amounted to about 25 per cent of the Pacific Fleet (pages 100-101).

He stated that from October to December, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 (pages 22-23) and later testified that in 1941 the United States did not have sufficient material to meet an attack on one ocean, much less in both (page 800).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Pacific Fleet was regarded as adequate to carry out the initial tasks prescribed for it in the War Plans, which were primarily defensive with the exception of diversionary raids against the Carolines and the Marshalls. (p. 421-2) Admiral Ingersoll discussed the transfer of ships of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic which he said was in accordance with the basic concept of the War Plans which indicated that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis powers. These plans contemplated that the British would release certain forces for the Far East. Admiral Ingersoll did not know why it took until November, 1941, for a detachment of British capital ships to arrive in the Indian Ocean. (p. 421-2)

Admiral Turner considered that the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared on November 26th to carry out missions assigned to it in the War Plans. These missions were defensive, except for possible raids (page 1017).

Admiral Turner said that forces were withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet to support an occupation of the Azores but that project was abandoned and the occupation of Iceland was substituted and some of the forces which had been withdrawn were then returned to the Pacific.

Admiral Turner said that he did not recall any official protest by Admiral Kimmel concerning the detachment of units to the Pacific Fleet, but Admiral Kimmel did not approve the matter. (p. 253)

Admiral Turner discussed the Rainbow Plan No. 3, the practice of keeping the war plans up to date and the movement of forces in accordance with the commitments of the war plans. Concerning the adequacy of the



Admiral Turner said, "We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally, was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength." (p. 256)

Admiral Turner said that the Fleet logistics were believed to be adequate for initial Fleet operations. (p. 257)

According to Admiral McMorris, while there were deficiencies in the Pacific Fleet, he felt that it would be effective to carry out the missions of WPL-46. WPL-46 was based on the Japanese starting war (page 893). The Fleet would have been alerted by dispatch and was advised for sometime that the situation was tense (page 894).

Admiral McMorris was of the view that the Pacific Fleet was adequate to carry out the missions assigned to it in the War Plans, although there were many marked deficiencies in the Fleet, particularly in anti-submarine craft. He said that he thought that Admiral Kimmel considered that the Pacific Fleet did consist of strong naval forces which could be effectively employed notwithstanding some handicaps. (p. 234)

Admiral McMorris said that he was not happy over the logistics situation, but certainly not discouraged over it. (p. 235)

Admiral McMorris thought the intention of Admiral Kimmel with respect to the carrying out of the War Plans in the event of war was to sweep for Japanese merchant ships, to make immediate reconnaissance of the Marshalls, to carry out as expeditiously as possible operations to establish our forces in the Marshalls, and to inaugurate patrol plane searches in the approaches to Hawaii. (p. 235)

Admiral Pye testified that the Pacific Fleet could have operated as far as the Marshall Islands, but no farther (page 431). It would have been difficult to operate long there because of the scarcity of tankers. Fuel was also short (page 432), but there was sufficient to operate up to 7 December. The fleet would have been more effective if the detachment had not been sent to the Atlantic (page 432).

Concerning the detachment of three battleships, four cruisers and a squadron of destroyers in June of 1941, Admiral Pye said that this materially reduced the power of the Pacific Fleet, but that it did not make much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished because the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Fleet could not have operated more than 2,500 miles from Honolulu no matter what its strength. Admiral Pye said that the greatest deficiency was in tankers. Another deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. He said that he thought all of the officers agreed that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands and that even with plenty of tankers, he doubted that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that because of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases. (p. 151) Admiral Pye said that during the training periods previous to December 7, fuel was being used at a greater rate than the rate at which fuel was being delivered so that the reserve was being reduced. (p. 152)

Admiral Delaney testified that he was familiar with the naval war plans in 1941 (page 500). He stated that WPL-46 could not have been executed with the forces available to CincPac, but some of the tasks might have been carried out (page 500).

Admiral Calhoun was familiar with WPL-46 and the preparation for carrying out the tasks of the Pacific Fleet (page 931). He said that their tankers were adequate to maintain the fuel supply at Pearl Harbor (the fuel tanks there were

filled to capacity on December 7, 1941), but not sufficient to do this and also supply the fleet while operating any considerable distance to the westward of Pearl Harbor and at high speeds (pages 932-3). The number of provision ships was hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the fleet if operating to the westward (page 933). The logistic support of the fleet, however, was adequate to carry out the initial tasks of WPL-46, which were of a limited nature (page 934). There were, he said, personnel shortages in the Pacific Fleet in 1941 (page 947).

Admiral C. W. Nimitz testified that he was Chief of BuNav during 1941 (page 947). Because of the expansion of the fleets and new construction, it was necessary to draw on the fleets for trained personnel to man new ships. About December, 1941, the ships were fully manned as to officers and about 90 per cent manned as to men. There was a large proportion of Reserve officers, and a large proportion of the men were untrained (page 948).

## VII. THE POSSIBILITY OF AERIAL TORPEDO ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR

### A. KNOWLEDGE AND EVALUATION OF SECRETARY'S LETTER:

Shortly after he assumed command, Admiral Kimmel saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, which discussed the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor and set forth the types of attack regarded as most likely (page 286).

In that letter, it will be recalled, the Secretary said that:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

Apparently, Admiral Kimmel also received a copy of the reply of the Secretary of War to that letter. It may be noted that the Secretary of War in his reply of February 1941 (Exhibit 24), expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the questions raised by the Secretary of the Navy, and as to the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. In his letter, the Secretary of War stated that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of the overseas departments and continued to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. The letter discussed the Army's pursuit planes at Hawaii and those to be sent to Hawaii, the present and prospective anti-aircraft guns, the fact that the aircraft warning service equipment would be delivered in June, advising that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department was being directed to give consideration to the question of employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Also, it stated with reference to the other proposals for joint defense that a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter and of the reply were being forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department with instructions that he cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective. It appears from the copies of the endorsement annexed to this letter that a copy of the letter was sent to CincPac and ComFOURTEEN.

Admiral Kimmel's testimony showed some confusion as to his agreement with, and his evaluation of, this correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. He testified that he felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine and that a bombing attack was the second most probable form of attack, and that the danger of an air torpedo attack was nil because the water was too shallow (page 286). He then corrected his testimony and stated that his previous testimony was erroneous and that he had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility (page 287).

Captain McCrea described his conferences which he had had with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, early in 1941. He recalled that Admiral Kimmel, who was shortly to relieve Admiral Richardson, specifically discussed the short-comings of the air defenses of Pearl Harbor. (p. 275)

Admiral Stark testified that the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War had been prepared by Admiral Stark and his assistants (page 287).

Admiral Ingersoll was familiar with the correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War concerning the inadequacy of defenses at Pearl Harbor. He recalled that there was some subsequent discussion of the question of balloon barrages and that the Fleet did not want

them at Pearl Harbor because of interference with aircraft operations. He recalled no further formal representations being made to the War Department on the subject of the deficiencies. (p. 418-9) .

General Marshall was familiar with the Secretary of War's reply to the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, 1941 (page 853). In this connection he said that he personally took steps to meet the deficiencies discussed therein; that Hawaii for years held first priority on material and was by far the best equipped Army installation; that additional planes were sent to Hawaii, seriously crippling the training program in the United States, and special efforts were made to expedite production. The problem of expansion was very serious because of limited equipment and personnel needed both for Hawaii and elsewhere, and also needed here for training essential to expansion (page 854).

Admiral Bloch said that after the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, 1941, a large number of fighters and some bombers were sent to Hawaii, but that so far as he knew, no additional anti-aircraft guns were sent. He said that they knew nothing about the defenses of the coast artillery and as to the adequacy of Army personnel, but that he was definitely of the opinion that the personnel of the Army was being increased all the time and was considered by the Army generally adequate for its task. Admiral Bloch knew that the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types of planes capable of performing inshore patrol. (p. 8)

General Short testified that he saw both the Secretary of the Navy's letter and War Department's reply. He agreed with the Navy's recommendations not as to smoke and balloon barrages (page 237).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that the Secretary of the Navy's letter had not been shown to him, and that the State Department had not been apprised of it. He said, however, that the State Department was kept informed of the Navy's attitude of United States-Japanese relations (page 199).

Admiral Schuirmann said that he was sure that the State Department had not seen the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, and the Secretary of War's answer concerning the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He believed, however, that they were fairly well informed of the lack of certain equipment and of personnel shortages in the Army and Navy generally. (p. 408)

In his voluntary statement, Admiral Anderson said that the Robert's report indicated that nothing was done about the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 27, 1941 by the top commanders or any of the junior flag officers. He said that so far as he was concerned, he never knew about the Secretary of the Navy's letter. (p. 398)

### B. CORRESPONDENCE ON ANTI-TORPEDO BAFFLES IN PEARL HARBOR

On February 15, 1941 (Exhibit 49), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for maneuver-room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter stated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief were especially noted. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on February 17, 1941 (Exhibit 54).

In reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on March 20, 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the depth of water in Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient type were developed (page 293).

In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Commandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent experiments, and to experience at Taranto, which stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient force to arm the torpedo, but that such attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely than in shallow water (Exhibit 55). The torpedoes at Taranto,

it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have been in eleven.

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor—and that even at the June letter, he did not think torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor (page 293). He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason (page 331).

Admiral Smith recalled the first letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning anti-torpedo nets, but not the June letter. He said they did not think the Japanese would attack with torpedo planes (page 536).

Admiral Smith said that he was familiar with the earlier correspondence on the subject of the need for anti-torpedo nets, and that they concluded that because of the shallow water at Pearl Harbor no such nets were necessary; he did not recall ever having seen the second letter. Exhibits 17, 18, and 19 are copies of the letters in question. (p. 60-1) Admiral Smith said that the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, as set forth in his letter of March 12, 1941, that anti-torpedo nets were not necessary, was never reconsidered. Admiral Smith complained that the Navy's torpedo information was kept too secret so far as the Fleet was concerned, other than the surface fleet. (p. 62)

Admiral Bloch testified that he believed that air torpedoes could not be launched profitably in Pearl Harbor (page 394).

Admiral Bloch said that he was familiar with the discussions concerning the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor; that he was familiar with the earlier correspondence but he never saw the later correspondence modifying the earlier views. (p. 26)

Admiral Halsey said that he had felt, prior to December 7, that the Fleet should have been protected at Pearl Harbor by anti-torpedo baffles and was strongly in favor of having them. (p. 306)

Admiral Bloch pointed out that such nets in Pearl Harbor might interfere with the take-off of seaplanes and with the sortie and entry of ships. Admiral Kimmel, he said, reached the conclusion and, insofar as Admiral Bloch was concerned, that settled the matter. Moreover, he said that there had no nets available at the time except some makeshift nets used at harbor entrances which they had manufactured themselves. (p. 27)

It may be noted, incidentally, that on February 11, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance stating that experimental development work should be undertaken on nets and booms; that there appeared to be an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which could be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use; and that efforts should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms (Exhibit 5).

#### VIII. THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE FREEZING OF JAPANESE ASSETS

During the five months of Admiral Kimmel's command which preceded the freezing of Japanese assets, Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark exchanged, in addition to official correspondence, "personal correspondence," which referred to official matters. This, Admiral Stark testified, was a "Navy custom," and these personal letters never changed official orders (pages 41-2).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel showed him every letter which he wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations; that these were personal letters, but had to be considered as official documents. (p. 33)

Admiral McMorris said that he thought he had read every one of the "personal" letters between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. (p. 2)

The highlights of this correspondence concerned

- (a) The inadequacy of the local defense forces at Hawaii and the necessity of reliance on the Fleet,
- (b) Admiral Kimmel's view concerning the possibility of a surprise attack,
- (c) Admiral Kimmel's desire for information as to developments,
- (d) the international situation.

# THE INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES AND NECESSITY FOR RELIANCE ON THE FLEET

Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941 (Exhibit 29), said, among other things, that he wished they could send Admiral Bloch more defense forces but they simply did not have them. He said: "If more are sent I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am turning heaven and earth to speed a considerable program we have for small craft patrol vessels for the district, but like everything else, it takes time and money cannot buy yesterday."

A letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941 (Exhibit 30), it was stated, among other things, that as many Army bombers and fighters as the Army could send to Oahu should be sent, together with Army anti-aircraft guns; that active and immediate steps were being taken to coordinate Army and Navy effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor; that Admiral Kimmel had a couple of interviews with General Short and found him responsive to the situation and highly cooperative, and Admiral Kimmel recommended that Admiral Stark keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu; that the detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District would have to be made from the Fleet, which was a further strain on the Fleet's small craft. He adverted to the possibility of a surprise attack and discussed a question of the "highest importance," the supply of modern type fighters throughout the Fleet and the need for such planes.

Admiral Stark replied on March 22, 1941 (Exhibit 32) to Admiral Kimmel's letter of February 18, 1941, and, among other things, pointed out that the highest priority had been given to Naval planes including patrol planes.

On May 7, 1941 (Exhibit 41) and on May 20, 1941 (Exhibit 42), there were discussions from Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel concerning the vessels and planes needed for defense, particularly against submarine attacks. Admiral Bloch's letter stated that he had no aircraft and complete reliance had to be placed exclusively on the Fleet on Army planes. The letter of Admiral Kimmel referred to previous correspondence on the subject and discussed in some detail the additional vessels needed. A memorandum was sent by Admiral Kimmel discussing various matters of interest and various inadequacies of Pacific Fleet. In connection with aviation it was stated, among other things: "Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area where there is no early possibility for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area."

The memorandum also stated that the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor was a matter of considerable concern and that "we" should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes, and radar equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this continental and expanding defense needs. The Naval forces available to the Commandant, it was said, were reduced to the point of non-existence.

Admiral Stark replied to Admiral Kimmel's letter dealing with the inadequacy of the local defense force of the Fourteenth Naval District on June 23, 1941 (Exhibit 43). He stated that he realized the necessity of increasing the strength of the Naval Local Defense Forces, but advised that "until the unsatisfactory situation pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief can be remedied, the light cruisers and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will have to be employed in the local defense of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier."

Admiral DeLany discussed in general the forces available to CincPac and the organization thereof; the general nature of the tasks assigned in the war plans to the Fleet; methods of training the Fleet prior to the attack, which also involved training with the Army in exercises. He said, among other things, "I think everybody realized that the defense of the island did depend on the Navy there because certainly the Army didn't have any ground forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or anything else that would make Pearl Harbor a well-defended operating base." (p. 75-6)

## ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VIEW CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE ATTACK

In his letter of February 18, 1941, to Admiral Stark, concerning inadequacy of local defense, Admiral Kimmel stated: "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to insure that the attacking force will pay. We need antisubmarine forces—DDs and patrol planes. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive."

## 406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

### C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S DESIRE FOR INFORMATION AS TO DEVELOPMENTS

In a postscript to his letter of February 18th, Admiral Kimmel stated that he had been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considered it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature, and that he had also heard that Operations considered that responsibility for furnishing the same type of information was that of ONI. Admiral Kimmel said he did not know that he had missed anything but if there were any doubt as to whose responsibility it was to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, would Admiral Kimmel kindly fix that responsibility so that there would be no misunderstanding.

In his reply Admiral Stark stated that ONI was fully aware of its responsibility to keep Admiral Kimmel adequately informed concerning foreign national activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese Merchant Vessels was furnished by air mail weekly and if desired could be issued more frequently.

In a memorandum dated May 26, 1941, surveying conditions in the Pacific Fleet as to personnel, aviation, material, communications, operations, national policy, and information, Admiral Kimmel stated that it should be a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, should be immediately informed of all important developments as they occurred and by the quickest secure means available.

### D. INFORMATION SENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

On February 25, 1941 (Exhibit 31), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel forwarding a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the Southern route. Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum for the President, of February 5, 1941, consisting of an analysis of the situation in Indo-China, which had been prepared by Admiral Stark. This stated Admiral Stark's views that Japan had some fear that the British and the United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indo-China and Thailand; that the strength of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines, and so far as Admiral Stark could tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major move, and, that as Admiral Stark saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time, and at present she desired not to go to war with the United States at all.

**Admiral Newton discussed a trip which he had made around March 1941, under secret orders, with a force consisting of cruisers and destroyers. He never learned the purpose of this trip. (p. 315)**

Admiral Stark's observations on the international situation were also set forth in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Exhibit 73) to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, which incidentally also discussed the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. The basic idea of this plan, he stated, was that the United States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet, that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier, and that the U. S. Asiatic Fleet would be supported by offensive operation of the United States Pacific Fleet.

He then discussed the British proposals and the dangers facing Britain. He stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic; that for some time past, Japan had shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in the Far East; and, he advised the addressees to watch this situation keenly. Unquestionably, he said, the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. The question, he said, was when and not whether Japan would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in a war against Germany and Italy within about two months, but that there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he advised that as much time as available be devoted to training.

## IX. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VISIT IN JUNE AND ANNUAL REPORT

## A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VISIT

Admiral Kimmel visited Washington in June, 1941 and, according to Admiral Stark, they reviewed matters of policy (page 113). According to Admiral Turner, in the fall of 1941, Admiral Kimmel came to Washington and they discussed the proper methods of conducting the initial phases of war (page 1019).

Admiral Kimmel said that in June, 1941, he told Admiral Stark and the President of the dangers to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, i. e. air attack, blocking of harbor, etc. He told the President that the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port when an attack came; that it took two to four hours to sortie and that once an attack was started it would be completed before they could change the disposition of the Fleet (page 367). In general, he said, he felt that the Fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor; but he made no protest and made no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers.

On June 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote a memorandum for Admiral Stark (Exhibit 10) with copies to General Marshall, Admiral King and Admiral Towers, in which he stated:

"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

"(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

"(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

"The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

"There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands."

## B. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S ANNUAL REPORT—YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1941

This official report, dated August 15, 1941 (Exhibit 44), was in five parts (1) Organization, (2) Operations and Training, (3) Material, (4) Personnel, and (5) Inspections. The report stated, among other things, that the Fleet had been organized into three Task Forces; that the Fleet was adequate for only limited offensive operations; and, that there were many deficiencies of ships, planes, equipment and men. The deficiencies included "inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor . . ." and it was said, there were insufficient patrol craft, and district patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, were not yet available.

## X. RECONNAISSANCE TOWARD JALUIT

*Captain Layton testified that in the latter part of November, 1941, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. The reconnaissance never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived, and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance*

be made at the earliest possible date and Admiral Kimmel, upon receiving Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton advised the Admiral to the effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of installation of cameras and that the time was still not definitely fixed. There is in evidence a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance (Exhibit 28). Captain Layton stated that the question of using Navy planes for this reconnaissance was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalinas" could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air strength, carriers, submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk (p. 265-267).

Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands (p. 499).

Admiral Bloch stated that long range reconnaissance was instituted in the summer of 1941 when he received some Intelligence information, and thought that it would be advisable to make long distance reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit (page 1139). Admiral Bloch went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended that he put in this service. He thought it was to 500 miles out (page 1140).

Admiral Bloch said: "In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situation arose and I cannot recall how we received information of it, whether by letter to the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 to 20 degrees. We sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued." (p. 14)

Admiral Bloch said that somewhere about the summer of 1941, after the President by Executive Order designated Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston as defensive sea areas, Admiral Bloch gave the commanding officer instructions that planes which came in and were not identified as friendly were to be fired on. (p. 14)

## XI. THE FREEZING OF JAPANESE ASSETS—DETERIORATION OF SITUATION FLEET SECURITY ORDER

### A. THE FREEZING ORDER

On July 24, 1941 (Exhibit 71), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart and a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel which, among other things, referred to a two-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark stated that he thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid an open rupture; they had a very plain talk; that Admiral Stark liked him, and that he had many friends in the Navy; that he had dwelt at length on Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indo-China; that Admiral Stark's guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, Japan would for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that he doubted the Japanese would use their Indo-China bases from which to take action against the Burma Road; of course, there was the possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but Admiral Stark doubted this in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but conditions were not getting better.

Admiral Schuirmann did not recall the extent to which the office of the Chief of Naval Operations participated in the decisions to establish "oil embargoes" to prevent the export to Japan of various strategic commodities (p. 406). He did remember that there was a discussion of the question of Japanese reaction particularly to the oil embargo and that Admiral Stark expressed the view that a total embargo on oil would of necessity force the Japanese to move south or to collapse. (p. 407)



connection with Admiral Stark's conversations with Nomura, it may be that on July 25, 1941, Nomura reported (Document I, Exhibit 63) to Tokyo

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of Naval Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many favors by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with what he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here appeared to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

At this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same was true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, Admiral Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on active duty because of the critical times, he added.

Please relay this information to the Navy."

Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on July 26th (Exhibit 34), requesting information as to steps to be taken in the event of Russian participation in the war and making various requests for equipment.

According to Admiral Stark, the Navy Department knew of the proposal to use Japanese assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order.

Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any discussion prior to the freezing order, but was informed of it after the decision was made.

(p. 258)

Admiral Schuirmann believed that the Executive Order freezing Japanese credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department. He did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of the freezing order. Admiral Schuirmann said that his own state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo-China and perhaps Malaya and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in the hopes that the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective measures by the United States. (p. 408)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in July freezing Japanese credits. (p. 422)

He stated that he advised the State Department that if the United States embargoed oil shipments to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with the United States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless the country were prepared to accept the risk of war (pages 43-45).

Admiral Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously. He thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States (page 989).

Admiral Turner said that the Navy and War Departments both felt that the freezing of Japanese credits would almost surely result in war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. (p. 254)

As a result of the freezing order the Japanese, according to Admiral Schuirmann, conducted a bitter press campaign against the United States (page 198). And, Admiral Short testified, relations became strained and he noticed uneasiness in the Japanese population (page 247). Admiral Kimmel stated that this worsened these United States relations (page 296).

#### B. FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION

The correspondence between Admirals Stark and Kimmel indicated that the situation in the Far East continued to deteriorate, and that the conversations with Nomura were not improving the situation. Thus, in a letter dated July 31, 1941 (Exhibit 72), he discussed the over-all situation, and stated that "after the situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start negotiations immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint effort to restore order over the Dutch East Indies; that he thought it fairly safe to say that the general held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I.; but that he thought Japan would go into the Maritime Provinces in August, and that

Turner might be right and usually was; Admiral Stark's thought had been that while Japan could ultimately go into Siberia she would delay going until the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also said that we would aid to Russia and that he hoped that Russia and Germany would exhaust themselves; that a Europe dominated by Russia was no more, and in fact, less attractive picture than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. A postscript to this letter said, among other things, that "obviously, the situation in the Far East could deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual."

In a letter of August 28, 1941 (Exhibit 11), Admiral Stark, among other things, discussed the status of the Japanese situation and said that the Japanese had to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very important messages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do. Stark did not know; that he had told one of their statesmen that another such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained; that Admiral Stark had had extremely frank talks with them; that Admiral Stark had not given up on continuing peace in the Pacific, but he could wish the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter of September 1, 1941 (Exhibit 36), such as whether he should not change his orders and issue orders to shoot to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor in the vicinity. He said, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we not shoot at contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941 (Exhibit 12, 37), and among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the long range could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in Article 723 of the Navy Regulations, which Article was quoted in full. Article provides for the use of force in self-preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort.

The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that our orders, i. e. not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States waters, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."

Admiral Stark also stated that the British planned to send various battleships to the East Indian station by late December, and that these, with other ships, should make the task of the Japanese in moving forward considerably more difficult. "It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has no action by that time."

Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that a major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshall and Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively, though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly was concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

In this letter, Admiral Stark asked ". . . would it not be possible for us to 'carefully' get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

A postscript to this letter stated that Secretary Hull had informed Admiral Stark that the conversations with the Japanese had practically reached an end. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement in the Far East until there was some agreement between Japan and China. It seemed to be remote. Whether their inability to come to any sort of agreement standing at the time was or was not a good thing, he hesitated to say.

A second postscript to the letter referred to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that Admiral Nomura usually was very frank when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark stated that conversations without result could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which was likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark had again written to Hull and thought Hull would make one more try; Hull kept Admiral

fully informed, and if there was anything of moment, Stark would of course let Kimmel know.

This letter also enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines, which indicated, among other things, that on September 30th, twenty-six Flying Fortress would leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

#### C. INADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND EFFORTS TO RECTIFY

There was during this period further correspondence on the inadequacy of equipment in the Hawaiian area. Thus on July 26, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote Admiral Stark and stated that when the proposed visit of Mr. Forrestal had been announced, a list of topics for discussion had been prepared by Admiral Kimmel's staff. Admiral Kimmel said that not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit, or whether Mr. Forrestal was informed of the war plans and of Admiral Kimmel's problems, that he decided it was better to combine the notes in a letter for Admiral Stark. The principal items were then listed in the letter. These were the importance of keeping CincPac advised of the Department's policies and decisions, and changes to meet changes in the international situation; adjustments of priorities in connection with a Pacific war, such as the need for transports and for guns and ammunition for Marines, for new construction to complete munition facilities, for building up the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, for more personnel, for small craft for patrol in the Naval District, etc; the necessity of improvement as to communications, including identification, friend or foe, equipment for aircraft; and, various aviation requirements.

On August 22, 1941 (Exhibit 35), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (in reply to Exhibit 34) and discussed the efforts made in connection with the development of radar equipment, and the other requests made by Admiral Kimmel. Again in August (Exhibit 45), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac stating that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourth Naval District, and related his efforts to secure additional patrol vessels.

#### D. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER ON SECURITY OF THE FLEET

Admiral McMorris testified that no formal written estimate of the situation was obtained by him, but that a mental estimate was maintained (page 887).

His estimate of the situation on October 1st was that United States-Japanese relations were strained and that the Japanese might go to war with Britain and the United States, or possibly with Russia, in which case the United States might become involved (page 887); also, that war between the Japanese and Dutch possessions was possible without the United States being initially involved.

Specific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet concerning the security of the Fleet base and in operating areas, was issued on October 14, 1941 (Exhibit 8).

This was Admiral Kimmel's security order for the Fleet and the only general order for this purpose (page 278). This order, Admiral Kimmel testified, was primarily an estimate but was a basis for training in order to meet contingencies (page 283). The possibilities of attack set forth therein, he said, were not necessarily in order of importance as to probability of attack (page 287).

Admiral Bloch said that almost immediately after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, he issued a "Base Defense Order" known as "2CL." As Admiral Bloch understood it, the object of this was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Commander-in-Chief could augment the forces of the Army which really had the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor. This order was revised in October, 1941. (p. 3)

This order provided that the security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(1) that no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided elements of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor or from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking ships in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) that a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,\* (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

Admiral Smith said that the October 14th directive on Fleet security contemplated air attack on Pearl Harbor, but that in the minds of the people out there such an attack was not expected. Unfortunately, he said, he believed that the attitude of most of the officers there was that they did not believe that the Japanese had the "guts" to try such an attack, and if they had they would not get away with it. He said that the estimate of the situation contained in the Pacific Fleet Contributory War Plan issued around July 1, 1941, had contemplated Japanese attack upon the outlying islands and against Malay and the Philippines, but did not consider an air attack against Pearl Harbor itself. (p. 57)

Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force; an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force; air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in the preceding. There was also to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

Security provisions were also prescribed for:

C. Sortie and entry.

Concerning Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 2CL-41 dealing with the security of the Fleet, Admiral Anderson said that prior to December 7 on more than one occasion he had proposed changes to the effect that whenever ships entered or sortied, depth charges should be dropped by the destroyers. This would be for the purpose of training and also for the purpose of having any Japanese submarines in the area assume defensive rather than offensive attitudes. (p. 395)

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G) referred to the anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist; that any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; that air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor were prescribed;

Admiral Pye said that in regard to the Commander-in-Chief's instructions for the security of ships at port, the only thing that was questionable in his mind was the part about the sector fire control; he never felt that ships could or should be confined to one sector; he had written a modification of the order which he said was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsibility which he did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander. (p. 167)

that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CinCPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; that ComFOURTEEN as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft and arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Present (exclusive of CinCPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain,

Admiral Smith interprets the directive in 2CL-41 concerning the condition of readiness as granting authority to ComFOURTEEN to order conditions of readiness. (p. 55)

and by holding drills, etc.

\*This, Admiral Kimmel testified, contemplated a surprise air attack. However, it was merely an assumption on which to base training—there being sufficient probability of such an attack to justify training. He thought it more probable that the Japanese would attack while the Fleet was away from, rather than at, Pearl Harbor. But it was never considered more than a possibility which ordinary prudence would make him guard against (page 287).

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition II read as follows:

Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed in the event of an air attack was also set forth, under which the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie orders sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie, the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc., and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, should inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, should launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. This provided, among other things, that in such event the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details, various actions were to be taken by other ships, and the Patrol Wings to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, carry out searches directed by Task Force Commander, and prepare to establish station patrol at 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. This also provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack." It also stated that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

It may be noted that Admiral Kitts stated that he continued as Fleet Gunnery Officer until September, 1942, and that the plans made by Admiral Kimmel were not essentially changed after the attack. The plans were generally sound, he said, but after Pearl Harbor, the Fleet got guns and men to make the plans effective. Nets and balloons were subsequently installed, but the balloons were later removed, as they interfered with operations (page 527).

Admiral McMorris said that they were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore, and there were discussions and conferences to improve the same. On the whole, however, he felt that his view was that the security arrangements set forth in the Fleet Security letter was satisfactory or else he would have recommended a change. (p. 239)

Exhibit 58—Pacific Fleet Letter 23CL-42, prescribing battle organization and conditions of readiness watches at sea, as issued by Admiral Nimitz on May 6, 1942, it was said, amounts to a reissue of Admiral Kimmel's instructions (page 503). It may be noted that Condition III, as defined in this letter, provided that all anti-aircraft batteries were to be manned on BB's, CA's and CL's, and one-half on CV's. Also it may be noted that in this letter, Admiral Nimitz stated that he believed that with efficient radar and the security afforded by air and surface screening, Condition III would normally meet security requirements when not in contact with the enemy. These provisions differ somewhat from Admiral Kimmel's letter on the same subject, dated February 21, 1941, a copy of which is annexed to Exhibit 58.

## **XII. INTELLIGENCE IN WASHINGTON—THE INTERCEPTION AND DECODING OF SECRET JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS**

### **A. ONI DISTRIBUTION AND ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE IN GENERAL**

Captain McCollum, officer-in-charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., said that his duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence concerning the Far East, correlating it, and informing the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations. (p. 10) In case information of serious import

was received, it was his responsibility to immediately bring it to the attention of the Director of Naval Intelligence and recommend necessary action. Usual direct access was available to Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division and to the Chief of Naval Operations himself. (p. 20)

Speaking of the dissemination of information to the fleet commanders, Captain McCollum said that the Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for preparing from the information available to it factual statements, which did not make estimate of enemy intention. These statements were then submitted by the Intelligence Division to the Plans Division and to CNO, who made the decision to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet. (p. 20) He said prior to about February, 1941, the Division of Naval Intelligence had occasionally submitted estimates of probable enemy intentions, but that at about that date authority to do so was removed. Thereafter, ONI was restricted to presenting the facts of the situation, and higher echelons made and disseminated the estimates as to enemy intentions. (p. 41-42)

Captain McCollum made the following general statement as to the organization of the office of Naval Intelligence: (p. 40-41)

"The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center for the Navy as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence center for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department; equipped to supply combat type of intelligence, which prior to outbreak of war is nearly always closely related to diplomatic negotiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was equipped with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which served him directly. With the exception of more static types of intelligence, such as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on, your combat intelligence was designed to function in the Navy Department to advise the Chief of Naval Operations, at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through his fleet intelligence officer, . . . and in the Asiatic Fleet, which in such respects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organization. . . . keep the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, advised.

"The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to maintain [available] certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which would produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic Theatre those intelligence agencies operating out there were made known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and their reports in every case funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Our naval attaches, for instance, were under orders to submit copies of every report that they made both to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well as to the Department. So, you had in effect a three point system in which combat intelligence came to any one of them was common to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief supreme in his own area. And that is essentially the way it has functioned throughout the war."

Captain McCollum said that there was close cooperation between the Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division (Army). He stated (p. 20-21):

"The Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division had the information of the situation. We were in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships, and they had full access to all of the radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department. That was given by me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to day with officers of the Far Eastern Section of MIS in the War Department, and that had been true for some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as withdrawing naval language officers from Japan or sending a dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers . . . without notifying my opposite number in the War Department what we intended to do."

Captain McCollum said that so far as he knew all Army information was made available to his section in ONI. He said, however, that the Army radio intelligence organizations did not furnish information of value regarding the Jap Fleet, since "they didn't touch the Jap Navy systems." Any radio intelligence organizations were working on Jap diplomatic ciphers and on certain minor Japanese Army systems. (p. 22-23)

The cooperation between the Far Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence service was "unofficial," but had the sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. (p. 23)

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence on 7 December, 1941, and for about 2 months prior to that date, named the following sources, in general, the sources of information available to the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of ONI: Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Section, collateral items of interest produced by the investigations of the domestic branch of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio intelligence, State Department reports from diplomatic agents and reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches and radio intelligence (p. 390).

Admiral Wilkinson stated that it was his understanding, confirmed by Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Operations, that final evaluation of information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence was the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations. Dissemination of information outside of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet was, likewise, understood to be the responsibility of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations following their evaluation and selection of those items which they believed should be forwarded. (p. 392)

Admiral Wilkinson said that such analyses as were made in the office of Naval Intelligence were submitted to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations to use as they saw fit. (p. 392)

Questioned regarding the exchange of intelligence in Washington between the Army and the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson replied that ONI and G-2 were in constant communication with each other and that in fact General Miles, Head of Military Intelligence was dining with him on the night of 6 December. (p. 408-409) Admiral Wilkinson stated that through this steady and effective liaison, all the information the Navy had regarding movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished the Army. (p. 409)

The organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence had been revised on August 1941. It consisted of a Director, Assistant Director, Domestic Branch, Foreign Branch, Administrative Branch, and field offices (page 461). Captain [redacted] was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI from October 9, 1941 to June 1942 (page 461).

[redacted] stated that intelligence was distributed as follows: Urgent, by oral report; daily a Japanese summary to the Director of Naval Intelligence by the [redacted] of the Far East Section, which was relayed to CNO; a daily summary of Department dispatches; weekly reports of dispositions of foreign fleets; a daily bulletin for the Naval Aide to the President; fortnightly summaries of international situations and sometimes special summaries; and dispatches from foreign posts and naval attaches. Generally, the information was evaluated for credibility and to a less degree as to the conclusions to be drawn. War Plans made the final evaluation of enemy intentions. Copies of all reports and oral reports were directed to the Chief of Naval Operations. A daily report of political situation was made to CNO (page 462). Military information was promptly [redacted] to CNO (page 463). (1)

Admiral Ingersoll recalled receiving frequent visits from a Naval Communications Officer who had Japanese messages, but whether he saw all of the messages or not he did not know. (p. 417-8)

As to the exchange of information as to United States-Japanese relations, there was close cooperation between the State Department and the Navy, according to Maxwell M. Hamilton, who during the latter part of 1941 was Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs in State Department. He stated that he had frequent contact with Admiral Schuirmann (page 1070) which involved questions which came up for decision involving foreign policy and naval policy (page 1071). The methods of furnishing information to the Navy on matters of United States-Japanese relations were: (1) the liaison office forwarded copies of paraphrases of telegrams or mail reports of interest to the Navy; (2) the Division of Far Eastern Affairs transmitted paraphrases of telegrams and mail reports from the Far East of interest to the Navy Department; (3) Conferences between Navy and State Department officials and meetings of the war council and Cabinet (page 1071). In general, he said, diplomatic information was transmitted to the Navy (page 1073).

One of the sources of Japanese military and naval information was Captain [redacted]-Hutton, who in 1941 was naval attache in Tokyo and who, as part of his

duties, was part of ONI. Ambassador Grew, he said, expected him to keep advised as to the Japanese Navy and they exchanged information (page 1079).

He had great difficulty in obtaining Japanese military and naval information (page 1077). He had informed the Navy Department by implication in a report that they could not depend on him to keep them informed concerning the Japanese Navy. He had to report to the Japanese Navy whenever he left Tokyo and his movements were restricted (page 1080).

He transmitted information by Japanese cable to the 4th Marine Radio in Shanghai and thence to the United States; and also by reports to Ambassador Grew and to the Navy Department by diplomatic pouch (page 1078).

By far the most important source of information in Washington as to the Japanese, however, was communications intelligence, which is discussed in the following paragraph.

#### B. THE INTERCEPTION AND DECODING OF SECRET JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS

Captain Safford made the following statements regarding the methods of obtaining and decoding Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches during 1941. (p. 103-104):

"They were initially obtained from intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and foreign points; mostly radio intercepts and occasionally land wire or cable. Some were photographs of station copies as they passed through the various commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-five per cent were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed Japanese systems. The principal was the 'purple,' which is a complicated electrical machine solved by the Army and machines made both by the Army and the Navy and two machines, in fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig-19 at this period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep abreast of the Jig-19 than it did the 'purple' once we had the machine reconstructed. In all these systems, 'purple,' 'Jig-19,' and the minor systems, we had an exchange between Washington, Singapore, Corregidor, and London. We pooled our efforts on that.

Captain Safford said that after Japanese messages were decoded they were evaluated and distributed as follows (p. 104-106):

"They were translated in the translation sections of the Navy Department unit and the War Department unit and the senior translator decided which were of relative unimportance, not worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with financial matters and visas and things like that; and the others were all typed smooth and turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, respectively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared briefs or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the messages and they were distributed to the higher officials in the War and Navy Departments and to the Secretary of State and to the President.

"In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usually saw them; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the War Plans Division. The Secretary of the Navy also saw them and usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide to the President saw them and took them in to the President.

"In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief Signal Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of Staff, War Department, and also to the Secretary of War.

"Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request of the President and after conference agreement between Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs was dropped and the original messages were prepared in folders and each day the folder was taken through. By agreement, all dissemination to the White House was handled through the Navy Department, and in return all dissemination to the State Department was handled through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything the Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy; and they put on a serial number. Ours were JD-1 and the Army's were SI-X, with a serial; so they were substantially duplicates unless something went wrong.



*"In addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to references, and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything that was referenced to anything bearing on this subject was put on the off side of the page, so that you had the message on one side and the references on the other side, the left hand side, of the folder. Then, anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And Kramer went with them and stood in the doorway or outside and if there was any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody who was interested in the subject. Kramer also went to the White House, I believe twice. Normally he would explain things to the Naval Aide to the President and the aide would depend on his memory to answer any questions the President might want to ask. The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning."*

*Admiral Wilkinson stated that with regard to the exchange of radio intelligence with the Army, that complete liaison existed between the decrypting agencies and complete exchange of actual texts immediately after their translation (p. 408).*

*vitality important Japanese code had been broken. This source of intelligence handled jointly by Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Near Admiral Leigh Noyes, who was Director of Naval Communications, said Communications handled the interception and crypto-analysis of Japanese messages and the information derived was turned over to ONI. This was a special procedure followed because this information was most secret, and would be useless if any inkling reached the enemy that we could read his communications (page 1026).*

*According to Admirals Redman and Ingersoll, it was the function of the Office of Naval Intelligence to evaluate and to distribute this information (pages 1102,*

*Admiral Ingersoll stated that there was no set routine for the distribution of this information. It was distributed by Commander Kramer when there was anything important involved. The Director of War Plans kept a current estimate of the military-political situation and conferred frequently with the Chief of Naval Operations (page 819). He said that Commander Kramer almost daily brought him a number of intercepts to him (page 824). These were given to Admiral K's Aide and were also shown to the Secretary of the Navy and possibly to the Assistant SecNav, the President, the Secretary of State, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and to Captain Schuirmann.*

*Commander A. D. Kramer testified that between October 1 and December 7, 1941, he was attached to ONI and loaned to Op-20-G, Naval Communications. He was head of a translation section of communication security. This consisted of translating decrypted intercepts and delivering them to ONI or to any persons authorized by DONI or CNO. Fourteen copies were made and seven went to the Navy. The other seven copies were for delivery to officers in the Navy Department and also to the White House or State Department. He had the responsibility of delivery to the White House and Army for delivery to the State Department. Addressees in the Navy Department who normally got copies were the Aide to the SecNav, CNO, DONI, Head of Far East Section of ONI, Director Naval Communications, and Head of War Plans Division (page 950). The seventh copy was a summary copy. A complete copy went to each addressee, delivery being made daily or more often if urgent. Earlier in 1941 he had attached a summary with asterisks to indicate important documents as the daily volume was so heavy (sometimes 130 pages a day) that the addressees would not have time to read all the messages. He marked and delivered the messages and it was up to the addressees to decide what they would read. All decrypted Japanese traffic was passed to him for distribution. He knows the Japanese language (page 951).*

*The decision as to whether translated messages should be passed to higher authority was made by ONI and he acted for DONI. As a rule an attempt was made to show the messages to McCollum and DONI before distributing them. Nothing was eliminated from the books of messages, but occasionally DONI would indicate something as being of greater or lesser interest to CNO or SecNav (page 954). During the latter part of the year he discontinued making summaries (page 954). As Japanese-United States relations were then strained, he used asterisks to indicate the important matter so as to get the information to those con-*

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cerned as swiftly as possible. He left the folder of messages for CNO with CNO aide customarily. On "hot" messages, he often gave it to CNO personnel (page 955).

### C. FAILURE TO SEND THIS SECRET INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL

The information obtained from the interception and decoding of secret Japanese communications was not sent, as such, to Admiral Kimmel. It will be recalled that he had earlier requested that he be kept promptly advised of developments and that the responsibility for furnishing secret information to him be fixed by Admiral Stark; and, that he had been advised that ONI was aware of its responsibility in this connection.

Information of the greatest importance, as will later appear, was obtained from secret Japanese communications, particularly after the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and the arrival of the special Japanese emissary, Kurusu.

In his testimony, Admiral Kimmel asserted that he had not been adequately informed of this information; Admiral Stark asserted that Admiral Kimmel had been kept adequately informed by the various dispatches sent to him.

Admiral Redman said that although none of the intercepted messages were sent to Admiral Kimmel, as intercepted and decoded, they were used as the basis of the dispatches sent to him. He said that it was beyond the capabilities of his organization to encode and transmit all this traffic to CincPac. The information could not be sent by air mail. Its security was important as the source of intelligence would be jeopardized if the enemy knew of our success in intercepting it. The secrecy of this material has been vital to war effort since December 7, 1941 (page 1102). His section could have handled sending briefs of these messages to CincPac (page 1105). Admiral Noyes said that it would have been a physical impossibility to keep CincPac informed of the contents of all "purple" messages (page 1045) and, according to Admiral Ingersoll, it would have been too much of a burden on naval communications to repeat all the intercepts to CincPac, although selections therefrom might have been sent (page 839).

Admiral Turner said that Admiral Kimmel was kept adequately informed and that the information not sent to him would have been of no help to him (page 1014). Moreover, he had thought that CincPac had the same intelligence that CNO did, including the "super-secret" class of information (page 1018).

It may be noted that General Marshall said that he did not see all of the intercepts, nor was the decision as what should be passed on to the field commanders always instituted by him (pages 874-7).

## XIII. RESIGNATION OF JAPANESE CABINET—ARRIVAL OF KURUSU—THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

### A. THE DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16, 1941

Following the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Turner drafted a dispatch to CincPac and others, which the Joint Board approved (page 989).

Admiral Turner said that he prepared the dispatch of October 16 which had been discussed with the Army and modified by the Joint Board. (p. 263)

Admiral Ingersoll said that the dispatch of October 16 concerning the change in the Japanese cabinet was based on an estimate by Admiral Stark and Captain Turner and he had no recollection of any correspondence from the State Department which would have formed the basis for that dispatch (p. 423).

Admiral Turner said that at this time he was convinced that if the Japanese attacked England in the Far East, the United States would go to war to aid England, and that the Japanese had decided to drive Britain out of the Far East. Some Japanese, he said, wanted to keep the United States out of the war, but the United States during 1940 and 1941 had made movements contrary to Japan's interest, and the whole political situation and Japanese interest in the Philippines convinced him that war was not far off. He considered that Japan would take the initiative (page 990).

He estimated where such an attack might be made, and had issued Rainbow War Plan No. 3 in January, which envisaged an attack by Japan against the Philippines, Borneo, and Malaya, and called attention to the fact that the Secretary of the Navy had written to the Secretary of War in January, 1941, stating that such an attack would be accompanied by an attack on Hawaii and on the Fleet by air, submarine or surface vessels (page 990).

On October 16th, when the dispatch was sent, he still considered that the considerations set forth in the Secretary of the Navy's January letter could be in effect. These matters, he said, were constantly discussed with Admiral Stark and Ingersoll (page 991).

The dispatch of October 16, 1941 (Exhibit 13), stated that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation; if a new cabinet were formed, it would probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American; if the Konoye cabinet remained, it would operate under a new mandate which would not include rapprochement with the United States; in either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia were a strong possibility; since the United States and Britain were held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there was a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities, the addressees were directed to take due precautions, including such "preparatory deployments" as would not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. CincPac and CincAF were directed to inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities.

Exhibit 6 is the October 16, 1941 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30) Admiral Leary said that he thought there was complete and free interchange of information among the higher naval command. He, however, did not recall having seen or having heard discussed the October 16 dispatch or the war warning. (p. 364-5)

Concerning the change in the Japanese Cabinet in October, 1941, Admiral Schuirmann said that the State Department had not taken as serious a view of this Cabinet shift as had the Navy Department. (p. 408)

General Short stated that he had been advised of this dispatch through Admiral Leary (page 247). Apparently the Navy Department did not advise the State Department of the dispatch (Schuirmann, page 200).

According to Admiral Turner, the "preparatory deployments" contemplated in the dispatch were the sending of submarines to the Marshalls and sending them to sea westward of Hawaii and in supporting and covering positions for Wake, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands (page 991).

Admiral Smith said concerning the directive to take "preparatory deployment" that an alert was sent to the forces in the operating areas, the training exercises were halted, the ships assembled with their destroyer screens and placed until further orders as a fleet and kept at sea, and directed to advise of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area; the ships in port, however, were not moved out although conditions of readiness were prescribed; this was not done for the protection of the base. (p. 49-50)

Admiral Halsey said that the "preparatory deployments" effected after the October 16 dispatch included readiness of the ships to take action and the dispatch of submarines to Midway and Wake, and also sending additional guns and ammunition there. (p. 296)

Concerning "preparatory deployments" directed in the October 16 dispatch, Admiral Ingersoll said:

"I think the preparatory deployments that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intention against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the southern Philippines, rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here, in connection with this dispatch and others which followed, that they were released by me. In all cases, such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases, I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not bother him further, I released the dispatch in the form which he had approved." (p. 423)

Admiral Ingersoll said further he did not recall that they expected the Pacific Fleet, as distinguished from the Asiatic Fleet, to make any important new dispositions. (p. 423)

The direction not to take provocative action against Japan was inserted by him. The State and Navy Departments were agreed that the United States should get as much time as possible to prepare, and there were conversations with

the Japanese which appeared on the surface to be a possible solution so that there would be no war, and this government did not desire war with the Japanese at that time. Therefore, they did not want the Fleet to assume a threatening position by cruising near the Marshalls or sending submarines near the Japanese islands. Nor did they want to arrest disloyal people in Hawaii. They wanted to retain peace as long as possible and to make sure that when war came, it would be Japan and not the United States which started it (page 992). The question of shifting the Fleet back to the West Coast had been continuously discussed, said. This was put up to the President and each time it was decided to keep the Fleet out there, except that about one-third or one-quarter of the Fleet would come to the West Coast for repairs and recreation. But, by October 16th, everyone believed that the Fleet should stay at Pearl Harbor (page 992).

It is of interest to note that at about this time Admiral Turner had a conference with Nomura, at which, according to Nomura, Admiral Turner said to him that what the United States wanted was not just a pretense, but a definite promise that should a conference be held between the leaders of the two governments without a definite preliminary agreement, and should an advance be made in Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament; that Japan spoke of peace in the Pacific as if she could decide matters independently, and so it would seem to Admiral Turner that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance (Doc. 2—Exhibit 63).

#### B. ADMIRAL STARK'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 17, 1941

On October 17, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (exhibit 38). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been popping here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility,' in fact, it tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."

Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would make a move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

Also annexed was a memorandum of October 17, 1941, by Rear Admiral Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make that decision on the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet in power.

#### C. JAPANESE MESSAGES CONCERNING GERMAN ATTITUDE: NOMURA'S DESIRE TO RESIGN

On October 18, 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated October 1, 1941, which stated that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's position, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United States although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63).

A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated October 16, 1941, was intercepted and translated on October 17, 1941. In this Toyoda advised Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for revision

the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy and the United States, which, under the three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63).

On October 22, 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted and translated on October 23, 1941, in which he said that he was sure that he, too, could go out with the former cabinet; that he knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in Japan; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his conferees in the United States there were some who felt the same way, that they were all or deluded souls; that the instructions could be carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse; that he did not want to continue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people"; that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63).

On October 23, 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations had a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government would proceed; that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter; that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post (Document 6, Exhibit 63).

#### D. ADMIRAL BLOCH'S LETTER ON INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE

On October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter dealing with the local defense forces and their inadequacy (Exhibit 46). In this letter, Admiral Bloch stated that he recently had tried to obtain, without much success, the assignment from the Commander-in-Chief of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol; the only planes available for the purpose were Army planes, the types and numbers of which were inadequate for the purpose. Admiral Kimmel's endorsement pointed out that any assumption that forces could be diverted from the Fleet for this purpose were false; that a Fleet tied to its base by diversion of light forces necessary for its security at sea is no Fleet at all, and that the Fleet was assigned, in the event of war, certain tasks which would require all of its units and men.

#### E. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S ESTIMATE AND ACTION

Admiral Kimmel stated that after receiving the October 16th dispatch, he did not consider war imminent. He tried to find out, he said, what the United States would do if Japan attacked the maritime provinces, but received no answer; he learned, after December 7th, that the United States had made a commitment to England to the effect that, even if not attacked, she would aid England in the Far East (page 297).

Admiral Turner said, "That detachment went to Australia for the purpose of indicating to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief informed, to the best of his ability, as to the international political situation and the probabilities of the future. While the Government could not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked Great Britain, they fully believed that we would do so. In our conversations with the British, we never could make a firm commitment that at any particular time the United States would enter the war, for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive Department did not have the power to put the Country into war. Conversations were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the British authorities, and joint plans, not too definite in nature, were drawn up but we never could be sure that if the Netherlands East Indies or the British were attacked the United States would surely come into the war. (p. 254)

He took the action described in his letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14), which was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (page 297). In his letter, Admiral Kimmel advised that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

It may be noted that in connection with his need for cruisers, Admiral Kimmel stated in this letter that, "I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks." The letter also stated, among other things, that Admiral Kimmel was forwarding an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra.

Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel's action, as set forth in his letter, was considered satisfactory.

Admiral Kimmel's War Plans Officer, Admiral McMorris, testified that the October 16th dispatch had indicated to him that there was a greater chance that the United States would be involved in war with Japan (page 887). Admiral Pye stated that he had not seen the October 16th dispatch, nor did he have any knowledge of it. He was on the Pacific Coast and about that time received a dispatch from CincPac to be prepared to return to Oahu, whereupon he recalled his officers and men and put his force on twelve hours sailing notice (page 423).

Admiral Bloch recalled that after the dispatch advising of the change in the Japanese Cabinet there was a conference with Admiral Kimmel, whom he saw practically every day. He does not recall who else was present. (p. 14)

Concerning the October 16, 1941 dispatch, Admiral Smith said that to the best of his recollection no specific change of plans was made because they had received warnings constantly for a period of more than a year; he did not recall that anything was done particularly about that dispatch; he believed that everyone of the dispatches of that nature were discussed by General Short, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and usually with members of the staff. (p. 48)

#### F. THE FIRST JAPANESE "DEADLINE" MESSAGE

It will be recalled that throughout this period the Navy Department was receiving information from intercepted Japanese communications. Some of these indicated that the Japanese Government had established "deadlines" for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. The first was a Navy translation on November 5, 1941 (Exhibit 63, Document 7), of an intercepted Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 5, 1941, the substance of which was: This message is of "utmost secrecy." It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. . . . I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. . . .

#### G. ADMIRAL STARK'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 7, 1941

On November 7, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 74). He stated, among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question is—what next?" Also, "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what have written you before; it continually gets 'worse and worse'! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good."

Admiral Kitts said that he was in Washington on temporary duty between October 6 and November 8, and that when he returned to Hawaii he carried a message from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel to be delivered orally that Admiral Stark outlined the courses of action which the Japanese might follow, and that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no way indicated by the message which he carried. (p. 187)

H. JAPANESE INTEREST IN SHIPS AT THE PHILIPPINES AND SEATTLE

During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68). According to one of these messages, which dated November 5, 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of progress made on all equipment and establishments.

I. ARRIVAL OF KURUSU; STARK AND MARSHALL RECOMMENDATION AS TO ULTIMATUM

The special Japanese emissary Kurusu arrived in Washington at this time.

Admiral Smith said that when Kurusu was en route to the United States, his plane broke down at Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and Admiral Smith told him not to do this for it might be that the plane had been told by the administration to break down; that they knew more about what was going on than Admirals Bellinger and Smith knew and that Kurusu should be permitted to stay there.

Captain Wellborn discussed the general reaction to Kurusu's visit. (p. 386).

The situation then existing was summarized by Nomura, in a report to Tokyo, dated November 10, 1941, intercepted on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit 39) by reference to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation with "a certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Kurusu's visit to the President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they waited for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretary of State believed "those reports." Nomura also said that his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan invaded, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the United States. Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and American positions. Admiral Stark also advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated November 14, 1941 (Exhibit 39).

Concerning the withdrawal of Marines and gunboats from the Chinese territory and waters, Admiral Schuirmann said: "I remember this proposal but the United States and British armed forces from China were withdrawn principally because they were in jeopardy and not because of a desire to withdraw our forces as an example to the Japanese. Naturally, the suggestion to the Japanese that they undertake to withdraw all their military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China was probably based on a desire to capitalize on this action in diplomatic course. The question of withdrawal of our gunboats and Marines from China had been under discussion for some time during 1940. Various recommendations were received from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the question was taken up with the State Department at various times during the year 1941. The difficulty in reaching a decision was because of a number of factors, such as the effect on the Chinese of our withdrawal, i. e., would it appear to them that we were abandoning China to its fate; the question of the effect on the Japanese, principally whether the Japanese would regard it as withdrawing from China in fear of the Japanese or whether they would regard it as a step preparatory to clearing the decks for action. As the situation became more tense and upon receipt of Admiral Hart's letter of August 28, 1941, which was transmitted to the State Department on October 3, 1941, the question was discussed many times with the State Department. Failing to reach an agreement with the State Department, I prepared a memoran-

dum, dated November 4, 1941, which Secretary Knox approved, suggested a plan for withdrawing from Shanghai, and on 8 November, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a confidential message to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, stating that the President had approved the withdrawal of Marines from China except those required for communication and custodial duties and subject to State and Navy making a plan for orderly that civilians, nationals, and others might have prior notice. November 14, the President announced the decision to withdraw the Marines from Shanghai, and the withdrawal would begin shortly." (p. 409-410)

Admiral Schuirmann said that the delay in taking the foregoing action was due to a lack of agreement as to the effect on the Japanese and the Chinese and a certain lack of agreement as to the urgency of withdrawing the Marines. The State Department was of the view that sufficient time should be allowed to withdraw civilians in China before completely evacuating the Marines. The State Department generally was in opposition to the removal at least to the extent that the Navy was unable to get a definite answer as to whether or not prior to November 4 the State Department would agree. (p. 410)

With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated November 5, 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, to the President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the middle of December 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.

According to General Marshall, during 1941 he felt that war with Japan was imminent and both he and Admiral Stark exerted their efforts to delay a break with Japan as long as possible in order to be better prepared (page 860).

#### J. FURTHER AND FINAL JAPANESE "DEADLINE MESSAGES"

At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows:

(a) A translation on November 17, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which were:  
 . . . The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, please fight harder than you ever did before.

What you say is of course so . . . but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States) . . . try to realize what that means. In your opinion ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient . . . the situation renders this out of the question. "I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to side-track us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them to a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about immediate solution."

(b) On November 22, 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63), a translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:  
 "To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we want to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signature can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great



ain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors.

General Marshall had no definite recollection but thought that he had been informed of the various intercepts concerning the course of diplomatic conversation prior to December 6, 1941, such as the preceding "deadline" message (page 871).

Admiral Turner was familiar with the second message establishing November as the final "deadline" date. He interpreted this as meaning that Japan was going to attack England, the United States, or both, and that forces were already under way which could not be recalled. He knew such movements were in progress from sightings and dispatches from China and he thought that troops were moving south and into Indo-China (page 904).

#### K. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

Mr. Grew said that on or about November 17, 1941, he telegraphed the State Department and emphasized the need to guard against sudden Japanese action, civil or military, in areas not involved in the Chinese theatre. He was taking into account the probability that the Japanese would exploit the advantage of surprise (page 1063). He had no idea of the definite date Japan would attack, although he knew they had been preparing for any eventuality (page 1065).

Admiral Stark testified that he had received intelligence early in November that the Japanese situation was so bad that the Japanese government had concluded that a war or a diplomatic victory was necessary to distract popular attention, and a deadline had been fixed and then changed (page 159). He probably saw the "deadline message."

On November 24, 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which Admiral Stark said, was included in part on the "deadline" intercept—page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their civil and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility x Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam to be informed separately"

Exhibit 7 is the November 24 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30)

Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 24th did not indicate to him any new information. (p. 244)

Admiral Stark testified that he personally was responsible for the statement "... a surprise aggressive movement in any direction ..." was a possibility. He stated that he had thought at the time that it might be on Hawaii and had said so when he wrote these words in (page 49-50). The Philippines and Guam were mentioned specifically, he said, because Japanese movements indicated an attack to the south; this dispatch was intended to give a condensed picture of the situation and left up to Admiral Kimmel the question of any additional measures to be taken. No specific instructions were sent; they did not wish to "call-out" at the time (pages 50-53). Admiral Stark said that he always considered Japanese hostile action without declaration of war possible, and that Hawaii was a possible place of attack, but that the information which he had did not indicate that it was a probable place of attack (page 792).

Admiral Turner said that the dispatch of November 24th was discussed in the Joint Board and that at this time Admiral Stark and General Marshall were meeting daily. Admiral Turner prepared this dispatch and it was referred to General Marshall. It was changed in order to keep it from being too specific. The Navy Department and War Department were not specific as they did not want to alarm Admiral Kimmel not to be on guard as to other matters under his cognizance. At this time, Admiral Turner was convinced that the Japanese were moving into Siam, Malaya, and attack the Philippines (page 996). He pointed out that late in October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations was convinced that

war was coming and had diverted merchant shipping from the Central Pacific to the south so that the ships would not be captured (page 1013).

Admiral Kimmel testified (page 298) that he felt that the dispatch of November 24th required no action other than the action which he had already taken; that he considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility; that he expected a submarine attack at Pearl Harbor if the Philippines were attacked; that he considered the words "in any direction," as used in the November 24th dispatch included Pearl Harbor only as regards submarine attack, and that any other attack, other than on the Philippines or Guam, would be on foreign territory (page 299).

Admiral Smith stated that the words of this dispatch "in any direction including Philippines or Guam" implied that the Japanese were not going any farther eastward (page 534).

On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 47), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of October 17, 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A Marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do."

On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 16), Admiral Stark also wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general policy after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. . . . I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be anything."

#### XIV. DISPATCHES CONCERNING REINFORCEMENT OF WAKE AND MIDWAY

On November 26, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40) was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable; also, that the Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii, garrison troops for advance bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to provide any anti-aircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take this into consideration and advise when practicable the number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Also on November 26, 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OPNAV had requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later

of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army understood that these forces be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy planes at outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

#### INTERCEPTED JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS OF NOVEMBER 26TH AND 27TH

November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows: A Navy translation on November 27, 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:

"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while."

A Navy translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following: the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI",
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA",
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI."

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Message to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."

An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68) of a message to Manila, dated November 20, 1941, in the "Purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of ship—presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay. (Near Manila,

furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to the Asama Maru."

An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63) of a message to Washington, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code, which stated:

"This message is to be handled in Government Code. The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too

Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Consulate on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will use the following code: (Codes were then set forth.)"

#### XVI. THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOTE OF NOVEMBER 26TH

Stanley K. Hornbeck, of the State Department, testified that by the end of October it was evident that Japan and the United States could not agree. In November, the Secretary of State came to the conclusion that the question could not be solved by diplomacy (page 764). On November 20th, the Japanese rejected the things they wanted, which it was impossible to agree to. On November 26th, the Secretary of State gave Nomura and Kurusu a note setting out the United States position. The following day the Secretary of State again stated that he could not settle this by diplomacy, but that he still hoped that the Japanese might come forward with some reply. Between November 26th and November 7th, the President sent a note to the Emperor of Japan (page 764). It was evident that no agreement could be reached, this did not necessarily mean that Japan and the United States could not get along without an agreement (page 765).

Stanley K. Hornbeck had no recollection of discussing the note of November 26th with Admiral Stark or the Secretary of the Navy (page 765). He did not consider the note as an ultimatum to Japan (page 766). The text of the note of November 26th was not released until after December 7th. The Secretary of State had a conference at which he announced that a note had been sent and the press released a variety of possibilities (page 772).

Mr. Hamilton, also of the State Department, said that on November 24 there was a conference which the Secretary of State, Admiral Stark, General Gerow, and Mr. Hornbeck, Ballantine and he were present, and at which the general military and diplomatic situation in the Pacific was discussed (page 1074). There were later meetings at which he was not present, including one of the Council on November 25th and also on November 28th (page 1074). Mr. Hamilton could not be sure whether the note of November 26th or the substance thereof was given to the Navy Department (page 1073).

Admiral Turner remembered the Japanese dispatch concerning the note to Japan of November 26th and he saw it on November 28th. He believed Admiral Schuirmann had brought it over from Secretary Hull to show it to Admiral Stark, and that Admiral Stark had stated that there was no possibility of Japan accepting this note (page 995).

Admiral Stark stated that he did not recall the November 26th note to Japan (page 108) but that on November 27th, Secretary of State Hull advised him that negotiations were terminated (page 109). Admiral Stark testified that when first asked about this note he had not remembered it, but reading it his recollection was refreshed, and that Admiral Schuirmann may have discussed this note with him at the time (page 809).

Admiral Schuirmann stated that to the best of his recollection he did not deliver a copy of the November 26th note to the Navy Department, nor did he specifically inform Admiral Stark of this note (page 217). He characterized the note as an "ultimatum" in the sense that no one expected the Japanese to accept its terms (page 716).

Admiral Turner said that negotiations with Japan had been conducted so as to delay war as long as possible in order to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for war (page 1013). He knew that the Army and Navy had recommended that no ultimatum be given to Japan (Exhibit 39A). He did not consider that the note of November 26th was an ultimatum, although he did expect Japan to accept its terms (page 1015). He did not know whether Admiral Stark saw a draft of the November 26th note before it was sent, but Admiral Turner did see it. He said that no note given by one government to another is ever entirely acceptable (page 1016). He did not regard the note as important (page 1023), nor think it hastened the time of war because Japan was then already on the move (page 1024).

General Short testified that prior to December 7th, he had no knowledge of the State Department note of November 26th (page 263).

The court took judicial notice of the note of November 26th (page 147). The Japanese summary of the diplomatic situation and of the American proposal and the reaction of the Japanese to that proposal, were contained in communications intercepted, decoded and translated on November 28th. These were:

(1) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63) of a message from Washington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," Message #1180, reading:

"From NOMURA and KURUSU.

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our face and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for the sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.

in, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled. In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back intently."

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was familiar with this message, but had delivered it to Admiral Stark (page 696).

An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63) of a message from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated November 28, 1941, in the "Purple" code and headed "Extremely urgent", which stated:

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been considering the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment concerning the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

1. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'
2. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
3. (2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.
4. (3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.
5. (4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no one in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
6. (5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
7. (6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
8. (7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
9. (8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
10. (9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties shall not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Monroe Power Pact.)"

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We went back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to help CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Chiang that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having seen this message, but that it may have been discussed (pages 776-777). Admiral Schuirman said he was familiar with it, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark, although he had told Admiral Stark that such a note had been sent (page 697).

An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63) of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 28, 1941, in the "Purple" code, reading: "To your #1189.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just as and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say

that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." (NOTE.—The man is the Navy Minister.)

Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen this message (pages 775-6). Admiral Schuirmann was familiar with this, but did not deliver it to Admiral Stark (page 698). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 826).

Captain Layton said that neither he nor Admiral Kimmel had been advised of the note of November 26th. He thought that Admiral Kimmel could have been better informed, and that if he had had a full picture he would have had a clearer conception of Japanese-United States affairs (page 914).

Admiral Kimmel stated that he was not advised of the contents of the United States' note of November 26th, which was given to the Japanese, until after his return to the United States (page 301). And, he and Admiral Smith stressed the press and radio indicated that negotiations between the Japanese and the United States continued after November 27th. But, Admiral McMorris, his War Plans Officer, said that the press may have indicated that Japanese-United States negotiations were continuing after November 27th; he did not recall (page 893).

Admiral Stark testified that he had no recollection of press and radio statements between November 27th and December 7th which indicated that negotiations with the Japanese were resumed. He pointed out that, according to "War and Peace" on November 25th and November 28th, Secretary of State Hull had said that there was practically no possibility of an agreement, that the Japanese might break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force, that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy, and that the plans for military defense should include the assumption that the Japanese might use the element of surprise and attack at various points (page 149). There was, Admiral Stark said, a further conversation with the Japanese on December 1st (page 149).

Dr. Hornbeck stated that between November 26th and December 7th, there were some further conversations with the Japanese representatives (page 767).

Mr. Hamilton stated that there were some meetings with the Japanese Ambassadors between November 26th and December 7th. He, however, considered that negotiations with the Japanese ceased on November 26th. There was a bare possibility that diplomatic conversations might continue, but they had virtually reached a conclusion, and the matter, therefore, was one for the armed services. He considered that there was no chance of getting a favorable reply from the Japanese (page 1074).

Ambassador Grew, on the other hand, did not think that negotiations with Japan had definitely ceased until Tojo saw him on December 7, 1941, after the attack (page 1046).

## XVII. THE WAR WARNING OF NOVEMBER 27TH

### A. THE WARNING

Captain Layton testified that he learned of the receipt by CinCPac, of the war warning message of 27 November 1941, in the mid-afternoon of that day on being shown a tape copy in the communications office. He stated that subsequently, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a paraphrase copy of the dispatch which was shown to and approved by Admiral Kimmel, therefore thereafter, he (Layton) gave to Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, for delivery to General Short; that subsequently he checked with Lieutenant Commander Burr and ascertained that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short (Page 189-190).

Captain Layton also testified that at the time he showed Admiral Kimmel his paraphrase copy of the war warning message a large conference in the Admiral's office had just been terminated, and that, while Admiral Kimmel was examining the paraphrase, Captain Earle, Chief of Staff to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, entered Admiral Kimmel's office stating he had a very urgent message which General Short had delivered to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and which was further to be delivered to the Commander-in-Chief. Captain Layton stated that Captain Earle delivered the message to which he referred to Admiral Kimmel, and that both of them remarked to the effect that it was the same dispatch in substance that they had just received. (Page 189)

on November 27th, after delivery of the State Department note of the 26th, before receipt of the intercepted communications showing the reaction of the Japanese Government, the "war warning" was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac and CincAF. It read:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan ending toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform district and Navy authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department x Spenavorm British x Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"

Exhibit 8 is the November 27 dispatch by CNO to CincPac and CincAF. (p. 30)

#### B. PREPARATION OF THE WARNING

Admiral Turner said that he prepared the "war warning" after talking to Admiral Stark and that it meant just what it said. Admiral Ingersoll assisted in the timing of this message (page 839). Admiral Stark testified that the working of the "war warning" dispatch had been carefully considered by him and by his officers, and also by the Secretary of the Navy (page 54).

Concerning "M" Day, Captain Glover said, "M" Day is commonly understood as the day of execution of a war plan. In the case of WPL-46, "M" Day, unless otherwise designated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch worded as follows: "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon receipt of this Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the execution of WPL-46, including acts of war. WPL-46 stated that all parts of the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating the enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken. (p. 177) Captain Glover said that possibly declaring "M" Day west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier would have been more effective in alerting our forces than the method actually used by the Navy Department. He said, however, that the plan did not lend itself very easily to being put into effect as a means of warning only but was based on war activities. (p. 177)

Captain Glover said that Rainbow 5 contemplated the commencement of hostilities after a declaration of war. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, he said, might have become effective on "M" Day or certain features of it might have been placed in effect before "M" Day and that plan stated that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war. This plan, therefore, could have been made effective on about November 27 if desirable. (p. 178) Admiral Turner thought that the war warning was the proper way to advise the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet of the situation and that the war plans could not be partially executed because it would have been an involved situation and not as clear as the warning given. Moreover, it would not have been practicable to have declared a mobilization, in certain areas prior to the existence of the state of war. (p. 270)

Admiral Turner said that the preparation of the dispatches of November 24 and of November 27 was similar to that of the October 16 dispatch. He discussed the situation at the time of the preparation of the November 27 dispatch as follows:

"As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State, at a small meeting at which I was present, that the State Department has no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from Intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South. It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the

dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic analyses were being made by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and brought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses. Japanese radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions." p. 265)

Admiral Turner said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that to all intents and purposes the negotiations were over on November 27th, though he (Hull) was not going to close them. Mr. Hull, he stated, kept Admiral Stark well informed (page 995). This was the basis of the statement in the "warning" that negotiations had ceased.

Admiral Ingersoll believed that the "warning" was sent because the Secretary of State had delivered the note of November 26th to the Japanese (page 851).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the reason for sending the war warning on November 27 was indicated in the dispatch, referring to the number and equipment and organization of Japanese naval forces. He said that the reason why the dispatch referred to an aggressive move in the Western Pacific was that the character of the landing craft referred to in the dispatch were such that they could not have been used in any area other than in the far eastern area. (p. 425)

Admiral Brainard did not recall having had any part in the drafting of the October 16 dispatch or the November 24 dispatch or the war warning. He did not know definitely that a set of war warning dispatches were prepared and held in readiness for dispatch to merchant shipping and that for a period of two or three weeks prior to December 7, they were restraining entry of merchant vessels and vessels of the NTS service into the Western Pacific so as to avoid their being trapped. (p. 402)

#### C. THE FAILURE TO MENTION HAWAII

Admiral Stark said that he did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning" because he indicated, from the best intelligence which he had, where the blow was most likely to fall (page 793). It was agreed in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, he testified, that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility but that the information available indicated that the Philippines, Guam and the Kra Peninsula would be attacked (page 797). Generally speaking, he and his advisers did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).

At the time of drafting the "war warning," Admiral Turner said, he expected that the Japanese would make some kind of an attack on Hawaii (page 995). He did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning," he said, because the places named were the strategic objectives and he did not believe that the Japanese would launch an amphibious attack on Hawaii (page 1020). He invited attention to the difference between the dispatch of November 24th, which had warned of the possibility of a "surprise aggressive movement," and this dispatch, which warned of "an amphibious expedition." The earlier dispatch, he said, was the result of deduction and covered any type of action by the Japanese. On November 27th, however, they knew that, as a fact, the Japanese were on the move (page 997).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he had made the insertion of "Thai" and "Continental districts" in the "war warning" (page 839). The breaking of diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean war, he said. But, the information as to Japanese movements indicated action at Siam or Kra Peninsula and it was quite evident that if the Japanese made war on the United States, the Philippines were a probable objective and Guam would fall like a ripe plum. In the dispatch they mentioned southeast Asia as a probable Japanese objective because they had no information of an aggressive movement in any other direction. The intention of the war message was to state that war was imminent—on the other hand, there was the wish not to take any step which could provoke war with Japan (page 842). And, Admiral Kimmel never asked for any clarification of the "war warning." (page 842).



THE DIRECTION TO "EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT"

Vice Admiral McMorris directed his attention to:

(a) the provisions of the Rainbow Five War Plan in respect of the initial task of the Pacific Fleet at times when Japanese were not in the war, including the maintaining of Fleet security and protecting the territory of the associated powers (which included Hawaii), and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with patrol planes and light forces and by the action of striking groups, and guarding "against a surprise attack by Japan."

and

(b) the direction in the war warning message of November 27, 1941, to CinCPac, to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46,"

and testified in the respect of what appropriate defensive deployment was executed, that, "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movements of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft." (Page 321-322).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the language in the war warning of 27 November 1941, with reference to the defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46, "was a direction." (Page 322).

He stated further that he considered that the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deployment, (page 322), that it was a major action in line with the measure to execute an appropriate defensive deployment, that the major portion of the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and that reinforcements were sent to Midway and Wake; that it was likewise in accordance with the directive that the ships were maintained with a full supply of ammunition and a minimum quantity of fuel. (Page 323-324).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an appropriate act, "but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements." (Page 324).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishment of long distance air patrol from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. (Page 324).

The "war warning" directed the addressees to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

Admiral Bloch recalled a discussion between Admiral Kimmel and someone else in his presence discussing the directive to carry out a "defensive deployment." So far as Admiral Bloch knew, he had never encountered that terminology before. He doesn't recall what it meant to him at the time nor does he know whether or not Admiral Kimmel regarded the submarines at Midway and Wake as a "defensive deployment." (p. 22)

Admiral Turner said that the things they expected CincPac to do were not communicated to CincPac in detail because the Navy Department's plan was of a broad discretion to commanders. They expected CincPac to take appropriate action on the "War Warning" dispatch (page 998).

The expectation in the Navy Department as to the "Defensive Deployment" that would be taken was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows: "It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic, the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to their deployment for defense of territory." (p. 265)

Admiral Stark said that he had anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the war warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness

measures, distant reconnaissance and A/S measures, and that the measures previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. He did not require a report of the actions taken pursuant to this message (pages 54-62, 84). He considered that after this message Admiral Kimmel had a "free hand" (page 801).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he considered that the "war warning" put additional tasks on the Pacific Fleet of security of itself and readiness for any eventualities, but that the message was not to completely interrupt training (page 849). Training, however, should have been secondary after this message (page 821). The October 16th dispatch had directed CincPac to make certain dispositions; he had informed the Chief of Naval Operations and those had been considered satisfactory (page 849). After November 27th, any measures that were necessary to guard the security of a fleet were necessary in all fleets.

Admiral Pye said that as to the directives in the November 27 dispatch concerning deployment, it would have been necessary to recall the Task Forces which were at that time absent, in order to prepare them from a logistic point of view and consequently, there was no deployment that could be made immediately which would have better prepared Task Force One. Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes and was not expected to return for over a week; there appeared to be no action to be taken by the Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress. Admiral Pye said that no change was made in the scheduled deployment of his task force after the November 27 dispatch. (p. 155)

Concerning the deployment referred to in the War Warning, Admiral Ingersoll said, "Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reinforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war." (p. 426)

The reason why Admiral Kimmel was not called upon to report what he was doing after the War Warning was Admiral Ingersoll said, because they knew that submarines were out on observation missions, that reinforcement of Wake and Midway was contemplated and they believed that the routine air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some time were being continued. They believed at that particular time that the air patrol was by no means as complete as it should have been. (p. 426 and p. 427).

#### XVIII. REPETITION OF ARMY DISPATCH ON NOVEMBER 28TH

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information (Exhibit 19) which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue x Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment x If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act x This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense x Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent x Report measures taken x a separate message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States x Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan x Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southwest Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further: "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act x be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur"

Exhibit 9 is the November 28 dispatch from CNO to CincPac.

A. GENERAL MARSHALL

General Marshall thought that he had seen the Army dispatch which was stated in the Navy dispatch of November 28th (page 864). However, General Marshall did not think that Marshall had seen it. The language made Marshall believe that he had seen it particularly because the instruction that Japan must commit the first overt act came from the President. He had no recollection that a warning not to alarm the civilian population came from the same source (page 865).

XIX. REINFORCEMENT OF MIDWAY AND WAKE

It will be recalled that on November 26th dispatches had been sent to CincPac by the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the proposed reinforcement of Midway and Wake with Army planes and personnel, and requesting that Admiral Kimmel confer with General Short about this and advise the Chief of Naval Operations as soon as practicable (supra, page 56).

Captain Wellborn said that he thought that the background of the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense at Midway and Wake was that the Navy felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility and that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be reserved for amphibious work. One method of reducing overhead requirements of the Marines was to relieve the Marine Corps Units of their static defensive duties. (p. 386)

On November 28th, dispatch 280627 (Exhibit 76) was sent by CincPac to NAV. This advised that ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes were being discharged at Wake.

Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force Two on November 28. (p. 291-293)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled clearly one conference on November 27 when it was decided to send fighting planes to Wake. He said that he was with Admiral Kimmel that day until about six in the evening. The discussion of the defense of Wake and the dispatch of fighter planes was participated in by General Short, General Martin and some other Army officers and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey. He said Marine planes were selected because the Army could not fly their fighters more than 15 miles from the coast. (p. 297)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled that there was some prior discussion of sending Army units to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked upon those bases as part of the Fleet and for that reason he wished to confine the forces ashore to Marine and Naval personnel. It soon became evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases were picked, he said, to be garrisoned by Army forces.

Admiral Halsey said that when he left to go to Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far Admiral Kimmel wanted him to go and Admiral Kimmel said, "Use your common sense." (p. 298)

Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the ENTERPRISE to deliver Marine fighters to Wake, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces. Admiral Kimmel said that in that case he was to use his own discretion. And, Admiral Halsey replied, that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret and that if he found even a Japanese sampan he would sink it. (p. 43)

Similar items would be landed at Midway.

Admiral Newton said that he was at Pearl Harbor from November 27 until the morning of December 5 and was temporarily in command of a task force because Admiral Brown departed around December 4 for a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions. He received no particular information concerning the international situation. (p. 316)

Although Admiral Newton was commander of the most powerful unit under the Commander Scouting Force, he never saw the October 16 dispatch nor was he ever informed of the contents of it and recalled no warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments which were given to him thereafter. (p. 317) Admiral Newton said that he never saw or heard of

the November 24, November 27 and December 3 dispatches. Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton during the period November 26 to December 5 did not learn anything indicating the increased danger of the situation with Japan. (p. 317)

When Admiral Newton left on December 5, he was directed to proceed to Midway to fly off a squadron of planes. He had the LEXINGTON, CINCINNATI, CAGO, PORTLAND and five destroyers on that mission. He considered the mission solely one to reinforce Midway and attached no special significance to the mission. He considered that there might be more danger from submarines than in the past and zig-zagged his course and had scout planes cover his advance. He gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparation for war other than ordinary routine. (p. 317)

About November 26 or 27, Admiral Brown and his Task Force Three returned to Pearl Harbor. They left Pearl Harbor on December 5.

Admiral Brown was of the view that the movement of the two task forces to the outlying islands after November 27, may have been in pursuance of the instructions contained in the dispatch regarding defensive deployment. (p. 141)

and that about December 1st ground material for temporary operation of two Army bombers would be sent, but that only six of such planes on Oahu were in operating condition. The dispatch also discussed the use of Army pursuit planes for insular defense and the need for additional, anti-aircraft guns; the fact that Army troop reinforcements were being made on outlying bases but that such was considered not advisable as Marines were available; that twelve Marine fighters would leave November 28th in a carrier for Wake; that other Marine planes would be sent to Midway later; and that on December 1st, twelve patrol planes would be sent from Midway to Wake, and those at Midway would be replaced by planes from Pearl Harbor.

The Chief of Naval Operations replied on November 28th (Exhibit 75) in a dispatch stating that the steps described in CincPac's 280627 appeared to be the best that could be done under the circumstances. This also stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General to cooperate with the Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and troops in support of Marines, and would endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses, but that it was doubtful if much improvement was possible soon. An immediate report on the effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in the immediate future was requested.

Admiral Brainard said that a dispatch recently examined by him showed that it was contemplated that a group of vessels under Admiral Halsey's command would leave around December 1, 1941, to land reinforcements on Wake but he found no indication of his having seen the dispatch at the time. The daily movement sheets, he said, from 21 November to 10 December showed movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier movements between Pearl Harbor, Wake and Midway. (p. 401)

Admiral Ingersoll said that they received reports of ship movements which were plotted and that he thought that the movements to Wake and Midway in early December were known at the time in Washington but he is not certain. He said that in keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kimmel's ships they relied on the ship movements reports and in the quarterly schedules of employment. (p. 424)

In letters of December 2nd to Admiral Stark (post, pages 113-114), Admiral Kimmel further stated his views as to the desirability of using Army planes and personnel at Midway and Wake and his concern that the replacement of Marine personnel would weaken the defense, would raise the question of unity of command, and that the increase in Army and Navy stations requiring Fleet support would interfere with offensive operations. (5)

Admiral Bloch discussed the various construction projects at Pearl Harbor and at the outlying islands. (p. 91-92)

Admiral Bloch said that the security of the outlying islands, such as Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, was a matter of some concern in November 1941; that the water capacity of the islands was small and that as a result of having civilian construction workers present there, the garrisons were smaller; he was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway than on Oahu. (p. 94)

According to Admiral Delany, during the tense period preceding December 7, the outlying islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake were a matter

great concern to the Commander in Chief's staff. (p. 81) The proposal to change from Marine to Army garrisons caused additional worry and concern and was a subject of many conferences out there. (p. 81)

Admiral Smith stated that he did not believe that the dispatch concerning the reinforcement of outlying islands by the Army was considered related to the war warning of November 27. He said that the discussions concerning the outlying islands lasted several days and, as a result, there was a decided mental preoccupation with this on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii. (p. 63)

Captain Glover said that the decision to reinforce Wake had been made by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and that Captain Glover and Captain Moore did not share the view that it should be done. They did believe that Midway should be fortified. (p. 176)

## XX. PEARL HARBOR—ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION

### A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL

Admiral Kimmel testified that after receiving the "war warning" dispatch of November 27th, his estimate was that the Japanese would move within the next days by amphibious expedition against the Philippines or Kra, or possibly Iwo, and that there was a good chance of a mass submarine attack at Oahu. He did not expect an air attack at Pearl Harbor, although an air attack was still a remote possibility" because, he said, of the tenor of the dispatches sent to him, the information which he had, the difficulties of making such an attack, and information received from the Navy Department and from other sources indicated that the greater portion of the Japanese carrier forces was in home waters. He thought that a primary cause for the "war warning" dispatch was the fact that diplomatic negotiations had ceased, and when the newspapers indicated that negotiations were resumed, the warning lost much of its force. He further stated that no ultimatum had been given to the Japanese because the Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the President that no ultimatum be given to them (page 301). He testified that the phrasing of the "war warning" dispatch and the phrasing of the dispatch of November 28th led him to believe that anything less than a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor was most improbable (page 302). His testimony concerning the November 28th message, Admiral Kimmel stated that it furnished no new information and that it stressed that Japan should be expected to commit the first overt act (page 325).

The "war warning," was discussed with ComFLEET. A dawn fighter patrol was considered, but was not regarded as practical because of the limitations of the Army planes (page 303).

He considered that the action of the Navy Department in failing to make any change in his plans to send carriers to Midway and Wake indicated that the Navy Department expected no immediate activity in either the outlying areas (page 309) or in the Hawaiian area (page 309).

He further testified that the day after receipt of the "war warning" of November 27th, he had a conference with General Short, attended by members of their staff.

Admiral Smith said that there was no set hour for a Staff conference, that Admiral Kimmel had a conference practically every day and would send for the people that he wanted; he would usually have over officers from the Fleet and very frequently would have Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye, at such conferences (p. 34).

He said that while he presently did not recall the incident that General Short referred to a statement made by McMorris at that conference, in response to a question by General Short, to the effect that there was no chance of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, he testified that the message of November 27th followed a pattern which he had been continuing for some time, and that he felt that before hostilities commenced he would receive additional information which would be more definite. When the attack came without this information, he was inclined to blame himself for not having been smarter, but when he found some time later that the information was in fact available in the Navy Department which would have enabled the action taken by him had he known it, he felt differently about the matter. If he had had that information, he said, he would have thoroughly searched all shore going activities, including the Army, and in all probability would have had the Fleet put to sea in an intercepting position, and would have conducted reconnaissance to the best of their ability.

Admiral Kimmel admitted, however, that during the entire period when he was CincPac, he maintained the same estimate as was set forth in his letter of February 18th (Exhibit 30), which stated that "a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility . . ."

#### B. ADMIRAL BLOCH

Admiral Bloch testified that he had estimated that if the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, it would be by (1) submarine attack, (2) blocking the channel, (3) laying mines, (4) sabotage. He believed that an aerial torpedo attack could not be successful and if there were an air attack it would be by bombs (page 409). He considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility (page 394). He saw the "war warning" dispatch, conferred with Admiral Kimmel and did not disagree with his conclusions.

On November 27, after the receipt of the "War Warning", the Chief of Staff brought over a paraphrase of the dispatch. Admiral Bloch saw Admiral Kimmel the next morning. There were others present but he does not recall who they were. There was a term in the dispatch concerning defense deployment. Just what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was Admiral Bloch did not know, but they had at that time two submarines at Midway and two at Wake. (p. 14)

The dispatch concerning the sending of planes to Midway and Wake (Exhibit 18) did not change his estimate (page 394). The part of the November 28th dispatch which impressed him was the desire that Japan should be allowed to commit the first overt act and that the public should not be alarmed (page 395).

Admiral Bloch said that after the War Warning of November 27, negotiations between Japan and the United States were resumed and that this had a very definite effect on his mind. Also, he said he had no feeling of impending hostilities in the Hawaiian area around the 7th of December. (pp. 14 and 16)

Admiral Bloch volunteered at the end of his testimony a statement that the Navy Department had more information than they had in Hawaii; that a number of warnings were sent to them; that the Navy Department had in the War Plans a means of putting into effect all of the plans prior to "M" day that such action would have been more effective than the warnings sent out and in this connection he referred to the State Department note of November 26 concerning which he had no knowledge until after December 7.

Admiral Bloch said that he had not seriously considered nor had he heard anybody else talk about the influence on public opinion in the United States which an attack on Pearl Harbor would produce. (p. 88)

Prior to December 7, Admiral Bloch was of the opinion that a carrier attack against Hawaii prior to a declaration of war was remote; one important consideration was his belief that a large body of surface vessels could not cross such a large expanse of water without the Navy having some knowledge of it. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that although he could not recall that any officer had ever expressed the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was improbable yet he was definitely of the opinion that such an attack was remote although he is unable to analyze that opinion and to determine the various factors which had caused him to reach that opinion. (pp. 89 and 90)

Captain Earle said that they had considered the estimate indicating that the most likely form of attack would be by air, but somehow or other they always felt that it couldn't happen here and that the Japanese would not take that chance. (p. 377)

#### C. ADMIRAL PYE

Admiral Pye testified that he saw the November 24th dispatch (warning of an aggressive move in any direction) on November 29th. He recalled no decision made as a result of it (page 424)

Admiral Pye said that on November 29, he had a conference with Admiral Kimmel during which Admiral Kimmel showed him the November 24 message and called in his Intelligence Officer who explained the locations of the enemy forces, indicating no unusual activity in the Naval forces of the Japanese navy. They discussed possible action to be taken by Task Force 1 which was the only Task Force in port aside from the battleships of Task Force

and decided that there was no action that could be taken by that Task Force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. (p. 153)

Admiral Pye said that he was not present at any conferences between Admiral Kimmel and his staff or other senior officers. In his own discussions with Admiral Kimmel, there was no mention of the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. For some months there had been a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. His feeling in this connection was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action but an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers it was felt that the Fleet in port with the presumed effectiveness of the Army air forces would be in a better position for defense than they would be at sea. Admiral Pye also saw the war warning message on the same day, i. e., on November 29. (p. 154)

Admiral Anderson said that the war warning was shown to a group of Flag officers including Admiral Anderson in the office of the Commander in Chief. Under the war plans in force, Admiral Anderson had no specific duties to perform. He said that he knew that there were two task forces at sea and knew that there was an excellent plan in existence for long distance daily air reconnaissance. He assumed that whatever was considered necessary to be done was being taken care of. (p. 393)

Admiral Anderson said that his ideas during early December were that he expected the Japanese would not attack farther east than the Philippines. He was influenced in all his thoughts as to security by the knowledge or what he thought was the knowledge that a long distance daily reconnaissance by air was being maintained. He assumed that such distant air reconnaissance was being maintained and said that he had read a very complete plan for such daily reconnaissance and knew that it had been placed into effect but did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7. (p. 394)

He felt that this dispatch indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam. He the "War Warning" at the same time and discussed it with CincPac. It was to several addressees. The "War Warning" to him was nothing more than had been receiving for some time (page 425). He did not see the November message until after December 7th (page 427).

Admiral Pye testified first that he had not made any estimate of the situation during the period November 27th to December 7th (page 429). In response to Court's questions he then stated that the maneuvers which he was on had not alerted him from making an estimate, but that he had made no written estimate (page 434). He kept a running mental estimate. He considered a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility but not a probability (page 435). He thought it a bad move because it was the one thing to unite the United States in an all-out effort, and therefore that it was unlikely to be undertaken (page 435). He considered a submarine attack the most likely act in advance of (page 436). Before the attack he felt the defense measures taken were consistent with the situation; they thought torpedoes could not be launched from air in waters less than 75 feet deep (page 436); and a bombing attack alone did not have been profitable (page 437).

He thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor was remotely possible and did not consider that such an attack would be made before diplomatic relations were broken off (page 438).

Admiral Pye stated that WPL-46 required the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, there were no carriers in port and the Fleet at sea without carriers would be more vulnerable than in port; moreover, Intelligence had indicated that all major ships of the Japanese fleet were in home ports. No additional security measures were taken in his command. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the phrase "execute an appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying out tasks assigned WPL-46" was meaningless, according to Admiral Pye (page 426). He did not know if CincPac had made a direct estimate as to air attack (page 426).

Concerning his estimate of the probability of a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that a primary feature was that he felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry into the war than they could possibly gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. He said further that the Secretary of the Navy when he came to Pearl Harbor after the 7th of December said that no one in Washington had stated to him that there was any possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner who

was the most aggressive minded of all. Admiral Pye thought that the feeling in Honolulu was influenced by the attitude of the Department in the preceding months in taking forces from the Pacific and indicating that they considered the German situation more serious than the Japanese situation. He also said that they had not been adequately advised of the development of conditions as known in Washington.

Admiral Pye said that although an attack against the United States was not expected, they did expect the Japanese to proceed against the Dutch and British. Admiral Pye said that he thought that the general impression then had been that the Japanese naval air pilots were fairly good but that they did not think that these pilots were as good as they appeared to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. (p. 158) Admiral Pye said that they had no information as to the torpedoes which had actually been developed by other nations. (p. 158)

Admiral Pye said that he did not think that any of them had felt that an attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. (p. 151)

Admiral Brown was not familiar with the security measures such as search and other matters relating to the internal defense of Oahu except in a most general way. (p. 137)

Admiral Brown's Task Force had assigned to it the task of developing technique and examining the materials for amphibious warfare and during the six months preceding the attack, his energies and the energies of his staff were devoted to that subject. The primary task was training. During the year preceding Pearl Harbor, it was his impression that there must have been at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break out with the Japanese and each time the question was discussed whether or not defensive measures should be taken or training continued. His feeling was that training should be continued until the moment that war developed. This is what happened to the Fleet. (p. 137)

During the last days of November, Admiral Brown participated in conferences with the Commander in Chief. His recollection was that the great concern had been as to the security of the outlying islands. They had believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when they came and had discussed the possibility of an air raid. His belief was that an air raid was possible but highly improbable; that dispositions should be made for the defense of the outlying islands and he believed that the greatest threat to Pearl Harbor was local sabotage. (p. 137) Admiral Brown believes that during the week preceding December 7, he was in almost daily conference with the Commander in Chief. Admiral Brown said he did not remember whether or not he saw the November 27 dispatch. It was his recollection that there was a prolonged discussion of that dispatch. (p. 139)

Admiral Brown said that during the last few days prior to December 7, he felt that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of a misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. He did not consider the attack a menace and was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor. His own estimate in December was that the Japanese would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the Dutch or the British. He probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation. (p. 145)

Admiral Brown's recollection of the conferences which were attended by Army representatives was vague. He believed that the conferences were mainly in connection with internal security on the island and with shortages in defense weapons and various forms of air craft. He recalled that in about November, somebody suggested that there might be a surprise air attack at Hawaii, that at the time Admiral Halsey was present that Admiral Brown expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a mission successfully and that if they did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment. (p. 142)

Admiral Brown said that his erroneous belief at that time was that Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. (p. 142)

Admiral Halsey said that the war warning dispatch affected him very seriously. He thought that there was going to be a fight before he got back to Pearl Harbor. He said that when he left Pearl Harbor, he diverted battleships, cruisers and destroyers and told them to carry out exercises in a certain area and then headed West with the remainder of his task force. He then issued orders to put in war heads in all torpedoes, to regard a submarine as hostile and to sink it, to arm the planes with bombs and



shoot down any plane that was not identified. When they neared Wake, they went from Condition 3 to Condition 2. He tried to make full preparation for combat and he carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles. Admiral Halsey said that he felt he might be attacked before he returned to Pearl Harbor and thought it might precipitate war. (p. 299)

Admiral Halsey said that he did not feel that they were informed on what the Japs were doing and felt that they were operating in the dark. He thought that a good deal more was known in Washington than was known in Pearl Harbor. (p. 300)

Admiral Halsey said that they thought the Japanese attack would take place in the Far East except by submarine and that they underestimated the Japanese ability to operate carriers or did not give it enough consideration. (p. 301)

Admiral Halsey said that the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor had been on everyone's mind but that he personally did not expect an air attack. He pointed out that anti-aircraft drills had been had on many occasions. (p. 302)

Admiral Halsey said his personal and official relations with Admiral Kimmel were very close and that they conferred every time he returned to port. He said that Admiral Kimmel was principally worried about materiel conditions, the very heavy turnover in personnel and the question of balancing training against security. (p. 294)

Admiral Halsey said that there was a continuous flow of messages crying "wolf" and consequently the senses tended to be dull but the possibility of the international situation was constantly before their minds. (p. 296)

Admiral Newton said that for several months preceding December 7, all hands had felt a tautening up of the situation and he believed that the majority were of the view that submarines were their greatest menace. (p. 332)

Admiral Leary said that after their return to port on November 28, 1941, the security conditions existing on the ship were the same as on the previous stay in port which had ended about November 21. Admiral Leary said that the question of training is always a paramount one and that it was not possible to carry out the required training and maintain entirely satisfactory security measures. (p. 365) Admiral Leary said that in the few weeks prior to December 7, he had thought in a general way of the possibility of a surprise attack, and that they all felt that the contingency was remote and that the Intelligence Services would give adequate warning. (p. 365) He said that his estimate was that a surprise attack would be an air attack. (p. 366) He recalls no specific discussion along that line.

Admiral Bunkley said that on October 15, the CALIFORNIA was at Long Beach and received orders to be ready to sail at 24 hours' notice. He received the drastic change of orders without being taken into the confidence of Admiral Pye as to any messages received which caused such a change in plans. (p. 415)

Admiral Bunkley had no idea of any warnings having been sent in November and December indicating that the situation was dangerous. His opinion at the time was that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. He did think that an attack would come in the Philippines. (p. 415)

#### D. ADMIRAL SMITH

Admiral Smith testified that Admiral Kimmel kept him informed of everything (page 530). He saw the "War Warning," but though the press or radio said that negotiations were resumed (page 531). Each day the War Plans Staff and the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave CincPac an estimate of what was pending. He remembered the November 28th message mainly because of the basis therein not to alarm the civilian population (page 531); but this did affect his estimate.

It seemed odd to him to take Navy and Marine planes off Midway and Wake in accordance with the November 26th dispatch and to put Army planes there. Army planes had to be transported by carrier (page 532). It would take weeks to deliver these planes, and this meant the absence of carriers in the event of Japan, and while not fully prepared for war (page 533). Admiral Smith testified that he considered this dispatch a directive, despite its language (page 543).

He said that the inference from Exhibits 15 and 17 was plain that the warning directed against an attack on the Philippines or Guam (page 545). The

"in any direction" dispatch of November 24th may have intensified the action they were taking, but did not at all change their general estimate (page 54).

The "war warning" message, he said, would have been more effective had it stopped with the word "warning" (page 534).

Admiral Smith stated that in the Pacific Fleet they were not thinking of defense of Pearl Harbor, but about the Fleet and readiness of the Fleet. ships were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out into battle, not the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 548).

He stated that the Roberts' Report was correct in stating they were aware of the possibility of hostile action without declaration of war (page 556), but expected that the Japanese might hit the Philippines, Midway, or Guam, but not Pearl Harbor.

*Admiral Smith said that the basis for his estimate that a surprise air attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable was as follows (p. 374-375):*

*"There was a great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the Navy Department, and our intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and, I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even as far as a neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. We believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was for this reason that we did not fear an air attack."*

They did regard a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as a sure thing (page 557).

Admiral Smith said that they were very submarine conscious, and the reason for that was that they had had several sound contacts; perhaps some of them were false. On one occasion, in the month of February 1941, they had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head which occurred about a month later. They never found out exactly what it was, but after investigation came to the conclusion that the contact was due to two different leaks of water temperature although the destroyers had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about six o'clock in the morning, told him to issue orders to bomb this contact. Before the order went out, however, he canceled it and reported the fact to CNO saying that he had no authority to do this except within the three-mile limit around Pearl Harbor; a reply of the CNO was to the effect that it was a good thing that such orders had not been issued. So, Admiral Smith said, probably all of the contacts were false, but they were submarine conscious more than they were aircraft conscious and everyone in the Fleet believed that if an attack came it would be by submarine rather than by aircraft. Admiral Smith believed that the officers of the Fleet felt that there was little danger of an air attack. (p. 557)

Admiral Smith said that the warnings sent to them mentioned attacks from the Far East, and this probably resulted in a state of mind where they did not believe that they would be subjected to an air attack on Pearl Harbor although they did expect submarine attack. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that he thought there had been too much "cry wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that his thought was at the time, and still was, that they spent too much time in worrying about the outlying islands. They had large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway, and the Commandant-in-Chief spent a great deal of time, more than he should have spent, in efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to the extent of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pearl Harbor War Plan would indicate. Looking back on it, Admiral Smith thinks that they probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to the larger things. (p. 64)

E. ADMIRAL M'MORRIS

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November 1941 occasioned no surprise and did not convey any considerable amount of additional or startling information, because the situation with reference to Japan had been tense throughout the year of 1941 (p. 325).

Admiral McMorris said that he had thought that sabotage or a submarine attack was a distinct possibility (page 887). Up to the time of the attack he considered the possibility of an air torpedo attack very remote (page 888) and for reasons therefor: (a) increasing evidence of Japanese movements toward the Philippines; (b) concentration of troops in South China Area; (c) movement of transport ships from the Empire to the South; (d) Navy warnings indicated the possibility of hostilities in that area, attack on Philippines, or movement of Japanese forces in Halmahera; (e) distance involved and logistic problem; (f) the British attack on Italian Fleet in southern Italy—here the depth of water and short distance for run of torpedo was important; (g) confidence in anti-aircraft defenses against torpedo planes.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he considered sound the views expressed by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of 24 January 1941 (Naval Court Exhibit 9), though he had not been completely in accord as to the elements of danger as listed in importance by the Secretary (p. 325-327).\*

Vice Admiral McMorris further testified that he had considered an air attack possible but not probable and further than he considered the Fleet should not make as its sole object of existence the defending of itself against a surprise attack and that it should carry on other fundamental duties, including training and readying itself for operations (p. 327).

He felt that the attack would be on the Philippines with a possible raid on Wake and Midway, and Guam would be seriously endangered (page 889). He felt that a submarine attack on Hawaii was probable.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to his estimate of the situation and possible courses of enemy action during the period of 27 November to 6 December 1941, that substantially he estimated the Japanese were on the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. His early estimate was that the Japanese would act with the expectation that the United States would not enter the war with Great Britain unless it was itself attacked, but later he came to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling to leave the line of communications abreast the Philippines exposed to attack in which case the United States would come into the war, and therefore, he estimated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct possibility but were probable.

He further estimated that the Japanese would seize Guam when they initiated the war, because of the negligible defenses there, and that, because the defense of Midway was stronger, with which the Japanese were probably familiar, it was initially a probability that Midway would be subjected to heavy raids but that was less likely that there would be any Japanese effort towards seizing Midway.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he further estimated that there were likely to be heavy Japanese submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto; that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces operating at sea, and that there was a likelihood of attempts being made to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel, in order to block ingress and egress. He also expected that there would be enemy submarine activity along the Pacific Coast. (Page 303-304.)

After receipt of the message of November 27th, a discussion was had as to whether or not any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those training and operating areas, and it was felt that the situation was already well known and it would, in effect, be a message to continue what they were doing: only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for submarines (part

\*—This was the letter in which the Secretary envisioned the initiation of a Japanese war by a surprise attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and listed the dangers in order of importance as air bombing attack, air torpedo attack, sabotage, submarine attack, mining, and bombardment by gunfire. The Secretary further stated that the countermeasures to be considered, in order of importance, were the location and engagement of Japanese carriers, and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched, pointing out that these were largely the responsibility of the Fleet, though perhaps not possible of being carried out in the event of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war (p. 326).

Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 26th from the Chief Naval Operations regarding the transfer of planes to Wake, of which CincPac was an addressee, probably influenced whatever ideas or views resulted from the series of dispatches, but the question of moving Army planes there was given extensive consideration and the determination was made to send defensive planes to Midway and Wake, preferably Marine, and they felt it imperative to have protective fighters there because they anticipated operating a number of patrol planes from Wake if war should start (page 891).

A squadron of patrol planes searched in advance of the carrier and was withdrawn after she had discharged the planes at Wake (page 892). When Halsey and "Newton" moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of Marine aircraft, they were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence before they again entered port (page 894).

**As Admiral McMorris recalled it, orders to depth bomb submarine contacts were issued after the war warning and orders given to Admirals Newton and Halsey to repel hostile planes. (p. 246)**

The proposal to send Army troops and planes to Midway and Wake did not, far as he was concerned, weaken the "war warning." He thought those planes would be weakened in defense by such a change; that they were important; and might be subject to attack so that the time was inauspicious (page 896).

**Admiral McMorris recalled that at not a great while before the commencement of war, there was a suggestion to replace the marines at outlying islands with Army forces and that this was discussed with General Short. It was concluded not to send them. They felt that the Washington proposal was badly timed. He did not feel that it vitiated the war warning dispatch. (p. 247)**

Those dispatches (Exhibits 18, 40) were proposals and not directives and the recommendation was against the proposals and recommendation was accepted (page 896).

He believed from the limited knowledge he had that the danger from enemy aircraft was not great (page 896). He did not consider that the Japanese would make a surprise air attack; he felt that the only serious danger was sabotage of submarines (page 900).

*With reference to testimony given by him in previous investigations to the effect that in his opinion the island defense was adequate and that the chances of an attack inflicting damage were small, Vice Admiral McMorris testified generally that the bases of that opinion were as follows:*

(a) *That the anti-aircraft guns and the fighters would destroy a large proportion of attacking planes;*

(b) *That bombing by enemy planes would not be sufficiently accurate to obtain a large number of hits;*

(c) *That notwithstanding the success of the British air torpedo attack on Taranto, which he believed was attributable to peculiar conditions that existed at Taranto, he did not believe there was any serious hazard in an air torpedo attack at Pearl, because: (1) the attacking planes would have to fly very low, thereby exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire and fighter interception, and (2) the shallowness of the water and the short distance available for torpedo runs would operate to reduce the effectiveness of this type of attack. He stated that manifestly his conclusions were entirely wrong, but that they had been reached on the basis of reading available information as to torpedo performance in our own Navy;*

(d) *He admitted that he did not have any knowledge as to whether the Army anti-aircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness but he assumed that they were in a state of readiness. " . . . Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. I knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent there. . . . Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or the watches being kept" with respect to the air defenses of Hawaii (p. 330-332).*

Admiral McMorris said that he saw the November 28th dispatch and considered the directive for reconnaissance to mean search by aircraft for submarines or a raiding cruiser.

**Admiral McMorris said that he did not believe that a surprise air attack was likely in the Hawaiian area although he did consider such an attack**

possible in the Philippines and even against Midway or Wake. Probably he said, some discussions along those lines may have taken place but he had no specific recollection of such a discussion. (p. 236) He personally never considered an air attack as more than a remote possibility and he is certain that Admiral Kimmel was not anticipating such an attack.

Admiral McMorris said that the characteristics of the leaders of the Japanese Navy had been discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, Admiral McMorris, and others, and the general impression was that they were rather capable and aggressive leaders. (p. 236)

The reasons why Admiral McMorris thought a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility were as follows:

"For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict." (p. 237)

Admiral McMorris said that they did anticipate that mass submarine attacks in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were quite possible. (p. 238)

Admiral McCormick who at the time was under McMorris, said that the courses open to the enemy, as the War Plans Officer saw them, were in the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and submarine attacks and the seizure of all of our possessions in the western Pacific; it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the western Pacific; an air attack on Pearl Harbor was listed as a possible course of Japanese action. Predominant attention was focused on the preparation for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. A very low degree of probability was assigned to air attack at Pearl Harbor. (p. 68) He said that he did not think that any of Admiral Kimmel's advisers had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they made.

Admiral McCormick said that in formulating estimates of the situation, the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders were not, so far as he knew, taken into consideration. (p. 70)

Admiral McCormick said that the term "defensive deployment" use in the war warning puzzled them. The further strengthening of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral Kimmel and his staff could derive from this directive.

Admiral McCormick said that he knew of not one person at Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack. (p. 71)

Admiral McCormick, at the end of his statement, said that Admiral Kimmel was whole-heartedly and self-sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet ready for war; that "There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an approach, as has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I mentioned had not existed." (p. 72)

Captain Murphy said that he did not think that an attack, such as the attack that was made, would be made. He thought that it would be stupid for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and that they might have gone into Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies without involving the United States. He thought they might attack the Philippines.

Captain Murphy said that he thought the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks involved in Rainbow 5. (p. 199) He was not sure whether the words defensive deployment in any way signified security measures, but interpreted the words as leaving the matter open to those in Pearl Harbor. (p. 200)

## F. ADMIRAL DELANY

Admiral DeLany stated that he saw all of the messages from the Navy Department. He did not consider that CincPac had been furnished complete information on relations between the United States and Japan, because full information of the negotiations and discussions were not forwarded to CincPac (page 506).

The "War Warning" dispatch meant to him that Japan was on the move, but he did not interpret it as showing an immediate Japanese attack on the United States.

Admiral DeLany said that between November 27th and December 7th, he knew that Japan was on the move, but he thought they would go into the Malay or Thailand. He did not know what we would have done if this had included an overt act against the United States. The Pacific Fleet had not been given a clear-cut view of the attitude which the United States Government was assuming toward Japan. He had not thought that the Japanese would initiate a war by attacking the Pacific Fleet as such an attack would wake up the United States more than anything; also because they had reports that the Japanese fleet was primarily based in the Empire (page 497).

In his opinion, if there were an attack, it would be by submarine. He did not envisage an attack by air or surface ships (page 498).

Rear Admiral DeLany reaffirmed his belief, previously stated to the Roberson Commission, that there was no discussion between 27 November and 7 December by the staff as to the probability of an air attack of the nature of that which occurred. (p. 165)

Asked what consideration was given to possible directions of aggressive movements, warned against in the 24 November message from OpNav to CincPac and Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, he replied that aircraft carriers were sent to deliver planes to Midway and Wake but that an attack farther to the eastward was not contemplated. (p. 170)

Following the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November conferences between the Army and Navy retained the concept previously held that the greatest danger to the Hawaiian area lay in the possibility of submarine attacks and sabotage. (p. 172)

Admiral DeLany stated that joint Army and Navy exercises relating to defense of the islands were handicapped by lack of equipment necessary to provide Central air warning control post. This equipment, together with anti-aircraft weapons, communication facilities and planes, was declared not available although following the Pearl Harbor attack they were received almost immediately. (p. 174-176)

Adequate air reconnaissance was impossible, in his opinion, due to the small number of planes and crews, condition of the planes and the necessity for maintaining them in readiness for an emergency. (p. 181)

From the information which he had in November 1941, he did not think a torpedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor could be launched because of the depth of the water. This information had been sent in letters by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor, Admiral DeLany said that he did not and never would have expected that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor as they did. That everyone was of the opinion that the danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area; and that there might be sabotage on the island. The general concept of the defense of the island and the security of the base there was based on that idea. (p. 77)

Admiral DeLany said that nothing in the dispatches received by the Navy indicated that hostilities would be started in the way in which they did in fact start. (p. 78)

Admiral DeLany said that the reasons why they regarded a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor as improbable were that the last information which they had placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters; there was inherent danger for the Japanese in bringing their Fleet in for such an attack; and it was felt that the one single thing which would inflame Americans would be an attack upon their home territory. (p. 80)

Admiral DeLany thought that in formulating the opinion that an air attack was unlikely, consideration was given to the characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, an air expert. (p. 81)

G. ADMIRAL CALHOUN

Admiral Calhoun said that he had been present at Admiral Kimmel's conference every morning and heard all the information that Admiral Kimmel disclosed. He knew of the "war warning" dispatch and interpreted it to mean that would start in the Philippines (page 935). Nobody had expected war immediately, he said, and Admiral Kimmel did not indicate any contrary view (page 935). When the "War Warning" was read, he had thought, and believed the Japanese also had thought that it did not necessarily mean that war was imminent and that the Fleet should go on a war footing (page 939).

In his voluntary statement at the end of his testimony, Admiral Calhoun discussed the fact that he attended all of Admiral Kimmel's conferences and that neither he nor anyone else expected any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time when it came. (p. 228)

H. CAPTAIN LAYTON

Captain Layton stated that he had seen the "War Warning" and had considered it fitted into the picture that the Japanese were going to strike in Southeast Asia (page 911). He had no apprehension of an air attack on Hawaii. He at the time translated a Japanese novel which academically discussed an attack on Pearl Harbor. He showed this to Admiral Kimmel about three or four months prior to December 7, 1941 (page 911). From the "War Warning" message and information he had at the time, he expected the Japanese to attack Thailand, possibly the Philippines (page 912) and after our search planes from Manila reported Japanese forces off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam, he reported this estimate to CincPac. This was in agreement with the "War Warning" (pages 912-3). Air attack on Pearl Harbor was a capability of the Japanese but he did not consider it a remote possibility. Surprise attack was a Japanese characteristic (page 913).

Captain Layton knew Admiral Yamamoto personally and was familiar with his characteristics. He did not specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of Admiral Yamamoto's characteristics a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor was likely (page 223). He said that on one occasion when he discussed with Admiral Kimmel a book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was mentioned and Admiral Kimmel asked him what he thought of the chances. He said "I only hope we can intercept them and I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." He also said that in the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, he thought that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned, and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much in the first battle. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that he saw the war warning of November 27th and thought that it fitted in with the picture up to date as he saw it, namely, that the Japanese were moving to the South. His estimate was unclear as to whether or not the Japanese would attack the Philippines or would leave their flank unguarded and attempt to work some compromise deal through Kurusu and Nomura. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that there was no discussion from November 27th to November 7th in his presence, "in higher authority" as to the importance of acting against internal sabotage (page 914).

I. ADMIRAL BELLINGER

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor, of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Neither did he see or know of the CNO despatch of 28 November regarding possible hostile action by the Japanese. (P. 498-499)

Admiral Bellinger referred to Addendum I of Exhibit 53, which stated that an attack from carriers at 300 miles was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. He envisaged air attack as the most logical form for the greatest success (page 668). He expected a bombing, not a torpedo attack (page 669).

Admiral Bellinger said that he had not thought it probable that an attack would take place on Oahu as the opening event of the Japanese-United States war (page 668) and his estimate contained in the plans was in order to work out a defense of Pearl Harbor and not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese (page 687).

During the five days preceding December 7, Admiral Bellinger with the "flu." His assistant, Captain Ramsey, conferred (p. 122)

Admiral Bellinger said that late in November, 1941, he thought probable form of Japanese attack would be by submarine or sabotage. (p. 123-124)

#### J. ADMIRAL KITTS

Admiral Kitts testified that he had thought an air torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor, and antiaircraft measures such as nets and balloons considered (page 516).

Admiral Kitts did not attend staff conferences generally. shown any warning dispatch but knew the general tenor of warnings. (p. 185) Admiral Kitts said that he had considered on Pearl Harbor as a serious possibility and also a submarine combination of the two. (p. 186) Admiral Kitts said that he the Fleet Circular letter in February or March known as 20 indicated that a surprise air attack was a definite possibility. (p. 186)

His feeling in this regard was minimized by two letters from the CIO Operations, stating that the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow for torpedo run. Nets had not been put in because they were a hindrance to movements and because it was felt that the danger of torpedo attack was small. Balloon barrages had not been put in because of interference with movements of our own aircraft (page 516). Nets had been placed at the entrance to Pearl Harbor (page 517).

The deepest water in Pearl Harbor was 42 feet, or 7 fathoms, and that the Navy Department had estimated that torpedoes could not be launched in less than 10 fathoms (page 519).

#### K. ADMIRAL WITHERS

Admiral Withers said that he had seen the "War Warning" and had been at a conference held on November 28, 1941. He said that he told Admiral Short that he thought the dispatch meant war and that he would sink Japan if they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back (page 108). Short was not at this conference (page 1086). He had no orders to take action against enemy ships within the 500 mile area from Pearl Harbor.

He had thought there would be an attack on Hawaii, but did not know the kind of attack (page 1086). The "War Warning" message did not mention the Philippines and he had felt that an attack might come anywhere but that the chances were that it would be on the Philippines (page 1086).

Captain Curtis said that he had been apprehensive for a long time about December 7 about the danger of the Japanese starting a war with the United States and he feared particularly sabotage. (p. 108)

#### L. COLONEL PHILLIPS

Colonel Phillips testified that General Short received an Army dispatch corresponding to Exhibit 19, on November 27th or November 28th, and a conference was held with Admiral Kimmel (page 483). He said that a receipt of the dispatch an estimate of the situation was made which was not a sabotage alert. He estimated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was not probable, and that if there were an attack, it would be by air. He did not recall receiving any information additional to that message until the "War Warning" message (page 486).

He stated that his opinion that the enemy might attack by air was his own personal opinion (page 493).

#### M. GENERAL SHORT

General Short said that at this time he considered sabotage the most probable method of attack on Pearl Harbor since the information they had indicated that the Japanese were moving southward (page 239). He said that during a conference with Admiral Kimmel, McMorris had stated that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there had been no disagreement by those present.



that Admiral Kimmel would have moved the ships out if he had thought an air attack likely.

XXI. CONFERENCES BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT AFTER NOVEMBER 27TH

Admiral Smith said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect; Admiral Kimmel and General Short, he "estimates," conferred every day between November 27th and December 7th (page 546). He present at some of the staff conferences (page 547).

He said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect in stating that Admiral Kimmel did not inform himself of measures taken by General Short; Admiral Smith was present at most of the conferences, and had been early directed by Admiral Kimmel to cooperate with the Army (page 550); also, Short informed himself of Kimmel's actions (page 551).

He stated that within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the "war warning," Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. General Short had been promptly advised of this message (page 561).

*Commander Harold S. Burr, then Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant at the headquarters, Commanding General Hawaiian Department, while at CincPac Headquarters in the presence of Capt. Earle received from Lt. Commander Layton a copy of the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November (Exhibit 17, Naval Court of Inquiry) with instructions to deliver it to General Short. Commander Burr could not locate General Short or the Chief of Staff and left the dispatch with the Senior Officer Present, Lt. Col. William Donnegan, G-3, explaining its urgent nature. Commander Burr stated that on the following day Col. Donnegan told him that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short. (pages 577-8)*

He did not recall "the details" of that conference. He thought that the message was intended to put them on their toes and to get them ready to carry out the War Plan.

Admiral Kimmel, according to Admiral Smith, had a shock in the week preceding Pearl Harbor when orders were received from the Navy Department to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all of the Marines off of the outlying islands and Marine and Navy planes and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes. As Admiral Smith remembered it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two staffs together. He said "the Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke before-hand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports." or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out." (p. 40-41)

Concerning the "war warning," Admiral Smith said that it was received somewhere in the midafternoon on the 27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and a conference was held. By six o'clock that evening, the Army was on the march, unfortunately what they did was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, and the bridges. In other words, they alerted against sabotage because it was the consensus of opinion

from this dispatch that attacks would be against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and by the other sabotage on the Japanese population. The war warning, he said, was carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning. He thought that the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except as to the danger of sabotage. The question of possible attack by air did not arise. Admiral Smith was not apprised of the contemplated action of the Army and did not believe that Admiral Kimmel had been advised. Admiral Bloch was at the conference, but Admiral Smith recalled no discussion of measures to be taken by Admiral Bloch's task force in light of the warning. Admiral Smith did not recall what condition of readiness was set for ships in port. He said the ships at sea were apprised of this warning.

Admiral Smith said that the operating schedule for ships which had been previously issued was not departed from except that the ENTERPRISE was sent to deliver planes to Wake. He said that as a result, at the time of the war warning, two of the three task forces were at sea; Admiral Pye's task force returned about the 5th of December, he thought, and also part of Admiral Halsey's task force; Admiral Brown's task force departed on the 4th of December, he had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers but no battleships; the net result of the adherence to the operating schedule previously issued was that there was a movement of ships inward to port rather than the deployment involving movement outward. Admiral Smith said that it might very well be that these plans had been known to the Japanese and that they chose their time to attack when two task forces were scheduled to be in port.

The war warning, Admiral Smith said, did not indicate to him that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. He knew that a greater part of the approaches to Pearl Harbor were not covered by any reconnaissance, but recalled no discussion at the conferences concerning this fact. (p. 50-53)

General Short stated that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed his anti-sabotage alert into effect. According to Admiral Smith and Colonel Phillips, the Army went on the anti-sabotage alert on November 27th (pages 53-479). General Short stated that he also conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251), they talked over every phase of what they were doing (page 242).

Admiral McMorris recalled that at about this time a conference was held between Admiral Kimmel and General Short regarding utilization of Army aircraft to strengthen defenses at Midway and Wake (page 889).

Admiral Brown said that he had overheard Admiral Kimmel frequently question General Short as to the Army's adequacy to defend Pearl Harbor against enemy air attack and that General Short had replied that his equipment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try to have it increased.

Admiral Pye said that he personally attended no conferences in which the situation was discussed by the Army High command; his conferences with Admiral Kimmel were concerned with Fleet operations. (p. 149)

Captain Murphy said that after the receipt of the war warning he, Captain Smith, Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, and Captain Layton, were called into Admiral Kimmel's office, and he read the dispatch and asked for their opinion. Admiral Kimmel said that he would have a further conference that afternoon. Captain Murphy said that he thought that at that conference the decision was made to reinforce Wake and to send some planes to Midway. (p. 197)

Admiral Bellinger did not see the warning dispatches (Exhibits 15 and 17) before December 7th, and between November 27th and December 7th did not confer with the Army Air Force Commander regarding long range reconnaissance (page 672).

Admiral Bloch recalled no discussions concerning unity of command (page 395).

## XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL—EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE

### A. IN GENERAL

*Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941 through 7 December 1941, testified that all Pacific Fleet task force commanders were notified of the receipt of the so-called war warning (p. 356).*

In this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).

Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures (p. 373).

The direction contained in the war warning to "execute an appropriate defensive movement preparatory to carry out the task assigned in WPL-46" was a new one, Admiral Kimmel testified. He thought it referred to measures of the type already taken by him (page 305).

As a result of the "war warning," he said, he continued the security measures already in effect (page 299). On November 27th, he issued orders to bomb identified submarines found in the operating areas around Oahu. He informed the Chief of Naval Operations of this. Full security measures were invoked for ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts (pages 299-300). Admiral Bloch testified that no change was made in the condition of readiness, except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began patrolling the Honolulu harbor channel and approaches (page 395).

Admiral Bloch said, "I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought they were in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were alerted and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th of December, I asked General Short about it and he told me, No, it was only a partial alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have told me they were alerted No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1. Our highest form is 1 and their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy is concerned, I know of nothing particular, except the Commander of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had called in the Commanding Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80—they were the only four ships that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of those was equipped with listening gear—and had given them a pep talk. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order about the 27th of November to the effect that any submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea area should be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were told to be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war, would be in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships of the Fleet, in the operating areas, and they might make an effort to get in the Harbor. That was the reason for the pep talk. I know no other action was taken as a consequence of the warning of the 27th of November." (p. 16)

Admiral Bloch said, "So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness. I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in and the future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was informed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different condition of readiness." (p. 16)

After the War Warning, Admiral Bloch knew of no additional aerial reconnaissance. Admiral Bloch did take one other step, namely, he directed the District Coast Guard Officer, who was the Port Commander of Honolulu, to put an inshore patrol in effect from Honolulu with three Coast Guard cutters, the same as Admiral Bloch conducted from Pearl Harbor with Destroyer Division 80. (p. 17)

Admiral McMorris said that on receipt of the "war warning," CincPac had a discussion with his staff. A determination was made that its directions were largely in effect already (page 888). Instructions were given to the forces to be particularly alert and to bomb submarine contacts believed hostile (page 888). The practice was started of giving CincPac daily or every other day recommendations as to what was to be done if war broke out within twenty-

four hours. Consideration was given to getting combatant ships out of Pearl Harbor if war broke out, he said, but not to getting them out as a defensive measure.

Concerning the direction to take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt act and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.

Admiral McMorris outlined his understanding of the action taken as a "preparatory deployment" at page 243.

Concerning the direction in the war warning to take "defensive deployment," Admiral McMorris said that they concluded that they should keep their forces in close proximity to Hawaii where they could be kept fully fueled and ready to move toward the Marshalls, and this was in agreement with the directive. (p. 245)

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that as a result of the war warning on November 27th, there occurred considerable discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff, and the following determinations or conclusions were reached:

(a) no material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area because the naval organization was already substantially on a war footing;

(b) it was essential that training continue until it became necessary to move the principal elements of the Fleet into offensive operations, and therefore, that there should be a continuation and no modification of the training schedules;

(c) that limitations in supplies and facilities, particularly defensive aircraft, had precluded stationing requisite defensive forces at Wake or Midway and other island outposts until it became virtually mandatory, and, accordingly, that only two aircraft carriers, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers were dispatched, one to Wake, the other to Midway, with fighter aircraft;

(d) that Midway and Wake, considering the personnel engaged in the preparation of defense, were not able to accommodate an increase in personnel, though possibly a small number of men and some specialized equipment were dispatched to Wake. (Page 304-305).

Admiral DeLany said that training conditions were maintained in the subordinate commands, and that no additional security measures were invoked upon receipt of the "war warning" (page 499).

Admiral DeLany said that he believed that everything possible was done with the available forces, to secure early information of possible attack within their concept that enemy activity within the area would be confined to submarine and sabotage. (p. 78-9)

Concerning the instruction in the war warning to take "defensive deployment," Admiral DeLany said that as he recalled the island was alerted, the Commander-in-Chief put certain aspects of his security letter in effect with the forces afloat, and he pointed out, the actual deployment of the Fleet in view of its organization into task forces for the accomplishment of offensive missions, existed.

Admiral DeLany also stated that the Commanding Officer of the aircraft had been given orders to accelerate the refitting of the planes which had come to them without self-sealing tanks and other offensive war equipment. (p. 79)

Admiral DeLany recalls that about this time, submarines were sent out on patrol at Midway and at Wake. (p. 79)

Admiral Calhoun said that he did not know of any additional security measures which Admiral Kimmel could have taken (page 943); he considered the existing COMFOURTEEN security orders adequate (page 944).

Admiral Smith said that because, as the Court inquired, an attack on Pearl Harbor was held only a remote possibility, that additional precautions against such a possibility were unnecessary and unjustified (page 560).

Admiral Smith said that the intended raid to the Westward called for by the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan on the outbreak of hostilities was very much in the minds of Admirals Kimmel and Halsey. The question of the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not seriously considered; the Fleet was ready to carry out its tasks at the outbreak of war; and the question of an attack before negotiations were completed was not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, seriously considered. (p. 58)

Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was not due to preoccupation concerning offensive movements. (p. 63)

Admiral McCormick said that consideration had been given to using Fleet units to augment the Army and local defense forces, and that the Fleet would constitute the backbone of any defense of its own security; the necessity for training for offensive missions naturally makes it impossible to keep the forces wholly employed in routine security measures. (pp. 69)

Admiral McCormick said that he did not think that it was true, to the state of imbalance, that the foremost thought in their minds was the offensive movements rather than the security angle, although they intended to make the maximum offensive use of the Fleet which its comparatively small size would permit. (p. 70)

#### B. RESPONSIBILITY FOR LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE

*Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to the question of whether or not there had been any discussion by Admiral Kimmel concerning reconnaissance from Oahu during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941, that it was not a practice to have formal conferences though there were numerous conferences and discussions, and that undoubtedly such question of reconnaissance was a matter that was discussed during that period, (p. 307); that "definitely" was subject matter discussed during that period between himself and others and Admiral Kimmel. (p. 308).*

*Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he was not able to state what Admiral Kimmel had to say concerning the discussion of reconnaissance from Oahu, "but", he continued to testify, "the conclusions that he (Admiral Kimmel) reached did not result in any distant search being maintained, but rather that the search at the time was against submarines in localized areas." (p. 308).*

Admiral Kimmel stated that under the provisions of Exhibit 52, Task Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) was to provide a long range scouting force, direct patrols into areas, and at times, ordered by CincPac to improve the security of the Fleet units and bases, and was to issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. There were insufficient planes for complete reconnaissance. The schedules of employment of the planes were submitted to and approved by Admiral Kimmel, pursuant to Exhibit 52. Although Admiral Kimmel had nothing suitable for reconnaissance, he could, Admiral Kimmel said, ask for such planes.

Admiral Kimmel stated that the Navy patrol planes were under his direct command (page 1125), and he assumed the direct responsibility of employing them. That Admiral Bloch was charged with the execution of that part of the plan which required the search, and he always had the right to request those planes for that purpose and did so on several occasions. However, Admiral Kimmel issued the orders to the planes (page 1125). He said that he was directly responsible for whether a distant reconnaissance with planes should be taken and that no subordinate had recommended such reconnaissance (page 374).

Admiral Kimmel said that he did not know that daily patrols were permanently in effect prior to his command, as indicated by a question, over a certain arc from Honolulu. He did know that certain searches had been conducted but thought them ineffective (page 373). He had considered using part of the planes to search for a probable area of enemy advance. Such search had been done previously for a number of days on Admiral Bloch's suggestion, but had been discontinued after finding nothing (page 373).

To the best of Admiral Kimmel's recollection, reconnaissance patrol in certain areas was not in effect when he took command. A patrol covering the operating area was in effect, and he continued that patrol (page 1125). In any event, he thoroughly considered the question of running patrols and had to make a decision between training and running patrols. He was told by the commander of the patrol planes and by the Army of their training difficulties. In addition, they did not have a sufficient number to maintain an adequate patrol over a long period of time, and a patrol out to 300 miles is almost useless as a guard against an air raid. That was and is his opinion, although any patrol run has some value as far as surface ships are concerned.

Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion that any air attack on Oahu would come at night and considered at some time the placing of all available planes in the air in the morning, but did not think the time had arrived to take any measures such as that (page 1131). The "emergencies" were continuing all the time and he did not have the personnel and material (page 1132). If he had put the Navy PBY's

in the air at all, he would have had them out on patrol (page 1132). Had he had all the planes in the air each morning at daylight, he said, it would have alarmed the civilian population (page 1134).

Admiral McMorris said that long range reconnaissance was considered at that time and earlier, but had to be considered along with the availability of patrol planes, the status of training of these planes, employments they might be called on to carry out, the offensive operation laid down in war plans, and the necessity of covering operating areas, and supplying personnel for new squadrons (page 86).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection of a conference or conversation between him and Admiral Kimmel concerning reconnaissance from Oahu between the period of November 27 and December 7, 1941, but that such was "a matter" that was discussed between him and Admiral Kimmel and between the two of them with other members of the staffs and with other senior naval officers present in Pearl Harbor.

He stated that he no longer remembered the details but did recall the considerations that were in mind, in general, and the action determined upon. He stated that the situation as to equipment was that the number of patrol planes was small and that certain of them were earmarked for Midway and Wake, and for reconnaissance of the Marshalls at an appropriate time.

He stated that the following matters were considered:

(a) that it was believed to be highly important to maintain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas;

(b) that it was contemplated, in case war should start, that most of the Japanese shore-based aircraft were to be moved to the Island outposts (Midway, Johnston, and Wake) but that some were to remain under the operational control of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Command since that command had no aircraft of its own;

(c) that, in order to have the patrol craft ready for prompt movement to Island outposts where the repair and upkeep facilities were negligible, it was considered highly important that there be no excessive use of such craft which would require engine overhaul and interfere with readiness for flight on short notice;

(d) that, because the Navy patrol wings as a whole were being increased, the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in giving essential advanced operational training, that it was determined that such training should be continued as much as possible.

Considering these matters, that is, the requirements for antisubmarine patrol readiness of patrol aircraft for distant service, and continuation of the training program, "it was determined that the arrangements that were actually in effect were the best that we could do. This in effect accepted a calculated risk. Subsequent events proved that the calculations weren't good." (page 305-306).

Admiral McMorris stated further in this connection that calculations made at this time showed that "only varied limited sectors could be continually patrolled with the forces then available." (page 306).

He further stated "it may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness of the search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the approach of Japanese carriers on the morning of 7 December would have been detected as their approach would quite possibly have been unguarded."

With reference to the extent of the sectors which could have been covered by reconnaissance from Oahu by the patrol planes available during the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral McMorris testified that his testimony of Admiral Pelling, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that continuous daily patrols for an undetermined number of days would have been feasible during the period in question by dividing the combat crews into three groups and using twenty planes daily, which would have covered 144°, "wouldn't be wrong." (page 309-310).

However, he testified, that the only consideration given in that statement is to the question of running a search, "but the Commander-in-Chief had not only to consider the matter of weighing, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for distant service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being built." (page 310).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he could not state categorically the extent of the sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes during the period in question. He stated that various combinations of diagrams, some drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the aviation officer, and some probably drawn by the Operations Division, were given consideration, though he was not able to testify as to the extent the diagrams were presented to Admiral Kimmel, neither was he able to state when and by whom any such diagrams were considered.

*He testified that if any long distant searches were instituted, they undoubtedly could have been a compromise among the different features involved, "just as a compromise was actually reached in limiting the searches to the fleet operating areas." (page 309).*

Previously searches of rotating narrow sectors had been made daily (page 890). Due consideration, it was decided not to make long range air reconnaissance would be of limited effectiveness and training would suffer heavily and the operational readiness of the planes would be reduced. He recalled no formal conference on this matter with Admiral Kimmel, but it was probably discussed (pages 890-1).

The war plans group and he were of the opinion that a raid on Hawaii was likely and wanted to have the patrol planes ready to go to Midway and Wake for offensive operations (page 890).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the patrol or aircraft reconnaissance being conducted from Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period from 27 November 1941 onwards, were very limited. He stated that the aircraft at all outlying bases excepting Midway were entirely defensive, while those at Midway were partially defensive and partially for patrol. He stated that the patrols from Midway were limited because of the limitations there in the amount of gas and upkeep facilities, which required conservation in order that the engines might not be worn out "before a critical period arose" (p. 327-328).

He also testified that if a maximum search had been instituted from Pearl Harbor and from Midway after the warning of November 27th, there would have been a highly critical situation with regard to aircraft engines by the 7th of December (p. 328).

Exhibit 19 (repeat of Army dispatch) directing that operations be conducted not to alarm the civilian population, had no bearing on the action taken by regarding reconnaissance or other war preparations (page 891).

Admiral Bloch stated that his sole connection with long range reconnaissance was that as ComFOURTEEN, he made a joint agreement with the Commanding General which would be placed in execution on "M" day or by order of the War Navy Departments, or upon mutual agreement of the two local commanders of the Army and Navy; that then it would be the responsibility of the Navy to provide reconnaissance planes, the delivery of which was indefinite. Commander of Wing Two was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and under Admiral Bloch's control to the extent that Admiral Bloch exercised control over shore based aircraft, and through him Admiral Bloch arranged to coordinate air effort. Admiral Bellinger was ComPatWing Two, ComTaskFor Nine, Air Scouting Force and ComNavBase Defense Air Force. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was like a volunteer fire department. When you sounded the alarm, they came; otherwise they were doing something else (page 398). Under 41, Admiral Bloch was not responsible for long distance reconnaissance (page 399). Admiral Bellinger was to do this, subject to orders from CincPac (page 400).

On November 27, CincPac decided to make no change in schedules; that included the long range reconnaissance (page 400).

Admiral Bloch stated that he could recall no request which he made for long range reconnaissance other than the request in June 1940, and in the summer of 1941. He felt that while he could recommend such reconnaissance, the Commander-in-Chief did not depend on him to make such a recommendation before ordered reconnaissance (page 1140). Admiral Bloch was Naval Base Defense Force and Admiral Bellinger was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (page 1141). Admiral Bloch had supervisory control and both he and the Commander-in-Chief could give Admiral Bellinger orders (page 1142). The planes under Admiral Bellinger as Naval Base Defense Air Officer only when they were activated, and they were only activated while Admiral Bloch was there for (page 1143). The arrangement was a makeshift one, arising out of the fact that Admiral Bloch had no patrol planes with which to make reconnaissance; so Admiral Kimmel had a makeshift arrangement to furnish patrol planes to the Naval Base Defense Air Force for reconnaissance in case of an air attack in order to protect the carriers, and to supplement the deficiencies in Army fighters (page 1144). Admiral Bloch probably could have gotten planes temporarily by a request to Admiral Kimmel, but could not order a protracted daily reconnaissance without Admiral Kimmel's authority because of Admiral Kimmel's decision of November 27th that he would not make any distant reconnaissance (pages 1144-45).

Admiral Bloch said that he had discussed with Admiral Kimmel the fact that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and had asked Admiral Kimmel if he would supply the planes for such reconnaissance; Admiral Kimmel said that he could not commit himself to that duty except insofar as it might be possible on any occasion and that he, Admiral Kimmel, might have to go away from the locality and take his own forces with him, and the District should really have its own forces. It was Admiral Bloch's definite understanding that in the absence of any planes of his own, missions of reconnaissance to be performed would have to be performed by the Fleet planes and that Admiral Kimmel reserved to himself or to the echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for overseas missions. Actually, he said, Admiral Bellinger was the officer who, as Commander of the Patrol Squadrons of the Fleet and as Commander of the Defense Air Force, did this. It was obvious that the Commander of the District could not use patrol planes without the permission of the Commander of the Defense Air Force because the patrol planes were employed by the Fleet on other missions. It had to be done by the Fleet, there was no confusion of thought as to that, and it was well understood that Admiral Kimmel actually would be the officer or somebody delegated by him would be the officer to designate what reconnaissance was to be made. (p. 9)

Admiral Bloch said that on the occasions when he had asked Admiral Kimmel for patrol planes that Admiral Kimmel said that he would do what he could but could not make any commitments because in the event of hostilities parts of the Fleet would have to leave Pearl Harbor. But Admiral Bloch recalled no statement by Admiral Kimmel to the effect that he could not take any particular security measures because of his commitments to offensive movements. (p. 23-4)

Admiral Bellinger stated that CincPac made the final approval for reconnaissance aircraft operation. CincPac or ComFOURTEEN could vitalize Naval Defense Air Force. ComFOURTEEN worked under CincPac. Naval Defense Air Force was not composed of all aircraft, but of aircraft reported available (page 665). Admiral Bellinger said that he would have looked to ComFOURTEEN or CincPac to direct reconnaissance (page 683).

Admiral Bellinger said that in the absence of definite information as to the probability of an attack, it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance. (p. 125)

Captain Ramsey said that Admiral Bellinger was not a naval base defense officer insofar as planes were concerned, except in a drill or emergency, and did not control fighting planes, radar, or anti-aircraft guns (page 593).

Captain Ramsey said that during the period November 27th to December 7th, there were approximately 83 Army and Navy planes available for patrol. Twelve of these were B-17's; the Army only reported six available to Navy Base Defense. The Navy patrol planes were either in Task Force Nine or associated with other task forces (page 599). All were operating on schedules approved by CincPac (page 600).

Admiral Bellinger, he said, had nothing to do with the daily employment or schedules of planes and did not have authority to order them to discontinue training and institute long range reconnaissance on his own authority in absence of an immediate emergency (page 600).

Admiral Pye stated that it was not his job to advise as to patrols (page 483).

Colonel Phillips testified that distant reconnaissance was discussed but not undertaken. The Navy, he said, was responsible for such reconnaissance (page 483).

#### C. READINESS OF AIRCRAFT AND DRILLS

Admiral Bloch said that in addition to the 250 fighters that the Army had of their own, the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters ashore and available to the Army. Each morning at 8 o'clock, Admiral Bellinger would give the Army a list of the planes which were available to the Army and the Army was supposed to send to him at the same time a list of the Army bombers that were available to the Navy. (p. 10)

Admiral Bloch said that in the beginning they had an air raid and blackout drill once a week, and later on they could not have it that often. The Army did not always come in on the drills. There were some interferences because the time that Admiral Bloch would choose for the drill was not always agreeable to the other forces. It interfered with the work of



force commanders at sea and some of them complained. It was then decided, at about the time that 2CL was issued, to set the date two or three months ahead so that everyone would know that drills were going to happen on that date. (p. 10)

According to Admiral Bellinger, the condition of the planes as to readiness between November 27th and December 7th was the "normal" condition B-5 (50% on four hours notice) which was the normal condition of readiness (page 669); the Army was in Condition E-5 (in routine operation and could be made ready in four hours).

Captain Ramsey said that during the period prior to December 7, drills were held under the plans developed for the Naval Base Defense Air Force and defects were noted and corrected (page 593).

Colonel Phillips could not remember whether any reconnaissance drills were held by the Army and Navy from October 15th to December 7th (page 488).

Admiral Kimmel stated that air-raid drills had been held weekly, and later bi-weekly, for several months prior to December 7th (page 296).

#### D. EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE

Admiral Kimmel stated (page 299) that he ordered one patrol squadron to Wake, and that the patrol squadron at Midway be replaced by a squadron from Pearl Harbor, and that the squadrons were to conduct reconnaissance en route. Daily searches were made by the squadron at Midway on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th of December, and were to be made daily until further notice.

The ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake on November 28th, and landed planes at Wake on December 3rd. The ENTERPRISE conducted daily reconnaissance flights. The patrol squadron at Wake was withdrawn and conducted a reconnaissance sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Halsey said that there was a plan which came out daily prior to December 7 showing the reconnaissance for that day. He recalled that the Fleet operating areas were searched daily and he thought that prior to December 7 there regular searches in certain sectors believed to be most dangerous. (p. 304)

The LEXINGTON was sent to Midway with a VMF squadron on December 5th and conducted reconnaissance en route. She was 400 miles southeast of Midway when war broke out.

Daily reconnaissance of operating areas was conducted with PBY planes based at Pearl Harbor. Two submarines were operating at Wake and two at Midway on patrol.

Admiral Delaney stated that all reconnaissance was conducted in connection with training flights (page 499).

*Admiral Bellinger said that from 1 to 4 December 1941 scouting flights were conducted daily, covering an approximate 90 degree sector, to a distance of 300 miles, by one squadron per day for the sector. He emphasized that these flights were flown as part of Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises only; they were training flights and not directed fleet reconnaissance. He was unable to recall the sectors utilized (p. 494).*

The operating areas were under constant patrol. No additional security measures were invoked upon receipt of Exhibit 17 (War Warning), primarily because of lack of sufficient planes and pilots, and for getting planes in operating condition so far as guns and bullet-proof tanks were concerned (page 499).

#### E. EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN:

*Vice Admiral Bellinger said that although aircraft were lacking to enable a 360 degree search from Oahu, a partial aerial reconnaissance, covering certain selected sectors, was a possible and feasible operation (p. 477).*

*Any regular reconnaissance must, Admiral Bellinger said, have been adopted at the expense of the expansion training program then in effect. Had he received clear warning to search for an enemy force, all his planes would, of course, have been utilized, but no thorough 360 degree search was possible with the equipment at his disposal (p. 508-509).*

*If a limited search had been planned, it would have been of the northern approaches to Oahu, since these were considered the most dangerous. But no limited search was contemplated, according to Admiral Bellinger, who recalled no dis-*

*cussion of aerial reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel in the days up to December (p. 506-508).*

Admiral Stark testified that the Navy did not have sufficient patrol planes and distribution was made of what he had. He was constantly trying to get more. Other obligations of the Navy under JAAAN-35 generally were taken care of (pages 34-37). There were not sufficient forces for coastal work in Hawaii. Forces for this purpose had to be drawn from the Pacific Fleet (page 37). Hawaii, Johnston, and Oahu was, on December 7th, in category "D", "subject to major attack," and under the agreement a stronger offshore patrol was required than under "C", and "long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of GHQ air force." He was uncertain what "GHQ" air force meant, but believed it to be a mobile force subject to direct orders from the War Department to be used to augment a local force (page 38). Admiral Stark also testified that the trip of the carrier to Wake did not impair CincPac's ability to carry out reconnaissance (page 803).

General Marshall stated that the status of "GHQ Air Force" mentioned in "Joint Action Army-Navy, 1935" as to long range reconnaissance planes was that there were no planes in that Air Force available for transfer to Hawaii in case of emergency. It was the air force in the continental United States, he said, and was being made available in pieces for overseas use all the time (page 859).

Admiral Kimmel testified that under the joint plan, the Army was to operate all pursuits and the Navy all bombers and patrol planes and that there were daily reports as to the availability of planes (page 296). He said that long range reconnaissance to be effective should cover a radius of 800 miles (page 304) and that it would take 84 patrol planes for one flight of 360° and two and a half times that number for continuous daily search. All sectors around Oahu were ones from which an attack could be expected, even though he had testified before the Robert's Commission that he thought North the most probable sector (page 305). If restricted, he would search the western 180° sector first (page 305).

He further stated that his firm conviction was that long range reconnaissance over a period of time would have put his planes out of commission. Thirty days of long range reconnaissance would have reduced his planes by 25%. Incidentally, if he had sent the planes out, and when he did so, he would have armed them and did arm them (page 329).

Admiral Bellinger made reference to a report of a Joint Army and Navy Board dated October 31, 1941, signed by Admiral Bellinger and his Army opposite. Paragraph 4 indicated that as pertained to Army aviation, the problem confronting the Board, as stated by the Army, was that the Army's mission was to defend the naval base against all attacks by an enemy; that the Hawaiian Air Force was to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment, aviation; and to detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation (page 663). This report pointed out that 170 B-17s and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill that mission. There would be needed 84 naval patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directed under ComFOURTEEN, and to supplement or to replace the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two which might be ordered to advance bases on outlying islands.

He stated that both the Army and the Navy were in the process of receiving replacement of obsolescent planes (page 663), and there were the usual shakedown and maintenance problems. There was an absence of spare parts for PBY planes, and the installation of leak-proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Also there was difficulty with cracking of engine nose sections and installation of modified sections was in progress (page 663).

The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two, he said, was training in preparation for war (page 663). The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force on a functioning basis would have necessitated substantial cessation of training (page 664). Continued operation of all planes for scouting would have soon reduced their material readiness and fatigued the crews. Therefore, as stated in the estimate of the situation, advance intelligence of a possible attack within narrow limits was a prerequisite for starting long distance patrol (page 664).

Admiral Bellinger said that fifty planes per day would be required to cover 360° for 700 miles (page 672). Counting eight available Army bombers and about 54 Navy planes, there were 62 planes available for patrol. These Navy planes were in PatWing Two and PatWing One, which also included a squadron at Midway and a squadron which returned to Pearl Harbor on December 5th and needed maintenance work (page 676). There was scarcely more than one cr

per plane. Continuous daily patrol could be flown only by dividing combat crews into three groups, which means twenty planes daily which could cover 144°. This would be for an undetermined number of days, but would not be permanent. Spare parts were critically short (page 673). The 54 Navy planes were PBV-5's sent to replace obsolescent planes and had arrived, one squadron of 12, Oct. 28th; one squadron of 6, Oct. 28th; one squadron of 12, Nov. 23rd; one squadron of 12, Nov. 23rd. They were new and there were shakedown difficulties (page 673) and absence of spare parts. They had received some earlier vintage PBV-5's and had had trouble with cracking of engine nose sections. The practical range of PBV-5 was radius of 700 miles, of PBV-3's 600 miles (page 670).

Exhibit 59 (letter from CincPac to CNO of January 7, 1942, enclosing Bellinger's letter) contains data on planes needed for 360° patrol to 700 miles (page 675).

He commanded PatWing Two and had control of PatWing One (page 677). Task Force Nine included everything he had, so it included these planes. The general policy or plan as to employment schedules was set out by CincPac. Other than planes being overhauled and repaired, the balance of those planes were occupied each day in carrying out the routine schedule of operations (page 677), which schedules were matters between plane commanders and CincPac through regular channel of command.

All-out reconnaissance after November 27th would have completely disrupted training, he (Bellinger) said (page 679), and if all training had been stopped and a daily patrol commenced on October 17th, it would have affected the efficiency of the air force on December 7th; many planes would not have been in flight condition (page 680).

Admiral Bellinger testified that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available. Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PPV-5 type, with limited available spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assuming that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes, for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius of 700 miles, totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PPV-5's. Actually, on 7 December 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake and required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have been able to cover 128 degrees (pages 480-483, 485-487, 502-504).

Admiral Bellinger further testified that if he had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral Bellinger's "vague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several weeks (pages 504-506).

Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector. But there had been searches made to the south because of information received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force was to the south. (p. 506-07).

Admiral Bellinger said that when he arrived in Hawaii on October 30, 1940, he found they were operating on a shoestring (page 667), and he tried to point out to the Navy Department, via CincPac and Commander Scouting Force, the importance of remedying the existing deficiencies, but the emphasis seemed not to be on the Pacific. He was not satisfied with the supply of planes and the development of plane facilities in Hawaii up to December 1941, though there had been considerable improvement over the time he first reported (page 674) in 1940

Admiral Bellinger discussed the main effort during several months preceding the attack which consisted of training, maintenance difficulties, etc. (p. 116)

Admiral Bellinger said that prior to December 7, they were short of the allocated number of crews for patrol planes and the main training was expansion training so as to increase the number of crews. (p. 117)

Admiral Bellinger discussed the reasons why a 360° circumference could not have been maintained. He said that there was no hard and fixed decision as to the direction in which an attack might be launched although the wind direction indicated that the northern sector might be more desirable. The location of bases from which such an attack might come were in the southwesterly direction. (p. 118) Admiral Bellinger said that the 300 miles estimated as an enemy launching radius was a high estimate but had been selected as giving the enemy the advantage in the estimate.

Captain Ramsey stated that he believed a patrol of 800 miles was necessary for distant reconnaissance. One squadron of PBV-3 planes attached to Pat Wing One and Two could only fly a radius of 700 miles. Around November 27th it was decided to reinforce Wake with Marine fighter squadron, and one of the patrol squadrons, VP-21, which had been at Midway since October was transferred to Wake with orders to scout and cover the advance of Admiral Halsey's task force. A second patrol squadron was sent out from Pearl Harbor to Midway to scout and similarly cover Admiral Halsey's advance and retirement. VP-22 left Wake on December 3rd or 4th and arrived at Pearl Harbor on December 5th, which left just the one squadron, VP-21, at Midway (page 583). That squadron was of old, obsolete planes, PBV-3's, which were due for overhaul and to be replaced with PBV-5's.

With nine planes undergoing repair or out of commission for other reasons, they had 12 naval planes at Midway and about 60 at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe which could have been used for reconnaissance to the 700 mile point (page 583). There were also six Army B-17's which were available and which could go beyond 300 miles; they could go to 800 miles.

He, Capt. Ramsey, was asked whether, with these planes available from November 27th to December 7th, he could have complied with a directive to conduct long range reconnaissance through 360° (page 583). He stated: No. A single plane going to 700 miles could cover a sector of only 8°; only 50% of the 66 planes could be used continuously and therefore only 264° could be covered daily (page 583); 360° could be covered only one, or possibly two, days in an emergency but could not be maintained. Three weeks of intensive daily searches would have seen about a 75% reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit, placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other going. The pilots could have kept going about six weeks but then would need a protracted rest (page 584). Daily long range reconnaissance could have been maintained indefinitely by using 30 planes each day until the exhaustion period was reached provided they were permitted by higher authority to operate that many for search alone, because that would have left them entirely without a striking group except as remaining 36 were available (page 583). Without exhausting planes or personnel, and assuming the supply of critical parts, they could have safely and indefinitely operated a daily reconnaissance to 700 miles with 18 planes and could have covered 144° (pages 584-5).

He further stated that a 700 mile radius of search with 18 planes was based upon a 25-mile visibility. Such visibility did not ordinarily prevail in the Hawaiian Area for a distance of 700 miles; it was either very good or so bad that scouting was impracticable (page 590). Except in a case of a wide-spread weather front a patrol to 700 miles in a 144° sector had a good chance of detecting any large number of vessels on any given day (page 590).

For the PBV-5's, which in the case of several squadrons had during October and November just replaced the PBV-1, 2, and 3 planes, there were substantial, no spare parts. There was the usual shakedown difficulty with a new type plane engine sections cracked and replacement program in effect; material for installing armor and leak-proof tanks in the PBV-5's just being received, and first planes were finished December 7th (page 591).

He, Capt. Ramsey, said that once at Pearl Harbor he saw forty PBV-5's going through to Australia, New Zealand, or Dutch East Indies. This was at a time when such planes were needed at Pearl Harbor (page 602).

He agreed with the Roberts' Report to the extent that the means for distant reconnaissance at their disposal would have provided a certain degree of security but were not adequate for absolute security (page 595).

He said that there had been discussions of the most probable sector for an enemy attack and the northwest sector was considered the most likely line of approach (page 597). In drills for readiness the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was ordered to take up the sector from 315° to 00°, and for any single day he would have sent the planes to cover this sector. On a continental control, the sector would have to be varied, as if a single sector were flown every day the enemy would learn of this and easily avoid it (page 597).

Admiral Davis said that the entire 360° circumference was not of equal importance; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another arc to the south and west were the most important. He estimated that if there had been a coverage of 180° so divided established after receipt of the dispatch of November 27, the chances would have been fairly good, perhaps two out of three that the patrol would have intercepted the Japanese carriers; based on knowledge since acquired, he would be inclined to put the chances as no better than one out of two. The chances, he said, have always been good enough so that defensive search is more than justified. However, he felt that the Japanese had launched their attack at Pearl Harbor from a long distance in order to avoid detection and therefore, that the chances of sighting the Japanese by a previous day's search were less than one out of two.

Admiral Davis said that it was the Commander-in-Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with training and other Fleet improvements and that going into a defensive status would interfere with this work. Concerning the possibility of attack and precautions to be taken, Admiral Davis indicated that he only occasionally saw or heard of warnings given to the Commander in Chief; that he had stated that comprehensive air searches were practicable and would very definitely interfere with progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet; he naturally expressed the opinion that a surprise air attack was possible and could only be prevented by the most extensive searches but he did not realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. He is sure that Naval Intelligence did its best but is convinced that information on the subject was lacking.

Admiral Davis said that he did not believe that the Commander in Chief regarded the damage possibility that might result from a Japanese air raid as very great; that it was apparent that he felt that training and improvements of our own Fleet still had priority, particularly because he believed that there would not be at that time any overt action. Precautions to a certain degree had been taken. As December 7 approached, he was concerned about the general situation with respect to the outlying islands and stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection there. (p. 98-99)

Admiral Davis said that although there were not enough planes and pilots to have established and maintained a long-range 360° search indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft. It could have been undertaken had it been considered essential but unless reinforcements arrived it could not have been maintained.

Admiral McMorris said that, in general, it was a Navy responsibility to obtain early information of the approach of any possible enemy and that forces available for such detection were in general the Fleet patrol planes of PatWingTwo and that the extent of any search that they might carry on was determined by the Commander in Chief. It was as a practical matter, impossible to maintain an effective patrol for anything but a brief period. (p. 240)

Admiral McMorris said that it was not contemplated to use ships for picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii. (p. 240)

Admiral McMorris said that he thought that as of the time in question, the provisions made for obtaining early information of the approach of an enemy were the best that could reasonably be made consistent with the training and other demands on the part of the Fleet, although from hindsight the answer would be otherwise. (p. 241)

Admiral Calhoun said that after the warning of November 27th, CincPac ordered air patrol to the limit of endurance of planes and pilots (page 941). Admiral Smith testified that patrols were flown over operating areas, but there were not sufficient planes for a 360° search (page 538).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Bellinger maintained an air patrol the operating areas only because he had insufficient planes for a more extensive patrol; however Admiral Bellinger based his position entirely on the shortages of planes and not on personnel fatigue. (p. 43)

Admiral Smith said that if CincPac had interpreted Exhibit 17 (War Warning) to mean an attack on Pearl Harbor, he could have put out a search with available aircraft, including Army and carrier-based planes, moved the Fleet westward and advanced carriers to intercept the Japanese (page 557). Without Fleet movement, he could have searched, with the available planes, a radius of perhaps 600 miles, but not through 360° (pages 557-8). The destroyers were required to protect heavy ships in case of the expected submarine attack and could not be used for patrol.

Exhibit 59, a letter by Admiral Nimitz, dated January 7, 1942, was an urgent request for more patrol planes so as to conduct an effective daily search to about 800 miles, which would require about fifty planes daily—there being at the time of this letter a total of 109 (Army and Navy) long range planes available. It was said that this was inadequate for search, a striking force and special mission a minimum of three times the number needed for one day was necessary. He described the extent of the search being made: 25 patrol planes and 12 B-17's were used daily for a 700-mile search, covering 290°; and relatively ineffective planes, such as available VSO, VJ, and B-18's were used to cover the remaining sectors to about 200-300 miles. To this were annexed supporting and detail memoranda, including a letter by Admiral Bellinger, dated December 30, 1941.

Until August, 1941, Captain George Vanduers was an assistant to Admiral Bellinger particularly in connection with arrangements for joint Army-Navy air command. (p. 290). He prepared the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, which indicated that a surprise carrier raid appeared to be the most probable course of action for the enemy. (p. 290). Captain Vanduers stated that, in his opinion, search with 80 planes over a two-week period of the most probable sectors would have been about 40% effective.

Admiral Fitch, who preceded Admiral Bellinger and was Commander of Patrol Wing Two from June, 1940, until October, 1940, said that during the time when he was in command of Patrol Wing Two it was recognized that they had insufficient planes and efforts were made to increase the effectiveness of those they did have, to develop Western island bases and to increase the number of planes. Off-shore patrol plane searches were instituted as a routine from Pearl Harbor and varied as to the amount of searches conducted (p. 228-9). Admiral Fitch said that assuming 80 planes, long range, available and employed over a two-week period and searching only the most probable sectors, a search plan could be evolved which could be expected reasonably to be 50% effective in detecting an enemy attack. (p. 289)

Admiral Kimmel said that if he had had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles and it had met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an attack except by the means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126). Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably could have delivered a very effective attack. The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector.

#### XXIII. ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL SHORT

General Short testified that Alert No. 1 against sabotage was put in effect. General Short considered sabotage as the main danger since the information received was that the Japanese would move Southward (page 239). He said that in a conference, in response to Admiral Kimmel's question, Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, had said there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there was no disagreement. Also, he knew that Admiral Kimmel did not think an air attack likely or he would have moved the ships out. The dispatch which General Short had received put emphasis on not alarming the civilian population and there had been no indication as to what form hostilities might take. He pointed out that the Army sent in B-24's on photo missions

med, and also on December 6th sent out twelve B-17's not in combat con-  
on (page 240).

e said that although he had had conferences with Admiral Kimmel during this  
od, no request was made of him for planes for long distance reconnaissance  
e 249).

e did not recall having seen the dispatch of November 24th, but did see the  
atch of November 28th, which had repeated the Army dispatch to him.

Captain Curtis discussed the general procedure for delivering copies of  
Navy messages to the Army and the procedure handled in connection with  
the November 27 dispatch as follows:

"Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase of such a  
dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a paraphrase to the ad-  
dressee's communication office, and have them ask the Commanding  
General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to sign the  
dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular dispatch  
wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral  
Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my  
telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would  
take care of it by sending his Intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to  
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I  
tried to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused,  
saying that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as  
to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the  
Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief  
of Staff, had delivered a copy to General Short's G-2 officer for delivery  
to General Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G-2  
officer, told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally  
in his bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, personally, about up-  
setting the system of receipts, but, in my own mind, I am satisfied that this  
dispatch was delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval  
District and to General Short, although I held no receipt." (p. 112)

response to the direction contained in the Army dispatch, General Short  
sed the War Department of the action taken by him. The War Department  
not reply. He received another telegram on November 28th which con-  
ed him in his belief that sabotage was considered the main danger (page 244).  
eplied on that day telling what he had done (page 245). He did not report  
ong range reconnaissance for that was the Navy's responsibility (page 246).  
eceived no further information from the War Department and did not change  
alert (page 243).

General Marshall said that after the Army dispatch of November 27th, no  
her warnings were sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short until December  
(page 869). Two other messages warning against sabotage were sent by  
r parts of the War Department on November 28th, but General Marshall  
not familiar with these until after December 7th (page 869).

General Marshall stated, concerning the dispatch in which General Short in-  
ed the War Department of the measures taken pursuant to the warning of  
ember 27th, that so far as they could determine the reply from the Philippines  
the reply from Hawaii came in together and were stapled together. General  
shall initialed the one from the Philippines, which was on top, but not the one  
Hawaii (pages 880-1). He had no recollection one way or the other as to  
ether he had seen the one from Hawaii. He was away from November 26th-  
(page 880), and at other times up to December 7th, and had no recollection  
ether or not he knew of the precautions which General Short had taken  
(page 881).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having been advised of General  
t's reply until after December 7th (pages 151, 802).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of alert the Army  
effective at this time, but he knew that they had some alert in effect (page 326).

#### V. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AND UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR—JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS

##### A. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE

Admiral Bloch said that he had been advised by the District Intelligence  
Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consu-  
late who were spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the

Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had defined information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on this matter dated November 10, 1941, file S-A8-5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The letter thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC) A8-5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above-mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The Army would not agree to the indictment of these Japanese and the matter was referred to Washington where the War and Navy Departments agreed that the matter would not be brought to trial. (p. 15)

Captain Murphy said that there was a general impression that the Japanese could know anything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet. (p. 200)

Admiral Brown said that he thought it quite probable that the Japanese had a copy of the employment schedule setting forth the Fleet Movement. (p. 145)

Captain Mayfield pointed out that the topography of Pearl Harbor permitted easy observation of the ships there. Captain Mayfield was of the belief that there were about 350 Japanese societies which were active. He said that there were also 250 consular agents which he believed were used by the Japanese consulate for the purpose of getting information. (p. 311)

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of the domestic branch of ONI and the activities of the Counter-Espionage Section and conferences with the F. B. I. and the Army set-up. (p. 284) Admiral Wilkinson also discussed the Navy's desire to have the Department of Justice prosecute various Japanese in Hawaii for being non-registered agents of a foreign government and said that the Commanding General had urged that prosecution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the Japanese and the Americans.

Captain Mayfield said that he had participated in conferences at Hawaii concerning the possible prosecution of the Japanese consular agents but that the Army had indicated that they did not want these men prosecuted. (p. 311-312)

Concerning the use of Japanese fishing boats and Intelligence work, Captain Mayfield said there never was definite proof of espionage in all these boats but he believed that they were used for that purpose. (p. 312) Captain Mayfield said that he had no exact information indicating that amateur radio transmitters were used for Intelligence work or regular commercial broadcasts from Hawaii. (p. 312)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the Japanese consular agents of which there were about 240 and the fact that one of them in June 1940 had been proved to have been engaged in espionage. He discussed the correspondence relating to the prosecution of these consular agents which was resisted by General Short.

Lt. Stephenson discussed the sources of Japanese espionage information and the limitations on counter Intelligence due to limited personnel in ONI and to other reasons. (p. 326)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the measures taken to prevent the acquisition of information by visiting Japanese merchant crewmen, etc. (p. 327)

Lt. Stephenson discussed at some length the various sources of information open to Japanese and the inability of the Intelligence Section to prevent the acquisition and transmission of such information.

Lt. Stephenson referred to reports which he had written concerning the espionage problem in Hawaii dated February 9 and February 14, 1942 in the Kuehn case and a report dated April 20, 1943 in the Counter-Intelligence of ONI. He said that it was known on the basis of information after the war that the consulate head used commercial communication facilities for the transmitting of vital Intelligence from and after December 3. (p. 331)

Lt. Stephenson said that no evidence had ever been found establishing that Japanese sampans had been used for espionage purposes but it was recognized that they were so used. (p. 332)

Concerning Japanese espionage, Admiral Smith said:

"I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was so



out by the Japanese by plane. The Intelligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who flew back to the West Coast, and, as the result of all this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe of Charles Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Department intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these priests, but it was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement between the United States and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part of Japanese communications between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii, trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working, but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them."

Captain McCollum said that it had been suspected for some time prior to December 7, 1941, that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. He said that at various times during the last 6 months of 1941 U. S. destroyers had reported contacts with enemy subs in and around the Hawaiian group: Several of these contacts were considered well authenticated. Although most of the contacts were not in the immediate vicinity of Honolulu, he believed that one had been made in Molokai Channel—the approach to the drill grounds of the fleet. In July or August, 1941, it had actually been suggested that a search be made of a certain point to the north of Midway, where it was believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with some of the Japanese reconnaissance subs (p. 23-24).

Vice Admiral Smith stated that there had been many reported submarine contacts prior to 7 December 1941 in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but that in most cases these contacts had not been considered authentic. He did not recall any submarine contacts during the period October-December, 1941 (p. 340).

Captain John B. Earle, USN, in December, 1941, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, testified that in the several months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack there were ten to fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor, most of the reports coming from sampans, occasionally from Army lookout posts, and now and then from planes (p. 451). Captain Earle recalled few of the details of these reports; he remembered none in the months of October and November, 1941, or in December prior to the 6th of that month (p. 451).

A search of the files of CinCPac by Admiral Hewitt's investigation resulted in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:

(1) On 3 November 1941 an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41 was observed by a patrol plane and crossed by Task Force One. An air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032300, 040042).

(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of the CinCPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a

restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280855). A search of part of the area by task group of three destroyers was pursued from 1050 to 1845 on the 28th but produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281135, 281704, 281845).

(5) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23, which was lost in change of range; it was evaluated as probably not indicating the presence of submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022356). An investigation, ordered to be made by DesRon 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.

Lieutenant Woodrum said that over a period of years considerable information had been gathered by the Naval Intelligence Service concerning Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. He said, "There are voluminous reports available concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It is well known that officers attached to these groups made 'sightseeing trips' of the islands, including such vantage points as Aie Heights." (P. 385.)

Admiral Pye stated that the Japanese had practically unlimited means of obtaining and transmitting information concerning United States ships at Oahu (page 429). Charts recovered after the attack, he said, indicated that the Japanese had planned to attack certain berths, expecting the ships to be in the position in which they had been berthed three weeks earlier (page 430).

Admiral DeLany stated that the enemy had unlimited opportunity for observation and for getting information out of Pearl Harbor. The operating schedule for the Fleet provided a varying length of time for ships to be in port and at sea (page 499). But, he had no specific information that the Japanese were endeavoring to keep currently informed of the location and movements of Units of the Fleet immediately preceding December 7, 1941 (page 500).

Commander Rochefort said that Japanese opportunities for espionage and for transmission of information were ample (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, there were no restrictions on the Japanese getting information out of Hawaii, but the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables (pages 909-910).

#### B. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR

Captain Rochefort, officer-in-charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, said that his immediate superior was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. In his relations with the District Intelligence Officer, he freely exchanged information and views, except for "ultra" information. The relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to "exchange all information available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by him." A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer every morning. With regard to the FBI, Captain Rochefort met the agent-in-charge frequently and discussed the general situation, but did not discuss ultra matters. In turn, the FBI agent kept Captain Rochefort informed of what he was doing, "possibly with some limitation." Captain Rochefort's relationship with the Army was similar to that with the FBI. He said that between 27 November and 7 December 1941 he had several talks and exchanged opinions with Colonel Fielder, G-2 to General Short. However, he gave the Army no ultra information. He said that his relationship with the Army was entirely on a personal basis—i. e., there was no official system set up for joint operations. Captain Rochefort's relations with the Federal Communications Commission were limited to technical matters, such as direction finding and the location of unauthorized stations (p. 44-46, 65).

Captain Rochefort said that during the latter part of 1941 the communication intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the tasks of attacking and exploiting Jap personnel code, administrative code, and the code in use in the Marshall area. It was also to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems, except the "five-numbered system." The Washington center was charged with general control of all three units and in addition worked on Jap diplomatic systems and such others as were directed (p. 44).

Admiral Hewitt's examination brought out information not previously developed regarding the intelligence sources and activities of Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet.

In this connection, Commander Fabian said that he had been attached in November and December, 1941, to the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor. This unit had a number of personnel detailed to the decryption of Japanese radio traffic and operated a direction finder, twenty-six radio receivers, and other equipment necessary to intercept enemy transmissions. Its general mission was to

study Japanese communications with a view to keeping track of the Jap fleet, and in this connection the unit was attempting to break the enemy naval system JN-25 (p. 68-69, 73). The unit also intercepted Jap diplomatic codes and of these was assigned the task of reading the machine cipher "purple," machine cipher "red" and the code J-19. However, the exploitation of these codes was primarily for the purpose of obtaining local information: all purple traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in the red and J-19 codes were sent to Washington for complete analysis. The latter messages were not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit, since this unit was not performing any cryptanalysis of the diplomatic codes (p. 70-72). Commander Fabian said that from breaking the "purple" dispatches during the period 27 November to 7 December they knew that American-Japanese negotiations in Washington were not proceeding satisfactorily and would probably be broken off (p. 72).

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, during 1941, said that a copy of all Jap diplomatic messages decrypted by the Corregidor radio intelligence unit was furnished daily to the Army. The Army was not given copies of dispatches sent out by CinCAF to CinCPac or to Washington dealing with purely naval matters. Captain Mason said, however, that he conferred quite frequently with the head of intelligence in the Philippine Army Department and quite often provided estimates as to the locations of the Jap fleet. Speaking generally, Captain Mason said that he was in close contact with the Army most of the time and that information was freely exchanged. He said that the Army did not have a radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, although they did have an intercept station which merely copied Japanese Army and diplomatic traffic (p. 70-71).

Captain Safford, chief of the Communications Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department, during 1941, said that the Corregidor radio intelligence unit had been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems for several years, up to and including 7 December 1941. Main interest of this unit was on the local Asiatic circuits for the information of CinCAF, but late in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering the Berlin-Tokyo circuit. These latter intercepts were forwarded to Washington and weren't touched locally (p. 98-99).

With respect to the exchange of information among the Corregidor, Pearl Harbor and Washington radio intelligence units, Captain Safford made the following statement (p. 99):

"If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the intercept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for the 'purple' machine and keys for another system which we called Jig-19, and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of duty.

"With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few."

Captain Safford said further that there was a free exchange of intelligence information between the Corregidor and Pearl Harbor units "so far as it pertained to the projects they were assigned." However, since the dissemination of intelligence was considered a function of Naval Intelligence rather than Naval Communications, Captain Safford indicated that information regarding the Japanese fleet obtained by the Corregidor unit would not necessarily be passed to the Pearl Harbor unit. He said that such information would normally be passed to CinCAF or his Fleet Intelligence Officer, and further dissemination would be made by them (p. 100-101).

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, was District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, in December, 1941. The mission of his office comprised general intelligence matters in cooperation with other federal and local intelligence organizations, especially with respect to espionage and counter-espionage and any other intelligence functions as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the District Commandant. Lt. Col. Bicknell was the Army officer charged with local intelligence. The FBI official was Mr. Robert L. Shivers (p. 558).

Admiral Mayfield testified that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations prescribed complete cooperation between the District Intelligence Office and G-2 of the Army and the FBI. Admiral Mayfield stated that cooperation was full and whole-hearted, that all information possessed by his office was readily available to G-2 and the FBI, which were given copies of any material of interest (p. 559).

Admiral Mayfield stressed that despite free interchange of assistance between his office and the radio intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District, headed by Commander Rochefort, that unit was a separate organization and in no sense subordinate to the District Intelligence Office. Commander Rochefort's unit reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the opinion of Admiral Mayfield. As to the general nature of the work of Commander Rochefort's unit, Admiral Mayfield was unable to give definite information (p. 560).

Reports by Commander Rochefort's unit, concerning the location or movement of Japanese fleet units, were not routed to the District Intelligence Office, and Admiral Mayfield said he had no knowledge of them (p. 561).

Relations between the District Intelligence Office and the Fleet Intelligence Office were, according to Admiral Mayfield, cordial, close and cooperative. He was in "more or less constant" personal communication with Captain Layton (the Fleet Intelligence Officer), to whom he endeavored to furnish all information of interest (p. 560-561).

Admiral Mayfield recalled no conversations with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort from November 27th to December 7, 1941, concerning the prospects of war between Japan and the United States. Admiral Mayfield said the only intelligence matters he discussed with Admiral Bloch and Captain Layton concerned counter-espionage measures. Admiral Mayfield added he was not advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941 of the so-called war warning (p. 574-575).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Admiral Bellinger added that not until after 7 December 1941 did he see or know of the CNO dispatch of 28 November stating that hostile action by the Japanese was possible. Nor, said Admiral Bellinger, did he see any of the daily communication intelligence summaries, 14 October to 5 December 1941 prepared by the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel (p. 498-499).

Admiral Bellinger did not remember having seen a memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel on the subject of the location of the Japanese fleet (p. 499).

(1) Sources and distribution:

Admiral Kingman said that the details of administration of the investigative activities within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the Commandant than was the case with those cases more closely connected with Washington. He recalled that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the investigative activities in the Fourteenth Naval District which were carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty thereat, and thinks that this was mentioned in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations which, however, the Examining Officer was unable subsequently to locate. (p. 336) Admiral Kingman could recall nothing relating to the activities of the so-called consular agents at Hawaii. (p. 336)

The facilities for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies were, according to Admiral Bloch, as follows: When Admiral Bloch arrived at Pearl Harbor, there were two units at Pearl Harbor composed of communicators and Intelligence people, Japanese language students. The information thus secured by radio intelligence and such other information as they secured was transmitted to Cavite and to the Navy Department. That was Admiral Bloch's principal source of Japanese intelligence. They also received the intelligence that was collected at Cavite.

When Admiral Bloch arrived, he was dissatisfied with this organization and he organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence," where they were under one hand. This unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors and all the other things they had, with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, this unit was placed in a secure place in one big room in the basement of the office building, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders. Admiral

Bloch always did his best to augment this force by getting more and better men. In addition to that unit, they had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army Intelligence and the FBI and they also had such reports as were sent to them by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. They kept in touch with the Commander-in-Chief as best they could and Admiral Bloch believed that they were getting everything that was pertinent although the Commander-in-Chief had many sources of information that Admiral Bloch did not have. Admiral Bloch felt, however, that Admiral Kimmel conscientiously endeavored to give to him everything that Admiral Kimmel thought he should have. Admiral Bloch believed that the Navy Department had more knowledge about actual conditions than they did. (p. 12) All of the information received by the Combat Intelligence unit, he said, was always delivered to the Commander-in-Chief. (p. 13)

Admiral Smith said that they got very little Intelligence on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but that they had radio intelligence and every time that one or more of the three Task Force Commanders were in port or the Type Commanders were in port, Admiral Kimmel would have them over and have the Intelligence Officer point out on his chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of the location of all units of the Japanese Fleet. Admiral Smith was present at all of such conferences. The War Plans Officer (then Captain now Rear Admiral McMorris), the Operations Officer then Captain now Rear Admiral De Lany, the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Comdr. Layton) and the Fleet Communications Officer, were always fully informed of all intelligence in this manner. (p. 33)

Captain Edwin T. Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, during 1941. He had studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. (p. 214)

The sources from which he obtained information concerning the Japanese Navy in 1941 were:

"The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval Attache, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander-in-Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu." (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he thought that our intelligence coverage was good, although always incomplete.

Captain Layton said that he felt that the State Department undoubtedly had information which was not supplied to the Commander in Chief and which would have been of value. (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he intimately concerned himself with the results obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organizations. He said that the information obtained and made available to the Commander in Chief was principally from the unit at Cavite and the local unit in Pearl Harbor, that almost nothing came from Washington, and that he felt that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture. (p. 216)

Captain Layton said that he communicated the available intelligence concerning Japanese naval forces daily at about 8:15 in the morning, and if subsequent to that time important information was received, he would report it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity. When he reported to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions the War Plans Officer and senior Operations Officer were called in. When task force commanders would return to port, Admiral Kimmel would send for Layton and have him review the situation. (p. 216)

The discussions which he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized generally as follows:

"The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the

Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls the estimated strength in the area the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of submarines—they were called 'submerged submarines'—off Molokai, whether submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions." (p. 217)

Commander Rochefort had studied Japanese in Japan for three years from about September, 1929 until September, 1932, and qualified as Japanese interpreter and translator. Commander Rochefort's source of information in addition to the work of his own Combat Intelligence Unit were the Washington headquarters, a unit similar to his attached to CincPac and other government agencies such as the FBI, the Army and F. C. C. Honolulu. The information furnished by these latter agencies, he said, was of no value prior to December 7, 1941. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort said that any message originating in one of the combat intelligence units was automatically sent to the other two units. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort reported the intelligence which came into his hands to the Commander-in-Chief, FOURTEEN personally and to the Commander-in-Chief, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Captain Mayfield said that the organization of the District Intelligence Office when he reported for duty consisted of about thirteen persons. He sought and obtained additional personnel but his opinion was that the organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7. (p. 309) Captain Mayfield said that the cooperation between the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence at Hawaii was very good. (p. 309)

Captain Layton said that the Army's liaison with the Fleet was through Colonel Edward Railey and that he saw Colonel Railey almost every day. He did not receive from any Army source any information available. (p. 217)

In his statement at the end of his examination Lt. Stephenson said that there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization that Admiral Bloch was not sufficiently security conscious and not sufficiently mindful of the enemy espionage potential at Hawaii. This, however, he said, could make him cite no casual connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack.

Captain Earle said that he was generally familiar with the activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District, and as far as he knew both he and Admiral Bloch were satisfied with the activities of that office. He could recall nothing of the results obtained by Commander Rochefort's unit. (p. 373-5)

Admiral McCormick remembered no instance where the War Plans Section received any intelligence derived from local sources, except one or two cases dealing with counter-espionage. (p. 70) Admiral McCormick said that he had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until they saw the dispatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had been seen large movements on the way south, off Indo-China. He said that the War Plans Section, as a whole, was not furnished with daily or periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence or Fleet Intelligence. (p. 70)

Admiral Delany believed that the information furnished by Intelligence was the best that those sources could assemble but was aware that the sources were inadequate and believed that there was a general feeling that they were more or less operating in the dark not only from the information that they were able to collect in Pearl Harbor but also as to information furnished from other sources. This applied to information both as to the location of Japanese units and as to the probability of war. (p. 84)

Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the Naval Intelligence bulletins. (p. 138)

Admiral Pye said that Admiral Kimmel in effect turned over to him the training program and in connection with that his consultations with Admiral Kimmel were frequent. Also, Admiral Kimmel customarily called in to

Intelligence Officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known. (p. 148)

Concerning the intelligence available from the middle of October until the time of the attack, Admiral McMorris said that they felt that they would like to have known lots more than they did and that on the whole, they felt it was somewhat insufficient but did not see any probability of achieving improvement. (p. 241)

Admiral Kimmel testified that his Fleet Intelligence worked with ComFOURTEEN's Intelligence. He depended largely on units of the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence for information. The Intelligence units were satisfactory (page 280). Also he received intelligence from ComFOURTEEN, Navy Department, and forces afloat (page 280). Summaries of information were furnished him (page 281). The number of war plans officers were increased by him. Serving as such were McMorris, McCormick, Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer, and a Lieutenant. All enemy intelligence went to war plans and estimates were drawn from day to day (page 281). Information was furnished to him, to his War Plans head, to his Chief of Staff, and to Captain DeLany (Operations). The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and he interexchanged intelligence (page 282). Prior to December 7th, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was informed of intelligence affecting Hawaii and other places where he had forces. He was not informed regarding plans for places distant from Hawaii (page 282). The Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel said, gave him all the information which he had (page 283).

Captain Layton said that, as Fleet Intelligence Officer, his main sources of information were from CNO and DONI, who forwarded reports from naval diplomatic sources, reports from observers, from the State Department, from the local intelligence officers, and liaison with the British secret intelligence, and reports from ComTWELVE, ComSIXTEEN, and ComTHIRTEEN (page 904). He was kept informed of FBI and Army Intelligence at the time (page 909). He passed information to CincPac by hand in its original form. If the information was a long report, he made a brief of it (page 904). He thought that local Army Intelligence was not getting the "highly secret" information from the Army; he informed them in general (page 908).

Admiral Bloch said that the intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District was efficient, although not adequate in space and personnel, and kept him and CincPac informed (page 391). Intelligence was received from CincPac, the District Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. He did not receive the intelligence bulletins from the Navy Department, his ONI probably did (page 392).

Commander Rochefort testified that he was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District from June through December, 1941 (page 471). Combat intelligence consisted of an interceptor unit, a direction finder unit, and a cryptographic or research group. Collaboration with the FBI, Army, and Federal Communications Commission was on a personal basis. They received, normally, reports from ONI at Washington, and the letters and dispatches in their own system, which were of a more technical nature. They would get all information of a technical nature from Washington, but all information available at ONI in Washington was not sent them as a matter of course (page 471). Only one or two bits of political or diplomatic information were sent to him (page 472). Military information would be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Rochefort handled intelligence of Japanese ship movements. The information received was automatically passed to CNO, CincAsiatic, and to CincPac. Written summaries were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer (page 472).

*The following information was contained in the ComFourteen Radio Intelligence Summaries and was made available to Admiral Kimmel (p. 193):*

1. The November 27th Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary, delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Samo and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third

*Fleet and other units.* As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning airforces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

2. The Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered November 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communication and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were heard. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that "Traffic activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

3. The communication intelligence summary of the 29th of November, delivered the 30th, stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders, both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, Radio Yokosuka (7 miles from Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AIFM and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no name call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positions known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, including CarDiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships, but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The CinC Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. The Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichijima the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet (Hew. Exhibit 22).

4. The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, and that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. The reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUAs. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of the Fleets were in Kure. In the same message the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual addressee, the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief."



Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus the latter's known progress from the Empire to Chichijima and Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; that various facts indicated a submarine concentration in the Marshalls. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only of the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer (Hew. Exhibit 22).

5. The communication intelligence summary for December 1st, delivered on December 2nd, stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December, indicated that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading, "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was understood in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated, as to the First Fleet, "Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China"; Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that the same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka—Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated, "No change." As to carriers, it was said, "No change." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

6. The communication intelligence summary delivered on December 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that COMSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at COMFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated

that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routine indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "No unit has stood out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it was said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the assignment of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.

Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted the lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

7. The communication intelligence summary of December 3rd, delivered on the 4th, under the heading "General," stated that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

8. The communication intelligence summary of December 4th, delivered on the 5th, stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system, using the prefix UT in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and the same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated, "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made of the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in the area were quiet. This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

9. The radio intelligence summary for December 5th, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit duplex operations. There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old, which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed conditions.

of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you have said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force had been seen either."

There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet, addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo-China (Hew. Exhibit 28).

Any time important information was received, he said, CincPac and ComFOURTEEN would come and discuss it.

General Marshall said that prior to December 7th, he thought that all pertinent Army intelligence was given to the Navy, but the Army did not then receive, as regular routine, intelligence from the Navy as to Japanese ship movements (page 864).

## (2) Interception of Japanese communications:

Captain Rochefort said that certain communications with which the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was concerned (Exhibit 13) were received by him from the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, about 2 or 3 December 1941. He identified one of these as Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245, and said that due to the difficulties inherent in the code it had not been deciphered until the night of 10 December. The message prescribed a set of signals indicating the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area and their activities, and included arrangements for lights in houses, on beaches, from boats, want ads over Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island (p. 57). Captain Rochefort said that aside from this communication he did not receive prior to December 7, 1941, any other Japanese reports regarding American ships in Pearl Harbor or preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack (p. 58).

Captain Rochefort also read into the record two communications (part of Exhibit 13) which he did not recollect having seen before (p. 57-59). One of these referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives, the other to the lack of reconnaissance by the "fleet air arm" at Hawaii.

Admiral Mayfield said that the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Naval District had sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on February 9, 1942, a report (part of Exhibit 40) regarding a message sent by the Japanese consulate to Tokyo on 3 December 1941. A copy of this message had been delivered by Admiral Mayfield to Commander Rochefort's radio intelligence unit for decryption on 4 or 5 December, but Admiral Mayfield did not learn its contents until 11 December. The message transmitted to Tokyo a proposed system of signalling by lights and other methods for the purpose of reporting departures of U. S. naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system had been conceived and submitted to the Japanese Consulate by one Otto Kuehn, a German resident on Oahu, who was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. Admiral Mayfield stated that neither his office nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation found definite information that any part of the proposed signals had ever been used (p. 564-565).

Mr. William F. Friedman, Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications, Signal Security Agency, War Department, identified two Japanese messages from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, (Exhibit 13) as having been intercepted by the Army. They had been decoded by the Army on 8 December 1941. One of these messages referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives and the other pointed out the lack of reconnaissance being conducted by "the fleet air arm" at Hawaii (p. 522-523).

Captain Safford stated that the two messages referred to in the preceding paragraph (Exhibit 13) were in the Japanese PA-K2 code and could have been

decrypted by the Navy in one and a half to two hours. However, the Navy gave precedence to the processing of all "purple" and J-19 messages and would not have touched the PA-K2 communications as long as there were any J-19's on hand (p. 530-531).

Lt. Donald Woodrum, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, produced transcripts of telephone conversations obtained by tapping the lines of the Japanese Consul and Vice-Consul for the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941, when the taps were removed by order of Capt. Mayfield. The transcripts (marked Exhibit 38) contain little, if any, information of military significance, being concerned largely with routine consular activities and those of the local Japanese population. (p. 379)

To Lt. Woodrum's knowledge, there were only 2 local telephone interceptions which may have had military significance. The first was in 1940 from Vice Consul Okuda to a Buddhist priest on the island of Maui advising the latter to keep the Consulate informed on any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In 1941, the exact date not stated, a woman very much agitated called the Consulate to say the the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor, to which the person at the Consulate made no reply. (p. 383)

Wire tapping was discontinued on 2 December because, in the opinion of Lt. Woodrum, the secrecy of the activity was jeopardized by the accidental discovery of similar activity on the part of the FBI by employees of the telephone company. (p. 379-81)

With regard to his instruction of 2 December 1941, that tapping of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul by officers of the District Intelligence Office cease, Admiral Mayfield gave as his reasons: (a) that the telephone company had discovered the FBI was also tapping these wires and he feared that the resulting disclosure of this tapping would jeopardize the security of the tapping by the District Intelligence Office, and (b) the interceptions up through 2 December had revealed nothing of intelligence value. (p. 571)

Lt. Woodrum stated that prior to 1 December 1941, efforts to obtain copies of coded messages sent from the Jap Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington via commercial cable companies were unsuccessful. As of 1 December, however, in accordance with an agreement between Mr. David Sarnoff, of RCA, and Admiral Bloch, copies of all messages sent via RCA were available to the naval service and the first of these were received at the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December. It is Lt. Woodrum's understanding that these were sent immediately to Commander Rochefort's unit and, further, that they were not decoded until after the attack, it being necessary even then to use a Japanese code book that was found during a search of the Consulate on the 7th. Summaries of decoded copies of messages sent from the Consulate on 6 December has been marked "Exhibit 40." (p. 383-5)

Admiral Mayfield said that Exhibit 40 contained the translation and digest of several messages sent by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo via commercial cable companies on and after 3 December 1941. One of these messages, dated 3 December, reported the departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. A message, dated 4 December, reported the arrival of the HONOLULU. (p. 565) Copies of these two messages were received in the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December (p. 566) and forwarded to Commander Rochefort's unit. Another Japanese consulate message, dated 5 December, reported the arrival of 3 battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON, the departure of five heavy cruisers and other information. (p. 565) Admiral Mayfield did not know when this message had been received at his office. On 6 December, the Jap consulate filed two messages regarding U. S. ship movements and one regarding U. S. Army use of balloons. Admiral Mayfield believed that these probably did not reach his office until 7 December. (p. 566-567)

Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, testified that none of the intelligence material he received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor included any information received from intercepted telephone conversations of the Japanese or from intercepted cable messages. None of the cable messages was seen by Admiral Smith until two days after the attack. (p. 36)

Mr. George Street, Honolulu District Manager for RCA Communication Incorporated, testified that during the first week in December 1941, copies of all cable messages sent to Japan by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu were turned over to the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer, (Admiral Mayfield) at his request. Mr. Street added that all the RCA copies of those messages had been

*destroyed under authority of the Federal Communications Commission, because of lack of storage space. (p. 411-413)*

*Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer in the Hawaiian Department in November and December 1941, testified that the Army radio intercepted unit at Fort Shafter made no decryption whatever of intercepted Japanese messages. The intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decryption. (p. 387-388)*

Commander Rochefort said that the United States was handicapped because could not censor Japanese communications (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables, but efforts were made to get those messages. However, they had no information concerning the messages which the Japanese consul was sending out (pages 909-910).

Admiral Wilkinson said that the District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had endeavored to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents from the local cable companies but had been advised that the law did not permit interference of such messages. (p. 285) He said that despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence Officer had arranged to tap the long distance telephone and kept a record of the telephone conversations with Japan. This, he said, was done only in the last few days before December 7. The conversations in general appeared to be innocuous. There was one suspicious telephone conversation on the afternoon of December 6. Concerning this, Admiral Wilkinson said, "This conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed to intercept constituted, as I recall, the only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been correct." (p. 286)

Captain Mayfield said that messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio were not made available to him until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of RCA. He said that the Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company handled the traffic during the month of November. Traffic was switched to RCA as of December 1 and thereafter Captain Mayfield was able to obtain all of his traffic from RCA. Since it was in code and he had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit it to another organization to be read. He learned the content of a various number of these messages after the attack and there was considerable information about movements of the Fleet and other military forces which he said was not entirely accurate. (p. 311) Captain Mayfield said that so far as he was aware, the telephone conversations of the Japanese were not recorded or censored. (p. 313)

Admiral Bloch said that they were not able to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies did not and would not give them such dispatches. They all went by cable and so far as Admiral Bloch knew, none went by radio. (p. 15)

Admiral Smith said that they did not have access to the files in the Cable Office; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files; that it was taken to Mr. MacKey of Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph cable message; at that time there were certain Japanese codes which they could break and the Intelligence Officer thought if he could get those messages, he might learn what was going on; that they did not get them until three days after the attack and never received any information from this source before the war. (p. 46)

Commander Rochefort said that he received from the Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, directly or otherwise copies of such communications in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned—about December 1, 1941. These were about ten to fifteen messages and Commander Rochefort was asked to examine them, which he did. He succeeded in extracting some information from them within 12 hours, with the exception of two or three messages which he finished on the evening of December 10th. He said that the first messages did not contain any important information, but the latter two or three did contain important information. He said that

he had been unable to obtain that information at an earlier date because of the inherent difficulties in the task, and that the task had been made a matter of paramount importance and about 12 to 16 hours daily were devoted to that work alone. (p. 208-9)

Commander Rochefort said that the F. C. C. was monitoring radio traffic in the so-called "amateur" status, but that he never heard of their apprehending any communications from Japanese spies to Japan. (p. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at Hawaii communicated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and occasionally by radio. (P. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that he had not been informed of any telephonic communication between the Consulate General at Hawaii and Japan. (p. 209)

Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese Consulate General, Captain Layton said:

"26. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after?

"A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.

"27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack?

"A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source." (p. 218)

Captain Layton said that the District Intelligence Officer maintained constant monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward apprehension of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view, but that he did not recall the details of this. (p. 218)

Admiral Turner said that he did not know what type of decrypting Pearl Harbor was doing, but that Naval Communications had told him that CincPac was getting as much of the Japanese communications as they were, and sooner (page 100). He said that the Director of Naval Communications had informed him that CincPac had the decrypted Japanese messages, and that was why no information of this nature was sent to CincPac. He was similarly assured by Admiral Noyes, said.

Admiral Noyes denied telling Admiral Turner that Pearl Harbor was intercepting the same Japanese traffic as Washington (page 1036). He said that Pearl Harbor had an intercept station specializing in certain codes but was not intercepting Japanese cable messages, and the so-called "purple" messages were usually sent by cable (pages 1037-38).

Admiral Redman said that CincPac did not have facilities for decoding "purple" intercepts; the problem was not assigned to him and all translations were accomplished in Washington (page 1106).

### (3) Surveillance of consulate

Admiral Bloch stated that after the receipt of certain dispatches relating to destruction of codes, which are later discussed, he had Intelligence arrange for close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate. What, if any, surveillance was in effect before this does not appear.

## C. INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS

Captain McCollum, who was Officer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., during December, 1941, said that his duties consisted of evaluating and passing to the Director of Naval Intelligence all intelligence received concerning the Far East including all information on the Jap Navy. (p. 10) Sources of intelligence available to his Section regarding the Jap Fleet were reports by our consular authorities and agents in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by merchant ships, reports on movements of Japanese merchant shipping, and radio intelligence supplied by Captain Safford's unit, Op-20-G. However, by the end of November, 1941, the Far Eastern Section had become almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Jap naval forces. This was due to the fact that U. S. embargoes against Japan had shut U. S. merchant shipping out of the north Pacific and also discouraged Japanese shipping to the Americas. In addition, increasingly strict Japanese security

measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get timely information out of the country. (p. 10, 12, 13) As a result of this situation, a dispatch was sent out by Opnav on 24 November (GCT) to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, pointing out that information on the Jap fleet was unsatisfactory and requesting that every effort be made by use of radio intelligence methods to locate the Japanese naval forces. (Exhibit 8) Following this dispatch, estimates were received from ComFourteen and ComSixteen, dated 26 November (GCT). (Exhibit 8) These evaluations were virtually the same and estimated that two Jap task forces were being organized, one fairly well located in the Formosa-southern Japan area, another possibly located in the Mandated Islands. However, ComFourteen estimated that there was a strong concentration of submarines and at least one carrier division with the force in the Mandates, while ComSixteen could not confirm this. Greater reliance was placed on ComSixteen's dispatch because his radio organization was in a better position to intercept Japanese radio traffic and was stronger in numbers and continuity of operation. (p. 13-14)

Captain McCollum said that radio intelligence consisted of three distinct procedures: translations of the enemy's code dispatches, inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic, and a study of the call signs of enemy ships. (p. 12) He said that on about 1 December 1941 intelligence obtained from a study of the call signs of Japanese ships became considerably less valuable because there was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the Jap fleet: "In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time elapsed before we could build up identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on . . . the actual radios were still going out, but we couldn't get anything out of them very much." (p. 15-16) Captain McCollum did not know of any general call sign change which had accompanied previous major movements of the Japanese. (p. 16) However, he said that taken in connection with the known regroupings of Jap naval forces and the fact that the Japanese fleet was believed ready for action the call sign change was interpreted as a "possible indication of action to come." He said that CincPac was as well informed as the Office of Naval Intelligence as to these changes in the call signs of the Jap fleet. (p. 17)

Other than the ONI bulletin of 1 December 1941, Captain McCollum was aware of no information sent out to the fleet from the Navy Department between 1 December and 7 December 1941 regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet. (p. 19)

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic, rather than from the decryption of Jap messages. (p. 73-74) Other sources of information during the period 26 November to 7 December 1941 were reports from the Naval Attache, Shanghai, and a number of sighting reports obtained by reconnaissance planes. On 2 December a despatch was sent from CinCAF to OpNav reporting the sighting of nine submarines. On the same date, another despatch to OpNav reported 3 submarines, 21 transports and enemy patrol planes in the Camranh Bay area. On 6 December, a despatch reported a convoy in Camranh Bay. Twenty-four to forty-eight hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a British report was received to the effect that heavy Japanese units were rounding Poulo Condore, French Indo China. During this period, it was believed that all known Jap carriers were in the Kure-Sasebo area. (p. 75-76)

Captain Rochefort stated that between 26 November and 7 December 1941 very little information was obtained regarding the location of the Jap fleet by radio intelligence means. The reason for this was that while the total volume of Jap radio traffic remained about the same or increased the traffic which contained as an addressee or originator one of the major vessels was almost non-existent. He said that the Japanese radio traffic which was received contained a certain amount of "padding or rejecting of messages," but that in his opinion there had been no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms. (p. 53)

Admiral Wilkinson stated that the ONI summary of 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) represented the best of the knowledge and belief of the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time, and was based on the digest of all available information, radio intelligence, and sightings. He believed, but could not be certain, that a copy of the summary had been sent air mail to Pearl Harbor on or about the date of issue, 1 December 1941. (p. 396)

Admiral Wilkinson recalled seeing a digest, prepared by the Far East Section of ONI of daily Communication Intelligence summaries issued from Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 22). He recalled noting in particular those for the period 1 December to 5 December, 1941, and being aware that a large part of the Japanese fleet appeared to have gone into radio silence. The Admiral believed that the fact appeared daily in reports issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the reports drew the conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent, since the only movements picked up were in that direction (p. 362).

Admiral Smith said that based on the communication intelligence summaries during the period 27 November to 6 December 1941, he had estimated that Japanese carriers during that period were "some in the Marshalls and the remainder in home areas." (p. 362) Referring further to the summaries, he said (p. 363)

"Vice Admiral SMITH: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these patches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and radio traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

"Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?"

"Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea."

"Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?"

"Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, it usually wind up with, 'They are believed to be in home waters.'"

Admiral Smith said that he had not known about the change in call signs of the Jap Fleet which occurred on 1 December. (p. 364) He did not recall having discussed with Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers indicated by the communication intelligence summaries after 1 December (p. 365)

A fortnightly summary, issued by ONI on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 23) stated concerning the Japanese military situation, that Japanese troops, supplies and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moving quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continued. Japanese army strength in Indo-China was believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking Province and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China. Naval aircraft and craft also moved south. It was estimated that there were about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China, and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

Concerning the Japanese naval situation, the report stated that deployment of naval forces to the southward had indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters were pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Movements to the south appeared to be carried out by small individual units, but organization of an extensive task force, then definitely indicated, would probably take sharper form in the following few days. To that date, this task force, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appeared to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constituted a strong strike force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons; it asserted that although one division of battleships might be assigned, the major capital ship strength remained in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. It also stated that the equipment being carried south was a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consisted not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

The record does not contain other ONI summaries. Admiral Stark, however, testified that the estimates as to the positions of Japanese carriers and battleships were conflicting and that the easternmost position estimated was the Mandates (pages 72-3).



Admiral Turner said that there had been a great deal of naval radio traffic which suddenly ceased, which meant that the Japanese fleet had put to sea (page 1002). Admiral Turner also said that they did not know where the Japanese fleet was. Deductions were that there was to be a covering force in the Marshalls' and that some forces would carry on missions in the China Sea. Available information as to the location of the Japanese fleet, although considerable, was incomplete (page 1002).

Admiral Ingersoll stated that it was difficult to get information on Japanese units. Units in Cavite and Pearl Harbor for radio intelligence were practically the only sources (page 818). When there was a significant move reported, he knew about it.

Captain Smith-Hutton said that in November, 1941, he could obtain no information of Japanese military movements except one to Southeast Asia. Japanese military movements did not appear in the press (page 1077). No information reached him indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the latter part of 1941, he felt sure that Japanese would make an aggressive move to relieve economic pressure exerted by the United States embargo, but he was not sure this would solve the United States in war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him (page 1079).

Embassador Grew had no information as to movement of a Japanese carrier eastwards Pearl Harbor (page 1064).

Admiral Redman did not think that the December 1st ONI Bulletin was sent CincPac by dispatch (pages 1107-8).

Captain Layton

*Captain Layton testified with respect to the photostatic copies of the various dispatches in exhibit 8 that he thought CincPac received the dispatch of 24 November 1941, from OpNav to CinCAF, information CincPac and others, that the dispatch from Com14 dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, had been sent by the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, and that Com16's dispatch of 26 November 1941, time date group 261331, was a reply to the Com14 dispatch 260110. (Page 190-191)*

*Captain Layton testified that the three dispatches referred to above (exhibit 8) summarized the intelligence available to Coms14, 16, CinCAF and CincPac, concerning Japanese naval movements during the month preceding 26 November. (Page 191)*

*Captain Layton testified that he noted that the Com16 unit stated in the dispatch 261331, that it could not confirm the supposition: by Com14 that submarines and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and that Com16's best indications were that all First and Second Japanese Fleets were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. (Page 191)*

*Captain Layton considered that Com16's reference to First and Second Fleet carriers was made in relation to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated 29 July 1941; that the Japanese naval organization as stated by ONI at that time included information that there were attached to each of the First and Second Fleets, two carrier divisions, that is, CarDivs Three (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) and Five (RYUJO, HOSHO) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the First Fleet; and that CarDiv One (AKAGI, KAGA) and CarDiv Two (SORYU, HIRYU) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the Second Fleet; thus, Captain Layton explained, the ONI bulletin of July, 1941, stated that there were eight carriers assigned by the Japanese to the First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers listed as assigned to any other fleets.*

*Therefore, Captain Layton testified the Com16 dispatch 261331 stating that its best indications were that all known operating Japanese carriers were believed to be in the Kure-Sasebo area was understood by him to mean that all known operating Japanese carriers were in that area, and that Com14's estimate at that time differed from that of Com16, in that Com14 was of the opinion that there was at least one Japanese carrier in the Marshalls at that time. (Page 191-192) (also see Page 248-250)*

*that in the latter part of November, he received information of two or more Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. He had reported to CincPac Japanese carriers at Truk and the Marshalls, in June, 1941 (page 912). On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire "4" aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home*

area." This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships and cruisers, with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913). He knew now that there were certain decrypted messages in the Navy Department which by themselves might not mean much, but taken together would have warned of an attack against Hawaii more than the messages they received. This refers to some movement messages later discussed. Some other messages in Exhibit 63 indicated war, he said, but did not specifically refer to Pearl Harbor (page 916).

Commander Rochefort said that no Japanese ships were reported closer than the Marshalls during the latter part of November, up until December 7th (page 472). No information was received which indicated a Japanese attack other than at Guam or the Philippines, of the United States possessions. Nothing east of Guam was indicated.

Admiral DeLany stated that CincPac had no information contrary to the Oahu Bulletin of December 1, 1941 (page 503). He recalled information that there was a small carrier force, prior to December 7th, to the southward of the Philippines but that the main Japanese strength was at Japan (page 87).

Admiral McMorris stated that he had had no information that Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls (page 899).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was familiar with the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries, particularly those for the period 27 November–5 December 1941 (Exhibit 22); that he recalled being familiar with the information contained in them and thought he frequently did not himself read them, he either heard them read or orally presented by Captain Layton; that he certainly had access to all the material contained in those summaries (pages 310–311).

He, in many cases, identified his own and the initials of Admiral Kimball appearing either on the Communication Intelligence Summaries (Exhibit 22) or on the Intelligence reports prepared and submitted by Captain Layton (pages 310–311).

He further testified that he had no independent recollection of having seen ComFOURTEEN dispatch of 26 November 1941, and other dispatches attached thereto in Exhibit 8, nor the memorandum dated 1 December 1941 prepared by Lt. Comdr. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. He considered it probable, however, that he did not see the Layton memorandum of 1 December 1941 (p. 311–312).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that so far as he could recollect, he believed the major elements of the Jap Fleet to be fairly well located on and about 1 December 1941. He remembered that on or about 1 December 1941 there was a change in the call signs of the Japanese fleet, and stated, with reference to his believed location of the Japanese carriers, that they were thought to be in home waters or towards Formosa (p. 312).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that offhand he could not recall the information on which his estimate as to the location of the Jap carriers was based, but that it would require a considerable number of quotations from Communication Intelligence Summaries (Ex. 22) to point out the source of such belief (p. 313).

Following this, Vice Admiral McMorris did refer to the Communication Intelligence Summaries, in an effort to show the basis for his belief that the carriers were in home waters or towards Formosa:

24 November: A statement that on the 23rd there were a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 3 with Cinc Third Fleet.

25 November: A statement that one or more of the carrier divisions were present in the Mandates.

26 November: Reference was made to general traffic intelligence involving Cinc Second and Third Fleets, the China Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, and the Combined Air Force, indicating a heavy traffic condition, but no reference was made to any part of the Summary which said anything about carriers.

27 November: Reference was made to information in the Summary concerning various Japanese fleets but not to information specifically referring to carriers or to the carrier fleet.

28 November: Vice Admiral McMorris referred to information in the Communication Intelligence Summary of this date to the effect that there were many high precedence messages involving the Combined Fleet and to information concerning the Third Fleet, but he did not point out any information concerning carriers (p. 314).

29 November: Reference was made to various items of information in this Intelligence Summary, but not to any involving the carriers.

30 November: Reference was made to information to the effect that there was a strong impression that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was underway, and to the fact that one urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff of Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, and to the Combined Air Force.

1 December: No reference was made to any information concerning carriers (p. 315).

2 December: Reference was made to the paragraph in the Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on carriers and that carrier traffic was at a low ebb.

3 December: Reference was made to various items of information but none concerning carriers (p. 316).

4 December: Reference was made to the large number of urgent messages from Tokyo, to the lack of messages from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet, and to the fact that the former was believed to be in the vicinity of Takao (p. 316-317).

5 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders, and that there was no traffic from the Commander of the carriers or from the Commander of the Submarine Force (p. 317).

6 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders and to the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had originated several messages to the carriers (p. 317).

After reviewing the above Summaries, Vice Admiral McMorris admitted that between December 1st and the time of the Japanese attack there was no Intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a carrier fleet as such (p. 319). He stated, however, that it was his recollection that there had been one or two vague indications associating carriers with the Second and Third Fleets, and some possible associations with Palau and in at least one instance an association with the Marshalls (p. 320). Upon examination of the Fleet Intelligence Officer's memorandum of December 1st, Vice Admiral McMorris stated he could not find on it any reference to Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 (p. 320). He could not recall if there had been any conference between Admiral Kimmel and himself concerning the 1 December estimate of Captain Layton (p. 321).

He stated that he did not reach any conclusion that the carriers were operating independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet (p. 319).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that during the period in question, the information available as to the locations of the Japanese Fleet units was not as specific as was desirable; that he did not recall the lack of information as to the carriers, and "taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand . . . we were extremely disturbed" (p. 321).

General Short testified that he had received no information indicating Japanese movements east of Guam (p. 265).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the information from his own Fleet Intelligence was principally as to the movements of ships and, he said, it gave no indication of a Japanese attack (p. 327).

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of ONI and pointed out that there was no established or effective method for the dissemination of information of Combat Intelligence. (p. 280) Admiral Wilkinson said that for some time the Japanese section of the foreign branch of ONI had been preparing daily an analysis of the situation as to Japanese Fleet locations and as to Japanese-American relations. (p. 281) Admiral Wilkinson referred to the fortnight summary issued on December 1 and said that it had been discussed with Admirals Stark and Turner and had been sent out air mail on December 1.

According to Captain Safford, there were three main radio intelligence units—one in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations along the Atlantic seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean; the second at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Mid-

way, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor; the third at Corregidor. There were intercept stations from the West Coast of the United States which fed traffic directly to Washington. The main station in Washington was concerned particularly with that branch of intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments. It was also used for training personnel. The station at Pearl Harbor was confined to that branch of intelligence dealing with the dispositions and movements of naval forces in the Pacific and surveillance over Japanese naval communications. These duties did not include surveillance over any diplomatic communications. The Asiatic unit at Corregidor was at the disposal of CinCAF to use as he saw fit. Up to early 1941, it was mostly concerned with diplomatic communications, but in October or November shifted its main attention to Japanese naval communications. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that the unit at Pearl Harbor was kept fully informed only of results obtained by the Washington unit as to operations of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific with one important exception, namely that on December 1, 1941, CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN were sent a copy of a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that the Japanese were planning a landing in Malaya. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that on November 26, 1941, estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and distribution of the Japanese Fleet, and that the estimates differed. ComSIXTEEN'S report placed one carrier division as operating in the South China Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters, and further advised that the evaluation was considered reliable. He said that in Washington they believed that the report from ComSIXTEEN was correct, but did not advise the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that on November 24, 1941, he had sent a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that Sixteenth District's intercept reports were considered most reliable and requesting that other reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information. The basis for the belief that ComSIXTEEN's reports were better was the geographical location of ComSIXTEEN. (p. 357)

Captain Safford said, "Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December 1941, may be found in the monthly report of Station 'H'—in the 'Chronology' which was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks." (p. 360-2)

"Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by the witness as being C. I. Station 'H' 'Chronology' for December 1—December 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communications Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination."

Admiral Brainard said that the "War Information Room" receives information from sources such as O. N. I., Naval observers and what is made known to them through the communications system and plotted the movements of Naval units including Japanese. To the best of his knowledge they were receiving all Japanese information available in the department. (p. 402).

Admiral Smith said that around the beginning of December 1941, the information he received from the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to the effect that one Japanese force was supposed to be at Truk and to the best of his recollection the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in the Eastern waters; that they had no knowledge as to the Japanese carriers; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had said that he did not know where the carriers were; and that Admiral Smith recalled no difference of opinion between the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers. (p. 47)

Admiral Smith said that the Pacific Fleet staff believed that the Japanese Navy was very efficient although they had little knowledge or information concerning the Japanese Navy; all of the information on the Japanese Navy was by Radio Intelligence only, that is, as to the location of the Fleet. (p. 47)

Admiral Pye said that a rather high evaluation was placed upon the report of the Intelligence Officer concerning the Japanese Fleet inasmuch as no contrary or other information had been received. At the time, Admiral

knew the sources upon which the Intelligence Officer was relying for his information.

Concerning information from October on as to the movements of units of the Japanese Fleet, Captain Layton said:

"Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attaches in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements of considerable number of Japanese transports and troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarkation. The Naval Attache at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for the joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Saeki area; that the invasion was to follow the line of the German blitzkrieg of Holland and Belgium and that considerable air forces were being assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early part of November. Recurring reports of movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of some of these transports—that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats—led to a belief that amphibious operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface-force task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands—Southern Formosa region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations was noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the forerunner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied, 'Nothing yet.' He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com 14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet (which includes the First and Second Base Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally to our amphibious forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command, the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the French Indo-China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihoku and Takao, Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were somewhat connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this development, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of move-

ment, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-knit organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruises being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could not confirm the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of November, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com 14 unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G-3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At the same time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condition of war was also received; and from the State Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increasing forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again mentioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CincAF regarding Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Japanese Navy to be put into effect. On 4 December, a report from CincAF received stated CincChina had reported a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CincAF forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 5 December, the Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I prepared and submitted. It showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Div

sions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six—the latter was marked “May head for the Mandates?”—that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration of shore-based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area, and that the Cinc Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes, Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believed to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.

“34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?

“A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.

“35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?

“A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and NIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.

“36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?

“A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.

“37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the number of carriers in home waters?

“A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Fourteen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.

“38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at Hawaii?

“A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Commander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American Mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.

“39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up of forces as placed by your Intelligence toward the end of November, the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?

“A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however, was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and

cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts' Commission and not as estimate of the situation that I had expressed formally or informally, Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal informal estimate.

"40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of nature which you have just been discussing?

"A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me as we remained at our telephones throughout that week-end, although I went back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.

"41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?

"A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their communications on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement discussed previously." (p. 219-223)

Captain Layton said:

"I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliary units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only the message, but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated the conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning." (p. 225)

In view of its importance, the following is quoted directly from the examination of Commander Rochefort:

"32.Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chronologically, nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or about 1 October 1941.

"A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was to endeavor to obtain information from the specific types of traffic as assigned by Washington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of radio traffic originated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain information from radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first mission mentioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the part of personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not of any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study and estimate was drawn up which was submitted to the Commandant, A v



released a dispatch to Washington, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this dispatch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence, due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restrictions, was made available from the files of the communication companies in Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the personnel attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.

"33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate which you made about 26 November?

"A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main, of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the other force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.

"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?

"A. Two, sir.

"35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you getting along similar lines from the other two units?

"A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of my knowledge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.

"36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers—do I understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the Marshall Islands or proceeding in that direction?

"A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls area.

"37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the southward of, say, Formosa?

"A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.

"38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East in agreement with your estimate?

"A. No, sir.

"39. Q. In what respect?

"A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Washington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for the direction of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier division in the Marshalls.

"40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?

"A. I do not recall.

"41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch from Com 14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

"A. Yes, sir; the following morning the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.

"42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

"A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.

"43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplomatic negotiations were concerned?

"A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.

"44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a similar estimate from Washington, is that correct?

"A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating that several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was no direct answer.

"45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance of the subject, that you had a right to expect something from Washington?

"A. No, sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter within their purview.

"46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the most important units?

"A. Yes, sir.

"47. Q. Do you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not have a greater number of those ships located?

"A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack of radio traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of the Japanese ships.

"48. Q. What particular type of Japanese man-o-war did you feel were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon their movements?

"A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.

"49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?

"A. No, sir.

"50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?

"A. Yes, sir.

"51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse during that period?

"A. Yes, sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.

"52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might presage another offensive movement?

"A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another offensive movement.

"53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors to the importance of this lack of traffic?

"A. Yes, sir.

"54. Q. To whom did you represent that?

"A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Commander in-Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. However, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned, did not include areas to the eastward of the Mandate islands." (p. 210-212)

Commander Wright discussed the equipment which was available at the Fourteenth Naval District unit for the detection and location of enemy ships (p. 379-80)

## XXV. INTERCEPTED JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS AFTER THE "WAR WARNING" AND UP TO DECEMBER 6, 1941

### A. FAILURE TO TRANSMIT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL

After November 27, 1941, when the "war warning" was sent to Admiral Kimmel and prior to the Japanese attack, there were a number of highly significant Japanese coded communications intercepted, decoded and translated by the Navy and the Army in Washington. Both the State Department and the Navy Department believed, according to Admiral Schuirmann, that from November 27th to December 6th relations with the Japanese were constantly deteriorating (page 2).

It will be recalled that on November 28th, there were available in Washington the intercepted Japanese communications showing the reaction of the Japanese to the State Department note of November 26th; that it was regarded as a "humiliating proposal;" that with a report of the views of the Imperial Government transmitted in two or three days the negotiations would be de facto ruptured; but, that the Japanese emissaries were not to give the impression that the negotiations were broken off (supra, pages 60-63).

Except to the extent set forth in the following chapter, Admiral Kimmel was not advised of any of this information. The reasons for this action have been previously mentioned (supra, page 44). As Admiral Stark explained it, in p

Pac was not sent all of the information that was available in Washington; it was the job of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate that information; they did not give CincPac the most useful information; and, they left it to him as to what to do after they gave him the picture as they saw it (page 800).

Admiral Stark testified that the procedure by which he received classified information was through his Flag Secretary or delivery to him personally by ONI. Admiral Kramer normally brought information from Intelligence. Sometimes information was evaluated and sometimes dispatches were brought in direct for evaluation. Intelligence and War Plans did the evaluations which were normally gone over by Admiral Ingersoll. A watch officer and duty officer in the War Plans Division received information after office hours and decided whether it should be brought to him at once. During the critical period from November 27th to December 7th, he felt that he was receiving all of the important information regarding Japanese-United States relations (page 774).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he was not sure that he had seen every document intercepted through interception (page 833).

#### B. CONCERNING THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND SITUATION

On November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated November 29, 1941 (Document 20, Exhibit 63), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had always been in a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should be asked to stick to the basic objectives that the United States had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of this message but did not deliver it to Admiral Stark.

Also on November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, which used a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals"); that the President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was having strong repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in their speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different—some good word—but instead got this (the Premier's speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would have to change the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.

There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on December 7, 1941, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 21, Exhibit 63)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
Date: December 1941  
Subject: Purple CA)  
Re my #857

2. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that although there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

3. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall this, but it may have been discussed (page 778). He did not advise CincPac of this message since he did not consider that it added anything (page 779). Admiral Schuirmann said that he was aware of this message and the following one, but had not delivered them to Admiral Stark (pages 702-3). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 828).

2. Army translation—(Document 22, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo

"To: Berlin

"November 30, 1941

"Purple

"#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)  
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through the negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views differ on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we have come to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

[Part 2 of 2]

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which should not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

3. The Navy report states that "on 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured.

Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is."

Commander Kramer said that the President was so interested "in the dispatch" to Berlin that Kramer was directed to prepare a special paraphrase for the President's retention; otherwise neither the State Department or White House were permitted to retain copies of the "super secret" dispatches (page 983).

4. Army translation—(Document 23, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington (Nomura)

"To: Tokyo

"November 28, 1941

"Purple

"#1214 To be handled in Government Code.

"Re my #1190.

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principals, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

"This we must carefully note."

In connection with the diplomatic situation,

Admiral Schuirmann said that the Navy Department had been kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu. (p. 411) Reference was made to page 138 in "PEACE AND WAR" concerning which Admiral Schuirmann said that he did not recall the particular meetings mentioned on November 25 and November 28. Admiral Schuirmann did recall that on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull telephoned him and said that he wanted Admiral Schuirmann to know that he didn't seem to be able to do anything more with the Japanese and that they were liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone. Admiral Schuirmann assured Secretary Hull that a war warning had been sent out and reported the conversation to Admiral Stark. (p. 412) Admiral Schuirmann said that the general attitude of Admiral Stark and General Marshall was that any time that could be gained in the outbreak of hostilities was to the benefit of the United States. (p. 412)

it may be here noted that on December 2nd, Under Secretary of State Welles had a conversation with Nomura and Kurusu (page 311), which was summarized by Welles as follows:

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina. It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement—and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for the purpose of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government. Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and

independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.

"The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter, but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to the Japanese Government."

Admiral Schuirmann could not recall that information as to this note was given to Admiral Stark.

On December 3, 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated December 2, 1941 (Document Exhibit 63) which stated:

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: 'Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th.' The Under-Secretary then said: 'I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world.' Thereupon we replied: 'The United States and other countries have pyramidical economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure and breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny.' Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: 'I am well aware of that.' I continued: 'I cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve.' The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: 'The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here.' Then he continued: 'In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary.' I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your consideration of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233."

It may be noted that about December 3rd, according to Admiral Schuirmann, the State Department felt that although there might be some further discussion with the Japanese, it was inevitable that they would be unsuccessful. The Chief of Naval Operations, he said, was kept informed (page 203).

There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available on December 4, 1941, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 26, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo  
 "To: Hainking  
 "1 December 1941  
 "(Purple)  
 "#893

"... In the event that Manchuria participates in the war . . . in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

"A summary follows:

"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

"2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia."

2. Navy translation—(Document 27, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington  
 "To: Tokyo  
 "1 December 1941  
 "(Purple)  
 "#1227

"(This raised the question of the possibility of a conference between persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have them make one final effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Honolulu . . . It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)"

3. Navy translation—(Document 29, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo  
 "To: Washington  
 "3 December 1941  
 "(Purple)

"#875 Chief of Office routing.

"Re your #1232

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement."

4. Navy translation—(Document 31, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington  
 "To: Tokyo  
 "3 December 1941  
 "(Purple)  
 "#1243

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."

On December 5, 1941, there were available translations of additional intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations as follows:

1. Army translation—(Document 33, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington

"To: Tokyo

"3 December 1941

"(Purple)

"#1243

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

2. Navy translation—(Document 34, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington

"To: Tokyo

"1 December 1941

"(Purple)

"#1225

"(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secretary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech at the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)"

#### C. CONCERNING UNITED STATES SHIPS AND PLANES

On 4 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 20 November 1941, serial 7029, which states (Exhibit 13)

"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation."

Captain Safford said that to the best of his knowledge none of the Japanese intercepts which were translated in the period immediately prior to 7 December 1941 and which showed interest in U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were sent to CINCPAC (p. 111). He added that so far as he knew the codes used by the Japanese in their reports on U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were not being read by the radio intercept unit there. (p. 116)

"In addition to the Japanese intercepts which were translated prior to 7 December 1941, a number of Jap messages regarding U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were intercepted before that date but not translated until after the attack. (Exhibit 14)

"From: Tokyo (Togo)

"To: Honolulu

"November 28, 1941

"J19-K9

"Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner.

"1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

"2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure. (Translated by the Army, 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu

"To: Tokyo

"December 6, 1941

"#253

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered over five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine



they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack, against these places.

"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation." (Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu

"To: Tokyo

"December 6, 1941

"PA-K2

"1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were—and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

"9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)

"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm." (Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)

"From Honolulu

"To: Tokyo

"November 28, 1941.

"J-19.

"Military report:

"(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

"(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are:—number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

"(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

"(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor." (Translated by the Army, 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu (Kita).

"To: Tokyo

"5 December 1941

"(PA-K2)

"(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here.

"(2) The LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

"(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

"8 battleships.

"3 light cruisers.

"16 destroyers.

"Four ships of the Honolulu class and . . . were in dock." (Translated by the Navy, 12-10-41.)

(6) "From: Honolulu (Kita).

"To: Tokyo.

"1 December 1941

"(J19) Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

"1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

\* \* \* \* \*

"2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week." (Translated by the Navy 12/10/41.)

(7) "From: Honolulu (Kita).

"To: Tokyo.

"3 December 1941

"(PA-K2)

"From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters

"1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the follow

"I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

| Meaning                                                  |                                      | Signal |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| "Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units. | Preparing to sortie                  | 1      |
| A number of carriers.                                    | Preparing to sortie                  | 2      |
| Battleship divisions.                                    | All departed between 1st and 3rd     | 3      |
| Carriers.                                                | Several departed between 1st and 3rd | 4      |
| Carriers.                                                | All departed between 1st and 3rd     | 5      |
| Battleship division.                                     | All departed between 4th and 6th     | 6      |
| Carriers.                                                | Several departed between 4th and 6th | 7      |
| Carriers.                                                | All departed between 4th and 6th     | 8      |

"2. Signals.

"I. Lanikai\* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

|                                  |        |
|----------------------------------|--------|
| "One light between 8 and 9 p. m. | Signal |
| " " " 9 and 10 p. m.             | 1      |
| " " " 10 and 11 p. m.            | 2      |
| " " " 11 and 12 p. m.            | 3      |
| "II.                             | 4      |
| "Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m.     | 5      |
| " " " 1 and 2 a. m.              | 6      |
| " " " 2 and 3 a. m.              | 7      |
| " " " 3 and 4 a. m.              | 8      |

[Part 2]

"III. Lanikai\* Bay, during daylight.

"If there is a 'star' on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signal 1, 2, 3, or 4.

"If there is a 'star' and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7,

"IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House\*\* will indicate the following:

| Times      | Signal |
|------------|--------|
| "1900-2000 | 3      |
| 2000-2100  | 4      |
| 2100-2200  | 5      |
| 2200-2300  | 6      |
| 2300-2400  | 7      |
| 0000-0100  | 8      |

"V. K.G.M.B. \*\*\* Want ads.

"A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. Box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

"B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

"C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

"3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanator

\*\*\*\* at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the east and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be daily until your signal is received:

| Time      | Signal |
|-----------|--------|
| From 7-8  | 3 or 6 |
| From 8-9  | 4 or 7 |
| From 9-10 | 5 or 8 |

\*Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

\*\*A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

\*\*\*A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

\*\*\*\*At latitude 20-45 N., longitude 156-20 W."

(Translated by the Navy 12/11/41)

"From: Honolulu (Kita)

"To: Tokyo

"November 24, 1941.

"J-19.

"1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

"2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaiana Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

"3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

"4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

"Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe." (Translated by the Army 12/16/41.)

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, did not recall seeing translations of intercepted Japanese messages prior to the attack, relating to the presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. (Exhibit 18) (p. 406-7)

Asked whether it was his belief, prior to the attack on 7 December, 1941, that Japanese agents at Pearl Harbor were reporting United States ships there, Admiral Wilkinson replied that he believed such reports were being made; however, it was his belief that the Japanese were concerned about the presence of the fleet "with a view to its availability for distant operations rather than its susceptibility as a target." (p. 407)

On November 29th, there was an Army translation of a message from Manila to Tokyo, dated November 22, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 68), which reported on British and American ships at Mamila.

On December 3rd, the Navy translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 15, 1941 (Doc. 24, Exhibit 63), which stated:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not specifically recall this message, but may have seen it, as the Japanese were reporting a great mass of ship movement information, and he assumed they knew every move we made (page 781). He stated that it was routine for the Japanese to report ship movements and the fact that they reported such movements from Honolulu was not unusual (page 790).

To have gone the limit, he said, in tightening up on espionage and on Japanese facilities for getting information out might have precipitated the war which they were trying to delay. He pointed out that they did stop Japanese ships from using the Panama Canal and did reroute safely United States ships (page 795).

On December 4th the following intercepts were available:

1. Navy translation—(Document 12, Exhibit 68)

"From: Manila (Nihro)

"To: Tokyo

"25 November 1941

"(Purple)

"#790

"1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port. (Probably the U. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons.)

"2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

"3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown."

2. Navy translation—(Document 14, Exhibit 68)

"From: Tokyo

"To: San Francisco

"29 November 1941

"(J19)

"Circular #2431

"Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

"Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed (or at which it arrived), and port of destination (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, on South China seas."

## 500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

On December 5th the following translations of intercepted communications were available:

### 1. Army translation—(Document 37, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo (Togo)

"To: Honolulu

"November 18, 1941

"J-19

"#113

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area 'A'—Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, (Probably means Mamala Bay), and the areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy."

### 2. Navy translation—(Document 36, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo

"To: Honolulu

"29 November 1941

"(J19)

"#122

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future you will also report even when there are no movements."

Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen these two messages, but that he did not change the situations as to which he had advised CincPac (page 7). Admiral Schuirmann did not remember seeing these (page 720).

### 3. Army translation—(Document 13, Exhibit 68)

"From: Manila (Nihro)

"To: Tokyo

"November 28, 1941

"Purple

"#799

"Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day."

On December 6, 1941, there was available in Washington an Army translation of an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18, 1941 (Document 40, Exhibit 63), reading as follows:

"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in #219\* (a—Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.) on the 15th day.

"Area A<sup>b</sup>—(b—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.) A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

"Area C<sup>a</sup>—(c—East Loch) 3 warships of the heavy cruiser classes were at anchor.

"2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, ENTERPRISE, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS.' 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D<sup>a</sup>—(d—Middle Loch).

"3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 100 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A and passed the water reservoir on the Eastern side."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not see this message (pages 781-2). Admiral Schuirmann similarly testified (page 719).

"It is of interest to note that a Japanese message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated December 2, 1941, was intercepted, apparently on December 23rd, and translated by the Army on December 30th (Document 46, Exhibit 63), which read:

"(Secret outside the department)

"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, aircraft carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there is any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets."

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23. •  
 Also of interest is a similar message, dated December 6, 1941, translated by the  
 day, December 12, 1941 (Document 45, Exhibit 63), which directed that Hon-  
 wire immediately the movements of the fleet subsequent to December 4th.  
 Admiral J. R. Redman during the latter part of 1941 was Assistant Director  
 Naval Communications (page 1091). He said that the general tenor of Japanese  
 was a searching expedition all over the world, as to ship movement. This  
 been going on for a long time, but was intensified during the several months  
 preceding December, 1941. There were about 700 dispatches in November 1941.  
 the last month prior to December 7th, diplomatic intercepts averaged 25 a  
 September and October were heavy but there was an increase in November  
 (page 1101).

Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (the location of ships in areas in Pearl Harbor)  
 more specific than the other ship movement dispatches (page 1104).  
 Admiral Turner did not specifically remember seeing the ships movements  
 patches; they had been going on for a long time (page 1004).  
 Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not remember Documents 24, 36, and 37  
 Exhibit 63 (ship movements reports). He would not have attached any sig-  
 nificance to them as he presumed such reports were being made as a matter of  
 time; same as to Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (page 836). No record was kept  
 persons to whom these documents were shown at the time.

Commander Kramer said that he was generally familiar with Documents 24  
 36 in Exhibit 63 and stated that these would have been in daily folders sub-  
 mitted to the regular recipients of this class of information. As to ships move-  
 ments, the Japanese were always reporting them, so that those were not unusual  
 messages, but somewhat more emphatic (page 961).

Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 36 of Exhibit 63 (concerning  
 reports even when there are no ship movements) on December 5th; Document 37  
 requesting reports on certain areas at Pearl Harbor on December 5th; Docu-  
 ment 40 (giving the locations of ships at Pearl Harbor (about December 6th).  
 Previously during the year similar intercepts were received, but Document 40  
 Exhibit 63 was the first of the ship movement messages which had gone into  
 mail as to the location of ships at Pearl Harbor at a specific time. It was re-  
 ceived December 6, 1941 (page 974) (also page 976).

The inference he gathers from these is that the Japanese were concerned  
 not only about the location of United States ships but they had also been concerned sim-  
 ilarly about planes in the Philippines and all aspects of military establishments  
 in the Netherlands East Indies (page 974). Moreover the inference was that  
 since we were working with the British and Dutch, the Japanese were concerned  
 about the action we were taking, and there was no indication from this material  
 of overt intentions against the United States (page 975). This was, however, the  
 time the Japanese had asked for such detail (page 975).

## XXVI. THE "WINDS" CODE AND MESSAGES

### A. THE WINDS CODE

On November 28th, there was translated another intercepted Japanese com-  
 munication establishing the "winds code," in addition to the previous message of  
 November 26th, which in substance was as follows:

Heavy translation—November 28, 1941 (Document 15, Exhibit 63):

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 1941

(9)

Regular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the  
 cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in  
 the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME  
 (East wind rain).

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North wind  
 cloudy).

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear).

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast  
 and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all  
 papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence."

On December 5th, Alusna at Batavia advised OPNAV of a message "Thorpe for Miles War Department" of a code intercept to the effect that Japan would notify her consuls of "war decision," by using the "winds code" words from Japanese weather broadcasts (See Documents 2 and 3, Exhibit 64).

#### B. MONITORING FOR THE CODE WORDS

Captain L. F. Safford testified that in 1941 he was in charge of the Second Section of Naval Communications, which collected information through intercepts (page 744). Document 15 of Exhibit 63 is the so-called "Winds Code" which was available to the Navy on November 28th. This was repeated in Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64. There is no material difference in these messages (page 745). After receipt of these messages special effort was made to monitor for these messages. C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and Cairte were monitoring (page 746).

Admiral Turner said that at the time when he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 he discussed it briefly with the Chief of Naval Operations and instructions were given to watch for the code words.

Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (Winds Code message) on November 28, 1941 (page 956). Arrangements were made to watch for any use of the Winds Code by the Japanese and to promptly notify staff officers who had cards showing the message.

#### C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF WINDS CODE

Admiral Kimmel was advised by a copy of a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, from CincAF to OPNAV (Exhibit 64), that according to an intercepted communication, if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed, certain words would be used in the Tokyo news broadcasts.

Captain Layton testified that he had not seen Document 15 of Exhibit 63, but had received the same information. Upon receipt of it special watches were set to intercept the execute of the winds code, but no execute was ever received (pages 905-6).

#### D. "WINDS" MESSAGES USING THE CODE WORDS FOR RUSSIA

On December 4, 1941, the Federal Communications Commission reported a Japanese radio broadcast apparently using the "winds code" words relating to Russia (Document 2, Exhibit 65), as follows:

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FAVORABLE WEATHER

"KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FAVORABLE WEATHER AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS"

"CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM"

Weather message from Tokyo station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941

On December 5, 1941, the FCC reported another Japanese broadcast apparently employing the "winds code" relating to Russia. The report (Document 3, Exhibit 65) was, in substance:

"TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LIGHT FROM SOUTH

(repeated 3 times)

"Weather message from Tokyo station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 GMT December 5, 1941"

Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood stated that he was watch officer in OP-2 Naval Communications (page 919A). He first saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (intercept establishing the Winds Code) about November 30, 1941 (page 919). On the evening of December 4, 1941, the FCC phoned an intercept to him. He did not remember the exact text, but it did not contain the words that he was looking for, which were the Japanese phrase: "Higashi No Kazeame." This phrase would have indicated the severance of relations with the United States, in case of war.

The watch officers in Op-20-G had been instructed to telephone Admiral Noyes when an execute message was received (page 920). He telephoned Admiral

yes and thought that he again called the FCC (page 921). Admiral Noyes told him, on receipt of the message, that "he thought the wind was blowing in a funny direction." He identified Document 2 of Exhibit 65 as apparently a message received from the FCC (page 921). This meant to him that there would be a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States, but with Russia (page 921). He thinks that's why Admiral Noyes said to him that "the wind was blowing from a funny direction."

A pencil memo was the only written record of the above-described intercept. He did not know the disposition of this memo. He turned it over to the succeeding watch officer (page 922). He had no recollection of any confirmation of the message from the FCC (page 921). He did not know of any other intercept or an execute message of the Winds Code (page 923). He can account for the inability of the Navy to produce the message as recorded by him, or a confirmation of it, only from his own viewpoint: He had instructions to transmit the message orally, in view of its urgency. He, therefore, had to call Admiral Noyes once. He did not think that they had been ordered to make any record of the message (page 925).

**E. WAS THERE A "WINDS CODE" MESSAGE RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES?**

*In a statement before Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Captain Safford testified concerning the "winds message" as follows:*

*He testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people. (pages 112-114)*

*Captain Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast (page 115).*

*Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received (pages 114-115).*

*Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in McCollum's draft dispatch. (pages 117-118)*

*Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "True 'Winds Message'." The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being inter-*

cepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover Tokyo-Pe-lin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than fifty per cent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated the logs of these stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept. (pages 119-122).

Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he stated that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "wind" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." (page 123).

Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor (page 124).

Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted such message (page 540).

On being recalled for examination, Captain Safford testified that he had had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised him of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that in 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used (pages 538-539).

Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but that in receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and turning it over to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that in thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the year preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression that he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England was possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall (pages 131-132).

Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his testimony Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI" which was contained in the Japanese message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he turned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do not disclose the correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning the fact that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded (pages 133-135).



Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message," which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material (pages 133-136).

Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received or seen an intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation, but that as Captain Safford said he did make such a call, he (Brotherhood) believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time (pages 144-147).

Lieut. Comdr. Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United States were used (pages 140-142).

Lieut. Comdr. Perring's testimony was that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States or to any other nation (page 148).

Lieut. Comdr. Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a 24-hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941 (pages 433-441).

Lieut. Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew of or saw any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States (pages 149-150).

Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson (pages 28-32).

Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Possibly he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which Captain Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out (pages 398-401).

Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor, because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).

They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack. (pages 73, 78).

Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and no "winds" intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and the last one later than six months prior to his testimony in this investigation. He said that Captain Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by someone in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Colonel Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had not told Safford that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler (pages 515-520).

Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a 24-hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941. (Pages 46-7.)

There was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether or not there had been any Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United States.

- (1) Witnesses who said that there was no such message or that they recalled no such message

Admiral Stark stated that he knew of no execute of the "winds message" (page 783).

Captain Wellborn said he knew of no "winds message" indicating that the Japanese were going to attack the United States. (p. 389)

General Marshall thought that he had been aware of the "Winds Code" (Document 15, Exhibit 63), but did not recall any execute message (page 872).

Admiral Noyes said no intercept of such an execute of the Winds Code was received in the Navy Department (page 1033. See pages 1047-8). The question of why such a "winds" message is missing from the Communications is that no such message was ever received by naval means (page 1040). Admiral Ingersoll said that he remembered the "winds" code (Document 15 Exhibit 63), and probably saw it on November 29th. He recalled that there was some difference of opinion as to what it or the execution message meant. He did not know whether this was discussed with Admiral Stark, and did not remember what the doubt of the message was, but remembered that some message was received prior to December 7th (page 825). He did not know where the document, if any, showing a "winds" execute, was (page 826).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he knew of the "winds code" and that he recalled seeing on or about December 4th the Japanese broadcast directive indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States. He said that he did not know why this information had not been sent to Admiral Kimmel except that probably it had been supposed that the Hawaiian intercept station had also received that broadcast. He said it may have been because of this that a message in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes was sent. (p. 429)

Admiral Redman saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (winds code), but never saw execute of it; he heard about it in discussions around December 6th or 7th, but didn't remember where. He heard about it from Admiral Noyes and from Commander Kramer (page 1103). Admiral Schuirmann testified that he recalled that some broadcast had been intercepted, but that there was lack of agreement as to whether or not it constituted "winds" message (page 723).

Comdr. Lynn and Lt. Comdr. Perring testified that they did not see any part of the "winds" message (pages 740, 813).

Captain Layton said that the messages establishing the "winds code" signified that if the code word were sent it meant that diplomatic relations would be severed and anything could happen (page 907).

He did not know of the receipt by any unit of the Navy of any execute of the "winds" message (page 908). He asserted that if an execute of the "winds" message had been received, it would have been rapidly and aggressively acted upon (page 917); he believed that all personnel would have been recalled to their posts, an anti-submarine and distance patrol would have been started, and that the Navy force would have sortied (page 917). He did not think that the "war warning" message meant the same as the "winds code" for it concerned the termination of negotiations but that did not necessarily mean the cessation of diplomatic relations or war (page 918).

Witnesses who said that there was such a message, or some such message

Captain Safford stated that at 0800 on December 4, 1941, Lt. Murray, possibly another, came in with a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is." He thought the message translated read: "War with America; War with England; War with Russia." He has not seen a copy of this since December 15, 1941. It came in from an East Coast station (page 746), but he can't determine what station. There was no confirmation of this intercept from other sources. He had no recollection of a second "winds" message, but was unable to find any trace of it. He testified before Admiral Hart. Since then he learned that the FCC intercepted a "winds" message at Portland. He saw that message for the first time at the hearing and did not recognize it (page 747). He did not recall any other messages in Exhibit 65 (FCC intercepts). They do not indicate a break in relations with the United States.

He asserted that the "winds" message he saw on December 4th is not on file and cannot be found despite repeated search since November, 1943; that Lt. Dr. Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them but did not care to tell him. The witness said he also knew what happened to the other copies, through very "second-hand and devious sources" (pages 747-8). He said that Document 15 of Exhibit 63 indicated that a "winds" message meant "a break of diplomatic relations;" the Dutch translation said it would mean "war." It was interpreted by DONI as meaning war and a signal for the execution of Japanese war plans (page 748). Two sources said it meant a break in diplomatic relations; two said it meant war (page 748). The breaking of diplomatic relations and war were regarded by them, he said, as synonymous in Japanese-United States relations (page 754).

He was certain that an immediate distribution was made on December 4 of the "winds" message to CNO, DONI, Director of War Plans, Assistant Chief of State Department, White House, and War Department, and that Commander Kramer could tell about this (page 749). This information was not passed to CincPac, though McCullom wrote a long dispatch estimating the situation and including this information, which dispatch was not sent. This draft dispatch had been given to Admiral Wilkinson, who wanted to send it; Admiral Noyes said it was an "insult to intelligence of CincPac" (page 749). Admiral Wilkinson disagreed and went to the "front office" to try to get it released. He knew of copy of this draft message now in existence (page 750).

In another lengthy statement at the close of the examination Captain Safford reviewed the McCollum dispatch and the "Winds" message as follows:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you.' Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, but I did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message' was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General there through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. From November until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 4, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units were not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts

Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message,' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message', McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The following officers should have some recollection of the 'Winds Message': U. S. Navy—Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S. Army—Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft. The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time." (p. 360-361)

Because his section knew the Japanese, he said, they considered them tricky and underhanded, and Japanese history showed that they began war without a declaration or the breaking of diplomatic relations (page 755).

Comander Kramer said that on December 3rd or 4th, he was shown a "winds" message by *CY watch officer* and took it immediately to Captain Safford, and Captain Safford took it to Admiral Noyes. Kramer did not handle this as it was a plain language message (page 956). The message received and shown him was "Higashi No Kazeame," translated as "East Wind Rain." This meant strained relations or a break in relations and possibly war with the United States. That message was on teletype paper when he saw it, which indicated that it had come through a USN Intercept Station. He has not seen this message since (page 957).

The different meanings he gave of the "winds" message are inherent in the nature of the Japanese language. He could not definitely interpret a message executing the code as meaning war (page 969).

The "winds" message did not necessarily mean war (page 987).

He has seen the messages in Exhibit 65, but he did not handle these (page 957). There is no question that the "important" documents in Exhibit 63 in the folder delivered regularly to CNO (page 980). He was sure that the "winds" message was sent to the office of CNO (page 981).

Admiral Turner said that to his knowledge none of the code words were received prior to December 7, 1941. He changed his testimony and said Admiral Noyes had called him on the telephone—the date he could not recall—he thought it was December 6th—and had said "the winds message has come" (page 1004). He understood that Admiral Noyes had told CNO. He assumed that CincPac had the "winds" message. The "winds" message meant at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war (page 1005).

### (3) Testimony concerning the "McCollum Dispatch"

It will be recalled that Captain Safford testified that McCollum had drafted a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including information as to the "winds" message, which he and Admiral Wilkinson desired to send to Admiral Kimmel, and which Admiral Noyes opposed.

Admiral Noyes testified that he had discussed McCollum's dispatch with Admiral Wilkinson, and had thought that such estimates should come from CNO (page 1039).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall a draft dispatch prepared by Comdr. McCollum during this period which was not sent out (pages 154A, 154B). Nor did he recall any conversations about this time concerning the sending of additional messages to Admiral Kimmel (page 165).

Admiral Turner said that he had known about the dispatch prepared by McCollum and had discussed it with McCollum. He did not know what happened to the dispatch, or whether it was transmitted. He thought he initiated it and gave it back to McCollum (page 998), but he "is not sure of it" (page 1004).

Commander Kramer heard, after December 7th, of a long draft dispatch which had been prepared by McCollum. He did not know how it had been handled (page 960).

Admirals Ingersoll and Redman did not recall the draft dispatch to CincPac which had been prepared by McCollum (pages 830, 1106).

## XXVII. INFORMATION SENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL AFTER THE "WAR WARNING"

*As of this time there was available to CincPac information of the organization of the Japanese fleets as follows:*

(1) On 29 July 1941 the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of the Japanese Navy. This report stated that as a result of information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main commands—the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:

- (a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
- (b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
- (c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
- (d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
- (e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto, consisted of various Battle Divisions, a Cruiser Division, three Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons. Battle Division 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were Carrier Division 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), Carrier Division 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO); and Carrier Division 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYOGA, MIZUHO).

The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. Carrier Division 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were: Carrier Division 1 (AKAGI and KAGA); and Carrier Division 2 (SORYU and HIRYU).

The Third Fleet included Carrier Division 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA) and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force, and submarine squadrons.

The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine Fleet, and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also given (Hew. Exhibit 81; Hew. page 818).

(2) On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received) the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese Navy and with Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI Bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:

"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and sea-plane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below:

#### Major fleet commands

##### "I. Combined Fleet

|                       |                              |                                                |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 1. First Fleet        | (Battle Force)               | 3 Battles, 1 Crusier, 2 Destroyers             |
| 2. Second Fleet       | (Scouting Force)             | 4 Crusiers, 2 Destroyers, etc.                 |
| 3. Third Fleet        | (Blockade & Transport Force) | Small Craft.                                   |
| 4. Fourth Fleet       | (Mandate Defense Force)      | 1 Destroyer, 1 Submarine and many small units. |
| 5. Fifth Fleet        |                              |                                                |
| 6. Sixth Fleet        | (Submarine Fleet)            | 6 Submarines                                   |
| 7. Carrier Fleet      | (Aircraft Carriers)          | 5 Cruisers                                     |
| 8. Combined Air Force | (Seaplane tenders, etc.)     | 4 Airrons, & shore based planes.               |

##### "II. Japanese Naval Forces in China.

|                              |                 |                                  |
|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. First China Exped. Fleet  | (Central China) | Gunboats                         |
| 2. Second China Exped. Fleet | (South China)   | 1 CA, 1 CL and small craft       |
| 3. Third China Exped. Fleet  | (North China)   | Torpedo Boats, etc.              |
| 4. Southern Exped. Fleet     | (Saigon)        | 1 CL, transports and mine craft. |

"The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full war-time footing."

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and HARUNA—as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941 and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.

The Second Fleet included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One of the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).

The composition of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated, "The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported at Maizuru." (Exhibit 21; p. 185.)

Admiral McMorris stated that he did not know whether Washington kept CincPac fully informed but, he said, the information which was received was taken at its face value (page 899).

The "war warning," it will be recalled, had been sent to Admiral Kimmel on November 27th. On November 28th, the Army dispatch had been repeated to Admiral Kimmel, advising, among other things, that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. Also on November 28th, there had been sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of CincAF's dispatch advising of the "winds code" to be used if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed. And, on the same day, he had been in communication with OPNAV concerning his plan for the reinforcement of Midway and Wake, and, in that connection there had been mention made of the shortage of anti-aircraft guns.

On November 30th, Admiral Kimmel sent a dispatch (Exhibit 77) urgently recommending the shipment of 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns and ammunition for familiarization and training.

On November 30, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to CincPac for information (Exhibit 76), which advised in part:

"Indications that Japan about to attack points on KRA by overseas expedition X. Disire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X. A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information were all negative.

**Exhibit 10 is a dispatch of November 30 from CNO to CinCAF, informal to CincPac.**

Also on November 30th Admiral McMorris prepared, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, a memorandum setting forth the steps which he recommended to be taken in the event of American-Japanese war within the ensuing twenty-four hours (Exhibit 69A). This was revised on December 5th and set forth the steps to be taken in the event of war within forty-eight hours (Exhibit 69B).

*Vice Admiral McMorris testified that during the first week of December, 1941, he, and he was sure Admiral Kimmel, had in mind constantly the "war warning" the fact that the Japanese forces were, according to Intelligence, on the move, the fact that the Japanese were destroying codes, and that the Japanese in the Pacific had attacked without declaration of war (p. 328).*

*He stated further that during that time he was also considering the task set forth in Phase IA of the Pacific Fleet Plan, and that daily or on alternate days he furnished Admiral Kimmel with an informal memorandum as to the action that should be taken by important elements of the Fleet if war were initiated within twenty-four hours. He stated that typical of such memoranda were the Naval Court of Inquiry Exhibits 69A and 69B, which were dated 30 November and 5 December 1941, respectively (p. 328-329).*

*With reference to the Phase IA task of maintaining air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and the fact that no provision was made for carrying out that task, Vice Admiral McMorris testified that submarines were considered to be the greatest element of danger. He said that anti-submarine patrols had been placed in effect (p. 329).*

At about this time, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel also received information concerning the estimated position of the Japanese Fleet. As Captain Layton expressed it:

*Captain Layton testified that in accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a memorandum for the Admiral, dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet. This was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of December 1st and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel and which reflected the later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December 1st-2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on information available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including December 1941.*

*Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units of the Orange (Japanese) fleet were "thought" to be located as listed in the memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships, "(?) and other units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.*

*In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief of the China Fleet, the Shanghai Base Force, and an air group.*

*In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force, with numerous air groups, and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted carrier with transport planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at Takao with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Csrdiv 4—two CV and four L. Cardiv 3—two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARUNA—3 BB (maybe 2 BB) and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.*

*In the Hainan-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In*



French Indo-China Area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships, including 21 transports and some base forces, among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group and base force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier "KORYU" plus plane guards," and several submarine squadrons and base force (Hew. Es. 23).

Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on this point as follows:

"Mr. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"Captain LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of those units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect. . . . (P. 212-213)

"Mr. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Carvies 1 and 2 a serious jocular one?

"Captain LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Carvies 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"Mr. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

"Captain LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location" (P. 255-256).

On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After it was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it was made available in the Empire—4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home area. This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and indicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The message referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to influence public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships, and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending a portion of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was the basis of his reasoning (page 913).

Captain Layton further testified that there were delivered to him, for presentation to Admiral Kimmel, daily communication intelligence summaries, during the period of time subsequent to the sending and receipt of the dispatches of 26 November. (Page 192). Captain Layton identified such summaries for the period 14 October to 14 December 1941, (Exhibit 22), and pointed out that the initials appearing in the lower right hand corner of these documents reading HEK, appeared on the original and were the initials of Admiral Kimmel (Page 193-194).

Captain Layton stated further that on certain of the originals of the communication intelligence summaries there appeared underscoring of certain parts and that certain of the underscoring were performed by Admiral Kimmel and certain other marks appearing on the summaries, including marks as to direction, finder bearings and positions of ships were made by he, himself (Captain Layton, Page 193).

Captain Layton summarized and made reference in his testimony to what he considered to be the significant parts of the Communications Intelligence Summaries dated from 27 November to 6 December 1941, and of the dispatches received and sent during the same period, (Pages 194, 237, 244, 245), including his 1 December 1941 estimate as to the location of the Japanese Fleet Units (pages 244, 245, 252, 253), and to the comments made on 2 December 1941 by Admiral Kimmel when, in discussing the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate, Admiral Kimmel noted and commented on the absence of the information concerning the location of two Japanese carrier divisions. (Pages 212, 213, 256). This intelligence, as summarized by him, particularly concerning the locations of Japanese carriers, but not entirely confined to them, was briefly as follows:

A. 27 November 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary Information of 27 November, delivered 28 November, was: Some tactical traffic from carriers. Enciphered addressees were noted, indicating a new command and a newly formed unit became active in an operational or maneuverable stage and not in an administrative or routine role. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates; it was stated that carriers were still located in home waters. The commander of the submarine forces was located in the Chichijima area and this was of significance. (Page 194-196).

(2) The term, "home waters" as used in the summary, with reference to the location of the carriers, meant Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds in the Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Bay area, and, in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. The term, "home waters" did not include Etorofu, since placed in northern Japan, including Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as high north area. The area east of Japan that would be included in the term "home waters", would embrace perhaps 40 to 60 miles or more; it would be about the same distance that the United States Fleet operations would take us west to San Clemente, San Pedro or San Diego. The definition of the term, "home waters", as indicated above, was understood by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 196).

(b) (1) The Naval Attache at Shanghai in dispatch number 270855, reported sightings between Hong Kong and Shanghai, of many transports that were proceeding south, and that military wharves at Shanghai were abnormal. (Page 196).

(2) OpNav dispatch to CinCPac and CinCAF, information CinCLC number 272337, was received. This was the war warning message. It directed an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. (Page 196-197).

B. 28 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 28 November, delivered 29 November, it was noted that Tokyo originators were sending a considerably high precedence traffic to the Commander-in-Chief, Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. It was further noted that no movements of Combined Fleet Units were detected. Communications between the Army Commander on Formosa and the Commander, Amphibious Force, were considered a sure sign of amphibious operations. No submarine traffic was observed. (Page 198-200).

(b) (1) The following dispatch traffic occurred:

a. Com14 to OpNav, information CinCAF, stating the British consul advised that the Japanese would attack Krakow Isthmus on 1 December without an ultimatum. (Page 200-201).

b. CinCAF to OpNav, CinCPac, Com14, Com16, establishing the winds in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net, the other from Japanese language foreign broadcasts. (Page 201).

c. Com16 to CinCAF, OpNav, CinCPac and Com14, advising that an unidentified ship had relieved the KASHII and was in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area. (Page 201).

d. OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Com16 and Com14, dispatch number 281633, advising of information received from the State Department.

various reports from sources in Asia concerning the movement of Japanese forces southward. (Page 201-202).

C. 29 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 29 November, delivered 30 November, it was noted that eleven messages from Tokyo intelligence, and four long messages from Tokyo radio intelligence were sent to major commanders. The Jaluit radio direction finder station included the Commander, Submarines as an information addressee, which indicated that he was in the approaches to, or about to enter the Mandated Islands, likely the Marshalls.

It was noted that there was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, who was in charge of the south invasion forces, Carrier Division 3, along with 2 cruiser divisions, 2 destroyer squadrons, 2 submarine squadrons, the Third Fleet or Amphibious Forces, and the French-Indo-China Forces. The Commander of the Submarine Forces had his traffic routed through Saipan, though on the previous day, it had been routed through Chichijima, indicating a southerly or southeastern movement. (Page 202-204).

(2) The only reference to carriers appearing in the Communications Intelligence Summary of this date was that CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet; and there was no other information on that date relating to Japanese carriers. (Page 205-206).

(3) It was believed that CarDiv 3 was composed of the RYUJO and Hosho. (Page 206).

(b) (1) The Communications Intelligence Unit at Cavite sent a dispatch noting general radio intelligence obtained by it on the previous two days. It referred, in dispatch number 261331, to new Japanese ship arrivals in the Takao area. (Page 204).

(2) There was received OpNav dispatch number 290110, addressed to Commander Northern Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Frontier, information CinCPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, advising that the Army had sent a war warning dispatch to the Western Defense Command, and quoting that dispatch, which advised of the termination of the negotiations with the Japanese, stated hostile action possible at any moment, directed the undertaking of reconnaissance and preparations to carry out WPL-46. (Page 204-205).

D. 30 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 30 November, delivered 1 December, it was noted that general radio traffic was less than usual, and that the only tactical circuit was between the AKAGI and several MARU's. The significance of the term, "tactical circuit" is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru. (Page 206).

(2) It was noted further that the battleships KONGO and HIYEI were placed as units in the CinC, Second's task force. Captain Layton explained that while it was a mistake to place the HIYEI as a member of the second fleet's task force, as it is now known that the HIYEI was one of the battleships that attacked Pearl Harbor, and that it was, on 30 November 1941, on the high seas enroute to Pearl Harbor. This mistake was an error in fact but not an error in substance and arose from a bad identification of a ship similar to the HIYEI, that is, the HARUNA, which, in fact, did take part in the second expedition under the CinC, Second Fleet. (Page 207-208).

(3) It was further noted that there was a strong impression that the CinC, Third Fleet was on its way, and that there was a continued association of the Commander, Submarine Forces with Jaluit, which, along with his known progress through the Chichijima area to the Sopian zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls. Consequently, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that this bore out Com14's previous contention that there was a submarine concentration in the Marshalls, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good portion of the submarines of the Submarine Force. (Page 208).

(4) It was also noted that there was in the Marshalls, a unit of plane guard destroyers, indicating the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although that fact was not confirmed. (Page 209).

(5) There were other indications of air-submarine operations from the M-shalls, following from the fact that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama Naval Air Corps were located there. (Page 208-209).

(6) The Communication Intelligence Summary of this date was initialed by Admiral (then Captain) McMorris, War Plans Officer. (Page 209).

(b) (1) CinCPac received from Com16 a dispatch addressed to OpNav, information CinCAF, CinCPac and Com14, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same garble pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' call signs had not changed. (Page 210).

(2) OpNav dispatch number 301709, addressed to CinCAF, information CinCPac, was received. It requested CinCAF to report daily as to whether contacts were made in the air search being conducted between Manila and Camaguey Bay, and that such reports should be made even though the results were negative. This search was being made by CinCAF in pursuance of the directive by OpNav in its dispatch number 300419. (Page 210).

#### E. 1 December 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 1 December, delivered 2 December, it was confirmed that all service radio calls of Japanese naval forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 1 December, midnight. (Page 213).

(2) This change in service calls was of particular significance since it was the Japanese custom ordinarily not to change their radio calls until after the change had been in use for a period of six months or more. The last change in service calls had occurred on 1 November 1941, so that the discontinued service calls had been used for only one month. This indicated a progressive step toward preparation for active operations on a large scale. (Page 213).

(3) Captain Layton testified that the underlining in red on the original of the communication intelligence summary of the words that the change in service calls indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale was, to the best of his recollection, made by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 213-214).

(4) It was further noted in the communication intelligence summary that the Japanese were adopting more and more security provisions in handling their radio traffic. (Page 213-214).

(5) No change was noted as to the location of the Submarine Force, which was believed to be eastward of the line between Yokosuka-Chichijima-Saipan, under "carriers", it was stated that there was no change. This, Capt. Layton explained, meant that there was no change in the previous report as to the location of carriers. The last report as to carriers, he stated, was that they were in the Empire area with the exception of Car-Div 3, and with the further exception that there was possibly 1 carrier in the Mandates. (Page 215).

(6) The Communications Intelligence Summary noted further that there was nothing to report concerning the Fifth Fleet. (Page 215).

(7) Captain Layton explained that the Fifth Fleet was on organization, which little or nothing was known but there that were indications in the past that it was a force assembled for operations in the Northern waters. (Page 216).

(b) The following dispatches were handled:

(1) OpNav to CinCAF and Com16, information CinCPac and Com14, referring to an intrigue in Thailand, intended to draw the British and Japanese into war over that country. (Page 217).

(2) Com 16 to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Com14 and OpNav, advising that Japanese station JVJ in closing at 1700 hours, presumably minus nine minutes, stated that all listeners should be sure to tune in at 0700 tomorrow morning as there may be important news. Com16 suggested several radio frequencies which might be used. (Page 217).

(3) Com16 advised of the results of its radio intelligence activity which included the obtaining of information of Jap ship arrivals in the Takao area, which was under the command of the CinC, Third Fleet, and that the ATAGO had shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo communication zone and was apparently enroute to South China waters. (Page 217-218).

It also advised that there was an impression that the broadcast scheduled by Japanese radio station JVJ, indicated above, would be an executive winds message. Captain Layton testified that as a result of receiving this dispatch several monitors were put on a double alert but nothing came of it. (Page 218).

#### F. 2 December 1941:

(a) (1) On this day there was presented by Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate.

of the location of the Japanese Fleet Unit. Admiral Kimmel directed Layton to prepare the estimate late on the afternoon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, directing that it be prepared as of 1 December. (Page 210).

(2) The memorandum was prepared by Layton and dated 1 December, and, afterwards, Layton obtained certain substantiating and additional information from the officer who prepared the daily communication intelligence summaries. When the 1 December estimate was shown by Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noted that it contained a typographical error on page 4, which he corrected in his handwriting. (The error consisted of a reference to "20 CL", which should have read, and was corrected by Admiral Kimmel to read "2 OCL". The 1 December Layton estimate is exhibit 23. (Page 211).

(3) Admiral Kimmel discussed this estimate with Layton and noted that it did not contain any information as to the locations of the Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers, though it did list Carrier Divisions 3 and 4, and the KASUGA MARU, 1 XCV, as being located in the Bako-Takao area, and the KORYU, 1 CV, in the Marshalls. It was in connection with the absence of reliable information on which to base an estimate as to the locations of CarDivs 1 and 2 that Admiral Kimmel addressed to Layton the question whether they might be rounding Diamond Head at that moment or words to that effect, to which Layton replied that he hoped that in such case they would be sighted before now. (Page 211-212-213).

(b) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary of 2 December, delivered 3 December, that the Japanese were having difficulty in routing their radio traffic, which arose from their change in call signs, which was probably due to the unfamiliarity of the operators with the new calls and with the location of the units affected. The summary noted that Com16 reported the Second and Third Fleets to be in the Takao area, but the Communication Intelligence Unit in Hawaii noted that there was one indication that the two fleets were not close to Takao and it expressed a belief that a large fleet, made up of First, Second Third Fleet Units, had left Empire waters and was proceeding on a course that was not close to Takao. (Page 218).

(2) The First Fleet appeared to remain relatively quiet. The association of the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet continued. Under "carriers" it was stated, "almost a complete blank on information of the carriers today." It was stated further that though over 200 service calls had been partially identified since the 1st of December, yet not one carrier call had been recovered since that date, causing it to be evident that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. (Page 219).

(3) Captain Layton stated that Admiral Kimmel read the statement in the Communication Intelligence Summary with reference to carriers, and the failure to identify carrier call signs, as well as the information that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. (Page 220).

(4) Captain Layton explained the difference between the reference in the Communication Intelligence Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, and the reference in this summary in connection with the Second Fleet that a lack of new identification contributed to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet was underway in company, as follows:

- a. There was no radio silence insofar as the Second Fleet was concerned.
- b. The Second Fleet was using its radio and was on the air on known frequencies;
- c. That Fleet was handling a normal pattern of traffic; there was a normal number of calls in its circuits though a number of them were not identified.

The lack of identification was due to the change in call signs. However, the normal amount of the traffic, associated with the lack of identification, caused it to be believed that the Second Fleet was at sea. However, with reference to carriers, there was a complete blank of information, meaning that the carrier circuits were definitely not up to normal use. This would have meant either that the carriers were under radio silence wherever located or operating, or else that they were operating so close to home that they were using a broadcast frequency which could not be heard far away. (Page 220-225).

(5) Captain Layton in his testimony, however, insisted that the statement in the Communication Intelligence Summary that carrier traffic was at a low ebb did not signify anything unusual to him at that time, (page 225), since it was sometimes the custom of the Japanese to take their carriers into the Inland Sea area where they would not be heard from for a considerable period of time. (Page 225-226).

(6) He stated that he could not recall whether he had any discussions with Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of carrier traffic. (Page 226).

(c) (1) Com18 advised OpNav, CinCPac, CinCAF and Com14 that the CinC, Second and Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and stated further that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok has requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes. (Page 226).

(2) CinCAF dispatch number 020345 to OpNav, Information CinCPac advised that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a southerly course. (Page 226).

(3) CinCAF dispatch number 020730 to OpNav, information CinCPac, reported further sightings of Japanese submarines and some ships in Comranh Bay. (Page 226-227).

(4) Assistant Naval Attache in Shanghai to OpNav, information CinCPac, advised of Japanese troop movements in the vicinity of Shanghai. (Page 227).

#### G. 3 December 1941:

(a) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 3 December, delivered 4 December, that though the volume of traffic was normal, the state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. It was noted that there was an extensive use of alternate calls by major commands which slowed up identification. It was stated "no information on Japanese submarines or carriers." (Page 227-228).

(b) (1) On this day, OpNav addressed a dispatch to CinCAF and Com18, information CinCPac and Com14 that Tokyo had ordered its embassies to destroy its purple machine. (Page 228). Captain Layton obtained information as to what the purple machine was and at Admiral Kimmel's request, advised him of that information. (Page 228-229). Admiral Kimmel was also advised that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning papers. (Page 229).

(2) OpNav in dispatch number 031850 advised that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying their codes and important papers. (Page 230).

(3) The Naval Attache in Singapore in dispatch number 020335 stated that the Cinc, China Fleet had restricted the movement of Allied ships in China waters. (Page 230).

#### H. 4 December 1941:

(a) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 4 December, delivered 5 December, that an important move had been made by the Takao radio in inaugurating a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that was used by the Tokyo radio, showing that Takao had now assumed the position of handling major fleet traffic on high speed circuits. Many urgent messages were also noted, being addressed by Tokyo to major commanders and among these was a seven part Tokyo intelligence dispatch. The outstanding item of the day was the lack of messages originating from the CinC, Second and Third Fleets, who previously had been very talkative and now very quiet. (Page 230-231).

(2) There was no traffic which enabled any check to be made on the presence of the Fourth Fleet Units in the Marshalls. The impression obtained from the fact that the previously talkative commanders were silent, though still prominent as addressees, especially of intelligence dispatches, was that they were at sea and maintaining radio silence though still receiving. Captain Layton explained that as of that time the Japanese had not learned how to use the American trick of putting out messages without indicating who was the originator. (Page 232).

(b) (1) The dispatches handled on this day referred to Japanese troop and ship movements of China and Indo-China, and other general information, obtained from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch numbers 020704, and 020702, and Naval Attache, Tokyo, dispatch number 030630. (Page 232-233).

#### I. 5 December 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 5 December, delivered 6 December, noted that the traffic volume was extremely heavy and that all circuits were overloaded. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to cause a jammed condition on all circuits. Neither the CinC, Third or Second Fleets originated any traffic although they were still frequently addressed, and it is believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or further south. (Page 233-234).

(2) It was noted that a number of Marus had addressed the CinC, Third Fleet, and there was traffic strengthening the impression that the CinC, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. There was no traffic from the Commanders of the Carrier or Submarine Forces. (Page 233-235).

#### J. 6 December 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 6 December was not delivered until after the attack on 7 December. (Page 235).

(b) (1) *Certain dispatches were also received on the 7th, which Captain Layton thought were received after the attack. (Page 235-237).*

information sent to Admiral Kimmel.

(ii) *Vice Admiral McMorris testified that in advising Admiral Kimmel during the critical period of 1941, he considered the negative as well as the positive information available concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers, and that such negative information included the Intelligence that there was no information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers (page 330).*

During this period, as previously noted, included the fortnightly summary of present national situations, prepared by ONI and issued on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57). In addition to the military and naval information furnished, this included, concerning the Japanese diplomatic situation, that unless the Japanese tested a continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations would have virtually broken down; the Japanese government and press were claiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the greater East Asia sphere; the press was also criticising Thailand severely; strong indications pointed to an early Japanese advance against Thailand; and, relations between Japan and Russia remained strained.

On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50) and advised that Admiral Halsey's advance in the ENTERPRISE to Wake had been covered by two patrol squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway, and Wake, and that upon completion of the movement, Admiral Kimmel planned to turn one squadron to Pearl Harbor and leave the other at Midway and awaiting developments. The letter discussed the difficulty of supply and defense of the outlying islands. The letter also stated that consideration was being given to the matches concerning the use of Army personnel in outlying islands; and, that Admiral Kimmel had frequently called Admiral Stark's attention to the inadequacy of Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area, with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, he said, very little had been done to improve this situation. It was pointed out that because of the Army's lack of equipment, Admiral Kimmel was unable to understand the dispatches directing that the Army be utilized in the defense of the outlying islands. In a postscript to this letter stated, "You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area." It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he took no exception to this (page 153).

In connection with the Army's development of airfields in Fiji and New Caledonia, Admiral Kimmel stated in a further postscript to his letter that the Navy was bound to be involved in the protection of shipping and of the fields. He said, "Near we may become so much concerned with defensive roles, that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive."

Also on December 2nd, Admiral Kimmel sent an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the defense of outlying islands and referring, among other things, to the November 28th dispatches in this connection. After some discussion, this letter concluded that Marine armament could be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent; that, if the Marines were replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, would be valueless as a defense battalion; replacing the Marines would very materially weaken the defense because of the lack of proficient personnel; and, that considering all aspects, Marine planes were of more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

It was also stated that the presence of Army forces on outlying bases would inevitably bring up the question of command; that Midway, Wake, Johnston and Eniwetok were Navy bases; that unity of command would be necessary; and, that command would have to be vested in the Navy's commanding officer at each location.

In his letter also said that Admiral Kimmel had conferred with General Short on the matter and that arrangements were in progress looking toward the organization of three Army defense battalions, the training of such units with available equipment, the obtaining by the Army of requisite equipment, the Army organization of three pursuit plane squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status, and bringing said units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for support or replace Marines or for use on other islands not manned by Marines. Admiral Kimmel stated also that the major point was that the Advanced Bases were "going concerns;" that "the international situation is such that active

defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice; that any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there were compelling necessity therefor.

In his letter Admiral Kimmel also expressed "growing concern" over the increase in the Army and Navy stations that might require support from the Fleet; that such involvement "may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet;" that this should be curtailed; and, that the Fleet in a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific could not contribute very much to the victory over a power thousands of miles to the westward.

Admiral Kimmel's letter closed with various recommendations consistent with the views expressed in his letter.

Admiral Smith, during recross examination by Admiral Stark, said that Admiral Kimmel had regularly reported to Admiral Stark the action he took, but not the "war warning" message (page 552). On recross by Admiral Kimmel, Stark stated that Exhibit 50, the December 2nd letter, did report what Admiral Kimmel was doing. Admiral Stark's lawyer contended this was not a reply to the message but to the earlier one about plane movements; the witness finally characterized the letter as a "routine weekly report" (pages 533-534). He remembered no dispatch which reported the action taken by Admiral Kimmel after the "warning" (page 554), but said "probably there was" (page 555).

In addition to the December 2nd letter, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel had sent a dispatch on November 28th, concerning the same subject.

On December 3, 1941, OPNAV sent two dispatches advising of Japanese instructions to destroy codes, as follows:

1. A dispatch from OPNAV to CinCAF, ComSIXTEEN for action, and to CinPac and ComFOURTEEN for information which advised that the Japanese had ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy Purple machines and the Batavia machine already had been sent to Tokyo; Washington also had been directed to destroy the Purple and all but one copy of other systems of all secret documents; also, that the British Admiralty had reported that the Japanese Embassy at London had complied (Exhibit 66).

Captain Safford referred to OpNav secret dispatch #31855 which he prepared on December 3, and to a similar dispatch released by Admiral Wilkinson. He then said:

"Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him, 'Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?' McCollum emphasized both 'we's' . . . McCollum replied, 'We are doing everything we can to get the news out to the Fleet.' In sending this information, I was operating within the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreements between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. ComSIXTEEN #31855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to CinPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U. S. N., on CinPac's Staff, could have explained its significance." (p. 359-360)

Captain Safford said that the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District did not have any material from which they could have gained this information through their own efforts. (p. 360)

2. A dispatch from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN, for action:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts in Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important and confidential and secret documents" (Exhibit 20)

Admiral Pye said that he saw the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes and discussed it with the Commander in Chief, and it seemed perfectly evident that such action could precede war by many days and it did not indicate immediate action. They were unaware of the significance of this information and as it had appeared in the newspapers it probably did not mean as much as it would have meant had they known the source. Admiral Pye felt that at Oahu they were pretty much operating in the dark so far as the international situation was concerned. (p. 157)



Exhibit 11 is the December 3 dispatch by CNO to CinCAF, CinCPac and others.

Concerning the code destruction messages, Admiral Turner said that it was impossible for him to understand how anyone could believe that because of the messages the war was coming in the Western Pacific and would not involve Oahu. He pointed out that both Washington and Manila had been included in the dispatch.

Admiral McMorris said that the December 3rd dispatch concerning codes was the best indication, in his opinion, that the United States would be involved in war with Japan. He did not recall Admiral Kimmel's view. (p. 247)

Admiral Anderson said that he had not precise knowledge but he thought that there had been a proper dissemination of information among the officers of the higher command. He saw the Commander in Chief at least weekly. Admiral Anderson did not think that he had seen nor had he been told about the October 16 dispatch. (p. 392). Admiral Anderson could not recall the November 24 dispatch or the November 30 dispatch to CinCAF with copy to CinCPac for information. He did remember having seen the war warning and believed that he had seen the December 3 dispatch.

As a matter of interest, it may be noted that a sentence appearing at the end of this copy of the dispatch, which was released by T. S. Wilkinson, was stricken out in pencil. That sentence read: "From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia."

On December 4, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CinCAF, CinCPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:

"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CinCAF, CinCPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and OpNav X. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained"

On December 6, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 22) bearing time-date stamp 061743 was sent by OPNAV to CinCPac for action, and to CinCAF for information. This stated:

"In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment"

Commander Kramer drafted Exhibit 66, the December 3rd dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of the "purple" machine. This was sent on the "Kopek" Channel, which was a channel for technical traffic between the Navy Department, Pearl Harbor and the Asiatic Station (page 971). It indicated, he said, a break in diplomatic relations. Exhibit 20, sent out by OPNAV on the same day as Exhibit 66, was the interpretive dispatch of Exhibit 66 (page 960).

Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 21 (dispatch to Guam of December 4th, directing the destruction of codes) was prepared by him and motivated by the growing feeling that war in the Pacific was imminent (page 1031). It was released by Admiral Ingersoll.

Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 22 (authorizing destruction of codes on outlying islands, dated December 6, 1941) was prepared by him and treated as priority dispatch, despite the lack of priority shown on its face (pages 1040, 1042).

Admiral Stark testified that the code destruction message was sent to Guam because he felt that Guam was in the most danger; he did not similarly advise ComFOURTEEN because he did not think Hawaii was in as much danger as was Guam (page 69). At this time, Admiral Stark testified, he believed that war was imminent. Of particular significance, he felt, was the information relating the destruction of codes (pages 165-6). He also knew that the Japanese consuls were advising the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines, Hawaii, the United States, etc. (page 157). Admiral Ingersoll stated that the dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of codes strengthened the "war warning" (page 835).

Admiral Turner said that on Friday, December 5, 1941, there was a discussion between Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll and himself concerning the general situation, and they all felt that all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary (page

1006). They did send some other messages about destruction of codes, to Japanese and our own (page 1007).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he regarded the dispatches concerning Japanese destruction of codes as indicating that the Japanese were going to take steps to prevent the seizure of their codes upon the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations and regarded the dispatch directing Guam to destroy classified matter as a general precautionary measure (page 327). He "presumed" that he received the December 6th dispatch prior to the attack (page 327).

Admiral Smith testified that he saw the dispatches relating to the destruction of codes but that this meant little to him as CincPac was prepared to destroy codes (page 533). At this time, he said, war was inevitable (page 534).

About December 3rd, Admiral Smith said, after receipt of the dispatch of that date, and information from the Asiatic Fleet to the effect that the Japanese movements were on the way to the Southward, he believed that the Japanese were going to attack Malay Peninsula and possibly the Philippines; he thinks that the reaction of others at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters was the same.

Admiral Pye testified that he saw Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) December 4th, but that this information was published in the newspapers (page 427). Admiral Pye testified that he had not seen Exhibits 21 and 22 (Page 427).

Commander Rochefort, who was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fifteenth Naval District, stated that during this period the Japanese Consulate was burning or destroying various papers (page 474).

Captain Layton said that the messages concerning Japanese code destruction meant to him only that the Japanese were destroying a cipher machine; he knew "purple" designated it as a diplomatic code (pages 904-5) and that the "purple" cipher was a high class cipher (page 908).

On December 5, 1941, he said, they received word from the Naval Observer Wellington that the Japanese were destroying codes. This was given to CincPac and was considered along with other information received at that time (page 906). At that time, they received messages from the British and from Washington stating that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese attack on Kra Peninsula; this seemed to dovetail with the other information which they had (page 906).

There was a discussion concerning the significance of the code destruction messages; they seemed to indicate to Layton that Japan was preparing for all eventualities. He presumed that when it was discussed by Admiral Kimmel with the War Plans Officer and others, it was a matter of discussion (page 906).

Admiral McMorris said that he felt that Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) indicated strongly that there would be war with Japan. He did not recall whether this opinion was prevalent on CincPac's staff, but believed it was thought by CincPac that war was then extremely possible (page 895).

It may be noted that although Admiral Kimmel stated that he had kept General Short informed, he did not personally direct that General Short be given dispatches concerning codes destruction (Exhibits 20, 21, 22) and did not know whether they were given to him (page 327).

The only action that Admiral Bloch recalled as a result of the December 4th dispatch concerning the destruction of codes was the security measures already prescribed, the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, a warning that was given to the Destroyer captains, and his belief the Army was on a high alert. (p. 18)

Admiral Bloch did not believe that the Army had been informed of the destruction (code) messages. The messages, he said, were secret and that they had been admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, but one thing and another, Admiral Bloch's War Plans Officer would know about them. Admiral Bloch said that since General Short and he saw one another very frequently and Admiral Kimmel and he saw one another practically every day, it is hard to believe that anything of importance could take place or that anything could be received of even small importance that was not discussed because it is only fair to assume that they discussed everything. (p. 18)

General Short, he said, had an Army Colonel as a liaison officer in Admiral Bloch's office and Admiral Bloch had in the General's office a Lieutenant Colonel from the Naval Reserve as a liaison officer and these men were supposed to be kept informed. Admiral Bloch's liaison officer did not know of the

patches that had been received because Admiral Bloch did not consider that it was proper to tell him; he was quite inexperienced. Nor was Admiral Bloch sure that the Army's liaison officer knew of the messages, but he said they were in close touch through these liaison officers and felt that they knew what was going on. He said that it was indicated that there were some things which they were not correctly informed about. (p. 18)

Neither General Short nor his Chief of Staff recalled having seen these messages prior to the attack (pages 255, 486).

# XXVIII. THE "MORI" CONVERSATION; JAPANESE BURNING PAPERS

General Short testified that about December 5th or 6th, he received intelligence reports to the effect that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers.

Admiral Bloch said that after the receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese were burning papers, he didn't know whether or not that was something that was really filled with meaning; he believed that so long as there were negotiations going on in Washington, there was a possibility of the period of waiting being extended; he had a very definite feeling that we were going to have war sometime in the future but just how far in the future he was unable to predict. (p. 17)

Lt. Stephenson discussed in some detail the Mori telephone conversation intercepted on December 6, 1941 and stated his conclusion that he believed it unlikely that this was a calculated transmission of information from Honolulu to Japan.

On December 6th, he received a report of a long telephone conversation between a person named "Mori" and someone in Japan, in which references were made to the weather, ships at Pearl Harbor, and the local attitude toward the Japanese (page 233).

*The Mori conversation was as follows:*

*(Exhibit 39)*

IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present.

Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

(H) I do not know why this is so, but appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in . . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various sorts are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

(J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to the war daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, an unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he explained for the first time to the people of Hawaii that he was in the land today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, but he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already come back to the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid discussing about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't know whether all of the fleet has done this, but I think that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. Here the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

\*(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

\*(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamuno"; that a person named Takogishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takogishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takogishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year's celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the Army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Thank you.

(J) Off phone.

# X. THE LIKELIHOOD OF A JAPANESE ATTACK AT HAWAII AS ESTIMATED WASHINGTON DECEMBER 6, 1941

## A. NAVY ESTIMATES

Admiral Stark testified that as of December 6, 1941, he considered that a United States and Japanese war was imminent and that there was a strong probability Japan would strike. He thought that the Philippines and Guam were the likely targets, of United States territory. He considered that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but, he said, he thought that there was a good chance any attack there would be detected in time to intercept it or to reduce its effectiveness (pages 73, 165). However, he had no information indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable (pages 105, 792). Generally speaking, he said, he and his advisors did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).

Captain Wellborn said that there were various individuals in the Navy Department who felt that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable—such as Admiral Turner, and there were others who felt that it was less probable, although possible, such as Admirals Ingersoll and Stark.

Admiral Turner, on the other hand, testified that he had expected a landing in East Asia, attacks on the Philippines and some form of attack on Hawaii

(page 1002). He had thought that an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor was not only possible (page 997) but that it was a probability, and he was not surprised when it was made (page 1021).

Captain Glover said that a daily short strategic summary of the international military and political situation had been prepared by Commander Ansel in collaboration with Captain Wright and submitted to Admiral Turner. These are contained in a notebook entitled "Daily Information Summary—Op12" filed with the Combat Intelligence Section. Captain Glover said that he did not believe that it had generally been felt by officers in the Plans Division that the Japanese would strike as they did. (p. 176)

Admiral Turner said that he had always been of the view that a torpedo plane attack on ships in Pearl Harbor was possible and pointed out that the Bureau of Ordnance had modified its earlier letters indicating that still 75" depth was necessary.

Admiral Turner said that the Chief of Naval Operations shared his view as to the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor and that they felt that Admiral Kimmel also had the same views. (p. 261)

Admiral Turner said that generally he thought our Intelligence regarding Japanese intentions and activities was quite good. He said that he had anticipated that the Japanese would attack the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies at the end of November 1941. The attack of December 7 came as no surprise to him whatsoever nor, he said, was it a surprise to the Chief of Naval Operations. He was not surprised by the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor and pointed out that he had originated the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 1941, pointing out that just such an attack was the most probable form that the initiation of war by Japan would take. (p. 259)

Admiral Wilkinson recalled no specific evaluation as to the capability of the Japanese to launch an attack such as the attack which was made. (p. 287) Admiral Wilkinson said that he was not surprised by the fact that the Japanese did venture a carrier raid, but was surprised by the force of the raid, and by the fact that the attack had come in without detection. (p. 287-8)

Admiral Ingersoll stated that he had considered that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility (page 821) but he had not thought that an air attack on Oahu was probable. He had thought that when war came there would be numerous Japanese submarines around Pearl Harbor and he expected raids against outlying islands in the Fourteenth Naval District and that any attack on Hawaii would be by submarines or surface forces (page 847). (3)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he thought the dispatches concerning the reenforcement of Midway and Wake should have accentuated the idea that there was a danger of raids in the area rather than allay suspicion as to the probability of attack in the Hawaiian area. (p. 427)

Admiral Ingersoll said that the December 3 dispatch indicated that war was imminent and a matter of a few days or hours and that it was believed in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations that such war would include the United States as indicated by the reference to Washington in that dispatch. (p. 428)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled no discussion in late November or early December regarding the probability of an air attack on Hawaii. They did anticipate possible attacks by submarines and possible raids either by light forces or by submarines at Wake, Midway and Johnston. (p. 426)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he expected that the Japanese attack against the United States would be on the Philippines and Guam with possible raiding attacks on our outlying islands to the westward of Hawaii and submarine attacks against shipping around Hawaii and generally between the west coast and the United States. He said that he did not recall anyone in operations reporting to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated by an air attack on Pearl Harbor. (p. 430)

Captain Heard testified that they had no information which indicated or would lead to an obvious conclusion that there was an impending attack on Hawaii. He was quite convinced that war would start in Southeast Asia (page 468).

*Admiral Wilkinson said that for a month preceding 7 December 1941 there were no discussions in which he participated regarding the likelihood of a Japanese move on Pearl Harbor. He stated further that during the first week in*

*December, 1941, he remembered no discussions concerning the question of whether or not aerial reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu (p. 396).*

According to Commander Kramer, from the information he saw there was not the slightest indication of Japanese overt intention to attack the United States. The information of this type was known to be incomplete and CNO knew this (page 985).

#### B. ARMY ESTIMATE

General Marshall said that he had felt that a Japanese attack would come in the Western Pacific, also possibly against the Panama Canal, which was then closed to the Japanese (page 861). The Japanese movements pointed to a move into Thailand, action to cut off the Burma Road, and a threat to the Malay-Kra Peninsula. They had no indications of Japanese plans for assault on Hawaii (page 860-1). He always was in fear of a surprise attack on United States territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and the Philippines before Hawaii; there were no specific indications in the possession of the Army and no reports from the Navy showing a threat against Hawaii (page 863). The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to General Marshall (page 882). It had appeared to him, as set forth in his letter in February 1941, that the possibility in Hawaii in the way of attack was combined air and sabotage. There was a strong probability—really a certainty—that there was an evil intent in the Far East. The question was when it would explode and to what extent it would be on an infiltration basis. As to probability, Siam, the Malaya Peninsula, and the Panama Canal took priority, in his opinion, to Hawaii.

#### C. STATE DEPARTMENT ESTIMATES

Ambassador Grew said that he had received no report from the Korean underground that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and Mr. Hamilton said that he had felt that the Japanese would move to the southward, but that he had not excluded from his estimates an attack on United States possessions (page 1075).

### XXX. JAPANESE MESSAGE ADVISING OF FOURTEEN PART REPLY AND FIRST THIRTEEN PARTS

#### A. MESSAGE ADVISING OF FOURTEEN PART REPLY

On December 6, 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communication (document 38, Exhibit 63), as follows:

"From: Tokyo  
"To: Washington  
"December 6, 1941  
"Purple

"#909 Re my #644 (\*).

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

#### B. THE FIRST THIRTEEN PARTS OF THE REPLY

Also on December 6, 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63), which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy

(\*) See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.)

translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, view in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiation.

#### C. DELIVERY OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE ABOVE MESSAGES

Captain Heard testified that he did not know what information was available on the evening of 6 December 1941, but that a 24-hour watch, headed by a senior officer, had been maintained in ONI since 27 May 1941 (page 467). A 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section had been commenced on 4 December 1941 (page 467), and ONI had a direct wire to Secretary Hull (page 468).

Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn in December, 1941, was Senior Watch Officer in Op20-G, which handled the decoding of Japanese diplomatic cryptographs (page 734). He was familiar in general with Exhibit 63, the intercepts. The Army and Navy cooperated to get this material; each maintained interception stations (page 734). The Army intercepts were cleared through the Navy and vice versa. The division made on the basis of dates; Army was responsible for even dates; the Navy odd (page 735). Documents were noted as to time of translation; the dates at the top were the dates of interception (page 735).

He said that Document 39 (14 part dispatch) was received in the Navy Department from station as follows: (all times Washington time)

Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 received 1149, 12-6-41:

Parts 9, 10 received between 1149 and 1451, 12-6-41

Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13 received at 1451, 12-6-41.

These first 13 parts were processed and given to Commander Kramer between 2100 and 2200, 12-6-41.

Commander Kramer said that the fourteen part message was received to him (Document 39, Exhibit 63) and he got the first 13 parts broken down and translated by 2105, December 6th. He called Admiral Wilkinson, who confirmed his plan of distribution. He went to the White House and gave a folder to one of Admiral Beardall's assistants, which contained the 13 parts of the Japanese reply, with instructions to get it to the President right away. The President was entertaining. He then went to Secretary Knox's house and waited while Secretary read the message, and had a brief discussion of it. When he delivered the messages to Secretary Knox, Secretary Knox did not comment as his wife and a business associate were present (page 972). Later Kramer and the Secretary privately discussed some of the points of the 13 parts of the reply. Secretary Knox called Secretaries Stimson and Hull, and these calls indicated a meeting of the three Secretaries at 1000, December 7th. Kramer was instructed to go there with this and any other material which came in. He then took the translations to Admiral Wilkinson, in his quarters. He thought that Admiral Wilkinson called Admirals Turner and Stark, but is not certain (page 982). He arrived back in the Navy Department at 0030. He then secured and went home, could be reached by telephone at any time.

Document 38 of Exhibit 63, advising that the time of delivery of the 14 part reply would be directed by a separate dispatch, was received and delivered to Kramer on December 6th along with the 13 parts (page 971).

Captain Safford said that on the week-end of December 6, 1941, his unit handled three times the normal traffic for a busy day (page 756). Thirty parts of the 14-part message came in and were distributed by Kramer between 2100 and 2400 on December 6th. The Army advised that it had informed Secretary Hull by 2230.

Apparently based on conversations with Kramer, Captain Safford stated that Kramer distributed the messages to the White House and to Admiral Wilkinson; that he believed that Admiral Wilkinson telephoned Admiral Stark; and that Kramer returned to Navy Department at 1 a. m., then went home, and gave instructions for a call when part 14 came in, as he had instructions to deliver the message to Admiral Stark at 0900, December 7, 1941.

According to Admiral Ingersoll, he saw the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply on the night of December 6th-7th. This, he said, indicated that the situation was very tense (page 828). He did not remember the other message (Document 38).

Admiral Turner remembered Document 38, but he did not remember when he saw it (page 999).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall the above translations or the information delivered to him at his home by office messenger on the evening



December 6th nor any conversation with Secretary Knox or Admiral Wilkinson (pages 780, 166).\*

XXXI. DECEMBER 7, 1941, IN WASHINGTON

A. INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS OTHER THAN PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE"

Captain Safford said that an intercepted Japanese message in the shape of a circular telegram from Tokyo, using the "hidden word" code, dated 7 December 1941, (Exhibit 20), was received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, shortly before 11 o'clock in the morning of 7 December. Three of the words in this message had a secondary or hidden meaning, constituting the actual message. Captain Safford said that this message was translated in such a hurry on Sunday morning, 7 December, that only two of the three key words were given their hidden value. As a result, the message was translated (p. 125-126):

"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation."

Captain Safford said that if the third and omitted key word had been given its hidden meaning, the message would have read (p. 126, 609-610):

"Relations between Japan and England and United States are not in accordance with expectation."

Captain Kramer made the following statement with regard to his translation of the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941, referred to in the preceding paragraphs (p. 133-135):

"I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the fourteen-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message, which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the United States. . . .

" . . . My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30."

Captain Kramer further stated that when he returned to his office at around noon on 7 December and noted the omission in the "hidden word" message of reference to the United States, he attempted to telephone all persons who had received the translation. However, he was able to contact only two of them, he thought these two were Captain McCollum and Colonel Bratton. Captain Kramer believed that he had made the telephone calls at about 12:30 (p. 596-596).

\* It will be recalled that on December 6th there was also available in Washington an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18th, describing ships, and the courses of ships in Pearl Harbor (Document 40, Exhibit 63).

## 530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

On December 7, 1941, there were three Japanese communications intercepted and translated by the Army in addition to part fourteen of the Japanese reply and the "1 p. m. message." These were:

1.

"From: Washington (Nomura)

"To: Tokyo

"December 3, 1941

"Purple (Urgent)

"#1256. Re your #875\*.

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 1, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and me at once."

2.

"From: Washington

"To: Tokyo

"December 6, 1941

"Purple (Urgent)

"#1272

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing of peace" once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President was his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEAHY and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 1, into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us . . . (Message incomplete).

3.

"From: Budapest

"To: Tokyo

"December 7, 1941

"LA

"#104 Re my #103.

"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

"Relayed to Berlin."

### B. PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE"

Also on December 7, 1941, the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply, and a Japanese instruction to the emissaries in Washington to deliver the reply one p. m. on the 7th of December were translated, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 39, Exhibit 63)

\* See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.)

"From: Tokyo  
 "To: Washington  
 "7 December 1941  
 "(Purple-Eng)  
 "#902 Part 14 of 14

(NOTE: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

2. Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo  
 "To: Washington  
 "December 7, 1941  
 "Purple (Urgent—Very Important)  
 "#907 To be handled in government code.  
 "Re my #902(\*)

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."

C. DELIVERY OF PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE" AND ACTION TAKEN

Captain McCollum said that he arrived in the Navy Department at about 0730 on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, to assume a special watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI. Shortly after his arrival Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, sent for him and a discussion was had concerning the situation in the Far East. A little before 8:30 both Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum went down to talk to Admiral Stark. At about 9 o'clock Captain McCollum received word that one of his officers wished to see him urgently. He stepped outside and Lieutenant Commander Kramer delivered to him the last part of the Japanese "Fourteen Part Reply," together with the instructions directing its presentation to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, Washington time (p. 34-35). At that time Captain McCollum had a short talk with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance of the instructions and the latter pointed out that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about 7:30 in the morning, Honolulu time, and about 2 o'clock in the morning out in the Philippines; that the exact significance of this was not known, but that if an attack were coming it looked as if it were timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii (p. 33, 36). Captain McCollum said that he took the message and instructions in to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note (p. 36). Captain McCollum stated: "We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the ambassadors, we felt there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out . . . to Admiral Stark. . . ." (p. 33-34).

Referring to the Japanese instructions to deliver the "Fourteen Part Reply" to the U. S. Secretary of State at 1 p. m., Washington time, on 7 December, Captain Kramer said that he had been impressed by the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where he knew that the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Baru with the connivance of the Thai Chief of Staff. Consequently, when he delivered the "1 p. m. message" to Mr. Hull's private secretary, he pointed this fact out to the latter and to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office. He also mentioned the fact that 1 p. m. in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor (p. 137).

(\*—S. I. S. #23843—text of Japanese reply.)

*Captain Kramer said that in all he had pointed out the significance of delivery time of the "Fourteen Part Reply" to perhaps eight or ten different people, including Commander McCollum, several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton, possibly Admiral Wilkinson, and probably Captain Safford. He did not remember whether he had mentioned the matter when delivering the "1 p. m. message" to CNO's office (p. 137-138).*

Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood said that the fourteenth part of Japanese reply was received while he was on watch between midnight and 7 a. m. December 7, 1941 (page 925). Also a further dispatch was received during watch, concerning the time of delivery of the long diplomatic message. The dispatch, the long diplomatic message, was in English (part 14 of Exhibit 63). He thinks he delivered this to the Army. The second was in Japanese (page 926), required translation which he thinks was done by an Army translator (part 4 of Exhibit 63). He left the dispatches for Kramer and left around seven o'clock. Kramer came in. He can't remember whether the translated message was held before he left the office at 7 a. m. (page 926).

Lieutenant Commander A. V. Perring testified that on 7 December 1941 he was on duty in Op20-G of Naval Communications, beginning at 0700 (page 812). He said that Part 14 of the Japanese reply was processed and ready for delivery at 0700 and was delivered to Kramer on his arrival between 0900 and 1000; the "1 p. m. message" was received from an Army translator at about 0715 and held until Kramer arrived and then was delivered to him (p. 813).

Lieutenant Commander Lynn testified that Part 14 of the Japanese reply did not require translation into English; it was received between 0305 and 0700 December 7th, and, he thought, it was handed to Kramer at about 0900-1000. He said that the "1 p. m. message" arrived between 0305 and 0700, 12-7-41, was processed and in the Army's hands for translation at 0700, 12-7-41.

According to Captain Safford Part 14 came in and was decoded and read at 0700, 12-7-41 (page 757). The "1 p. m. message" came in and was sent to the Army for translation from the Japanese, and came back about 1000, December 7 (page 758).

Kramer, he said, went to Admiral Stark's office, gave it to him personally or to his aide, then to Admiral Beardsall at the White House, and then to the State Department with the 14th part at about 1000, where Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, and Secretary Stimson were (page 758). (The Court here refused to sustain Judge Advocate's objection to testimony by the witness as to what was told to him (page 748)).

Captain Safford continued, stating that Kramer came back and found a translation of the message instructing delivery at one p. m. There also was a message "in the hidden-word code" which had been translated hurriedly and was "relations in England not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste they left out a word and the message should have read—(the witness was interrupted). He then said that Kramer immediately redistributed the messages; went to CNO and gave them to an aide, Admiral Stark being in conference; to the White House, there to an aide; to the State Department about 1000 and gave copies to the Secretaries of War, State and Navy. He then said that the copy which Kramer gave to the Secretary of the Navy was a note saying this was sunrise at Honolulu and midnight at Manila and undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours. (On Admiral Stark's motion this was stricken out by the court since the witness had no personal knowledge of it.)

Captain Safford summarized the information which he said indicated objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as follows:

"Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, South Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expell the United States and England from China, South Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government

had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead-line for negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable, and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) that date. 1:00 p. m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to Admiral Stark. At this same time, information was also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately." (p. 357-8)

Captain Safford then discussed the distribution of information within the Navy Department and to the President and State Department, etc. His statement of the distribution by Commander Kramer from December 1 on was based, he said, on what Commander Kramer told him verbally.

Commander Kramer said that he received no phone call on the night of December 6th-7th and came in at 0900 on December 7th, received the 14th part of the reply and took it and the first 13 parts to Admiral Stark's office about 0900 where there apparently was a meeting. He was not certain who was in Admiral Stark's office. He was in a hurry. Admiral Wilkinson was there (page 973). He then left the Navy Department at 0930 to make delivery to the White House, and was at the State Department at 0950 waiting for Secretary Knox in order to deliver this additional material.

This delivery did not include the message setting 1 p. m. as the time for delivery of the reply. He did not get that until he returned to the Navy Department at about 1020. He then found that a message had been received which directed delivery of the reply to the Secretary of State at 1300, and also other messages which directed destruction of Japanese codes still on hand, and one which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 1030. He handed the "1 p. m. message" to Admiral Stark's aide at 10:30 or 10:45 and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk. Document 41 of Exhibit 63 is the "1 p. m. message", which had been translated by Army. He then left to deliver this new material to the White House and the State Department. He handed the material to a State Department official, who customarily received such material for the Secretary of State, and who was to deliver it to Secretary Knox.

He invited attention, verbally, to the time involved (page 965); that is, that this was 7:30 in Honolulu and a few hours before sunrise at Koto Bharu. He did not tell the naval officers this as he figured they would know it. The remarks he made were not to Secretary Knox himself but to the State Department official who handled this material for Secretary Hull and who was to deliver it to Secretary

Knox. He did not advise the official in the State Department to tell the Secretary of the Navy that 1300 Washington time meant dawn in Pearl Harbor and that might mean an attack on Pearl Harbor (page 985). And, he said, Captain Safford never stated to him or in his presence that the message concerning the delivery of the note indicated a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor (page 986).

Captain Heard, who was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI, stated that information about the Japanese reply was available in the Navy Department at 0900, 7 December 1941 (page 464). Sometime between 0900 and 1000 DONI took the Chief of the Far East Section, Commander McCollum, with him to CN to present this information. This statement, he said, was based on official records, a report from McCollum, and an official statement of DONI made very shortly after the event (page 465). Lieutenant Commander Watts relieved McCollum at 0800, 7 December (page 466).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that on the morning of December 7, 1941, he knew that the Japanese Ambassadors would present a note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. He knew the general tenor of the note that would be presented (page 204). The note was in the nature of an ultimatum. He was in Admiral Stark's office in the morning of December 7th, and Admiral Stark had the information which he had. Admiral Stark talked to General Marshall on the telephone. The Japanese asking for an appointment at 1 p. m. on a Sunday was quite unusual and out of the known routine of the foreign service (page 205). Admiral Stark concurred in a dispatch to be sent by General Marshall. The State Department was not advised of this dispatch (page 205).

He also testified that information concerning delivery of the Japanese note at 1 p. m. was available to him between 0900 and 0930 on the morning of December 7th. He does not know when it got to the Navy Department (page 213).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of the contents of the Japanese message stating that a fourteen-part reply would be sent, of the fourteen-part reply, and of the "1 p. m. message." As to the "1 p. m. message," he repeated that he had this information at 0930 on December 7th, and believed that Admiral Stark received this information about that time (page 715). He talked to Admiral Stark about 1000 (page 214). General Marshall telephoned about 1030 (page 216).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that Commander Kramer delivered this type of material and that no record was kept of time of delivery. He discussed the situation with Admiral Stark but not specific messages. When he went to Admiral Stark's office on December 7th, he recalled, he waited a while for Stark to come in at about 0930 (page 729). He then knew of the prospective 1 o'clock delivery of the "sharply worded" Japanese note and that it was a reply to the United States note of November 26th, and so informed Admiral Stark. Admiral Stark knew of this when General Marshall telephoned. He believes that Stark had delivered to him that morning "the book" containing the messages received the previous night. He is positive that the Army had the same information that the Navy had (page 730). He personally did not think Japan was going to attack (page 732).

Admiral Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind concerning the evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th was the "one p. m. message", which he learned about on the morning of December 7th. He did not remember the "14 part message" in reply to the State Department note of November 26th. Admiral Schuirmann, he said, may have given him a full picture on the morning of December 7th, and it is reasonable to assume that he did so (pages 789-790).

He stated that he had no information about the "14 part" reply or the "1 p. m. message" until he arrived at his office on December 7th (pages 790-791). He said that on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, he received information that the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a message to Secretary Hull at exact 1300. He was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when General Marshall called and asked if he had this information. He first told General Marshall he did not think this information should be sent out, but instantly changed his mind and called General Marshall back, asking him to have the Army authorities inform the Navy. He asked General Marshall if he could get the message out quickly and offered to send it via Navy communications. General Marshall said he could get it out quickly.

Admiral Stark recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann "the time element" in connection with the "one p. m. message" (page 170), but recalled no suggestion made to him that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor. He did not recall what information he had about the Japanese message to be delivered at 1300, December 7, 1941, except the hour of delivery (page 172).

Admiral Stark stated that he had not called Admiral Kimmel on the Trans-Pacific telephone before December 7th (page 190). He stated that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply and regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel on December 7th concerning this (pages 113, 793), and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (page 799).

General Marshall said that he first saw the "14 part message" and the "1 p. m. message" sometime Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 (page 873). He 'phoned Admiral Stark, and at first Admiral Stark did not think that any message to Hawaii was necessary because the recipients might be confused by too many messages. Admiral Stark 'phoned back in a few minutes, asking that the naval authorities be advised.

General Marshall was informed, after sending some of his men back two and three times to the message center, that his message would be received within 30 minutes after dispatch. It was in the message center at 1150 and sent by radio to all points except Hawaii; they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station and therefore sent it by wire. General Marshall did not know this until afterwards (pages 873-4).

General Marshall estimated that he arrived at 10:30 a. m., Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, and first saw the "14 part message" and "1 p. m. message" shortly thereafter (pages 878-9).

He said that Admiral Stark did not inquire as to the rapidity of War Department communications in connection with dispatching the Army message of December 7, 1941 (page 879).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he arrived at the office about 0900, December 7th. He did not recall any discussion with Admiral Stark about the fourteen part message or delivery thereof until Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with General Marshall (page 837). He stated that on the morning of December 7th, he knew that the Japanese Ambassador had requested an interview with Secretary Hull in the afternoon. At the same time, Admiral Stark told him that this had been discussed with General Marshall (page 831). Admiral Ingersoll said that there was no discussion on the morning of December 7th of the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was sunrise at Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila.

**Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or fourteen part Japanese reply. (p. 429)**

Admiral Turner said that he came to the Navy Department about 1030 or 1100 on December 7th. Admiral Stark called him and showed him a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required the Japanese Ambassador to present the Japanese reply on the 7th. Admiral Stark said he had talked to General Marshall, who said he had sent a dispatch on the matter to Hawaii. Admiral Stark said that he thought Admiral Kimmel already had intercepted and decrypted the Japanese message; they thought that he had the 14 part reply and "1 p. m. message" (page 1000).

He first recalled the time of delivery as 10:30 and corrected this to 1 p. m. He said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that he could not give the Japanese an appointment until 2:30 p. m. Admiral Turner thought from this dispatch that an attack on the United States or Britain was coming that day or the next (page 1000). They had been warned, he said, that the scrambler telephone was not secure and so the Navy Department did not use it for secret matters (page 1001).

Admiral Noyes said he did not see the 14-part message or delivery instruction prior to 7 December 1941 (page 1035, 1036); that there was no direct or convenient telephone circuit between CincPac and CNO on 7 December 1941 (page 1038) and that a Navy message from CNO, which had been designated for the fastest possible transmission, would be in CincPac's hands in a maximum of an hour (page 1044).

According to Admiral Smith, CincPac was not kept well informed of developments by the Navy Department (page 565). He testified regarding Secretary Knox's visit to Pearl Harbor, after the attack, and statements made by him there (page 556-57). He said that at lunch he joined Secretary Knox, Kimmel, Pye, Bloch, Short, Beatty (Aide to Secretary), and that the Secretary said: "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" They said, "No," and the Secretary then continued: "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. on Sunday, the 7th. I know that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." They never got that information (page

566). The Secretary also said, "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor" (page 567). Admiral Smith said that it is easy to deduce from 1 o'clock delivery dispatch, which they received after the attack, that Pearl Harbor was a logical place of attack as the time indicated was sunrise there.

## XXXII. CONDITIONS AT PEARL HARBOR PRIOR TO ATTACK

### A. THE SHIPS IN PORT

Admiral Hewitt's investigation developed that at the time of the attack the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 100), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows:

#### (1) In Pearl Harbor:

(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.

(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force—Task Force E) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four mine layers.

(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, four mine layers which were under overhaul.

(d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.

(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and four Marine Air Squadrons (VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24—a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.

(f) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of 100 planes) at Ewa, Oahu.

(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONAUT, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadron VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY-1, 1 J2V.

#### (2) At sea:

(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.

(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.

(c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinary component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.

(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.

(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.

#### (3) At other places:

(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and four planes of Squadron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.

(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.

(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercises) two Base Force PBY-1 planes.

(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.

(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.

To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines,



*and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.*

*Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule (Ex. 73; Hew. page 605).*

Admiral DeLany stated that the ships were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Fleet; the principal mission in late 1941 was training, and they had no orders from Washington to discontinue (page 507).

Admiral Smith said that after the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet to three task forces, one task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against one another; sometimes all three task forces would be at sea at the same time. (p. 35)

As Operations Officer, one of Admiral DeLany's duties was the preparation of "Schedules of Employment." These were originally prepared on a quarterly basis about six weeks before the end of the quarter, and a considerable number of these were printed and widely distributed. (p. 83) The schedules provided for patrol of the operating areas and for air patrol coverage, entrances and sorties, primarily because they felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating areas was something that they had to guard against and also to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor (p. 84).

On December 7, Commander Paul C. Crosley was Flag Secretary on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. He produced a copy of the Pacific Fleet employment schedule, dated August 13, 1941, which was incomplete since Enclosure A was missing. Enclosure A was a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter. (p. 179) Commander Crosley also produced a proposed employment schedule dated November 10, 1941. (p. 180). Commander Crosley produced copies of the employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3 for the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942, and discussed the method of printing and distributing same. (p. 181).

Admiral Brainard did not recall any changes which had been made in the employment schedules for the last quarter of 1941 which had been submitted by the Pacific Fleet. He said that a rather general freedom of action was given to the Fleet Commanders as to changes in the operating schedules. He recalled that about the middle of 1941, the schedules were changed from type schedules to task force schedules after the Commander-in-Chief had established a task force organization. (p. 401)

Admiral Pye stated that the task forces rotated days at sea and in port; the days and dates varied. A task force could be figured to stay in port for nine to fourteen days (page 430). His task force, Task Force One, was in Pearl Harbor from November 27th until December 7th (page 418).

Admiral Pye said that it did not occur to him at any time between November 27 and December 7 to take the ships to sea because of the Army's inadequacy since it was his confirmed opinion that the greatest danger was from submarines. (p. 169)

On December 7, 1941, Task Force One was in port, except for the SARATOGA, which was on the West Coast. Task Force Two was at sea; the ENTERPRISE was delivering planes to Wake; Bat. Div. One of Admiral Halsey's Task Force Two was in port. Task Force Three was conducting operations at sea, and Task Force Three's carrier, the LEXINGTON, had gone to Midway to deliver planes (page 539). The COLORADO was on the West Coast, and the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock at Pearl Harbor (page 540).

Admiral McMorris said that one of the considerations that prompted leaving the battleships of Task Force Two when the ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake with Marine planes, was the possibility of a clash with some Japanese ships and they did not want to handicap the carrier and its light forces with the slower battleships (pages 891-2). The Fleet, he said, was operating under a schedule, but no directive had been received to keep the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at that particular time (page 893).

Admiral Kimmel testified that about two-thirds of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, because Task Force One and Task Force Two overlapped in schedule for a few days (page 369).

The location of the various ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th was set forth on a map, which is Exhibit 60. From the summary annexed to that map it appears that there were in port 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 29 destroyers, 8 destroyer minelayers, 4 destroyer minesweepers, 5 submarines, 1 floating drydock, 1 hospital ship, and 21 auxiliaries. It also appears that the MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA were double berthed near Ford Island, as were the TENNESSEE and WEST VIRGINIA, and the ARIZONA and VESTAL.

Admiral Bloch said that the berthing of ships so as to develop maximum anti-aircraft fire was the responsibility of the senior officer embarked; the double-berthing of battleships was unavoidable (page 400).

- (3) Admiral Bloch said that on December 7 all of the available battleships were in Pearl Harbor—8 battleships—and that those most severely damaged were the double-berthed battleships in the outer positions at the moorings; however, he did not think that the double berthing could have been avoided since there were no other berths available. (p. 28)

Admiral Anderson said that air torpedo attack was the most damaging to his battleships. The planes, he said, came from an easterly direction. Since the ships were berthed, there was a considerable number of the ship's guns so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes. Admiral Anderson said that assuming that at least one-fourth of the battleship's aircraft guns had been ready for opening fire and free to fire at will upon approaching planes, his estimate would be that those guns could not have defeated nor seriously diminished the attack. (p. 397) Admiral Anderson said that there wasn't any choice as to what the Commander Battleships could do in assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just as many berths designated available to him as there were ships. (p. 398)

Admiral Smith said that the ships were anchored in four sections because the Army did not have enough anti-aircraft guns and it was necessary to locate the ships so that the fire from the ships' guns would be effective. "We" knew that the only guns that could be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor probably were the Navy guns (page 552).

Admiral Smith said that they had thought at the time that the Army and Navy operating through the local defense forces were capable of furnishing a complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack but that they now realized that they were not. (p. 42)

Admiral Brown said that knowing that the Army defenses were weak and inadequate, he thought that the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon their own anti-aircraft for their own defense both at Pearl Harbor and at sea. (p. 144)

#### B. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

Admiral Turner discussed the knowledge in the Navy Department of the Army's condition of readiness as to anti-aircraft equipment, radar and searchlights like at page 260.

Admiral Kimmel testified that there were no naval guns ashore except a Marine battery (page 283). Admiral Kitts said that the statement in the Roberts' Report about Navy shore batteries, at page 20, is inaccurate although there may have been a Marine battery (pages 518, 521).

Admiral Bloch said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was one Marine battalion which had some anti-aircraft weapons. (p. 303)

Admiral Halsey said that during the months preceding December 7, 1941, he had been of the view that the Army did not have enough equipment or proper equipment to defend Pearl Harbor, particularly as to anti-aircraft guns and fighting planes. (p. 303)

Admiral Kitts stated that the Army had charge of the shore-based anti-aircraft batteries. In the area immediately around Pearl Harbor, the only anti-aircraft fire on December 7th was from the ships and the fleet marine school at Pearl Harbor. The greatest strength of Army anti-aircraft guns was in mobile batteries of 3-inch caliber, which had not been emplaced on December 7th and did not get in position until after noon on December 7th. He estimated that the Army had 32 3-inch guns and one battery of 90 mm. guns (page 516).

He said that the Army anti-aircraft guns at Kamehameha were in action about 25 minutes after the attack. These were fixed position guns (page 516). The main Army anti-aircraft guns were mobile batteries which were not in position

except one battery. He was informed that the Army's mobile anti-aircraft was first in place at noon (page 522). The fixed guns may have been in operation earlier.

Admiral Kitts discussed the readiness of personnel and ammunition on shipboard and anti-aircraft batteries. (p. 191) Admiral Kitts said that the Fleet had its full allowance of ammunition and in general its mobilization allowance aboard at the time of the attack. (p. 192) Admiral Kitts discussed the gunnery training which had been given prior to Pearl Harbor. (p. 193) Admiral Kitts discussed the anti-aircraft guns at Pearl Harbor, (p. 189) and the anti-aircraft armament on ships in the Harbor. (p. 190)

The number and location of the Army's guns were, according to Admiral Bloch (page 413) as follows:

"To my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about 80 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, about 20 37-millimeter guns, and about 100 50-calibre machine guns—all of these for anti-aircraft use. Of the 3-inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed emplacements, always mounted, and about one-half or two-thirds of this 30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the other 3-inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3-inch guns; all of the 37-millimeter guns and 50-calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their orders from the Army."

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army planned the mounting of the anti-aircraft guns; he did not consider mounting anti-aircraft or machine guns on buildings in Pearl Harbor, nor did he ask the Army to install guns in such places (page 416). The Army, he said, had insufficient guns to carry out its assigned tasks under JCD-42 (page 387).

According to Admiral DeLany, Admiral Kimmel was familiar with the terribly weak defenses of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet. (p. 78)

Admiral McMorris said that although he personally felt the Army's preparations for the defense of Oahu were adequate that he thought Admiral Kimmel had been concerned over the anti-aircraft defenses and had talked with the Commanding General on the subject.

Colonel Phillips testified that he did not consider the material condition of readiness of the Army adequate to defend Pearl Harbor (page 494). There was, he said, a shortage of anti-aircraft guns (page 479).

General Marshall said that for Hawaii—110 30-mm., 144 37-mm., and 516 50-calibre AA guns had been ordered; on December 7, 1941, four-fifths of the 30-mm were complete, and one-fifth of the lesser calibres (page 855).

Admiral Pye testified that there was no system of coordinating the fire between ship and shore batteries; Sector Commanders took command of fire control and so notified ships in their sectors (page 418).

Colonel Phillips could not recall whether there had been any plan for coordinating the Army gunfire with the Navy gunfire (page 481). The Local Joint Army-Navy Committee made various plans, but he did not recall when they had met last prior to December 7th (page 481).

General Short testified that no plans had been made for coordinating the gunfire from the ships in the harbor with the Army's fire (page 228).

Admiral Kimmel testified that COMFOURTEEN had had many drills for coordinating the fire of the ships in harbor with the shore fire (page 365).

#### C. ARMY AND NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINESS

General Short testified that the Army had three alerts—the first against sabotage; the second the additional threat of submarine, surface or aircraft attack; and the third an "all-out" alert. The alert in effect on December 7, 1941 was Army Alert No. 1—the anti-sabotage alert (page 228).

Admiral Bloch said that with the exception of one or two isolated cases, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Those cases involved disgruntled sailors. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December. (p. 88)

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of an Army was in effect although he did know that they had some kind of an alert effect (page 326). He did not make specific inquiries of General Short as to the kind of the alert which the Army was maintaining (page 343).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy condition of readiness in effect was condition No. 3 as set forth in 2CL-41 and an order requiring two 5-inch and two 50-caliber guns on each battleship, which amounted to one-fourth of the anti-aircraft to be manned at all times (page 278). He said that he considered condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient under the circumstances (page 279).

Admiral Kimmel stated that on December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral Pye was the Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters was at the submarine base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship to which he could move on short notice (page 278). He testified that ComFOURTH Fleet was to advise the Senior Officer Present Afloat of the condition of readiness to maintain and that the Senior Officer Present Afloat was charged with the duty of setting the condition of readiness for ships (page 365). He did not know what Admiral Bloch advised Admiral Pye of the condition of readiness to maintain (page 279).

The condition of readiness of the Fleet, Admiral Kimmel testified, was changed after November 27th because full security measures for ships were already in effect (page 303).

The court wanted to know whether if Admiral Kimmel had increased the anti-aircraft guns would it have done any more than man a few anti-aircraft guns (page 303). He said, at best, it might have done so and it might have enabled the intercept fighters to come into action a little better.

Admiral Bloch stated that Condition 3 was, and for several months had been, in effect for the Fleet; the condition of readiness for Navy shore establishments and aircraft was determined by each commanding officer, but there was no change in effect on December 7th, except normal day to day routine for training (page 303).

Admiral Pye stated that there was no condition of readiness set for ships in port. His testimony before Admiral Hart that condition 3 was in effect and that he so informed Admiral Kimmel was erroneous (page 419).

Admiral Pye said that the defenses of the Fleet were largely in the hands of the Army and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 164-5).

Admiral Pye said that Condition 3 was in effect for the ships in the Fleet on December 7, and had been prescribed previous to the last entry of Condition 3. He had no understanding that that condition would be in effect unless otherwise was given. He did not receive any advice from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as to the necessity for a higher condition of readiness. (p. 164-5).

However, each battleship had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned in addition to the anti-aircraft control (page 419). This condition was in excess of that required by condition 3. Gun crews for manned guns were required to be on deck near their guns with communications, including anti-aircraft control, manned (page 422). The anti-aircraft control (director) was the only battle lookout. The officers and men required to remain ashore were sufficient to man all anti-aircraft guns.

Admiral Anderson said that none of the three specific conditions of readiness set forth in sub-heading G of 2CL-41 were maintained by the Fleet while it was in Pearl Harbor during November and December. He testified that he was very clear that none of these conditions was in effect at the time of the attack because he gave close personal attention to matters of gun and ammunition readiness and on his own initiative he had increased the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battleships. He had established 24-hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each battleship, and two of the 5" anti-aircraft guns on each ship were told off each day as ready guns. (p. 396) Admiral Anderson said that the anti-aircraft batteries aboard the battleships were, generally speaking, eight 5" anti-aircraft guns .25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns. Also most of the ships had either four guns of three inch .50 calibre or four quads of 1"1. (p. 397)

Admiral Bunkley said that in October, 1941, while his ship was in Pearl Harbor they were not under any condition of readiness, i. e., under condition 1, 2 or 3. They had two machine guns manned at all times and

munition ready for two 5" guns with the crews of those guns standing by. They were operating under the Fleet security letter issued prior to October and a security order for the CALIFORNIA which was designated to prevent sabotage by requiring a security patrol. There were no changes ordered prior to December 7 that he could remember. (p. 413-4)

While at sea, Admiral Bunkley said the battleships did maintain conditions of readiness and it was his opinion that these precautions were carried out both for training and because of the danger of a submarine attack. (p. 415)

Admiral Pye said that: He was at sea on November 24th and received a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel and from then on until the task force entered Pearl Harbor, all possible measures against submarine and aircraft attack were taken (page 433). He said that Admiral Bloch only had the duty to inform him as Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor of the necessity for a condition of readiness (page 420). He did not do so (page 420).

Admiral Kitts testified that Condition 3 was in effect at sea and its equivalent in effect in port (page 513). He said that the condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was equal to or better than that laid down in 2CL-41, dealing with Port Security (page 523).

Admiral Smith said that despite the Robert's Report, the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency (page 548).

Admiral Delaney said that the condition of readiness was as set forth in 2CL-41 (page 498). He felt that this was satisfactory.

#### D. NUMBER AND CONDITION OF THE MEN

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army had insufficient and "green" personnel (page 387). According to General Short, on December 7, 1941, he had 57,000 troops. He had asked for 71,500 (page 257).

As to Navy personnel, Admiral Smith said that in his opinion (which the Court did not seem to share), the withdrawal of men from the Fleet for the purpose of filling complements and new construction had not materially decreased the efficiency of the Fleet (page 560). The ship did have the crews that they had normally held, "say a year before Pearl Harbor" (page 560) on the 85 per cent basis. He commented that several days after Pearl Harbor they received a letter written shortly before Pearl Harbor from the Bureau of Personnel, refusing to give them further men, and stating that the war was in the Atlantic.

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel had constantly asked for additional equipment of men for the Pacific Fleet, but he adverted to a letter received shortly after Pearl Harbor from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated November 25, 1941, File No. FF12/MM-(55), (Secret-Confidential File Room Bureau of Personnel) advising that the war was in the Atlantic. (p. 38)

Admiral Smith said that the personnel and materiel shortages did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet; he had always felt that the complements were unnecessarily large; the Fleet was adequately manned; he considered the ships very efficient; the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed by the shortages; but the Commander-in-Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction. (p. 38)

Admiral Smith said that the materiel conditions of the Fleet was all right and was satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the program of alterations, as laid down by the Materiel Bureaus of the Navy Department, did not interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the morale and health of the Fleet was excellent. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that, in his opinion, the efficiency of the Fleet did not suffer from too frequent changes of personnel. (p. 63)

Admiral Halsey said that one of his most vivid recollections of the period prior to the attack was the constant effort on the part of Admiral Kimmel and his subordinate commanders to get additional personnel and materiel. (p. 307)

Admiral Kimmel testified that regular liberty was granted the night of December 6th-7th, i. e. three-fourths of the officers and one-half of the men had liberty. The ones who remained were required to be trained and capable of manning anti-aircraft guns. At the time of the attack there were 90 per cent of the men and 70 per cent of the officers aboard. There was no evidence of consequential indulgence in liquor (page 330).

General Short testified that he knew of no unusual intoxication on the night of December 6th, and that no effects of overindulgence were apparent on the morning of the 7th (page 269).

Admiral Delaney testified that morale in the fleet was high. The fleet had been intensively trained under warlike conditions. Joint training with Army had been conducted (page 496).

Admiral Kitts, who was in charge of training, stated that in his opinion the efficiency of the ships and gunnery on December 7, 1941, was in the highest state ever reached in time of peace (page 512). He stated that a shortage of calibre ammunition had affected the target practice of the ships. (In this connection, the Court took judicial notice of the Robert's Report.) (page 512). He said, however, that the Fleet's training and efficiency were of the highest subject to manpower and some ammunition shortages (page 525).

Admiral Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of December 6th-7th, and saw nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the ships were fit for duty on December 7, 1941. The high state of readiness of personnel for combat was the result of intensive training during 1941 (page 526).

Admiral Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of men and officers on the 6th and 7th of December was satisfactory (page 443). Their behavior during the attack was superb (page 445). He considered that the state of training was the highest he ever saw in the Fleet, despite shortages of material (page 444).

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion on December 7, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it had ever attained. (p. 149)

Admiral Calhoun said that there was no unusual or excessive drinking on the night of December 6th, and no evidence of drunkenness on the morning of December 7th. (p. 226) Admiral Calhoun discussed the liberal provisions over the week-end. (p. 226)

No instances of men being unfit for duty came to the attention of Admiral Bloch (page 411). Admiral DeLany stated that in his opinion the men were fit for duty and they performed their duty well (page 508). According to Captain Ramsey, all men were fit for duty and were efficient (page 607). Commander Rochefort testified that the deportment of the officers and men was excellent (page 476). Colonel Phillips stated that the condition of officers and men as to sobriety was normal on December 6th-7th. All the men he came in contact with on December 7th were fit for duty and on the job (pages 494-5).

#### E. THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

General Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October 1941. The system was not completely installed and the personnel were inexperienced. In October, 1941, he had sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for training and the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job (pages 223-225). In addition to the radar system, they maintained 100 coast artillery stations as lookout stations. These were not continuously manned, and were not manned on December 7th because of the alert then in effect (page 227). No civilian lookouts were maintained because the distances at Oahu were too small as to make them valueless (page 227).

General Short said that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at ranges of from 75 to 100 miles, and that they might have been more effective if higher station locations had been completed (page 227). On December 7th, the aircraft warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily (page 227). The system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel wished to do so (page 263). The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he estimated that that was the best time for the enemy to attack, if the enemy was going to attack (page 265). The Interceptor Command was functioning on November 27th on a 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m. basis daily, although the Interceptor Command was not established by written order until December 17th.

General Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer in the Information Center of the Aircraft warning system in August, and on November 24th the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He does not remember whether they were actually there on December 7th (page 226). He said that Admiral Kimmel assigned Commander Curtis as Liaison Officer the day after the request was made, but General Short felt that Admiral Kimmel did not understand that he wanted a liaison officer actually working in the Information Center and not a general liaison officer. Lt. Comdr. Taylor was sent to help with the aircraft warning system (pages 261-2).

Colonel Phillips said that the Interceptor Command was barely in the first stage of organization on December 7th; there were no permanent stations, but a mobile station was operating (page 487). Ultimately this command included an information center, but he isn't sure whether it was set up on December 7th. The Aircraft Warning System was operating for training from November 27th until December 7th. He did not remember the hours they were working (page 487), but it was in the morning.

General Marshall said that in connection with the installation of the aircraft warning service, the plans were for six fixed and six mobile stations (page 857).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army on the radar set-up. He sent officers to work with the Army. Army personnel had been taken to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system was in operation and that it was far from perfect (pages 289-290). He said that he did not know that the radar system was not to be operated after 0700 (page 290). He did not know the details of the progress of construction on the radar system but knew that the Navy had continued pressure on the Army to get something done on this line (page 294). The Army's radar crews, he said, were green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net needed polishing in order to make it effective (page 304).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel knew that the Army radar station had not been functioning; it had just been completed; it had been operating on the morning of December 7, but Admiral Kimmel hadn't known it. (p. 41)

Admiral Smith said that he knew the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning of a Japanese carrier raid. (p. 44)

Admiral Kimmel testified that he was quite certain that in many conversations which he had with General Short, he stressed the necessity for an aircraft warning system as well as for other elements of defense (page 1128); General Short never requested him to supply any naval operators to be used in the operation of Army radar on Oahu, and so far as Kimmel is concerned, he made no request of the Commandant (page 1129). General Short did ask for a liaison officer in July, who was furnished. Admiral Kimmel was informed that General Short did not in fact request the Commandant for "watch officers;" they would have been supplied, had he asked (page 1129). Admiral Kimmel did send Commander Taylor to assist the Army (page 1130). Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle radar matters with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that the Navy liaison officer who was supposed to be supplied to the Army Interceptor Command was only one of a number to be supplied as well by the Army (page 1146). A Navy liaison officer was not there on December 7th because the Army had not even sent watch officers, nor had they asked the Navy to send a watch officer. The Army Warning Service was not actually established until December 7th (page 1147). A Navy liaison officer for the Army Interceptor Command, for the evaluation and relay of information, was not sent until after December 7th, as the system was not set up before then, although the agreement had required this.

Admiral Bloch said that when General Short arrived in February, he and Admiral Bloch talked about the Army's radar system and as the net progressed to completion General Short, about September or October, told Admiral Bloch that he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train operators and he wanted to know if there was anything Admiral Bloch could do to help him. Admiral Bloch requested the Commander-in-Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea for training which was done. As of December, Admiral Bloch thought that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not yet all out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but Admiral Bloch had no knowledge as to whether they were standing any regular watches and early in December there was no means developed for controlling aircraft so as to differentiate by means of radar between friendly and other planes. (p. 11-12)

As to communications, Admiral Bloch said the communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. All ships and stations were required to listen at all times on that frequency. There were teletypes between the Army Headquarters and Admiral Bloch's Headquarters with a branch in Admiral Kimmel's office. There was telephonic communication

between Admiral Bloch's Headquarters and General Short's "Mess Center". Admiral Bloch also had such communication from the Headquarters Control and Command Posts, both at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor to the gates. There was also telephonic communication between the Headquarters Control and the Artillery Headquarters. There were, Admiral Bloch said, means for rapid communication including communication from the "Interceptor Command" to Admiral Bloch's Headquarters. (p. 19)

Admiral Bloch said that there was no naval officer specifically detailed to the Army Interceptor Command. After December 7, that Command was staffed by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them. At that time, the Army asked for watch officers to communicate with the Navy, although Admiral Bloch said it had been his plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy people were sent there on December 7. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net had been used in any tactical operation. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army was having a great deal of trouble getting the radar system to work; there was trouble with the electronics and the Army came to Admiral Bloch for assistance; the Army was referred to the Commander in Chief and an officer by the name of Taylor was sent to help the Army in an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's radar going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison and Admiral Bloch thought that he was there only in the capacity as an expert to assist the Army with their electrical and mechanical difficulties. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch had no confidence in the Army radar system because he knew that it was not completely set up; the operators were not completely trained; and there was no way so that friendly or hostile planes could be identified there being no IFF equipment. Admiral Bloch said that there was a standard procedure for aircraft approach to and departure from Oahu, Army and Navy planes and that in addition to Army and Navy planes, there were various commercial companies operating aircraft there. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army had a number of observation posts on Oahu and adjacent islands, but that these were not manned unless there was a full alert and that not all of such posts had means of rapid communications with headquarters. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had for obtaining information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by visual observation was the signal tower. (p. 21)

Captain Ramsey stated that about a week or ten days before December 7, General Davidson asked Admiral Bellinger whether the Navy could furnish officer personnel to help man the radar system for 24-hour operation and that if the Navy did not supply the men, he could operate only in the critical hours of the morning and evening. The final decision was that the Navy could not supply the officers required at that time on a permanent basis. He did not know the reason (page 601).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he was only slightly informed as to the Army radar system (page 686).

Admiral Bellinger said that the Army Interceptor Command was not ready to perform its part in the protection of Pearl Harbor from the viewpoint of radar installations and of their ability to control their fighter groups, the number of planes they had, and the general quality of their pilots. (p. 21)

Commander W. G. Taylor testified that between October 1st and December 7th, he was assigned to temporary duty, Commander Airforce, Pacific Fleet (page 609). He was loaned to the Army Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity to aid in setting up the air warning system. (3)

Admiral Halsey said that he had sent his communication officer to work with the Army on the Army's radar system and that that officer had reported to him that the radar system was very backward as to its state of readiness. (p. 302)

He had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar development at the time. In working with the Army, he worked mainly on liaison between the air warning systems and the commands; he worked in an advisory capacity (page 611). He had been detailed to the job at the direction of Admiral Kimmel around the middle of November, at the request of the Army (page 622).



He first reported to the Army as an advisor about the second week in November and called a conference at which he submitted a memorandum which was prepared because of the difficulty in getting the Information Center set up. (4)

Commander William E. G. Taylor completed a naval flight course and was commissioned an Ensign in 1926; after a year's service, he resigned his commission and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. He served as an instructor specializing in fighter aircraft, and was placed on inactive duty as a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1934. He then had various jobs as a pilot, and was commissioned a Sub-Lieutenant in the British Naval Reserve Force in September, 1939, and thereafter engaged in various combat operations with the British. (p. 338-340) He said that the British fighter operations were very effectively directed while the planes were in the air. The general assumption was that the direction was employing a system of advanced electronics for interception of enemy aircraft. (p. 341)

Commander Taylor, while serving with the British, made reports to United States Naval representatives and endeavored to get as much information as he could on the methods of fire control used by the British. (p. 342) Commander Taylor returned to the United States in an effort to get from the British faster fighter craft which could be used by the Fleet and the Fleet air arm. (p. 342) Commander Taylor was next transferred to the British Royal Air Force on October 2, 1940, and was assigned to an R. A. F. squadron known as 242 in order to get operational experience before taking over his own squadron. He said that it was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of the R. A. F. fighter during the so-called Battle of Britain was the magnificent fighter direction control which the British had. (p. 343)

During this period of service with the Royal Air Force, Commander Taylor became more interested in the patrol system used by the British and continued to make reports to the American Naval Attache. Commander Taylor said that both the American Army and the American Navy had a large number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system, and that his impression was that all of the information was made available to them, but that it did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of the method used by the British. (p. 343-4) Commander Taylor said that he had made a full report to various officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics and particularly sought out the officer who was at that time in charge of radar development. Commander Taylor could arouse no interest in the use of this radar for fighter direction. (p. 344)

In July, 1941, after having had his own squadron for six months, Commander Taylor was advised by the British that because of his age they were going to make him a Wing Commander in charge of a fighter operational unit. He asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to be returned to the American Navy. He was commissioned in the American Navy in July, 1941, given a special assignment to visit several radar stations, and reported to the Bureau of Aeronautics in August of 1941. (p. 345)

Commander Taylor was given various lecturing assignments to ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and he arrived at Pearl Harbor in October, 1941, where he spoke to Admirals Halsey and Kimmel, among others. He lectured to the Army fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field and lectured to the pilots of the SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. He found that the ENTERPRISE' fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods but had progressed much further than any other ship. He found that the ENTERPRISE had had their radar equipment for some time, the SARATOGA had no radar, and the LEXINGTON had recently acquired radar. In all ships equipped with radar, all hands were going through a training period. Commander Taylor was recalled by a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel which stated that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, desired Commander Taylor's assistance for technical purposes. (p. 347)

The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1, 1941, as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and the Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows:

"During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true: (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command

appeared to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. No time before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. (2) The actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under the Interceptor Command. The Interceptor Command fully realized the importance of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and lend all assistance with their power to help complete its installations. They seemed relatively impotent, however, in getting assistance needed from the Commanding General's Staff. (3) One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. (4) The air warning equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground-to-air and air-to-ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve its purpose as was later proved. (5) There were only five Army mobile radar equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the reported aircraft readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen miles radius from the equipment. It was, therefore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction at each station. All stations were under-manned for twenty-four hour operation. At the time of my inspection, either commercial or Signal Corps field telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the Information Center. (6) The Information Center itself had been planned on an Area Command scale similar to the Boston or New York Information Centers and was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu. The building was a temporary, wooden building and had been just been completed at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had been provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the activities which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this time and no provisions had been made to provide them. (7) The anti-aircraft batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established between the anti-aircraft command and the Information Center. (8) No attempt had been made to secure control of the anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor. (9) No liaison had been established between the searchlights and the Information Center. (10) No attempt had been made to disperse the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. (11) No automatic aircraft recognition system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. (12) No aircraft approach lane system had been planned. (13) No system for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu from reports from parent aviation activities had been organized. (14) No visual observers reporting system had been organized.

"By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and

the command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal points at Wheeler Field. Direct command lines were installed from Liaison positions in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and one at Halienua Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been established between the Army anti-aircraft batteries (three and five inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff to request control of anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that 'No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot it down.' However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down USS ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 20, at which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems would not be put into effect until war was declared, because it was felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corp's (Hawaiian Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G-2 liaison officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400-0700 by the order. The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it existed on about 1 December and was told that in view of the failure of the responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to activate the Information Center on a twenty-four basis, he would initiate a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. However, no action was taken up to December 7." (P. 350-351)

Commander Taylor said that there was a 15-mile dead area around Oahu in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December 7 there was no visual system to supplement that weakness. (p. 351)

Commander Taylor said that the Army's radar operators and maintenance men at radar stations were insufficient in number and were not fully trained even up to December 7. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said that he had asked the Navy for six liaison officers for the Information Center, and on December 8 he received ten who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA. He had also asked ComFOURTEEN to whom he was directed by the Commander in Chief's Staff, that control the anti-aircraft guns on naval vessels in the harbor should be held by the Information Center; also that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu; and that a letter be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a 24-hour basis. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said he made full reports to the Staff of the Commander in Chief as to the inadequacy of the Army Air warning system. (p. 352) He was quite sure that the Commander in Chief's Staff fully realized the situation.

His recommendation in regard to the Army air warning system was made on November 24, 1941. The memorandum containing his recommendation was introduced in evidence, marked Exhibit 62, and read to the Court. This covered a meeting held for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a wartime basis; attended by Army and Navy officers who agreed as to the importance of the Center and as to the necessity for liaison watch officers from each activity to transmit information; information was to be drawn from various sources including naval aircraft; the system was being operated 0700 to 1130 but should be on a full-time basis; ComFOURTEEN should be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison officers; confusion during exercises due to the number of planes could be controlled (1) by having all flights reported by parent units; (2) by enforcing aircraft approach procedure; (3) by requiring approaching planes to report at least 60 minutes before coming in (CincUS had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises, this was to be discussed for a decision as to its value); IFF was not available; the question of gun control of ships in port was to be discussed with CincUS; also it was decided to investigate the possibility of using naval radar to supplement land radar in an emergency.

Very little was done as a result of this memorandum, he said, because the Army was unable to get more personnel. It was the Army's duty to supply personnel with the exception of the Navy liaison officers (page 619). He personally requested CincPac's, ComFOURTEEN's Chief of Staff and Admiral Bellinger to supply liaison officers and was told that they were not available, but would be ordered to report to the Information Center as soon as possible. Liaison officers were essential to the proper dissemination of information (page 620). Their absence here, however, actually made little difference so far as the Navy liaison was concerned.

Commander Taylor said that the air warning system could have been made more operative sooner if there had been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things needed (page 621). This impetus should have come from the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army. He remained with the Army for one month after December 7th, and at the end of seven days the Information Center was running smoothly. The war made it easier to get liaison officers (page 621).

Even if information from the radar were properly plotted, it would have been impossible to tell if planes were Japanese or whether they were United States planes; without some method of identification, radar cannot tell friend from foe. The Information Center is for the purpose of determining what friendly planes are in the air so that if a radar track is picked up that does not correspond to the course of the friendly planes it is presumed that it is the track of enemy planes.

The radar equipment of the Army, he said, was adequate to do a fair job in the morning. Communication between the air warning system and the other organizations was in, except for some of fighter dispersal areas and the line between the civilian air warning. Communications between fighter director officers and fighter aircraft were inadequate to control fighters more than five miles off shore. The Army radar operators were well trained. For some time prior to December 7th, the radar had been operated from 0800 to 1630 in the afternoon, but shortly before December 7th, General Short gave orders to close down the radar stations.

except between the hours of 4:00 a. m. and 7:00 a. m. (page 611). He understood the change was made to save the equipment.

On December 7th, there were no permanent radar installations on Oahu; there were five mobile sets (page 624). The permanent equipment was there, but it would take some time to put it in (page 624).

He stated that the Information Center of the air warning system was not adequately set up prior to December 7th, and they were in the process of teaching controllers (page 612).

At no time were there sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the radar station even partially (page 625). The Robert's Report is incorrect in stating that there were sufficient partially trained personnel on November 27th to operate the system twenty-four hours a day (page 626). There were insufficient well-trained personnel to operate even partially at any time. They could get fairly good 360° coverage, and he believed that in no case could a large raid come in undetected (page 626).

The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, was in charge of the radar, and the Navy assisted in setting up an air warning system, except that they had not furnished liaison officers (page 615). The radar was entirely under the control of the Army; his duties were advisory (page 616). At the time he came in contact with the Army, the Information Center was being organized by two junior Army officers who worked hard to get the system into operation but did not have enough force to get what they needed from various commands to get the station operating (page 627).

There was not sufficient personnel to operate the radars twenty-four hours a day, although he felt that the station should be operated twenty-four hours a day, fully manned. There were just enough sets to cover the area of Oahu. If any one set had gone out, it would have meant the loss of that coverage. (page 617)

Concerning the Army radar system, Admiral DeLany said that they did not rely upon it for any information because the radar itself had just been installed and was being used for training operators. (p. 80)

Captain Curtis discussed his connection with the development of radar from 1936 to 1938 and the disclosure of the Navy's developments to the Army in about 1937. (p. 110) Captain Curtis discussed the status of the Army radar in November, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. He did not know what delayed the Army generally in securing radar. The Army's problem in connection with radar was much simpler than the Navy's; he informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar was not in an operational but was merely in an instruction status prior to December 7. (p. 111)

Admiral Anderson said that it was the Army's mission primarily to defend Pearl Harbor and that he had no exact knowledge as to the readiness to repel air attack; he was not familiar with the state of readiness of the air warning net.

#### F. SHIPS' RADAR

Admiral Kimmel testified that some of the ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th were equipped with radar, but it was not manned because it was ineffective due to the surrounding hills (page 331).

Admiral Pye said that the PENNSYLVANIA and CALIFORNIA were equipped with radar (page 422). The efficiency of this radar was good. The ships' radar could not be used in port because of the surrounding hills and buildings.

Admiral Pye said that after the beginning of the war, the PENNSYLVANIA while at sea had picked up planes with radar and tracked them for a distance of 85 miles. (p. 168)

Admiral Smith said that the ships' radar was of no use in port (page 559). He stated that two carriers which were outside had radar, but picked up nothing, and that Admiral Halsey on his trip to Midway and return had an air search to a radius of 300 miles and picked up nothing (page 559). To have stationed a ship clear of Pearl Harbor with radar would have been ineffective due to the 65-mile range of the radar, and to station a cordon for that purpose would have been ineffective and very dangerous because of the risk of attack on the ships (page 559). However, he did not recall consideration of this at the time.

Captain Ramsey stated that the CURTIS, from her berth in Pearl Harbor, could cover the 150°-160° arc to southward with her radar for a distance depending on the altitude of the target (page 603).

Commander Taylor said that the radar equipment in the Navy was excellent prior to December 7, 1941, but the operators of radar were, in general, inex-

perienced (page 610). In a land-locked harbor with mountains around it, performance of radar equipment aboard ship was not good (page 614). In Pearl Harbor, the ships' radar might work, and again—it might not. It would be affected by mountains to the north as to performance to the south (page 614).

#### G. STEPS TAKEN BY COMMANDER LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE

Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch's performance of duty as Naval Base Defense Officer was satisfactory (page 285). He was to advise of the condition of readiness, but this did not relieve the Senior Officer Present Afloat from fixing the condition of readiness (page 286).

Admiral Bloch, he said, was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer and to command the Naval forces in the event of an attack, and also for necessary drills (page 289). Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch had no ships suitable for reconnaissance (page 356), and that planes were available to Admiral Bloch only for drill or in an emergency (page 354), but that he should have asked for planes if he considered them necessary for long range reconnaissance, and could have asked for submarines or surface ships for such use (pages 354-5). He said that Admiral Bloch had available four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three coast guard cutters, and the SACRAMENTO (page 361).

Admiral Bloch testified that the forces assigned to him as a local defense force were four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three Coast Guard cutters, the SACRAMENTO, one net vessel, one gate vessel, two self-propelled oil lighters, and a few small tugs and small craft. This force was not adequate to perform the Navy's task under JCD-42 (page 386). He had no surface or aircraft offshore patrol and had no attack force.

Admiral Bloch said that CincPac was his immediate superior in command (page 388). He stated his responsibility under 2CL-41 and what steps had been taken so as to discharge this responsibility. These were an agreement which had been made with the Army regarding the use of planes, and drills had been made pursuant thereto, marine anti-aircraft had been made available to the Army, arrangements had been made at Navy installations to emplace Army guns (which were not emplaced prior to the attack) and to take care of those gun crews; about twenty-six 3" anti-aircraft guns had been emplaced by the Army near Pearl Harbor; air control had been arranged for through Commander Patrol Wing Two; in drills the Senior Officer Present Afloat had been advised of what conditions of readiness to maintain and this was Admiral Bloch's responsibility; bi-weekly drills had been held with the Army during the Autumn and up to December 7th; the Communications plan, including air raid alarm signal, had been planned and executed in drills (page 390).

On the 7th of December, 1941, certain features of the Joint Coast and Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Department plan were in effect. Admiral Bloch said:

"Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy in paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of some (c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e) which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f) which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono-buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic location had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. No torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation. (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant reconnaissance: the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and, I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promise of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving."

taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective. (l): with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack. (o): supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that."

Captain Curtis said in substance that the communications between Headquarters and the ships were the same as they would have been if Headquarters had been maintained aboard the PENNSYLVANIA. Captain Curtis discussed communications arrangements with the Army and with aircraft and with the air station at Kaneohe Bay. (pp. 105-107)

General Short testified that he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol during the period from October 16th to December 7th, and that harbor patrol posts were established and the channel was being swept (page 234). (2)

Admiral Bloch said that he gave General Short no reason for believing that the Navy forces at sea would give adequate warning against a hostile attack. (p. 21)

Admiral Bloch stated that there was no inner air patrol on the morning of December 7, 1941. He had asked the Navy Department for four observation sea planes for this purpose (page 407). He had no planes under his direct command.

#### H. ARMY AIRCRAFT

General Short testified that his aircraft defenses were very inadequate and that he had on December 7th, twelve B-17's, only six of which were in commission. In addition to the six available B-17's, he had ten A-20's, and 50 B-18's, which he characterized as death traps against a modern plane, only twenty-four of which were in commission. He had asked the War Department for more planes (pages 223, 224, 231).

On December 7th, General Short testified, the Army pursuit planes were in a state of routine training except for the alert against sabotage (page 228). Not being alerted for combat, it required 55 minutes for the Army aircraft to get into action on December 7th (page 229). General Short testified that on December 7th, the Army maintained no inshore patrol except as incidental to training. One squadron of planes, he said, did have ammunition right next to the planes (page 229). The long range bombers which he had were available for cooperation with the Navy. The B-17's were good for a 1200 mile radius if they carried bomb loads.

Colonel Phillips testified that on December 7th, the Army had about twelve planes sendable for distant reconnaissance (page 484), and a squadron of small reconnaissance planes (page 485). He said that there was a shortage of Army planes (page 479).

General Marshall said that for the Hawaiian project 148 pursuit planes were scheduled: there were 99 P-40's and 46 P-36's there on December 7th. The commander had asked for 180 long range bombers but shortages prevented reaching this figure. There were 12 B-17's there on December 7th (page 855).

Admiral Kimmel testified that during his tour of duty, the effective Army pursuit planes had been increased from none to 100 and that only six Army B-17's were available on December 7th (page 289). He said that in November, 1941, the War Department had ordered the transfer of certain B-17's from Oahu to the Philippines, which left only twelve at Oahu, six of which were available for use (page 290).

Admiral Kimmel stated that the best defense the Army had against an attack such as the attack which in fact was made, was pursuit planes, and that the Army did not have sufficient planes or crews (page 331). He estimated that on December 7th the Army needed three times the number of pursuit planes they had at Oahu (page 371).

Admiral Bloch said that in his opinion the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on; their main fighter field was Wheeler Field; they had another at Bellows Field and an improvised field in the neighborhood of Haleiwa; and Admiral Bloch had recommended that the Navy release a field at Kahuku Point. (p. 21)

Admiral Bloch believed that on December 7 the LEXINGTON, the ENTERPRISE, the SARATOGA and the YORKTOWN were away from Pearl

Harbor and had their planes with them so that there were only about Marine fighting planes at Pearl Harbor at the time. How many were available that morning, he did not know. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch said that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Force, General Martin, had told him that he only had three planes available for inshore air patrol; he could not use the Army bombers because they could not see, and he could not use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs and could not see very well either; Admiral Bloch believed that one of three planes cracked up before December 7. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch's recollection of the number of Army bombers available December is set forth on page 25.

Admiral Smith said that they did not have a very high regard for the ability of the Army fighter and bomber pilots; that they considered, apart from aircraft gunfire, that the most efficacious defense against air attack would be from the Navy's own carrier planes; since the carriers were away from their planes, he said, he would have sensed, if he had realized the danger of an air raid, that there was no security for Pearl Harbor aside from the aircraft gunfire. (p. 44)

The Army aircraft, Admiral McCormick said, were insufficient in number and limited in usefulness because they lacked some navigational equipment and had some weakness in radio. The comparative efficiency of personnel was not in his mind at the time. (p. 72)

During his discussion of the Army aircraft, Admiral Davis said that provisions for command in the air were still only of a general nature and that there had been no real development along that line by drills, although drills had been held. There were two reasons for this: first, that the air warning net radar system had not been actually placed in operation and secondly, that the Hawaiian area had not been placed on the basis of unity of command; that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual defense was slower than it might have been. (p. 100)

Admiral Pye said that it was definitely known that the air forces available to the Army and the aircraft installations were below those which were considered necessary for proper defense. (p. 163)

Commander Taylor said that, in his opinion, there were sufficient numbers of fighter aircraft at Oahu to repel a number of aircraft that actually attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, and that the quality of the fighter aircraft was such as not to outperform the Japanese fighters, but the performance was sufficient, he believed, to have been able to break up, to a large extent, a raid of the sort which came in. Commander Taylor said that about 80 percent of the fighter pilots of the Interceptor Command were well trained; the other percent were green. (p. 353)

#### I. THE SUBMARINES

Rear Admiral Withers, Commander Submarines, stated that the submarines were engaged in training for war. They were assigned to task forces for training and trained with other ships.

He considered his force mobilized on December 7th, and the condition of personnel was excellent (page 1087). The submarines were ready for war; there was no particular condition of readiness in effect.

He generally kept about one-third of the submarines at Pearl Harbor (page 1085). The total number of submarines which he had was 32, 18 of which were based at Hawaii. Some of these were on the West Coast for overhaul (page 1084). Twelve submarines had gone to Manila early in November, 1941 for observation and to be in position should war come (page 1084). On December 7th, 11 submarines were off Midway and two off Wake. There was no line of submarines out to cover the area surrounding Hawaii (page 1084). Only five submarines were at Pearl Harbor (pages 1088-9). Five submarines were inadequate to throw a scouting force around Hawaii (page 1089).

#### J. RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE

The responsibility for long range reconnaissance, the readiness of aircraft for drills, the extent of the actual reconnaissance and the extent of reconnaissance which could have been undertaken during the period November 27th to December 7th have been discussed at pages 77-85, supra.

The court inquired whether Admiral Kimmel's reason for not using planes for distant reconnaissance was not that the presence of foreign carriers was neither



known nor suspected. He agreed (page 380). There were no inner air patrol flown on December 7, 1941, stated Admiral Kimmel (page 375). As to distant reconnaissance, he said that the planes available to the Army and Navy had been lumped for defense but there were not enough to perform distant reconnaissance effectively. A total of 81 patrol planes and twelve B-17's were in the area. Of this number, 61 patrol planes and six B-17's were available on Oahu immediately prior to the attack. There were twelve patrol planes operating from Midway. The number was not sufficient "on a requirement of 84 planes" for 360° patrol based on 15 mile visibility. The inadequacy had been reported and more planes asked for; they did the best they could. He thought that there were a number of planes searching on December 7th in the operating areas and some engaged in maneuvers with our own submarines—he was told that there were about a dozen in the air (page 374). Midway was running a reconnaissance, as much as they could with 12 planes. He estimated that not more than 50 patrol planes on Oahu were in flying condition on December 7th.

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 1941, the actual situation of the planes was as follows: There were 7 planes in the air conducting search between 120°–170° to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; there were four planes on the surface of Midway armed with two 500-pound bombs, and on ten-minute notice; at Oahu, there were 12 planes of VP-11 ready for flight on four hours notice; VP-12 had six planes ready for flight in 30 minutes notice, and 5 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP-14 had 3 in the air on security patrol, 3 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and 4 ready on 4 hours notice; VP-22 had 12 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP-23 had 11 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP-24 had 4 planes in the air conducting tactics with submarines, and 1 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice (page 684).

Admiral Bellinger described his duties on December 7. Planes normally under his command consisted of a total of 81 planes on December 7. (p. 115). On December 7, he said, there were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33 planes at Pearl and 12 at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned on December 5 from an extensive tour of duty at Midway and Wake. They had been sent there about October 17. He did not believe that any of the patrol planes were dispatched to the outlying islands after November 27 except in connection with sending Marine planes by carrier to Wake where one squadron was sent. (p. 116).

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 58 of the 81 planes were in commission, nine were under repair and fourteen were in the air. (p. 117).

Admiral Bellinger discussed the conditions of readiness of the airplanes and the report of availability of Army and Navy planes on December 5 and 6. (pp. 125 and 126).

Admiral Bellinger said that after the attack, the Army communicated with the Army planes and the Navy communicated with the Navy planes. He also discussed the communication difficulties between Pearl Harbor and the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe. (p. 123).

There was no inner patrol around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th (page 685), and there were no planes available to him, either Army or Navy for that purpose (page 685).

Captain Ramsey said that units of the Army bombardment division and of Marine bombardment aviation reported daily planes available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, when functioning. The Base Defense Air Force only came into existence in an emergency or for drill purposes. ComFOURTEEN or CincPac could vitalize this Base Defense Air Force (pages 574–6). Some order by officer senior to Admiral Bellinger was necessary (page 576). PatWings One and Two were under Admiral Bellinger's command, of course.

Exhibit 53 was the basic operations plan of Naval Base Defense Force and was in effect on December 7th (page 576). Annex B to Operations Plan No. 1-41 was issued pursuant to this plan, and Addendum 1 to Operating Plan No. 1A-41 was an estimate of the situation prepared by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, covering the situation at the end of March, 1941 (page 577). (Paragraph 3(b) of this addendum stated that an air attack was the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu, etc.). He considered this estimate sound, and that if any attack came on Oahu, it would come by air, which would be the only effective way to attack (pages 578–9).

The general condition of readiness of aircraft was "Baker 5," 50% available on four hours notice, between November 27th and December 7th, but many units were in a higher condition and some airplanes were actually in the air (page 579).

He had no records from which he could refresh his memory as to the condition of readiness but gave isolated examples (page 580); Pat Wing Fourteen was in the air, conducting search of the operating area on December 7th, he did not remember whether there were three or four; there were about six planes of Pat Wing Two in the air, conducting tactics with the submarines in the "sanctuary" over that island." (page 585). There was a ready squadron, planes lined up and presumably ready to take the air in 30 minutes, which was to be relieved at 8 o'clock by another from Kaneohe (page 580).

The readiness question was one in fact decided by higher authority (page 581). He could not say whether directly by CincPac or Commander Naval Base Defense Force. In ordinary drill practice the drill message placing the organization on an activated status came from the latter; then they would send a dispatch to a unit making aircraft available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, and start issuing drill orders. Planes in the air were to be sent immediately to search sectors. At the end they would send a message, "Resume normal condition of readiness." At least once in a while he was on that job (it appears he was there at least as early as November 1, 1941, but may have been there earlier, see page 575) the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree. He could not recall who sent the message, but it was some higher authority and the change was from "Cast" to "Baker" (page 581).

Under normal operating conditions the planes available for the Naval Base Defense Air Forces were under different commanders.

The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force never had planes assembled under his command except for drill or emergency and, therefore, except in these cases, he had no opportunity to set the condition of readiness (page 582).

He also said that aside from the ready squadron at Ford Island, the other patrol craft there were in various position: some were ready for launching, some being repaired, some in hangers for long repair or modification (page 585).

On the morning of December 7th, six planes at Midway were scouting to cover task forces there and six on the water fully manned and loaded with live bombs (page 585).

He stated that dispersal of patrol planes was impracticable on land or in harbor (page 585).

According to Captain Hamsey, on the morning of the 7th, patrol planes covering operating areas were under orders to depth bomb submerged submarines outside the sanctuary without a close escort. He said that for several months prior to December 7th, the planes of Pat Wing Two flew armed. All planes on search of operating areas, by order of CincPac, carried live depth charges (page 604). The Army planes were usually armed (page 604).

He said that before December 7th, he had only one officer assistant; after, he had 42 officer assistants (page 608). They were available later because their ships had been sunk.

General Short testified that one of the most important things the Navy was supposed to do was long range reconnaissance (page 228). He said that from October 16th to December 7th, he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol, harbor patrol, post were established and channels were being swept. There was a plan for Navy long distance reconnaissance and drills were held once a week (page 234). He said the joint air plan was effective March 1941 (page 234).

General Short testified that he did not know what Admiral Bloch did with respect to distant reconnaissance. Under the agreement, if the Navy planes were insufficient for such reconnaissance, the Navy could have asked the Army for planes (page 237). The Navy made no request of General Short for planes for distant reconnaissance, although General Short conferred with the Navy on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251).

General Marshall said that heavy Army bombers had been delayed because of delay at the manufacturing plants and, after delivery, unexpectedly strong winds adverse to Hawaii, kept the planes at the West Coast for three weeks. The initial squadron arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (pages 681-2).

### XXXIII. THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

*This investigation developed the following evidence regarding the sighting of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (Exhibits 18, 76):*

*At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive*

sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.

The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:

"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course speed 9 knots"

After receiving this visual, signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR, asking:

"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that, you sighted?"

At 0520 the CONDOR replied:

"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance"

In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine it was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.

The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that he had seen a submarine (p. 87-92, 428-429).

The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18.) Since the conversation was solely between the ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate vessel charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer, who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of December 6-7. At 0458 on the 7th the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR, now Lieutenant Commander M. H. Hubbell, testified that at 0632, when the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching daylight conditions" (Exhibits 44, 45).

The log of the signal tower for December 6-7, 1941, records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0800 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Ex. 46).

The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appeared to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke pots near the object (Exhibit 73).

The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES into Pearl Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened

fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. About this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine. The submarine keeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water (Exhibit 74).

At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):

"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."

The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supplementary message:

"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarines operating in defensive sea area (Exhibit 18)."

This message was received by the Bishop's Point Radio Station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired (pages 414-416, 452-469).

#### A. JAPANESE SUBMARINES

Captain Smedberg said that the sum of the information on the midget submarines used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was that they were carried and launched from mother submarines, were about 41 feet in length, and had a maximum cruising range of 175-180 miles at the most economical cruising speed of 4 knots. They were probably not equipped with radio (p. 8-9). Complete information on Jap midget subs is available in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 20 October 1944, Volume 1, number 15 (Exhibit 5), and Office of Naval Intelligence Publication "ONI 220-Japanese Submarines" (Exhibit 6).

NOTE: The latest Office of Naval Intelligence publication referring to Japanese midget submarines ("ONI 222-J, The Japanese Navy") establishes that Japanese midget submarines used at Pearl Harbor were actually about 80 feet long, rather than 41 feet long as stated by Captain Smedberg. They carried 18-inch torpedoes, had a top speed of 12 knots, and could dive to a depth of 100 feet.

Captain Ramsey said that at 0730 on December 7, 1941, he received a call from the Staff Duty Officer to the effect that they had sunk a submarine one mile from the Pearl Harbor entrance (page 586).

Captain Earle said that at about 0710 on December 7, he learned of the submarine attack off Pearl Harbor; that this did not indicate to him that an air attack might be imminent; that his reaction was that the enemy had decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign of war; that the WARD was making another mistake. He pointed out that they had had on the average of ten or fifteen reports of submarine sighted in the area in the several months preceding the attack. When he received word of this attack, he told the Watch Officer to be sure and get the dispatch verified to notify the Commander in Chief's Watch Officer immediately, to advise ComFOURTEEN's Operations Officer, and then he called Admiral Bloch and discussed the matter with him. As the matter had been referred to the Commander in Chief, they decided that they would wait for further developments.

ments. They did not discuss the fact that the presence of the submarine might indicate an air attack. (p. 376)

Admiral Bellinger read an excerpt from a report prepared by him as follows: "0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief. 0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone and received by some of the planes in the air at 0805." (p. 129)

Admiral Bellinger knew of no attempt at his command headquarters to relay the information of the attack on the submarine to Army headquarters.

He requested authentication; reported it to the Staff Duty Officer of CincPac, and drew up a search dispatch (page 586).

Concerning the submarine attack on the morning of December 7th, Admiral Smith said that he had received no report of that attack, the report was received by the Staff Duty Officer, who was Commander V. R. Murphy, who delivered the message to Admiral Bellinger, and he believed to Admiral Kimmel. He said:

"My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of the Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at 7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor, and as she turned, the conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the WARD informed the signal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that he had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody that it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You see, we had received so many false submarine reports before that time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal sent through the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told us later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. I'm quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secretary of the Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message before that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made for months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult to communicate with the Army. It had to go through several stations."

Captain Murphy said that no specific information was furnished to him concerning the international situation when he went on watch as Staff Duty Officer; he had a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving him the dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet and instructions as to action to be taken in the event of war. (p. 196)

Captain Murphy said that he was not familiar with the Army's condition of readiness on December 7th. (p. 198) He did not know whether or not the Army radar system was operating that day.

Captain Murphy said that as Staff Duty Officer if anything unusual occurred during his tour of duty, he would have advised ComFOURTEEN, who in turn would have advised the Army since ComFOURTEEN was charged with dealings with the Army. (p. 201)

Captain Murphy said that about 7:20 or 7:25 in the morning of December 7th, he received a report to the effect that a submarine had been sunk by the WARD. He described his actions as follows:

"At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant Duty Officer. And I said, 'Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?' And he said, 'No.' I said, 'While I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it and whether or not he's called Admiral Bloch.' I finished dressing, Black

came back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. I then dialed the operator—it was a local dial system—and told him to tell the Duty Officer to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation might be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the phone and it was Ramsey—now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from Pat Wing Two. He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, 'I have just had a report that I have not been able to get any more details on,' and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang from the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready-duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and to investigate, and had ordered the stand-by destroyer to get up steam. I said, 'Had you any previous details or any more details of this attack?' He said, 'The message came out of a clear sky. There was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind.' I then called Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and of the ready-destroyer being ordered out and of the stand-by destroyer getting up steam. He said, 'I will be right down.' About that time, and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he had nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, 'No,' but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search plan available in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone rang again; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that he had another message from the WARD saying that she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and requesting a Coast Guard cutter to be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him the message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman came in, saying, 'There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor and this is no drill.' I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea: **'JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.'** I then called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available now, I'll correct that: I told the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available?' He said, 'I don't think I have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for search.' I then called all the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief; some I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith myself. By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information. From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immediate direction of events."

Captain Murphy said that that contact was about the third or fourth of a series of such contacts; that all previous ones had, insofar as actual progress was concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, he thought, might be the real thing but he wanted some further information as to why the WARD thought that it sunk a submarine so that he could formulate an opinion whether or not there was a submarine sunk. In the previous contacts, they had never been able to establish definitely that there had been a submarine involved. He had less doubt about the authenticity of this than he had had about some of the others. He did not interpret this submarine as possibly being accompanied by an air attack (p. 202).

Admiral Bloch stated that at 0715 on December 7, 1941, he received a telephone message from the Chief of Staff that the WARD had attacked a submarine in Pearl Harbor and was escorting a sampan in.

Commander Granville C. Briant was Aviation Aide to ComFourteenth Naval District (p. 229). During November and December, 1941, Commander Briant was one of the District Watch Officers. There were about eighty or ten of such officers. Commander Briant discussed the instructions given

Watch Officers and qualifications of those on the Watch Officers list. (p. 230). He also discussed the functions of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 232). Commander Briant said that to his mind the Watch Officers had not been advised of the seriousness of the situation and specifically they were not advised of the war warning. (p. 233)

Admiral Bloch said that, "on the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine was sighted by USS WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the USS ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did receive at 7:12 a. m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counter-attacking a submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed—at least his operations Watch Officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time we were." (pp. 21 and 22)

Admiral Bloch did not think that the Army had been advised on the morning of December 7 of the dispatch from the WARD concerning the submarine attack. (p. 22)

The Staff Duty Officer at CincPac was given the same information. They were not sure whether this was a true report. The ready duty destroyer was ordered out. Before the report was clarified, the air attack had started. The first submarine contacted was one mile outside the entrance buoy (page 401). He learned after December 7th that a patrol plane had also seen this submarine or another, attacked it with depth bombs and sunk it. This was a midget (page 403).

A midget submarine was later sunk inside the harbor. When it was later recovered, it was found that both its torpedoes were missing (page 403). It had fired at the CURTISS and missed.

No anti-submarine nets had been installed, but anti-torpedo nets had been installed to keep a submarine outside from firing torpedoes into the harbor. If the anti-torpedo net had been closed, a midget submarine would probably have become fouled in the net. Practice required the net gates to be open all day and closed all night except when ships were passing them. At 0445, December 7, 1941, some minesweepers came in and the gate was not closed until after 0800 when it was ordered closed by Headquarters (page 404). The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet; the depth of the net was 45 feet (page 405). From keel to conning tower the submarine was about 20 feet.

Also, a midget submarine ran aground on a reef off Bellows Field and was recovered by the Army (page 406).

Admiral Kimmel testified that on December 7th his headquarters were at the submarine base at Pearl Harbor, his Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was nearby and he could move to it on short notice. By moving his headquarters to shore, he did not intend to supplant Admiral Bloch (page 278). There was nothing irregular in his establishing his headquarters ashore since this in no way changed his responsibilities (pages 363-4).

Between 0730 and 0740, Admiral Kimmel had a report of a submarine attack off Pearl Harbor and he was waiting for an amplification of this report. Between November 27th and that time, he had had about a half-dozen such reports. While waiting for amplification, the air attack started (page 332). He said that the officer reporting the sinking of the submarine should, under 2CI-41, have broadcast in plain language, but sent it in code which resulted in delay.

Admiral Kimmel said that the one submarine which did attempt to attack in Pearl Harbor was stopped before accomplishing anything (page 373).

He also said that he had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack (page 1124).

Admiral Calhoun said that on December 7, 1941 he had no warning that a submarine was in Pearl Harbor until the MEDUSA and CURTISS informed

him that they had sunk a midget submarine on the other side of Ford Island (page 945).

Captain Layton testified that a submarine entered Pearl Harbor and fired both of its torpedoes, one passing between the *RALEIGH* and *CURTIS*, the other burying itself in the mud near the berth of the *UTAH*. This submarine was sunk and was so thoroughly destroyed that no intelligence material was obtained from it. (Page 285-286)

Another Japanese midget submarine which was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu, was captured on December 8th along with its commanding officer. This submarine contained various documents which were captured, including a chart of Pearl Harbor on which was laid a course into the harbor, around Ford Island and out of the harbor, as well as indications of positions of various ships in the harbor. (Exhibit 32A, 33A)

Captain Layton also testified that the midget submarine beached off Bellows Field bore the designation I-18 which was the apparent designation of its "mother submarine." He pointed out that the chart of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from the "I-18" contained notations in pencil along both sides of the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor, reading "I-16", "I-20", "I-22", "I-18", and "I-24". He testified that from intelligence subsequently received it was known that such were the designations of the Japanese mother submarines that carried the five midget submarines believed to have been present outside Pearl Harbor on 7 December (Page 284).

Captain Layton further testified that the times shown on the track map of Pearl Harbor that was recovered from the Japanese submarine off Bellows Field was, in accordance with Japanese naval custom, Tokyo time, minus nine, and that all dates indicated were east longitude or Tokyo dates, regardless of the fact that the 180th meridian may have been crossed. Therefore, he said, that the "times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor." (Page 279).

Captain Layton examined the original Japanese map which contained the track around Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 32A), and stated it to be his professional opinion as a seaman that the track shown on the map was a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings and distances indicated thereon. He stated that "it is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the CO<sub>2</sub> absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary gang." (Page 281-282).

Captain Layton also testified that the notations on the chart under the time 0450 did not indicate that the captain of the midget submarine recorded that he himself, had sunk an enemy ship. Captain Layton pointed out that the submarine still had both of its torpedoes aboard, which was its full complement. He pointed out also that the track in question was carefully laid out both by course and distance, with the course in degrees and distance in meters, and the time in minutes and seconds; and that the latter indicated that the speed of the submarine was to be varied from point to point so as to make its arrival at the several points at a predetermined time. He pointed out that the time indicated, 0450, which was Tokyo time, would be 0920 Pearl Harbor time, and that at 0920 Honolulu time, the attack was still taking place and there was a tremendous amount of activity in the area indicated on the map. Accordingly, Captain Layton gave as his opinion that he doubted if the captain of the midget submarine would have been able to so meticulously follow his course all around the harbor and at the same time make notations from point to point. (Page 283).

The notations on the Japanese chart indicated also that the submarine commander had received intelligence reports as late as December 5th. (Exhibits 32-32A).

The Japanese submarine commander who was captured, upon being interrogated, admitted that he had failed in his mission. (Page 18).

With reference to the language appearing on the Japanese map, which is variously interpreted as "sink enemy ship," and "enemy ship sunk," Captain McCollum testified that it was not possible to infer whether the past tense or the future tense was in the mind of the person who made the notations, because there were no kana symbols attached showing the tense of the verb. (Page 25-26)

NOTE: It is to be noted that the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board that Japanese midget submarines must have been in the harbor



*a few days before the attack and evidently moved in and out of the harbor at will ('RAPHB', Page 155) is based wholly on the captured Japanese maps and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge at Honolulu, 7 December 1941, which in turn is based solely on those maps. In this connection, it is pointed out that Admiral Hewitt made a thorough study of the question (Hewitt Report, Page 146-148) which caused him to conclude that there was no evidence warranting the belief that any Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. (Hewitt Report, Page 157).*

#### B. DETECTION OF PLANES BY THE ARMY RADAR SYSTEM

J. L. Locard, First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, and Sergeant George E. Elliott, U. S. Army, who were privates on December 7, 1941, testified that they were on duty that morning from 0400 to 0700 on a mobile radar unit on the northern part of Oahu at a site called Opana (page 628).

There were supposed to be three men on the shift, but the men arranged, and Sergeant Murphy approved, only two, it being a Sunday morning (pages 637-8). The station had been set up in November, about Thanksgiving (page 639).

Locard stated (page 641) that his station worked 0400 to 0700 on Sundays and holidays and 0700 to 1700 on weekdays. The Robert's Report states that on November 27, 1941, the Army ordered the radar system operated each day from 0400 to 0700, but Locard had no knowledge of such order (page 643), and his station operated those hours on Sunday.

Elliott understood that the station had been operated from 0400 to 0700 before December 7th according to schedules (page 652).

The radar set which they were operating could cover 180° from northeast to west. They were instructed to track for flights, intercept them and report them to the Information Center (page 629). Locard was in charge of the station. They had telephonic communication with the Information Center.

Locard had been operating these radar sets since August, when they were put in operation (page 630). The set was of rather crude construction at that time. It would pick up one plane at 100 miles and sometimes not pick up three or four (page 631).

They had no information prior to 0800 of the movement of friendly aircraft. Radar could not distinguish friend from foe.

On the morning of December 7th, they continued to operate after 0700 as the truck had not come for them, in order to give Elliott training in radar operation (page 631). He was not regarded by Locard as a qualified operator (page 633).

At about 0702 they discovered an unusually large response in a northerly direction at 136 miles. Locard checked the equipment to make sure, and when the planes came in to 132 miles they decided to call the Information Center (page 633). Elliott first talked to the switchboard operator at the Information Center (page 633).

Elliott testified that he had wanted to send the information in right away, but that Locard had laughed at him and finally told him to send it in if he liked. After a short time, they did (page 648).

Locard then got the switchboard operator to call the Army officer on duty and then he reported the information to him. The officer thanked him. They continued to track the planes in to 20 miles, when they lost them because of distortion.

They left the unit and became aware of the attack at 0830 and went back on duty at their unit at 0910. Their equipment meanwhile was being operated by others who had relieved them (page 636).

Elliott had no information concerning an expected flight of B-17's (page 646).

This, incidentally, was the first time Elliott had this 0400 to 0700 duty; previously he had worked in the late mornings or afternoons (page 646). He thought that other units had also picked up the flight and reported it, but had no knowledge to that effect (page 657).

Lt. Col. K. A. Tyler, U. S. Army, who was then a first lieutenant, was at the Army Information Center on the morning of December 7, 1941. He was there for training as an assistant controller. He was the only officer present and had been on duty there only once before (pages 446-7). Five or six plotters were on duty, who plotted radar reports (page 448). In all, five radar stations were in operation.

He received no information or instructions before going on watch, nor did he relieve any one. Watch was 0400 to 0800 (page 449). He understood the mechanics of radar, but he had never seen one in operation.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, at 0715, he received a call from the radar station at Opana, stating that the operator had a report of a large number of

planes at 130 miles. Private Lockard was the operator he talked to (page 458). He thought about the report for a minute, thanked the operator, and did nothing about it.

He was looking for a flight of B-17's, but had no official notice that they were coming in. A bomber pilot friend had told him that when there was a flight of B-17's en route, the radio stations played Hawaiian music all night. That night and morning they did. He thought B-17's were coming in because Hawaiian music was playing on the radio, which was an arrangement made for homing planes (page 458). He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to contact his superiors (page 459).

There was no means of distinguishing friend from foe. He thought the planes were either B-17's, due from San Francisco on a northeast course, or some Navy carrier planes. He thinks now that the large plot report at 0715 were the Japanese planes (page 460).

The only information he had of Japanese-United States relations was what he had read in newspapers.

He learned of the attack by phone call at 0800. He called all forces but Major Berquist and Major Tindall came and took over (page 452). A naval officer reported to the Information Center shortly after the attack began (page 453).

Commander Taylor said that on the morning of December 7th, he got to the Information Center between 0830 and 0900 (page 612). Upon his arrival the Information Center was in great confusion. Plots were made of everything reported, but there was no way of determining what planes were Japanese or American (page 613).

Captain Ramsay said that during the day, they called Army radar and requested that they track the Japanese planes in retiring and advise, but got no information (page 601).

It is not clear whether the Navy had been advised of the expected arrival of the Army planes on December 7th. Admiral McMorris stated that several senior members of CincPac's staff certainly were aware that some large bombers were flying from California to Oahu at that time, December 6th (page 90). Admiral Smith thought that they did not know of the prospective arrival of Army planes on December 7th (page 563). He said, incidentally, that the Army B-17's arrived that morning without ammunition (pages 569-72). Captain Ramsay stated that prior to 0755 on December 7th, he had no information of the scheduled arrival of Army planes (page 587).

#### C. THE AIR ATTACK

Captain Smedberg said that a Chief Yeoman in the Japanese Navy who had formerly been attached to the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Jap Combined Fleet, and who had been captured during the Marianas campaign, had furnished what is believed to be an accurate account of the composition and movements of the enemy forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This information is presented in summarized form in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 8 December 1944, vol. 2, number 22 (Exhibit 3; p. 4-5).

The high points of the prisoner's account were as follows: The secret operation order upon which the Pearl Harbor attack was based was dated 1 November 1941 and specified that: (1) "War will be declared on X-Day," and (2) "The operation will become effective on Y-Day." A second operation order, dated 5 November, fixed Y-Day as 23 November 1941 (22 November, Pearl Harbor time) and a third operation order, dated 10 November, set X-Day as 8 December 1941 (7 December, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 5-6).

The Japanese plan called for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by a carrier "Striking Force," with a "Surprise Attack Force" of submarines delivering a coordinated blow. The submarine force was to carry out reconnaissance in advance of the attack by the Jap carrier planes and was to attack U. S. warships which escaped from Pearl Harbor. If the opportunity became available, it was also to launch attacks with midget subs after the plane attacks (p. 6-7).

The striking force, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo, consisted of the Jap Navy's five carrier divisions: The KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYABAMA and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA, and destroyers, including elements of DesRon 1 (Exhibit 3; p. 6).

The "Surprise Attack Force" included about twenty fleet-type submarines, some of which carried midget subs. This constituted a large part of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.

The Japanese operation order specified that the carrier force was to leave Japan about X minus 16 Day (21 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) and proceed by way of Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, for Pearl Harbor. Most of the submarines of the "Surprise Attack Force" were to leave the Inland Sea on X minus 20 Day (17 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 6-7).

The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo Channel some time between November 19 and November 21, 1941, Pearl Harbor Time, and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, where it assembled and fueled. Departure was taken on or about 27 November 1941, under cover of a heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction, heading on course about 085° to a point in longitude about 170° W; then turned southeast on course about 135° and proceeded to a point due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor Time. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to the northwest on a heading of about 300° to a point about longitude 170° E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a point near 140° E, and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).

General Short testified that he heard the first bomb of the attack; the Chief of Staff told him it was the "real thing." He immediately ordered an all-out alert (No. 3). His narrative of the attack appears at pages 254-255 of the Record. He had no notice of a submarine having been sunk near Pearl Harbor prior to the attack.

Admiral Kimmel testified that he became aware of the attack by a telephone message from the Staff Duty Officer (pages 332-333). He reached his headquarters at 0805.

Admiral Bloch said that he knew of the attack at 0755; he heard bombs and saw a Japanese plane; he went to headquarters, sent dispatches to Washington, Philippines, Guam and to ships at sea advising that Oahu had been attacked; called all Navy Yard workers and Naval personnel to duty, flooded dry docks and took other local measures (page 400). He said that ample personnel reported (page 401). When the Japanese attacked, a visual signal was given and the air raid alarm was given. Insofar as other measures planned, including air search for the enemy, were possible after the attack, they were carried out.

Admiral Pye testified that on the morning of December 7th, he was in the Halikulani Hotel (page 418). He learned of the attack at 0755 and proceeded to Pearl Harbor in an automobile with Admiral Leary (page 423). His Chief of Staff took action to carry out 2CL-41 as he was not aboard at the time of the attack (page 421).

Concerning the sortie of ships on December 7, Admiral Pye said:

"I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul." (p. 166)

Admiral Bellinger said that, on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Force immediately assumed a functioning status without orders from higher authority (page 664).

Captain Ramsey saw the bombing on Ford Island; had a radio message broadcast of the raid; ordered planes in the air to search 315° to 360° from Pearl Harbor to the maximum distance, and assigned searches of other sectors (page 587).

After the attack he ordered the planes in the air to search 315° to 360° because they always thought that the likely direction of approach (page 597). To the best of his belief, the Japanese attack came from the northwest and subsequent information indicated that the planes had been launched from carriers about 325 miles from Oahu bearing 325° (page 598).

Shortly after December 7, Admiral Davis saw a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which indicated that the planes had been launched from a point about 250 miles north of Oahu. (p. 103-104)

Captain Ramsey reviewed what he did on the morning of December 7th (page 605). After he issued search orders and Admiral Bellinger approve, there were a stream of requests for information; the first order he received was from CincPac to "locate and destroy enemy," but all possible action was already taken; communications were disrupted by the raid and smoke; all planes available were told to take off immediately; various orders were received during the day, including some from CincPac to search specific sectors (page 606).

Captain Ramsey said that they received some information during the morning concerning a chart from a shot-down plane in which the purported rendezvous was to the southwest of Hawaii (page 602).

Various Army planes did go northward that day—they went out to 150 miles but had to return because B-17's could go no further without protection of A-20's, which had no longer range (page 602).

Admiral Smith stated that he did not get information as to the probable location from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack—for some two days. There was a great deal of confusion; false reports from civilians of troop and parachute landings; a false report from one of our planes of an enemy carrier to the south; a squadron of our seaplanes returning from Midway to Pearl Harbor on that afternoon dropped two bombs on what the pilot said was a camouflaged Japanese carrier south of Pearl Harbor, but seems to have been the PORTLAND. A chart showing the position of Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7th, but was not shown to the Navy until the afternoon (page 564). Planes left to the north, but this was not known by the Navy until two days after the attack. Visibility was good at Oahu on December 7th, but fog could usually be found to the north.

Admiral Kitts said that about 175 to 250 Japanese planes came in from carriers to attack from west-northwest, a distance of some 200 miles (page 524).

Admiral Kitts said that no orders in regard to fire control were issued on December 7 other than by the ships' commanding officers and one by the Commander in Chief were issued to stop firing on friendly planes. (p. 191)

Admiral Kitts said that, as he recalled it, 28 planes were shot down by the Fleet. (p. 193)

He testified that on December 8th, after the attack, he was in conference with General Davidson and was shown a radar plot showing planes coming in from about 150 miles and going out again. The plot coming in might have been interpreted as friendly planes, but after a two-hour attack on Pearl Harbor, the outgoing plot must have been the enemy. This plot was not reported to the Navy until he saw it on December 8th (page 520).

Colonel Phillips said that on December 7, 1941 he received a telephone message of the attack and ordered the all-out alert. Some Army pursuit planes took off but he did not know when or how many (page 389). He did not know whether any bombers took off. He said that there was on December 7th, a radar track of planes which turned out to be Japanese, but he cannot remember whether it was incoming or outgoing or either (page 488). He saw this track after December 7, 1941, but did not remember where or what it showed (page 489).

Admiral Smith was not familiar with the Army radar system (page 558). He stated that after the attack, Colonel Davidson told him the radar track had been reconstructed from the bearings, but on Sunday that they were not convinced that that was the direction from which the attack came (page 558). This is "obviously correct, because we searched to the south rather than to the north" (page 588).

Commander Taylor described the confusion which existed on December 7 at the Information Center. He said, among other things, that there were a number of plots prepared of the course of aircraft that morning which were studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from and what direction they had returned; that about 48 hours after the raids they completed the construction of an estimated plot, and that it was his understanding that during the subsequent visit of the Secretary of the Navy, this plot was shown to him as evidence that all information received by the Information Center had been received in an orderly manner. (p. 351)

At the time of the attack, Commander Wright was having breakfast with Commander Williams, who, he said, had been handling the traffic analyses end of the job. He directed Williams to go over to the Communication Intelligence Unit, find out as much as he could about the composition and location of the attacking forces and telephone the information. He said that, in general, the information coming over indicated that there were at least four carriers, including the two by identified radio calls. The bearings obtained on this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South at an estimated distance of 250 to 300 miles. Conflicting reports were coming in from other sources. One bearing which was obtained from Lualualei, was in direct conflict with the other bearings, and indicated that the attacking force was almost exactly due North. (p. 380-1). Commander Wright said that he believed that an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the Southward affected all of the subsequent reports. He said that the report from Lualualei was transmitted by him to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Lt. Comdr. Layton, and he assumed that he passed it on to higher authority. (p. 381)

*Captain Rochefort said that when the attack commenced, the communications unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the direction finder stations, one of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea and that consequently no bearings on the attacking Jap force were received by his unit. He added that the failure of communications was not due to sabotage but was an accident caused by Army personnel setting up certain new circuits. He said that the Lualualei direction finder, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally broadcast by radio a bearing obtained on one of the attacking units. He had heard that this bearing was received by CinCPac as an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true, but was subsequently informed by the direction finder station that it had actually transmitted the bearing as 357. He said that the Lualualei direction finder was capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing. (p. 63-64)*

#### D. THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARMY'S MESSAGE

It will be recalled that on the morning of December 7th, General Marshall sent a message which indicated that the Japanese were presenting a note at 1 p. m., Washington time, which corresponds to dawn at Hawaii.

General Short testified that the December 7th dispatch from the Chief of Staff (Exhibit 48) was received by the Signal Officer at 1145, and decoded by 1428, well after the Japanese attack (page 251).

That dispatch, as set forth in Exhibit 48, was as follows:

"Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)

"Subject: Far East Situation.

"The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

Admiral Kimmel testified that a copy of the December 7th dispatch of the Chief of Staff to Short was received by him on the afternoon of December 7th, too late. He considered this information as news of a Japanese ultimatum and, as it stated that a note was to be delivered at 1 p. m. Washington time which was sunrise in Hawaii and midnight in Manila, he felt that it would have indicated a Japanese attack at Oahu (page 328).

## E. THE FAILURE TO TELEPHONE ON DECEMBER 7TH

Colonel Phillips said that at about 0822 Hawaiian time on December 7th, he telephoned General Marshall, that it took about five minutes to get the connection through, and the connection was excellent. General Marshall asked if he had the message. He replied, "What message?" General Marshall said, "The message I sent yesterday" or "last night." He replied, "No." (page 490). He got the dispatch from General Marshall at 1530, December 7, 1941. He did not know the time at which it had been sent or when it got to RCA in Honolulu.

Admiral Smith said that communications on December 7, 1941 could be established with Washington in thirty minutes by radio; they had no telephone (page 549).

Admiral Bloch stated that the only telephone connection he had with Washington was the regular commercial, not scrambler, phone (page 410).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Navy Department had no scrambler telephone connection to Pearl Harbor; the Army had one; that the scrambler telephone was not secure against an expert and that the Navy Department did not use the scrambler phone until 1942 (page 843).

It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply that he regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel about this, and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (pages 11793, 797).

## F. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IF THERE HAD BEEN ADVANCE NOTICE

General Short testified that if he had had two hours notice on December 7th, he could have been completely ready for an air attack. He thought that he would have alerted against an air attack if he had the information contained in the Chief of Staff's December 7th dispatch two hours before the attack (page 254). He stated, however, that he could not have prevented a torpedo attack on the battleships even with two hours warning since any aircraft attack once launched can be driven in (pages 265-6).

Admiral Kimmel testified that if he had received Exhibit 48 prior to the attack, he would have assumed the highest condition of readiness (page 329). He also testified that in the event of an attack together with submarines, and he has no reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack, it is well within the realm of possibility that had he taken the Fleet to sea, the losses would have been greater (page 1124). However, that presupposes that they would have found the Fleet and would have been able to deliver an attack. Had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese might not have attacked at that time at all. However, he thought that he would have taken the Fleet to sea.

In his closing testimony, Admiral Brown made a statement to the effect that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on December 7 might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu were almost free to pick the date and hour of attack. On December 7, the Japanese risked an attack only because they had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state of our defenses and their so-called diplomatic agents were able to direct the moment of attack. Admiral Brown then said: "I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never again allow enemy agents within sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air force can be observed."

Admiral Bloch said that had the Fleet left Pearl Harbor on December 7, there was a serious question in his mind as to whether or not the entire Fleet would have been destroyed in view of the powerful forces that the Japanese had in the area. Also, he said, had the Japanese attacked the supply at Oahu, the drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the Fleet, the United States would have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that the storage was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air. (p. 94)

Admiral Kimmel said that if he had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and had it met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an attack except by means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126). Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably could have delivered a very effective attack.

Admiral Halsey said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, they were 150 to 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor. He had flown off some of his planes and some of them on arrival at Pearl Harbor shot down Japanese planes and some were shot down. A number of his planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. (p. 305)

On the morning of December 7, Admiral Newton was about 300 odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. He thought that he would receive orders to intercept the enemy which he felt must be to the Northward of Oahu and signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was cancelled because presumably Midway had also been attacked. He reported his position to the Commander in Chief and told him that he had cancelled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, he received a dispatch from the Commander in Chief to report to Admiral Halsey but he did not know where Admiral Halsey's task force was or where it had been. He sent a dispatch advising Admiral Halsey of his position and Admiral Halsey directed him to join him in the vicinity of Oahu. He set a course for Oahu and about ten or eleven that morning received a message from Admiral Halsey that he was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles south of Oahu and was to intercept and destroy those carriers. He changed course and sent search planes. The search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had received information indicating that the attack had been from carriers located to the north, not to the south. They returned to Pearl Harbor around the 13th or 14th, meanwhile continuing air patrol. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes. (p. 319)

Admiral Newton said that he had assumed that the Japanese carriers attacked from the north because they had a better chance for coming in from that direction without being observed and because of the fact all shipping had been diverted to the southward and the training grounds of the Fleet were also to the southward. He felt sure that the Japanese were cognizant of this and consequently was greatly surprised when he was told that the Japanese carriers were to be assumed to be south of Oahu.

The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector. If he had detected an attack by the Japanese naval force 700 miles from Oahu, he would have violated his orders just as he did when he gave the orders to bomb the submarines; he does not know what he would have done, but thinks he would have found some way to handle the situation (page 1127).

Admiral McMorris said that if he had known a few days before that an attacking force was coming, he would have had the Fleet out, regardless of defense, so they could attack the enemy forces (page 897). His action (getting the Fleet out if he knew that a hostile force was approaching) would have been the same if a state of war had or had not existed (page 898). He would have informed the Navy Department if we had not been at war. To have deferred action would certainly have been unwise, even under our Constitution (page 898). Even if long range reconnaissance to 700 miles had been in effect, the attack could not have been prevented. He might have sent ships out to intercept the enemy and diverted carriers for this purpose. However, he thought the losses might have been greater if this had been done (page 898). However, the Army planes would have been alerted too and undoubtedly would have done some damage, principally to enemy planes. He doubted that the enemy carriers would have suffered very seriously (page 899).

Admiral McMorris said that had they foreseen the Japanese carrier raid, they would not have had the American battleships in port. He said, however, that actually the most profitable target for the Japanese would have been the oil tankers at Pearl Harbor. If they had destroyed them and the shops and dry docks, our capabilities would have been nullified for a very long time. (p. 248)

Admiral Bellinger agreed with the Court's view that it is a historical fact that carrier borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to successfully repel a carrier attack. He stated that he doubted very seriously that even with advance warning of this attack, he could have taken steps to save a great many planes which might have been destroyed otherwise, because of the difficulty of dispersion of patrol planes (page 686).

Admiral Turner thought that the Fleet could have been kept at sea after the orders for defensive deployment (page 1021). Admiral Stark knew that CinCPac had his fleet divided in three parts and that an operating schedule provided that at the time each part was to be in Pearl Harbor (page 1022). This seemed satisfactory.

He did not think that the Japanese attack could have been averted. Its destructive effect could have been lessened and more Japanese planes destroyed. If some ships had been deployed to northward, there would have been a better chance of detecting the enemy and bringing out shore based planes and carriers to attack them (page 1024). It was well recognized by people who concerned themselves with the defense of Oahu that the northern flank is a very weak place (page 1024).

Admiral Smith said that if Exhibit 48 (the Army dispatch of 1 p. m. meeting) had reached them between 0500 and 0600 Hawaiian time, effective measures could have been taken against the Japanese (pages 549-50), and perhaps the carriers would not have been damaged so much and the Japanese more. The destroyers could have gotten out and probably the cruisers; Army and Navy aircraft alerted and oil tankers sent out to the carriers; but, the battleships probably could not have gotten out, and, if they did, would have been sunk outside (page 55). The Robert's Report, he said, is incorrect in saying that prompt receipt of the message would still have been too late to be of any substantial use (pages 549-50).

Admiral Smith later said that if they had known, they would have given Condition I, sent the Fleet to sea, alerted all aircraft and sent carriers to the north to try to locate the enemy (page 569). It was true, he said, that if the Fleet had sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before the attack and were within enemy range, they would have been sunk, but had they been two or three hundred miles to the west, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would have been attacked. The battleships, therefore, could have been used as a support force since their speed was about 15 knots (page 568). Getting the Army planes aloft before sunrise would not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, have diverted the attack but would have decreased our damage and increased the damage to the Japanese. "There is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been damaged, even if we had been alert" (page 568). He agreed with the court that the only method by which the attack could have been completely diverted would have been to locate the carriers before they got within launching range.

#### G. THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE

The personnel casualties were summarized by Lt. Comdr. Robert D. Power, Jr., USNR, as follows:

"These reports, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give in detail the names of ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From this examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded. This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded, 896."

The damage to ships, as described by CinCPac on February 16, 1942 (Exhibit 61), was as follows:

##### "(a) Battleships:

"ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck except for material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable amount of ordnance material has already been removed, and work is under way in removing the 12-inch guns from turrets three and four.

"CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire. It sank gradually for about three or four days and is now resting rather solidly on a mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and port side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.



"NEVADA struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast caused explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage to the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5-inch gun crews.

"OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to being up-side down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.

"PENNSYLVANIA one bomb hit in way of after 5-inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the second deck.

"MARYLAND two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through the forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the maindeck causing only a small amount of damage. The second bomb (probably 500 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about twelve feet under water and exploded in the C&R storeroom. This explosion wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks through the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without going into drydock.

"TENNESSEE two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell type). One of the bombs struck the center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which necessitated replacement of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage. Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret and penetrated same in way of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no serious damage except for putting one rammer out of commission. The TENNESSEE suffered serious damage aft in officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by the oil fire starting from the ARIZONA. The shell plates around the stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken.

"WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the damage from torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below water and above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat deck and apparently exploded near the port side of the main or second deck. This explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire, which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to and including the bridge. A second bomb hit the top of turret III and passed through the 6-inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated defective material. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of the left gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have been located aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be wrecked and the rudder is lying on the bottom.

"(b) Cruisers:

"HELENA hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo causing the flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engine room. The starboard engine was found to be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await permanent repairs.

"HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through dock and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out the electric power cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H.

"RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the forward half of the machinery plant. The ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused serious

flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The vessel will return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent repairs to machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by placement of one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.

"(c) Destroyers:

"SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire following bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. The SHAW was re-docked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942 for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.

"CASSIN and DOWNES: CASSIN was struck by one bomb and DOWNES by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the PENNSYLVANIA. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the CASSIN partly off the drydock blocking and caused it to fall over on the DOWNES when the dock was being flooded during the repairs. This caused a serious structural failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the DOWNES were set-off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the CASSIN and probably well over 400 in the hull of the DOWNES.

"Most of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and re-conditioning, and it now appears that the machinery of the CASSIN is 98% good and the DOWNES about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs have been made on the hull of the CASSIN to permit her re-floating about February 5, and similar work is proceeding on the DOWNES.

"At present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two vessels as first-line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be effected within two to four months which will make the vessels entirely suitable for escort vessels, thus releasing two first-line destroyers for this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans covering suitable arrangements for deckhouses, bridge, armament, etc., adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally believed that although the hull of the vessels have been considerably weakened they will be entirely adequate to carry the considerable reduced load in armament and other topside weights required for an escort vessel.

"(d) Auxiliary vessels:

"OGLALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the HELENA. Vessel sank slowly at ten-ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1½ hours after being struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to remove her from the berth that she now occupies.

"CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery on the crane was seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commission. One bomb (probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Temporary repairs have been completed and permanent repairs await availability of the ship at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

"VESTAL struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit the forward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the ship. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main deck. The vessel was alongside the ARIZONA when the raid commenced and was beached at Aiea to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been completed during a short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed when a dock is available.

"UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth. Ship is within a few degrees of being exactly upside down."

The damage to airplanes, as reported on February 15, 1942 (Exhibit 61) was:

| “Extracts from Columns.....                       | 2                     | 5                         | 6                        |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Type                                              | Number present Dec. 7 | Number on hand after raid | Number usable after raid |
| Patrol planes.....                                | 69                    | 45                        | 11                       |
| Inshore patrol planes.....                        | 0                     | 0                         | 0                        |
| Fighters.....                                     | 24                    | 15                        | 0                        |
| Scout bombers.....                                | 60                    | 29                        | 14                       |
| Torpedo bombers.....                              | 2                     | 2                         | 0                        |
| Battleship and cruiser planes.....                | 92                    | 82                        | 11                       |
| Utility and transport planes (non-combatant)..... | 54                    | 48                        | 16                       |
| Total.....                                        | 301                   | 221                       | 52”                      |

## LIST OF WITNESSES

| Witness                              | Title                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Admiral H. R. Stark.....             | Chief of Naval Operations.                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann.....   | Director Central Division; Liaison with State Dept. for CNO.                                                                                                                                                                |
| Major General W. C. Short.....       | Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. CincPac and CincUS.                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel.....       | Com14; Comdr. Local Defense Forces; Comdr. Hawaiian Sea Frontier; Comdt. Navy Yard Pearl Harbor; Naval Base Defense Officer under 2CI-41 Comdr. Task Force Four.                                                            |
| Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch.....        | Comdr. Battle Force; Comdr. Task Force One; Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor.                                                                                                                                        |
| Vice Admiral W. S. Pye.....          | Army radar.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Lt. Colonel K. A. Tyler.....         | In charge of Foreign Branch, ONI.                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Captain W. A. Heard.....             | In charge of combat intelligence 14th Naval District.                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Commander J. J. Rochefort.....       | Chief of Staff (for General Short).                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Colonel W. C. Phillips.....          | Chief of Staff for Operations (for Admiral Kimmel).                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Rear Admiral W. S. Delaney.....      | Fleet Gunnery Officer (on Admiral Kimmel's staff).                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III.....   | Chief of Staff to CincPac.                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Rear Admiral W. W. Smith.....        | Operations officer to Adm. Bellinger (Adm. Bellinger in command of Pat Wing 2 and Pat Wing's Hawaiian Area); Comdr. Task Force Nine; aviation liaison officer to cooperate with Com14; Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force. |
| Captain L. C. Ramsey.....            | Advisor to Army on radar.                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Commander W. G. Taylor.....          | Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Comdr. Patrol Wing Two; Comdr. Task Force Nine; Comdr. Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor; Liaison with Com14; Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force.                               |
| Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger..... | Army radar.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1st Lieut. J. L. Locard, USA.....    | Army radar.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Sergeant G. E. Elliott, USA.....     | Senior Watch Officer, Op20-G decoding Japanese diplomatic cryptographs.                                                                                                                                                     |
| Lt. Commander G. W. Lynn.....        | Charge of Security Section of Naval Communications, intercepts.                                                                                                                                                             |
| Captain L. F. Safford.....           | Special Assistant to Secretary of State. On duty in Op20-G of Naval Communications.                                                                                                                                         |
| Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.....         | Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Lt. Commander A. V. Pering.....      | Chief of Staff, Army.                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Admiral R. E. Ingersoll.....         | War Plans Officer for CincPac.                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| General George C. Marshall.....      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris.....     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

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## LIST OF WITNESSES—Continued

| Witness                           | Title                                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood..... | Watch Officer in Op20-G, Naval Communications.                                        |
| Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun.....   | Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.                                                    |
| Admiral C. W. Nimitz.....         | Chief of Bureau of Navigation.                                                        |
| Commander A. D. Kramer.....       | Head of translation section of communication security in Op20-G Naval Communications. |
| Vice Admiral R. K. Turner.....    | Director of War Plans in office of CNO.                                               |
| Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes.....     | Director of Naval Communications.                                                     |
| Admiral J. O. Richardson.....     | CincUS prior to Admiral Kimmel.                                                       |
| Joseph C. Grew.....               | Ambassador to Japan.                                                                  |
| Maxwell M. Hamilton.....          | Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs in State Department.                         |
| Captain H. H. Smith-Hutton.....   | Naval Attache in Tokyo.                                                               |
| Rear Admiral Thomas Withers.....  | Commander Submarines, Pacific.                                                        |
| Admiral J. R. Redman.....         | Assistant Director of Naval Communications.                                           |

## LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HART

| Witness                                     | Title                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, USN, (Retired). | Commandant 14th Naval District; Commandant Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor; Commander Hawaiian Islands Frontier.                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 2. Commander Benjamin Katz, USN.            | Charge of Code Room, Navy Department.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 3. Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, USN...         | Chief of Staff of Pacific Fleet.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 4. Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick...          | Assistant War Plans Officer to CincPac.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 5. Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany, USN.          | Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer for CincPac.                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 6. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, USN...         | Fleet Aviation Officer for Pacific Fleet.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 7. Captain M. F. Curts, USN.....            | Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 8. USN. Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN.    | Commander PatWing Two; also controlled PatWing One; Commander Fleet Air Detachment on Ford Island; Commander, Task Force Nine; Liaison with Commandant 14th Naval District in connection with aviation facilities at outlying islands; Commander, Naval Base Defense Force. |
| 9. Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, USN.          | In command of Task Force Three.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 10. Rear Admiral W. S. Pye, USN.....        | Commander, Task Force One.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 11. Captain R. O. Glover, USN.....          | Assigned to Plans Division of Office Chief of Naval Operations.                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 12. Commander P. C. Crosley, USN....        | Flag Secretary on Staff of CincPac.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 13. Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III, USN.     | Fleet Gunnery Officer.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 14. Captain V. R. Murphy, USN.....          | Assistant to War Plans Officer.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 15. Commander J. J. Rochefort, USN...       | Assistant Operations Officer; Force Intelligence Officer for Scouting Force; Commander; Officer in Charge Combat Intelligence attached to COMFOURTEEN.                                                                                                                      |
| 16. Captain E. T. Layton, USN.....          | Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 17. Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, USN.        | Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 18. Commander G. C. Briant, A-(V)G, USNR.   | Aviation Aide to COMFOURTEEN.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 19. Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris, USN.       | Operations Officer on staff of Commander Scouting Force; War Plans Officer for Adm. Kimmel.                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 20. Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, USN...       | War Plans Officer for Chief of Naval Operations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 21. Captain J. L. McCrea, USN.....          | Aide to Admiral Stark.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 22. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, USN.         | Command of the MISSISSIPPI; Director of Naval Intelligence.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HART—Continued

| <i>Witness</i>                                 | <i>Title</i>                                                                           |
|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 23. Vice Admiral A. W. Fitch, USN....          | Preceded Adm. Bellinger as Commander, PatWing Two.                                     |
| 24. Captain George Vandeurs, USN....           | Assistant to Adm. Bellinger in connection with joint Army-Navy air command.            |
| 25. Admiral Wm. F. Halsey, USN.....            | Commander Aircraft Patrol Force; Commander, Task Force Two.                            |
| 26. Captain I. H. Mayfield, USN.....           | District Intelligence Officer of 14th Naval District.                                  |
| 27. Vice Admiral J. H. Newton, USN..           | Command of Cruisers Scouting Force.                                                    |
| 28. Lieut. W. B. Stephenson, USNR....          | Head of Counter-espionage Desk of District Intelligence Office of 14th Naval District. |
| 29. Rear Admiral H. F. Kingman, USN.           | Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI; Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. |
| 30. Commander W. E. G. Taylor, A-V(T), USNR.   | Special assignments on radar.                                                          |
| 31. Captain L. F. Safford, USN.....            | Charge of Communications Security Section of Naval Communications.                     |
| 32. Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, USN....          | Commander, Cruisers Battle Force.                                                      |
| 33. Captain J. B. Earle, USN.....              | Commander, Destroyer Squadron Five; Chief of Staff 14th Naval District.                |
| 34. Commander W. A. Wright, USN....            | Assistant Communications Officer on Adm. Kimmel's staff.                               |
| 35. Captain C. Wellborn, Jr., USN....          | Administrative Aide to Chief of Naval Operations.                                      |
| 36. Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson, USN.          | Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.                                    |
| 37. Vice Admiral R. M. Brainard, USN.          | Director of Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.              |
| 38. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, USN.        | Director of Central Division of Chief of Naval Operations Office.                      |
| 39. Rear Admiral J. W. Bunkley, USN (Retired). | Commanding Officer of U. S. S. CALIFORNIA (Admiral Pye's Flagship).                    |
| 40. Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, USN.....          | Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.                                                   |

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HEWITT

A. AT PEARL HARBOR IN 1941

| <i>Witness</i>                                | <i>Title</i>                                                                                                                                             |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN.....          | Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182).                                                                                                           |
| 2. Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN.....      | In charge of Communications Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541).                                                               |
| 3. Vice Admiral William W. Smith, USN..       | Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335).                                                                                                                       |
| 4. Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN.     | War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R. 293).                                                                                                                    |
| 5. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN..       | Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, CincPac. (R. 163).                                                                                                 |
| 6. Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN. | Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings; Commander, Patrol Wing Two; Commander, Task Force Nine; Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471). |
| 7. Captain John B. Earle, USN.....            | Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451).                                                                                                                     |
| 8. Mr. George Street.....                     | Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411).                                                                                                                        |
| 9. Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN.      | District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D. (R. 554).                                                                                                      |
| 10. Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN.....          | Cryptanalytical and Decrypting Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418).                                                                                |

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### LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HEWITT—Continued

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| <i>Witness</i>                                    | <i>Title</i>                                                                                                         |
|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 11. Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN-----             | Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 424).                                                               |
| 12. Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN---            | Assistant Communications Officer, CincPac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Communications Intelligence Unit. (R. 442). |
| 13. Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN.    | Cryptanalyst, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541).                                                 |
| 14. Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC-----            | Translator, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541).                                                   |
| 15. Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN.          | Commanding Officer, USS WABO (R. 87).                                                                                |
| 16. Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR. | Commanding Officer, USS CO (R. 428).                                                                                 |
| 17. Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR...            | Bishop's Point Radio Station.                                                                                        |
| 18. Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, USNR.       | Communications Office, 14th N. D. (R. 465).                                                                          |
| 19. Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR...            | District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D. (R. 376).                                                                   |
| 20. Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR----            | Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's Headquarters. (R. 376).                                                    |
| 21. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA.     | Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department. (R. 387).                                                                       |

#### B. AT THE PHILIPPINES IN 1941

|                                         |                                                                  |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 22. Captain Redfield Mason, USN-----    | Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68).              |
| 23. Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN--- | Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68). |

#### C. AT WASHINGTON, D. C. IN 1941

|                                                        |                                                                  |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 24. Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN.           | Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. (R. 389).          |
| 25. Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN----                | In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign Branch, ONI. (R. 389). |
| 26. Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN-----              | Communications Security Section, ONI. (R. 97; R. 529).           |
| 27. Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN-----                  | ONI and Communications Security Section. (R. 128).               |
| 28. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers-----                           | Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 529).                                 |
| 29. Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR. | Communications Security Section, ONI. (R. 143).                  |
| 30. Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN.              | Communications Security Section, ONI. (R. 149).                  |
| 31. Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR.        | Communications Security Section, ONI. (R. 433).                  |
| 32. Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR.         | Communications Security Section, ONI. (R. 140).                  |
| 33. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR.       | Communications Security Section, ONI. (R. 148).                  |

#### C. OTHER WITNESSES

|                                                  |                                                                      |
|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 34. Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN.       | Now Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 158). |
| 35. Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, USNR.    | Now in charge of a translating unit in Op-16-FE. (R. 158).           |
| 36. Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR.      | Translation sub-section head in Op-16-FE. (R. 158).                  |
| 37. Commander Walter Karig, USNR-----            | Authors of "Battle Report." (R. 80).                                 |
| 38. Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR----         |                                                                      |
| 39. Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR. | Head of Op-20-GL. (R. 529; R. 607).                                  |

## ADDENDUM ONE—FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.

4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the success of their attack.

5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.

6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.

8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p. m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.

10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.

12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7 which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.

14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.

15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.

16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications.

17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the following reasons:

(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.

(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.

(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would have been small.

18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the following reasons:

(a) Ships' anti-aircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready. It is to be noted that the anti-aircraft fire was more effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.

(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.

(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been so maintained as to thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.

(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.

(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.

19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for a 360 degree daily search, they would have increased the area which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments, it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to weigh the prospective needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines were already in progress.

21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have been designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of success.



22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.

23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.

(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.

(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.

24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in the Hawaiian area was justified.

25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken, it should be noted that:

(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.

(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and relaxation desirable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.

(c) Failure to install anti-torpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.

(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.

(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of anti-aircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.

26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.

27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.

28. War experience has shown that:

(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.

(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.

29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unified Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.

#### FINDINGS

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and other enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guard against surprise attack by Japan.

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, when it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to defend Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.

9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile radio or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of *threatening naval forces*"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and *other outlying United States positions*"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces *widely distributed in the Pacific*, and that *submarines in the Hawaiian area* \* \* \* ." (Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a *possibility*. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it a *serious probability*.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cooperative. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operational setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking toward the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commander in Chief, General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reinforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must remain with the Army. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reinforced with Marine planes.

26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack increased the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that some of which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage messages sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated in Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.

31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence in Washington were not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the mission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overwhelmed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CinCPac of the important facts learned.

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

36. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and

other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the interception of weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet, the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no such message could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of the officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Office feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be studied further by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to and record the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying

presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.

62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleet. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Palau and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch. ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.

65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed the summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received



the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, states that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." \* \* \*

"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location." \* \* \*

"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have

obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval force from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.

74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval force were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and matériel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.

80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.

84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected

within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forth-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Ssiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 3

Vol. I, No. 2  
8 Dec. 1941

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

U. S. S. NEVADA AFIRE ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

(See story of PEARL HARBOR on page 1)

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Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday. Therefore, Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on 18 December.

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PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE

When Jap planes struck clustered U. S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pin-point plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII. The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the

interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable.

Most remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The POW claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

On 2 September the final all-important "games" got under way, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were made up [2] as follows:

|                             | Rank              | Official duties                                                  |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>UMPIRES:</b>             |                   |                                                                  |
| <b>NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:</b> |                   |                                                                  |
| NAGANO, Osami.....          | Admiral.....      |                                                                  |
| FUKUTOME, Shigeru.....      | Rear Admiral..... | Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations).               |
| UOZUMI, Jisaku.....         | Captain.....      | Member First Section.                                            |
| YAMAMOTO, Chikao.....       | Captain.....      | Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.                                 |
| MAYUZUMI, Harue.....        | Commander.....    | Member " " " " " "                                               |
| TAMURA, Saburo.....         | Commander.....    | " " " " " "                                                      |
| SANAGI, Tsuyoshi.....       | Commander.....    | " " " " " "                                                      |
| UOZUMI, Yorichi.....        | Commander.....    | " " " " " "                                                      |
| <b>NAVY MINISTRY:</b>       |                   |                                                                  |
| TAKATA, Toshitane.....      | Captain.....      | Member of Military Affairs Bureau.                               |
| SHIKI, Tsuneo.....          | Commander.....    | " " " " " "                                                      |
| TOIBATA, Kurie.....         | Commander.....    | " " Office of Military Supply                                    |
| FUJII, Shigeru.....         | Commander.....    | Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro). |
| <b>N-TEAM:</b>              |                   |                                                                  |
| <b>COMBINED FLEET:</b>      |                   |                                                                  |
| YAMAMOTO, Isoroku.....      | Admiral.....      | CinC Combined Fleet.                                             |
| ITO, Seiichi.....           | Rear Admiral..... | Chief of Staff.                                                  |
| KUROJIMA, Kameto.....       | Captain.....      | Deputy Chief of Staff.                                           |
| GOTO, Shigeru.....          | Commander.....    | Staff Adjutant.                                                  |
| ISOBE, Taro.....            | Commander.....    | Staff Engineering Officer.                                       |
| SUGI, Toma.....             | Commander.....    | Staff Gunnery Officer.                                           |
| SASAKI, Akira.....          | Commander.....    | Staff Air Officer.                                               |
| WADA, Yushiro.....          | Commander.....    | Staff Communication Officer.                                     |
| NAGATA, Shigeru.....        | Commander.....    | Staff Navigation Officer.                                        |
| WATANABE, Yasuji.....       | Commander.....    | Staff Operations and Plans Officer                               |
| ARIMA, Takayasu.....        | Commander.....    | Staff Torpedo Officer.                                           |
| SEIMI, Ichiyoshi.....       | Commander.....    | Staff Supply Officer.                                            |
| OTA, Kanai.....             | Commander.....    | Meteorologist attached to Staff.                                 |

|                                                         | Rank               | Official duties           |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>N-TEAM—Continued</b>                                 |                    |                           |
| 1st. COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE): |                    |                           |
| KAKIMOTO, Gonchiro .....                                | Rear Admiral ..... | Commander.                |
| ARISAWA, Naosada .....                                  | Commander .....    | Deputy Chief of Staff.    |
| <b>E-TEAM:</b>                                          |                    |                           |
| SECOND FLEET:                                           |                    |                           |
| KONDO, Nobutake .....                                   | Admiral .....      | Commander.                |
| [5] YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke .....                        | Captain .....      | Deputy Chief of Staff.    |
| OISHI, Tamotsu .....                                    | Commander .....    | Staff Navigation Officer. |
| FOURTH FLEET:                                           |                    |                           |
| INOUE, Semi .....                                       | Vice Admiral ..... | Commander.                |
| FIFTH FLEET:                                            |                    |                           |
| HOSOGAYA, Boshiro .....                                 | Vice Admiral ..... | Commander.                |
| ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:                                     |                    |                           |
| TSUKAHARA, Nishizo .....                                | Vice Admiral ..... | Commander.                |
| KUSAKA, Jinichi .....                                   | Rear Admiral ..... | Chief of Staff.           |
| <b>A-TEAM:</b>                                          |                    |                           |
| THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions): |                    |                           |
| TAKAHASHI, Ibo .....                                    | Vice Admiral ..... | Commander.                |
| ISHIHARA, Hajime .....                                  | Captain .....      | Deputy Chief of Staff.    |
| SIXTH FLEET:                                            |                    |                           |
| SHIMIZU, Mitsumi .....                                  | Vice Admlral ..... | Commander.                |
| KANOAKA, Tomojiro .....                                 | Captain .....      | Deputy Chief of Staff.    |
| FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet):                        |                    |                           |
| NAGUMO, Chuichi .....                                   | Vice Admiral ..... | Commander.                |
| KUSAKA, Ryunosuke .....                                 | Rear Admiral ..... | Chief of Staff.           |
| GENDA, Minoru .....                                     | Commander .....    | Deputy Chief of Staff.    |

On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW was assigned to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). The afternoon, Commander WATANABE—Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer—handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the POW realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoked-filled room about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as [4] sunk.

On 6 or 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus calculating board—was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel use by Fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperment KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded—the basic plan continued as originally intended.

These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, D. E. I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands, including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMANY will begin".

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the Staff were already on board.

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yomen (not including POW) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO—then still War Minister—was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Op Orders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder—i. e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct E.L.T.)

[5] The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN  
1 November 1941

#### COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1

The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

War will be declared on X-Day.

This order will become effective on Y-Day.

#### *General Situation*

##### (a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservation of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

##### (b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

##### (c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, [6] supported by BRITAIN and the United States, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to Japan in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan border is formidable.

The USSR is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

*Our situation*

The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel is markedly improved.

*Strategic objectives*

To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that with BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIAN ARCHipelago and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof" HAKKO ICHIU), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will employ all the military strength necessary.

*Strategy*

The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in accordance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure secrecy [7] of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. The Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

Precaution: Disposal of this order.

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1

ANNEXED VOLUME

1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carrier and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HIT KAPPU BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

3. Targets for attack are airfields, aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will



via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

|                                                                                   |                                                    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| "Many warships in PEARL HARBOR_                                                   | "The fate of the Empire".                          |
| "No warships in PEARL HARBOR_                                                     | "The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".      |
| "The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack". | "Climb MT FUJI".                                   |
| "The time to commence the attack is 0520.                                         | "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520". |
| "All forces attack"-----                                                          | "Climb MT NIITAKA!".                               |
| etc.                                                                              |                                                    |

[8] 5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force commander.

The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION).

(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupa- [9] tion Forces will probably be PALAU.

9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet.

10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communications Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another POW confirms this).

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expect the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the NORTH and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11 Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U.S. and Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph—a few of which follow)

(1) GUAM

(2) WAKE

about X plus 2.

about X plus 7.

[10] (3) (The dates for the invasions of RABUL and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMO, and SANTA CHRISTINA groups were all entered.)

13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 1942.

Herewith are two of the above referenced documents

#### THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of its contents follows:)

1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAYAN Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILLIPINES (including FRENCH INDIA, CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be at SAIGON.

2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date of landings.

3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."

4. Supply Plans.

Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army ships and for the Navy's support of same.

5. Communications Plans.

6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October—and stated in effect:)

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku,  
*Commanding, Combined Fleet.*

[11]

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI WAN  
10 November 1941

STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETO-ROFU Is. KURILES).
3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
4. Break-down of attack plane units.  
The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit  
Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX  
1st Carrier Attack Unit  
Etc. (details not recalled by POW).
5. Fleet cruising formation  
(Including retiring formations)
6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.  
Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO Chulchi,  
*Commanding Striking Force.*

Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.

(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)

1. The coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

[12] 3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)

4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never

being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated for the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attack) and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.

6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the Kure Navy Yard with the CHUYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too early to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attack within the harbor.

7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry production power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and war materials, it will take at least several months [13] for her full production power to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at a very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at once, while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is our belief that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, for the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.

Communications Plans. (POW does not know about these; no details.)  
Supply Plans. (outline)

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

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Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #2  
Y-Day will be 23 November.

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5 November

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Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3  
X-Day will be 8 December.

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10 November

During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.

The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHIO); two BB's: HIRYU, KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TAMA, CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus AKUKUMA; elements of DesRon 1; and twenty subs.

[14] (Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA. The majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged although definite identification is not yet possible.)

One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sorties was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described the agency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in

These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.

Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U. S. Navy H. O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear eleven items, as follow :

1. Photograph of a Midget Submarine beached on Oahu.
2. Track Chart of Midget Submarine for Transit of Pearl Harbor.
3. Captured Track Chart of Japanese Carriers, covering the period from Pearl Harbor to Midway.
4. Chart reflecting translation of code tables carried by Japanese planes.
5. Photostatic copy of a document from a crashed Japanese plane obtained after the Pearl Harbor raid.
6. Captured chart [fragmentary] employed by Japanese Pearl Harbor raiders giving name, frequency, time of transmission and signal strength of two Honolulu radio stations.
7. Chart of torpedo runs, received from crashed Japanese plane.
8. Captured Japanese photograph of Ford Island under attack on 7 December 1941.
9. Photograph of vessels in the harbor bearing caption in Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".
10. Photograph showing Wheeler Field during the raid.
11. Chart captioned "Submarine Situation, Nov. 28-Dec. 4".

The foregoing materials will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 1 through 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

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[24] JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a sketch showing the approximate location of Japanese ships sunk in Manila Harbor through 14 November 1944. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant shipping have been sunk in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the 2nd Fleet. This estimated tonnage refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence" 1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transporters ranging from 2000 to 1800 gross tons. *Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the estimate.*

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANILA Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA class and a destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.

The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to indicate the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the ship was first observed to have been sunk.

Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear three items, as follows:)

1. Photograph of Manila Harbor.
2. Photographs showing [a] results of Third Fleet Air strikes on Manila Harbor 11-14 November and [b] sunken freighters on the bottom near the breakwater, Manila Harbor.
3. Photographs showing [a] burning ships and shore installations at Manila Harbor and [b] Pier Seven and other shore installations, Manila Harbor, showing damage from Third Fleet Bombs, 11-14 November 1944.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 13 and 15, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[28]

#### PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP

Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings of hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward and one aft.

Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his vessels for more practical if less humane purposes. More than 20 sizeable Jap vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships—a disproportionate allotment in view of his general shipping situation.

(The photograph mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, being a sketch of ships at Manila with arrow pointing to a ship apparently identical to *Baikal Maru*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 16, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[29]

#### INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON JAP FREIGHTER-TRANSPORT

(The photograph mentioned in the following paragraph, being a sketch of a Japanese freighter-transport in ORMOC Bay, will be found reproduced as Item No. 17, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomber Command on 11 November in ORMOC Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA—probably single-mount 25-mm mounted three on each end of the bridge. This armament is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on such vessels.

The enemy may be expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.

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(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a photograph of Manila Harbor and environs taken from the *USS Hancock*. This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 18, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[32]

#### KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL

(The sketch showing the drawings mentioned in the following paragraphs and bearing caption "KUMA-NATORI CL; Estimate of Revised Armament" will be found reproduced as Item No. 19, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warships has prompted a continuous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class light cruisers offer added documentation of this trend.

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted cruisers are now believed armed as follows:

- Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch guns of the original armament).

- Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armaments.

- Four 25-mm single mount guns.

- Ten 25-mm in dual mounts

- Three 25-mm in a triple mount.

- Two 13-mm in a dual mount.

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge, and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible, this change is believed unlikely.

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-mount AA gun.

The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each side of its former location.

A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.

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#### LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE

A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPA Item No. 8309) disclosed that the Japanese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as Experimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark 23 bomb, Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against airfields.

Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 36 or 72 hours. In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.

ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U. S. light cruisers sank this Jap warship.

[34]

## FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered enemy document (CINCPAC-CINCPMA Item No. 12,410). Although dated over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU were very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSSEN Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U. S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.

(The chart mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, being of floating mines in Japan Sea Area, March 1943 to May 1943, will be found reproduced as Item No. 20, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE

(A photograph of the new Japanese rifle grenade, mentioned in the following paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 21, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

A new type of Japanese High explosive rifle grenade, embodying several features not previously encountered, was captured during a recent operation. The grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade was produced for universal use.

Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse, this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. The cap initiates a black powder relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.

The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notepad attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents accidental detonation.

A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosive Investigation Unit #4, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear photographs of the *Genyo* Class Tanker, the victim of a PB4Y. These photographs will be found reproduced as Item No. 22, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)



[37]

## JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.

This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issuing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and the general tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

Of special interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evidence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKES early last summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not reproduced in this article.

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to make some sacrifice in quality.

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.

"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale because of the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness is nothing but throwing away fuel."

*Aggressiveness is stressed.*

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradually counters with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."

*Patience and imagination are essential.*

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained, [38] we must not become impatient and do anything rash.

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules. This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be determined."

*In regard to night operations.*

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its special need in reference to the use of radar."

*Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.*

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUYO, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the TATEYAMA Air Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."

*Planes must be ready for instant operations.*

"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving war reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the spot of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter so as to remedy the deficiency."

*Bad weather must be turned to account.*

"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, the best to return to base without loss of time."

*U. S. submarine tactics.*

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing the present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics of the present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."

"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However, a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future. Counter-measures must be studied."

"Surface submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. The submarines change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails, nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other types."

*Tactics for anti-sub patrol.*

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can obtain favorable combat results."

"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible. Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no leakage during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee to the surface."

*Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.*

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions (distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escort vessels)."

*Patrol altitudes and security.*

"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondly the ease of carrying out bomb and/or the possibility of complications."

"(1) When primarily for visual contact."

"a. Usually 400-800 meters will be suitable."

"b. In darkness it is best to fly at/about 200 meters."

"c. For confirming/sightings, etc./it is best to fly at about 300 meters."

"(2) When using magnetic detector."

"Daytime—under 80 meters is best."

[40] "Night time—80-100 meters is best."

"When an important escort convoy is passing it is necessary to report

movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that there are no gaps in the escort protection.

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of the movements of the convoy.

*The lookout.*

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy subs is the lookout.

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.

"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plane overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious result will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth serious efforts.

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar, magnetic detectors and the like.

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential submarine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and the radar is employed especially at night in search of surface enemy submarines.

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct escort without loss of time.

*Principles of the attack.*

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inaccurately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try. When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs as signals.

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain [41] due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its periscope and making another attack.

*Guiding other planes to the attack.*

"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker bombs so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the position of the enemy sub. Moreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.

"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. When the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.

"When two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off and make a second run.

*Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.*

"To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the sighting bombless plane—but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close lookout. (Comment: sic!)

(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being a "Method of dropping target bombs," will be found reproduced as Item No. EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[42] "When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used with guiding surface craft.

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of the enemy, and attack.

*Cooperation with surface craft.*

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since this is a most important means of establishing understanding.

"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio communications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired understanding can be realized.

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from the aircraft section.

"In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat them as if blind.

*Ordnance and equipment.*

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, 'Without a rifle, no infantry', so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.

"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (550 lb.) bomb as much as possible.

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine bombs is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."

(Comment: The Japanese use time rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-submarine bombs.)

"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to be [43] outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyance can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.

*Maintenance.*

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of matériel, depends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required.

*Confirmation evidence.*

"The confirmation of combat results is extremely important for the planning of future attacks.

"Furthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of submarine and additionally because enemy subs. are pulling various sorts of deceptive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results

dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is easy to let the enemy slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.

"When the following phenomena have been noted, consider the sinking confirmed.

"1. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.

"2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.

"3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which has been destroyed, come to the surface."

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[44]

#### LONG-SHAFTED ENGINE USED ON JACK

The smoothly streamlined cowlings of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is made possible by the installation of an unusually constructed engine, the long-shafted Kasei 23.

Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a recently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,608). Data on its performance has appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a highly streamlined cowlings and results in a relatively small frontal area. The cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.18 to 1.

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fan. The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling fan is similar to that employed on the FW190; in place of a carburetor, it has a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of the Japanese Kasei 23 engine, will be found reproduced as Item No. 24, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

its [45] 14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German BMW801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DINAH 3.

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.

Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the same direction as the propeller.

The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.

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#### NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION

The existence of an 11th Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might indicate that the 11th Air Division has been established to control the air defense of the industrial KOBE-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last March.

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An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and administrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division is therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically commands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 planes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.

[46]

JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE

Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated by photographs of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes. Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice, netting is not used.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Item No. 26, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

LIPA WEST FIELD's paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully camouflaged and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetment areas, also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being a photograph of Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Item No. 26, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[47] Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and fuselage. In most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palm trees and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one palm tree's length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.

There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view, even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas both with and without foliage covering.

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).

[48]

THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

HELEN

(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft)

HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in combat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new developments may make it much more formidable.

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon" and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its performance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.

The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h. p. engines. It was replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engines of 1450 h. p. Both models are

similar in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and nacelles similar to that of the British Mosquito.

There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 h. p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version has not been definitely identified.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of a heavily camouflaged "Helen," the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, will be found reproduced as Item No. 27, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[49]

#### PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE

Reproduced below are provisionsal sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor.

This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured mimeographed manual.

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be superseded when better information is at hand.

Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at five o'clock and large spinner.

Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.

(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of George", a new type Japanese Navy interceptor plane, will be found reproduced as Item No. 28, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[50]

#### SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.

Quoting the interrogation report:

"POW stated that his unit had become a 'suicide' squadron on the 27th of October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd (Bakarashi), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were 'weak points'. At the time he left MABALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).

"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U. S. carrier had any special significance.

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut

down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which other missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for such work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAMIKAZE" units are made up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAMIKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit marks a significant change in the development of this tactic.

[51]

## JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA

The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the position of JAPAN in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANH BAY are used for the protection of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN's source of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of INDO-CHINA will be increasingly developed.

It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Landing Force troops.

There are 64 airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airfields capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG and CAM RANH BAY area, at TOURANE, CAM RANH BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following items appear:

1. Outline map of Thailand and French Indo-China.
2. Aerial photograph of Cat Bai Airfield.
3. Aerial photograph of Hon Gay, the chief coaling port of French Indo-China.
4. Aerial photograph of Cam Ranh Bay.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 30, 31, and 32, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.

[55]

## JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. The latest development—the use of implanted bombs—is described in a report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded to BuOrd.

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetment areas and the main parking areas on the field.

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner:

- a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Composition C-4 dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with plastic explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.
- b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps inserted into the explosive.
- c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads run to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the target area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate dugout.



dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size bomb for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40, Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight cars.

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, was a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been substituted for the BETTY as bait.

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.

[56] Other areas have reported the use of a type of 70-mm mortar. The projectile is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are difficult to see. If contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm shell.

#### JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB

The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modification 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.

(A photograph referred to in the foregoing paragraph, being of an altered Japanese bomb captured on Guam, will be found reproduced as Item No. 33, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[5]

#### WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT

*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944*

[\*Prints only received; \*\*Sorties distributed]

#### JAPAN

*Kyushu: Good vertical partial coverage of Sasebo and Nagasaki*

| V/O    | F. L.     | Alt.    | Sortie No.   | Jicpoa # | Date taken |
|--------|-----------|---------|--------------|----------|------------|
| V..... | 154.9 mm. | 32,500' | M10/258-21 P | 9225-41  | 10/31**    |

*CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical coverage of areas indicated*

|            |           |         |                                           |          |       |
|------------|-----------|---------|-------------------------------------------|----------|-------|
| V.....     | 152.6 mm. | 32,000' | MR7-14PL                                  | 9240-153 | 9/29  |
| V.....     | 6"        | 32,600' | M13/5C-21P8 (Amoy A/D)                    | 9230-222 | 1/23  |
| V.....     | 24"       | 25,600' | M13/5C-21P8 (Amoy A/D)                    | 9231-223 | 1/23  |
| V.....     | 6"        | 50,450' | M11/6C-21P8 (Amoy Is.)                    | 9232-224 | 11/7  |
| Split Vert | 24"       | 22,450' | M11/6C-21P8 (Amoy Is.)                    | 9233-225 | 11/7  |
|            |           |         |                                           | 9234-225 |       |
| V.....     | 6"        | 29,300' | M7/2-9PS-A1 (Shanghai)                    | 9237-226 | 7/12  |
| Split Vert | 24"       | 20,000' | 4MA3-24CM (Amoy Vic. to (W. of Chelln) .. | 9241-227 | 8/8** |
|            |           |         |                                           | 9242-227 |       |

# 610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Photos received at CinCPac.CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 and including 1 December 1944—Continued

CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical converge of areas indicated—Continued

| V/O           | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.                                                                | Jicpos #                                                 | Date  |
|---------------|-------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 4MA3-24CM (Linyeung to Shalung).                                          | 9249-228                                                 | 8/8*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 4MA3-24CM (Chinkanchi to San-lui Vic.).                                   | 9250-228<br>9251-229<br>9252-229<br>9253-229             | 8/8*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 4MA3-24CM (Chungtung to S. of Paotal).                                    | 9254-229<br>9255-230<br>9256-230<br>9257-230             | 8/8*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 4MA3-24CM (Swatow to Amoy Vic.).                                          | 9258-230<br>9259-231<br>9260-231<br>9261-231<br>9262-231 | 8/8*  |
| V.....        | 24''  | 7,300'  | 21PR-4MB201 (Sanchiosze-Hwel-lung Kiao Area).                             | 9263-232                                                 | 9/21* |
| V.....        | 24''  | 9,000'  | 21PR-4MB201 (Tanganhsien).                                                | 9264-233                                                 | 9/21* |
| V.....        | 24''  | 14,000' | 21PR-4MB201 (Chitung).                                                    | 9265-234                                                 | 9/21* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Nanya to Saikiao).                                             | 9314-235<br>9315-235                                     | 7/27* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Yentien to Kwany-inting).                                      | 9316-236<br>9317-236                                     | 7/27* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (NW Nanshan N Pingtan).                                         | 9318-237<br>9319-237                                     | 7/28* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (N Pingtan to SE Santu to Liutu).                               | 9320-238<br>9321-238                                     | 7/28* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Liutu to S of Foo-chow).                                       | 9322-239<br>9323-239                                     | 7/28* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (S Foochow to N Hing-wa).                                       | 9324-240<br>9325-240                                     | 7/28* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (N Hingwa to Mel-chowcheng).                                    | 9326-241<br>9327-241                                     | 7/28* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Liuchow to Kweilin).                                           | 9328-242<br>9329-242                                     | 7/28* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Kitung to 8 Mi W Sungki).                                      | 9347-243<br>9348-243                                     | 8/7*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi W Sungki to Kuatow).                                      | 9349-244<br>9350-244<br>9351-244<br>9352-244             | 8/7*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Linyang to Paishih).                                           | 9353-245<br>9354-245<br>9355-245<br>9356-245             | 8/7*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (6 Mi S Slaoma to 10 Mi SE Kuatow—10 Mi W Kuatow to Haoscasha). | 9357-246<br>9358-246                                     | 8/7*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi NW Julian to Changyang).                                  | 9359-247<br>9360-247                                     | 8/7*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Fengwei to Amoy).                                              | 9361-248<br>9362-248                                     | 8/7*  |
| V.....        | 24''  | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Amoy to Paishui-ying).                                         | 9363-249                                                 | 8/7*  |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CMS-4M9-62A (26° 50' N, 117° 57' E to 26° 50' N, 119° 24' E).           | 9395-250<br>9396-250                                     | 9/16* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CMS-4M9-21A (24° 50' N, 118° 10' E to 25° 42' N, 118° 53' E).           | 9397-251<br>9398-251                                     | 9/17* |
| Split Vert... | 24''  | 20,000' | 24CMS-4M9-21B (25° 48' N, 118° 59' E to 26° 20' N, 119° 29' E).           | 9399-252<br>9400-252                                     | 9/17* |
| V.....        | 24''  | 30,000' | 21PR-4MB21 (Canton, White Cloud & Tienho A/Ds).                           | 9493-277                                                 | 3/13* |
| V.....        | 24''  | 30,000' | 21PR-4MB21 (Whampoa Docks).                                               | 9494-278                                                 | 3/13* |
| V.....        | 24''  | 30,000' | 21PR-4MB21 (Kowloon and Hong-kong).                                       | 9495-279                                                 | 3/13* |

## BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto

Chicki Jima: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage

|        |      |         |                     |          |       |
|--------|------|---------|---------------------|----------|-------|
| V..... | 24'' | 17,000' | C-840-26BS-4-11-65. | 9401-184 | 11/2* |
| V..... | 24'' | 17,000' | B-933-26BS-4-11-65. | 9402-185 | 11/2* |
| V..... | 12'  | 17,000' | A-002-26BS-4-11-65. | 9403-186 | 11/2* |
| V..... | 24'' | 18,500' | A-974-38BS-4M30-71. | 9404-187 | 11/2* |
| V..... | 24'' | 18,500' | B-973-38BS-4M30-71. | 9405-188 | 11/2* |
| V..... | 30'  | 19,450' | C-617-38BS-4M30-71. | 9406-189 | 11/2* |
| O..... | 64'' | 200'    | A-682-42BS.         | 9407-190 | 11/1* |
| O..... | 64'' | 200'    | B-682-42BS.         | 9408-191 | 11/1* |
| O..... | 64'' | 200'    | C-327-42BS.         | 9409-192 | 11/1* |

*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued*

## BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto—Continued

| V/O | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.           | Jicpoa # | Date taken |
|-----|-------|---------|----------------------|----------|------------|
| V   | 24"   | 18,900' | A-526-819BS-4M30-71  | 9454-193 | 11/24**    |
| V   | 24"   | 17,500' | C-674-819BS-4M30-71  | 9455-194 | 11/24      |
| V   | 12"   | 17,500' | D-527-819BS-4M30-71  | 9456-195 | 11/24**    |
| V   | 24"   | 16,000' | A-873-98BS-11-65-7BC | 9457-196 | 11/23**    |
| V   | 12"   | 17,000' | B-876-98BS-11-65-7BC | 9458-197 | 11/23**    |
| V   | 24"   | 17,000' | C-951-98BS-11-65-7BC | 9459-198 | 11/23**    |
| O   | 12"   | 200'    | A-016-431BS-4-11-64  | 9474-199 | 11/23**    |
| V   | 40"   | 20,000' | VD5-1A               | 9475-200 | 11/25**    |
| V   | 40"   | 20,000' | VD5-1C               | 9476-201 | 11/25**    |
| V   | 40"   | 20,000' | VD5-1D               | 9477-202 | 11/25**    |
| V   | 24"   | 20,000' | VD5-1E               | 9478-203 | 11/25**    |
| V   | 24"   | 20,000' | VD5-1G               | 9479-204 | 11/25**    |
| V   | 24"   | 20,000' | VD5-1H               | 9480-205 | 11/25**    |

*Haka Jima: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage*

|   |        |         |                     |         |         |
|---|--------|---------|---------------------|---------|---------|
| V | 12"    | 11,720' | A-948-38BS-4M30-55  | 9193-71 | 11/8**  |
| O | 12"    | 12,725' | A-491-98BS-7BC      | 9194-72 | 11/9**  |
| O | 24"    | 12,750' | B-951-98BS-7BC      | 9195-73 | 11/9**  |
| V | 12"    | 13,000' | A-153-431BS-47      | 9196-74 | 11/9**  |
| V | 24"    | 16,500' | A-661-819BS-4M30-53 | 9197-75 | 11/6    |
| O | 6 3/4" |         | No data             | 9198-76 |         |
| O | 12"    | 200'    | A-016-431BS-4-11-64 | 9471-77 | 11/23** |
| V | 24"    | 14,500' | B-223-431BS-4-11-61 | 9472-78 | 11/21** |
| V | 12"    | 11,400' | B-683-819BS-4M30-71 | 9473-79 | 11/24** |
| V | 12"    | 14,000' | A-016-431BS-4-11-64 | 9470-80 | 11/23** |
| V | 40"    | 20,000' | VD5-2A              | 9481-81 | 11/25** |
| V | 24"    | 20,000' | VD5-2H              | 9482-82 | 11/25** |

*Nishino Shima: Distant oblique partial coverage*

|   |        |     |          |        |        |
|---|--------|-----|----------|--------|--------|
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | VB102-18 | 9216-6 | 11/7** |
|---|--------|-----|----------|--------|--------|

## KAZAN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto

*Iwo Jima: Good vertical partial coverage of island in color*

|   |     |         |        |          |       |
|---|-----|---------|--------|----------|-------|
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 9219-261 | 11/19 |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 9220-262 | 11/19 |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 9221-263 | 11/19 |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 9222-264 | 11/19 |

MARCUS: Nanpo Shoto—Good complete vertical coverage

|   |     |         |                     |         |        |
|---|-----|---------|---------------------|---------|--------|
| V | 24" | 17,000' | A-880-26BS          | 9199-36 | 11/7** |
| V | 12" | 13,300' | A-998-392BS-4M30-55 | 9200-37 | 11/9** |
| V | 24" | 18,000' | A-846-98BS-7BC      | 9201-38 | 11/7   |

## PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

*Cebu: Good trimetrogon partial coverage*

|     |    |         |               |         |        |
|-----|----|---------|---------------|---------|--------|
| Tri | 6" | 13,500' | Essex-131 (V) | 9213-83 | 9/13** |
| Met |    |         | Essex-131 (P) | 9214-83 |        |
|     |    |         | Essex-131 (S) | 9215-83 |        |

*Negros: Good trimetrogon partial coverage*

|     |    |         |               |         |        |
|-----|----|---------|---------------|---------|--------|
| Tri | 6" | 13,500' | Essex-131 (V) | 9210-65 | 9/13** |
| Met |    |         | Essex-131 (P) | 9211-65 |        |
|     |    |         | Essex-131 (S) | 9212-65 |        |

## 612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued*

## PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

*Luzon: Good split-vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated*

| V/O           | F. L.   | Alt. | Sortie No.             | Jicpoa # | Date taken |
|---------------|---------|------|------------------------|----------|------------|
| Split Vert... | 24''    | Var  | CV16-2652 (Manila)     | 9263-132 | 11/5**     |
|               |         |      | CV16-2653              | 9264-132 |            |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-5 (Manila)        | 9268-133 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-6 (Manila)        | 9269-134 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-7 (Manila)        | 9270-135 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-8 (Manila)        | 9271-136 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-9 (Manila)        | 9272-137 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-10 (Manila)       | 9273-138 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-11 (Manila)       | 9274-139 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-12 (Manila)       | 9275-140 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-14 (Manila)       | 9276-141 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-15 (Manila)       | 9277-142 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Tico-16 (Manila)       | 9278-143 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 8 1/4'' | Var  | Tico-17 (Manila)       | 9279-144 | 11/6**     |
| [58] O        | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-125 (North Tip)   | 9280-145 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-111 (North Tip)   | 9281-146 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-1 (North Tip)     | 9282-147 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-114 (North Tip)   | 9283-148 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-126 (North Tip)   | 9284-149 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-113 (North Tip)   | 9285-150 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-107 (North Tip)   | 9286-151 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV11-112 (North Tip)   | 9287-152 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | Frank-149 (Manila Bay) | 9288-153 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV127-201 (Manila Bay) | 9289-154 | 11/6**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV127-196 (Manila Bay) | 9290-155 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV127-198 (Manila Bay) | 9291-156 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV127-202 (Manila Bay) | 9292-157 | 11/6**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV127-197 (Manila Bay) | 9293-158 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV127-199 (Manila Bay) | 9294-159 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV16-2649 (Manila Bay) | 9295-160 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | CV16-2651 (Manila Bay) | 9296-161 | 11/5**     |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | BKHL-366               | 9297-162 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | BKHL-367               | 9298-163 | 10/18**    |
| O             | 6 3/4'' | Var  | BKHL-368               | 9299-164 | 10/18**    |

*FORMOSA: Good split-vertical coverage of areas indicated*

|               |      |         |                                 |          |        |
|---------------|------|---------|---------------------------------|----------|--------|
| Split Vert... | 24'' | 30,000' | 21PH-4MB163 (Takao A/D & Docks) | 9243-339 | 9/12** |
|               |      |         |                                 | 9244-339 |        |
| Split Vert... | 24'' | 29,800' | 21PR-4MB163 (Sikano A/F)        | 9245-340 | 9/12** |
|               |      |         |                                 | 9246-340 |        |
| Split Vert... | 24'' | 29,500' | 21PR-4MB163 (Taito A/D)         | 9247-341 | 9/12** |
|               |      |         |                                 | 9248-341 |        |

*MALAY STATES: Good vertical coverage of Singapore*

|   |      |         |                             |         |        |
|---|------|---------|-----------------------------|---------|--------|
| V | 24'' | 22,070' | (444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC352) | 9340-2  | 11/5** |
| V | 6''  | 21,500' | (462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC475) | 9341-3  | 11/5** |
| V | 12'' | 22,900' | (444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC492) | 9342-4  | 11/5** |
| V | 12'' | 21,000' | (444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC411) | 9343-5  | 11/5** |
| V | 24'' | 22,000' | (444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC584) | 9344-6  | 11/5** |
| V | 24'' | 22,300' | (444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC485) | 9345-7  | 11/5** |
| V | 24'' | 22,300' | (444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC419) | 9346-8  | 11/5** |
| V | 24'' | 21,300' | (462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC382) | 9364-9  | 11/5** |
| V | 24'' | 21,300' | (462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC581) | 9365-10 | 11/5** |

*BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated*

|   |      |         |                              |         |        |
|---|------|---------|------------------------------|---------|--------|
|   |      |         | (Rangoon)                    |         |        |
| V | 24'' | 24,000' | (462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC-581) | 9366-3  | 11/3** |
| V |      |         | (462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC329)  | 9367-4  | 11/3** |
| V |      |         | (462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC479)  | 9368-5  | 11/3** |
| V | 12'' | 21,400' | (462BC) (4MB15) (462-AC479)  | 9369-6  | 11/5** |
| V | 40'' | 23,500' | (462BC) (4MB13) (462-AC444)  | 9370-7  | 11/3** |
| V |      |         | (462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC475)  | 9364-8  | 11/3** |
| V | 24'' | 23,500' | (462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC463)  | 9371-9  | 11/3** |
| V | 24'' | 22,000' | (462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC461)  | 9372-10 | 11/3** |
| V | 24'' |         | (462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC506)  | 9373-11 | 11/3** |
| V | 24'' | 22,000' | (444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC485)  | 9374-12 | 11/3** |
| V | 24'' | 22,000' | (444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC419)  | 9375-13 | 11/3** |

## PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

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*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944--Continued*

## BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated--Continued

| V/O | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.                               | Jlcpos # | Date taken |
|-----|-------|---------|------------------------------------------|----------|------------|
| V   | 24''  | 22,000' | (444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC580)              | 9376-14  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 40''  | 22,000' | (444B(j) (4MB14) (444-AC524)             | 9377-15  | 11/3**     |
| V   |       | 22,000' | (444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC411)              | 9378-16  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 24''  | 21,000' | (14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC525)               | 9379-17  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 24''  | 21,400' | (14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC494)               | 9380-18  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 12''  | 21,500' | (14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC546)               | 9381-19  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 40''  | 21,200' | (14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC469)               | 9382-20  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 24''  | 21,000' | (11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC508)                | 9383-21  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 12''  | 20,500' | (11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC452)                | 9384-22  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 12''  | 21,000' | (11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC574)                | 9385-23  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 12''  | 20,800' | (11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC541)                | 9386-24  | 11/3**     |
| V   | 12''  | 16,500' | (Taungup)<br>(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC202) | 9387-25  | 11/3**     |

## SUMATRA: Good vertical coverage of area indicated

|   |      |         |                                                   |        |        |
|---|------|---------|---------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| V | 24'' | 21,300' | (444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC580)<br>(Pangalan Brandan) | 9388-4 | 11/5** |
|---|------|---------|---------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|

## CAROLINE ISLANDS

## Palau: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated

|   |         |         |                                   |          |       |
|---|---------|---------|-----------------------------------|----------|-------|
| V | 24''    | 14,800' | 28PR4MB77-1 (Babelthuap A/F)      | 9421-475 | 11/1  |
| V | 40''    | 14,000' | 28PR4MB90-1 (Babelthuap A/F)      | 9422-476 | 11/5  |
| V | 40''    | 13,000' | 28PR4MB94-1 (Babelthuap A/F)      | 9423-477 | 11/9  |
| V | 24''    | 12,000' | 28PR4MB82-1 (Central Harbor Area) | 9424-478 | 11/3  |
| V | 6''     | 2,500'  | 28PR4MCB97-1 (Ngeregon Is)        | 9425-479 | 11/10 |
| V | 40''    | 15,000' | 28PR4MB95-1 (Urukthapel Is)       | 9426-480 | 11/9  |
| V | 40''    | 14,000' | 28PR4MB88-1                       | 9427-481 | 11/5  |
| V | 40''    | 10,000' | 28PR4MB118-1 (Urukthapel Is)      | 9428-482 | 11/15 |
| O | 12''    | 500'    | 28PR4MCB97-2 (Ngeregon Is)        | 9429-483 | 11/10 |
| V | 40''    | 14,000' | 28PR4MB99-1 (Koror Is)            | 9430-484 | 11/9  |
| V | 40''    | 16,000' | 28PR4MB83-1 (Koror Is)            | 9431-485 | 11/3  |
| V | 40''    | 15,000' | 28PR4MCB104-1 (Eylmalk Is)        | 9432-486 | 11/10 |
| O | 12''    | 50'     | 28PR4MB81-1 (Ngargol Is)          | 9433-487 | 11/2  |
| O | 6 3/4'' |         | VPB117                            | 9434-488 | 11/17 |

## Ponape: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

|   |         |         |                 |          |       |
|---|---------|---------|-----------------|----------|-------|
| O | 6 3/4'' | 1,200'  | MAC22-VMF-422-8 | 9311-596 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/4'' | 1,000'  | MAC22-H4-68     | 9312-597 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/4'' | 15,000' | MAC22-VMF-113-8 | 9313-598 | 11/22 |
| V | 20''    | 10,000' | MAC22-7         | 9444-599 | 11/12 |

## Pulo Anna: Good vertical partial coverage

|   |      |        |             |        |       |
|---|------|--------|-------------|--------|-------|
| V | 40'' | 5,000' | 28PR4MB70-1 | 9235-6 | 10/30 |
|---|------|--------|-------------|--------|-------|

## Sonsorol: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

|   |      |        |             |        |         |
|---|------|--------|-------------|--------|---------|
| V | 40'' | 5,000' | 28PR4MB70-1 | 9228-3 | 10/30** |
| O | 21'' | 50'    | 28PR4MB70-3 | 9229-4 | 10/30** |

## Truk: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage in airfield areas

|   |         |         |                     |          |       |
|---|---------|---------|---------------------|----------|-------|
| V | 12''    | 19,300' | A-236-27BS-4M30-70  | 9445-596 | 11/22 |
| V | 12''    | 19,400' | B-151-27BS-4M30-70  | 9446-597 | 11/22 |
| V | 12''    | 18,200' | C-935-27BS-4M30-70  | 9447-598 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/4'' | 18,800' | D-633-27BS-4M30-70  | 9448-599 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/4'' | 17,000' | E-810-27BS-4M30-70  | 9449-600 | 11/22 |
| V | 24''    | 18,000' | A-425-392BS-4M30-70 | 9450-601 | 11/22 |
| V | 24''    | 18,200' | B-638-392BS-4M30-70 | 9451-602 | 11/22 |
| V | 12''    | 17,600' | C-358-392BS-4M30-70 | 9452-603 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/4'' | 17,600' | D-358-392BS-4M30-70 | 9453-604 | 11/22 |

# 614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1941 and including 1 December 1944—Continued

## MARIANAS

*Agufan*: Good oblique partial coverage

| V/O    | F. L. | Alt.     | Sortie No.    | Jicpoa #     | Date  |
|--------|-------|----------|---------------|--------------|-------|
| O..... | 6¾"   | Var..... | VB117-23..... | 9218-30..... | 11/15 |

*Farallon De Medinilla*: Good complete vertical coverage

|        |     |         |                 |             |       |
|--------|-----|---------|-----------------|-------------|-------|
| V..... | 24" | 13,000' | B-832-26BS..... | 9469-6..... | 11/23 |
|--------|-----|---------|-----------------|-------------|-------|

*Guguan*: Good complete vertical coverage

|        |     |         |                   |             |       |
|--------|-----|---------|-------------------|-------------|-------|
| V..... | 24" | 10,000' | 28PR4MC169-1..... | 9223-6..... | 11/14 |
|--------|-----|---------|-------------------|-------------|-------|

*Pagan*: Good oblique partial coverage

|        |     |          |                |               |       |
|--------|-----|----------|----------------|---------------|-------|
| O..... | 6¾" | Var..... | VB117-22A..... | 9227-134..... | 11/14 |
|--------|-----|----------|----------------|---------------|-------|

*Rota*: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

|        |     |        |                   |               |       |
|--------|-----|--------|-------------------|---------------|-------|
| V..... | 12" | 3,000' | 28PR4MC167-1..... | 9236-185..... | 11/14 |
| O..... | 12" | 50'    | 28PR4MC169-1..... | 9238-186..... | 11/16 |
| O..... | 12" | 75'    | 28PR4MC170-1..... | 9496-187..... | 11/16 |

*Sarigan*: Good oblique partial coverage

|        |     |          |               |             |       |
|--------|-----|----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
| O..... | 6¾" | Var..... | VB117-22..... | 9224-8..... | 11/14 |
|--------|-----|----------|---------------|-------------|-------|

*Zealandria Park*: Good oblique shot

|        |     |          |                |             |       |
|--------|-----|----------|----------------|-------------|-------|
| O..... | 6¾" | Var..... | VB117-22B..... | 9226-1..... | 11/14 |
|--------|-----|----------|----------------|-------------|-------|

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following appear:

1. Aerial photograph of Luzon airfields, being an example of the concentration of Japanese airfields in the vicinity of Manila.
2. Aerial photograph of Grace Park Airfield, located in the northern part of Manila.
3. Aerial photograph of Legaspi Airfield.
4. Aerial photograph of Fort Stotsenburg, thought to be the Japanese Garrison Headquarters.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 34, 36, and 36-A, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 4

(Exhibit No. 4 is a captured Japanese submarine chart, translated showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 37, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Vol. 1 No. 15

20 Oct. 1944

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

## WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

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[1]

## DAMAGED JAP AUXILIARY IN MANILA DRYDOCK

When carrier planes from the USS ESSEX (CV-9) joined Third Fleet strikes on MANILA Bay on 22 September, they photographed a damaged Jap ship with stern awash in a floating drydock just outside the breakwater. This vessel was possibly the ship first believed to be a cruiser or even a battleship, although subsequent photo interpretation indicates that it is an engine-aft Naval auxiliary, probably a repair ship or tender. Based on measurements of the Dewey Dock, the only floating drydock known to be in MANILA, the damaged ship has an overall length of 350 feet and a beam of 48 feet. In lines but not in size it resembles the former AS TSURABASAKI (before conversion to the CV SHOHO) and the AR AKASHI, which was sunk at PALAU.

The deck is flush and rounded, with a cruiser stern. The bridge is forward, similar to that of the AKASHI. A single shielded gun, probably 5-inch, is forward of the bridge. Two AA mounts are on each side of the bridge, and two more are on the after superstructure. The amidships section is free of superstructure. The large single stack is aft. A four-sided pylon-type foremast is immediately aft the bridge superstructure, with two of the mast booms built into the bridge itself. Two heavy kingposts are aft of the stack. Aft of the kingposts appears a long rectangular open hatch; a gun may have been removed from this location. There is a probable crane amidships immediately aft of the foremast.

The Dewey floating drydock (YFD-1) was built in the U. S. in 1905 and towed to MANILA, and can handle ships up to cruiser size. The inside (floor) measurements of this dock are 500 feet by 99 feet, with a 30 foot clearance above the keel blocks. In the photograph, the dock appears to have been submerged for protection. Reports have not yet been received indicating damage to the drydock, although aviators from the HORNET claim at least three effective hits in the area.

(The photograph referred to in the foregoing paragraph, being of a Dewey floating drydock which was built in the U. S. in 1905 and

towed to Manila, will be found reproduced as Item No. 38, HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[2]

#### JAP MIDGET SUBS

Japanese midget subs may be expected in number as Allied forces push ward into the restricted waters adjacent to the PHILIPPINES, NANSEI SHOTLAND and FORMOSA. Evidence that the enemy continues to operate these widely publicized units was obtained when a hastily-scuttled boat was discovered salvaged at SAIPAN. Another harbinger of midget subs to be encountered early dispatch information from Third Fleet carrier planes, which claim to have sunk four such subs during the recent OKINAWA strike.

The tactical situation has restricted JAPAN's use of the midget sub during past two years. (The use of the midget sub in the European theater is known.) There is no concrete evidence that JAPAN has had units in combat zones since 7 December 1942, when a large U. S. cargo vessel was damaged beached by a midget sub near GUADALCANAL. Aviators have reported no visible midget subs in the South Pacific, but there sightings have never been confirmed.

In the early months of the war, midget boats were reported in almost every theater—KISKA, HAWAII, GUADALCANAL, AUSTRALIA, and MADAGASCAR. While the boxscore of ships damaged or sunk by these subs is not impressive, it includes a battleship damaged and a tanker sunk (in addition to the AK in the SOLOMONS); and one very narrow escape of a cruiser in SYDNEY Harbor in May 1942. Six of the two-man subs are known to have been sunk.

The PHILIPPINES area offers the midget sub far more favorable operating conditions than has hitherto been the case. The restricted waters will reduce the maneuverability of his targets, and hamper the effectiveness of our anti-submarine vessels. The indentations of the coast offer adequate concealment. At the same time, the distance from base is greatly reduced.

One type of midget sub is designed to be launched from a "mother ship" and another is carried as special equipment aboard a mother sub.

The sub-borne midgets are carried on the deck of the parent sub, secured by four heavy clamps and one supplementary clamp. An access hatch in the midget is designed to make a watertight fit into the deck hatch of the mother. The midgets are linked by telephone wires and battery-charging leads. In casting off, the mother sub releases the four main clamps while the supplementary clamp is released by the midget.

Ship-borne midget subs have been carried in the holds of certain seaplane carriers specially equipped for this purpose. This equipment includes a large hold, equipped with four sets of 6-ft. 8-in. tracks running lengthwise through the hold, and two cranes capable of lifting the 44-ton midget.

Midget subs vary in size from the 41-foot Pearl Harbor type to the 82-foot HYOTEKI type. This sub has a theoretical maximum surface speed of 17 knots for a brief time, and has a reported cruising range of 175-180 miles at 4 to 6 knots. Two 18-inch torpedoes are carried. For full details see ONI 2, "Japanese Submarines".

[3] In at least one case a Jap cargo tube was mistaken for a midget. This tube, which was probably used to deliver supplies to beleaguered garrisons ("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1., No. 7) was similar in size and shape to the midget, but had less taper forward and had a raised hatch forward and amidships, rather than the single streamlined conning tower of the sub.

The doctrine for use of Jap midget subs is indicated in a translation of the orders found in the midget salvaged at GUADALCANAL on 7 May 1943 (SOI Item No. 607). Excerpts from this document follow:

*Plan of attack against anchored Enemy Warships for the KO HYOTEKI (two-man sub) TAI based at GUADALCANAL.*

**The Time for Resolute Attack!**

If a powerful ship or transport should enter and anchor, the resolute attack will be executed immediately. In view of the present enemy situation, there will be more daytime attacks. However, even at night, aggressive attacks will be executed against the powerful enemy if the condition of the moon and weather permits.

Select a time for attack on an enemy ship when its defense is most awkward, such as while it is in the midst of unloading cargo.

Upon receiving a report that the enemy has been discovered, the attack will be carried out with the least possible delay. Do not lose your opportunity.



attack) because you vainly delayed and thereby allowed the enemy to escape into a strongly defended harbor.

Two HYOTEKI's (midget subs) will customarily be used against a powerful enemy ship. Four or more will not ordinarily be used simultaneously at one spot. When completely submerged, it is essential that a maximum depth be maintained.

Take the shortest course (to the point of attack). After completion of attack, HYOTEKI's must take a suitable circuitous route, while avoiding the enemy, and executing deceptive maneuvers.

It is essential that the attack be carried out from a firing position which is sufficiently close to ensure a direct hit. The basic firing position is from 70°-110° at 500 meters.

It is essential to pick out the most powerful ship or transport. However, if in order to do this you vainly delay your fire, you may lose the (chance to) attack due to enemy counter-measures, or impede the attack of the other HYOTEKI's.

When you receive interference from any enemy anchorage patrol boat, it is permissible to use some torpedoes, depending upon the situation. After having fired, submerge quickly to a deep depth and follow the action outlined in (3) of Article III.

[4] When it becomes impossible to return to the Base, return to, and land at territory occupied by friendly troops. Then tow the HYOTEKI quickly to the Base when possible. Otherwise, take quick and proper measures so that the HYOTEKI will not fall into the hands of the enemy.

After the HYOTEKI's depart, the Base will always stand by to receive (messages). It is essential that HYOTEKI's select the proper opportunity to send messages depending upon the situation of the enemy.

#### *Evasive Action by Midget Sub while on Attack Mission.*

(Comment: The translation of the next few paragraphs is not clear, but apparently refers to evasive action to be taken by the midget sub *after it has been launched from the base on an attack mission*. The document goes on to state that the sub will flood all tanks at once under this circumstance, and submerge to 50 meters or deeper, "utilizing the manual steering gear". It will then allegedly evade by turning to right angles from its original course. The midget sub is then to return to its base, taking precautions to avoid discovery.)

#### *Measures for the Prevention of Damage while Waiting at the Base*

When it is probable that there will be an enemy attack while moored at the Base, HYOTEKI's will submerge to the bottom immediately. They will surface when there is no further danger of attack, if it is easy to form an estimate of the outside situation from the inside of the submarine; if not, they will receive instructions for surfacing one hour after submerging.

Depending upon the enemy situation, it may have to remain submerged at the bottom daily from 30 minutes before sunrise until dusk.

Whatever enemy interference you encounter after leaving the Base, carry out your attack. After it is finished, do not uselessly throw away your lives but do your utmost to seek a means of escape and endeavor to return. Such as these are truly brave men and are faithful to the cause of their country.

#### *Radio Equipment on the HYOTEKI's.*

(The HYOTEKI's) are equipped with one type 97 Experimental Short Wave Radio Set (range approximately 50 nautical miles). Frequency Band, 8,000 kc. to 10,000 kc.

Crystal Sizes—8590 ck., 8905 kc., 9365 kc. (there is a separate set (of crystals) for sending and receiving on each of the above (frequencies)).

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear two photographs showing strafing by planes of the *USS Independence* of an enemy AK and an Enemy Patrol Craft. These photographs will be found reproduced as Item No. 39, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[6]

#### YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP

The YAMATO and MUSASHI, newest battlewagons in the Jap Navy, have long been mystery ships, even to Jap Naval personnel. For security reasons, even official Jap NAIREI appear to have been published with incorrect figures on characteristics and capabilities of these ships. Rumors have been rife on

tonnage, armament, and equipment aboard both BBs. The sketch on the facing page represents the impressions of an intelligent prisoner who is believed to be fairly reliable. It was drawn after close collaboration between the POW and a draftsman. Pending further photographic or documentary evidence, the sketch must be evaluated as unverified information from an enemy source.

(The sketch of a *Yamato* class battleship, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 40, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The prisoner, who served aboard the *YAMATO* and *MUSASHI* for a total period of 13 months, claims that the ships are almost identical. The flag of the Combined was reportedly on board first the former and then the latter, prior to the recent move to the new CL OYODO.

On the controversial subject of main batteries, the POW confirmed the report of triple mounts, but insisted that the guns were 45 cm (17.7") rather than 40 cm (15.7"). The size and calibre of these guns has long been subject to speculation. The POW claimed that projectiles for these guns stand six feet high, as compared with the *NAGATO*'s projectiles, which stand 5'6". Ammunition ordered for the *YAMATO* and *MUSASHI* is assertedly "40 cm, Type 2" rather than "40 cm, Type 1". According to the POW, this indicates 45 cm ammunition. The prisoner added that a standing joke among CPOs aboard the *YAMATO* concerned a remark to boots that these guns "are the largest 40 cm guns in the Jap Navy."

The secondary battery consists of twelve 15.5 cm (6") in triple mounts as shown in the sketch. Heavy AA armament is made up of six dual-mounted (5") DP guns, three on each side. There are "many" 25 and 40 mm mounts. Some of the 40 mm guns are in triple mounts. The prisoner insisted that the 40 mm AA on the main deck were (as shown) without added protection.

Another controversial subject discussed by the prisoner was the reported existence of tunnel-shaped compartments on either side of the stern, which have variously been reported as housing subs and PT boats. The POW stated that each tunnel was designed for two midget subs. He said that he had never heard of the subs actually being carried, and that he had no idea how they would be launched (It will be seen that the funnels are well above water-line). While the prisoner was aboard both new BBs, the compartments were used for storage space—incidentally for CinC Combined beer.

Two elevators are allegedly installed on each side of the foremast tower, capable of carrying three or four men. All ships' boats are carried aft in the passage space directly under the catapults. The space in the hangar is large enough (the POW said) for eight planes with wings folded, but he had seen no more than three carried. At full speed, the POW stated, the *YAMATO* was capable of 26 knots. He added the following details:

Length—886 ft; Beam—114.8 ft; Tonnage—55,000; Speed—26.5 kts; Draught—30.2 ft; Main battery—9 x 45 cm (17.7"); Secondary battery—12 x 15.5 cm (6.1"); AA Battery—12 x 12.7 cm (5"); Horsepower—90,000.

#### JAP INFLUENCE GROUND MINES

A new type of mine threat to U. S. ships is indicated in the photograph of the Jap minelayer seen on the opposite page. Three influence ground mines are identifiable on the starboard track and three others inboard. Although no photographic evidence has as yet been encountered by our forces, the photograph—coupled with documentary evidence—proves that the standard type of Japanese influence ground mine (known as Type 3) is in the forward areas.

(A photograph of a *Toshima* class Japanese Minelayer with Influence Ground Mines, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 41, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The photograph and a preliminary report of this mine were included in Intelligence Bulletin 14-44, distributed on 6 October by the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center. The minelayer was identified by SEFIC as of the *TOSHIMA* Class. The photograph was taken on 22 August off NGARUANL Reef (PALAU) by a P-40 of TF 73.

Characteristics of a Type 3 ground mine were contained in a captured Japanese

notebook which is believed fairly reliable: Overall length—11 ft., 2 inches; Diameter—21 inches; Total weight—2398 pounds; Weight of charge—1950 pounds; Maximum depth of water for laying—100 feet; Minimum counter-mining distance—560 feet.

The notebook has been translated as CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 10368-B. This document has not yet been published, but data on the mine was disseminated by the Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4 as Intelligence Report No. 10.

Although smaller, dimensions of the mine photographed here appear roughly similar to those of the mine described in the document. The mines photographed may be a smaller model of the prototype, or the disparity in length may be caused by the fact that the mines are being shipped without the parachute housing attached.

By virtue of its large charge, a ground mine need not fire on contact with the skin of a ship, but—being fired on the bottom by the magnetic or acoustic field of a target—will tend to break the ship's back or at least shatter all castings and pipes. Mines of this type are usually laid with parachute by aircraft at minimum altitude, but may be laid equally well by submarines or surface craft.

Development of a sure sweeping technique for such mines requires laboratory analysis of the firing mechanism to determine its selection of targets and possibilities of laying dormant over an extended period. Mine Disposal Units in forward areas are equipped to recover and disassemble new mines for return to technicians.

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JAP PC On the following page is a profile and plan view of a 170-foot Jap PC photographed at CHICHI JIMA by ENTERPRISE planes on 1 September. This vessel very closely resembles the 200-foot PC-13 Class as described in ONI 222-J, although there is a length differential of 30 feet and the PC shown in the sketch has added AA and depth-charge equipment. Reports from the South Pacific of patrol craft, described as of the PC-13 Class, cite lengths varying from 160 to more than 200 feet.

(The profile and plan view of a 170-foot Jap PC, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 42, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5, there appears a sketch map captioned "Submarine Situation, Oct. 9-Oct. 15" and bearing notation "Sightings in the Western NEW GUINEA-MOLUCCAS areas indicate the submarine concentration in the PALAU-MINDANAO region has moved southward". This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 43, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[12]

#### THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

##### OSCAR

(Seventh in a series reviewing the background of important Japanese aircraft)

The stubborn persistence of a poorly conceived airplane design is well illustrated by OSCAR, the Japanese Army's Type 1 fighter.

(A photograph referring to the foregoing paragraph, being of an "OSCAR" Model 1, the Japanese Army Type 1 fighter, will be found reproduced as Item No. 44 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This plane, development of which has closely paralleled that of the Navy ZEKE, is a product of the Japanese pre-war idea that planes and pilots were completely expendable. Carrying only two machine guns, OSCAR is the most lightly armed of any active fighter in use by a major power. It is highly vulnerable, despite the addition of some armor plate and gas tank leak-proofing.

But for all of that, it is still the most numerous of Army fighters and is standard equipment for combatant units in every theater. Because of its relative ease of manufacture, the Japanese have been forced to continue making it while striving for quantity production of more effective types. They are aware of the

plane's armament deficiency, but, up to now, have been unable to remedy because of design limitations.

TONY and TOJO have not yet succeeded in replacing OSCAR. There are indications [13] that FRANK (see page —) was intended as a successor but it is only beginning to come into the combat picture and may not live up to expectations.

OSCAR was active in some quantity at the time of PEARL HARBOR, in Model 1 version powered by a Type 99 950 h. p. engine and carrying two 7.7 mm synchronized machine guns. A Model 2 made its combat appearance early in 1943. It had a Type 2 1150 h. p. engine and standard armament of two 12.7 mm machine guns. Early planes of the Model 2 series closely resembled the Model 1 but later versions appeared with blunt wing tips. There have been reports of a Model 3, of which no details are known.

OSCAR's strongest point in combat is its extreme maneuverability at medium speeds and altitudes. This factor has made it troublesome to our fliers, but it has failed to compensate for its weaknesses.

#### CRASHED FRANK BELIEVED FOUND

Fragmentary information from CHINA reports recovery of the wreckage of a new type fighter, believed to be the Japanese Army's "Ki 84", or FRANK.

This plane was powered by an 18-cylinder engine and armed with two synchronized 12.7 mm machine-guns and two 20 mm wing cannon.

The plane was equipped with a four-blade paddle-type electric propeller. Gas tanks were self-sealing and two pieces of half-inch armor plate, 18" x 22" and 10" x 8" were installed behind the pilot's back and head. The empennage was reported as similar to that of TOJO, and hydraulically actuated landing gear retracted rearward. It had split flaps.

[14]

#### JAPS WORK ON NEW 4-ENGINE BOMBER

Japanese development of a new heavy bomber, strongly armed and powered by four Homare engines, is disclosed in a document (CINCPAC-CINCPAC No. 11,939) captured on PELELIU.

This plane, a Navy design still in the experimental stage, bears the Japanese designations of "Renzan" (Distant Mountain) or 18 Experimental Land Attack Bomber. It is the Japanese Navy's second attempt to produce a four-engine land plane, the first, the "LIZ" having proved to be a combat failure. There is little possibility that "Renzan" will be ready for service use until late 1945 at the earliest.

The document containing data on "Renzan" is another in the series of tabular data which have been recovered after recent invasions. It must be viewed as tentative, because it is mimeographed and bears no date or issuing authority, but it does appear to be of semi-official nature and recent origin.

#### "RENZAN"

The given data for this plane is as follows:

Crew: 7.

Engines: 4 x Homare (Modified).

H P.: 1850 at 26,240 ft.

Maximum speed: 315 Kts. at 26,240 ft.

Rate of climb: 12 mins., 45 secs. to 26,240 ft.

Cruising speed: 200 kts. at 26,240 ft.

Hypothetical ranges: Normal—2080 naut. mi.; attack overload 3520 naut. mi.

Reece overload—4070 naut. mi.

Armament: 2 x 20 mm each in dorsal, ventral and tail turrets; 2 x 13 mm nose turret, and 1 x 13 mm each in right and left waist hatches. (Total 6 x 20 mm and 4 x 13 mm).

Bomb Load: 3 x 1760 lb. bombs or torpedoes, or 2 x 4400 lb. bombs, or 2 x 3300 lb. bombs, or 8 x 550 lb. bombs, or 18 x 132 lb. bombs.

Because of the recent development of this plane—it was ordered in 1943—it is probable that the performance figures given above are specified rather than actual. However, they are, at least theoretically, possible of attainment by

plane with engines of the horsepower given. The high output listed for 26,240 feet—a rated altitude higher than that of currently operational Japanese aircraft—indicates a possibility that the Homare engines specified may be Model 51 or 52, both listed by official sources as designed for high altitude performance. The twin-gun turrets also are new in Japanese design.

#### TAIZAN

The same document supplies a new set of specifications for the two-engine bomber "Taizan", first information on which was outlined in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 11. The new material significantly differs from previous data, [15] possibly indicating error in one or both of the sources. However, it is not necessarily contradictory or inconsistent inasmuch as the plane is still in an experimented status and variations in design, equipment, and performance are to be expected.

The new information follows:

Crew: 5.

Engines: 2 x MK10A.

H. P.: 1950 at 26,240 ft.

Maximum speed: 303 kts. at 26,240 ft.

Rate of climb: 10 mins. to 13,124 ft.

Hypothetical range: Normal—1200 naut. mi.; attack overload—2000 naut. mi.; Recce overload—2400 naut. mi.

Armament: 2 x 20 mm in dorsal turret; 2 x 13 mm in tail turret; 2 x 13 mm in nose turret, and 1 x 13 mm each in right and left waist hatches.

Bomb load: 2 x 1760 lb. bombs, or 2 x 1100 lb., or 6 x 550 lb., or 12 x 132 lb.

The foregoing differs from prior information in listing a crew of five, rather than four; considerably increased armament, and a maximum bomb load of two, rather than one, 1760 lb. bombs.

The greatest difference, however, lies in the listed engine installation and consequent performance variations. Previous data indicated "Taizan" to be powered by two souped-up engines of the MK6 series, each delivering a takeoff maximum of 2700 h.p., and 2000 h.p. at 26,240 feet. Little is known of the MK10A engine, a new development, except that it is shown in official documents to be an 18-cylinder twin-row radial having a "Vulcan type" (presumably turbo) supercharger. This would account for the high rated output listed for 26,240 feet.

Another unresolved question is how five gun stations could be manned by a total crew of five, unless one man were responsible for both waist positions or a remote control apparatus were used. Previous information indicated total armament of only 2 x 20 mm and 2 x 7.7 mm, positions not given.

[16]

#### GEORGE—FIRE PATTERN AND SPECIFICATIONS

New translations add to the growing body of information on GEORGE (SHIDEN), Kawanishi's interceptor-fighter powered by a Homare 21 engine developing 2,000 h. p. at takeoff.

Although GEORGE has been in service for nearly a year, there have been no definite identifications of it in combat and no crash examinations in the field. It is believed that most of these planes have been assigned to Empire defense.

Reproduced as Figure 1 is a diagram showing the harmonization plan for GEORGE's four 20 mm fixed cannon and two 7.7 mm synchronized machine-guns. It was taken from a mimeographed Japanese copy of an armament manual published by YOKOSUKA Air Group in February, 1944 (CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 9720). The same document furnished rough line drawings of GEORGE which were published in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 5.

(Figure 1, referred to in the preceding paragraph, is a diagram showing the Harmonization Pattern for "GEORGE", Kawanishi's interceptor-fighter powered by a Homare 21 engine developing 2,000 h.p. at takeoff. This diagram will be found reproduced as Item No. 45, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[17] Two of GEORGE'S four 20 mm cannons are mounted conventionally, one in each wing. The other two are installed in faired housings on the under-

side of the wings. Of the conventionally mounted 20's these weapons may either the Type 99 Mk. I (low velocity) or Mk. II (high velocity). They are hydraulically charged and electrically fired.

The harmonization pattern illustrated is an experimental one and may have been revised, but it is of interest in showing the Japanese approach to the problem.

Another document (CINCPAC-CINSPOA Item No. 11,805) supplies new information on the specifications of GEORGE. This document is a pilot's notebook and should be evaluated with reserve but probably is reliable in the main. The given span of 39.37 feet agrees with previous information, but the length 29.35 feet, is greater than the 26.25 feet given in an earlier notebook. It is believed that 29.35 feet is the more nearly correct figure. Weights given in the current notebook also exceed those noted in prior documents and quite possibly indicate the installation of additional equipment.

Item No. 9720 shows provisions for mounting a small (66 or 132 lb.) bomb under each wing. This loading had been presumed, but not established, previously. Available data on performance of GEORGE appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 9 and 12.

Specifications extracted from the notebook (Item No. 11,805) follow:

**Principal Measurements:**

|                   |                        |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| Overall Span      | 12.000 meters (39.37') |
| Overall Length    | 8.9445 meters (29.35') |
| Overall Height    | 4.038 meters (13.25')  |
| Landing Angle     | 13.0°                  |
| Wheel Base Length | 4.450 meters (14.6')   |

**Main Wing:**

|                   |                                             |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Area              | 23.5-m <sup>2</sup> (252.8 sq. ft.)         |
| Chord Length:     |                                             |
| At wing root      | 2.700 meters (8.86')                        |
| At wing tip       | 1.250 meters (4.10')                        |
| Mean Chord Length | 2.070 meters (6.79')                        |
| Angle of Setting  | 4.0°                                        |
| Aspect Ratio      | 6.13                                        |
| Taper Ratio       | 1/2.16                                      |
| Alleron Area      | 1.23-m <sup>2</sup> x 2 (13.23 sq. ft. x 2) |

**Tail Assembly:**

|                               |                                     |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Horizontal Tail Assembly Area | 4.4-m <sup>2</sup> (47.34 sq. ft.)  |
| Elevator Area                 | 0.55-m <sup>2</sup> (5.92 sq. ft.)  |
| Vertical Tail Assembly Area   | 2.00-m <sup>2</sup> (21.52 sq. ft.) |
| [18] Rudder Area              | 0.66-m <sup>2</sup> (7.10 sq. ft.)  |

**Weight:**

|              |                       |
|--------------|-----------------------|
| Net Weight   | 2.710-kg (5.962 lbs.) |
| Normal Load  | 3.750-kg (8,250 lbs.) |
| 1st Overload | 3.891-kg (8,560 lbs.) |
| 2nd Overload | 4.246-kg (9,341 lbs.) |

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a captured photograph showing cruiser or battleship recovery of an old Jap float recon plane "DAVE". This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 4 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[19]

**IRVING VERSIONS CLARIFIED**

A recently captured document, combined with field observations, sheds considerable light on the several versions of IRVING and their nomenclature.

This document, a mimeographed reference pamphlet (CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 11,907), lists five separate variations of IRVING—all of them bearing the common Model-Type symbol "JINI". They are: Type 2 Land Recon Plane; Type 2 Land Recon Plane, converted as bomber; Type 2 Land Recon Plane converted as Type 2 night fighter; GEKKO, Model 11, and GEKKO, Model Modified.

The following table condenses salient points of difference among the five versions:

| Designation                                     | Crew | Normal weight  | Fuel carried in normal cond. (in U. S. gallons) | Armament                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------|------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Type 2 Land Recce.....                          | 3    | 15,950 lbs.... | 475 gals.....                                   | 1 x 20 mm and 1 x 7.7 mm fixed, and 4 x 7.7 mm in remotely controlled dorsal turrets. |
| Type 2 Land Recce (converted as bomber).        | 3    | 15,940 lbs.... | 264 gals.....                                   | Same as above, plus 2 x 550 lb. or 4 x 132 lb. bombs.                                 |
| Type 2 Land Recce (converted as night fighter). | 2    | 15,063 lbs.... | 475 gals.....                                   | 1 x 20 mm and 1 x 7.7 mm fixed and 1 x 20 mm in power turret.                         |
| GEKKO, Model 11.....                            | 2    | 15,246 lbs.... | 475 gals.....                                   | 2 x 20 mm dorsal inclined and 2 x 20 mm ventral inclined.                             |
| GEKKO, Model 11 (Modified).                     | 2    | 15,048 lbs.... | 475 gals.....                                   | Same as above, except 1 x 20 mm ventral.                                              |

[20] The foregoing information makes it possible to trace the history of IRVING, which has gone through more mutations than any other Japanese combat plane. The original version apparently saw little service, although one of them was recovered on TINIAN. The second variation required only the installation of external bomb racks, but also apparently was used very little.

Collateral information indicates that the third version made its appearance late in the summer of 1943, but it seems to have met with little success and was succeeded in the autumn of that year by the one mounting inclined, fixed 20mm cannon. This latter was dignified by an official Japanese Navy acceptance order, which changed the plane's designation from Type 2 to GEKKO. It is believed that all IRVINGS made since late 1943 have been the GEKKO variety.

The third variation, with a 20mm cannon in power turret, was illustrated in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 11. According to the document, the second member of the two-man crew normally occupies the rear cockpit section, but operates the turret during combat. Varying armament of GEKKO has been discussed in several past issues. The modified GEKKO, noted in CINCAP-CINCPO Item No. 11,907, may be the one for which a triple fixed 20mm dorsal mount ("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 13) was designed. Although the document does not specifically say so, it would be logical to add a dorsal gun when one of the ventral guns was removed.

However useful the document may be in clarifying nomenclature and development, still other minor variations of IRVING have been found in the field. Some specimens have mounted *both* nose cannon and inclined cannon, and most of them, whatever their armament, have been equipped with bomb racks.

There is also good evidence that a re-engined Model 12, or J1N2 IRVING is in existence, and IRVINGS equipped with radar have been examined in the field.

(A photograph of the GEKKO, Model 11, version of "IRVING", referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 47, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[21]

#### NEW JAP AIR-TO-AIR BOMBING DEVICES

The Japanese, vigorously experimenting with methods to halt our bombing strikes, have developed a variety of new weapons based on the principle of air-to-air bombing. Most of these still fall into the category of interesting gadgets, but all present a threat which may become serious if techniques are improved.

The standard air-to-air weapon appears to be the 75 lb. aerial burst phosphorus bomb with a 3 or 3.5 second delay, which was discussed in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. I, Nos. 4 and 13. Continuing use of this bomb is indicated.

More recent evidence shows experiments with at least three types of cable bomb and indicates the possibility of cable-training balloons, released from aircraft. Action reports have noted several new types of areal explosive bursts, under circumstances indicating that they were caused by air-to-air bombardment, but the nature of these has not been fully determined. The Japs also have used several types of aerial grenade discharger for some time, with little reported success.

An intriguing device of the cable variety is illustrated and described in a handwritten document (CINCPAC-CINCPA Item No. 11,006), captured on PELEL. This document is rough, incomplete and partly self-contradictory. In view of its nature and lack of date or source, it must be accepted with considerable reserve, but it is presented as an interesting and possibly significant bit of evidence.

The document, entitled "Notes on the 10 Kg. (22 lb.) Towed Bomb", remarks that the weapon is for use against "enemy large model planes". Exact tracings from the attached sketches, together with translations of the original notations, are reproduced as Figures 1 and 2.

(Figures 1 and 2, *supra*, are sketches showing:

1. Tracing of Japanese sketch purporting to show method of releasing towed cable bomb against Allied bomber.
2. Detail of towed cable bomb, from captured sketch.

These sketches will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 48 and 49 respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[23] "The towed bomb", says the document, "is fired from a point 200 meters (656 ft.) above the enemy plane by driving directly from above, in accordance with the method for attacking enemy planes. A tow cable is attached to the towed bomb. The initial speed of the bomb is about 200 meters per second, and since its head resistance is strong, it should be made to travel not more than 500 meters before striking the enemy plane. At the time of firing, the position of the bomb will form an angle of about 30° to the plane from which it is fired and an angle of 45° to the enemy plane".

(Comment: The last sentence appears anomalous under conditions of a vertical dive. To achieve such a combination of angles, assuming level flight by the plane under attack, the attacking plane would have to be gliding at an angle of 15° from the horizontal, or diving 15° past the vertical.)

The document continues: "The bomb will pass, in falling, close to the enemy plane. Since the bomb is pulled by a fighter plane by means of a fixed length tow cable and assumes a position similar to that of a sleeve target, the tow cable is pulled taut upon coming in contact with the enemy plane. The bomb, which is at the very end of the cable, is equipped with horns (to detonate it). Should there be an instantaneous detonation when the horns touch the enemy plane, it is fully possible to bring down a plane with one bomb.

"Nomenclature of the parts:

- "a. Bomb body.
- "b. Firing cylinder.
- "c. Firing mechanism.
- "d. Firing safety cylinder.
- "e. Tow cable housing tube.
- "f. Tow cable disengaging mechanism.

"Operation:

"When, in diving, the handle of the opening mechanism of the firing cylinder is pulled, the firing cylinder forms an angle of 30 to 45 degrees, depending on air pressure, with the under surface of the wing. The bomb is fired by an electrical firing mechanism".

Piecing together the text and the illustrations, it appears that the bomb container tube is carried flush against the under surface of the fuselage, or wing, during flight, with the tow cable extending back along the fuselage to a point near the tail. On entering the dive, the pilot operates a lever which permits the container tube to swing outward on its hinge, at an angle apparently controlled by inter-action of air pressure and a resistance spring. At the proper instant, the explosion charge is detonated, throwing the bomb out, while the cable unreeled and the protective cover falls away.

There have been no reports of such a device being used in combat, and it has not been examined in the field.

It has been established that the Japanese have developed another type of cable [24] air-to-air bomb, consisting of an explosive unit attached to a cable which in turn, is suspended by a parachute. There is, also, a fragmentary document indicating a device made up of two small bombs at either end of a cable.

An air crew of Seventh Bomber Command has reported being attacked by enemy planes which released an aerial burst bomb estimated at six feet in length and one foot and a half in diameter, thought possibly to be a 550 lb. version. From



Asiatic theater come reports of balloons, possibly trailing cables and released by aircraft, and of mysterious aerial explosions far out over the ocean.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a photograph of a B-29 over Yawata, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 50, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The supposed aerial-release balloons were noted over YAWATA by B-29s at an altitude of about 24,000 feet under circumstances which made it unlikely they [25] could have been either fugitive or captive. Such a device, equipped with trailing cables and explosive charges might be developed into an effective anti-bomber weapon if released in quantity.

Information on Japanese aerial-burst bomb tactics as carried out in actual combat is contained in Intelligence Memorandum No. 19 of Commander Shore-based Air, Forward Area, quoting the report of a veteran B-24 navigator. It follows:

"After being subjected to repeated attacks by Jap fighters over TRUK and IWO JIMA, dropping phosphorus bombs, it can be stated that certain definitely recurrent maneuvers are used. The attacking ZEKES will fly parallel to our formation, usually at 3 or 9 o'clock for one to five minutes, possibly gauging our altitude. They then accelerate, pass the head of the formation and go into a steep chandelle, cutting in towards the center of the formation. They then roll over on their backs, begin to descend and flip out the phosphorus bombs. Were our squadrons to lose altitude at the beginning of the enemy chandelle, this might be good evasive action.

"These passes were used almost exclusively at IWO JIMA when the sun was to the back of our formation. When the sun was high and from 10 to 2 o'clock, the Japs at both TRUK and IWO JIMA would drop their bombs on their first surprise run, directly out of the sun. The only evasive action we can take to avoid this is to plan our missions at times when the sun will be at our back".

The tactics described appear to follow written Jap doctrine ("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. I, No. 13) to the extent that, in each case, the bombs are released ahead of the bomber formation and while the attacking fighter is flying towards it. The report that the bombs sometimes are "flipped out" while the fighter is on its back does not fit the normal wing-rack loading of aerial burst bombs, and may indicate some type of ejection device which has not yet been examined in the field.

On the parallel approach from the rear a chandelle or Immelman, following acceleration, would permit the attacking plane to gain proper distance and altitude increment with a minimum of exposure to opposing fire and in a minimum of time.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear photographs showing Liberators under attack over Iwo Jima, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 51, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[26]

#### WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT

*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944*

[\*Negs. received; \*\*Prints only received]

#### JAPAN

*Kyushu: Good trimetrogon split and oblique coverage of areas indicated*

| V/O           | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.                           | Jicpos # | Date taken |
|---------------|-------|---------|--------------------------------------|----------|------------|
| Split Vert... | 24"   | 30,000' | Omura M7-40-25-AC288                 | 7213-16  | 8/21*      |
| V             | 24"   | 25,000' | Yawata-M7-468-285                    | 7214-17  | 8/20*      |
|               |       | 26,000' | Yawata-M7-40-44-AC503                | 7215-18  | 8/20*      |
|               |       |         | Yawata-M7-40-45-452                  | 7216-19  | 8/20*      |
| Split Vert... | 24"   | 30,000' | Taka Shima M7-40-25-AC288            | 7220-20  | 8/20*      |
| V             | 24"   | 26,000' | Yawata-M6-462-769                    | 7222-12  | 8/20*      |
| Split Vert... | 24"   | 30,000' | Nagasaki M7-40-25-AC288 (Taka Shima) | 7223-13  | 9/21*      |
| Split Vert... | 24"   | 30,000' | M7-40-25-AC-288                      | 7225-14  | 8/21*      |
| Tri Met       | 6"    | 30,000' | M7-40-25-AC-288                      | 7226-15  | 8/21*      |

# 626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 including 13 October 1944—Continued

## JAPAN—Continued

Kyushu: Good trimetrogon split and oblique coverage of area indicated—Continued

| V/O          | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.                             | Jicpos #     | De |
|--------------|-------|---------|----------------------------------------|--------------|----|
| V.....       | 12½"  | 26,000' | Yawata (Bomb Run) Wing M6-462-769-13PL | 7262-25..... | 8/ |
| V.....       | 12"   | 25,000' | Yawata A/F M7-468-442-14PL             | 7261-24..... | 8/ |
| V.....       | 6"    | 26,300' | Yawata-M19-444-262                     | 7260-23..... | 8/ |
| Tri Met..... | 6"    | 30,000' | Nagasaki-M7-40-25-AC288                | 7258-21..... | 8/ |
| Tri Met..... | 6"    | 30,000' | Omura M7-40-25-AC288                   | 7259-22..... | 8/ |
| O.....       | 6½"   |         | Yawata Area-468-217-20AAF              | 7263-26..... | 8/ |
|              |       |         | Yawata-468-353-20AAF                   | 7264-27..... | 8/ |
|              |       |         | Yawata-468-370-20AAF                   | 7265-28..... | 8/ |

## PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

CEBU-LEYTE-BOHOL: Trimetrogon and vertical coverage of portions of islands indicated

|              |          |          |                                          |              |    |
|--------------|----------|----------|------------------------------------------|--------------|----|
| Tri Met..... | 152.2 mm | Var..... | CVL23-33 (p) CEBU, LEYTE                 | 7098-42..... | 9/ |
|              | 6"       | Var..... | CVL23-33 (c) CEBU, VIC MAC-TAN IS, LEYTE | 7099-42..... | 9/ |
|              | 6"       | Var..... | CVL23-33 (s) CEBU, BOHOL, LEYTE          | 7100-42..... | 9/ |
| V.....       | 8¼"      | Var..... | ESSEX-124 (CEBU)                         | 7124-43..... | 9/ |

Bohol: Good Partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

|          |     |          |              |             |    |
|----------|-----|----------|--------------|-------------|----|
| V.....   | 24" | Var..... | CV16-2478    | 7009-4..... | 9/ |
| V.....   | 12" | Var..... | CV16-2479    | 7016-6..... | 9/ |
| V.....   | 8¼" | 8,000'   | CV16-2457    | 7005-1..... | 9/ |
| V.....   | 8¼" | Var..... | CV16-2480    | 7006-2..... | 9/ |
| V.....   | 6"  | 9,500'   | CV16-2455(V) | 7007-3..... | 9/ |
| V/O..... | 8¼" | Var..... | CV12-353     | 7011-5..... | 9/ |
| O.....   | 6"  | 9,500'   | CV16-2456(P) | 7008-3..... | 9/ |

Cebu: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated

|              |     |          |                                |              |    |
|--------------|-----|----------|--------------------------------|--------------|----|
| Tri Met..... | 6"  | 6,000'   | CV16-2448(V)                   | 7079-19..... | 9/ |
|              |     | 6,000'   | CV16-2449(P)                   | 7080-19..... | 9/ |
|              |     | 6,000'   | CV16-2450(S)                   | 7081-19..... | 9/ |
| V.....       | 8¼" | Var..... | CV16-2451                      | 7082-5.....  | 9/ |
| O.....       | 6½" | Var..... | CV16-2452                      | 7083-6.....  | 9/ |
| V/O.....     | 24" | Var..... | CV16-2453                      | 7084-7.....  | 9/ |
| V.....       | 12" | Var..... | CV16-2454                      | 7085-8.....  | 9/ |
| O.....       | 6½" | Var..... | CV16-2458                      | 7086-9.....  | 9/ |
|              |     |          | CV16-2459                      | 7087-10..... | 9/ |
|              |     |          | CV16-2460                      | 7088-11..... | 9/ |
|              |     |          | CV16-2461                      | 7089-12..... | 9/ |
| Tri Met..... | 6"  | 10,000'  | CV16-2462(V)(MACTAN)(CEBU)     | 7090-13..... | 9/ |
|              |     | 10,000'  | CV16-2463(P)(MACTAN)(CEBU)     | 7091-13..... | 9/ |
|              |     | 10,000'  | CV16-2464(S)(MACTAN)           | 7092-13..... | 9/ |
| V.....       | 6"  | 1,000'   | CV16-2467(N. E. COAST)(CEBU)   | 7093-14..... | 9/ |
| O.....       | 6"  | 1,000'   | CV16-2468(N. E. COAST)(CEBU)   | 7094-15..... | 9/ |
| V.....       | 8¼" | Var..... | CV16-2469                      | 7095-16..... | 9/ |
| O.....       | 6½" | Var..... | CV16-2472                      | 7096-17..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CV16-2473                      | 7097-18..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CV12-240                       | 7101-20..... | 9/ |
|              |     | 2,000'   | CV12-341                       | 7102-21..... | 9/ |
|              |     | 2,500'   | CV12-342                       | 7103-22..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CV12-343                       | 7104-23..... | 9/ |
| O.....       | 24" | Var..... | CV12-346(N. CEBU)              | 7105-24..... | 9/ |
| O.....       | 6½" | 1,000'   | CV12-347(SHIPPING)             | 7106-25..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CV12-348(CEBU HARBOR)          | 7107-26..... | 9/ |
| O.....       | 24" | Var..... | CV12-349(CEBU TOWN)            | 7108-27..... | 9/ |
| V/O.....     | 8¼" | Var..... | CV12-353                       | 7109-28..... | 9/ |
| O.....       | 6½" | Var..... | CV12-354(CEBU TOWN)            | 7110-29..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CVL27-159                      | 7111-30..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CVL27-160                      | 7112-31..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CVL27-161                      | 7113-32..... | 9/ |
|              |     | Var..... | CVL27-163                      | 7114-33..... | 9/ |
| V.....       | 12" | 5,000'   | WASP-167(SHIPPING CEBU HARBOR) | 7115-34..... | 9/ |
|              |     | 8,000'   | WASP-168(SARAVIA & MANAPLA)    | 7116-35..... | 9/ |
| V.....       | 12" | 3,500'   | WASP-170(EAST COAST)           | 7117-36..... | 9/ |

*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued*

## PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—Continued

*Cebu: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated—Continued*

| V/O | F. L. | Alt. | Sortie No.           | Jicpoa # | Date taken |
|-----|-------|------|----------------------|----------|------------|
| O   | 8¼"   | Var  | BKHL-302             | 7077-4   | 9/13*      |
| O   | 6½"   | Var  | BKHL-298             | 7118-37  | 9/13*      |
|     |       | Var  | BKHL-303             | 7119-38  | 9/13*      |
| V   | 6"    | 800' | ESSEX-123 (V)        | 7120-39  | 9/12*      |
| O   | 6"    | 800' | ESSEX-123 (P)        | 7121-39  | 9/12*      |
| O   | 8¼"   | Var  | ESSEX-139 (SHIPPING) | 7122-40  | 9/12*      |
|     |       | Var  | ESSEX-147            | 7123-41  | 9/14*      |

*Dinagat: Good complete vertical and oblique coverage of northern portion of island*

|         |     |     |                |        |       |
|---------|-----|-----|----------------|--------|-------|
| Tri Met | 6"  | Var | CV16-2476 (S)  | 7073-3 | 9/14* |
|         |     | Var | CV-16-2474 (V) | 7074-3 | 9/14* |
|         |     | Var | CV-16-2475 (P) | 7075-3 | 9/14* |
| V       | 8¼" | Var | CV12-353       | 7076-4 | 9/13* |

*Leyte: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated*

|         |     |        |                                  |         |       |
|---------|-----|--------|----------------------------------|---------|-------|
| Tri Met | 6"  | Var    | CV16-2476 (S)                    | 6996-19 | 9/14* |
|         |     | Var    | CV16-2474 (V)                    | 7010-19 | 9/14* |
|         |     | Var    | CV16-2475 (P)                    | 6997-19 | 9/14* |
| V       | 20" | 7,000' | CV16-2477 (BURAUE & N. W. LEYTE) | 6998-21 | 9/14* |
| O       | 24" | Var    | ESSEX-148 (LEYTE-SAMAR)          | 6999-22 | 9/14* |
| O       | 6½" | Var    | BKHL-289 (LEYTE-SAMAR)           | 7003-24 | 9/12* |
| V       | 8¼" | Var    | CV12-351                         | 7047-20 | 9/13* |
| V       | 20" | Var    | BKHL-284                         | 7126-26 | 9/12* |
| O       | 12" | Var    | CVL 27-165 (TACLOBAN)            | 7024-23 | 9/14* |
| O       | 24" | Var    | CV12-346 (DULAG A/F)             | 7125-25 | 9/12* |

*Mindanao: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated*

|            |     |         |                                    |         |        |
|------------|-----|---------|------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| O          | 6¾" | Var     | CV125-80 (CAGAYAN AREA)            | 7048-32 | 9/8*   |
|            |     | Var     | CV125-80A (CAGAYAN AREA)           | 7049-33 | 9/9*   |
|            |     | Var     | CV125-80B (CAGAYAN AREA)           | 7050-34 | 9/9*   |
| V          | 8¼" | 1,100'  | CVL25-83 (SAN AGUSTIN)             | 7051-35 | 9/14*  |
| O          | 6½" | Var     | CVL25-84 (C. SAN AGUSTIN)          | 7052-36 | 9/14*  |
| V          | 20" | 8,200'  | CVL27-150 (VALENCIA)               | 7053-37 | 9/9*   |
| V          | 6½" | Var     | CVL27-151 (VALENCIA)               | 7054-38 | 9/9*   |
| O          | 6½" | Var     | CVL27-152 (VALENCIA)               | 7055-39 | 9/9*   |
|            |     | Var     | CVL27-153 (VALENCIA)               | 7056-40 | 9/9*   |
| V          | 12" | 8,500'  | CVL27-154 (MACAJALAR BAY)          | 7057-41 | 9/9*   |
| O          | 12" | Var     | CVL27-155 (MACAJALAR BAY)          | 7058-42 | 9/9*   |
| V          | 12" | Var     | CVL27-156                          | 7059-43 | 9/9*   |
| O          | 12" | Var     | CVL27-157 (SURIGAO)                | 7060-44 | 9/9*   |
| V          | 8¼" | Var     | CV12-351                           | 7061-45 | 9/13*  |
| O          | 6½" | Var     | CV12-355 (JAP DD DAVAO)            | 7062-46 | 9/14*  |
| O          | 24" | Var     | CV12-356 (DAVAO)                   | 7063-47 | 9/14*  |
| O          | 6½" | 3,000'  | CV12-357 (DAVAO)                   | 7064-48 | 9/14*  |
|            |     | 2,500'  | CV12-358 (SASSA A/D)               | 7065-49 | 9/14*  |
| Split vert | 24" | 8,000'  | CV23-32 P (MALABANG)               | 7066-50 | 9/10*  |
|            |     | 8,000'  | CVL23-32 S (MALABANG)              | 7067-50 | 9/10*  |
| V          | 24" | 15,000' | WASP-195 (AIRSTRIPS N. OF DIGOS)   | 7068-51 | 9/14*  |
| V          | 12" | 10,000' | WASP-196 (DAVAO TOWN AND AIRSTRIP) | 7069-52 | 9/14*  |
| V          | 24" | 8,500'  | WASP-197 (AIRFIELD S. OF DAVAO)    | 7070-53 | 9/14*  |
| V          | 12" | Var     | WASP-198 (AIRFIELD S. OF DAVAO)    | 7071-54 | 9/14*  |
|            |     |         | (DIGOS PT. AREA & PADADA A/D)      |         |        |
| Tri Met    | 6"  | 6,500'  | WASP-138(P)                        | 7247-68 | 9/9*** |
|            |     | 6,500'  | WASP-139(V)                        | 7248-68 | 9/9*** |
|            |     | 6,500'  | WASP-140(S)                        | 7249-68 | 9/9*** |
| V          | 12" | Var     | (SARAGANI BAY AREA)                |         |        |
|            |     |         | WASP-142                           | 7250-69 | 9/9*** |
|            |     |         | (BUAYAN TO MT. TANGLI)             |         |        |
|            |     |         | (BUAYAN TO BEE HIVE)               |         |        |
|            |     |         | (SUMBANG PT. TO TINAGA PT.)        |         |        |
|            |     |         | (CAPE AGUSTIN)                     |         |        |

## 628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to including 13 October 1944—Continued

## PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—Continued

Mindanao: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated—C

| V/O             | F. L.   | Alt.    | Sortie No.           | Jicpoa # | Date  |
|-----------------|---------|---------|----------------------|----------|-------|
| Tri Met.....    | 6''     | 10,000' | WASP-144(V)          | 7251-70  | 9/9*  |
|                 |         | 10,000' | WASP-145 (P)         | 7252-70  | 9/9*  |
|                 |         | 10,800' | WASP-146 (S)         | 7253-70  | 9/9*  |
|                 |         |         | (SARANGANI BAY AREA) |          |       |
| V.....          | 12''    | 15,000' | WASP-147             | 7254-71  | 9/9*  |
|                 |         | 10,000' | CVL24-86 (COTABATO)  | 7255-72  | 9/10* |
| O.....          | 152.8mm | 1,000'  | CVL24-88 (COTABATO)  | 7257-74  | 9/10* |
| O.....          | 154.0mm | 3,000'  | CVL24-87 (COTABATO)  | 7256-73  | 9/10* |
| Split Vert..... | 24''    | Var.    | ESSEX-120 (P)        | 7207-55  | 9/12* |
|                 |         | Var.    | ESSEX-120 (S)        | 7208-55  | 9/12* |

Negros: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas and airfields indicated

|             |         |        |                                                         |         |       |
|-------------|---------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------|
| O.....      | 20''    | Var.   | BHKL-307 (BACOLOD & TALISAY A/F)                        | 7004-4  | 9/14* |
| V.....      | 24''    | 8,000' | CV16-2465 (MANALPA, ALICANTE SARAVIA AND TALISAY A/F's) | 7012-5  | 9/13* |
| V.....      | 152.3mm | Var.   | CV12-344 (V)                                            | 7013-6  | 9/12* |
| O.....      | 152.3mm | Var.   | CV12-344 (S)                                            | 7014-6  | 9/12* |
| O.....      | 24''    | 8,000' | CV12-352                                                | 7015-7  | 9/13* |
|             |         | Var.   | CV12-349                                                | 7017-8  | 9/13* |
| O.....      | 12''    | Var.   | CVL27-162 (DUMAGUETTE)                                  | 7018-9  | 9/12* |
| [87] V..... | 12''    | 5,000' | CVL27-171                                               | 7019-10 | 9/14* |
| O.....      | 12''    | Var.   | CVL27-172                                               | 7028-11 | 9/14* |
| V.....      | 12''    | Var.   | CV16-2466 (FABRICA)                                     | 7029-12 | 9/13* |
| V.....      | 24''    | 7,000' | ESSEX-140 (AIRFIELDS)                                   | 7030-13 | 9/14* |
|             |         | 8,000' | WASP-169 (SARAVIA TN & MANAPLA TN)                      | 7031-14 | 9/12* |
| V.....      | 6''     | Var.   | WASP-179 (V) (BACOLOD A/F, ALICANTE A/F)                | 7032-15 | 9/13* |
| O.....      | 6''     | Var.   | WASP-180 (P) (BACOLOD & ALICANTE A/F)                   | 7033-15 | 9/13* |
| O.....      | 6¾''    | 4,000' | CV12-359                                                | 7034-16 | 9/13* |
| O.....      |         | Var.   | CV12-351 (DUMAGUETTE & SOQUIJOR)                        | 7035-17 | 9/13* |
| O.....      | 6¾''    | Var.   | BKHL-297                                                | 7037-19 | 9/13* |
| O.....      | 8¼''    | Var.   | ESSEX-133 (SARAVIA) (P)                                 | 7036-18 | 9/13* |
| O.....      | 6¾''    | Var.   | BKHL-300                                                | 7038-20 | 9/13* |
|             |         | Var.   | BKHL-304                                                | 7039-21 | 9/14* |
|             |         | Var.   | BKHL-305                                                | 7040-22 | 9/14* |
|             |         | Var.   | BKHL-309                                                | 7041-23 | 9/14* |
|             |         | Var.   | BKHL-310                                                | 7042-24 | 9/14* |
|             |         | Var.   | CVL27-173                                               | 7043-25 | 9/14* |
|             |         | Var.   | CV16-2470                                               | 7044-26 | 9/13* |
|             |         | Var.   | CV16-2471                                               | 7045-27 | 9/13* |
|             |         | Var.   | CV16-2481                                               | 7046-28 | 9/13* |
|             |         | Var.   | CV16-2482                                               | 7072-29 | 9/14* |
|             |         | Var.   | CV12-343                                                | 7141-30 | 9/13* |
|             |         | 4,000' | CV12-345                                                | 7142-31 | 9/12* |
| O.....      | 8¼''    | 1,000' | ESSEX-129                                               | 7209-33 | 9/12* |
| O.....      | 12''    | Var.   | ESSEX-130                                               | 7210-34 | 9/12* |

Palmas: Good Partial oblique coverage of island

|        |      |        |          |        |       |
|--------|------|--------|----------|--------|-------|
| O..... | 24'' | Var.   | CV12-356 | 7077-1 | 9/14* |
| O..... | 6¾'' | 2,500' | CV12-358 | 7078-2 | 9/14* |

Panay: Good vertical and oblique coverage of ILOILO

|        |      |        |                    |         |       |
|--------|------|--------|--------------------|---------|-------|
| V..... | 24'' | 8,700' | ESSEX-141 (ILOILO) | 7020-3  | 9/14* |
| V..... | 12'' | 3,000' | ESSEX-142 (ILOILO) | 7021-4  | 9/14* |
| O..... | 8¼'' | Var.   | ESSEX-144 (ILOILO) | 7022-5  | 9/14* |
| O..... | 12'' | Var.   | CVL27-164 (ILOILO) | 7023-6  | 9/14* |
| O..... | 6¾'' | Var.   | CVL27-168 (ILOILO) | 7025-8  | 9/14* |
| V..... | 6¾'' | Var.   | CVL27-169 (ILOILO) | 7026-9  | 9/14* |
| O..... | 6¾'' | Var.   | CVL27-170 (ILOILO) | 7027-10 | 9/14* |

*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued*

## PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—Continued

*Samar: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated*

| V/O | F. L.     | Alt.   | Sortie No.                           | Jicpoa # | Date taken |
|-----|-----------|--------|--------------------------------------|----------|------------|
| O   | 20"       | 5,000' | CV11-34 (TUGNUG PT. TO CABLAGNA PT.) | 7001-4   | 9/13*      |
| V   | 152. Omm. | Var    | CV11-36 (TIP SAMAR IS.)              | 7002-5   | 9/13*      |
| O   | 8 1/4"    | Var    | BKHL-302                             | 7000-6   | 9/13*      |

## FORMOSA: Good vertical coverage of areas and airfields indicated

|            |     |         |                                                       |          |          |
|------------|-----|---------|-------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| V          | 24" | 30,300' | 4MB137-21PR TAKAO HARBOR                              | 7127-98  | 8/25*-** |
|            |     | 30,400' | 4MB137-21PR TAKAO A/D                                 | 7128-99  | 8/25*-** |
|            |     | 30,500' | 4MB137-21PR HEITO A/D                                 | 7129-100 | 8/25*-** |
|            |     | 30,200' | 4MB137-21PR OKAYAMA A/D                               | 7130-101 | 8/25*-** |
|            |     | 29,800' | 4MB137-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR                            | 7131-102 | 8/25*-** |
|            |     | 30,500' | 4MB137-21PR TAINAN A/D AND SAT. L/S.                  | 7132-103 | 8/25*-** |
|            |     | 29,900' | 4MB139-21PR KATO SEA-PLANE BASE                       | 7133-104 | 8/26*-** |
|            |     | 29,900' | 4MB139-21PR TAKAO A/D                                 | 7134-105 | 8/26*-** |
|            |     | 29,300' | 4MB139-21PR TAKAO HARBOR                              | 7135-106 | 8/26*-** |
|            |     | 29,700' | 4MB139-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR                            | 7136-107 | 8/26*-** |
|            |     | 31,500' | 4MB143-21PR TAKAO HARBOR                              | 7137-108 | 8/29*-** |
| Split vert | 24" | 30,000' | 4MB151-21PR TAKAO                                     | 7138-109 | 9/7*-**  |
|            |     | 30,000' | 4MB151-21PR TAKAO                                     | 7138-109 | 9/7*-**  |
|            |     | 30,300' | 4MB151-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR                            | 7139-110 | 9/7*-**  |
|            |     | 30,300' | 4MB151-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR                            | 7139-110 | 9/7*-**  |
|            |     | 30,000' | 4MB151-21PR RUN FROM TANSUI RIVER TOKO TO N. OF HEITO | 7140-111 | 9/7*-**  |
|            |     | 30,000' | 4MB151-21PR RUN FROM TANSUI RIVER TOKO TO N. OF HEITO | 7140-111 | 9/7*-**  |
| V          | 24" | 30,100' | 4MC7-21PR TAKAO HARBOR                                | 7192-112 | 1/24*-** |
|            |     | 30,100' | 4MC7-21PR HOZAN RADIO STATION & A/D                   | 7193-113 | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 6"  | 30,100' | 4MC7-21PR HEITO A/D                                   | 6888-91  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 24" | 30,100' | 4MC7-21PR HEITO A/D                                   | 6888-91  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 6"  | 30,300' | 4MC7-21PR OKAYAMA A/D                                 | 6889-92  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 24" | 30,300' | 4MC7-21PR OKAYAMA A/D                                 | 6889-92  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 6"  | 30,200' | 4MC7-21PR TAINAN & A/D                                | 6890-93  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 24" | 30,200' | 4MC7-21PR TAINAN & A/D                                | 6890-93  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 6"  | 29,400' | 4MC7-21PR KAGI A/D                                    | 6891-94  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 24" | 29,400' | 4MC7-21PR KAGI A/D                                    | 6891-94  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 24" | 30,400' | 4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN LAKE                            | 6892-95  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 24" | 30,500' | 4MC7-21PR TAICHU AND TOYOHARA A/D                     | 6893-96  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 6"  | 30,500' | 4MC7-21PR TAICHU AND TOYOHARA A/D                     | 6893-96  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 6"  | 29,800' | 4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN LAKE                            | 6894-97  | 1/24*-** |
| V          | 24" | 29,800' | 4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN LAKE                            | 6894-97  | 1/24*-** |

## PESCADORES

*Mako Island: Good complete vertical coverage of Mako Island*

|   |     |         |          |        |             |
|---|-----|---------|----------|--------|-------------|
| V | 24" | 24,300' | M4/5-9PS | 7176-8 | 4/24*-**/43 |
|---|-----|---------|----------|--------|-------------|

# 630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to including 13 October 1944—Continued

## KURILES

*Onkotan:* Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

| V/O    | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.         | Jicpoa #     | Date |
|--------|-------|---------|--------------------|--------------|------|
| V..... | 24''  | 14,500' | 11AAF4M1143-1..... | 7199-10..... | 8/26 |
| V..... | 12''  | 14,000' | 11AAF4M1143-2..... | 7200-11..... | 8/26 |
|        |       | 13,800' | 11AAF4M1143-5..... | 7203-14..... | 8/26 |
|        |       | 13,800' | 11AAF4M1143-6..... | 7204-15..... | 8/26 |
|        |       | 14,000' | 11AAF4M1143-7..... | 7205-16..... | 8/26 |
|        |       | 14,000' | 11AAF4M1143-8..... | 7206-17..... | 8/26 |
| V..... | 6''   | 14,000' | 11AAF4M1143-3..... | 7201-12..... | 8/26 |
|        |       | 14,000' | 11AAF4M1143-4..... | 7202-13..... | 8/26 |
| O..... | 24''  | 14,500' | 11AAF4M1143-1..... | 7199-10..... | 8/26 |

*Paramushiru:* Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

|        |         |  |                |              |     |
|--------|---------|--|----------------|--------------|-----|
| V..... | 12''    |  | FAW4-S425..... | 7198-45..... | 9/2 |
| O..... | 20''    |  | FAW4-S425..... | 7197-44..... | 9/2 |
| O..... | 6 3/4'' |  | FAW4-S425..... | 7196-43..... | 9/2 |

## BONINS

*Chichi Jima:* Good partial vertical coverage showing bomb damage to Omura seaplane base

|        |      |         |                           |               |     |
|--------|------|---------|---------------------------|---------------|-----|
| V..... | 24'' | 19,400' | A-973-38BS-H337-7BC.....  | 6991-118..... | 9/2 |
|        |      | 17,000' | D-708-819BS-H337-7BC..... | 6992-119..... | 9/2 |
| V..... | 20'' | 11,500' | B-556-H346-38BS-7BC.....  | 6989-116..... | 9/2 |
| V..... | 12'' | 11,500' | B-809-819BS-H346-7BC..... | 6990-117..... | 9/2 |
|        |      | 11,700' | A-282-H346-38BS-7BC.....  | 6993-120..... | 9/2 |
|        |      | 18,100' | C-674-819BS-H337-7BC..... | 6994-121..... | 9/2 |

*Haha Jima:* Partial vertical coverage of island

|        |      |         |                           |              |     |
|--------|------|---------|---------------------------|--------------|-----|
| V..... | 12'' | 15,000' | C-674-819BS-H337-7BC..... | 6995-44..... | 9/2 |
|--------|------|---------|---------------------------|--------------|-----|

## KAZAN GROUP

*Iwo Jima Rhetto:* Good selected oblique shots of Kita Iwo Jima and enemy ship

|        |         |      |               |               |     |
|--------|---------|------|---------------|---------------|-----|
| O..... | 6 3/4'' | Var. | VB116-31..... | 6986-158..... | 9/2 |
|--------|---------|------|---------------|---------------|-----|

*Iwo Jima:* Good partial vertical coverage showing bomb damage to airfields

|        |      |         |                           |               |     |
|--------|------|---------|---------------------------|---------------|-----|
| V..... | 40'' | 19,000' | B-338-392BS-H343-7BC..... | 6987-162..... | 9/2 |
| V..... | 24'' | 17,800' | B-236-27BS-H343-7BC.....  | 6984-159..... | 9/2 |
|        |      | 17,800' | A-473-27BS-H343-7BC.....  | 6985-160..... | 9/2 |
|        |      | 17,800' | 493-27BS-H343-7BC.....    | 6986-161..... | 9/2 |
|        |      | 19,000' | A-870-392BS-H343-7BC..... | 6988-163..... | 9/2 |

## MARIANAS

*Maug:* Selected distant obliques of island

|        |         |      |               |              |     |
|--------|---------|------|---------------|--------------|-----|
| O..... | 6 3/4'' | Var. | VB116-30..... | 6988-14..... | 9/2 |
|--------|---------|------|---------------|--------------|-----|

*Pagan:* Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

|        |      |         |                     |               |     |
|--------|------|---------|---------------------|---------------|-----|
| V..... | 24'' | 11,000' | 28PR4MC133.....     | 6970-105..... | 9/2 |
|        |      | 11,500' | A-994-27BS-7BC..... | 6971-106..... | 9/2 |
| O..... | 20'' | 10,000' | A-556-38BS-7BC..... | 6972-107..... | 9/2 |
| O..... | 12'' | 2,000'  | 28PR4MC131-1.....   | 6969-104..... | 9/2 |

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

## CAROLINES

Ponape: Three selected oblique shots showing bomb damage to old and new airfields

| V/O    | F. L. | Alt.   | Sortie No.                 | Jicpoa # | Date taken |
|--------|-------|--------|----------------------------|----------|------------|
| O..... | 63½"  | 9,000' | A-296-MAG22(48BS-M356-7BC) | 7173-581 | 9/24*      |
|        |       | 1,000' | B-503-MAG22(48BS-M356-7BC) | 7174-582 | 9/24*      |
|        |       | 5,500' | C-614-MAG22(48BS-M356-7BC) | 7175-583 | 9/24*      |

Truk: Selected oblique and vertical shots showing damage to airfield on Eton and seaplane base on Dublo

|        |     |         |                      |          |       |
|--------|-----|---------|----------------------|----------|-------|
| V..... | 24" | 19,500' | B-840(26BS-H339-7BC) | 7150-523 | 9/19* |
|        |     | 19,500' | C-833(26BS-H339-7BC) | 7151-524 | 9/19* |
|        |     | 20,000' | D-832(26BS-H339-7BC) | 7152-525 | 9/19* |
|        |     | 20,000' | E-993(26BS-H339-7BC) | 7153-526 | 9/19* |
|        |     | 20,500' | A-873(98BS-H339-7BC) | 7154-527 | 9/19* |
|        |     | 19,400' | B-876(98BS-H339-7BC) | 7155-528 | 9/19* |
| V..... | 12" | 19,500' | A-025(26BS-H339-7BC) | 7149-522 | 9/19* |
| O..... | 12" | 19,700' | C-362(98BS-H339-7BC) | 7156-529 | 9/19* |

MARCUS: Good complete vertical coverage of island

|        |     |         |                 |         |       |
|--------|-----|---------|-----------------|---------|-------|
| V..... | 24" | 18,500' | A-708-819BS-7BC | 7158-21 | 9/24* |
|--------|-----|---------|-----------------|---------|-------|

NAURU: Selected distant oblique shots showing bomb damage to phosphate plant and airfields

|        |      |        |                      |          |       |
|--------|------|--------|----------------------|----------|-------|
| O..... | 7"   | 9,500' | B-295-396BS-M355-7BC | 7178-272 | 9/22* |
|        |      | 8,500' | D-294-396BS-M355-7BC | 7179-273 | 9/22* |
|        |      | 6,300' | A-607-820BS-M353-7BC | 7181-275 | 9/20* |
|        |      | 7,500' | B-825-820BS-M353-7BC | 7182-276 | 9/20* |
| O..... | 63½" | 9,500' | A-615-396BS-M355-7BC | 7177-271 | 9/22* |
|        |      | 6,500' | 051-820BS-M353-7BC   | 7180-274 | 9/20* |

## [28] MARSHALLS

Jaluit: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to government station on Emidj

|        |     |         |                         |          |       |
|--------|-----|---------|-------------------------|----------|-------|
| V..... | 24" | 19,000' | A-002(26BS-TM-SPEC-7BC) | 7143-454 | 9/20* |
|        |     | 19,000' | B-947(26BS-TM-SPEC-7BC) | 7144-455 | 9/20* |
|        |     | 19,000' | A-168(98BS-SP. MIS-7BC) | 7145-456 | 9/20* |
|        |     | 19,000' | B951(98BS-SP. MIS-7BC)  | 7146-457 | 9/20* |
|        |     | 20,000' | A-673(431BS-SPEC-7BC)   | 7147-458 | 9/21* |
| V..... | 20" | 5,000'  | MAG31 (VB-133)58        | 7188-464 | 10/4* |
|        |     | 5,000'  | MAG31 (VB-133)59A       | 7189-465 | 10/5* |
| V..... | 8¼" | 3,000'  | VM0155-76               | 7185-461 | 9/30* |
| O..... | 8¼" | 2,500'  | VM0155-78               | 7186-462 | 10/4* |
| O..... | 6¾" | 1,000'  | MAG-57                  | 7148-459 | 10/3* |
|        |     | 2,000'  | VM0155-76               | 7184-460 | 9/30* |
|        |     | 1,500'  | VM0155-78               | 7187-463 | 10/4* |
|        |     | 1,000'  | MAG31-60                | 7190-466 | 10/5* |
|        |     | 1,000'  | MAG31-59                | 7191-467 | 10/5* |
|        |     | Var.    | MAG31-56                | 7194-468 | 9/30* |
|        |     | 1,000'  | MAG31-61                | 7195-469 | 10/6* |

Maloeap: Selected distant oblique shots showing bomb damage to airfield on Taroa.

|        |      |        |            |          |       |
|--------|------|--------|------------|----------|-------|
| O..... | 63½" | 1,500' | VMSB331-72 | 6981-415 | 9/27* |
|        |      | 1,400' | VM0155-75  | 6982-416 | 9/30* |
|        |      | 2,000' | VM0155-70  | 6983-417 | 9/27* |
|        |      | 1,500' | VM0155-77  | 7183-418 | 10/3* |

Mille: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to airfield on Mille.

|        |     |        |           |          |       |
|--------|-----|--------|-----------|----------|-------|
| V..... | 8¼" | 2,000' | VM0155-69 | 6976-277 | 9/26* |
| O..... | 6¾" | 2,000' | VM0155-73 | 6973-274 | 9/29* |
|        |     | 1,800' | VM0155-74 | 6974-275 | 9/29* |
|        |     | 1,500' | VM0155-68 | 6975-276 | 9/28* |
|        |     | 1,800' | VM0155-69 | 6977-278 | 9/26* |

# 632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 including 13 October 1944—Continued

## MARSHALLS—Continued

Wotje: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to A/F on Wotje.

| V/O    | F. L.       | Alt.         | Sortie No.                  | Jlcpos #      | Date |
|--------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------------|---------------|------|
| V..... | 12'.....    | 16,800'..... | A-287(431BS-S. B.-7BC)..... | 6980-483..... | 9/2  |
| O..... | 6 3/4'..... | 1,000'.....  | MAG31-54.....               | 6978-481..... | 9/2  |
|        |             | 1,000'.....  | MAG31-55.....               | 6979-482..... | 9/2  |

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

(Important CINCPAC-CINCPOA translations of captured documents, POW interrogation reports issued during the past week).

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 75 (6 October 1944). Interrogation of an infantry private captured on GUAM. Principally concerned POW's opinions about morale in JAPAN and methods of inducing surrender Japanese troops. Sketch-map of barracks area in HAICHENG, near ANSON MANCHURIA. 8 pp.

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 76 (7 October 1944). Interrogation of member of a Navy Construction Battalion, captured on SAIPAN. Information on training and functions of such units. Sketch-maps of SAMA Naval Airfield near YOKOHAMA. 4 pp.

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 77 (7 October 1944). Interrogation of an infantry 1st lieutenant captured on SAIPAN. Detailed history of 9th Expeditionary Unit; brief order-of-battle information on other units. Detailed opinions of POW on Japanese military morale. 8 pp.

Item #9589 (7 October 1944). Plan for Naval Air Arsenal Organization of the PHILIPPINES; including excerpt from Naval Air Hq Secret #17497, 20 December 1943. 8 pp.

Item #11,072 (7 October 1944). Air Strength of the 1st Air Fleet and status of supply of ordnance, fuel and vehicles, at such bases as YAP, AMBON, DAPALAU, MARIANAS, HAIMAHERRA, etc., as of May 1944. 11 pp.

Item #9384 (7 October 1944). Northern MARIANAS Group OpOrd A-1 & #14 (CHARAN KAMOA, 26 29 May 1944): giving T/O of Group Fortifications. 3 pp.

Item #9783 (7 October 1944). Extract resume of a Naval Air Technical Division Secret Report on the Results of Research and Testing of the 1K1B Engine, dated August 1942. 10 pp.

Item #10,801 B (7 October 1944). Two tables giving data on Japanese aircraft and specifications and performance of experimental planes; undated. 3 pp.

Item #11,114 (7 October 1944). A list of Naval Air Groups and their locations; undated (presumably 1943). 3 pp.

Item #11,403 (7 October 1944). 1st Air Fleet (61st Air Flot): proposed schedule of transfer of Air Groups to the PHILIPPINES; undated. 5 pp.

Item #10,804 (7 October 1944). Japanese Navy Administrative Order No. 1942, 1943, 1944) dealing with Naval Guard Units and Specially Established Guard Units. This publication is a compilation of all available Navy Administrative Orders regarding these two classes of KEIBITAI, extracted from NAIREI TEIYOKU, with corrections and deletions. 60 pp.

Item #10,390 (9 October 1944). A Sketch of harbor installations at HAIKOWAN; undated. 1 p.

Item #10,415 (9 October 1944). A Sketch of MOJI Port Facilities; undated. 3 pp.

Item #10,959 (9 October 1944). A brief description of the sinking of the HIYORI MARU on 17 May 1944; and a T/O of the 3rd Co, 28th Ind Car Bn. 4 pp.

Item #11,112 (9 October 1944). Notes on Japanese shipping (mineral production in Japanese colonies, fuel, etc.) taken from a notebook; undated. 2 pp.

Item #11,405 (9 October 1944). Excerpts taken from the diary of a member of the Medical Admin Unit, Mt Arty Bn, 50th Inf Regt; TINIAN; entries from February through 29 July 1944. 8 pp.



Item #9882 (10 October 1944). A very full name list of officers assigned to units under the command of the 31st Army; dated May 1944. 105 pp.

Item #9883 (10 October 1944). A file of shipping Hq Orders; dated March through May 1944; showing troop movements for that period. 27 pp.

Item #10,103 (10 October 1944). Sketches of airfields in JAPAN, taken from a notebook; dated variously 1934 to 1943. 12 pp.

Item #10,130 and #10,130 A (10 October 1944). North Pacific Weather Summary Maps and text—translation of a Japanese Hydrographic Office publication. 24 charts.

Item #10,188 (10 October 1944). Communications Net for ROTA; undated. 1 p.

Item #10,015 (11 October 1944). Hq, 14th Div: Reported on Conditions; dated 5 April 1944. 13 pp.

Item #10,090 A&B (11 October 1944). Two standing orders of the 523rd Naval Air Group (February & April 1944) giving the organization of the air group. 11 pp.

Item #9961 A (11 October 1944). A table of specifications for important Japanese planes; undated. 8 pp.

Item #9660 (11 October 1944). Reports on supplies, ordnance and personnel for Central Pacific forces; dated February through April 1944. 23 pp.

Item #10,452 A (11 October 1944). 13th Div OpOrd A #4, giving T/O's and ordnance issues for subordinate units. Dated 22 October 1943. 13 pp.

Item #11,823 (12 October 1944). Sketch map of KOROR, MALAKAL, and ARAKABESAN Islands, PALAU, showing location of supply depots. 1 p.

Item #9945 (12 October 1944). Naval Technical Research Laboratories report on tests with an underground sound detector, dated 10 June 1943. 15 pp.

Item #10,127 (12 October 1944). Naval Air Technical Arsenal report on the Model 10 Rocket Launcher for the Type 97 #6 Land Bomb; dated February 1944. 15 pp.

Item #8635 (13 October 1944). Tables of symbols used by Japanese ordnance plants and ordnance depots. 4 pp.

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 78 (13 October 1944). Interrogation of an artillery private captured on SAIPAN. Description of POW's reaction to surrender inducements. Information on food supply and rationing in JAPAN. Considerable new information on airfields and factories in vicinity of NAGOYA; sketch-maps. 16 pp.

#### ERRATA

In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. I, No. 14, article entitled "The Jap Naval Air Force, a Synopsis", second paragraph on page 21 should be corrected to read "It moved to the MARIANAS following our February, 1944 (not September) successes, and until May, etc."

CINCPAC-CINCPHA Item No. 10,987, pages 1 and 2, for "CV RYŪJŌ" read "CVL RYŪHŌ" (entry for 27 March 1944).

[29]

#### JAP ARMY HQ

(Note: The following article was prepared by the War Department. Much of the information is included in the new edition of TM 30-48.)

*The Emperor.*—The Japanese Constitution provides that the Emperor is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, that he determines their organization, and that he declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties. He is advised by two military councils, namely, the Board of Marshals and Admirals and the Supreme Military Council.

*Imperial General Headquarters.*—In wartime or in case of grave emergency an Imperial Headquarters is established under the supervision of the Emperor to assist in the exercise of supreme command. It consists of the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, the Ministers of War and of Navy and a staff of specially selected officers.

*Army Heads* (Corresponds to U. S. War Dept.).—Subordinate to the Emperor and Imperial Headquarters the direction of the Army is in the hands of four principal agencies. These are:

- The General Staff (SAMBO HOMBU)
- The Ministry of War
- The Inspectorate General of Military Training
- The Inspectorate General of Aviation

*The General Staff.*—The General Staff comprises five bureaus: General Operations, Intelligence, Transport and Historical. It is charged with the coordination of war plans, the training and employment of combined arms, the direction of large maneuvers, the movement of troops, the compilation of field regulations, maps and military histories, and with supervision of the General Staff College, Land Survey Department and probably the Fortress Headquarters. The Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the Emperor. The General Staff is organized as shown in Figure 2. Sources available to the War Department prior to 1941 indicated that the five Bureaus of the General Staff were further subdivided into numbered Sections. However, recent sources, such as the Army List and recent Transfer Lists do not confirm the numbering of the Sections. The Sections apparently are still in existence, but it is not known how many there are, nor are their functions known.

*The Ministry of War.*—The Ministry of War is the administrative, supply, and mobilization agency of the Army. Its chief, the Minister of War, is a member of the Cabinet and provides liaison between the Army and the Diet. He may be a general or lieutenant general on the active list and he is directly responsible to the Emperor. The Ministry of War is subdivided into the Secretariat and eight bureaus.

[30] *The Inspectorate General of Military Training.*—The Inspector General of Military Training consists of a general affairs bureau, a second bureau (DAI NI BU), and several inspectorates, and is responsible for technical and tactical training of the separate arms, except the Air Corps and services not under the War Ministry.

*The Inspectorate General of Aviation.*—This agency was created by an order issued 7 December 1938 to supervise Air Corps training. It comprises a General Affairs Department and a Training Department and is headed by a general lieutenant general. In aviation training matters only is it directly responsible to the Emperor; in other respects, the Inspector General of Aviation is subordinate to the "Big Three" (Chief of General Staff, War Minister, and Inspector General of Military Training.) The Inspector General of Aviation may be promoted to rank with but after the "Big Three".

(Figures 1 and 2, appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 5, are tables of organization of the Japanese High Command and the Japanese Army General Staff Headquarters, respectively. These tables were found reproduced as Items Nos. 52 and 53, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### *The Air Headquarters and the Army General Staff.*

The relationship of the Army General Staff and the Air Headquarters has to be very close. Nominally the Army Air Force Headquarters (RIKUGUN KOKU HONBU), as the highest tactical command, comes far down the line of subordination from the Army High Command and under the Inspector-General of Aviation rather than under the Chief of the Army General Staff. But in the TOJO regime one and the same general, Jun USHIROKU, occupied the posts of Vice-Chief of Staff, Inspector-General of Aviation, and Chief of the Air Force Headquarters. It is not clear, however, that so close a relationship, bringing the command of air operations directly into the office of the Vice-Chief of Staff, will continue. In the shuffle of commands after TOJO's fall, General USHIO was relieved of his aviation posts. For the first time an Air Officer, Lt. Michio SUGAWARA, was placed in command of the Inspectorate-General of Aviation. He was made commander of Air Headquarters simultaneously, thus continuing the now customary combination of the posts. But he had not as long time been a General Staff Officer, and his appointment may mean the reversal of the trend away from Air Force autonomy which USHIROKU's position climaxed.

Nominally, of course, the Inspectorate-General of Aviation is one of the four agencies of the Army High Command, along with the War Ministry, the General Staff, and the Inspectorate-General of Military Education. Like the other three, it is responsible only to the Emperor.

#### *The Supreme War Council and the Army General Staff.*

The new Koiso cabinet has introduced a new element into the picture of the Japanese High Command in the formation of a Supreme Council for the Direction of the War.

of the War. Domei transmitted a rush bulletin 5 August announcing the Supreme Council (SAIKO SENSO SHIDO KAIGI) as follows:

"Having received Imperial Sanction, and in order to formulate a fundamental policy for directing war and in order to adjust the harmonization of the combined strategy of politics and war, a Supreme Council for the Direction of War has been hereby established."

More recently a 14 September broadcast ascribed more specific functions to the Council. It was created, according to the announcement, to "harmonize and adjust state affairs and the High Command." Its function is "to unify the administration and the strategy of carrying out the task of modern warfare, but also extends to deciding the basic policies of administration, foreign affairs, and economy." Broad as such powers seem, the procedure outlines for the Council seems to place it high enough to carry them out. "The procedure of the Council," the announcement went on, "is to hand down to the Cabinet supreme policies decided by the Council which \* \* \* the Cabinet and the various Ministries will \* \* \* put into force."

The new Council, then, becomes the supreme power in the Empire, relegating the Cabinet to the position of an administrative body. The announcement of 14 September in fact called it "a powerful combined strength of the Army and Navy \* \* \* the fountainhead from which the measures to be enacted by the KOISO-YONAI joint cabinet will originate."

As the only source of information on the new Council is the official announcements of the Japanese, one must turn to inference for further explanation of its creation and function. Much light can be drawn from the composition of the Council. While no persons were named, the Japanese did announce its membership to include the War and Navy Ministers, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief of the Navy General Staff, and the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals.

The Council's membership, thus, represents a broadening of the basis from which Army and Navy influence upon JAPAN's war decisions can be drawn. It is to be observed that the Council's members are the members of the Imperial General Headquarters, plus senior officers of Army and Navy. The Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals already exists as a body, made up of elder statesmen in the two military branches, advisory to the Emperor on matters of military policy. To include them in the new Council is an obvious means of calling upon a wider circle of Army and Navy opinion and healing the rift so evident between Army and Navy [33] In the last months of TOJO's regime. Significantly, too, the Japanese have reverted to the practice of setting up a headless group in supreme place, combining in the new Supreme Council nearly all the reins of command over Cabinet and Armed Forces alike which TOJO had gathered into his own hands. Significantly, too, the same officers who ran JAPAN's war effort as the Imperial General Headquarters, still do so, as the nucleus of the Council.

The evidence is thus that the General Staff of the Army still functions behind the scenes as one of the chief ruling bodies of JAPAN. The new KOISO cabinet has brought it still closer, perhaps, to the Navy, but it has not changed its role and its influence.

#### 5 CM GROUND-MOUNTED NAVAL GUN

Information concerning this weapon is incomplete in view of the fact that plates were missing when the weapon was captured. However, examination has revealed several points not covered in a preliminary report published in "Weekly Intelligence," Vol. I, No. 5.

This weapon is a naval gun adapted to a ground mount, apparently designed from a British piece. Principle data on the gun includes:

|                                     |                          |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Overall weight : 500 lbs. (approx.) | Elevation : —11° to —21° |
| Length of tube : 4'8"               | Traverse : None.         |
| Recoil : 6"                         |                          |

It is equipped with a box-type single trail with a lunette through which a stake is driven to prevent the gun from moving to the rear when fired. There are no spades. The trunnions are attached to the one-piece, cold-worked steel tube at the center of gravity and mounted on the extension of the trail directly above the axle.

The breech cannot be opened when the maximum elevation is approached because of interference of the trail.

The photo below shows the captured gun.

(The photograph referred to *supra*, being of a Japanese 5 Ground-Mounted Naval Gun, will be found reproduced as Item 54, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### JAPANESE TYPE 3 LAND MINE

A Japanese document captured in the MARIANAS presents an explanation of a new type land mine. This is the first data available to Allied forces. It is important to note that data on this mine is derived from an enemy document and is not yet verified by contact in combat. The mine, known as the Type 3 Land Mine, has no exposed parts made of metal, and its presence would be extremely difficult to detect by use of standard mine detecting equipment. The mine case is made of terra-cotta, is circular in shape and has an earthen collar. The outer surface is unglazed. The fuze body, cover, plunger and striker spring are made of bakelite. The fuze seat is of hard rubber. The springs, pins and striker, all contained inside the fuze, are the only metal parts in the mine.

The mine is manufactured in two sizes. The larger mine is 27 cm (10½ in.) in diameter and 9 cm (3½ in.) thick. It contains approximately 3 kg. (6½ lbs.) of explosive and is assertedly effective against personnel at a radius of 10 meters (33 feet). The smaller mine is 22 cm (8½ inches) in diameter and 9 cm thick, contains 2 kg. (4½ lbs.) of high explosive and has an effective anti-personnel radius reported to be about 8 meters (26 feet). Both mines are considered to be effective against the tracks of a heavy tank. The bursting charges may be of any of the following composition: Ammonium nitrate (50%); TNT (50%); Ammonium nitrate (90%); Dinitro naphthalene (10%); Ammonium perchlorate (75%); Ferro-silicon (16%); Sawdust (6%); crude oil (3%).

The most interesting development in the new mine is the fuze. It may be operated by pressure of pull after the safety pin has been removed, and, according to the document, will function satisfactorily even after being buried in the ground for long periods of time. A percussion hammer located within the fuze is held in position by a release fork to which a trip wire may be attached. When the wire is pulled, the fork releases the hammer which is forced downward by the percussion hammer spring. The hammer comes in contact with the striker forcing it against the percussion cap. When pressure is applied directly on the head of the fuze, the plunger spring is compressed, and the entire plunger group, moving as a unit, is forced downward. The hammer comes in contact with the head of the striker and again forces it against the percussion cap. A pressure of approximately 2 kg. (4½ lbs.) or a pull of about 10 kg. (22 lbs.) is stated to be required to cause detonation.

(The sketch referred to, *infra*, being of a section of a Type 3 Land Mine Fuze, will be found reproduced as Item No. 55, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The fuze is threaded so as to be interchangeable with the standard type 100 dual action artillery fuzes. By substituting the fuze for one of the standard fuzes, any common mortar or howitzer shell may be converted into a very effective land mine or booby trap. It may also be used as a block of picric acid, TNT or other explosive and used similarly.

The mine's sensitivity to detonation by a normal fall is stated to be negligible. Dropped from a height of 0.5 meter (1½ feet) onto a concrete floor the mine will assertedly not explode, and it can safely be dropped on ordinary ground from a height of 4 meters (13 feet).

Because of its color and unfinished surface, the mine may be easily camouflaged in almost any terrain. It is considered to be greatly superior to previously reported mines designed for the same purposes.

The preceding sketch and following photos are captured photographs showing details of this Type 3 Land Mine. Most of the information presented herein is derived from CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 11,431 which will not be published in any other form.

(The photographs referred to *supra*, being two in number and having several items on each photograph, are as follows:

1. [a] Sketch of a Type 3 Land Mine; [b] photograph of Type 3 Land Mine and Fuze; [c] photograph showing packing of Type 3 Land Mine; and [d] photograph of fragments from Type 3 Land Mine.
2. [a] Photograph of Type 3 Land Mine with trip wires tied to sticks of wood; [b] photograph showing explosion of Type 3 Mine; and [c] photograph showing component parts of Type 3 Land Mine Fuze.

These photographs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 56 and 57, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear six separate items with several photographs on each item as follows:

1. Three views of a wrecked phosphate plant at Angaur.
2. [a] Photograph of small boat basin north of Angaur; [b] photograph of phosphate loading pier, Angaur; and [c] photograph of destroyed warehouses in Angaur.
3. [a] Photograph of a Jap 37 mm anti-tank gun in covered emplacement on Saipan; [b] photograph of Jap pillbox defending western side of Angaur; and [c] photograph of a personnel shelter.
4. [a] Photograph of a Jap 75 mm gun emplacement near Middle Village, Angaur; and [b] two views of a Jap 75 mm anti-aircraft gun at Angaur.
5. [a] Photograph showing manner in which Japanese at Angaur strung heavy rope between trees on the beach; and [b] two photographs showing two types of anti-boat obstacles encountered at Angaur.
6. [a] Photograph of remains of Jap lighthouse demolished by naval gunfire prior to U. S. landings at Angaur; and [b] photograph of an anti-tank trench along beach near a Saipan town.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### YAP

[43] Outflanked YAP, Jap island outpost between new U. S. bases at PELELIU and GUAM, was an important secondary target during landings in southern PALAU. YAP's military installations were extensively worked over by Allied surface units and aircraft, with results indicated in the photographs reproduced here.

In pre-war days, YAP—a compact group of four large and ten small islands, with a land area of only 83 square miles—was known chiefly as an important cable station and as the home of curiously primitive natives. YAP was linked by cable with PALAU, MENADO, the PHILIPPINES, and the Empire, as well as GUAM and the UNITED STATES. Anthropologists and ethnologists were intrigued by the natives, whose superstitions have persisted despite the efforts of missionaries.

Sensing impending U. S. moves in the CAROLINES, the Japs in early 1944, began an airfield on RULL Island. A prisoner claims the field was completed in April. According to this POW, elements of the 343rd, 523rd and 261st Air Groups were based here. Maximum A/C strength prior to our strikes was estimated by the prisoner as 40 bombers and 60 fighters, although photo reconnaissance never showed more than 45 planes.

Military installations on YAP include one airfield, three radio stations, and RDF installations, and a small seaplane base. These are protected by strong coast defense and AA gun positions as well as anti-invasion defenses. Beach defenses were strengthened recently and many new boat barriers constructed. It is difficult to assess the admitted heavy damage suffered by the airfield has however, definitely been neutralized.

The Jap garrison strength of YAP is estimated as about 8,000. Of this 5000 are reported attached to the 49th Independent Mixed Brigade, 800 46th Guard Force, plus 1200 air base personnel and about 1000 construction personnel. Women and children, said a POW, were evacuated to PALAU some time ago.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear four photographs as follows:

1. Photograph of Yap town under attack by carrier planes.
2. Photograph showing burning aircraft at Yap's soggy airfield.
3. Photograph showing the bomb-scarred and shell-pocked landing area of Yap's airfield.
4. Photograph showing a marine rifleman leading the way to a General Sherman tank at Horseshoe Valley, Peleliu.

The foregoing paragraphs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 65, 66, and 67, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.

*Confidential*  
20 Oct. 1944

#### JAPANESE AERIAL TACTICS AGAINST SHIP TARGETS

#### "KNOW YOUR ENEMY!"

(Addendum to CinCPac-CinCPOA—"Weekly Intelligence" Vol 1, No. 15)

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| Search and Reconnaissance | ----- |
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(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a sketch caricaturing a Japanese aviator throwing a bomb by hand. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 68, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### [1]

#### INTRODUCTORY

This study brings together an assortment of documentary evidence bearing on Japanese tactical doctrine for aerial operations against ship targets. No attempt has been made here to collate available information on other phases of Japanese warfare.

Although most of the material contained in this study is drawn from Japanese documents, this has been supplemented by such unofficial documents and POW information as appears to be logical and consistent.

It is important to note that the tactics outlined represent Japanese *theory* of doctrine, and may not be followed in combat.

Exact evaluation of such tactical information is difficult, because: (1) Japanese experience postdating available evidence may have changed enemy conduct; (2) operating units in any given case may not rigidly adhere to official doctrine; (3) it is not clear whether some documents reflect the tactical thinking of a particular Air Group or that of the Naval Air Force.

One final word of caution must be added. Study of this article will not reveal that the enemy has given much thought to the problem of tracking ship units and guiding the attack group into the position for a run. Fairly elaborate

tracking and liaison methods have been developed. These may well become out-moded and of scant importance as Jap airborne radar improves.

Despite the limitations indicated above, however, the material presented here is believed significant. It forms a fairly comprehensive background for the study of Jap tactics as well as a basis on which future tactics may be assessed.

#### SEARCH AND RECONNAISSANCE

The doctrine for the Southeast Area Fleet succinctly points out that the function of a recce unit is reconnaissance, and warns the unit to avoid combat if this would interfere with the primary mission.

The normal search radius for a medium bomber (BETTY) is 600-660 nautical miles, or, in the event of anticipated action, 700 miles. Recce seaplanes (JAKE) may be expected to search a radius of 250 to 300 nautical miles, and carrier attack planes (JILL) 350 nautical miles. Flying boats (EMILY) may fly a radius of 1000 to 1200 nautical miles.

A captured chart, reproduced as Figure 12, in the center spread of this addendum, sets forth a comprehensive search plan for TRUK, PALAU, WOLEAI, and SAIPAN. The date of the document is not given, but appears to refer to projected enemy searches in April (1944). All the sectors shown were not to be covered each day. Sectors to be flown were to be selected either by the day or according to a general plan. In some cases, it is known that the odd-numbered sectors were covered on even-numbered days, and vice-versa. Of course, if there was any indication of an Allied amphibious operation from a given direction, or if Allied ships or subs were sighted, searches were to be concentrated in this area.

[2] The following search plans, designed to meet particular tactical situations, have been taken from captured documents:

(A sketch relating to the "Patrol Search Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 1, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is designated as the "*patrol search method*", and is recommended for night searches.

Each plane flies in an angular figure eight, dropping a flare each time it crosses its base point. After a given patrol line has been covered the planes advance to a new patrol line in the direction of the enemy force.

(A sketch relating to the "Search Sector Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 2, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is designated the "*search sector method*". It is specified for use when the course of the enemy is not known and when it is necessary to carry out an abbreviated search with a small number of planes.

In this method target lights are dropped at the four corners of a square and the aircraft flies back and forth in parallel lines within the marked area.

(A sketch relating to the "Sweep Search Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 3, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is designated as the "*sweep search method*". This method is used on moonlit nights when the visibility is particularly good, or when the object of the search is a large force.

In this method a number of planes fly out from a common base and advance in parallel lines.

(A sketch referring to a "Night Search Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 4, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[3] This is a "*night search method*" for use by a radar-equipped plane.

The "a" on the diagram varies with the altitude. If radar conditions are favorable, it will be determined according to Table 1, (which follows the next

search plan). If radar conditions are unfavorable, the value for "a" is decreased to correspond with the decreased efficiency of the radar.

(A sketch relating to a method used for "Night Search" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used for "night search" employing two planes equipped with radar. Distance "d" is set by the commander of the unit and is based on the degree of certainty of the general position of the enemy and the lapse of time between the time of the discovery of the enemy and the beginning of the search. The value for "a" is determined by the following table. The search is planned so that a rectangle with sides of 2 "d", which has as its center the presumed position of the enemy, will be thoroughly searched.

| Altitude, meters.....<br>feet..... |                   | Over 1500<br>5000   | 750-1000<br>2500-3300 | 500-750<br>1650-2600 | 200-500<br>600-1600 |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| A                                  | Flying Boat.....  | 60 nautical miles.. | 45 nautical miles..   | 40 nautical miles..  | 30 nautical miles.. |
|                                    | Recece Seaplane.. | 40 nautical miles.. | 35 nautical miles..   | 30 nautical miles..  | 20 nautical miles.. |

Table No. 1

(Comment: This chart probably reflects a fairly realistic Japanese conception of the ranges of their own radar installed in EMILYs and JAKEs at the attack.)

(A sketch relating to "Search Plan for Use When the Distance Involved Is More Than 500 Miles" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 6a, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[4] This is a "search plan for use when the distance involved is more than 500 miles". The various factors, such as distance of the search base line (a), the search angle (c) (45 degrees in the absence of special orders), the interval between search lines (b), the lateral distance to be covered (e) and the number of planes to be used, are determined in advance. The interval "b" is less than twice the range of visibility.

This method is used when the course of the enemy is not known or it is thought that it may intersect the search base line at a large angle.

(A sketch referring to the next succeeding paragraph, being a search plan for use when it is thought the angle of intersection of the course of the enemy and the search base line will be small, will be found reproduced as Figure No. 6b, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This plan is used when it is thought that the angle of intersection of the course of the enemy and the search base line will be small.

(A sketch showing a search plan "for daily patrol on long distances of over 500 miles" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 7a, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used principally "for daily patrol on long distances of over 500 miles". The interval "b" is less than twice the range of visibility. The search distance (1) will be  $\frac{1}{10}$  of the total width of the search out made by turning in the same direction. The return angle (E) will be from 0 to 15 degrees depending on the anticipated angle of intersection between the course of the enemy and the base line of the search.

This plan is used when the number of planes available is large.

(A sketch showing a search plan for daily patrol on long distances of over 500 miles where the number of planes available is small will be found reproduced as Figure No. 7b, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)



[5] This method is used under the same circumstances as 7a where the number of planes available is small. The symbols have the same meaning here as in 7a.

(A sketch relating to a search method "when it is possible to predict the enemy's approximate course", mentioned in the next succeeding paragraph, will be found reproduced as Figure No. 8, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used "*when it is possible to predict the enemy's approximate course*" and when there is a small number of planes available.

(b) interval between the search lines will be less than four times the range of visibility.

(1) lateral distance will be one half of (b).

The search base line must be parallel to the expected course of the enemy.

(A sketch relating to a search method "when an attempt is made to search an area of broad frontage with a few planes" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 10a, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[6] This method is used "*when an attempt is made to search an area of broad frontage with a few planes*" or, when a rough estimate can be made of the general position, course, and speed of the enemy as in the case of enemy supply routes.

This plan is used when search is to be made in a direction opposite to that of the enemy's course.

Distances 1 and 1' are figured as follows:

$$1 = \frac{2dV_f}{V_f + V_e} \quad \begin{array}{l} V_f \text{ equals plane speed} \\ V_e \text{ equals speed of enemy} \\ d \text{ equals visibility} \end{array}$$

$$1' = 2d - \frac{(2L+1) V_e}{V_f}$$

No method for determining L is given.

(A sketch relating to a search plan "when a search is to be made in close pursuit of an enemy" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 10b, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This plan is used *when a search is to be made in close pursuit of an enemy*. The distances 1 and 1' are determined as follows:

$$1 = \frac{2dV_f}{V_f - V_e}$$

$$1' = 2d - \frac{(2L+L) V_e}{V_f}$$

Symbols have the same meaning as in 10a.

(A sketch relating to a search plan "for use of the night, or when visibility is poor" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11a, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[7] A plan *for use of night, or when visibility is poor*. Starting points are selected to the rear of the enemy. The base lines of the search should coincide with the expected course of the enemy.

L—length of search—no method for determining is given.

1—lateral distance—twice the range of visibility plus the length of the enemy force.

A—angle of change of course. Will the 20 degrees except where change indicated.

(A sketch showing an alternate plan of search for use at night or when visibility is poor will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11b, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

An alternate to 11a using three planes.

(A sketch showing still another alternate plan of search at or when visibility is poor, using four planes, will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11c, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

An alternate to 11a using four planes.

Distance between starting points will be more than twice the lateral distance.

(A sketch showing a plan of search to be used on moonlight when the visibility is good will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11d, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[8] This plan is to be used on moonlight nights when the visibility is poor. The symbols have the same meaning as in 11a. In this plan the base line will be at right angles to the enemy's course. This illustration shows the plane operates with three planes.

#### TRACKING

After a target has been located, it is followed by one or more planes such time as the Japanese attack unit is in a position to attack.

Flying boats (EMILYs) and recon seaplanes (JAKEs) are used in night tracking, (i. e., from about two hours after sunset until about an hour and before dawn). During the daytime less vulnerable planes are used.

According to one source, night tracking operations should be carried out at altitudes of 2500 to 5000 feet, while in the daytime, dependent largely on visibility, higher altitudes are flown.

The following series of rather rough tracking plans are taken from a combat notebook, with the comments. These plans are designed for use at night.

(A sketch showing an elliptical maneuver in tracking the enemy will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Elliptical maneuver. To be used during good visibility when the pilot can track the enemy while keeping him in sight by contact flying.

In this maneuver the pilot flies "d" distance away from the target, where "d" is said to be about 8200 feet.

(A sketch showing a maneuver used to track more than one ship will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[9] This is a maneuver used to track more than one ship, and "d" represents the limit of visibility (about 8200 feet), while the distance flown aft from the target is 3300 feet. This short distance is flown in order to make a close reconnaissance of the target.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver used for the purpose of making a close reconnaissance on one ship will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is used for the purpose of making a close reconnaissance on one ship. Three sides of the box are flown at the limit of visibility, while the fourth side is flown at 3300 feet.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the wind is of high velocity will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is flown at approximately right angles to the course of the ship at times when the wind is of high velocity. The probable purpose is to keep the plane in sight of the target without running quickly down wind and being forced to buck back against it.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the wind velocity is high will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

small will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is likewise flown at right angles to the course of the enemy. It is stated to be effective for use *when the wind velocity is small.*

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a chart of Japanese air searches out of Truk, Woleai, Palau and Saipan. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 71, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(A sketch referring to a tracking maneuver when the enemy force is great and there is no danger of losing it will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[12] This figure eight should be flown only *when the enemy force is great and there is no danger of losing it* if the plane temporarily loses contact.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the target can be kept against the moon will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is to be flown *when the target can be kept against the moon.*

The following tracking plans, all but one of which contemplate the use of radar, were taken from an operation order of the 11th Recce Unit.

(A sketch showing a flying boat tracking method designed for night work will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is a *flying boat method designed for night work.* As indicated in the diagram, the plane flies out of radar range on each leg. The altitude should be as high as possible. The plane employs a lateral beam. (This probably refers to the beam created by the radar antenna mounted on the side of the fuselage, which has been found in some Jap planes.)

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver designed for seaplanes will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[13] This is the same basic method as the one previously shown but is designed for *recce seaplanes.* Forty-five rather than seventy degree turns are employed.

(A sketch showing a tracking method designed for use where there is interference by enemy fighter planes will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is designed for use where there is interference by enemy fighter planes. It may take any pattern and simply consists of getting a radar contact, flying out of radar range and returning from a different direction until another radar contact is obtained.

(A sketch showing a tracking method to be used after the target is located by radar will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 6, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used after the target is located by radar. It is used by flying boats and recce planes. It is designed for two planes. (Apparently one plane describes a rectangle ahead of the target and another in back of the target.)

(A sketch showing a tracing method without the use of radar will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 7, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[14] This is a method for tracking without the use of radar. It employs target markers.

## HOMING THE ATTACK UNIT

Action reports from the early days of the war report the activities of Japanese snoopers. Their function is not only to locate and track the target to get the attack unit over the target in a position for an attack. In some cases the guide plane may be simply a bellwether, equipped with superior communications and navigational equipment and manned by competent personnel. Frequently, however, the guide plane is the snoopers, i. e.; a plane in contact with the target.

It is clear from documents that the attack unit, or a relief tracking plane, may be brought in on the radar of the snoopers or by the use of RDF equipment. The tracking plane is advised to keep the radar and communication mission at a minimum during the tracking operation. However, when the attack unit is coming in for the attack. A sudden increase in communications, or the commencement of the transmission of RDF, is a reasonable indication that the attack group or a relief plane is being homed in to the target. The following table, which was an annex to an official order (source and date unknown), shows the communication between the attack unit and the tracking plane. The general authenticity of the pattern set forth is corroborated by fragmentary references found in other documents.

(Note: Those marked \* to be used only when necessary)

| Attack Unit                                         | Tracking Unit                                                        | Notes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                     | Discovery of enemy: Strength, positions, base course, speed.         | For dive bombing report accurately the direction and velocity at 1600 feet. For low altitude bombing (TN: below 3300 feet) report the direction and velocity at 650 feet.                                                                                                                  |
|                                                     | [16] Weather in enemy area. Standard altitude for tracking position. |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Expected time of arrival over battle area.          |                                                                      | Direction of approach. Direction of approach is that of course of approach.                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Direction of approach.                              |                                                                      | Unless under special order, direction of approach is from direction of moon or of twilight.                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| *Method of Attack Method No. ....                   |                                                                      | Method of Attack.<br>(1) Unilluminated torpedo attack.<br>(2) Illuminated torpedo attack.<br>(3) Unilluminated dive bombing.<br>(4) Illuminated dive bombing.<br>(5) Unilluminated low altitude bombing.<br>(6) Illuminated low altitude bombing.                                          |
| Commerce transmitting RDF guide Beam! (MUSEN YUDO). |                                                                      | Unless under special order, commence tracking RDF guide beam 45 minutes before attack unit reaches battle area.                                                                                                                                                                            |
|                                                     | We are transmitting RDF guide beam.                                  | The RDF guide beam plane, ten minutes before attack unit reaches battle area, will put out signalling light in direction of attack unit to attempt to guide it.                                                                                                                            |
| *Drop parachute flares!                             |                                                                      | "Drop parachute flares!" Each time a flare is dropped over the enemy.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| (Continue to drop parachute flares!)                | We are dropping parachute flares.                                    | Continue to "drop parachute flares!" Flares dropped at about two minute intervals.                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| *We recognize the tracking unit's parachute flares. |                                                                      | About three course target lights, (KHOSHOTEI) or flare landing lights (SHOTODAN CHAKUSUI SHOMEITEI) are dropped near the enemy. They are dropped with regard to the speed of the enemy. On this point if the situation warrants it, low altitude (TN: below 3300 feet) may be carried out. |
| [16] *Indicate enemy position!                      |                                                                      | Reported without fail if it is to be a torpedo. If the situation warrants it, pyrotechnics are used as well as radio.                                                                                                                                                                      |
|                                                     | Enemy speed. Report of enemy course.                                 | Parachute flares GREEN: Enemy changing course to starboard.<br>GREEN-GREEN: Enemy changing course sharply to starboard.<br>RED: Enemy changing course to port.<br>RED-RED: Enemy changing course sharply to port.                                                                          |
| *Commence illumination!!                            |                                                                      | Parachute flares, Model 2, dropped so as to give a continuous illuminated background.                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Peel off!                                           |                                                                      | In the event that the attack unit is to be dropped by itself, if necessary, it will maintain illumination (HOSOKU SHOMEI WO)                                                                                                                                                               |

A captured notebook states that the RDF should be transmitted thirty minutes before the estimated time of arrival of the attack unit.

When the RDF system of homing is used, it is apparently intended that the tracking plane shall guide the attack unit over the target and not to the guide plane. In two separate sources, diagrams illustrating the method of guiding the attack unit in seem to emphasize this point. One of the diagrams is as follows:

(The diagram referred to in the foregoing paragraph illustrating a method of guiding an attack unit in will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[17] (Comment: If this scheme is followed, the target, by intercepting the RDF signal, should be able to determine the line upon which the attack unit is approaching.)

The tracking plane is instructed to fly at a low altitude while transmitting RDF and it is stated that where the distances are short and the altitudes high there is likely to be great inaccuracy in the directions indicated. It is further stated that the method is practically useless at altitudes of greater than 6500 feet.

#### ILLUMINATION

Japanese doctrine states that targets should be illuminated only when there is not sufficient natural light. The following table gives the periods when it is considered that illumination should be used.

| Moon Age        | Visibility                                                | Illumination |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| 10-20 days..... | Visibility good but with some mist and cirrus clouds..... | No.          |
| 5-10.....       | Visibility good but with light mist.....                  | No.          |
| 20-25.....      |                                                           |              |
| 1-5.....        | Regardless.....                                           | Yes.         |
| 26-28.....      |                                                           |              |

(Comment: Despite the above, it is noted that throughout discussions of illuminated attack, continual reference is made to the method of approach in which there is an assumption of some moonlight.)

Approaches should always be made so that the target is between the attack unit and the moon. (This piece of advice constantly recurs in documents.) The attack should be timed to take advantage of the greater visibility of the target when the moon is above 10 degrees and below 50 degrees above the horizon. It is more difficult to see the target when the moon is high.

[18] The actual illumination of the target may be accomplished by the tracking plane or by a couple of planes from the attack unit especially designated for the job. In either event, the technique is the same. When the attack unit is 20 nautical miles from the target, the tracking plane drops course lights in the rear of the target. As soon as the attack unit is able to see the course lights, it maneuvers to approach from the proper position with respect to the moon. When in proper position, the attack unit gives the signal for the illumination at which time para-flares are dropped on the side of the target away from the attack unit. One prisoner of war has stated that the flares are dropped to form a Vee, with the point indicating the direction from which the attack should be made, and it is noted that the following illustration seems to confirm that statement.

(A sketch referring to the foregoing paragraph and showing a method of dropping flares to form a Vee, will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 8, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

One source claims that planes of the attack unit are supposed to drop flares at intervals of five to seven minutes when they are within 50 nautical miles of the target. This is so basically unsound from a tactical stand-point that the Japanese would probably do so only if the other methods of homing were proving completely inadequate.

Some sources indicate, as does the communication table in Section III, that flares should be dropped directly over the target. This, it is thought, would be

done when it was otherwise difficult to inform the attack unit of the position of the target prior to the actual illumination.

After each plane has made its run or dive it is directed to drop a flare to illuminate the target for the succeeding planes of the attack unit.

[19]

#### THE ATTACK

The Japanese have long recognized the value of a coordinated attack by bombers, torpedo bombers and horizontal bombers. In the early days of the war there are examples of such attacks. More recent action reports are difficult to analyze because they do not show any very clear pattern; this may be due to the relative efficiency of the pilots and to the fact that, in the modern task force, what started out to be well-planned attacks simply broke up in the face of the opposition encountered.

In any event, the coordinated attack is planned for the particular occasion and may employ the various aircraft in an almost infinite variety of patterns. Other than statements generally recognizing the value of such an attack, statements of doctrine relative to the coordinated attack have been few. Hence these notes are concerned largely with dive, glide and torpedo attacks which have been given some attention in documents recovered.

#### A. DIVE BOMBING

Dive bombers should approach to within 50 nautical miles of the target in normal flight formation. Aircraft should be in close formation in order to maintain their defensive firepower and at the same time simplify communication and receive more effective support from the fighter escort.

Two examples of a normal flight formation are as follows:

(Two examples of a normal dive bomber flight formation, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[20] At about fifty nautical miles from the target, a screening formation is taken. (Some documents omit this intermediate step.) A diagram of the screening formation is as follows:

(The diagram referred to in the foregoing paragraph showing the screening formation at about 50 nautical miles from the target will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

A high altitude approach is favored if visibility and cloud conditions are favorable. Approach altitudes of from 13,000 to 33,000 feet are given in various documents, with approaches at 18,000 to 20,000 feet being favored. Observations in the field tends to confirm the later altitudes as reasonably standard.

For night approaches, the following altitudes are given. Full moon (20 days old) fine weather and good visibility: 10,000 to 13,000 feet. With full moon, light clouds and good visibility, or with full moon, fine weather and a certain amount of mist in the air: 6,500 to 10,000 feet. With new moon (or 20-25 days) fine weather, and good visibility: 8,000 to 11,500 feet. With full moon, fine weather and misty air: 5,000 to 8,000 feet. It is said that where above is standard, the succeeding planes may come in at higher altitudes being stepped up.

At a distance of from 33,000 to 65,000 feet from the target, the attack formation is taken. It consists generally of a column, or, where the attack is made from two or more directions, two or more columns. An altitude of 6,500 feet is preferred at this time and is maintained until the order for attack is given, at which time the formation files to an altitude of about 6,500 feet at an air speed of more than 140 knots.

The planes push over and dive at 60° to an altitude of 1600 to 1800 feet at which altitude bombs are released. The No. 1 plane peels off first, followed by short intervals by the succeeding planes. It is stated that a smoothly coordinated attack by 36 planes can be accomplished in three minutes, and some reports of attacks in the early days of the war indicate that this is a reasonable estimate.

[21] Normally, the approach is made directly to the target, but it is recommended that:

- a. When the sun is high, fly out of it;
- b. At dawn and dusk, fly out of the dark;
- c. Fly against the blue of the sky rather than the white of the clouds;
- d. Make use of scattered clouds.

When the wind is negligible (below 50 feet per second), it is recommended that the dive be from the bow or stern. If the wind is greater than 50 feet per second, the dive should be made with the wind at the tail of the plane.

There seems to be no particular preference with respect to dives from the bow or stern, although a majority of the diagrams show the dives as being made bow to stern.

*The "multiple formation" attack in which different elements come in from different directions is stressed in documents. A typical sketch is as follows:*

(The sketch referred to in the foregoing paragraph showing "multiple formation" attack in which different elements come in from different directions, will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Other similar diagrams show the second and third sections attacking at angles of 20° on the bow. Where there are only two sections, the bow to stern dive from dead ahead is omitted.

The preferred evasive tactic is a high speed, low altitude retirement along a predetermined course.

The No. 1 plane performs an important function in that it indicates the target, its course and speed; the wind direction and speed; the point of aim; bomb release altitude; direction of retirement; and rendezvous point. The planes following No. 1 observe its bomb drops and correct on them.

It is estimated that to make five or six direct hits 18 planes are required, of which eight will be shot down.

[22]

#### B. GLIDE BOMBING

The general doctrine applicable to dive bombing is applicable to glide bombing. Glide bombing is prescribed when, because of visibility, sufficient altitude cannot be gained for dive bombing. It seems to be standard for night attacks.

The push-over into the glide is at 3300 feet. The angle of the glide is 40° to 45°. The bombs are released at 1000 feet during the day and at 1300 feet at night.

#### C. TORPEDO ATTACKS

There is relatively little documentary evidence on Jap torpedo doctrine. Information available indicates that the approach formations are very similar to those employed in dive bombing.

Standard approach altitude is stated to be 6500 to 10,000 feet. Observations in recent encounters indicate that when within radar range an altitude of 160 feet or less is used. One prisoner of war stated that the approach until near the formation was at 3300 to 5000 feet after which the planes dropped to about 160 feet.

When the attack has started, the aircraft fly in a loose string, although in the face of heavy AA they may come in line abreast on a broad front. Diagrams of torpedo attacks follow:

(The diagrams of torpedo attacks mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No. 73, and Sketch No. 9, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[23] There are documentary references to an individual method of approach, in which the torpedo plane approaches on a course parallel to that of the target and then turns in toward the target for the drop.

One source states that the torpedo should be dropped from altitudes of 160 feet at an air speed of 160 knots; according to other sources, from 330 feet at an air speed of 140 to 160 knots. Reports indicate that torpedoes have been released at altitudes varying from 50 to 500 feet.

The release point is uniformly stated to be 2600 to 4000 feet depending on the course of the target. (Horizontal distance.)

(A sketch showing three release  
will be found reproduced as Sketch 1  
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry

## HEWITT INQUIRY I

(Exhibit No. 6 consists of ONI I  
Submarines", being a compilation of  
relating to Japanese submarines. It  
produced, in its entirety, as Items No  
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry

## HEWITT INQUIRY I

Exhibit No. 7 is a Berthing Plan at  
which will be found reproduced as  
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry

## HEWITT INQUIRY I

SECRET

Naval message—Na

|                          |                       |                      |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Drafter.....             | Extension Number..... |                      |
| From: COM 14.            |                       | Asteri<br>dress<br>F |
| Released by.....         |                       |                      |
| Date: 26 November 1941.  |                       |                      |
| TOR Coderoom.....        |                       |                      |
| Decoded by A. V. PERING. |                       | In                   |
| Paraphrased by.....      |                       |                      |
| Routed by.....           |                       |                      |

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmi  
and as administrative.

260110

Originator fill in date and time: Date Time C  
On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch cle

## COPEK

For past month Commander Second Fle  
which comprises following units:

Second Fleet, Third Fleet including

First Defense Division, combined Air

Subron Five and possible units of Batd

In messages concerning these units South  
force have appeared as well as the Naval St

Third Base Force at Palao and Rno Palao  
communications with Second Fleet Comm

Combined Air Force has assembled in Ta  
ponents have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in  
Second Base Force appears transporting

Takao radio today accepted traffic for  
submarine division or squadron.

Crudiv Seven and Desron Three appear as  
South China.

There is believed to be strong concentrat  
the Marshalls which comprise Airron Twe  
unit plus probably one-third of the submarin



Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
OPNAV-NCR-15

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

| Drafter ..... Extension Number 2927                                                                                  | Addressees                                                                                      | Precedence                       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>From:</b> COMSIXTEEN.<br><b>Released by:</b> .....<br><b>Date:</b> 26 November 1941.<br><b>TOR:</b> Coderoom..... | Asterisk (*) mailgram addressee:<br>For action:<br>CINCPAC.<br>OPNAV.<br>COMFOURTEEN.<br>CINCAF | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred. |
| <b>Decoded:</b> P. R. WHITE.<br><b>Paraphrased by:</b> .....<br><b>Routed by:</b> .....                              | <b>Information:</b>                                                                             | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred  |

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

If operational  
check below  
☐

261331

Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT  
On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text

Morning comment ComFourteen Two One Ten of Twentysixth X Traffic analysis past few days indicate Cinc Second directing units of First Second Third Fleets and Subforce in a Loose knit Task Force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X For purposes of clarity units expected to operate in South China area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as Second Section X Estimated units in First Section are Crudiv Seven X Alrron Six Defense Division One X Desron Three and Subron Six XX Second Section Crudiv Five X Cardiv Three Ryujo and One Maru X Desrons Two and Four X Subron Five X Desdiv Twentythree X First Base Force of Third Fleet X Third Base Force at Palao X Fifth Base Force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv Six and Batdiv Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance Third Fleet units in doubt but may be Assumed that these vessels including Desron Five will take station in Formosa Straits or further South X There are slight indications today that Desron Three Crudiv Seven and Subron six are in Takao area X Combined Air Force units from Empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China Coast X Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X Our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sase-Bo-Kure area X Our lists indicate Cincv combined in Nagato X Cinc First in Hyuga and Cinc Second in Atago in Kure area X Cinc Third in Ashigara in Sase-Bo area X Cinc Fifth in Chichijima area X Comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China Fleet appears to have been Strengthened by units from Central or North China probably torpedo boats XX Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being reinforced by one Base Force Unit XX Directives to the above Task Forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations X Cinc Second X Third and Cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X Traffic from Nav minister and Cngs to Cincs of Fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered Reliable.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
OPNAV-NCR-15

SECRET

## Naval message—Navy Department

| Drafter Extension Number Br. 3598                                        | Addressees                                                                                             | Message precedence                |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| From: OPNAV.<br>Released by T. S. Wilkinson.<br>Date: November 24, 1941. | For Action.<br>CINCAF.                                                                                 | Priority<br>Routine X<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom .....<br>Decoded by .....<br>Paraphrased by .....           | Information.<br>COM16.<br>ALUSNA, CHUNKING.<br>ASTALUSNA, SHANG-<br>HAI.<br>ALUSNA, TOKYO.<br>CINCPAC. | Priority<br>Routine X<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.  
2402239CR465

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.  
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addressees are often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature X since our intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to com 16 for action OpNav for information X after combined all incoming reports com 16 direct dispatches to OpNav info CincPac based on information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible results X request CincPac issue directive as necessary to fulfill original object.

Make original only deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person Art 76(4) av. Regs.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 9

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,  
Washington, December 1, 1941

Confidential

Copy No.  
Serial

## FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publication due to its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which so much of the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is transmitted to the Director of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

/s/ T. S. WILKINSON,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Director of Naval Intelligence

[1] Confidential

Serial No. 1  
December 1, 1941

## FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATION

## A. The Diplomatic Situation

## 1. Japan.

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolute

work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese attack against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.

## 2. Germany.

Members of the German Armament Commission in Casablanca are now authorized to wear uniforms and make arrests. General Schultheiss of the Air Force, Head of the Commission, is reported to favor a German military occupation of Morocco.

There is evidence that Germany, now virtually in control of the governments of Spain and Portugal, has impressed upon these governments the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with the United States and with Britain. It is Germany's expectation that such a policy will increase the resources of these two countries with materials which evidently can be turned against those who have supplied them.

Turkey still is being subjected to diplomatic pressure to join the Axis or "take the consequence." Germany's representations have had no apparent effect.

According to a press report from Berlin, seven more nations have signed the anti-comintern pact. The new signatories are Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government in China. This pact should not be confused with the Tri-Power Accord of which Germany, Japan and Italy were the original signatories and to which Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia subsequently adhered.

## [2] 3. Italy.

The repurchase of war materiel sold to Italy by the French is now the subject of conversations being held by a French delegation which arrived recently in Rome. These conversations were initiated by Italy and were based on Italy's urgent need for foreign exchange. These negotiations are not expected to meet with particular success.

The visit of the German Minister of Economics (Dr. Funk) to Rome on October apparently was motivated by the serious concern felt by Germany over the steady climb in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Dr. Funk threatened to raise the price of coal shipments to Italy, but it was agreed finally that Italy would not raise prices, and that Germany would increase the yearly exports of coal to Italy from the twelve million tons previously agreed upon to eighteen million tons. Previous shipments of coal from Germany barely reached two-thirds of the Italian national requirements. This was demonstrated by the recent laws restricting heating this winter.

## 4. France.

France moved a step closer to the "new order" in Europe on November 18 when Marshal Petain, under continued pressure from Berlin and the pro-collaborationist elements within the Vichy government, announced the "retirement" of General Maxime Weygand as delegate-general and military commander of French North Africa. That strategic area henceforth is to be administered from Vichy under the direct control of Vice Premier Darlan. Lieutenant General Alfonse Juin, until June of this year a prisoner of war of Germany and later commander of French troops in Morocco, succeeds Weygand as military commander in North Africa. The military command of French West Africa goes to General Jean Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Vice Admiral Fenard was named permanent Secretary General of French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the new Governor General of Algeria. Additional concessions to the Germans may be announced following the meeting of Petain and Darlan with Reichmarshal Goering which is scheduled for the near future. There are indications that this meeting may be followed by a conference with Adolph Hitler, with the possible attendance of Premier Mussolini.

[3] The Reich is said to be attempting to persuade Vichy to provide naval convoys for Italian supply vessels and to have requested that French Army divisions replace Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany, meanwhile, is reported to have cut the occupation cost levied against France from \$8,000,000 to \$6,000,000 a day, retroactive to May 10, 1941.

France's concern over the situation in Africa is manifested by the sudden departure from Vichy of Admiral Platon (Minister of Colonies), General Bergeret (Air Secretary) and Admiral Auphan (Chief of the Naval General Staff) to inspect the defenses of North and West Africa. During the absence of Platon and Bergeret, Admiral Darlan will act as interim Secretary of Colonies and Air

Additional powers have been granted Darle  
fense Ministry all services under the Franc  
istered by the War and Foreign Ministries.

Following the dismissal of General Wey  
of State announced that trade with North  
Franco-American relations were to be stud  
ments. At the same time American lend-  
French of General Charles de Gaulle.

On November 26, General Catroux (Fre  
claimed the independence of Lebanon and th  
name of France. The new government v  
Macache.

France is understood to have protested t  
size of the mission, numbering 350 political  
Kenkichi Yoshizawa, new Japanese Amba

Despite rumors of capitulation, the situ  
unchanged. The Paris radio announced on 1  
hold out longer than four to six weeks under

#### [4] 5. *Latin America.*

##### *Mexico.*

President Roosevelt has nominated the p  
S. Messersmith, to succeed Josephus Dani  
new British Ambassador to Mexico, Charle  
mid-December, which is about the same ti  
take up his new duties.

The State Department announced an  
Mexico providing: (1) The settling of a fin  
taken over in 1933, through experts or thro  
Mexico tendered \$9,000,000 in advance as  
agrarian claims comprised, Mexico to pay \$  
has already paid \$3,000,000 on these claim  
change of ratifications of the conventio  
\$34,000,000 is payable at the rate of \$2,  
trade agreement to be negotiated at once.  
a \$40,000,000 stabilization fund to maintai  
The United States will purchase up to 6,000  
silver monthly.

The Export-Import Bank has established  
ment of roads and highways. The credit  
ments up to \$10,000,000 over a three-year  
guarantees payment unconditionally; and  
the form of highway bonds, payable from  
*Costa Rica.*

President Calderon has repeated his off  
bases to the United States, as free measure  
*El Salvador.*

Pro-Axis Chief of Police Colonel Merino h  
Monterrosa.

##### [5] *Panama.*

Little progress is noted in the new go  
solidation of its gains. The second desi  
Minister to Washington; the third designa  
will be arrested if he returns to Panama,  
have been jailed. Key positions still ar  
there is a cordial disposition to cooperate w  
nationalistic laws passed by Arias are not  
tion is lapsing. The government is unlikel  
off U. S. tourist or business dollars.

##### *Argentina.*

There are many indications that a secret  
of the Straits of Magellan has been establ  
The recent death of the President of Chi  
on defense in that area. There have bee  
part of high Argentine officials over staff di  
and countries adjacent to the Argentine,  
promised to Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil  
fine is an interested party to all such dis

A new political party, of Fascist character, called *Patria* has been launched in Buenos Aires by the pro-Axis Manuel Frisco. Observers note a new student's party, or "Young Argentine" party, in process of formation. It is a coalition of radical nationalist groups.

German influence in the Argentine is very low, the Russian war having alienated many former supporters. There is demand for a more vigorous attitude toward the Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo, and an intensification of the Baborda Committee activities may be expected.

While there are no immediate signs of trouble in the Argentine, the next few weeks will be critical. The conscripts are finishing their military service and returning home. Justo, always a dubious factor in [6] politics, seems firmly in control of the Army. In the Senate, the nationalists and the Democratic factions have reached an impasse. A coalition of nationalist—or totalitarian—factions, under a strong leader probably would mean the overthrow of the present government.

#### *Brazil.*

During the period under review there have been some alarming reports from various sources in Brazil, forecasting trouble between Vargas and the explosive elements in his government. To date, however, nothing serious has occurred. Brazil is meeting, with some hesitation, her commitments in hemisphere defense, and cooperating in the movement of U. S. troops to *Surinam* by sending a military mission to Paramaribo, and strengthening her border forces in that area. Currently, General Goes is denouncing U. S. aims as imperialistic in South America, and his good faith in staff discussions should be accepted with grave reservations.

#### *Chile.*

The sudden death of President Aguirre Gorda, from a bronchial affection, has caused considerable unrest in Chile, and responsive uneasiness in that country's neighbors. Don Tinto, as he was affectionately called, because of the red wine for which his vineyards were famous, headed the only popular front government, but was generally regarded as a friend to Democracy. He has preserved for some years an uneasy equilibrium between highly antagonistic and immoderate factions. His successor pro tempore is a noted conciliator. Most observers believe that the government will remain stable during the sixty-day period before the election of a new President.

#### *Colombia.*

The Colombian Senate has rejected the U. S. Black List of Axis firms in the Western Hemisphere, on the grounds that, in a matter of such mutual interest to the American Republics, all their governments should have been consulted.

The Colombian press condemns articles on the country by Benjamin Welles and John Gunther, terming them "Ambassadors of Ill-Will." It is not realized [7] in the United States to what a high degree the Latin-American press is sensitive to criticism of national custom and usage. The sum total of U. S. literary comment on the Latin Americas is undoubtedly harmful to Pan American accord.

#### *Bolivia.*

A U. S. Army Air Mission has been established in *La Paz*.

#### *Ecuador.*

The notorious and able Dr. Kuhne, suspected Nazi-agent in Quito, has been banished to a small town on the Ecuador-Colombian border, because of attention focused on him by the writer John G. Gunther.

#### *Peru.*

Early in the period observers in Peru reported widespread popular resentment over Peru's failure to receive certain airplanes and material, embargoed by the U. S. Department of State pending settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Concessions have been made in the procurement of non-combatant types, and the excitement is subsiding. Affairs on the border are quiescent.

In Lima, the Aprista Party announce the possibility of the resignation of President Prado, because of popular dissatisfaction with the border situation. General Ureta, the hero of the Ecuadorean war, is a strong Presidential possibility, but he is said to have no desire to gain the office by unconstitutional means. Ureta is pro-U. S. and anti-Axis.

#### *General.*

The ABC countries at large are showing signs of disillusionment and exhausted patience in the matter of lend-lease material. Much has been promised; almost literally nothing has been sent. Some deliveries, even token deliveries, would have a happy effect at this time.

[8] *Trends.**Military and Naval.*

*Mexico.*—The naval budget for 1942 has \$8,000,000. This is twice the 1941 budget.

*South America.*—Nothing to add to sur  
*Economic.*

The period under review has been characterized by the press of the American Republics, and over the growing dearth of materials essential to the maintenance of the American States for a variety of heavy materials, south of the Rio Grande. Immediate obstacle to the availability of shipping. Here, as in the case of the Pacific, the patience of the Latin-American nations in U. S. good faith is deteriorating. The magnitude now of the demands upon Russia, and to China, and confusion in U. S. Opponents to U. S. and to Pan American of current circumstances. As a measure of immediate benefit, the allotment to Latin America is ever limited, and of shipping, appears urgent.

[9] *B. The Japanese Military Situation*

Japanese troops, supplies and equipment have been landed at the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong, Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements now in Indo-China is believed to be between 70,000 and 100,000 in south India.

Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. About 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China. Hainan Island.

*C. The Japanese Naval Situation*

Deployment of naval forces to the south. Preparations are underway for hostile operations. Ports and freighters are pouring into the China coast ports headed south, apparently to the south. Present movements to the south are individual units, but the organization of an expeditionary force, will probably take sharper form in the future, under the command of the Commander in Chief. The force is to be subdivided into two major task groups: one for the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Pacific. The striking force of heavy and light cruiser, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although the major capital ship strength is still in the Pacific, the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is in considerable numbers. Activity consists not only of large reinforcements but also of construction material with yard work.

*D. The Chinese Military Situation*

The Chinese are concentrating troops in the north, or moving up for this duty, are about 100,000 mechanized units. Skirmishing was reported in south Hopei, Shantung, south Anhwei, and

[10] *E. The German Military, Naval and Air Strength.*

It has been estimated that Germany now has 100 divisions. Of the 100 divisions, 10 are identified and not yet ready for field duty. This would be service at the present time.

**Distribution**

The 272 identified divisions are distributed as follows:

| <b>Location</b>             | <b>Number of Divisions</b> |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Russian Front</b>        | Total 168 (including 20    |
| Northern Group              | 31 motorized, 19           |
| Central Group               | 86 armored, 2              |
| Southern Group              | 51 cavalry, and 2          |
|                             | mountain divs.)            |
| Italy and Libya             | 3 (including 2 armored)    |
| Balkans and Hungary         | 14 (including 1 mountain)  |
| Poland and East Prussia     | 10                         |
| Finland                     | 7 (including 1 motorized   |
|                             | and 3 mountain)            |
| Germany and Austria         | 33                         |
| Holland, Belgium and France | 27                         |
| Norway                      | 8                          |
| Denmark                     | 2                          |

**Operations**

(NOTE: Eastern Front only; see ITALY for Libyan Campaign.)

[11] Following the freezing of the ground, German offensive operations have been resumed.

**Finnish sector.**—There is evidence of renewed pressure towards Murmansk, Kandalaksha and the White Sea. None of these objectives has been reached to date. The situation along the Svir River and in the southern Karelian front remains unchanged. There has been a resumption of artillery action at Hangoe.

**North-Central Sector.**—The siege of Leningrad continues with no apparent change in the situation. The Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active against the Finnish right flank on the Isthmus and against the German left flank engaged in the siege of Leningrad.

Russian counter-attacks have prevented German forces at Tichvin, just east of the Volkhov River, from effecting a junction with Finnish-German units in the Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to Leningrad via Lake Ladoga still open.

The Russians claim to have carried out counter-attacks in the vicinity of Novgorod. These attacks have had no visible results to date.

**Central Sector.**—German assault against Moscow has been resumed during the past 6-10 days. Despite bitter Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks, the Germans have made some headway north and south of the city. At Kalinin no appreciable shift in the lines has been apparent. Southeast of Kalinin the Russians have admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have officially claimed the capture of Solnechnogorsk, indicating considerable German penetration northwest of Moscow. The Russians admit being forced back in the Mozhaisk sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where the Russians report great German pressure.

**South-Central Sector.**—Gradual German advances along the Orel-Kursk front, which have been hinted at for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in the reports that Yefremov (on the Moscow-Yelets railroad) has been captured and that advance units, progressing toward the important center of Voronezh, have reached Tim, 40 miles east of Kursk.

[12] **Donetz Basin Sector.**—The Russians claim deep advances in a counter-attack on the "Donetz Plateau", but fail to mention the recapture of any important industrial centers. Axis reports have emphasized gradual progress along a broad front, but have been vague as to details.

Rostov apparently has been captured, although the Soviets insist street fighting is still in progress. A crossing of the lower Don River and the pursuit of retiring Red forces towards the Caucasus is reported from Berlin.

**Crimean Sector.**—According to reports, all of the Crimea except Sevastopol is now in German hands. The defeat of Russian forces in the central Crimea, the breaking of strong defense positions across the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of Kerch and of the western shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened up another avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.

Sevastopol is isolated and under siege, and apparently has lost its value as a base for the Red Black Sea Fleet.



## 656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

### *Personalities.*

General Kurt von Briesen was killed in action on the eastern front on November 20, 1941.

### *2. Naval.*

#### *Distribution.*

| Ship                       |      | Date               | Location                                                     |
|----------------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name                       | Type |                    |                                                              |
| TIRPITZ.....               | BB   | November 9.....    | Kiel                                                         |
| SCHARNHORST.....           | BB   | November 21.....   | Brest                                                        |
| GNEISENAU.....             | BB   | November 21.....   | Brest                                                        |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.....    | OBB  | November 9.....    | Hamburg                                                      |
| SCHLESSEN.....             | OBB  | October 7.....     | Central Baltic                                               |
| [13] GRAF ZEPPELIN.....    | CV   | Prior Nov. 16..... | Departed Stettin                                             |
| ADMIRAL SCHEER.....        | CA   | November 19.....   | Swinemuende                                                  |
| LUETZOW.....               | CA   | November 9.....    | Kiel                                                         |
| SEYDLITZ.....              | CA   | October 12.....    | Bremen                                                       |
| PRINZ EUGEN.....           | CA   | November 21.....   | Brest                                                        |
| ADMIRAL HIPPER.....        | CA   | November 5.....    | Off Sassnitz                                                 |
| NUERNBERG.....             | CL   | November 5.....    | One of these two ships off Sassnitz                          |
| LEIPZIG.....               | CL   |                    |                                                              |
| KOELN.....                 | CL   | September 29.....  | Gdynia                                                       |
| EMDEN.....                 | CL   | November 9.....    | Kiel                                                         |
| 4 Units.....               | DD   | September 24.....  | Northern Norway                                              |
| 5-7 Units.....             | DD   | September 24.....  | In the Baltic                                                |
| 1 Unit.....                | DD   | September 24.....  | Bergen                                                       |
| 3 Units.....               | DD   | September 24.....  | North Sea ports                                              |
| 2 Units.....               | DD   | October 24.....    | Cherbourg                                                    |
| Remaining Units.....       | DD   | .....              | Unknown                                                      |
| 150 Units (estimated)..... | SS   | .....              | Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports |

### *Operations*

A smaller number than usual of German submarines were encountered during the period November 6 to November 13. Two forces were operating: one off the Portuguese coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.

British October shipping tonnage losses were less than 75% of the September, 1941, losses.

[14] HMS ARK ROYAL was attacked and sunk by two or more German submarines just east of Gibraltar on November 13, 1941. It is not certain whether these submarines were operating out of the usual French West Coast bases, or from newly established bases in the Mediterranean.

In the light of available information, it appears practically certain that all Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports are being prepared by the Germans for use as bases for offensive operations. The naval forces at Axis disposal in this sea are still very inferior to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Axis Black Sea naval operations on any extensive scale are not to be expected until such time as the Red Black Sea Fleet either will have been destroyed or otherwise neutralized.

It is reported that Axis Black Sea forces have been reenforced by five small submarines brought down the Danube. A sixth small U-boat is to follow.

A shortage in available Axis Black Sea shipping may be indicated by the recent sinking of a 1200-ton Hungarian river motor vessel. This ship was reported to have been carrying munitions for Axis land forces and was sunk by a mine in the Black Sea.

H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE (CA) encountered and sank a converted German commerce raider on November 22 in the South Atlantic. The Axis raider, believed to have been the TAMESIS, was blown up by a magazine explosion thirteen minutes following the commencement of the engagement.

According to belated evidence, it is not fairly certain that the German 6,000-ton light cruiser KOELN was engaged in operations leading to the capture of the Baltic (Oesel) Islands six weeks or so ago.

### *Personalities*

Lt. Reschke and Lt. Guggenberger were in command of the two German submarines credited with the sinking of the ARK ROYAL. Reschke entered the Navy in 1929 and Guggenberger in 1934. Neither officer had been previously mentioned in connection with submarine operations.

[15] Captain Bernhard Rogge was in command of the raider reported sunk by H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE. Captain Rogge entered the Navy in 1915



and was advanced to his present rank in 1940. He has been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

### 8. Air

#### *Strength and Disposition*

According to a recent reliable report, the disposition of the German Air Force in Russia is as follows:

|                             | Leningrad | Moscow | South of<br>Kharkov-<br>Kiev | Finland<br>& North<br>Norway |
|-----------------------------|-----------|--------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Long range bombers.....     | 90        | 200    | 240                          | 40                           |
| Bomber reconnaissance.....  | 30        | 30     | 45                           | 10                           |
| Dive bombers.....           | 0         | 90     | 60-75                        | 30                           |
| Single-engine fighters..... | 30        | 180    | 130                          | 30                           |
| Two-engine fighters.....    | 30        | 35     | 0                            | 10                           |
| Totals.....                 | 180       | 535    | 475-490                      | 120                          |
| Grand Total, 1310-1325.     |           |        |                              |                              |

A previous report from the same source estimated that, as of October 1, 1941, the Germans had almost exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian front. This reduction in air strength may be due to some, or all, of the following factors: (a) reported withdrawal of some 560 bombers and 150 single-engine fighters from the Russian front to Central Germany for refitting; (b) losses; (c) shift of air strength to the Mediterranean, which has recently been reported from several sources.

In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of the recent British offensive in Cyrennica, German Air Force distribution was reliably reported as follows:

[16]

|                   | Bombers | Dive<br>Bombers | Fighters | Reconnais-<br>sance | Coastal |
|-------------------|---------|-----------------|----------|---------------------|---------|
| Cyrenaica.....    | 30      | 70              | 75       | 5                   | -----   |
| Sicily.....       | 10      | -----           | -----    | -----               | -----   |
| Crete.....        | -----   | 20              | 10       | -----               | -----   |
| South Greece..... | 60      | -----           | -----    | 20                  | 25      |
| Total—325.....    | -----   | -----           | -----    | -----               | -----   |

This represented a slight decrease in German air strength in the Mediterranean from the last previously reported figures.

### *Operations*

*West.*—Reconnaissance continues to be the chief German aerial activity in this theater, operations being carried out over the British Isles and over the sea approaches. A small number of bombers were regularly in action, and activity of mine-laying planes was reported occasionally.

*Russian Front.*—According to German claims, the German Air Force has been very active on the Eastern Front. Leningrad and Moscow were bombed regularly during the past two weeks. The northern part of the city of Leningrad is now in ruins, the Germans report. German bombers also are said to have paid particular attention to railroad communications; namely, the yards near Moscow and the Murmansk railroad at and north of Vologda.

The Luftwaffe also claims many successes in pounding the Russians in the Crimea at Sevastopol and at Kerch.

Up to November 1, German sources claim that 83,000,000 pounds of supplies in 30,000 flights had been carried to the front by German air transport.

On November 21, the Germans claimed further that, to that date, 15,877 Russian planes had been destroyed.

[17] *Mediterranean.*—German activity in this theater has been limited largely to defensive operations. It has been reported that German air units in Libya have recently vainly requested reinforcements of troop-carrying planes.

### *Personalities*

During the last fortnight, the German Air Force has lost its greatest technical expert and its leading ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed while testing a new secret

weapon. Lt. Col. Moelders was killed when a passenger crashed near Breslau on November 11, 1918, after attending Udet's funeral.

[18] *F. The Italian Military, Naval and*

*1. Military*

*Libya*

At dawn, Tuesday, November 18, the British offensive against the Italian and German forces has been preparing for this drive for of material has been flowing to the Middle forces are meeting the Germans with ample

The main spearhead of the attack began so the coast at Sollum, and branched northward. At Bir el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Arm was mauled by the British. At El Rezegh, including planes and personnel. Further south, coming from Giarabub, raced across the desert Italian outpost of El Augila.

Since the initial thrust a tank battle, between forces, ensued at El Rezegh where both sides were present. To date the fighting is still fluid. However, the British are now in possession of Nuovo (the main supply bases of the German forces), and the Tobruk garrison has made its forces at Ed Duda.

*East Africa*

Gondar, the last stronghold of the Italians, is within the next few weeks. The beleaguered a mountain top north of Lake Tana where it has been for the past seven months. British forces are now miles from Gondar.

(Note: Since the preparation of this report has been announced.

[19] *Russian Front.*

Italian ground lines of communication at the Front and air transport is being used to supply. are due to mined and mired roads, lack of refusal of the Germans to repair the railroads. forces in the Stalino area have been directed to be available.

*2. Naval.*

The Italian Navy is demonstrating its ineffectiveness. In the attack on an Italian convoy November 18, 1918, 8-inch gun cruisers stayed beyond the range during the entire action. Seven of the ten Italian German troops. Again on November 21/22 a Italian convoy escorted by three cruisers and a destroyer were hit at Messina. One cruiser and a destroyer were the convoy was again attacked by British air forces. hits were claimed on another cruiser and several

German submarines are basing now in the Adriatic that the principal German submarine base is at Capri. Permits to visit Capri are almost impossible for Italian nationality. A German submarine base on the West Coast of Sardinia which will accommodate

*3. Air.*

On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the General Rino Corso Fougier succeeded General Fougier as Secretary for Air. First reports of the ousting of Fougier he had failed to protect Italian cities from German interest lay in bomber and torpedo planes. It was reported that who is a specialist in pursuit aviation, would

in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command of the Italian Air Force because of [20] the sinking of the big convoy on November 8 when many German soldiers were drowned. Mussolini was said to have acquiesced to the German demand and, rather than submit, General Pricolo resigned.

General Fongler is only a figure-head, and it is reported that he is not respected by the Air Force. He was a protege and satellite of the late General Balbo and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 10

In reply refer to No. Op-16-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,  
Washington December 1, 1941.

*Memorandum for the Director*

1. Attached hereto is a resume of the outstanding military, naval and political moves made by Japan during the past two months. No effort is made to draw conclusions in each instance but a view of the general situation would indicate that the principal preparatory effort has been directed by the Japanese looking towards, first: an eventual control or occupation of Thailand followed almost immediately by an attack against British possessions, possibly Burma and Singapore.

A. H. McCOLLUM.

*Distribution:*

Copy No. 1—CNO.  
Copy No. 2—DNI.  
Copy No. 3—Asst. CNO.  
Copy No. 4—F  
Copy No. 5—Op-12  
Copy 6 and 7—File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

DECEMBER 1, 1941.

*Army preparations*

Starting about 1 October and continuing until about the middle of November the Japanese shipped out of the port of Shanghai alone a large quantity of military supplies. Vessels carrying this equipment were seen headed South or Southwest. The equipment consisted of all sorts of military stores and equipment, a large number of landing boats being particularly noted. Other especially noteworthy items consisted of a considerable number of tanks and trucks, quite a few of which were camouflaged green; considerable railroad equipment, particularly locomotives and rolling stock. While a few troops were taken out at this time these ships principally carried equipment. Starting about 15 November the character of the shipments underwent a marked change. From 15 to 21 November large transports took out of Shanghai alone some 24,000 fully equipped veteran troops, while an additional 30,000 were reported as being withdrawn from North China reputedly destined for Formosa. From 21 to 26 November 20,000 troops were landed at Saigon and 4,000 at Haiphong which with 6,000 troops already there were sent South to Saigon and Cambodia by rail. All wharves and docks at Haiphong and Saigon are reported crowded with Japanese transports unloading supplies and men. It is estimated that the following Japanese troops are now in French Indo-China ready and equipped for action.

|                                       |        |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
| (a) South and Central Indo-China----- | 70,000 |
| (b) Northern Indo-China-----          | 25,000 |

The landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops and supplies are undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan Island and more distant Formosa.

*Naval preparations*

Starting about 1 October and continuing through November extensive naval

preparations have been made. The following are the high points of this preparation:

(a) All possible ships have been recalled to Japan for a quick docking and repair check up that has now been completed.

(b) Some additional naval aircraft strength has been sent to the Japanese Mandate Island area.

(c) An air and surface patrol was established on a line between the Marshall Islands and the Gilberts. Guam was placed under air and submarine observation.

(d) The CinC 2nd Fleet organized two task groups, both rather loosely knit organizations; group No. 1 to operate in the South China Area and group No. 2 to operate in the Mandate Islands area. This organization is about finished and the CinC of the 2nd Fleet expects to be in Southern Formosa by 3 or 4 December.

(e) The CinC of the Combined Air Force has just completed an inspection of all outlying naval air groups, particularly those in the Mandates, South China and Formosa.

(f) Many merchant vessels have recently been taken over by the Navy and at least three of these have been equipped as antiaircraft ships.

*Political preparations—1 October–30 Nov.*

Japanese residents particularly women and children have been evacuated from

(a) British India and Singapore

(b) Netherlands East Indies

(c) Philippines Islands

(d) Hongkong

(e) Australia

(f) Many Japanese residents have recently withdrawn from the United States, Canada and South America.

Preparations have been made to shift the center of the War Intelligence and Espionage net covering the Americas from Washington to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Japanese Embassy at Rio de Janeiro has been equipped with short wave radio transmitter.

Great stress has been laid on establishment of espionage net in Thailand and Singapore as follows:

(a) Japanese consulate at Singora is manned by 4 Army Intelligence Officers.

(b) A consulate has been established at the northern railhead of Chiengmai.

(c) Army communication personnel and equipment is present at Singora, Bangkok and Chiengmai.

(d) Four Army and Navy officers under assumed names have been sent to the Embassy at Bangkok. The Ambassador has received instructions not to interfere in the work of these men.

(e) A chain of drug stores manned by intelligence agents is in process of establishment.

(f) Japanese Army doctors under assumed names are in the hospital at Bangkok.

(g) At the end of November 60,000 Bahts were sent in gold to the Ambassador at Bangkok with instructions to hold it for emergency intelligence use.

(h) At least two sabotage agents have been sent into Singapore.

In French Indo-China the Japanese military has taken over many police functions. Many Chinese and Annamese are being summarily arrested. At the end of November Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa queried his government as to whether he and his staff should take over the governmental functions of French Indo-China or continue to function through the front of the French Government General.

The Consul General at Shanghai has informed his government that all preparations are complete for taking over all physical property in China belonging to Britain, Americans and other enemy nationals.

The Army General Staff sent urgent requests for information for U. S. and Dutch troop and plane strengths and dispositions in the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies.

Special Ambassador Kuruu sent to the United States to conduct negotiations with the United States.



44.P31:P31 H.37

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA  
RECEIVED  
AUG 1946

# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

### S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL  
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND  
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
RELATING THERETO

---

#### PART 37


PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

---

Printed for the use of the  
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack







# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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#### PART 37

#### PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

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Printed for the use of the  
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack







JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

|                                                     |                                                      |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia              | JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania     |
| SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois               | BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California |
| OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine                   | FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin        |
| HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan               |                                                      |
| J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina |                                                      |

---

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*  
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*  
JULIE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*  
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(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*  
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JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*  
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*  
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*



## HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

| Part<br>No. | Pages     | Transcript<br>pages | Hearings                                      |
|-------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 1           | 1- 399    | 1- 1058             | Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.        |
| 2           | 401- 982  | 1059- 2586          | Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.    |
| 3           | 983-1583  | 2587- 4194          | Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.    |
| 4           | 1585-2063 | 4195- 5460          | Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.    |
| 5           | 2065-2492 | 5461- 6646          | Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. |
| 6           | 2493-2920 | 6647- 7888          | Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.        |
| 7           | 2921-3378 | 7889- 9107          | Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.    |
| 8           | 3379-3927 | 9108-10517          | Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.    |
| 9           | 3929-4599 | 10518-12277         | Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.       |
| 10          | 4601-5151 | 12278-13708         | Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.            |
| 11          | 5153-5560 | 13709-14765         | Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.       |

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

| Part<br>No.   | Exhibits Nos.                                                                                                                |
|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12            | 1 through 6.                                                                                                                 |
| 13            | 7 and 8.                                                                                                                     |
| 14            | 9 through 43.                                                                                                                |
| 15            | 44 through 87.                                                                                                               |
| 16            | 88 through 110.                                                                                                              |
| 17            | 111 through 128.                                                                                                             |
| 18            | 129 through 156.                                                                                                             |
| 19            | 157 through 172.                                                                                                             |
| 20            | 173 through 179.                                                                                                             |
| 21            | 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.                                                                                 |
| 22 through 25 | Roberts Commission Proceedings.                                                                                              |
| 26            | Hart Inquiry Proceedings.                                                                                                    |
| 27 through 31 | Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.                                                                                         |
| 32 through 33 | Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.                                                                                           |
| 34            | Clarke Investigation Proceedings.                                                                                            |
| 35            | Clausen Investigation Proceedings.                                                                                           |
| 36 through 38 | Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.                                                                                                  |
| 39            | Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,<br>Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-<br>ments. |



[See Index of Exhibits, supra pp. 2-4]

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 11

(This exhibit is the book entitled "BATTLE REPORT—Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea," by Commander WALTER KARIG, USNR, and Lieutenant WELBOURN KELLEY, USNR. It was published (1944) for The Council on Books in Wartime, by Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York, N. Y., and is not being reproduced here.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 12

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,  
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 22 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Rômajî version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

T. J. Skowie,  
T. J. SLOWIE,  
Secretary.

Document No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN.  
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND.  
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP.  
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST.

The above are the weather messages Maj. Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

Document No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from Tokyo station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

*Document*

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNIN  
 BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMOR  
 FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)  
 Weather message from Tokyo station .  
 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

*Document*

*English*

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE  
 NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT M  
 THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE K  
 WEATHER FORECAST: A

WEST WIND, CLEAR  
 WEST WIND, CLEAR

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE  
 NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT M  
 SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE N  
 WEATHER FORECAST: M

WEST WIND, CLEAR  
 WEST WIND, CLEAR

Above are the two weather messages from  
 mitted by them between 0002 GMT Decemb

HEWITT INQUIRY E:

INDEX

- A—Messages relating to Japanese interest in shi
- B—Messages relating to "winds code"-----
- C—Message advising Germany of war between J
- D—Messages relating to "hidden word" code....
- E—Message indicating steps to be taken as to  
 Britain and America-----

TOP SECE

Op-20-4-mp  
 Serial 0002020  
 (SC)A17-24(1)

From: The Secretary of the Navy.  
 To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.  
 Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence  
 Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl F  
 Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Ad  
 ing further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are photostatic  
 certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used  
 ence (a) :

|            |          |
|------------|----------|
| JD-1: 1842 | JD-1: 70 |
| JD-1: 5696 | JD-1: 71 |
| JD-1: 5730 | JD-1: 71 |
| JD-1: 6850 | JD-1: 71 |
| JD-1: 6943 | JD-1: 71 |
| JD-1: 6985 | JD-1: 71 |
| JD-1: 7029 | JD-1: 71 |
| JD-1: 7122 | JD-1: 72 |

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

From: Honolulu (Okuda).  
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).  
10 March, 1941.  
(J18K8)\*  
#043

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following;  
Four battleships (two of the New Mexico class and two of the Pennsylvania class).

Five heavy cruisers (two of the ----- class, one of the ----- class, and two of the ----- class).

Six light cruisers (four of the ----- class and two of the Omaha class).

Yorktown.

25 destroyers (-----)

Two destroyer tenders.

Several submarines.

One submarine tender.

Several transports.

Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle.

\*Note: This is first translation of J18K8, a new system effective 1 March, 1941.

JD-1: 1842 Navy Trans. 4-5-41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).  
To: Honolulu.  
September 24, 1941.  
J-19.  
#83.

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

JD-1: 5696

From: Honolulu (Kita).  
To: Washington.  
29 September 1941.  
Circular #041.  
Honolulu to Tokyo #178.  
Re your #083.\*

(Strictly secret.)

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48\*\*): KS.

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT.

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

JD-1: 5730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)

\*Not available.

\*\*Available, dated 21 August.

**664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
19 November 1941.  
(J19).  
Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI."
  - (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."
  - (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thal, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI."
- The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.  
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.  
JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

---

**SECRET**

From: Tokyo.  
To: Berlin.  
November 30, 1941.  
Purple. (CA).

#985. (Part 1 of 3).<sup>a</sup>

Re my Circular #2887.<sup>b</sup>

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments separately.)

In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25552 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR)

- <sup>a</sup> Part 2 not available.  
<sup>b</sup> Not available.

---

**SECRET**

From: Tokyo.  
To: Berlin.  
November 30, 1941.  
Purple. (CA).  
#985. (Part 3 or 3.)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitudes toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This directive is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please forward this directive to Rome, together with the separate one following.

JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25553 SECRET Trans 12-1-41 (MR)



From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
27 November 1941.  
(J19)

Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete).

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324.

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message).

(Part 1)

Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

EXAMPLE: A message meaning:

"Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used).

(Part 2)

| <i>Code Word</i>  | <i>Meaning</i>                                                                          |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ARIMURA-----      | Code communications prohibited.                                                         |
| ASAI-----         | Communications will be by radio broadcasts.                                             |
| ASAKURA-----      | Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.              |
| ASIKAGA-----      | Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.                         |
| AZUMA-----        | Pressure on Japan increasing continually.                                               |
| EDOGUTI-----      | Prepare for evacuation.                                                                 |
| HANABUSA-----     | Preparations for evacuation have been completed.                                        |
| HANAZONO (?)----- | Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.        |
| HATAKEYAMA-----   | Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . have been severed.                      |
| HATTORI-----      | Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are not in accordance with expectation. |

(Part 3)

|                 |                                                                                                                         |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| HIZIKATA-----   | Japan's and . . . (blank's) . . . military forces have clashed.                                                         |
| HOSINO-----     | Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are entering a full fledged general war.                                                  |
| IBARAGI-----    | Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited. |
| INAKAKI-----    | Have you --?-- the . . . (blank) . . . matter?                                                                          |
| ISHIKAWA-----   | I have--? the . . . (blank) . . . matter.                                                                               |
| KASHIWAGI-----  | We are commencing <i>military action?</i> against . . . (blank)                                                         |
| KOBAYAKAWA----- | Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of . . . (blank) . . . nationality.                  |
| KODAMA-----     | Japan.                                                                                                                  |
| KOMIYAMA-----   | China.                                                                                                                  |
| KOYANAGI-----   | England.                                                                                                                |
| KUBOTA-----     | U. S. S. R.                                                                                                             |
| KURIBARA-----   | France (?)                                                                                                              |
| KUSUNOKI-----   | Germany.                                                                                                                |
| MATUTANI-----   | Italy.                                                                                                                  |

## (Part 4)

|            |                                            |
|------------|--------------------------------------------|
| MINAMI     | U. S. A.                                   |
| MIWATA     | Canada.                                    |
| MIYAZAKI   | Mexico.                                    |
| MOROKOSI   | Brazil.                                    |
| MOTIZUKI   | Panama.                                    |
| NAGAMINE   | Argentina.                                 |
| NAKAZATO   | Thailand.                                  |
| NANGO      | French Indo-China.                         |
| NEGI (?)   | Netherlands East-Indies.                   |
| OGAWA      | Burma (?).                                 |
| OKAMOTO    | Malaya.                                    |
| OKUMZRA    | Australia.                                 |
| ONIZUKA    | Union of South Africa (?).                 |
| ONODERA    | Enemy country.                             |
| OTANI      | ? (Possibly: friendly, or allied country?) |
| ONISI      | Year.                                      |
| SIMANAKA   | Day (?).                                   |
| SAKAKIBARA | Tsuki) Month.                              |
| SIGENOI    | (Kō) Paragraph.                            |
| SANZYŌ     | (Toki) Time.                               |
| ITIRŌ      | 1.                                         |
| NISAKU     | 2.                                         |
| SANTARŌ    | 3.                                         |
| YOITI      | 4.                                         |
| GORŌ       | 5.                                         |
| MASAROKU   | 6.                                         |
| SIMETARŌ   | 7.                                         |
| YASOKITI   | 8.                                         |
| HISAMATU   | 9.                                         |
| ATUMI      | 0.                                         |

JD-1: 6985 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (7)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 20, 1941.

#111. Strictly secret.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood Hawaiian military reservation.

ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii).

To: Santiago.

2 December 1941.

(J19.)

Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete).

Tokyo to Rio as Circular No. 2432, on 29 Nov.

Re my Circular No. 2409\*.

The following are added this date to my Circular No. 2409\*, for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them a table).

(Translator's note: Undelined values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable value added below in parenthesis.)

| Code Word | Meaning                                                                                    |
|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ASAHINA   | From - - (blank) - - (date), Japanese ships stop here will not be allowed to take on fuel. |
| DATE      | Please telegraph probable amount of - - (blank) that can be imported.                      |
| KAWAHARA  | I estimate we can probably import about - - (blank) tons of - - (blank) - -.               |

\*JD-1: 6985. List of code names to be used in plain language messages, with the STOP at end.

| <i>Code Word</i>              | <i>Meaning</i>                                                                                                   |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| NIWAGUCHI-----<br>(Kawaguchi) | It is impossible to carry out - - blank) - -                                                                     |
| NAKAMUTA-----<br>(Nakamura)   | Are in the process of arranging for importation of - -<br>(blank) - -                                            |
| SATUNAKATA-----<br>(Munakata) | Send communications via - - (blank) - - (country).                                                               |
| KAZAMA-----                   | Communications will be through office stationed in - -<br>(blank) - - (country).                                 |
| TOKUSIMA-----                 | Japanese ship should arrive in - - (blank) - - (country)<br>on - - (blank) - - (month) - - (blank)<br>- - (day). |
| TAKENOUTI-----                | Is it possible for Japanese ships to come to - - (blank) - -<br>(country)?                                       |
| YA-GI-----<br>(Yanagi)        | It is not possible to send Japanese ships to - - (blank) - -<br>(country).                                       |
| TONEGI-----                   | It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to - - (blank) - -<br>(country).                                         |

*(Part 2)*

|                       |                              |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| TAKAGI-----           | Minerals.                    |
| SAWAMURA-----         | Lead.                        |
| SUMI-----<br>(Kasumi) | Mercury.                     |
| IWASAKI-----          | Petroleum.                   |
| HIROHATA-----         | Diamonds for industrial use. |
| ITAMI-----            | Platinum.                    |
| KADA-----             | Copper.                      |
| NAKAGAWA-----         | Carat.                       |
| MAEHATA-----          | Peru.                        |
| MASUKO-----           | Chile.                       |
| SENEIDA-----          | Colombia.                    |
| TAKENAKA-----         | Paraguay or Uruguay (?).     |
| SIMAZU-----           | Paraguay or Uruguay (?).     |
| IMAZAWA-----          | Venezuela.                   |
| FUJIKAKE-----         | San QINY.**                  |
| HASIMOTO-----         | Cuba.                        |
| SINDO-----            | Havana.                      |
| TIBA-----             | Rio de Janeiro.              |
| TOZAWA-----           | Sao Paulo.                   |

*(Part 3)*

|               |                 |
|---------------|-----------------|
| HASEGAWA----- | Riberao Preto.  |
| IRIFUNE-----  | Santos.         |
| ENOMOTO-----  | BAURU.          |
| BEPPU-----    | Curityba.       |
| TIKAMATU----- | Belem.          |
| SUETUGU-----  | Buenos Aires.   |
| OKIZUMI-----  | Santiago.       |
| YAMATO-----   | Lima.           |
| UMEGAWA-----  | Bogota.         |
| HARA-----     | Caracas.        |
| ISONO-----    | Montevideo (?). |
| FUKAMATI----- | Asuncion.       |

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT\*\*\*, Lima, Sao Paulo, Mexico City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

\*\*Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo).

\*\*\*Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago".



668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

JD-1: 7122 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area A, Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,\* and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

JD-1: 7063 ARMY 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (3)

\* Probably means Mamala Bay.

From Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you #219\* on that day.

Area A<sup>b</sup>—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left.

Area C<sup>c</sup>—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class and one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "XB". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.<sup>d</sup>

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor from the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area A, where they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time round 90 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relay to \_\_\_\_\_.

JD-1: 7111, Middle Loch. SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

\* Available in WH code dated November 14. Code under study.

<sup>b</sup> Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

<sup>c</sup> East Loch.

<sup>d</sup> Middle Loch.

From: Tokyo.

To: (Circular telegram).

7 December 1941.

(Plain Japanese language using code names).

Circular #2494.

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

November 28, 1941

J19 (Priority)

#118.

Re your #232\*.

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being cut off when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your local area. Retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final decision is entered into.

JD-1: 7157 ARMY 25859 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (5)

\* Not available.

<sup>b</sup> S. I. S. #25482 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which will be broadcast in the event that code communication is cut off.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 28, 1941.

#119 Re your message #243\*.

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S)

\* Available in code under study.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

#253 Re the last part of your #123\*.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Fort and Ewa<sup>b</sup>, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

ARMY 25877 JD 7178 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

\* Not available.

<sup>b</sup> Kana spelling.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

#254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

Nine battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

#238.

Military report:

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12;

# 670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops at Honolulu during December or January.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12/8/41 (7)

From: Tokyo.

To: Singapore.

December 2, 1941.

J19-19.

Circular #2450.

(5 yards complete.)

Re my Circular #2409\*.

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your location to supplement for the already given list.

| Code Word       | Meaning                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| KIKUTI-----     | Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) are now very lively.                                                                                    |
| KAGEYAMA-----   | Shipments along the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) have now virtually stopped.                                                                          |
| (DE ?)OUTI----- | ---(blank)--- ---(blank)--- has been forced back at ---(blank)---                                                                                                                   |
| AYAOKA-----     | The Burmese Independents movement is gradually gaining momentum. The officers are endeavoring to keep up with every resource, however, the movement is usually growing more fierce. |
| ITAOISI-----    | On the --- the Burma --- (blank) --- was attacked by Independents wing with pistols (or dynamite).                                                                                  |
| FUKUNISI-----   | On the ---th in the --- (blank) --- area rioting broke out.                                                                                                                         |
| MIYAMOTO-----   | I will continue the action I described to you until advised by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately.                                                                 |
| PART II         |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| KITAMURA-----   | Recently --- (blank) --- American military planes arrived at --- (blank) ---                                                                                                        |
| MUTO-----       | --- (blank) --- and pilots numbering --- (blank) --- arrived at --- (blank) ---                                                                                                     |
| NAGAOKA-----    | --- (blank) --- divisions of --- (blank) --- troops arrived at --- (blank) --- and left for --- (blank) --- on the --- (blank) ---                                                  |
| INABA-----      | --- (blank) --- divisions of --- (blank) --- troops are reportedly concentrated on the --- (blank) --- border.                                                                      |
| YASIROEW-----   | The Independents movement at --- (blank) --- and negotiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly.                                                                       |
| TUMURA-----     | At present there is a total of --- (blank) --- enemy merchant men docked at --- (blank) ---                                                                                         |
| NINO-----       | Merchant ships now docked at --- (blank) --- are from the following: American --- (blank) ---; British --- (blank) ---; Netherlands --- (blank) ---                                 |
| NAGAY-----      | --- an merchant ships left for --- (blank) --- loaded with arms.                                                                                                                    |
| NIOGUTI-----    | Our means of communication with Burma and the Indian Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive.                                                                                       |
| SEGAWA-----     | Our resident Nationals have been camped.                                                                                                                                            |
| PART III        |                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| YASUI-----      | It is reported that riots are breaking out.                                                                                                                                         |
| MARUSE-----     | Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields.                                                                                                                                   |
| KUBOTA-----     | Oil fields bombed.                                                                                                                                                                  |
| NIRA-----       | The residents of --- area are preparing to flee.                                                                                                                                    |
| MOORI-----      | Orders issued to residents of --- (blank) --- area.                                                                                                                                 |
| SEKYA-----      | Morale wavering.                                                                                                                                                                    |
| TUKAMOTO-----   | Netherlanders.                                                                                                                                                                      |
| OCHIAI-----     | Japanese Nitta Natives.                                                                                                                                                             |
| KURIBAPA-----   | Japanese.                                                                                                                                                                           |
| SISIYAMA-----   | ---                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| YAMANOUTI-----  | Premier.                                                                                                                                                                            |

| <i>Code Word</i> | <i>Meaning</i>                     |
|------------------|------------------------------------|
| NOSE             | Specialists' Commission.           |
| KURODA           | High tide (?).                     |
| NIRAI            | Some officers and private citizens |
| INOYAMA          | Telegraphy.                        |
| ENDOO            | The Yamashita Agency.              |
| ATUKAX           | The Nakamura Company.              |
| KOIZUMI          | India.                             |
| AER              | Java.                              |
| EDOGUTI          | Sumatra.                           |
| HIROSE           | Celebes.                           |
| HUKUI            | Borneo.                            |
| INOCYE           |                                    |
| FUKA             | British India.                     |
| KASAURA          | Ceylon.                            |
| IKAWA            |                                    |
| <i>PART IV</i>   |                                    |
| HUJIMURA         | Hainan Island.                     |
| IJIMA            | The Spratleys.                     |
| ARIASA           | Singapore.                         |
| HORUTA           | Pinan.                             |
| NIWA             | Bangkok.                           |
| KAMIYA           | Chien mai* ---- Singora.           |
| ISIDA            | Salgon.                            |
| NINOMIYA         |                                    |
| HOSOKAWA         |                                    |
| NEZU             | Tonkin.                            |
| YOKOTA           | Cambodia.                          |
| NUMATA           |                                    |
| WATAMZAWA        | Manila.                            |
| NOKAKI           |                                    |
| KERI             | Batavia.                           |
| SEKINE           | Menado.                            |
| SERISAWA         | Makassar.                          |
| SOWE             |                                    |
| ANDO             | Pankaran-Brandau*.                 |
| DOBASI           | Pankau Sasu*.                      |
| FUKUSIMA         | Mandalay.                          |
| BAKAMATSU        | Palembang.                         |
| <i>PART V</i>    |                                    |
| ISTUMOTO         | Jambi.                             |
| NAKINO           | Tarakan.                           |
| MAKINO           | Pa -- Pan.                         |
| SAKURAI          | Sagsirinda*.                       |
| TAKANO           | Sanga Sanga*.                      |
| UEDA             | Paura*.                            |
| YANAGIYA         | Banka*.                            |
| WATAGI           | Birton*.                           |
| FOAWA            | Sunda*.                            |
| AIDA             | Malacca.                           |
| BANDO            | Sumaran*.                          |
| FUNARASI         | Timor.                             |
| IKEDA            | New Guinea.                        |
| KATAGIRI         | Lashie.                            |
| MIXOGUYI         | The Periswisa* region.             |
| NICKADA          | The Geta* region.                  |
| SAWAKARA         | The Keta Eharu Region.             |
| TAKESITA         | East.                              |
| UTSUMONIYA       | West.                              |
| YAMASE           | South.                             |
| ARAWAKI          | North.                             |
| DOOKY            | Island.                            |

JD-1: 7214 ARMY 25943 SECRET Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

\* See S. I. S. #25609 in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches.

\*Kena spelling.

672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

5 December 1941.

#252.

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned message #239\* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.

3 light cruisers.

16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and \* \* \* were in dock.

26029.

JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

\*Available, dated 29 November.

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

#241 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #119.\*

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns can not be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231\*\* were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 knots) is possible, however, figuring on 50 percent of the time being used for maneuvering technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be at a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

(2) The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

JD-1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

\* JD-1: 7158.

\*\*Available, dated 23 November.

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii).

To: Santiago.

2 December 1941.

(J19).

Circular #328.

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November.

Re my Circular #2409\*



Additions to the list already sent; please use with others.

| <i>Code Word</i>  | <i>Meaning.</i>                                                                                                                        |
|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| KASIMA-----       | Have Japanese living there been interned?                                                                                              |
| KANŌ-----         | Japanese living here are all safe.                                                                                                     |
| KIKUTI-----       | Japanese living here have all been interned.                                                                                           |
| KATUNO-----       | Some of Japanese living here have been interned.                                                                                       |
| KAWASIMO-----     | The wave length of General Information broadcast will<br>be changed to-----kilocycles from----- (day)-----<br>----- (month)-----       |
| KAKAO-----        | Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please<br>(Kayao)----- change wave length.                                             |
| TUJIKITA-----     | Please change wave length of General Information<br>broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present<br>wave length.                |
| TABUSE-----       | Please change wave length of General Information<br>(Tabuti)----- broadcast to a longer wave length.                                   |
| SAITŌ-----        | The time of General Information broadcast is to be<br>changed starting on----- (day)----- from-----<br>(time)----- to----- (time)----- |
| HAYASAKI-----     | Please change time of General Information broadcast,<br>starting on----- (day)----- to, from----- (time)<br>----- to----- (time)-----  |
| ISEZAKI-----      | 100 (hyaku)                                                                                                                            |
| WANAMI-----       | 1,000 (sen)                                                                                                                            |
| YASUNO-----       | 10,000 (man)                                                                                                                           |
| UNO-----          | 100,000 (jyu man)                                                                                                                      |
| ITIOTA-----       | 1,000,000 (hyaku man)                                                                                                                  |
| (perhaps ITIOKA)  |                                                                                                                                        |
| (probably UTIOKA) |                                                                                                                                        |

JD-1: 7360 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

\*JD-1: 6985. List of code words similar to above.

From: Tientsin (7) *Peking*

To: Tokyo.

5 December 1941.

(Purple).

#625. (Circular Number.)

To be handled in government code.

Re my secret military communication #262\* of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

JD-1: 7335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR)

\*Not available.

# 674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941.

#245 (In 2 parts, complete).

(Military secret.)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following

1. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

| Meaning                                                 |                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units. | Preparing to sortie.....                  |
| A number of carriers.....                               | Preparing to sortie.....                  |
| Battleship divisions.....                               | All departed between 1st and 3d.....      |
| Carriers.....                                           | Several departed between 1st and 3d.....  |
| Carriers.....                                           | All departed between 1st and 3d.....      |
| Battleship divisions.....                               | All departed between 4th and 6th.....     |
| Carriers.....                                           | Several departed between 4th and 6th..... |
| Carriers.....                                           | All departed between 4th and 6th.....     |

26145.

JD-1: 7370 (continued) (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

## 2. Signals.

I. Lanikai\* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

One light between 8 and 9 p. m.-----

One light between 9 and 10 p. m.-----

One light between 10 and 11 p. m.-----

One light between 11 and 12 p. m.-----

## II.

Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m.-----

Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m.-----

Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m.-----

Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m.-----

## (Part 2.)

## III. Lanikai\* Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signal 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House\*\* will indicate the following

## Times

1900-2000-----

2000-2100-----

2100-2200-----

2200-2300-----

2300-2400-----

0000-0100-----

## V. K. G. M. G. \*\*\* Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or

B. CHIC--CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made in Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium\*\*\* at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 40° N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and so

\*Between Waimanala and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

\*\*A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

\*\*\*A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

\*\*\*\*At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

west of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received.

| Time           | Signal |
|----------------|--------|
| From 7-8-----  | 3 or 6 |
| From 8-9-----  | 4 or 7 |
| From 9-10----- | 5 or 8 |

JD-1: 7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

# B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 24, 1941.

#234. (Part 0 of 2)

Re your #114.\*

Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2)

JD-7511.

\* Not available.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

November 24, 1941.

#234. (Part 2 of 2.)

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in group sf -----, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)

JD-7511.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

December 2, 1941.

J-19.

#123. (Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications

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that they will be sent up. Also advise me provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on 1

JD-1: 8007 ARMY 27065 SECRET (Jap

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXI

(Exhibit No. 14 originally consisted 14B, 14C, and 14D, being photostatic c chart, showing courses and locations o These photostatic copies are reproduce found as Item No. 106, EXHIBITS Inquiry.)

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXI

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

25 July 1941.

(Purple).

#571.

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assu many courtesies by him. His opinions conc incide with mine; he told me that the onl countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral ( it seemed to me that the higher officials in to be men of excellent character and qualifica

To this, the Admiral replied that both tl Operations and the Director of War Plans same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of continued, both Kimmel and King were rec the highest caliber. Although Hart had res been kept on in active duty because of the Please relay this information to the Navy.

JD-1: 4063 SECRET (D) Navy Trans.

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SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 14, 1941.

Purple.

#943 (Part 1 of 2)\* (To be handled in Gov I had an interview with Rear Admiral TI me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not jus Should a conference of the leaders of the t definite preliminary agreement, and should made into Siberia, the President would be Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and independently, and so it would seem to m of her obligations toward the Three-Powe withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is at once, it would seem that a detailed agr Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

---

\* For part 2 see S. I. S. # 23516.

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.  
Army 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).  
To: Washington.  
October 16, 1941.  
Purple (CA).  
#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival ?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET

From: Berlin.  
To: Tokyo.  
1 October 1941.  
(Purple).  
#1198.

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Welzacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and other concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machina-

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tions of estrangement by third countries and that there is no change in her feeling toward German leaders and the people in general that cannot be covered. Please bear the wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with Germany there is no telling what step Germany will take with Japan.

Relayed to Rome.

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 10-

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 22, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

I have already wired you something about that I, too, should go out with the former the Secretary of State has known how small little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed that this is the case. There are some and who say that things will get better for me is not enough. Among my confreres here some who feel the same way, but alas, the Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI I imagine that you all have any objections. dead horse. I don't want to continue this line of people. No, don't think I am trying to flatter man of honor this is the only way that is me your permission to return to Japan. Moreover, if I have injured your dignity and the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

23 October 1941.

(Purple-CA).

Unnumbered.

From your message(s) I am advised of the result with and I wish to express to you that I am well aware, the outcome of the decision upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government is an exceedingly important matter. We are waiting for your Excellency's reports for our information.

For the above reason, we express our hope of your own personal wishes, and remain at

JD-1: 6016 SECRET (D) Navy Trans.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

5 November 1941.

(Purple-CA).

#736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is difficult for the signing of this agreement but I realize that this is a difficult order, but unavoidable one. Please understand this in saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from further deterioration with great determination and with unstinted effort. This information is to be kept strictly to

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).  
To: Tokyo.  
November 10, 1941.  
Purple (CA) (Urgent).  
#1066. Part 1 of 2.

1. I sent MOORE<sup>a</sup> to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

Army 6440 24655 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

<sup>a</sup> Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 10, 1941  
Purple (CA) (Urgent)  
#1066. (Part 2 of 2.)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

8. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

Army 6440 24656 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
November 16, 1941.  
Purple (Ca) (Urgent).

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,<sup>a</sup> and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.<sup>b</sup> Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,<sup>c</sup> and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is: therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24878. JD-1:6638. SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S).

<sup>b</sup> S. I. S. # 24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

<sup>c</sup> S. I. S. # 24873 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

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SECRET

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
November 22, 1941.  
Purple CA (Urgent).  
#812.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.<sup>a</sup> You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 6710. 25138. SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S).

<sup>a</sup> See S. I. S. # 24873. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

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SECRET

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple.

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the

<sup>a</sup> See JD 1: 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.



America Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

*Japanese*

Sangoku Joyaku Mondai  
(Three-Power Treaty question)  
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai  
(The question of non-discriminatory treatment)  
Shina Mondai  
(The China question)  
Soori  
(Premier)  
Gaimudaijin  
(Foreign Minister)  
Rikugun  
(The Army)  
Kaigun  
(The Navy)  
Nichi-bel kooshoo  
(Japan-American negotiations)  
Daitooryoo  
(President)  
Haru  
(Hull)  
Kokunaijoosei  
(Internal situation)  
Jooho Suru  
(To yield)  
Jooho Sese  
(Not to yield)  
Kaisei Kyuuten Suru  
(Situation taking critical turn)

*English*

Nyuu Yooku  
(New York)  
Shikago  
(Chicago)  
Sanfuranshisuko  
(San Francisco)  
Ito Kun  
(Mr. Ito)  
Date Kun  
(Mr. Date)  
Tokugawa Kun  
(Mr. Tokugawa)  
Maeda Kun  
(Mr. Maeda)  
Endan  
(Marriage proposal)  
Kimiko San  
(Miss Kimiko)  
Fumako San  
(Miss Fumako)  
Shoobai  
(Trade)  
Yama Wo Uru  
(To sell the mountain)  
Yama Wo Urenu  
(Not to sell the mountain)  
Kodomo Gaumareru  
(The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO:  
Section Chief KASE:  
The Minister's residence  
The Vice-Minister's residence

Setagaya 4617  
Yotsuya 4793  
Ginza 3614  
Ginza 1022

ARMY 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
19 November 1941.  
(J19).  
Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
  - (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
  - (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI".
- The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.  
JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Nanking.  
15 November 1941.  
(Purple).  
#499.

Re your #818\*  
To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while.

jd-1: 6848 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)

\*Not available.

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
19 November 1941  
(J19)  
Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.\*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.\*\*

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE\*\*\*

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT).

\*East wind rain.  
\*\*North wind cloudy.  
\*\*\*West wind clear.

From: Washington.  
To: Tokyo.  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (Extremely urgent).  
#1180. (Part 1 of 2.)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington.  
To: Tokyo.  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (Extremely urgent).  
#1180. (Part 2 of 2.)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington (Nomura).  
To: Tokyo.  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (Extremely urgent).  
#1189. (Part 1 of 2.)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China, and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

ARMY 25441 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington (Momura).  
To: Tokyo.  
November 26, 1941.  
Purple. (Extremely urgent).  
#1189. (Part 2 of 2.)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

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In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Toyko. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

ARMY 25442 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
November 28, 1941.  
Purple. (CA.)

#844.

Re your #1189.\*

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180<sup>b</sup> and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

- \* S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442.
- <sup>b</sup> S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436.

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
29 November 1941.  
(Purple-CA.)

#857.

Re my #844\*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points

\*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).

Telephone Code.

TransPacific Radio Telephone.

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y. "Is that so?"

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y. "We are being careful."

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues; using voice code)

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y. "No particular ---- (one or two words faded out) ----"

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y. "Yes."

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K. "Let's see—this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:0 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y. "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

**686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

**From: Tokyo.**  
**To: Washington.**  
**1 December 1941.**  
**(Purple-CA).**  
**#865.**

**Re my #857\*.**

1. The date set in my message #812\*\* has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124\*\*\*. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

**JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)**

\*JD-1: 6921.  
\*\*JD-1: 6710.  
\*\*\*Not available.

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**SECRET**

**From: Tokyo.**  
**To: Berlin.**  
**November 30, 1941.**  
**Purple.**

**#986. (Strictly Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.) (Part 1 of 2)**  
**Secret outside the Department.)**

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

**ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (MR)**

~~SECRET~~

From: Tokyo.  
To: Berlin.  
November 30, 1941.  
Purple.  
#986. (Part 2 of 2.)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25535 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR)

~~SECRET~~

From: Washington (Nomura).  
To: Tokyo.  
November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#1214.

To be handled in Government Code.  
Re my #1190\*.

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plans to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

ARMY 6971 25548 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

\* S. I. S. # 25444 and # 25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.

From: Tokyo (Togo).  
To: Honolulu (Riyofji).  
15 November 1941.  
(J19).

#111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (8)

SECRET

From: Washington.  
To: Tokyo.  
December 2, 1941.  
Purple.

(Completed Translation)

#1232. (Part 1 of 2)

Re my #1231 \*.

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233\*. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. \*We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

\* Not available.

\*Original translation incomplete from this point on.

SECRET

From: Washington.  
To: Toyko.  
December 2, 1941.  
Purple.

#1232. (Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #1231\*.

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1223\*. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. Recently the President, too, the four year incident —

ARMY 7021 25659 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

\* Not available.



SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#1232. (Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.\*

ARMY 25660 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

\* Not available.

From: Tokyo.

To: Hsinking.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#893.

-----In the event that Manchuria participates in the war----in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that his country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchuokuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Washington.  
To: Tokyo.  
1 December 1941.  
(Purple.)  
#1227.

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

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SECRET

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 4, 1941.  
Purple. (Urgent.)  
#891.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #1256.<sup>a</sup>

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875.<sup>b</sup> I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

ARMY 7105 25731 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

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<sup>a</sup> Not available.  
<sup>b</sup> S. I. S. # 25725.

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
8 December 1941.  
(Purple.)  
#875.

Chief of Office routing.

Re your #1232.\*

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been

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\*JD-1: 7021.

an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

JD-1: 7057 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

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SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

Purple. (Urgent.)

#1234.

Strictly Secret.

Re your #862\*.

I know that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

ARMY 7059 25730 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

\* Not available.

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From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1243.

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.

JD-1: 7050 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

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SECRET

From: Berlin.

To: Tokyo.

December 4, 1941.

Purple. (CA.)

#1410.

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UKHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 7134 25807 SECRET Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

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From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1243.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

JD-1: 7008 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225 (Part 1 of 3).

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857\*. Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.

From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Premier's statement, (see my message #1222\*\*), and said that that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery of the entire text.

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

\*JD-1: 6921.

\*\*Available, Purple dated 30 November.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).

(Message having the indicator 20803\* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China - - - the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

\*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225. (Part 3 of 3.)

Hull: "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these conversations to a successful conclusion.

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position."

I: "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."

In general he expressed his agreement to this.

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China problem.

"As I have pointed out on several occasions," I said, "this has been the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem."

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2).

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 30, 1941.

Purple.

#1224.

Re your #857.\*

I at once requested HULL for an interview; however, I failed to be notified of the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's expected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so will you transmit yours message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)

ARMY 7089 25762 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (2).

\* See S. I. S. # 25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.

From: Tokyo.

To: Honolulu.

29 November 1941.

(J19.)

#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo (Togo.)  
To: Honolulu.  
November 18, 1941.  
J-19.  
#118.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N," Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,\* and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S).

\* Probably means Mamala Bay.

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.  
#901.

Re my #844<sup>a</sup>.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

<sup>a</sup> See S. I. S. # 25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.  
#902. (Part 1 of 14.)  
Separate telegram.

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.

#902. (Part 2 of 14.)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.

#902. (Part 3 of 14.)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.

#902. (Part 4 of 14.)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.

Purple.

#902. (Part 5 of 14.)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.

Purple.

#902. (Part 6 of 14.)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

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From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 4, 1941.

Purple.

#902. (Part 7 of 14.)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories



in disregard to realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 SECRET

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.

#902. (Part 8 of 14.)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.

#902. (Part 9 of 14.)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.  
#902. (Part 10 of 14.)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr----- (45 letters garbled or missing)----- been compelled to observe the satus quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the -----es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.  
#902. (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n-- (50 letters missed)---sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.  
#902. (Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington.  
December 6, 1941.  
Purple.  
#902. (Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and

Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, *ANDND\** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT\*\** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

\*Probably "and as"

\*\*Probably "China, can but"

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
7 December 1941  
(Purple-Eng)  
#902. Part 14 of 14

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7Dec.1941 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Honolulu (Kita).  
To: Tokyo.  
November 18, 1941.  
J-19.  
#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219<sup>a</sup> on that day.

Area A<sup>b</sup>—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C<sup>c</sup>—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D<sup>d</sup>.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 80

<sup>a</sup>—Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

<sup>b</sup>—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

<sup>c</sup>—East Loch.

<sup>d</sup>—Middle Loch.

**700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to \_\_\_\_\_.

ARMY 7111 25817 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

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SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 7, 1941.

Purple (Urgent—Very Important).

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902<sup>a</sup>.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (3)

<sup>a</sup>—S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.

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SECRET

From: Budapest.

To: Tokyo.

December 7, 1941.

LA.

#104.

Re my #103<sup>a</sup>.

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

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SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

Purple (Urgent).

#1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating these sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us----(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)-----

ARMY 7176 25846 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 2T)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

December 3, 1941.

Purple (Urgent).

#1256. Re your #875<sup>a</sup>.

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once.

ARMY 7128 25849 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (1)

<sup>a</sup> See S. I. S. # 25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

December 6, 1941.

PA-KZ.

#128.

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #128<sup>a</sup> the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 7381 26158 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

<sup>a</sup> Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

December 2, 1941.

J-19.

#128.

(Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

## 702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 16

SECRET

## Naval message—Navy Department

| Phone Extension Number: 2827                                        | Addressees                                        | Message precedence              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by.....<br>Date: 28 November 1941.    | For Action:<br>CINCPAC.<br>OPNAV.<br>COMFOURTEEN. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom.....<br>Decoded by P. R. WHITE.<br>Paraphrased by..... | Information.                                      | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 26-41.

281516

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT -

Comment Naval attache that *Astalusha Sharda* two seven zero eight three zero X Isuzu (cl) in Formosa Straits Sunday X Subtender and four subs probably Subron Six plus Nagoya Maru tender X Last sentence believed to be sendal (cl) plus two desdls XX Other items no comment XX Additional info from CN Nitta Maru sailing Yokosuka to Takao twenty ninth with military supplies XX Two senior construction officers and four thousand men status not known ordered mandates XX Unidentified ship believed to be light cruiser has apparently relieved Kashii as flagship southern expeditionary fleet X This ship now in Camranh Bay Saigon area XX

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) NAV REGS.

NOTE.—Penned notations in italics.

SECRET

## Naval message—Navy Department

| Phone Extension Number: 2827                                   | Addressees                                          | Message precedence              |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Leased by.....<br>Date: 1 December 1941.  | For Action:<br>OPNAV.                               | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom.....<br>Decoded by: WHITE.<br>Paraphrased by..... | Information:<br>CINCPAC.<br>COMFOURTEEN.<br>CINCAF. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41 816913

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date time GCT

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41.

TEXT

From RI X Arrivals in Takao area past two days X Comdesron five in Natori X Naka to join Desron four X units of number two base force and Chogel X Last named ship considered to be tender for two divisions submarines X All these units now under command Cinc third X Cinc second in Atago shifted from Kure to Sasebo Comm Zone apparently en route South China waters

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav Regs.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 Classified      COMMANDER IN CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET      Incoming

Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X Same garble cable X No change in shore addresses XX

30 Nov. 41 Crypto-Group 87 CBO HMC Serial No. 12-2

Originator:      Information:

COM 16

CINCAF

Action:

CINPAC

OPNAV

COM 14

Authenticated:

F. S. Lockard,  
 F. S. LOCKARD, *Ens. USNR.*

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 17

(Exhibit No. 17 is a photostat of a captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plan V of "Battle Report". This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 107, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 18

RADIO LOG

of

BISHOP'S POINT RADIO STATION

7 December 1941

RADIO LOG

SECTION BASE

BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.

|                          |                                |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Watch                    | Receiver & Controls O. K.      |
| C. E. Gibson, Supervisor | Freq.: 2670 KCS.               |
| R. B. Moyle, Operator    | Date: 7 December 1941 R. W. H. |

|      |        |        |                                                  |
|------|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 1445 | DZ5Y   | DB1L V | DN3L AR                                          |
|      | DN3L   | V DZ5Y | K                                                |
|      | DZ5Y   | DB1L V | DN3L AS ONE MOMENT PLEASE STAND BY               |
|      | DB1L   | DZ5Y V | DN3L AR                                          |
|      | DN3L   | V DZ5Y | COME IN                                          |
|      | DN3L   | V DB1L | K                                                |
|      | DZ5Y   | V DN3L | WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE K          |
|      | DZ5Y   | V DN3L | WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE     |
|      |        |        | OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED K              |
| 1450 | DN3L   | V DZ5Y | THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT    |
|      |        |        | THE TIME 0200 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM |
|      |        |        | THE ENTRANCE APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE EN-      |
|      |        |        | RANCE K                                          |
| 1451 | DZ5Y   | V DN3L | R                                                |
| 1456 | DZ5Y   | V DN3L | BT DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON     |
|      |        |        | THE SUB K                                        |
|      | DN3L   | V DZ5Y | NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION K                      |
|      | DZ5Y   | V DN3L | WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME APPROXIMATELY THAT YOU    |
|      |        |        | SAW THE SUBMARINE K                              |
|      | DN3L   | V DZ5Y | APPROXIMATE TIME 0350 AND HE WAS APPARENTLY      |
|      |        |        | HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K                       |
| 1458 | V DN3L |        | R                                                |
| 1505 | DZ5Y   | V DN3L | AR PLEASE                                        |
|      | DN3L   | V DZ5Y | K                                                |
|      | DZ5Y   | V DN3L | BT THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION NOTIFY US IF   |
|      |        |        | YOU HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION WE WILL CON-       |
|      |        |        | TINUE SEARCH K                                   |

## RADIO LOG—Continued

## SECTION BASE, BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.—Continued

|      |        |                                                            |
|------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1508 | V DZ5Y | R                                                          |
| 1524 | DB1L   | V DZ5Y AR                                                  |
|      | DZ5Y   | V DB1L K                                                   |
|      | V DZ5Y | WE ARE FINISHED K                                          |
| 1525 | V DB1L | R                                                          |
| 1535 | DR7Y   | V DJ8A PM DRBR EARLY 0450 K                                |
| 1538 | V DJ8A | R                                                          |
| 1539 | DW2X   | V DB1L AR                                                  |
|      | DB1L   | V DW2X K                                                   |
|      | DW2X   | V DB1L CLEAR K                                             |
|      | V DW2X | R                                                          |
| 1555 | DJ8A   | V DR7Y AR                                                  |
|      | DR6Y   | V DJ8A K                                                   |
|      | DJ8A   | V DR7Y 815 FEMALE 0525 YOU GOT THAT MESSAGE BEFORE DID YOU |
|      | DR7Y   | V DJ8A R BOTH MESSAGES R LAST TWO MESSAGES K               |
| 1557 | DJ8A   | V DR7Y R                                                   |
| 1630 | DE2A   | V DW2X AR                                                  |
|      | DW2X   | V DR9Q K                                                   |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L K                                                   |
|      | V DZ5I | K                                                          |
|      | DE2A   | V DW2X Z RIME WING 071614 (SEE FILE) K                     |
| 1641 | V DN3L | R                                                          |
|      | V DZ5I | R                                                          |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L AR                                                  |
|      | DN3L   | V DW2X K                                                   |
| 1642 | DW2X   | V DN3L ZCD DZ5I R AR                                       |
| 1643 | DN3L   | V DW2X R                                                   |
| 1647 | DW2X   | V DZ5I AR                                                  |
| 1650 | DW2X   | V DR9Q ZCE DZ5I K                                          |
|      | DR9Q   | V DZ5I ZSF K                                               |
|      | DZ5I   | V DR9Q S3 K                                                |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L ZCE DZ5I AR                                         |
|      | DZ5I   | V DW2X K                                                   |
|      | DW2X   | V DZ5I ZSF K                                               |
|      | V DW2X | S5 K5 K                                                    |
| 1652 | V DZ5I | R                                                          |
| 1714 | DR7Y   | V DJ8A HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR ME                            |
|      | DJ8A   | V DR7Y YES 2307 COUNTER 0640 VA                            |
| 1715 | DR7Y   | V DJ8A R                                                   |

6 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey,  
RICHARD WILMOT HUMPHREY,  
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U. S. N. R.

This copy was certified in my presence:

Walter H. Kozacko,  
WALTER H. KOZACKO,  
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

## RADIO LOG

## SECTION BASE, BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.

Watch  
G. E. Gibson, Supervisor  
R. B. Moyle, Operator

Receiver & Controls O. K.  
Freq. 2670 Kcs.  
Date: December 1942 1941 R. W. H.

|      |        |        |                                               |
|------|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 1715 | DW2X   | V DN3L | TIME OF LAST ENTRY                            |
| 1721 | DN3L   | V DW2X | AR                                            |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L | K                                             |
|      |        |        | P BK WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS  |
|      |        |        | OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AR            |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L | STAND BY FOR MORE MESSAGES                    |
|      | DNRL   | V DW2X | IM1 YOUR LAST PRIORITY K                      |
| 1723 | DW2X   | V DN3L | WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DRIPPED DEPTH |
|      |        |        | CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE |
|      |        |        | SEA AREA AR                                   |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L | DID YOU GET THAT LAST MESSAGE K               |
|      | V DW2X | R      |                                               |
|      | V DN3L |        | STAND BY FOR FUTHER MESSAGES                  |



## RADIO LOG—Continued

SECTION BASE, BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.—Continued

|      |        |        |                                                                                                                    |
|------|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1727 | V DW2X |        | R                                                                                                                  |
| 1749 | DW2X   | V DN3L | AR                                                                                                                 |
|      | DN3L   | V DW2X | K                                                                                                                  |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L | ZMA 8 BUT STAND BY AR                                                                                              |
|      | V DW2X |        | R                                                                                                                  |
| 1755 | DW2X   | V DN3L | AR                                                                                                                 |
|      | V DW2X |        | K                                                                                                                  |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L | ZMA 8 BUT STAND BY FOR MESSAGE AT ANY TIME AR                                                                      |
| 1756 | V DW2X |        | R                                                                                                                  |
| 1803 | DJ8A   | V DN3L | P P AR PLEASE                                                                                                      |
|      | DR9Q   | V DN3L | ZCG DJ8A AR                                                                                                        |
|      | AJ8A   | V DR9Q | AR                                                                                                                 |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L | P AR                                                                                                               |
|      | V DW2X |        | K                                                                                                                  |
|      | V DN3L |        | BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED A SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU<br>PLEASE HAVE COAST GUARD SEND CUTTER TO RELIEVE<br>US OF SAMPAN AR |
| 1805 | V DW2X |        | R P K                                                                                                              |
|      | V DN3L |        | AS 1 MINUTE                                                                                                        |
|      | V DJ8A |        | K                                                                                                                  |
|      | V DN3L |        | BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED SAMPAN AND ESCORTING<br>SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE CUTTER RELIEVE<br>US OF SAMPAN AR  |
|      | DN3L   | V DW2X | Z DW2X 071807 DN3L P GR 11 BT HELID ARUQS QLUAN SVDER<br>LBVQY NEXKQ TPHQX BMMQH LBPBV ARUQS HELID K               |
| 1810 | DR7Y   | V DJ8A | IMI GR 1                                                                                                           |
| 1812 | DJ8A   | V DR7Y | GR 1 402                                                                                                           |
|      | DR7Y   | V DJ8A | R                                                                                                                  |
|      |        |        | MOYLE AND GIBSON OFF TO BANKS AND HUMPHREY.....                                                                    |
| 1817 | DE1T   | V DW2X | AR                                                                                                                 |
| 1821 | DN3L   | V DW2X | AR                                                                                                                 |
|      | DW2X   | V DN3L | K                                                                                                                  |
|      | V DW2X |        | Z DW2X 071828 DE1T Q DN3L P GR 5 BT PROCEED IMMEDIATE-<br>LY AND CONTACT WARD AR                                   |
| 1826 | DW2X   | V DN3L | R                                                                                                                  |
|      | DR7Y   | V DJ8A | AR                                                                                                                 |
|      | DJ8A   | V DR7Y | K                                                                                                                  |
|      | DR7Y   | V DJ8A | HERE IS A MESSAGE Z DK2K 071801 DR7Y GR 4 BT PROCEED<br>CONTACT HARBOR PATROL                                      |
|      | DJ8A   | V DN3L | IMI THAT LAST MESSAGE                                                                                              |
| 1830 | DW2X   | V DR6K | ZMC ZGD DR6K DR9Q DU1P                                                                                             |
|      | DJ8A   | V DN3L |                                                                                                                    |
| 1830 |        |        | RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER HAVE GONE OUT—POWER<br>OFF                                                                |
| 1830 |        |        | AIR RAID BY JAPANESE PLANES                                                                                        |

6 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey,

RICHARD WILMOT HUMPHREY,

438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U. S. N. R.

This copy was certified in my presence:

Walter H. Kozacko,

WALTER H. KOZACKO,

Lt. Comdr., USNR.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 19

14 MAY 1945.

Received the following secret material from Captain L. F. Safford, USN, for official use in the Pearl Harbor Investigation:

- (1) Three copies of Com 14 Daily RI Summaries (at Pearl Harbor) from 1 Nov. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl.
- (2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dec. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl.
- (3) Photos of the following (3 copies):

OpNav to CinCAF 242239

Com 14 to OpNav 260110

Com 16 to OpNav 261831

OpNav to Alusna Tokyo 040330

## 706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Com 13 031825  
Com 16 to OpNav 010245  
Foote's message  
Com 16 to OpNav 041502  
Hidden message of December 7  
Bainbridge Island 051830  
Com 14 052200

(2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dec. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl. (JD-1 No. 7148).

JOHN L. SONNETT.

### COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 1 NOVEMBER 1941-6 DECEMBER 1941

SECRET

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—1 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume a little less than normal. Receiving condition fair, traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged, but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared, but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

**Combined Fleet.**—The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

**Carriers.**—The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

**Submarines.**—Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

**Third Fleet.**—This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC, is very busy with Tokyo.

**China.**—The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—2 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair, but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Forces originating many despatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating many despatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence despatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—3 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emanate from TOYKO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of

this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

**Combined Fleet.**—Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

**Third Fleet.**—Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by JIATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

**Air.**—1. WE address, today broke down as "ITIKOUKU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct; it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicated that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before, but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can be easily accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—4 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

**Air.**—High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the aid dispatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

**Mandates.**—The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

**Submarines.**—No activity noted.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—5 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff Car Divs and TIYA 44 (Unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many dispatches passing between the two.

**Third Fleet.**—Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section?). Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today.

The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous dispatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—8 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon, all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

**Takao-Bako Area.**—It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprised practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.

**Combined Fleet.**—A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

**Mandates.**—The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO Paloa continue to be the most active units.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—7 November 1941*

**General.**—Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bona fide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentration in that area.

**Air.**—Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

**Fleet.**—Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

*Communication Intelligence Summary—8 November 1941*

**General.**—Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a dispatch *action* to S. C. O. Combined *INFO* S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

**Fleet.**—Chief of Staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with the Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

**Air.**—Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC, Combined Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.

*Communication Intelligence Summary—9 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic column heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area, but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

*Communication Intelligence Summary—10 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

**Combined Fleet.**—Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A Staff officer of BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The Cinc, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

**Third Fleet.**—The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. Cinc Three originated one movement report for information of Cinc Fourth Fleet.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Little activity. Cinc Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the Cinc Fourth for information of Jaluit.

**Fifth Fleet.**—One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.

**Air.**—The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. Cinc Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

*Communication Intelligence Summary—12 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities, in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

**Combined Fleet.**—The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is borne out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with the BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

**Air.**—CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

**Fifth Fleet.**—The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

**China.**—The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIWI dispatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INRO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.

4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 Messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. At 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO Intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with dispatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

*Combined Fleet.*—The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

*Third Fleet.*—Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of

*Air.*—Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

*China.*—The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor air receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AINav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.

2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to AN1758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

*Combined Fleet.*—Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China Area in near future.

*Third Fleet.*—Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

*Fourth Fleet.*—No movement yet from the Truk area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

*Submarines.*—No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

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**Air.**—One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U #9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No Messages of the D. F. type were detected so it presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of BatDiv Three flagship.

**Combined Fleet.**—Same as yesterday, same units (BatDiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC. Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

**Third Fleet.**—Inactive.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamol) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

**Submarine Force.**—Little activity detected. It is believed that some activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.

**Air.**—Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 16, November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers—(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives—Expressed thanks, etc., to all



officers and men of Army Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."

*First and Second Fleets.*—Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airron Seven (8 Chitose class)  
Carrier Division Four  
Destroyer Squadron Seven  
Destroyer Squadron Three  
Battleship Division Three  
Cruiser Division Seven

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, these appear to an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates.

It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

*Third Fleet.*—Believed inactive in Sasebo—Kure area.

*Fourth Fleet.*—FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (Men 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite, but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition of this mythical fleet, but is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus area.

*Submarines.*—Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet Commands continues.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different, but all fitting the same line on the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going into Tokyo, it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.

*Combined Fleet.*—No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

*Third Fleet.*—Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

*Air.*—The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

*China.*—Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku ad-

dressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama, Bako, CinC, South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication section. The double originator BUMIL and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

**Combined Fleet.**—CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force today in an urgent NIKAWIWI dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

**Third Fleet.**—The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps awhile ago and may be transporting air units for equipment.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic still interested in Jaluit.

*Communication Intelligence Summary 19 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some technical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AINAVS. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

**Combined Fleet.**—The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of

Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

*Third Fleet.*—Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Flagship located Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

*Communication Intelligence Summary—20-21 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNIWIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo became very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R.D.F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder Net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was a duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

*Combined Fleet.*—Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in the Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

|                                 |                        |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) | ENO 7 (Unidentified)   |
| TAE 1 (Airron 7)                | AKU 8 (Air Unit)       |
| KAME 5 (Airron 6)               | KUSU 7 (Unidentified)  |
| YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5)               | SATU 88 (Unidentified) |
| KENU 3 (Crudiv 7)               | KUNI 88 (Unidentified) |
| RESE 4 (Desron 3)               | OYU 9 (Unidentified)   |
| AKI 0 (Desron 4)                | KOA 0 (Unidentified)   |
| TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For)    | NOTU 6 (Unidentified)  |
| SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For)    | NETE 5 (Unidentified)  |
| YOMO 9 (Desro 5)                | NSI 3 (Unidentified)   |
| REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps)      | SUTE 1 (Unidentified)  |
| KUNO 9 (Ermo)                   | YAYU 1 (Unidentified)  |
| MIMO 3 (Air Unit)               | MARE 5 (Unidentified)  |
| TUE 7 (Unidentified)            | Plus 11 Marus          |

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or a Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out—so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

*Communications Intelligence Summary—20-21 November 1941*

*Mandates and Fourth Fleet.*—The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with

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the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

### *Communication Intelligence Summary—22 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs and sent two other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Pelelin and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

**Combined Fleet.**—CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETES (Crudiv?), KO02 (Subron5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force) MIRA 9 (CarDiv3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collection), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure) META 0/ (AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?) NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MIMI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

**Third Fleet.**—CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SANBOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI" and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

**Fourth Fleet.**—CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

**China.**—The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

### *Communication Intelligence Summary—23 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo Address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore  
Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Com-  
NIKA-WIWI bined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and  
Southern Expeditionary Force.
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information  
NIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary  
Force Chief of Staff.

**KESANA EONO** (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.  
**WIWI**  
**SUTE 1** (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NWA 2, information Tadio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship.  
**NIKA**  
**Imakuni Air** to **Iwakuni Air Detachment** at **NAHA** information **Kure, Bako, and MINO 3** in Takao.  
**KIU**

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Second Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI. RENGO. RI.

Unidentified fleet unit (SUITE 1) listed recently in KURE appeared on circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

- ENU 3**—CruDiv 7 Flagship?
- OWI 2**—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
- KE 8**—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
- USE 4**—Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

**Combined Fleet.**—CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of commander traffic, but not important messages originated by him were reported. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned summaries of 22nd were still being circulated, but Third Fleet appeared as most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (Exp. Fr) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addresses were included in nearly all high intelligence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous place in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and the Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Marine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit, to Sasebo early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using and working units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 8385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

**2.**—Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Marine Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three closely associated with Second Fleet operations.

**INA.**—CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic were quiet. Bearings from the Philippines and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few months and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled operating in the Palao area.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—24 November 1941*

**GENERAL.**—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulty of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. The poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and

the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "Share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

- (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
- (b) The increased activity among third fleet addressees with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
- (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

*First and Second Fleets.*—Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

*Third Fleet.*—Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

*Fourth Fleet and Mandates.*—Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Aid Squadron Twenty-Four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

*Submarines*—Comparatively little activity.

Comparatively quiet.

*Carriers*—No definite indications of location.

*Combined Air Force*—Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary—25 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet, and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Malzuru. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

*Combined Fleet.*—Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an origination, addressing Third Fleet, Air Force and South China units. A second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicated the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

*Air.*—Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

*Fourth Fleet.*—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past

Intra-Fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching messages. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR 15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working (SUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations actively. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

**Combined Fleet.**—Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via Hainan, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present in Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker ATONO appeared in several of CinC second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and Combined Air Force still continues at its high level.

**Fourth Fleet.**—No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Hainan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

**Fifth Fleet.**—The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

**Submarines.**—As noted above, Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of their arrival at Takao yesterday and their previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

**Marus.**—Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

**Third Fleet.**—Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Tako circuit unreadable on midwatch. Some local traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five dispatches to the major commanders. *The Direction Finder activity very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.*

**Combined Fleet.**—No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to still be with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. *There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately.* Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

**Third Fleet.**—Still holding extensive communication with Bako, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing those occurring today were:

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)

"KOROKUKITISIKI"

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in canteen of RYUJO)

"URIZEUBAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

**Fourth Fleet.**—CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at ENI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the

**Marshalls.** *No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.*

**Air.**—*An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any combined air force units to Hainan.*

**Submarines.**—*Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.*

*Communication Intelligence Summary 28 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to WREØ (The Tokyo D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and *IS GETTING RESULTS*.

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent two AInavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

**Combined Fleet.**—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and DESRONS two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO, (CA).

**Third Fleet.**—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at TUOTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-four and KAMOJ.

**South China.**—SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, and the French Indo-China and Combined air force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

**Submarines.**—Except for the mention of Subrons Five and Six in two dispatches there was no submarine activity today.

*Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commander both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message from Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AInavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Sec-



ond Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. On address was "juitikoukuukantai" 11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

*Combined Fleet.*—The arrival of Air-Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of Cin C. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE  
SUBRON FIVE  
SUBRON SIX  
CRUDIV FIVE  
CRUDIV SEVEN  
DESRON TWO  
DESRON FOUR  
THIRD FLEET  
FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.

*Third Fleet.*—Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

*Submarines.*—Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

*South China.*—CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 30 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARU'S. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chief of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

*Combined Fleet.*—The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the Same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (Taiwan Army Headquarters).

*Third Fleet.*—Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON two, Four and Five, COMCRUDIV five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second

Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander of Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Mandates a little greater day than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the ENIWA to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. One of his large units (SIT14) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago. JALUIT cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in the area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in the area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. The presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of a carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

BAKO Active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941*

*General.*—All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0001 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls changed only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparation for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days after the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches five to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic to deliver all dispatches old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. It is that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pay the toll of time and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

*First fleet.*—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating in the Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has to operate in a prominent role.

*Second Fleet.*—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

*Third Fleet.*—Nothing to report except that the same association of the Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China continues.

*Fourth fleet.*—No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Nothing to report.

*Submarines.*—Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhat in this general area.

*Carriers.*—No change.

*Combined Air Force.*—No change;

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941*

*General.*—The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times. It appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it has previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to the report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these

*Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao.* The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. Comsixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

*There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo.* Hainan continues a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

*First Fleet.*—Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. *From inconclusive evidence it appears as if there may be been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs.* As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet Call associated with Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet calls appears not associated with the second and Third Fleets.

*Second Fleet.*—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

*Third Fleet.*—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

*Mandates.*—Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

*Carriers.*—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December, and not one carrier call is at a low ebb.

*Combined Air Force.*—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the Major Commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same address.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Island area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the BNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on Submarines or Carriers.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so

that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among other Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Saka. In all, This activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

*Combined Fleet.*—The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still Copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-Four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (Which is believed to be an oil tanker).

*South China.*—Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKo sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed conditions of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon".

*Combined Fleet.*—Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarines Force has been seen either.

*Third Fleet.*—In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet."

HITOYONGUN SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUs have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing the Palao radio and the RNO TAI-HOKU and the Commander Second Fleet.

*South China.*—SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.



*Communication Intelligence Summary 6 December 1941*

al.—Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being  
 tted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic.  
 not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result  
 sion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now  
 broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts),  
 N, OIMAUTO and TAKAO.

day's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with  
 elligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of  
 's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

ined Fleet.—Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders.  
 nits are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The  
 nder in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers,  
 Fleet and the Major Commanders.

h Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK  
 t is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that  
 mbers of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite  
 ssociation between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in  
 hina. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of  
 nd Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost  
 neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command  
 all operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

Fleet.—This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN sea with OMINATO  
 sting traffic for this unit.

arines.—The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to  
 mand. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is  
 y in the MARSHALLS.

China.—Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending  
 essages to the Task force.

## SECRET

H, 1 December, 1941.

## CHRONOLOGY

China Area: No change in location of flagships assigned to the China  
 s observed. Subron 6 is at Takao and is probably going South. Airron 7  
 e vicinity of Hainan Island. Comdr. Combined Air Force is still at Takao.  
 #95431. RMO Tuihoku originated a message with prefix, MIN—highest  
 , action Bako, information Sama, Takao and Chiefs of Staff of five un-  
 d calls. Sheet #95451 CinC South China Fleet originated a despatch  
 efix, KIU NIKA WIWI—Urgent-special cipher, action three unidentified

ined Fleet: CinC's Combined, First and Second Fleets are all believed  
 n the Kure area. CinC Second Fleet sent a code movement report it is  
 that this Command will go to South China or Indo-China.

little activity was observed in the Kure or Casebo area. Most of the  
 seemed to be in South China, but this might have been caused by more  
 ch coverage of South China circuits, with less coverage of Empire circuits.  
 arines: No activity noted in Subforce. Comdr. Subforce is in the Man-  
 probably with a number of submarines. Some submarine units are still  
 t Yokosuka and Kure.

h Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet is still at Truk.

usual activity noted in the Mandates, except that Comdr. Subforce is in  
 nity of Saipan and will probably go to Truk to join CinC Forth Fleet.

al: Service calls for units afloat were changed on 1 December. The first  
 ls were noticed about 1100. Old calls were used by some units until  
 . The "WE" (enciphered) addresses were also changed. The only shore  
 erved to be changed was OASI4 (Sama, Hainan) to YUI.

e kana authenticators were used after the message NRs on several des-  
 but were not used on others. This was begun after the change of calls.  
 ge number of DF despatches, originated by MENU1 (Jaluit), were sent  
 UTU broadcast, information IKA1 (unidentified). These messages were  
 ed several days ago. Several messages, originated by Comsubforce, were  
 at on the UTU broadcast for action of Subforce. These were also several

d.  
 n, using the call HOKO, called FUHO (Tokyo) and NUKU (Takao) on

13013 Kcs during the day. On 14310A Kcs (Takao to ships) NUKU (Takao) called RIKU once and then secured.

A considerable number of messages that had been originated several days ago were noted in traffic intercepted. This might have been done to keep the volume of traffic up to cover-up for a decrease in the amount of traffic originated.

*Station H, 2 December, 1941.*

South China Area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai; CinC South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in Canton area; Comdr. Indo-China Force is at Saigon; CinC Central China Fleet is at Shanghai.

Takao continues to accept traffic for delivery to Comdr. Combined Air Force and Commanding Officer Kanoya Air Station. Desrons 4 and 5 and Chogel (flagship Subron —) are in Takao area and are probably going South.

Several high precedence despatches were originated by South China units, indicating increased activity in that area.

The following units normally based in Japan have gone South to Hainan or Indo-China areas: Desrons 2, 4 and 5, Subrons 5 and 6, Airron 7 and Crudiv 7.

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have remained at Kure with the First Fleet and most of the Second Fleet. CinC Second Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China to direct operations of units sent to this area from the Empire.

No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Carriers were given in today's traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. Cardiv 4 is believed to still be at Sasebo. Cardiv 3 has not shown any activity during the last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South.

Submarines: No activity in the Subforce has been observed. Comdr. Subforce is in the Mandates. Several submarine units are still at Yokosuka and Kure. Several despatches originated by Mandate units were given to Comsubforce for information.

Fourth Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet remains at Truk.

Several high precedence despatches were originated by Fourth Fleet units, indicating activity of some sort is taking place in the Mandates.

General: Takao Air Station (MERO6) was heard sending traffic (broadcast), formerly sent on the UTU broadcast, to REHES (Combined Air Force) on 11500M Kcs during the evening watch.

Addition to "WE" table: YO=A.

*Station H, 3 December, 1941.*

South China Area: No change in location of major flagships assigned to South China waters was observed.

Takao was acting as radio guard for CinC Second Fleet, Comdr CAF and Comdg. Officer Kanoya Air Corps. Bako was much more active than usual and was probably acting as relay station for vessels going South. Bako was heard working Takao on 3705A Kcs during the evening; this station stopped working Tako on the hour to hold schedule with ships.

Takao, using call NUKU, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A Kcs (night) and 14310A Kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broadcast. Traffic was broadcast to CinC's Combined, Second and Third Fleets, Comdr. Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo-China Force and several unidentified afloat calls.

NUKU (Takao) and MAYA were heard working each other on 6762 Kcs during the evening.

Considerable high precedence traffic was originated by South China or Indo-China units indicating unusual activity in this area.

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to be in the Kure area. CinC Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and is probably going South.

There were no indications that CinC Third Fleet had moved South, except that Takao was heard broadcasting traffic for that command. It is believed that the Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo.

Very little activity was observed in the Empire.

Submarines: No activity in the Subforce was noted. Comdr. Subforce is believed to still be in the Mandates. Submarine units are believed to be in port at Yokosuka and Kure.

Fourth Fleet: Very little activity observed in the Fourth Fleet. CinC Fourth Fleet is still at Truk. Normal activity was indicated in traffic intercepted in this area. Several ships were in the Truk and Jaluit areas. No activity of any kind was noticed in the Palao area.

General: Tokyo (FUHO), Takao (NUKU) and Saipan (HOKO) were heard working each other on 13000A Kcs during the day and early evening. Takao relayed traffic from Saipan to Tokyo.

*Station H, 4 December, 1941.*

South China Area: CinC China Fleet is at Shanghai; CinC South China is in the vicinity of Amoy; Comdr Indo-China Force is at Saigon.

Takao continues to broadcast traffic on 7155A (night) and 14310A Kcs (day) to ships in that vicinity. A regular series of UTU numbers are being used by Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call, NUKU and calls RIKU (All ships in my vicinity?).

NUKU (Takao), TAI (Sama) and TANU (Saigon?) were heard working with other on 7008N Kcs during the evening. TANU sent traffic to Takao, designated by KORUØ (Kanoya Air Corps), indicating this unit is at Saigon. Note sheet #96819 sent by TANU (Saigon?) to TAI (Sama) for delivery "WE" address, (TONUSIUDANSANJIUTEU—Army?). The text of the message consisted of 3 numeral groups. Sheet #96829 was similar, except that the text consisted of 4 numeral groups.

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have remained in the Kure area. CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in the vicinity of Takao and might be going South. Takao broadcasted traffic addressed to CinC's Second and Third Fleets.

Very little activity was observed in the Sasabo or Kure areas. The Carriers are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu.

Submarines: No activity among the submarines was observed. Comdr. Subforce is still in the Mandates. Several submarine units remain at Yokosuka and Kure.

Fourth Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet is believed to have remained at Truk. CinC Fifth Fleet is probably at Chichijima.

Very little activity was noted in the Mandates. Several messages were exchanged between CinC Fourth Fleet and Commanders in South China waters. General: KUNIWI (Tokyo Naval Intelligence) sent a 7 part SUU WIWI spatch to Chiefs of Staff Combined, Second, Third, China, South China, Indo-China Fleets and to Sama. A number of high precedence messages were also sent to the above addresses, to general collective calls and to KANKA (All ships and stations) by Naval Intelligence and Communication Division, Tokyo. The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action.

*Station H, 5 December, 1941.*

South China Area: No change in location of major units in South China has been observed.

Increased activity in South China and Indo-China indicates that a move of some sort in that area is imminent.

Takao continues the use of the UTU broadcast on 7155 Kcs to units in that area. From all indications CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao area or have moved even farther South from Takao.

Tokyo Naval Intelligence and Communication Division continue sending high precedence messages for general distribution and especially to CinC's Combined, Second, Third, South China Fleets and Comdrs Indo-China and Combined Air Forces. From all indications CinC Second Fleet is in command of operations in Indo-China and South China areas.

Combined Fleet: It is believed that CinC's Combined and First Fleets remain at Kure. Very little activity was observed in the Empire.

CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in the Takao area or in South China. No indication as to location of the Carriers was noted in today's traffic, although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu.

Submarines: No activity in the Subforce was observed. Comdr. Subforce is still in the Mandates. It is believed that one Subron is at Yokosuka and another at Kure.

Fourth Fleet: Very little activity was observed in the Mandated Islands. CinC Fourth Fleet seems to have moved from Truk to the Jaluit area. Subforce is probably in company with CinC Fourth Fleet.

There has been quite an exchange of messages between units in the Fourth Fleet and in the South China or Indo-China areas. This indicates closer cooperation between the Mandate and South China forces.

General: Saipan, Ominato and Takao were heard broadcasting traffic to vessels in their vicinity. Tokyo broadcasted traffic on 12330 Kcs in addition to his regular UTU broadcast. At 0430/6th Tokyo was observed using 32 Kcs for an UTU broadcast. This frequency was used dual with 12330 Kcs. Signals were very strong during the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent on this broadcast is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo.

—?—4 (Saigon?), LU3 (Palao) and HAKU6 (Tokyo) were heard working each other on 4746M Kcs at midnight.

Ominato, Chichijima and Tokyo were heard on 6020 and 4010 Kcs during the evening watch. Chichijima called Yokosuka, but that station was not heard. Kanoyu Air, Yokosuka Air and 9NUU (Plane ?) were also on this frequency.

Ominato was heard sending traffic to UFU1 (5th fleet) on 4010 Kcs. This command has probably split, with part of it at Chichijima and the rest at Ominato.

*Station H 6 December, 1941.*

South China area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai. CinC South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in the vicinity of Amoy. Comdr. Indo-China Force (aboard Kashi) is at Saigon. CinC Central China Fleet is at or near Hankow and CinC North China Fleet is in vicinity of Tsingtao.

Considerable activity in the South China and Indo-China areas was indicated by the large amount of high precedence traffic originated by and sent to units in these areas. Most of the traffic sent to units in Southern waters was originated by Tokyo.

CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets are still in the vicinity of Takao or farther south. Comdr. Combined Air Force is at Takao Air. Traffic for Kanova Air Corps, Shlogama Air Corps, Genzan Air Corps, 11th Air Corps, Takao Air Corps and other units believed to be Air Corps or squadrons was handled by Takao, indicating they are in the South China or Indo-China area.

Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 Kcs (A) (night) and on 14310 Kcs (A) (day).

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and 1st Fleets are believed to still be in the Kure area.

Very little activity in the Empire was observed. Most of the traffic addressed to CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets and Comdrs. Combined Air Force and Indo-China Force is also given to CinC Combined Fleet—probably to keep that command informed of operations being carried out in Indo-China.

Submarines: No activity of importance was observed in the SubForce. Com-SubForce originated several messages addressed to the entire Submarine force. This command is in the Mandates, but it is not known whether he is at Jaluit or Truk. Several indications lead to the belief that ComSubForce is at Jaluit.

At least two Subrons are believed to have remained in home waters, with one at Yokosuka and the other at Kure.

Fourth Fleet: It has been definitely established by traffic study that CinC 4th Fleet is in the Truk area. Several times traffic routing indicated that part of the Staff of CinC 4th Fleet was at Jaluit. It is possible that this command has been split-up for better administration of all operations in the South Seas. The Kamoi (with Commanding Officer, Chitose Air Corps aboard) is in the Jaluit area.

Traffic continues to be exchanged between several 4th Fleet units and Commands in the Indo-China area.

Fifth Fleet: Ominato has been heard working the flagship and at least one other unit of the 5th Fleet for the last few days. This fleet has been based at Chichijima for some time. It is probable that part of this force has remained at Chichijima; it is known that KEO6 (Alron attached to 5th Fleet) is there.

General: At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 Kcs, dual with 12330 Kcs, for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 Kcs (M) was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcasted traffic on 6665 Kcs (A) during the evening.

Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps toward placing the operations of the Navy on a war-time basis.



HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 20

TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,  
Washington 25, D. C., 24 May 1945.

OP-20-4-mp  
Serial 0002720  
(SC)A17-24(1)

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.

Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are the following, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

(a) Photostatic copy of station "S" intercept sheets 5651, 5652 and 5653 (Tokyo Circular # 2492, 7 December 1941); and

(b) Photographic print of JD-1: 7148, Circular #2494, 7 December 1941.

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these documents are classified TOP SECRET. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these documents to this office is directed.

James Forrestal.  
JAMES FORRESTAL.

S 7 DEC 41

SF DE JAH

621 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG  
KOSHI PANAMA

Urgent 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI HAT-  
TORI MINAMI KINENBUNGO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYU  
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Obese ovals RPWMO RFNMO RTJMO RWFMO gnome

SF DE JAH

622 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG KOSHI HAVANA  
623 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI HONOLULU  
624 S TOKYO 19 7 850 JG RIYOJI NEW YORK  
625 S TOKYO 22 7 8508 JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER  
626 S TOKYO 22 7 850 JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWA ONT  
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)

S 7 DEC 41

1220 JP  
7630

SF DE JAH

627 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI SAN FRANCISCO  
628 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI PORTLAND ORE  
629 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI SEATTLE  
630 S TOKYO 19 7 850 S JG RIYOJI NEW ORLEANS LA  
631 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI CHICAGO ILL  
632 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI LOS ANGELES CAL  
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)

S 7 DEC 41

1243 JP  
7630

From: Tokyo.

To: (Circular telegram).

7 December 1941.

(Plain Japanese language using code names.)

Circular #2494.

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 21

PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #45-41, 27 NOVEMBER 1941

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

HRK

Cincpac File No.  
A8/FF1/(25)  
Serial 01954

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
November 27, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: PACIFIC FLEET.  
Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.  
Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.
2. BECAUSE OF THE *CONFIDENTIAL* NATURE OF BOTH THE *SOURCE* AND *INFORMATION* CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE *CONFIDENTIAL* CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.
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4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or correction) during the present National Emergency.

P. C. Crosley,  
P. C. CROSLY,  
*By direction.*

**DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41)**

List I, Case 3; P, X.  
Atlantic Fleet A1;  
Asiatic Fleet A1;  
One copy each to:  
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,  
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.

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## [1] (A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEET. OCTOBER 30, 1941. (10574)

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O. N. I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.

## MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

|                                            |                                                 |                                                |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| <b>I. Combined Fleet</b>                   |                                                 |                                                |
| 1. First Fleet                             | (Battle Force)                                  | 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons.                |
| 2. Second Fleet                            | (Scouting Force)                                | Desrons.                                       |
| 3. Third Fleet                             | (Blockade & Transport Force)                    | 4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.                     |
| 4. Fourth Fleet                            | Force)                                          | Small craft.                                   |
| 5. Fifth Fleet                             | (Mandate Defense Force)                         | 1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.       |
| 6. Sixth Fleet                             | ?                                               | ?                                              |
| 7. Carrier Fleet                           | (Submarine Fleet)                               | 6 Subrons.                                     |
| 8. Combined Air Force                      | (Aircraft Carriers)<br>(Seaplane tenders, etc.) | 5 Cardivs.<br>4 Airrons, & shore based planes. |
| <b>II. Japanese Naval Forces in China.</b> |                                                 |                                                |
| 1. First China Exped. Fleet.               | (Staff Headquarters)<br>(Central China)         | 1 PG and 3 DD's<br>Gunboats                    |
| 2. Second China Exped. Fleet.              | (South China)                                   | 1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.                    |
| 3. Third China Exped. Fleet.               | (North China)                                   | Torpedo Boats, etc.                            |
| 4. Southern Exped. Fleet.                  | (Saigon)                                        | 1 CL, transports and mine craft.               |

[2] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-wartime footing.

## COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

NAGATO, Flagship

## FIRST FLEET

*Batdiv One*  
NAGATO (F)  
MUTSU  
YAMASHIRO  
*Batdiv Two*  
FUSO (F)  
ISE  
HYUGA  
*Batdiv Three*  
HIYEI (F)  
KONGO  
KIRISHIMA  
\*HARUNA  
*Crudiv Six*  
KAKO (F)  
FURUTAKA  
AOBA  
KINUGASA

*Desron One*  
ABUKUMA (F)  
*Desdiv 6*  
IKAZUCHI (F)  
INAZUMA  
SAZANAMI  
HIBIKI  
*Desdiv 21*  
NENOHI (F)  
HATSU HARU  
HATSUSHIMO  
WAKABA  
*Desdiv 27*  
SHIRATSUYU (F)  
ARIAKE  
YUGURE  
SHIGURE

\*NOTE: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs.

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET—Continued

*Desron Three*

SENDAI (F)

*Desdiv 11*

FUBUKI (F)

SHIRAYUKI

HATSUYUKI

*Desdiv 12*

SHIRAKUMO (F)

SHINONOME

USUGOMO

MURAKUMO

*Desron Three—Continued*

*Desdiv 19*

ISONAMI (F)

SHIKINAMI

AYANAMI

URANAMI

*Desdiv 20*

AMAGIRI (F)

ASAGIRI

YUGIRI

SAGIRI

Total: 10 BB, 4 CA, 2CL, 27 DD.

[3]

COMBINED FLEET

SECOND FLEET

TAKAO, Flagship

*Crudiv Four*

TAKAO (F)

ATAGO

CHOKAI

MAYA

*Crudiv Five\**

MYOKO (F)

NACHI

HAGURO

*Crudiv Seven*

KUMANO (F)

MOGAMI

MIKUMA

SUZUYA

*Crudiv Eight*

TONE (F)

CHIKUMA

*Desron Two*

JINTSU (F)

*Desdiv 8*

ASASHIO (F)

ARASHIO

OSHIO

MICHISHIO

*Desdiv 15*

KUROSHIO

OYASHIO

NATSUSHIO

HAYASHIO

*Desron Two (Cont'd)*

*Desdiv 16*

HATSUKAZE

YUKIKAZE

AMATSUKAZE

TOKITSUKAZE

*Desdiv 18*

KASUMI

ARARE

KAGERO

SHIRANUHI

*Desron Four*

NAKA (F)

*Desdiv 2*

YUDACHI (F)

MURASAME

HARUSAME

SAMIDARE

*Desdiv 9*

ASAGUMO

YAMAGUMO

MINEGUMO

NATSUGUMO

*Desdiv 24*

KAWAKAZE (F)

YAMAKAZE

SUZUKAZE

UMIKAZE

Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.

\*NOTE: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5.

THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo—Vice Admiral

NAGARA, Flagship

NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE

CHOGEI (F)

Subdiv -----

-----

-----

Subdiv -----

-----

-----

1st BLOCKADE FORCE

Desron Five

NATORI (F)

Desdiv 5

ASAKAZE

HARUKAZE

MATSUKAZE

HATAKAZE

Desdiv 12

SATSUKI

FUMITSUKI

MINATSUKI

NAGATSUKI

Desdiv 34

HAKAZE

AKIKAZE

YUKAZE

TACHIKAZE

2nd BASE FORCE

----- Maru (F)

At least 5 other men of war, and 17  
merchant ships.

Total, 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6 SS, 6 CM,  
12 AM, 6 XPG, 12 PC, 46 AP.

Minelayer Division

ITSUKUSHIMA (F)

AOTAKA

HATSUTAKA

Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21

AM-1 AM-7

AM-2 AM-8

AM-3 AM-9

AM-4 AM-10

AM-5 AM-11

AM-6 AM-12

Gunboat Division 1

6 Gunboats (Converted Fish-  
ing Vessels)

SUBCHASER SQUADRON

----- (F)

Subchaser Division 1 and 11

PC-1 PC-7

PC-2 PC-8

PC-3 PC-9

Subchaser Division 21 and 31

PC-4 PC-10

PC-5 PC-11

PC-6 PC-12

27 AP—Names Unknown

2nd BASE FORCE

----- Maru, (F)

Minelayer Division 17

SHIRATAKA

YAEYAMA

KUNAJIRI

FOURTH FLEET

HIRATA—Vice Admiral

KASHIMA, Flagship

Crudie Eighteen

TENRYU (F)

TATSUTA

KASHIMA

Desron Six

YUBARI (F)

Desdiv 29

OITE

HAYATE

ASANAGI

YUNAGI

Desdiv 30

MITSUKE (F)

KISARAGI

YAYOI

MOCHITSUKI

Subron Seven

JINGEI

Subdiv 26

RO-60

RO-61

RO-62

Subdiv 27

RO-65

RO-66

RO-67

Subdiv 33

RO-63

RO-64

RO-68

Subdiv -----

-----

-----

8 XPG

## FOURTH FLEET—Continued

*Survey and Patrol Division*  
**KOSHU**  
**KATSURIKI (CM)**  
**KOMABASHI (AS)**  
*Repair and Salvage Division*  
**MATSUEI MARU**  
**NAGAURA (MARU)**

**3rd BASE FORCE**  
Palao, Headquarters  
----- Maru (F)  
*Guard Division 3*  
----- Maru  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----  
*Subdiv 6*  
**RO-56**  
**RO-57**  
**RO-58**  
**RO-59**  
*Subchaser Division 55*  
----- Maru (F)  
**XPG 551 (?)**  
**XPG 552 (?)**  
**XPG 553 (?)**  
**XPG 554 (?)**  
**9 AP or AK**

**THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ PALAO)**  
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #16 and TOBI detachment of 4th Defence Force  
----- Detach. 4th Def. Force  
----- " " " "  
----- " " " "  
----- " " " "  
----- " " " "  
----- " " " "  
(Estimate these unknown locations to be SOROL, HELEN REEF, ULITHI, YAP and ANGUAR).

[6] **4th BASE FORCE**  
Truk, Headquarters  
----- Maru (F)  
*Guard Division 4*  
----- Maru (F)  
-----  
-----  
**4 AP or AK**

**FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ TRUK)**  
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #17 and Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Olol Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Greenwich Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Mortlock Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Pingelap Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Puluwat Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Lamotrek Detachment of 4th Def. Force, ----- (Hall ?) Detachment of 4th Def. Force.

**5th BASE FORCE**  
Saipan, Headquarters  
**SHOEI MARU (F)**  
*Guard Division 5*  
Composition unknown  
*Minelayer Division 19*  
**OKINOSHIMA (F)**  
**TOKIWA**  
*Subchaser Division 56*  
**KASHI (F)**  
**XPG 561 (?)**  
**XPG 562 (?)**  
**XPG 563 (?)**  
*Gunboat Division 8*  
Composition unknown  
**9 AP or AK**

**FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ—SAIPAN)**  
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #18  
Tenian Detachment, 5th Defence Force PAGAN

**6th BASE FORCE**  
Jaluit, Headquarters  
**TAKUHAN MARU (F)**  
*Mine Sweeper Division 16*  
**NAGATA MARU (F)**  
**CHOKAI MARU**  
**DAIDO MARU**  
**IKUTA MARU**

----- ? -----  
----- Maru  
----- Maru  
----- Maru

*Subchaser Division 5*  
**PC-51**  
**PC-52**  
**PC-53**

**SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ—JALUIT)**  
**KAIKEI Maru**  
**#5 FUKU Maru**  
----- Maru  
Miscellaneous Forces ashore including AIR GROUP #19 at IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and probable Air Groups at WOTJE and KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is. (Kwajalein Atoll)—Detachment 6th Defence Force KWAJALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll), TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll), ENIWETOK Is (Eniwetok Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE Atoll—Detach. of 6th Def. Force, UTIRIK Atoll—Detach. of 6th Def. Force

Total: 4 CL, 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS, 1 Survey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM, 41 AP or AK.

(This may be the SALVAGE Unit known to be in 6th Base Force)

[7]

**FIFTH FLEET**

CL----- (F)

The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.  
The Flagship has been reported at Maisuru.

**SIXTH FLEET**

(Subarine Fleet)

KATORI, Flagship

**Subron One**

**TAIGEI (F)**

*Subdiv 1*

I-9

I-15

I-16

I-17

*Subdiv 2*

I-18

I-19

I-20

**Subron Two**

**KITAGAMI (F)**

*Subdiv 7*

I-1

I-2

I-3

I-7

*Subdiv 8*

I-4

I-5

I-6

**Subron Three**

**NAGOYA MARU (F)**

*Subdiv 11*

I-74

I-75

*Subdiv 12*

I-8

I-68

I-69

I-70

*Subdiv 20*

I-71

I-72

I-73

**Subron Five**

**YURA (F)**

*Subdiv 28*

I-59

I-60

*Subdiv 29*

I-61 (Sank 10-2-41)

I-62

I-64

*Subdiv 30*

I-65

I-66

**Subron Six**

**KINU (F)**

*Subdiv 9*

I-123

I-124

*Subdiv 13*

I-121

I-122

**Subron Ten**

**KARASAKI (F) \***

*Subdiv 18*

I-53

I-54

I-55

*Subdiv 19*

I-56

I-57

I-58

*Subdiv 21*

RO-33

RO-34

**TOTAL: 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS.**

\*NOTE: The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.

[8]

**CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)**

CV KAGA, Flagship

*Cardiv 1*

AKAGI

KAGA (F)

*Desdiv 7*

OBORO (F)

USHIO

AKEBONO

AKATSUKI

*Cardiv 2*

SORYU (F)

HIRYU

*Desdiv 23*

UZUKI

KIKUTSUKI

MIKATSUKI

YUZUKI

## CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)—Continued

|                  |           |                           |
|------------------|-----------|---------------------------|
| <i>Cardiv 3</i>  | RYUJO (F) | <i>Cardiv 4—Continued</i> |
|                  | HOSHO     | <i>Desdiv 3</i>           |
| <i>Desdiv 17</i> | ISOKAZE   | HOKAZE                    |
|                  | URAKAZE   | SHIOKAZE                  |
|                  | HAMAKAZE  | NAMIKAZE                  |
| <i>Cardiv 4</i>  | ZUIKAKU   | NUMAKAZE                  |
|                  | SHOKANU   | <i>Cardiv</i>             |
|                  |           | CV KORYU                  |
|                  |           | CV KASUGA (MARU)          |

TOTAL: 10 CV, 16 DD.

## [9] COMBINED AIR FORCE

*Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.*

Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air (e. g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.

Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.

## SHIP-BASED SQUADRONS

## SHORE-BASED GROUPS

|                                       |                           |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Air Ron 6</i>                      | 8th Air Group             |
| KAMIKAWA MARU (F)                     | 10th Air Group            |
| FUJIKAWA MARU                         | 11th Air Group            |
| KENJO MARU                            | 12th Air Group            |
| (Has been working with the 3rd Fleet) | 14th Air Group            |
| <i>Air Ron 7</i>                      | 16th Air Group            |
| CHITOSE (F)                           | 17th Air Group            |
| CHIYODA                               | 18th Air Group            |
| MIZUHO                                | 19th Air Group            |
| (Has been working with the 1st Fleet) | 23rd Air Group            |
| <i>Air Ron 24</i>                     | Chichijima                |
| KAMOI (F)                             | Chinkai                   |
| 1 XAV                                 | Genzan                    |
| Yokohama Air Group                    | Hyakuribara (or Moribara) |
| Chitose Air Group                     | Iwakuni                   |
| (Has been working with the 4th Fleet) | Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)          |
| <i>Patrol Squadron 2</i>              | Kashima                   |
| NOTORO                                | Kasumigaura               |
| (Formerly with Air Ron 6)             | Kisarazu                  |
|                                       | Kure                      |
|                                       | Maizuru                   |
|                                       | Oita                      |
|                                       | Ominato                   |
|                                       | Omura                     |
|                                       | Saeki                     |
|                                       | Sasebo                    |
|                                       | Suzuka                    |
|                                       | Takao                     |
|                                       | Tateyama                  |
|                                       | Tsukuba                   |
|                                       | Usa                       |
|                                       | Yatabe                    |
|                                       | Yokosuka                  |

Total: 5 AV, 3 XAV, 35 Air Groups.

## [10] TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

|           |          |         |
|-----------|----------|---------|
| SHIRETOKO | ONDO     | AKASHI  |
| SATA      | HAYATOMO | MUROTO  |
| TSURUMI   | NARUTO   | OTOMARU |
| SHIRIYA   | MAMIYA   | SETTSU  |
| IRO       | ASAHI    |         |

Total: 8 AO, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.



[1]

JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

KOGA, Mineichi—Vice Admiral

IZUMO, Flagship

SHANGHAI BASE FORCE

ASUGA KURI  
TSUGA HASU  
*Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section*  
*Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai*  
*Banking Base Force*  
*Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking*

TOTAL: 1 OCA, 1 PG, 3 DD.

CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OR FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KOMATSU, Teruhisa—Vice Admiral  
UJI, Flagship

*Patrol Division 11*

ATAKA ATAMI  
SETA FUTAMI  
KATADA FUSHIMI  
HIRA SUMIDA  
HOZU HASHIDATE  
TOBA

*Group 10*

*Kankow Base Force*  
*Chukiang Base Force*  
*Submarine Division 1*

SHINFUKU MARU (F)  
HITONOSE  
CHIKUBU

TOTAL: 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

NIIMI, Masaichi, Vice Admiral  
ISUZU, Flagship

*Submarine Division 15*

ISUZU (F)  
ASHIGARA

*Patrol Division 14*

SAGA  
AM-17  
AM-18

TOTAL: 1 OCA, 1DD, 8 TB, 1 AP.

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET—Continued

*Torpedo Boat Division 1*

OTORI  
HAYABUSA  
HIYODORI  
KASASAGI

*Guard Division 15*

*Guard Division 16*

*Canton Base Force*

*Amoy Base Force*

*Hainan Is. Base Force*

*13 Special Service Ships*

TOTAL: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG,  
2 AM, 13 Misc.

[12]

NORTH CHINA FLEET, OR THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

SUGIYAMA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral  
IWATE, Flagship

*Patrol Division 12*

IWATE (F)  
MANRI MARU

*Torpedo Boat Division 11*

HATO KARI  
SAGI KIJU

*Torpedo Boat Division 21*

CHIDORI  
MANAZURU  
TOMOZURU  
HATSUKARI  
KARUKAYA

*Gunboat Division 1*

*Gunboat Division 2*

*Gunboat Division 13*

*Gunboat Division 14*

*Tsingtao Base Force*

SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KASHII (F) (CL)  
SHIMUSHU (CM)  
AP

[13] (B JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS)

1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently administers the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base.

2. Up to the present the entire Mandate Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in

Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41

(At this point in Exhibit No. 21 there appear two sketch maps of Palao Islands and of Malakal Harbor and approaches. These maps will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 110 and 111, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT

1. *Aviation Facilities*—Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June-1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on Imleji (EMIDJ) Is.

2. *Headquarters*—Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bitumen and powdered coral roads.

3. *Radio towers*—Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).

4. *Shore Batteries*—Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile waterfront street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).

*Mobile Batteries*—Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).

5. *Government Pier*—600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940).

6. *Mole*—150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW corner of JABOR (1933).

7. *Conspicuous red building* (may be red-roofed building) (1936).

8. South Seas Trading Co. *PIER* (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).

9. *Two buildings* (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear?—small marine railway?). A gasoline storage located near the two buildings (1936).

(The sketch of Jaluit, to which the foregoing notes apply, will be found reproduced as Item No. 112, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 22

Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 October 1941

D F Bearings—

30 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

Positions—

|            |                                               |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| FUI 5 (M)  | Communication—Sama (SASI 4) to Takao (FUWI 4) |
| KURU 8 (M) | do —Ponape (RESU 0) to Truk (YUMI 0)          |
| WINI 5 (M) | do —Sama (SASI 4) to MENU 3 (Maru)            |
| KONA 9 (M) | 34.7 139.5                                    |
| SIKA 4 (M) | 14.1 156.6                                    |
| TEE 5 (M)  | 21.2 141.5                                    |
| TEFU 0 (M) | 17.1 136.2                                    |
| MESU 4 (M) | 19.0 144.2                                    |
| YOHA 6 (M) | 08.8 165.0                                    |
| SUWI 4 (M) | 11.3 139.3                                    |
| SAYU 5 (M) | 14.3 162.0                                    |

OCTOBER 15, 1941.

*Vessels in Mandates October 14-15*

| Call     | Type                   | Location                                               |
|----------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| E ME 5   | M under CNO            | In Mandates                                            |
| EKO 0    | SubDiv in 4th Flt      | In Mandates                                            |
| HAKI 3   | Maru                   | In Mandates (Comdr MINO 2 onboard)                     |
| HI I 5   | DesRon in 4th Flt      | In Mandates                                            |
| HIKO 9   | Maru                   | Jaluit—Chichijima area?                                |
| HOME 1   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| FUNE 9   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| I KI 3   | In 4th Flt             | In Mandates                                            |
| KARI 3   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| KA O 7   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| KERO 8   | KATSURIKI              | In Mandates                                            |
| KENO 2   | KOSHU                  | In radio company with RIYU 6 who contacts RDO YOKOSUKA |
| KINI 5   | Maru                   | Posit—163-29, 11-34N                                   |
| KONA 9   | Maru                   | " 139-31, 34-45                                        |
| KAMA 6   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| KURU 8   | Maru                   | (14th) Between Ponape (going to) Truk.                 |
| MESA 0   | Maru                   | Posit—157-47, 07-58                                    |
| MENE 5   | TAMA, 4th Flt          | In Mandates                                            |
| MESU 4   | Maru                   | Enroute Saipan ? 144-11, 19-00                         |
| MENA 6   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| MINO 2   | Minesweep Div, 4th Flt | In Mandates                                            |
| MITA 5   | Air Tender, 4th Flt    | Not in Jaluit area (where generally).                  |
| MURU 3   | Maru                   | Posit—164-47, 09-40                                    |
| MUTU 1   | DesDiv in 4th Flt      | In Mandates                                            |
| NAU 5    | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| NINO 058 | CofS., 4th Flt         | In Truk area.                                          |
| NOSA 2   | Maru                   | Jaluit area.                                           |
| NURO 4   | JINGEI, 4th Flt/       | In Mandates                                            |
| O SO 8   | SubRon, 4th Flt        | In Mandates                                            |
| O YO 8   | KAMOI, 4th Flt         | In Mandates.                                           |
| RARU 5   | Maru                   | In Mandates (Call doubtful)                            |
| RASE 0   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| RATU 5   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| RIRO 5   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| RISI 6   | Maru, Air Tender, CAF  | In Mandates                                            |
| RISA 2   | HAYATOMO, 4th Flt      | In Mandates                                            |
| RIYU 6   | MUROTO, 4th Flt        | In Mandates                                            |
| SAYU 5   | Maru                   | Yokosuka to Truk or Ponape, 162-00 14-30               |
| SIKA 4   | Maru                   | Saipan to Jaluit, 153-36, 1406                         |
| SEWA 4   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| SETO 1   | Maru                   | In Mandates                                            |
| SUWI 4   | Maru                   | Near Yap, 139-18 11-16                                 |
| SOYO 9   | 4th Flt                | In Mandates                                            |
| TE E 5   | Maru                   | Posit—141-32 21-09                                     |
| TETU 7   | Flt Unit, 4th Flt      | In Mandates.                                           |
| TETU 2   | Unidentified           | In Truk area.                                          |
| TEFU 0   | Maru                   | Posit—136-13 17-05                                     |
| TOHI 1   | KOMOBASHI              | Jaluit area.                                           |
| TOWA 2   | 4th Flt Vessel         | In Mandates.                                           |
| TOYA 3   | " " "                  | In Mandates.                                           |
| TUHO 33  | " " "                  | In Jaluit—Chichijima area.                             |
| TUYU 00  | CinC 4th Flt           | In Mandates.                                           |
| WINI 5   | Maru                   | Hainan to MENU 3 (In Mandates)?                        |
| YAYI 6   | Maru                   | In Mandates.                                           |
| YOKA 6   | Maru                   | Posit—164-58 08-47.                                    |
| YOKU 5   | SHIRETOKO              | In Mandates.                                           |
| YUHO 8   | Maru                   | Saipan area.                                           |
| YUMO 3   | Maru                   | In Mandates.                                           |
| MOTO 6   | Maru                   | Japan or outside Mandates.                             |
| SEWI 7   | Maru                   | In Yokosuka zone—may be going Mandates.                |

*Communication intelligence summary, 15 October 1941*

*General.*—Traffic above normal. Several more new radio calls representing shore stations and Naval auxiliaries appeared lately. Bureau of Personnel traffic again reached a high peak. Many general despatches (addressed to "all hands" or large collective addresses) appeared. It is worthy of note to list the radio stations called by Radio TOKYO to deliver general despatches originated by Tokio Personnel, Tokio Naval Minister, Tokio Communication and Tokio Bureau Military Affairs.

|                |     |                           |
|----------------|-----|---------------------------|
| Radio Yokosuka | and | Flagships S. China Fleets |
| Radio Kure     | " " | 1st Fleet                 |
| Radio Sasebo   | " " | 2nd Fleet                 |
| Radio Maizuru  | " " | 3rd Fleet                 |

|                       |     |                 |
|-----------------------|-----|-----------------|
| Radio Ominato         | " " | 4th Fleet       |
| Radio Takao           | " " | Subforce        |
| Radio Shanghai        | " " | Cardivs.        |
| Radio Saipan          | " " | Combined Fleet. |
| Radio Palao           |     |                 |
| Radio Kanoya          |     |                 |
| Radio Spratley Island |     |                 |

Tokyo Communications also originated a despatch addressed to "all hands" information to a Naval auxiliary (SITU 1) indicating possible future operations of this vessel. A large number of vessels appear to be in Saseho area. However, the Commander First Base Force, Third Fleet at Saseho addressed units of his command at Kure and Yokosuka. Some maneuvering traffic observed on 7024 (using 3 kano calls) and 5897 kcs.

*First and Second Fleets.*—2nd Fleet units observed at Kure. A New Naval auxiliary (NIRA 8) reported to the 1st Fleet Secretary. Relatively little activity among 1st and 2nd Fleet vessels indicated in radio traffic. A vessel identified as YAMASHIRO (BB) originated one dispatch to the KOMOBASHI in Jaluit Area.

*Submarines.*—Continued activity on submarine frequency (6385) by vessels using secret calls. DF bearings indicate they are approximately in the Chichi-jima Yokosuka-Kagoshima area.

*Air Activities.*—Kaga continues as flagship of Cardivs. The SHOKAKU and Commander of the Cardiv are in the NAHA-Takao area. Also it is believed one of the large airons in Combined Air Force (TOME 2) is also in same vicinity and that Commander Cardiv 3 (NUYA 88) and the HOSHO are connected with these vessels in some maneuver going on or planned as all were associated in despatch headings. Indications are that two or three large groups of Combined Air Force are in the Genzan-Chinkai Area (YUMO 8, YOME 7, MOO 0?). Ashigara originated dispatch to 11th Air Base which was forwarded to Maizuru for delivery.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Traffic above normal. Many new calls observed, some of which are undoubtedly garbled.

*Fifth Fleet?*—The new fleet or force which has been mentioned at various times in the past (NARE (6) appeared in dispatch headings frequently today. The call was associated with 4th fleet units and some Naval auxiliaries which appear to be new or newly commissioned. One dispatch originated by Communication Officer 5th Fleet was addressed for action to the 5th Fleet, a new fleet unit in parenthesis (TOYU 5) and for information to Radio Takao, Tokyo, Saipan, Palao, Truk, Jaluit and to Communication Officers 2nd, 4th Fleets, Sub-Force, Cardivs and Combined Air Force.

*D F Bearings.*—27 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

*Positions.*—NESU 5 (M) Comm-Kure #4 SLF (SIKA 8) to Shanghai (KAMO 0)

|                  |      |       |
|------------------|------|-------|
| YOKE 7 (M)       | 08.4 | 155.1 |
| KIMO 5 (KASHI)   | 20.9 | 112.0 |
| KENO 2 (KOSHU ?) |      |       |

# COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, 16 OCTOBER 1941

*General.*—Average amount of traffic intercepted, with complete absence of "dummy" traffic for the first time since early October. All forces active in originated and addressed traffic except South China. A considerable number of WE addresses appeared, usually associated with air activities. One broke as "Chinkai Defense Force" indicating newly organized activity at that location. Ominato transmitted a despatch with three WE addresses, which broke as Chief A Area, Chief B Area and Chief C Area. Stations addressed in this despatch fit the call table line designated tentatively as "Temporary Shore" or "Advanced Base" stations, which were most commonly associated with the South China activities up to and including the Indo China campaign. Stations fitting this classification are increasing in the Chinkai-Chosen area, one unidentified unit (TAWI 7) which was formerly connected with So China Forces, has reappeared in the Chosen area, with line of bearing from Oahu D/F passing thru the Rashin, Seisin area. Units of 12th Air Corps are apparently embarked on two unidentified Marus and probably proceeding to join the 12 A. C. Commander at Genzan Air.

*Combined Fleet.*—CinC Combined, possibly back on NAGATO, appears to be acting as radio guard for an increasing number of units from 1st. 2nd. Carriers.

and Subfor. The tentatively identified 5th Fleet appeared as action and information addressee in several despatches concerning addressees in the Mandates, Chichijima, and major force commanders. The 2nd Fleet was a heavier originator with traffic addressed to major units of the Combined. No indication of change of location of 1st or 2nd fleets. Third fleet continued actively originating and receiving traffic from Sasebo area. Flagship of #2 Base Force, 3rd Fleet, with commander aboard at Sasebo.

*Carriers.*—Active in exchange of traffic as yesterday. No indicated change of location. Planes from Kasanohara Air are operating aboard or with the HIRYU. Commander Carriers still aboard KAGA in area between Sasebo and Taiwan. AKAGI and SORYU at Yokosuka.

*Air Force.*—Chitose Air enroute to Mandates, probably to Marshall area, with Yokohama Air at or near Truk. Indications that Yokosuka Air is, or will be, moving to the Mandates, possibly to the Palau area.

*Sub Force.*—Same activity on Subfor frequencies as previously reported, bearings remaining the same.

*China.*—Activity appears confined Takao, and North China areas, with Shanghai continuing normal. A despatch addressed to China Fleet collective exempted the North China Force from delivery, thus placing N. China Force as part of CINC CHINA FLEET (on Idzumo) Command.

*Miscellaneous.*—Many new calls appearing, including MARUS, which have been very recently taken over, as they are not equipped with call books and use WE addresses for activities which have assigned calls. One new unit apparently containing both Marus and Combatan vessels appeared today without indication of which Force he is attached.

*D F Bearings.*—31 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

*Positions.*—

KINE 9 (?) Comm. KURE RETI 3 to YOKOSUKA HOMI 3.

ERO 6 (?) Comm. Takao FUWI 4 to Bako NOTI 7.

YUKO 9 (?) Comm. Canton RUYO 6 to Bako NOTI 7.

MURU 3 (M) Comm. Remain with Ponape and establish with Truk RESU 0 to YUMI 0

MISE 5 (Fleet Unit)—Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to KINU 7 (Maru)

KARO 9 (ERIMO)—Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to Kure RETI 3

NIRI 0 (M) Comm. Yokosuka HOMI 3 to Saipan OSI 0

RETI 5 (M) Comm. Remain with Shanghai (KAMO/0) establish with SIKI 8.

KUNA 1 (M) 10.7 166.7

TEFU 0 (M) 23.0 137.4

TIWI 1 (M) 23.5 140.9

JAPANESE NAVY—OCT 16TH

*1st. Fleet:*

BB's believed in INLAND SEA-SASEBO area.

AIRRON 7 and a CARDIV in NAHA-TAKAO area.

KONGO and HIYE had busy traffic with SAEKI AIR.

*2nd. Fleet:*

Some units are definitely at KURE.

*3rd. Fleet:*

Concentrated with few exceptions in general SASEBO area.

ASHIGARA is mentioned in 3rd. Fleet traffic with major units of that Fleet.

CHOGEI (Flag of NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE) appears with NAGARA (3rd. Fleet Flag).

*4th. Fleet:*

Definitely in TRUK area. Large air concentration in the MARSHALLS.

*5th. Fleet:*

Still in process of organizing. CHICHIJIMA RADIO, 4th FLEET and CINC COMBINED are interested parties in traffic which includes this hypothetical fleet.

**SUBMARINES:**

Many units definitely in KURE area. Perhaps a dozen are operating in exercises in the general CHICHIJIMA-YOKOSUKA area. With a few as far south as the MANDATES.

From one indication it appears that COMSUBFORCE is at SASEBO.

**Air:**

A large part of COMBINED AIR FORCE appears to be in CHINKAI-SASEBO-GENZAN area. One section of CAF operating with a CARDIV of 1st. FLEET in TAKAO area. CARRIER LOCATIONS: AKAGI and ZUIKAKU in YOKOSUKA area. KORYU at KURE. KAGA at SASEBO.

**General:**

Several fleet auxiliaries (tankers etc.) appear to be in SASEBO area. KASHII near SAIGON. ISUZU (Acting Flag South China) in HAINAN-SOUTH CHINA area.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 October, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume about normal. (Traffic flow now being analyzed by statistical machinery and normals are established for all major and secondary stations). Dummy traffic again absent from TOKYO—Fleet broadcast. Spratley Islands radio sent a message to TAKAO. This message must have been relayed to TOKYO because TOKYO repeated the message under a priority procedure sign to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Comcardiv 4 (SUTU 7) ESARO (believed to be their Radio Intelligence unit) BAKO, Chief of Staff South China Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Forces, RNO TAIHOKU, Commander 11th Air Corps and Chief of Staff of South China Air Forces. It seems that the Spratley report caused considerable excitement. The resignation of the Cabinet was reported to the fleet by plain language today.

**Combined Fleet.**—The impressions grow that there is underway a concentration of units upon the Combined Fleet Flagships. Subrons 5 and 6 appear with him today.

The following is what is believed to be the circumstances surrounding the relief of the Combined Fleet Flags. On September 23 the MUTSU was in Kure Navy Yard. On September 27th or 28th she joined the Second Fleet. On October 1 CInC 2nd Fleet relieved as CInC Combined Fleet and hoisted Flag in MUTSU. He was active today in addressing messages to general calls. The CInC Second Fleet also originated many dispatches. One message, originated on the 14th of October was repeated again today. It was addressed as follows:

2nd Fleet Collective  
3rd Fleet Collective  
Combined Air Force  
Subron 5  
Subron 6  
Airron 7  
BatDiv 3  
Information to  
Comcardivs.  
C in C Combined Fleet  
Radio Takao  
Radio Palao  
Radio Tokyo:

**South China.**—Traffic to this area with special reference to TAKAO was higher today than usual. The movement of the ZUIKAKU to Taiwan as reported by Com. 16 today is only partially confirmed here. A call (SIHA 5) identified here as the SHOKAKU of Cardiv 4 appeared today in care of the Combined Air Force at TAKAO and was routed to that station for delivery. No indication of any other units in her company. Direction Finder bearings place some Carriers together in the area east of TAIWAN and south of KYUSHU. These units could and probably will establish radio Communication with TAKAO. While they may move to TAKAO it is expected that they will not but will remain in the area east of TAIWAN. Some slight indications exist that the Flagship of the Combined Fleet is with these carriers but is not confirmed.

**Submarines.**—KATORI and submarines are still in area southward and east of KYUSHU.



**Fourth Fleet.**—Very little fourth Fleet activity.**D/F Bearings.**—38 Naval auxiliaries in Mandates including:

|        |         |        |
|--------|---------|--------|
| HAKI 3 | 07. 5 N | 165 E  |
| KENO 2 | 26      | 153    |
| KERO 8 | 18      | 155    |
| MESU 4 | 18      | 148. 5 |
| MEMU 7 | 06      | 170. 5 |
| NIRI 0 | 30. 5   | 134. 5 |
| NOTA 4 | 05. 5   | 165    |
| OYO 8  | 05. 5   | 164. 5 |
| ORU 6  | 11. 5   | 163. 5 |
| TEE 5  | 16. 5   | 140    |
| TOHI 1 | 12. 5   | 165    |
| KIME 3 | 08.     | 154    |

**Positions.**—

|          |                             |          |
|----------|-----------------------------|----------|
| NORU 6   | 11. 5 N                     | 102. 0 E |
| TIWI 1   | 24. 7 N                     | 142. 4 E |
| TUU 5    | 33. 2 N                     | 142-3 E  |
| MAO 5    | 16. 2 N                     | 144. 4 E |
| YOHA 6   | 3. 5 N                      | 160. 4 E |
| SEWI 7   | 32. 3 N                     | 140. 9 E |
| MURU 3   | TRUK to SAIPAN              | CZ       |
| OMI MARU | 18. 8 N                     | 145. 1 E |
| SINI 2   | 22. 0 N                     | 116. 0 E |
| FURI 6   | 26. 7 N                     | 123. 3 E |
| KUSU 9   | Estab. Comm. with YOKOSUKA. |          |
| TIKA 9   | AMOY to TAKAO.              | CZ       |
| RIRO 5   | 19. 8 N                     | 159. 4 E |
| KURU 8   | Saipan to Chichijima.       | CZ       |
| YOHA 6   | Jaluit to Saipan.           | CZ       |

**Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 October 1941**

**General.**—Traffic volume about normal. Traffic consisted largely of administrative traffic. There was one WIWI message from TOKYO to CinC Combined Fleet for information of CinC China Fleet, CinC South China Fleet and an unidentified unit in the French Indo China Force. Naval Communications TOKYO has originated several messages of general address. These may indicate a coming change of call or cipher systems. The Secretary to the Navy Minister sent out a plain language message announcing the appointment of Admiral Shimada Shigetaro in Tojo's Cabinet. This message was given a general distribution as is usual with messages of this character but also included was "ZAIGAITAIKOUS-~~IKANTUKIBUKAN~~". While it is understood that the Attache to Thailand would be interested, yet the inclusion of him as an addressee on an otherwise strictly naval despatch will make it appear that there was some sort of a military tie-up between Japan and Thailand. Another plain language despatch from the Secretary China Fleet to INOUE, Head of the Military Mens Association, thanks him for message to newly appointed Commander in Chief of the China Seas Fleet. This is the first intelligence of the relief of the China Command.

**Combined Fleet.**—No information received today to check location of First Fleet. The flagship is still acting as guard for units previously reported as being in company. One Cardiv (UYU 3) had its traffic accepted by the MUTSU today. The CHITOSE also joined the flagship. Desron 3 is in SASEHO area. HAGURO is in KURE area. 2nd Fleet traffic is being routed thru KURE.

**Third Fleet.**—Still in SASEHO area, little activity except for the Commander 2nd Base Force who addressed several MARUS of his unit.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Mandates traffic largely concerns air activities. The impression is that there is a considerable amount of air movement between the Mandates and the Empire. CHITOSE air is very active in the MARSHALS. KATSURIKI is at JALUIT.

**Submarines.**—The Chief of Staff of SubForce is receiving his traffic via SASEHO. There were fewer submarine calls on tactical circuits than for the past few days. It is believed that all submarines are nearing SASEHO.

**Carriers.**—AKAGI and SORYU are at Yokosuka. From traffic it appears that SORYU is finished with whatever she was doing at SASEHO and is about to join her division which is in company with CinC Combined. Cardiv 4 is definitely in TAKAO area.

*China.*—Little activity save for the Spratley Islands Radio Station which originated several messages today.

*D/F Bearings.*—None.

*Positions.*—

|        |                                         |         |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|---------|
| SIHI 2 | 22.0 N                                  | 115.0 E |
| TUYA 2 | From RETI 3 to SUKA 2 C. Z.             |         |
| HIRE 4 | 20.4 N                                  | 114.4 E |
| YOHA 6 | 15.7 N                                  | 158.4 E |
| TIWI 1 | 21.7 N                                  | 145.2 E |
| RUTI 2 | 22.8 N                                  | 146.1 E |
| NOSA 2 | 11.6 N                                  | 169.0 E |
| TEFU 0 | Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3) |         |
| TIWI 1 | 18.7 N                                  | 145.2 E |
| TUU 5  | 29.1 N                                  | 147.1 E |

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 October 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume below normal. Less traffic was copied at Heela due to poor receiving conditions but since there were numerous dummy messages among those intercepted, the traffic volume is considered below the daily average attained in the last two months. There has been a perceptible increase in the use of secret (or tactical) calls and addresses with not only drill and maneuvering traffic but in administrative despatches as well. Today's traffic included some maneuvering type (4 kana nigori) traffic with HE one and two letter calls being broadcasted by Tokyo Radio to presumably submarine units. Kanoya Air was also employing tactical calls on 8915 kcs with a call 1 MIYA. Tokyo Radio in delivering an "all hands" despatch called all Major Fleet Flagships less the call identified as FIFTH FLEET. Tokyo Radio originated one despatch for action to Radio Sasebo, Kure, Takao, Maizuru, Chichijima, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Jaluit, FUMU 44 (may be new Chinkai Station), Ominato, TAU 77, KUMO 66, Indo-China and "HOROMUSIRO Air Corps Base. This list just above covers all outlying stations. KUMO 66 is believed to be Shanghai and TAU 77 definitely is in the far North (Kuriles). The WE addresses included the No. 2 and No. 61 Air Corps Commanders associated with Kanoya Air.

*First & Second Fleets.*—Very little activity among 1st Fleet Units as far as traffic is concerned. Some traffic for second Fleet units was handled by Kure Radio. Combined Fleet Flagship was guard for Suzuya, Midzuo and SUBRON 5 among others. Combined Fleet frequency (6775kcs) was active with secret calls.

*Submarines.*—Radio Saipan accepted a despatch for SUBDIV 29 (UFU 11). While this one instance may represent a garble, it matches fairly well the past reports that some of the units using secret calls on 6385 kcs lately were submarines in the general Mandate area. Some of the Submarine service calls were associated in despatch headings with CARDIV and COMBINED AIR FORCE Units.

*Air.*—Continued indications that a large part of the Combined Air Force is spread from Takao area to Genzan. Shokaku ("C" calls him Zuikaku) definitely associated with this concentration in the Takao area with at least one additional unit SUYO 8 (probably DesDiv plane guards). Also RYUJO appears to be associated with same operation but may be as far North as the Sasebo area. Chinkai radio guard for a few additional fleet vessels associated with China Air activities formerly. AKAGI and SORYU definitely in Yokosuka area. All other Carriers appear to be in the general Sasebo area except for SHOKAKU.

*Third Fleet.*—Slight decrease in THIRD FLEET traffic observed.

*Fourth Fleet & Mandates.*—Very few 4th Fleet Units appear outside of Mandates. Bearings of the KOMABASHI place this unit between Ellice and Gilbert Islands but one bearing was labeled poor so that it is believed this vessel still in Jaluit vicinity. Thirteen new Naval auxiliaries reported by GUAM in Mandates; some of these verified by COM-14 reports.

|                              |      |       |
|------------------------------|------|-------|
| <i>Positions.</i> —TUU 5 (M) | 27.8 | 150.3 |
| YOHA 6 (M)                   | 18.0 | 155.7 |

*Communication Intelligence Summary 20 October 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume far below normal. Receiving conditions good but traffic light on all circuits. In the early evening the major circuits were quite active but all traffic was cleared by midnight. The TOKYO broadcast carried a good percentage of dummy traffic. Maneuvering traffic intercepted on 13560



Kcs. and 8710 Kcs. That intercepted on 8710 Kcs. indicates that a tactical problem is being worked out. The traffic usually carries an EN in the heading, has an additional number at the beginning of the text, and all originator numbers are fairly close together. Numbers being in proximity indicate that all series were started at the same time, i. e. the beginning of the exercise. The secret calls used are mostly unidentified but MUTSU (9 HEFU), a submarine unit (3 TEI), and TOKYO RADIO (7 MARI) were among those heard. The type traffic which is believed to be Direction Finder or Radio Intelligence has been received from CHINKAI and an unidentified station in the CHOSEN or MAN-CHUKUO area. Other identified stations sending it are TAKAO TAIWAN), JALUIT, and three other stations in the MANDATES. JALUIT sends these messages singly but CHINKAI combines several at a time in one transmission. The amount of this traffic is increasing.

*Combined Fleet.*—Little traffic concerning the First and Second Fleets seen. What traffic did appear was handled via KURE radio. A staff officer of the French Indo China Force is aboard NEGATO. JALUIT addressed a message to Commanding Officer, Batdiv 3.

*Submarines.*—The Staff Communication Officer of Subron 1 addressed a message to TRUK. The number of submarines operating with Combined Fleet is not known but is believed to comprise the greater part of the Submarine Force.

*Air.*—Air traffic in Mandates centers about CHITOSE AIR and Airron 24. No change in status of carriers as previously reported.

*Mandates.*—Except for air activities and civil engineering traffic, 4th Fleet and Mandates very quiet.

*China.*—No change in dispositions. The China Fleet Intelligence Bureau addressed one of their members at MACAO. The Commander of the French Indo China Forces originated several despatches to an unidentified unit which was addressed by TOKYO in a WIWI message two days ago.

*D/F Bearings.*—27 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

*Positions.*—

|                  |                   |
|------------------|-------------------|
| KINO 5 (KASA 11) | SAIGON—Base 217   |
| TUU 5 (M)        | 24. 7      153. 5 |
| RUTI 2 (M)       | 15. 3      149. 0 |

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 21 October, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume returned to about normal today. There was no dummy messages in the TOKYO broadcast. Last night this TOKYO to Fleet Circuit was interfered with by station KTK (Mussel Rock, California, Globe Wireless). This interference also bothered the Japanese for TOKYO shifted his frequency down 10 Kcs. to avoid it. Statistical analysis of total navy traffic for period 15-19 October shows a close agreement with the normal established for the past 3 months. CinC Combined Fleet originated about 50% more traffic than normal and CinC 1st Fleet originated far less than his normal. These were the only variations noted. The major shore stations are not now experiencing as many difficulties as before in the routing of traffic, the whereabouts of all units being apparently better known. Sasebo radio today sent traffic identified as direction finder bearings. The stations now sending this traffic are CHINKAI, ORU 4 (in Manchuko), FUMU 4 (in Chosen ?), JALUIT and SASEBO. The amount of this traffic is still increasing. All High North Circuits checked but little activity.

*Combined Fleet.*—Little traffic concerning these fleets. The Commander in Chief appears as an addressee but did not originate much to his command. It is known that Subron 5 is in company with MUTSU but the flagship of Subron 5 (YURA) is in CHINKAI area. This leaves doubt as to the location of his command. If with him there MUTSU must also be in that area. The Second Fleet has been quiet for some time.

*Third Fleet.*—Apparently inactive in Sasebo area. Comairron 6 made a movement report to CinC 3rd Fleet. The Commander 1st Base Force is fairly active with his Marus.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Inactive in Truk area. SAIPAN was in communication with KAGOSHIMA Air and Commander Cardivs.

*Fifth Fleet.*—No indication yet of any attempt to organize and concentrate this vague unit. The Commander 5th Fleet sent a despatch to CinC Combined today.

*Submarines.*—Submarines tactical circuits heard today. A Staff Officer of

Commander Submarine Force addressed a message to the SubForce collective and for information to all major Fleet flags.

*Air.*—The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message as follows:

Action to: MINISTER OF NAVY.

CHIEF OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

COMBINED AIRFORCE.

CINC COMBINED FLEET.

CARDIV 4 less HOSH0 and ORU 4 (unidentified).

CARDIV 3.

Information to: CINC CHINA FLEET.

CINC SOUTH CHINA FLEET.

ALL MAJOR FLEET FLAGSHIPS.

It would appear from this message that whatever the combined Air Force intends to do will interest the China Fleet. It is apparent that he has all ready located parts of his command from TAIWAN northward at least as far as GENZAN. The fact that he has had Carriers added to his force (Carriers are not normally part of the Combined Air Force) indicates a large scale operation over a long distance.

*D/F Bearings.*—33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

*Positions.*—

|               |                                              |
|---------------|----------------------------------------------|
| 9 (M)         | Comm—Takao (FUWI 4) to SAMA (SASI 4)         |
| 4 (M)         | Comm—Palao (MISE 8) to Yap (INE 6)           |
| 8 (M)         | Comm—Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3) |
| 4 (M)         | Comm—Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7)        |
| 5 (M)         | Comm—Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7)        |
| 2 (M)         | Comm—Establish with Sasebo (KIMU 9)          |
| 6 (M)         | 22.5                      151.5              |
| 8 (Katsuriki) | 10.0                      169.0              |
| 2 (M)         | 12.8                      150.5              |
| 6 (M)         | 27.5                      124.2              |
| 7 (M)         | 22.7                      149.0              |
| 7 (M)         | 16.3                      147.5              |
| 2 (M)         | 19.2                      159.9              |
| 6 (M)         | 24.3                      122.1              |

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 October 1941*

*General.*—Larger volume of traffic intercepted than normal, with no "dummy" traffic appearing. The traffic was dominated by exchanges between Staff Communication Officers of all major forces, with highly significant increase in China and South China activities. UNI WIWI from a Tokio originator was addressed action to CinC Combined, info to CinC's Com. Air Force China, South China Air Command (at Sama, Hainan) KORYU (CV) plus Yokosuka and Bako addresses. The use of tactical (numeral two-kana) calls is increasing with despatches coming through on regular shore channels carrying NR and SMS of identified service calls. Air activities, afloat and ashore, in all areas, were heavy traffic originators, with greatest emphasis on the Whole mandate area, Takao-China-Hainan. 11 Marus yesterday and today were noted using the suffix denoting "C. O. Naval Detachment aboard" without definite indication of affiliations, though most appeared connected with the Takao-Hainan air movement.

*Combined Fleet.*—Most traffic from CinC Staff was from Staff Comm. Officer, with suffix "Secretary" second in volume. Many general address despatches were originated, embracing all areas in specific callups and leading to believe that a call change may be impending or that some communication change is scheduled. The D/F net collective appeared with most general address messages. No indication of movement of CinC from Kure-Sasebo area.

*First Fleet.*—Addressed frequently but little originated. No area change indicated.

*Second Fleet.*—Same as First.

*Third Fleet.*—Apparently still in Sasebo area.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Communications to and from CinC continue through TRUK. Originates several collectively addressed to 4th Fleet. NIKAI WIWI (Special key URGENT) from Naval Intelligence Tokio addressed for action Ch, of St. 4th Fleet info Combined and Maizuru address. SUU UNA WIWI from MAYURU (Tokio) to Ch. of St. 4th, info all air and base forces in the Mandates.

*Fifth Fleet.*—This nebulous unit is very elusive. The tentatively identified Commander was exempted in a general address message and again appeared in the proper order between 4th Fleet and Subfor in an address. Delivery routes and guard stations have never been determined.

*Submarines.*—Some activity with tactical calls on Subfor frequencies are reported all October. No detectable change in operating areas previously reported.

*Carriers.*—Cardiv 4 addressed care Takao Radio and included with China Hainan addresses, indicating probable operating area South of Taiwan. Cardiv (UYU 3) with the Koryu and Zuikaku are operating with Yokosuka and Onoda air stations. AKAGI and SORYU appear to be preparing to leave Yokosuka to resume operations. Carrier Comdr. still aboard KAGA in company HIRYU. Traffic still appears through Sasebo routing.

*Combined Air Force.*—Air Force and communications most active in the Pacific traffic. The reshuffling of air units which was underway in September and the first half of October is apparently completed and large scale operations in the Mandates, Chosen-Manchukuo, and Taiwan-Hainan-Amoy areas are in progress or progressing. The Special Task Force or Southern Expeditionary Force, which the KASHII is Flagship is assuming considerable importance in despatching headings and is connected with the Combined Air Force and CARDIV 4 in forthcoming maneuvers or operations. A call tentatively identified as Spratley Is. (NRE 0) is addressed in several general collective despatches originating from the Tokyo Communication Division and Tokyo Plotting and DF Sections and is coming directly from Tokyo for delivery, indicating probable DF activity in that area.

With nothing definite to point to, the impression grows that a large scale screening maneuver or operation, at least, is in progress, involving mainly units in the Mandates, Takao-Hainan Indo-China area, the Kuriles, and the marines Marcus and Chichijima to the Kuriles. Identification of Horomus as an Air Base the other day places air operations up to the Northern Kuriles.

*DF Bearings.*—33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

*Positions.*—

|                    |                                                    |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| HONA 6 (M)         | Communication—Chinkai (SUTI 5) to Tsingtao (UYU 1) |
| SAHO 2 (M)         | Communication—Sasebo (KIMU 9) to TIKU 0 (shore).   |
| KIMO 5 (Kashii)    | Base 217—Saigon.                                   |
| KENO 2 (Koshu?)    | 09.3 151.1.                                        |
| KERO 8 (Katsuriki) | 10.0 169.0.                                        |
| HAO 7 (M)          | 13.5 149.4.                                        |
| YOHA 6 (M)         | 25.0 148.7.                                        |
| FURI 6 (M)         | 27.3 124.4.                                        |
| SATE 0 (M)         | 23.1 148.3.                                        |
| SEMI MARU          | 13.7 144.6.                                        |

#### Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 October 1941

*General.*—Traffic interception about normal volume with continuing absence of dummy traffic. The collective address communication messages continue either presaging a call change or correcting communication publication to conform with organization changes. There was less exchange of traffic between Europe and Mandate areas due to confusion on the Orange circuits but it was indicated that the volume and character was similar to yesterday. Expansion of the Combined Air Force activity into the Indo-China area was indicated by increasing traffic to and from the Southern Expeditionary Force, in the Saigon area, with information dressings including all forces attached to China waters northward to Chinkai.

*Fleet.*—No changes in locations previously reported except that traffic routes place the tentative Fifth Fleet as at or near Yokosuka and traffic headings information addressees may indicate that this force is charged with operations in the area from Chichijima northward. Tentatively, this would place task assignments for various forces as below:

Combined, 1st, 2nd and Subforce nucleus plus some carriers Yokosuka and Sasebo.

3rd Fleet, Sasebo, Japan Sea, Maizuru.

4th Fleet, Marshalls to Palau to Chichijima.

5th Fleet, Chichijima to Kuriles (vague).

Southern Expeditionary Force (KASHII Flag) Indo China, South China Sea.

South China Force (ISUZU Flag) Hainan-Taiwan.

Combined Air with Carriers, Taiwan-Naha, Chichijima.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Cinc Truk area as before.

Significant despatches included six URGENTS plus several routines as below:

UNI—Cinc CombFlt to Comdr. CombAirFor INFO: Cinc China, SoChina, Ch. NavGenSt, Tokyo, plus Yokosuka, Bako and Hainan addressees.

NIKA WIWI—Tokyo origin to CinC Combined, CinC 4th.

UNI—Cinc CombFlt to St. Comm. Officer CombAirFor infor St. Comm. Officers China Flt., SoChinaForce, SoChAirFor, Comm. Div. Tokyo, plus Sasebo and Bako addressees.

UNI—Chief of Staff China Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo. Retransmitted by Communication Division Tokyo for information to Staff Communication Officer, Combined Fleet.

Routine—Chief of Staff South China Force—same as above.

WIWI—Naval Intelligence Tokyo to Chief of Staff China Fleet information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, South China Force.

Routine—Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, and Maizuru address.

SUU WIWI—Chief Navy General Staff Tokyo to Staff Communication Officer Fourth Fleet.

Routine—Chief of Staff Submarine Force to Collective ALL FORCES COMBINED FLEET, Collective Submarine Force, information DF headquarters Tokyo and new station in South China sea area. (NRE Ø)

Routine—Long 3 part despatch from DF headquarters Tokyo to Collective ALL MAJOR FLAGSHIPS information Tokyo Tracking Section, Stations of DF Net.

Routine SUU—Short 5 numeral despatch from joint origin Bureau Military Affairs—Navy General Staff Tokyo to Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions, Combined Air Force, China Fleet, North China Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Force, Sasebo, Bako, Chinkai addresses—information—unidentified addresses plus collective shore. In this it is noted that CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE is omitted but the Southern Expeditionary Force is included. This is similar to operations in Indo-China occupation when the Third Fleet assumed major importance with CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE apparently subordinated.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 October 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume light due to very poor receiving conditions obtaining

Heavy static and fading ruined reception on the night watches when most is copied. The TOKYO broadcast carried no dummy traffic. The number of general messages emanating from Tokyo continues to be high. Most of these came from the Communications activities of the Ministry. There were a few from the double originator, Navy Minister and Chief of the General Staff. Especially prominent today was the activity of the SUTU 7 and ESARO combination thought by this Unit to be radio intelligence and direction finding activities. ESARO received frequent reports from Chinkai and ORU 4 (station in that area), UIT, and PALAO. He in turn originated messages to the CINC COMBINED FLEET, CINC SECOND AND was, more frequently than not, at least an information addressee in all messages between the major commanders. The interest in the South China Activities continues. There has been much traffic directed to the South China Indo China Force, to HAINAN activities and to NREØ (identified as Spratley Islands but thought to be in vicinity of Camranh Bay). This particular activity of South China interest seems to date from the 15th of October when NREØ received a dispatch to Takao which was then reported to all major commanders.

**First Fleet.**—Little activity by fleet units except as noted under Second Fleet. Combined Fleet received a KIU from C. N. G. S. and from the Commander in Chief Direction Finder Activities (SUTU 77). He sent one to a general collective address to SUTU 7 and NREØ (Spratley? Camranh?).

**Second Fleet.**—After a long period of comparative inactivity the CinC Second Fleet today sent a message with the following heading:

Second Fleet (Collective) (Now in Sasebo area)  
Combined Air Force (Collective)  
Third Fleet (Collective),  
Div Three,  
on Three,

## Information :

Palao Radio  
 NERO (Spratley ?, Camranh ?)  
 SUTU 77 (D/F)  
 Tokyo Radio  
 ComsubFor

French Indo China Force  
 Subron Six  
 Subron Five  
 Takao Radio  
 CinC Combined Fleet  
 ComCarDiv Five

Attention is invited to the action addressees of this message. They have appeared separately in the traffic for weeks and are here grouped in one message a single commander. Secondly, the units named are not normally under the Command of the Second Fleet. The geographic area indicated is to the south (Palao, Takao, Spratley).

*Third Fleet.*—Same activity by Second Base Fleet but little traffic from this unit.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Comairron Twenty-four addressed a message to 6 Tokyo addressees and part of his unit at Yokohama Air Station, less the Chitose Air Corps. No other activity in Fourth Fleet.

*Air.*—The Communication Officer CarDivs sent a message with the following heading:

Com.Off. SubFor.  
 " " Desron One.  
 " " BatDiv Three.  
 " " CruDiv 8.

Cardivs less *Cardiv 3*.

## Information :

Tokyo Radio.  
 SUTU 749.  
 ComOff Combined Fleet.

The air activities of the Air Force and the Cardivs continues as previously reported.

*Submarines.*—Comsubfor addressed a message to Jaluit, Tokyo Radio and Communication Officer Carrier Divisions.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 October, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume about normal. All circuits heard well except for the Yokosuka-Saipan circuit which was poor. At 0730 Tokyo radio began transmitting traffic with tactical calls, from that time until noon these calls were of the single and double KANA variety. At 1200 he worked apparently the same people but sent only the numeral kana hand variety. In all cases these messages began a new numbering series for each originator. The normal or administrative traffic continued on in the old series. The conclusion is drawn that these new number series while continuing the old indicator the beginning of tactics akin to a fleet problem with that traffic to form separate files. Activity of the direction Finder net was indicated by transmissions from the Chinkai and ORU 4 stations. None was received from the mandates Stations but this was due to the poor reception of the Saipan circuit. Tokyo Communication originated several more messages of general address. One NIKA WIWI was originated by Tokyo and sent to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions, Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Carrier Division Two.

*First Fleet.*—Little information relative this fleet but at sea in the Kyushu area. Practically the only traffic concerning it was in the tactical systems mentioned above.

*Second Fleet.*—No activity.

*Third Fleet.*—Commander Second Base Force originated a movement report which went for information to Maizuru. Bumil sent one to Chief of Staff Third Fleet for information of Commander First and Second Base Forces.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Air Squadron Twenty-fourth is still very active with Jaluit and Truk.

*China.*—Little activity. Spratley Island addressed a message to NRE0 (Camranh) for information of a First Fleet Unit, Saipan, Chichijima, Hainan and Takao. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force sent one to CinC Combined Fleet for information of all Combined Fleet Commanders.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 October, 1941*

**General.**—Large amount of tactical call traffic intercepted on frequencies used for communication between Tokyo and Mandate Stations. Identifications of calls showed that Tokyo, Saipan, Palau, Truk, Jaluit and two or three unplaced shore calls handled the bulk of the traffic. Guards for all forces of the Combined Fleet were also present, using a large number of alternate calls and addresses. Analysis of the routing and handling of this type of traffic leads to the belief that the activity is largely concerned with a major communication drill or test, combined with possible maneuvers of the Fourth Fleet and air units in the Mandates. Control of the operation appears to rest with Tokyo Radio, who transmitted several high precedence-urgent despatches in abbreviated procedure on the UTU, calling collective Combined Fleet for delivery. The prefix "Jitsu" appeared occasionally, meaning that the despatch was bona fide, indicating that the bulk of the traffic was drill. This is reverse of the usual procedure of indicating the drill traffic by the prefix "Enshu" when normal traffic constitutes the bulk of the load. Possible active participation of the Fourth in maneuvers is indicated by exemption of this force in several messages under normal addresses and general collectives. Contradictory routing to tactical addresses previously identified as major force flagships and commanders and the lack of "jigs" and repeats tends to confirm the primary communication nature of the exercise. This may be preliminary to a major call change in the near future. Normal administrative traffic intercepted indicates that there has been no movement of major units into areas in which the tactical traffic would place them.

**Combined Fleet.**—Flags of Combined, First, Second and Submarine Force appear to still be located in the Kyushu area, with Air Force commander and Carrier Division Four in Takao. Preparations for an unidentified air command (YOME 7) to move from Taiwan to South China appear to be under way. It is believed that Carrier Division Three (NUYA 8) is proceeding to join Carrier Division Four to operate under Air Force Commander. One despatch heading indicates that the HOSHO may also be rejoining Carrier Division Four. Commanding Officers of the SORYU and KORYU were aboard the KAGA (Commander Carriers Flagship) yesterday. The AKAGI has left Yokosuka Navy Yard and will probably rejoin the KAGA. The Fifth Fleet is assuming a slightly more tangible form, with an additional alternate recovered and a movement report involving a new fleet unit with this force (?). Yokosuka continues to accept traffic addressed to Fifth Fleet.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 October 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume below normal attributed to weekend and possible non coverage. A few dispatches in tactical systems using new types of calls observed; these were undoubtedly late deliveries of the previous day's heavy traffic in tactical communications. A survey of the past few days traffic and location sheets reveals the definite association of certain naval auxiliaries with several component parts of the Combined Fleet. Some of these naval auxiliaries are known to be tankers. Examples (1) Commanding Officer KYOKUTO Maru that made two or three fast tanker trips to California last spring is aboard the KAGA, (2) the NARUTO and another new auxiliary (YUMAØ) appeared at least twice with those first fleet units most likely to move.

**First and Second Fleets.**—COM-16 reports the majority of First and Second Fleets in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. Also that the YAMASHIRO is in Yokosuka while KONGO is in Malzuru. The units of the First Fleet that appear to be involved in movements, present or immediate future, include:

SENDAI—CL.

MIDZUHO—AV.

HYUGA—BB.

1 other BB—(WAFUØ) with HYUGA.

BatDiv 3—(Includes KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA, HIYEI).

Desron 1 and 3.

**Submarines.**—COM-16 reports ComSubForce and large part of the Submarine Force in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. One important Submarine Squadron (NASU4) has appeared frequently associated with Cruiser Division 8 in the Second Fleet and Destroyer Squadron 1 in First Fleet. There is a slight indication that a part of Carrier Divisions and these forces will operate in the Mandates. Several dispatches forwarded to ComSubForce and ComCarDivs have also in-

cluded JALUIT and TRUK Radio Stations. Additionally Tokio Radio originated a despatch to Communication Officer Cruiser Division 8 information to COMOFFS CAF, Second Fleet, BatDiv 3, CARDIVS and JALUIT Radio. While SubForce is exempted in this last despatch, there seems to be a tie-in between these forces and the Mandates.

*Air.*—The following units appear to comprise all air activities of Combined Fleet now operating in Takao-South China Area:

MOO9—11th Air Corps.  
NTI4—CAF (Comdr., and COMOFF).  
OTO6—KANOYA Air Corps.  
REA2—SHIOGAMA Air Corps.  
SIHA5—ZUIKAKU.  
SUYO8—Plane guards for ZUIKAKO.  
TOME2—Large AIRON in CAF.  
YUHI7—KASUGA MARU (new Converted carrier)?

Also CarDiv 3, HOSHO, and RYUJO appear to be in Takao general area but not with the above forces.

*Mandates.*—A considerable concentration of air activities continues in the Mandates. One Mandate naval auxiliary YUH08 originated a despatch to a FUSAN (Korea) address. Fourth Fleet and Chitose Air Corps both appear at TRUK.

*China.*—North and South China appear relatively quiet if Takao is placed outside of this category.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 28 October 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with good reception on all circuits except Tokyo to Shanghai which was poor. The direction finder stations throughout the Mandates were active indicating an exercise of this net. The types of tactical traffic previously reported as being very heavy has now been reduced to very light. It is now apparent that such traffic was in the nature of a drill embracing the entire Communication System. A few tactical circuits heard, Carriers were heard on 9606 kcs., Central China Forces on 4690 kcs. and the Direction Finder Net on 4955 kcs.

*First Fleet.*—No indication of movement of this fleet. Today a message addressed to Chief of Staff Second Fleet and Battleship Division One was sent to the Second Fleet for delivery. Another message originated by CinC. Combined Fleet was intercepted on Jaluit radio station frequency. This last message is discounted as being a communication error of some description. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force is aboard the Combined Fleet Flagship today. It will be recalled that the Radio Officer of this force was aboard the Flagship several days ago.

*Second Fleet.*—No comment.

*Third Fleet.*—Except for some activity among units of the First Base Force, Third Fleet very quiet.

*Fourth Fleet and Mandates.*—Indications are growing stronger that the Fourth Fleet is preparing for operations. The CinC. Fourth Fleet has been originating considerable traffic for the past two days and this has been addressed to the Combined Fleet, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions and several Tokyo addressees. The Base Forces at Saipan, Jaluit, Truk and Imleji have become active in traffic. The air activity in the Marshalls is increasing although there have been no reinforcements of the air units all ready there. Truk radio has been active in transmitting weather originated by stations at Mortlock, Ololo, Kwajalangi, and one unidentified station. His frequent communication with Commander Carrier Divisions plus above weather may indicate coming augmentation of the air forces there.

*Submarines.*—Little activity.

*China.*—Tokyo originators are still addressing much traffic to Sama, Takao, Bako, Saigon and the South China Fleet. The latter made a movement report today but the movement is believed to be a local one.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 October 1941*

*General.*—Less volume of intercepted traffic today. The heavy use of tactical calls and addresses on the Tokyo-Mandate Fleet general circuit which commenced on 25 October and was tagged as a communication test-drill, was completed early on the 28th. Use of tactical calls with maneuvering traffic on

us Fleet frequencies, with Combined, First, Second Fleet flagships and units of these Fleets participating continues and a revival of tactical traffic on submarine frequencies indicates that portions of these forces are at sea. Carriers are also heard working. The Third Fleet was especially prominent as an indicator with code movement reports from Comdesron Five, Comairron Six, Com 2nd Base Force, First Defense Division of Third Fleet indicating preparations for some activity on the part of this force. The Fifth Fleet is daily assuming more tangible form and it is believed that it will shortly appear as an integral unit of the Combined Fleet.

**Combined Fleet.**—Continued operations with First, Second Fleet Units, AKAGI, KURE and SHOKAKU apparently in same south Kyushu area. It is believed Commander Submarine Force is also operating in the same area.

**3rd Fleet.**—This unit apparently preparing to move from Sasebo area. The Third Fleet is not aboard his usual flagship, NAGARA, today. Various Fleet units initiated movement reports as reported above under general heading.

**4th Fleet.**—Remains Truk area, with general air activity continuing throughout Mandate area but especially Siapan-Truk-Jaluit areas.

**Submarine Force.**—Jaluit Radio came up under tactical call on Submarine Force frequency working three previously unheard ships with D/F bearings running through the Marshalls.

**China.**—Carrier Divisions Three and Four continue association with Commander Air Force Commander in the Takao area, with HIKOI (Unidentified Office) apparently having cognizance over forces in Taiwan, South China, Malayan areas, as well as the South Expeditionary Force in Indo China area. It is still felt that the areas of operations of the various forces as outlined in summary of 23 October is substantially correct.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 30 October 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume a little above normal. TOKYO Communication is continuing to originate messages for general distribution. This activity has continued a considerable period now and is, I believe, unprecedented. The subject is unknown because of the general address always involved. The only indications are that a major change in the communication system is imminent at regular reports are being made to the Navy concerning communications. Little tactical traffic intercepted. The High North circuits continue to be active.

Base HO 4 heard calling HO 1 and exchanged signal strengths but no message sent. Jaluit, Saipan, and Truk heard working each other. Direction of activities quiet; Jaluit did not send in any bearings, Saipan sent two bearings, Chinkai sent four.

**Combined Fleet.**—Little activity evidenced by either the 1st or 2nd Fleets. CINC COMBINED Fleet was prominent as an addressee but originated very little traffic. The greater part of these Fleets appear to be in Kure area but it is indicated as being in Sasebo.

**3rd Fleet.**—This Fleet very active in radio traffic. The Commander in Chief reported much traffic as did the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Base Forces. Today the despatches seemed to be of the movement report variety while today appear to be regarding organizations. Some typical headings are:

From: TIYA 77 (Comdr 1st Base Force)

To: CINC COMBINED FLEET

Chief of Naval General Staff

Info: All Major Unit Commanders (less 4th Fleet, French Indo-China Force, 1st Defense Division and COMAIRRON 6)

CINC THIRD FLEET sent one as follows:

Action: CINC COMBINED FLEET

Chief of Naval General Staff.

Info: MESA 1 (unidentified); All Major Commanders (less 4th Fleet); COMAIRRON 6; NITU 7 (A Division in 3rd Fleet); Defense Division 1; NAGARA; Comdr 2nd Base Force; Comdr 1st Base Force.

There has been no confirmation of movement of this Fleet by other means than traffic headings. Normal delivery of traffic via Sasebo continues. No confirmation by DF bearings. It is therefore believed that the movement is imminent. The directive is not evident but Cavite reports that the ASHIGARA departed for South. BuMil is in active touch with Bako and the RNO at Oku.



**Fourth Fleet.**—One despatch today addressed the Commander in Chief of the 4th Fleet in care of Naval Intelligence at Tokyo. For the past two days all 4th Fleet Traffic has been addressed to the Chief of Staff rather than the CINC. Most of the activity in this Fleet still centers about the 4th, 5th and 6th Defense Divisions. Today both Saipan and Truk sent messages to MOMU/Ø (a new Carrier identified here as KORYU). The association of the KORYU, SAIPAN, TRUK and YOKOSUKA Air Corps leads to the belief that KORYU and YOKOSUKA Air will move toward Saipan soon.

**Submarines.**—Nothing to report.

**China.**—The traffic load on the South China circuits has greatly increased. SAMA, HAINAN is quite prominent as an addressee and has originated far more traffic recently than for the past few months.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 31 October, 1941*

**General.**—at 0000, 31 October, Japanese Navy service calls changed in all fleet and air units, as expected. Shore station calls and addresses remain unchanged. Insufficient data is at hand at time of writing to determine whether tactical calls in the fleet were also switched; however these shifted on 20 September and may carry over. Traffic intercepted on 31st about normal volume with continuation of general address messages from Communication Division Tokyo, Naval Ministry and China Fleet Intelligence. Increasing traffic involving the Fifth Fleet appeared, including communication officers of this force and of the Fourth, probably indicating early activity of the Fifth Fleet in connection with, or in areas adjacent to, the Fourth Fleet. Naval Ministry originated a despatch to CinCs Fourth, Fifth, Yokosuka addressee. Information to Saipan Base Force, Jaluit Base Force, Fifth Defense Force (at Saipan), Sixth Defense Force (at Wotje), unidentified activity associated with Fifth Fleet organization (NEO 6), and unidentified activity (SETA 6).

CinC Second to Second Fleet (collective Suffix 38), BatDiv 3, Subrons Five and Six, Desrons One and Three, Unidentified Maru, Second Fleet (Suffix 29). Information to Commanders Combined Fleet, CarDivs, Subfor, and movement offices at Tokyo, Kure, Yokosuka and Sasebo. Significance of this address is obscure, possibly indicating organization or movement.

**Combined Fleet.**—Bearings place combined flagship, First fleet flag, carriers and subfor units previous mentioned in the same general area Kure to south and southeast of Kyushu.

**First Fleet.**—Inactive as traffic originator.

**Second Fleet.**—No indication of area from traffic, but it is believed that some units of this force in connection BatDiv Three and units mentioned in the heading of the despatch quoted above are preparing to operate.

**Third Fleet.**—Continued movement reports from units and individual ships as noted past three days, but no direction indicated.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Flagship remains in Truk area. Activity among air units and shore based forces continues, with increasing emphasis on the Jaluit area. Jaluit exchanged communication officer despatches with Combined and Fourth Fleets. No D/F activity from this area was noted today.

**Fifth Fleet.**—As mentioned under general.

**Submarine Force.**—Exchange of despatches by communication officers of Commander Carriers and Submarine Force indicate arrangements being made for coordination of operations.

**China.**—Taiwan continues to be the center of Combined Air Force activity with communications between Air units concentrated in that area and bases in Palao and Truk areas in one direction and China, South China, Hainan and Indo China Southern Expeditionary Force on the other. Commanders Eleventh and Twelfth Air Corps, Shiogama Air, Takao area. This is a concentration of practically the same units which were together at Hankow Air during latter July and August. First Base Defense Force of the China Fleet (TIFU Ø) is included as an action addressee in practically all despatches originated by China force commanders, including China Fleet, North China Force, Central China, South China, South China Air Force, China Fleet Intelligence and South Expeditionary Force. Carrier Divisions Three and Four traffic still goes via Takao.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume is a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It

ieved that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have been added but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet up and save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

**Combined Fleet.**—The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic in messages placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were not very active but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

**Carriers.**—The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

**Submarines.**—Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up.

**Third Fleet.**—This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST FLEET FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy in Tokyo.

**Hainan.**—The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair. Bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call in progress satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual messages.

The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last week. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many despatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and SAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence units are originating periodic despatches, those from Tokyo being prefixed with T. There were several high precedence despatches from Tokyo with the fleet commanders as addressees.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to originate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented for the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for the nature of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO has received two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI (identified).

**Combined Fleet.**—Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence, Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the Philippines, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet is to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

**Third Fleet.**—Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

—A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a

command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

**Air.**—High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

**Mandates.**—The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS Island appears as an originator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

**Submarines.**—No activity noted.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many despatches passing between the two.

**Third Fleet.**—Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YAO2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section?) Whether or not there are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several despatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered somewhat. Today the *specific call-up* on the Tokyo broadcast was *eliminated*. Formerly

Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a *single call* without regard to the *addressee of the message*. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the *address* and *originator* were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

**Takao-Bako Area.**—It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.

**Combined Fleet.**—A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

**Mandates.**—The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November 1941*

**General.**—Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.

**Air.**—Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

**Fleet.**—Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 1941*

**General.**—Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a despatch *action* to S. C. O. Combined *INFO*. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively

identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

**Fleet.**—Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. BatDiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

**Air.**—Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of BatDiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

**Combined Fleet.**—Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

**Third Fleet.**—The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the CinC. Fourth for information of Jaluit.

**Fifth Fleet.**—One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.

**Air.**—The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC. Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the Empire. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

**Combined Fleet.**—The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Latey returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

**Air.**—CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

**Fifth Fleet.**—Nothing to report.

**Fourth Fleet.**—The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

**China.**—The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.

2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.

4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.

5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.

6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.

7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO Intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

**Combined Fleet.**—The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of

BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Office is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in the division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

*Third Fleet.*—Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with the Sixth BASE FORCE JALUIT. Several messages were exchanged, apparently to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.

*Air.*—Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with the fleet and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined Air Force is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

*China.*—The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one message from RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair reception conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.

2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in relation to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

*Combined Fleet.*—Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Sea and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China Sea in near future.

*Third Fleet.*—Still in Sasebo area. The Cinc. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in the area. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

*Fourth Fleet.*—No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff have been addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

*Submarines.*—No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO. Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

*Air.*—One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HA. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representative of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in the area.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore stations. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato.

Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were sent so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for the maintenance and organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one message to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire Communication net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet transmitted one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv flagship.

*Combined Fleet.*—Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Two) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CincPac Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging movements of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

*Third Fleet.*—Inactive.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CincC. Fourth traffic being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, on undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

*Marine Force.*—Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Marine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.

—Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

A large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of messages are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new type of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch was given; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) without the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

Dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Commands and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers—(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.

2. Resolution of House of Representatives—Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."

*First and Second Fleets.*—Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kura area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airron Seven (3 Chitose class)

Carrier Division Four



Destroyer Squadron Seven  
 Destroyer Squadron Three  
 Battleship Division Three  
 Cruiser Division Seven.

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates. It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuni Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

*Third Fleet.*—Believed inactive in Sasebo-Kure area.

*Fourth Fleet.*—FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC, Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.

*Submarines.*—Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet commands continues.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic have been found going into Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few vessels of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.

*Combined Fleet.*—No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

*Third Fleet.*—Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

*Air.*—The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

*China.*—Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taihoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama. Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address

emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

**Combined Fleet.**—CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

**Third Fleet.**—The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

**Combined Fleet.**—The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

**Third Fleet.**—Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

**Fifth Fleet.**—Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

**Combined Fleet.**—Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Eure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three)

TAE 1 (Airron 7)

KAME 5 (Airron 6)

YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5)

KENU 3 (Crudiv 7)

RESE 4 (Desron 3)

AKI 0 (Desron 4)

TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For)

SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For)

YOMO 9 (Desron 5)

REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps)

KUNO 9 (Ermo)

MIMO 3 (Air Unit?)

TUE 7 (Unidentified)

ENO 7 (Unidentified)

AKU 8 (Air Unit)

KUSU 7 (Unidentified)

SATU 88 (Unidentified)

KUNI 88 (Unidentified)

OYU 9 (Unidentified)

KONA 0 (Unidentified)

MOTU 6 (Unidentified)

NETE 5 (Unidentified)

NSI 3 (Unidentified)

SUTE 1 (Unidentified)

YAYU 1 (Unidentified)

MARE 5 (Unidentified)

Plus 11 Marus.

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or at Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out—so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

**Mandates and Fourth Fleet.**—The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron

of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs and sent two other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

**Combined Fleet.**—CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE 5 (Crudiv ?), KOO 2 (Subron 5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 0 (AKASHI (at Kure) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

**Third Fleet.**—CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SAN-BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

**Fourth Fleet.**—CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

**China.**—The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore  
*Precedence*  
NIKA-WIWI Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st,  
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Southern Expeditionary Force.
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information  
NIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff.
3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern  
WIWI Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.
4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship  
NIKA NWA 2, information Radio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship.
5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure,  
KIU Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RISI".

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

KENU 3—CruDiv 7 Flagship?  
 HOWI 2—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.  
 EKE 8—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.  
 MUSE 5—Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

*Combined Fleet.*—CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

*Air.*—Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

*China.*—CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third, Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.

#### *Communication intelligence summary, 24 November, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heela intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

- (a) The falling off of traffic to China addressees.
- (b) The increased activity among third fleet addressees with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
- (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addressees.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

**First and Second Fleets.**—Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

**Third Fleet.**—Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC. Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

**Fourth Fleet and Mandates.**—Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

**Submarines.**—Comparatively little activity.

**China.**—Comparatively quiet.

**Carriers.**—No definite indications of location.

**Combined Air Force.**—Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary 25 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over past two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

**Combined Fleet.**—Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC. Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

**Air.**—Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

**Fourth Fleet.**—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary 26 November, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AINavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

**Combined Fleet.**—Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in Hainan waters. While no indica-

tions were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level.

*Fourth Fleet.*—No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

*Fifth Fleet.*—The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

*Submarines.*—As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETES's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

*China.*—Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

*Third Fleet.*—Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.

*Combined Fleet.*—No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

*Third Fleet.*—Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:

"DAIHATIEUTABUTAI SANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)

"KOROKUKITISIKI"

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO)

"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

*Fourth Fleet.*—CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

*Air.*—An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

*Submarines.*—Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is

becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NREØ (the TOKYO D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS.

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

*Combined Fleet.*—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CRUDIVS Five and Seven and DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).

*Third Fleet.*—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.

*South China.*—SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

*Submarines.*—Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two despatches there was no submarine activity today.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent *eleven* messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent *four* long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two Alnavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

*Combined Fleet.*—The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor



denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE CF 2CV  
SUBRON FIVE CL+10SS  
SUBRON SIX CL+4SM  
CRUDIV FIVE 8CA  
CRUDIV SEVEN 4CA

DESRON TWO-1 CL-12DD  
DESRON FOUR-1 CL-12DD  
THIRD FLEET  
FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Forces, CRUDIV Four and LUMIL-AFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.

*Third Fleet.*—Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number *Two* Base Force. Number *One* Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron *Two* and *Four*. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

*Submarines.*—Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

*South China.*—CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary November 30, 1941.*

*General.*—Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with *AKAGI* and several *MARUS*. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

*Combined Fleet.*—The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces but also included *KONGO* and *HIYEI*, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).

*Third Fleet.*—Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON *Two*, *Four* and *Five*; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI 4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet

submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

*South China.*—BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief, China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941*

*General.*—All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

*First Fleet.*—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters.

*Second Fleet.*—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

*Third Fleet.*—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

*Fourth Fleet.*—No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Nothing to report.

*Submarines.*—Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. Flagship somewhere in this general area.

*Carriers.*—No change.

*Combined Air Force.*—No change.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941*

*General.*—The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons Five and Six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

*First Fleet.*—Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets.

*Second Fleet.*—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941*

*Third Fleet.*—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

*Mandates.*—Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

*Carriers.*—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

*Combined Air Force.*—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same addresses.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on submarines or Carriers.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

*Combined Fleet.*—The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes-

ages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which the CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

**Fourth Fleet.**—The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).

**South China.**—Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

#### *Communication intelligence summary, December 5, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic to these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon".

**Combined Fleet.**—Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or further south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.

**Third Fleet.**—In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUN. SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.

**Fourth Fleet.**—The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio, the RNO PALAO and the Commander Second Fleet.

**South China.**—SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

*Combined Fleet.*—Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

*Fifth Fleet.*—This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

*Submarines.*—The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

*South China.*—Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 December 1941*

*Combined Fleet.*—The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief and Staff are believed to be in Empire waters. There appeared to be a split in this command in Mid-November which led to the belief that the operations as initiated by Second Fleet Commander in South East Asia occasioned a supreme Commander in Empire waters with a secondary Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in South East Asia or elsewhere.

*First Fleet.*—First Fleet is believed to be temporarily in the background as some first fleet units should be operating with the Second and Third Fleets and the majority of the remainder is operating with the Carrier Divisions. Battle Ship Division One and Two have disappeared as far as our identifications are concerned. Battleship Division Three is believed to be operating with Carrier Divisions which outfit is in turn divided so that HIYE I and KIRISHIMA are operating with Striking Force #1 in the Blue Pacific and HARUNA and KONGO are probably with the or a #2 Striking Force. Destroyer Squadron One and ABUKUMA are believed also in the #1 Striking Force. From one dispatch in plain text and associations, it appears likely that Striking Force #1 is still in the Oahu-Midway area (Lat. 32°N Long. 164°W).

*Second Fleet.*—Cruiser Division Eight of this Fleet may be operating with Striking Force #1. Other units are probably with the Commander-in-Chief, Second in Southeast Asia. One indication is that the bulk of the Second Fleet is operating against Malay and Singapore while the Third Fleet took care of Luzon. The indications continue that Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force are under one command; also that Indo-China Force and South China Force seem to have lost some of the close association with this combination, probably because South China and Indo-China Force are holding the South China Coast and Indo-China.

*Third Fleet.*—Together with some units of the Combined Air Force is probably operating against the Philippines and also in Malay. The close connection of Palao with Third Fleet addresses and Palao prior to war is the basis for this assumption.

*Fourth Fleet.*—Operating in the Mandates. No recent indications of operations of this fleet outside of the Mandates. On one hand there is a close connection between Fourth Fleet and Fifth Fleet in the north; on the other hand Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet must be working together in the defense of the southern flank. Air Squadron Twenty-four figures prominently in the traffic and is still in the Marshall area. Saipan Radio initiated a broadcast similar to Takao. Jaluit appears to have taken over some of the primary duties of a radio intelligence unit and is assumed to be headquarters in the "Field".

*Fifth Fleet.*—Definite information that this fleet is in the northern area continues. Ominato Radio handles traffic to and from the Fifth Fleet units. This fleet appeared to shift from Yokosuka north to Ominato area shortly before war opened. The composition of this fleet is still somewhat obscure but is believed to have very few so called fleet vessels. Probably as large percentage of fleet auxiliaries and converted air tenders?

**Carriers.**—#1 Striking Force, operating in Blue Pacific. Believed to comprise Carrier Division One—AKAGI (Flagship Cardivs)

KAEA  
Carrier Division Two—HIRYU  
SORYU

Carrier Division  
Four (or Five) —SHOKAKU  
ZUIKAKU

Cruiser Division Eight  
Destroyer Squadron One

KIRISHIMA— —First Section BatDiv Three.  
HIYEL.

By deduction #2 Striking Force, if such an organization exists, comprises

Carrier Division Three—RYUJO  
HOSHO

Carrier Division  
Five (or four) —KORYU

and probably other combatant units. Carrier Division Three and RYUJO were definitely associated with Second and Third Fleet prior to war.

**Submarines.**—A strong force of submarines believed to be operating with Fourth Fleet and another force operating with Carrier Divisions.

**China.**—China Fleet Commanders in normal bases or locations.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 December 1941*

**General.**—Traffic volume continues very high with proportionate amount of high precedence traffic. The actual amount of traffic intercepted at Heela has not increased materially since the Eighth but this is due to the concentration of efforts on obtaining all transmissions of Japanese vessels in the Hawaiian area somewhat at the expense of obtaining the maximum traffic on all known circuits. There were very few signals identified as emanating from the immediate Hawaiian area. A great many bearings have been obtained the last two days in the sector 295-300 true from Oahu; since most calls involved have been tentatively identified as vessels in the North China and Takao areas, increased activity in that region may be the reason therefor. The Navy Minister originated the following dispatch to the Secretary of the Combined Fleet which was broadcasted from Takao Radio:

"164. From the Cabinet, Prime Minister and Admiral Arihama Takaza Igo received a request for a congratulatory telegram as follows addressed to all hands (?).

"Congratulations (upon) there having been attained manifold results (war results) (at) the outset of the naval war. We pray for the success of the fortunes of war for all ranks of officers and enlisted men".

**Combined Fleet.**—No change.

**First Fleet.**—No indications of any change. The calls identified as First Fleet have practically disappeared from the traffic lately. This is submitted as a partial strengthening of the opinion that the First Fleet has lost its identity as such and has been split between Carrier Divisions and the large task force operating in the Malay area. The report of United States bomber action on a HARUNA type Battleship in the Philippine area, if true, substantiates this.

**Second and Third Fleets.**—Appear to be "intact" in the Southeastern Asia area.

**Fourth Fleets.**—Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet and some of the Fourth Fleet vessels definitely show in the Mandates. It is believed that Air Squadron Twenty-four is still in the Marshall area and that the Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet, is in the Truk area. While complete coverage at Heela is not possible under present conditions, the available traffic does not indicate the previous association between Palao and Second-Third Fleet combination.

**Fifth Fleet.**—No apparent change in the available information on this fleet. Considerable activity has been noted in the High North and Ominato area shore stations.

**Submarines.**—Commander Submarine Force continues to show in the routing of traffic to and from Mandate stations, particularly the Marshall Island area. From all the reports of submarine activity in the Hawaiian area and the well established fact that Submarine Squadrons Five and Six went south to Malay prior to declarations of war, it appears that practically all submarines are away from Empire waters or that our estimates of Japanese submarine strength were lower than actual numbers.

**Carriers.**—Very little radio activity the past twenty-four hours. One possible significant clue to Carrier Divisions future operations was contained in a despatch from Tokyo Radio to the Commander of First Air Fleet flagship, AKAGI, listing a long string of Tokyo Broadcast messages which it is assumed provided a reminder or check on those dispatches which should have been received for the First Air Fleet during the period 7-10 December. To this office, the inference is that for the past three days (during radio silence in Hawaiian waters), a check up was not practicable but now may be done without breaking radio silence. While this may be far-fetched, it still remains a possibility.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 December 1941*

**General.**—Intercepted traffic volume lower than normal due to employment of receivers in search watch. The amount intercepted was however, indicative that the traffic volume for the Fleet was high, Jaluit and Saipan broadcast overloaded and the Yokosuka to Saipan was in continuous operation.

**Local Operations.**—Continuous search watch was maintained on all known Air and Submarine frequencies during the day. No air circuits heard. It was expected that after dark the submarines circuit 6385 kcs. would liven up but there was very little activity. Two bearings of submarines in this vicinity were obtained. HEHIYA was heard and a bearing of 050° True was obtained. HIMI was heard on 180.2° True. Other submarine calls were faintly heard and bearings were all to the westward.

**First Fleet.**—Nothing to report.

**Second Fleet.**—Together with Third Fleet in the Malay Area.

**Fourth Fleet.**—Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet is in the Mandates with most of the Fourth Fleet. He is believed to be in the Truk area but is maintaining close liaison with the Marshalls in which is stationed Air Squadron Twenty-four and KAMOI. Jaluit radio is handling all traffic for the Submarine Fleet which indicates this place as the base for the submarine operating in the Hawaiian area.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 December 1941*

**General.**—No apparent change in traffic volume or high precedence traffic. No material change in fleet locations has been definitely established. However, it is apparent that several minor units have altered positions and, after combining several British conflicting reports, many units are more definitely located than heretofore.

**Combined Fleet.**—Singapore reported Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet at Sama Bay in Hainan. Both Corregidor and Pearl Harbor report the Supreme Commander today in the Chichijima-Mandate area. If it is assumed that there is a split in the command, which possibility was brought up recently by this office, then both British and our reports may be correct. Our evidence here points to Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet very closely associated with Mandate addresses and possibly in the general Saipan area.

**First Fleet.**—First fleet calls showed again after a period of obscurity. Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet originated one despatch to Chief of Staff, *First Air Fleet* (recently near Oahu); Chief of Staff, *First Fleet*; Yokosuka Air Group; Chichijima Air Group? Chief of Staff, Fifth Fleet; Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet? and other commands.

**Second and Third Fleets.**—There appears to be a difference of opinion as to locations of these forces. The only definite point of agreement between British and United States reports is that the entire Second and Third Fleets are in the Luzon-Singapore-Saigon triangle. The best estimate of locations is as follows:

*Saigon-Malay Area*

CinC, Second Fleet (Singapore?)  
 Second Fleet (Singapore area ?)  
 First Fleet Units operating with  
 Second Fleet: 2 BB of Batdiv 3  
 (less sunk ship), Desron 3, 3 CL (flag-  
 ship Subrons and Desron) (N. E.  
 coast of Malaya)  
 CinC. Southern Exp. Force (Saigon)  
 Comdr. Combined Air Force (Saigon)  
 CarDiv. 3—HOSHO-RYUJO (Siam)  
 Subrons Five and Six

*In Philadelphia Area*

CinC, Third Fleet  
 Third Fleet  
 Second Base Force of Third Fleet  
 AKASHI (Repair Ship)  
 Possibly Air outfits from Takao area.

*Fourth Fleet.*—There appears to be little change in location of Fourth Fleet in Truk-Saipan-Marshall area. Fourth Fleet addresses and First Air appeared together in several despatch headings. This is submitted as the clue to the present disposition of the Striking Force against Oahu. Squadron Twenty-four normally in Marshalls and unidentified Fourth command (RATA9) also included in this same association.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Little change or information.

*Submarines.*—During the past twelve hours, there have been four to five single bearings of submarines in the Oahu area bearing 302 True to 49 True from Oahu Flinder Stations. Bearings were equally spread. One bearing of submarine unit from Dutch Harbor provided a possible fix in L. 30 N, 146 W. Actually six bearings of submarine units were received from West Coast stations—these were also somewhat spread over North Pacific area. Since west stations are untrained to copy Japanese, no calls were given, consequently no fixes obtained. Evidence is conclusive that majority of submarine units in North Pacific are widely spread in the Dutch Harbor-Oahu-San Diego area, plus several in immediate vicinity of Hawaiian Islands. Tokyo Radio came 17 Kcs. with a powerful broadcast on the 11th December. This is believed to be an additional safeguard for widespread submarine units communications as usually all addressees have been identified as submarine units. The best clue came from Direction Flinder bearings of the of the number of submarines in North Pacific including the immediate Hawaiian area is 8 to 12 submarines. There appears to be a split in serial numbers of Submarine Force Commanders despatches. The assumption is that perhaps one serial series is for submarines in the Pacific and the other for Submarine units in the South Eastern area. Commander Submarine Force is believed to continue in the Marshall area.

*China.*—Report received of part of South China Fleet in Jaluit area. This is believed to be correct. From inconclusive evidence, China's depleted fleet of South China Fleets are still spread between Shanghai and Canton-Haïan area.

Address "OKASHUDANSO.SATI" originated despatch to CinC. Second and Southern Expeditionary Force using a four numeral code. The original appears to be the OKA army division headquarters-location, except as to associated addresses, not evident.

#### *Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 December 1941*

*General.*—Traffic volume heavy with a great number of high precedence messages. Practically all traffic being handled by broadcast. Large parts of intercepted traffic addressed to submarine units but this is due to our concentration on submarine frequencies.

*Combined Fleet.*—Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet is still taking his traffic from Saipan. Tokyo gives some traffic for Combined Fleet units to Chichi-jima delivery showing that some units are in that vicinity. In several dispatches Commander-in-Chief, First Fleet was associated with Commander Striking Force, Commander First Air Fleet and Commander Submarine Fleet. Tokyo Intelligence addressed messages to this group of commands. The Commander of Second and Third Fleets are still closely associated in the traffic. It is not possible to definitely separate them in areas as yet but it is still believed that Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet is concerned with operations in Malaya while Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet appears to be situated a little farther north, keeping him concerned in Philippine operations. Since the Second Base Force is associated with Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet it is probable that this unit is in the Philippine area.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The Commander, Fourth Fleet is indicated at Truk or Saipan. Not in the Marshalls. Air Squadron 24 and KAMO I in Marshalls with Squadron 24 basing on the northern-most ATOLL (radio call HII5) and is giving a doubt the unit raiding Wake. Yokohama Air Corps has moved to a new establishment in the Gilberts.

*Fifth Fleet.*—Commander-in-Chief, Fifth Fleet in communication with OMI-10 radio. He has a number of units with him as indicated by his radio action 4640 kcs. These units furnished the greater part of the radio activity tonight. This force appears to be guarding the northern approach to Japan.

*Submarines.*—Little submarine activity last night. Some traffic heard on 6385 but no bearings outside of the 250-300 sector obtained. One unit (6RI) fixed



by Direction Finder bearings from Dutch Harbor and Oahu. At a position just N. E. of Wake Island. Commander Submarine Fleet at Jaluit and is continually broadcasting.

*Air.*—The Commander, First Air Fleet has appeared in dispatches as mentioned above but no other carrier traffic found.

*Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 December 1941*

*General.*—High traffic volume continues. An increase in tactical traffic over the past two days was evident in the Siam-Philippine area. Also radio activity was on the increase in the North China Area and the Yokosuka sector. Dispatch headings and radio activity on 5350 kcs. indicated a grouping of several Naval auxiliaries (MARU's) with a few fleet vessels. Only bearings on this group placed them in the Northern sector—Chinkai or Japan Sea area? To take one case, Chinkai Radio was very active on 6345 kcs. with about 16 units. All these indications point to reinforcements organizing or proceeding from the Japan area to other locations. In another area, a bearing of the Fourth Base Force Detachment at Greenwich Island (YOME6) showed 270 degrees which is 15 degrees above Greenwich Island, and associated traffic indicated this force was probably afloat in the Saipan area since several Naval Auxiliaries were included in the traffic. Another significant despatch heading which was repeated several times contained the action address "Communication Officers of Major Fleet units (or Forces) less Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, and First Air Fleet". These three organizations seem to be the ones on the "loose" at the present date.

*Combined and First Fleet.*—First Fleet showed a little in the dispatch headings. Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and the First Air Fleet appeared to be associated with Yokosuka Radio and the calls believed to represent Yokosuka Air, Tateyama Air, and Chichijima Air.

*Second, Third Fleets, Combined Air Force.*—No indications of any material changes in locations these fleets. Tactical traffic was particularly heavy among the major units operating the Siam-Philippine area. Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District reported an identity of Air Corps 22 which has figured prominently in the S. E. Asia sector. It is believed this group may be shore based in Hainan or Siam. Several air units showed at Takao which have been inconspicuous lately—Kanoya Air, Takao Air, Shiogama Air, and Staff Combined Air Force. This may or may not indicate change in dispositions due to the fact that the traffic routing through Takao Radio has never been clearly defined or understood.

*Fourth Fleet.*—The 17th Air Corps, Air Squadron 24, and possibly Kisaratsu Air was represented at a Marshall Island Station (HII5). This group was very busy with tactical traffic and apparently was operating, possibly in Wake area. Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet remains at Truk. Palao was not prominent.

*Fifth Fleet.*—No indication of locations or plans.

*Submarines.*—Traffic to submarine units particularly heavy. No bearings of submarine units in the Hawaiian area were obtained. Traffic to some submarine units are repeated several times indicating difficulties of communicating with distant locations. The tactical call ITO, which from Direction Finder bearings passed from west to east of Hawaii on the 12th, 13, appears to be a Submarine Squadron Commander. No bearings on ITO obtained since 13th.

*Carriers.*—Remarks on First Air Fleet contained in above. Only indication as to present location is the associations in traffic with three air activities in the general Yokosuka area.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 23

## PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM OF 1 DECEMBER 1941

## LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 1, 1941.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

M-E-M-O-R-A-N-D-U-M

From: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

To: Admiral.

Subject: ORANGE FLEET—Location of.

1. From best available information units of the ORANGE fleet are *thought* to be located as listed below:—

*Yokosuka Area*

|                                           |             |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
| TAKAO (CA)-----                           | 1 CA        |
| 3rd Fleet HQ-----                         | ?           |
| #1 Patrol Force-----                      | ?           |
| AIR GROUP of 5th Fleet (Chichijima?)----- | 36 planes ? |

Total—1 CA plus ? 36 planes.

*Kure—Sasebo Area**CinC Combined Fleet**CinC First Fleet*

|                                         |        |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|
| BatDiv 1 & 2-----                       | 6 BB ? |
| Crudiv 6—may head for Mandates (?)----- | 4 CA ? |
| Desron 1-----                           | 1 CL   |

12 DD

*CinC 3rd Fleet in NAGARA*

|                    |      |
|--------------------|------|
| 1 CL-----          | 1 CL |
| 1 CL-----          | 1 CL |
| Desdiv 12 (?)----- | 1 CL |

4 DD

|                                     |      |
|-------------------------------------|------|
| <i>Cruiser Division EIGHT</i> ----- | 2 CA |
|-------------------------------------|------|

Total—6 BB—6 CA—1 CL—16 DD.

*Shanghai Area*

CinC China Fleets in IZUMO----- 1-OCA

|                          |       |
|--------------------------|-------|
| Shanghai Base Force----- | 1-PG  |
|                          | 3-ODD |

plus miscellaneous craft  
36 planes (?)

#10 Air Group-----

Total—1 OCA—1 PG—3 ODD—36 planes, etc.

*Bako—Takao Area*

THIRD Fleet Submarine Squadrons----- 1 AS

6 SS (I)

Subron-5----- 1 CL

6 SS

Subron-6----- 1 CL

4 SM

Desron-5 less Desdiv 22----- 1 CL

8 DD

#2 Base Force----- 3 CM

5 XPG or XPO

17 AP or AK

Desron-4----- 1 CL

12 DD

## LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS—Continued

*Baco—Takao Area—Continued**Comdr. Combined Air Force*

|                            |           |
|----------------------------|-----------|
| 5th Air Battalion (Army ?) |           |
| 11th Air Group.....        | 36 planes |
| Air Squadron 6.....        | 3 XAV     |
|                            | 30 planes |
| Air Squadron 7.....        | 3 AV      |
|                            | 48 planes |
| 23rd Air Group.....        | 36 planes |
| " Air Group.....           | 36 planes |
| " Air Group.....           | 36 planes |
| " Air Group.....           | 36 planes |
| Genzan Air Group.....      | 36 planes |
| Shiogama Air Group.....    | 36 planes |
| Kanoya Air Group.....      | 36 planes |
| Kasuga Maru.....           | 1 XCV     |
|                            | 36 planes |

at

CinC 2nd Fleet with units enroute TAKAO

|                           |                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------|
| plus Crudiv-5.....        | 4 CA possibly 5 CA |
| Desron-2.....             | 1 CL               |
|                           | 16 DD              |
| Cardiv-4.....             | 2 CV & 4 DD        |
| Cardiv-3.....             | 2 CV & 3 DD        |
| Batdiv-3 less HARUNA..... | 3 BB (maybe 2 BB)  |

Total—3 BB—4 CV—7 CL—47 DD—4 SM—3 AV—4 XAV—4 CA—  
3 CM—17 XAP—5 XPC—450 planes.

*Hainan—Canton Area*

|                                           |         |
|-------------------------------------------|---------|
| CinC South China (in ISUZU).....          | 1 CL    |
| CinC Sm Exp Force.....                    | 1 CA    |
| Crudiv-7.....                             | 4 CA    |
| Desron-3.....                             | 1 CL    |
|                                           | 15 DD   |
| 1st Base Force (?).....                   | 3 CM    |
| (part of this may be in Formosan waters). | 12 AM's |
|                                           | 6 XPG   |
|                                           | 12 PC   |
|                                           | 27 AP   |

Total—5 CA—2 CL—15 DD—3 CM—12 AM's—6 XPG—12 PC—  
27 AP.

*French Indo China*

|                                   |                 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| CinC S. Exp. Fleet in CHOKAI..... | 1 CA            |
|                                   | 1 CL            |
|                                   | 1 CM            |
|                                   | 9 Torpedo Boats |
|                                   | 1 XPG           |

Total—1 CL—1 CM—9 Torp. Boats &amp; Miscellaneous.

Some of 1st &amp; 2nd Base Force are may be here (?)

*OMURA AIR GROUP*

|                                           |               |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------|
| 12 Air Group {                            | 36 planes     |
| 13 Air Group { Some may be on Hainan..... | 36 planes (?) |
| 14 Air Group {                            | 36 planes (?) |

*Mandate Area*

|                     |           |
|---------------------|-----------|
| PALAO               |           |
| 16th Air Group..... | 36 planes |
| 3rd Base Force..... | 10 XPG    |
|                     | 4 SS (Ro) |

Total—36 planes—10 XPG—4 SS.

*Truk*

|                     |       |
|---------------------|-------|
| CinC 4th Fleet..... | 1 CL  |
|                     | 2 OCL |
|                     | 1 CL  |
|                     | 3 DD  |

LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS—Continued<sup>1</sup>

Mandate Area—Continued

4th Base Force----- 4 XPG  
4 XAP  
17th Air Group----- 4 XAM's  
36 planes

Total—36 planes—2 CL—2 OCL—8 DD—4 XPG—4 XAP—4 XAM.

Saipan

CinC Submarine Force----- 1 CL  
plus subs (?) 1 Suron (?)----- 1 AS  
7 SS

Chitose Air Group----- 36 planes  
18th Air Group----- 36 planes  
5th Base Force----- 2CM  
8 XPG  
5 XAP

Total—78 planes—1 CL—1 AS—7 SS—2 CM—8 XPG—5 XAP.

Marshall Area

19th Air Group----- 36 planes  
Yokohama Air Group----- 36 planes  
Wotje Air Group----- 34 planes  
Kwajalein Air Group----- 24 planes  
Air Squadron 24----- 2 XAV  
KORYU (?) plus plane guards----- 20 planes  
1 CV  
4 DD  
Submarine Squadron 7----- 1 AS  
9 SS (Ro)  
Sudiv (?)----- 4 SS (I)  
Submarine Squadron 3----- 9 SS (I)  
6th Base Force----- 4 XAM's  
8 XPG  
8 PC  
KATSURIKI----- 1 AG (survey)

Total—140 planes—2 XAV—1 CV—4 DD—1 AS—22 SS—4 XAM—  
8 XPG—3 PG—3 PC—1 AG.

Respectfully,

E. T. LAYTON  
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.,  
Fleet Intelligence Officer.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 24

SEALED—SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

| 'Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992                             | Addressee                                                                 | Message Precedence                 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| From: Chief of Naval Operations----- R17R                   | Action:<br>To CinCaf.<br>CinCpac.<br>Com11.<br>Com12.<br>Com13.<br>Com15. | Priority.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred. |
| Released by: Ingersoll-----<br>Date: November 24, 1941----- |                                                                           |                                    |
| TOR Code Room-----<br>Decoded by-----<br>Paraphased by----- | Info:<br>Spenavo London.<br>Cinclant.                                     | Priority.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred. |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.  
242005CR#443.

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence.  
Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery: Date Time GCT.  
[Hand written]: Cinclaf CinCpac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action spenavo London  
and Cinclant for infox..

## TEXT

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Adees to inform senior Army Officers <sup>their</sup> ~~your~~ areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately

Copy to (WPD, War Dept.) and to OP-12 *but no other distribution.*

[Handwritten:] plus 3 copies to sealed secret file.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

NOTE.—Linetype and italics denote change.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 25

SEALED—SECRET

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Phone extension number: Op-12, Ext. 2992                                         | Addressees                            | Message precedence                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| From: Chief of Naval Operation.<br>Released by .....<br>Date: November 27, 1941. | For action:<br>CINCAF.<br>CINCFAC.    | Priority X.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred. |
| TOR Coderoom.....<br>Decoded by .....<br>Paraphrased by.....                     | Information:<br>CINCLANT.<br>SPENAVO. | Priority.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred.   |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

GKVJL BVKLW 2723379921

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward Stabilization of Conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition ~~probably~~ against either the Philippines [Written: Thai] or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X Inform district and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X

[Handwritten:] Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD War Dept.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 26

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS BY PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 October 1941-2 December 1941

Confidential

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: B3. Serial No. 82. Date: October 6, 1941

Moored in a Bay near HAKODATE on 26 September:

7 SS  
2 CL  
2 CA  
Underway headed South in Japan Sea night of 26th: 5 CA.  
1 departed YOKOHAMA: 1 CL (NAKA) Class.  
1 Located South of Hong Kong (CL) ISUZI & (DM) SHUMUSHU.  
1 departed Shanghai (OCA): IZUMO.  
1 departed Shanghai (PG): TOBA.  
1 arrived CHEFOO: 1 TB.  
Week ending 27th: Mouth Pearl River—  
12 AP upstream.  
14 AP downstream.

Serial No. 83

Groups are reported at: Takao, Hohow, Taichu (?) and Kagi (?).  
HIGARA is reported to have left Sasebo with probable destination South

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 85. Date: 27 October 1941

Best information of locations of units of Orange Fleet is:

Takao Area:

|              |                   |
|--------------|-------------------|
| CVs          | AVs               |
| RYUJO        | NOTORO            |
| SHIKAKU      | KENJO MARU        |
| Unidentified | Maru Type         |
|              | Maru Type         |
|              | DD (Plane Guards) |
|              | DD " "            |

Takao: Commander Combined Air Force

Sea & Ariake Bay Area: FIRST & SECOND FLEET plus SUBFORCE

at:

Sasebo: YAMASHIRO.

Osaka: KONGO.

Moorea-Eastern Kyushu Area:

CVs: AKAGI HIRYU  
KAGA HOSHO  
Unidentified  
Unidentified  
Unidentified

Sasebo Area: THIRD FLEET

(continued)

## 784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 84. Date: 4 November, 1941

The following information is from a source which has been thoroughly reliable in the past:

From 1 Nov. the navigation through URAGA CHANNEL is restricted as follows. Seven fixed buoys are in the channel.

- (1) Lighted buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 136 degrees, 6050 meters (3.27 miles). Lighted painted black.
- (2) Lighted buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6500 meters (3.55 miles). Painted black.
- (3) Lighted buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6700 meters (3.66 miles). Painted red.
- (4) Flag buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 87 degrees, 6600 meters (3.61 miles).
- (5) Flag buoy: From buoy (4) 190(170?) degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).
- (6) Flag buoy: From KANNONSAKI LIGHT 88 degrees, 4900 meters (2.67 miles).
- (7) Flag buoy: From buoy (6) 170 degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).

### NAVIGATION

Sail to the east of lighted buoy (1) and between lighted buoys (2) and (3). Sail to the east of the northern four buoys because the sea area to west of them is dangerous. Do not enter (this area).

When meeting (another ship) going to the entrance between buoys (2) and (3), the ship leaving port is to wait.

There will probably be maintenance by naval patrol vessels and by the lookout station on the northwest point of NOKOGIRI YAMA.

Take care!

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 85. Date: 10 November 1941

Reliable information indicates the ZUIKAKU, NOTORO and two Maru Tenders have returned to the Sasebo-Kure Area. RYUJO is still in Taiwan. The KENJO MARU is in the Saigon-Camanh Bay Area.

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 86. Date: 12 November 1941

It is reliably reported that the RYUJO has returned to Kure.

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: (?). Serial No. 87. Date: 22 Nov. 1941

Dutch Authorities in the NEI have received information that a Japanese Expeditionary Force which is strong enough to constitute a threat against the NEI or Portuguese Timor has arrived in the vicinity of Palau. If this force moves past a line through Davao-Waigee-Equator the Governor General of the NEI will regard it as an act of hostility and will consider war to have begun.

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 88. Date: 23 Nov. 1941

CinCAF has no information confirming the Dutch report of a Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palao. His information does not indicate the presence of

units other than the Fourth Fleet in the mandates and no unusual concentration of that force. It is possible that there may be an increase in the number of transports and marus. There has been a concentration of 30-40 marus in the Saipan area since the middle of October. CinC Fourth is at Saipan as of the 22nd and it is possible that Airon 24 may also be present. Slight indications are that one battleship division and two carriers are preparing to proceed to the mandates but so far there has been no signs that the movement has begun.

---

*Secret*

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 89. Date: 23 Nov. 1941

CinC Fourth Fleet is now reported to have returned to Truk after a trip to Saipan in the Kashima. There has been increased activity of the cruiser division and other units of the Fourth Fleet in the Truk-Saipan area. The following increases in Base Forces are estimated: Third (Palao), one (1) division marus; Fourth (Truk), two divisions marus, two maru air tenders, special landing force (?); Fifth (Saipan), two divisions marus; Sixth (Jaluit), three divisions marus, three unidentified shore commands, two maru air tenders.

The activity of the Combined Air Force is increasing. The Eleventh Air Corps is believed to be at Palao and Alron Twenty four is concentrated in the Marshalls. The Fifth Fleet is apparently at Chichijima with portions possibly at Marcus. There have been approximately seventy arrivals or departures of marus since one November, mostly in the Truk and Jaluit areas.

---

*Secret*

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: ---- Serial No. 90. Date: 25 November 1941

The U. S. N. Shipping Adviser in Batavia reports that the Dutch report concerning the Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palao originated from the Dutch Army in Timor. Portuguese Timor was named as the objective of the Expedition. The information was classed as doubtful and no further confirmation has been obtained.

---

*Secret*

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: ---- Serial No. 91. Date: 25 Nov. 1941

The British report that Germany is obtaining rubber from Saigon in the following shipments. All routing is from Saigon to Bordeaux around Cape Horn. Six thousand tons was shipped in two Japanese ships on 15 October and 14 November respectively. Five thousand tons is to be shipped in a German ship on about one December. The Jap ships may be German vessels under Japanese charter. The ships have not yet been identified.

---

TOP SECRET

*Secret*

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 12. Date: 25 November 1941

Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army Officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.



TOP SECRET

Secret

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 13. Date: 25 Nov. 1941

For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force composed of the following:

Second Fleet—Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st Defense Division)—Combined Air Force—Desron Three—Airron 7—Subron 5—possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet).

These units are linked with the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The Commander Second Fleet has intensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which is at Palao.

The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that certain units have moved on to Hainan.

The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and may be en route South China. A strong concentration of submarines and aircraft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv and one third of the submarine force.

Com 14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

TOP SECRET

Secret

## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A. Serial No. 94. Date: November 26, 1941

A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few days as follows. He considers it reliable:

1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being directed by CinC 2nd Flt in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects:

Section I to operate in South China Area.

Section II to operate in the Mandates.

2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Flt.

## SECTION I

*CruDiv 7* (From 2nd Flt) (4 CA's—KUMANO, MOGAMI, MIKUMA, SUZUYA)

*Airon 6* (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's—KAMIKAWA MARU, FUJIKAWA MARU, KENJO MARU)

*1st Defense Division* (From 3rd Flt)

*Subron 6* (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4 ss)) (note 4 SMs)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Crudiv 6* may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 CA's—KAKO, FURUTAKA, KOKA, KINUGASA)

## SECTION II

*Crudiv 5* (From 2nd Flt) (3 CA's (maybe 4)—MYOKO, NACHI, HAGURO)

*Cardiv 3* (From Carrier Flt) (2 CV's—RYUJO, HOSHO) RYUJO and 1 MARU

*Desron 2* (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs (12 DD's))

*Desron 2* (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs (12 DD's))

*Subron 5* (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's))

*Desdiv 23* (From Carrier Flt) (4 DD's)

*1st Base Force* (From 3rd Flt)

*3rd Base Force* (At PALAO)

*5th Base Force* (At SAIPAN)

*Other lesser units* (Names not known)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Batdiv 3* may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 BB's—HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) (HARUNA may be undergoing major repairs)

3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Flt in doubt but it is assumed they will be stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south.

4. Indications are that today (Nov. 28th) *Desron 3* (1st Flt), *Crudiv 7* (2nd Flt) and *Subron 6* (6th Flt) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air Forces from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOCHOW, PAKHOI, SAIGON and other bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN.

5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CV's in the MANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Flts are still in the KURE-SASEBO area.

6. He believes that:

CinC Combined Flt is in *NAGATO* (BB)

" 1st " " *HYUGA* (BB)

" 2nd " " *ATAGO* (CA) (In KURE area)

" 3rd " " *ASHIGARA* (CA) (In SASEBO area)

" 5th " " *CHICHIJIMA* area

" 6th " " *KASHIMA* (CL) (In YOKOSUKA area but this is unreliable)

7. CinC 2nd Flt, CinC 3rd Flt and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force apparently have the major roles.

8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet (probably torpedo boats).

9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expeditionary Force.

*Secret*

#### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A. Serial No. 95. Date: November 27, 1941

A reliable agent states that there appears to be ORANGE Army activity in the air that involves Imperial Headquarters, Combined Army Forces and Commander OPTION KING AFIRM. Commander OPTION KING AFIRM and Combined Army Taiwan and Combined Army Forces Sama.

*Confidential*

#### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: B-3. Serial No. 96. Date: 27 November 1941

Information from British Intelligence (Far East) sources states:

Japan will commence Military Operations on 1 December against the KRA Isthmus, Thailand, with the objective of interposing between Bangkok and Singapore.

Main landing and center of effort at SINGORA (SONGKHLA).

Japanese Assault Forces to proceed direct from TAIWAN (FORMOSA) and HAINAN Is.

TOP SECRET

*Secret*

#### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 97. Date: 28 Nov. 41

Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure will be carried out on Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic relations are on the verge of severance:

On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times at the beginning and the end will have this significance:

HIGASHI HIGASHI: Japanese-American.

KITA KITA: Russia.

NISHI NISHI: England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and NEI).

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On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used:

"HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (America).

"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI" (Russia).

"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England).

The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 98. Date: 28 Nov. 1941

Com 16 reports location of following units:

In Formosa Straits:

ISUZU

SubTender

4 Subs (probably Subron 6)

NAGOYA MARU

NITTA MARU sailing Yogosuka to Takao on 29th with military supplies.

Two senior construction officers and 4000 men (status unknown) order to the Mandates.

Unidentified CL (?) has apparently relieved KASHWI as flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and is now in the Camranh Bay Saigon Area.

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 99. Date: 29 Nov. 1941

Com 16 reports recent developments noted:

"COMDR FIRST PATROL FORCE" has headquarters apparently in Palao or Yokosuka along with other forces of this nature.

"FIFTH AIR BATTALION" is at Takao.

"COMDR AIR BORNE TROOPS" (location unknown).

"FRENCH INDO-CHINA BILLETING DETACHMENT" in Saigon Area.

"THIRD FLEET HEADQUARTERS" probably at Yokosuka.

CinC Third has shifted flag from ASHIGARA to NAGARA.

CinC Southern Expeditionary Force shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI.

New additions to the *First Section* (Ser. # 94):

DESRON 4.

SUBRON (?).

AIRRON 7 (CHITOSE type).

The HIYEI and KONGO now appear to be definitely in the First Section but no movement has been noted.

Completely reliable information indicates that CinC Combined will leave Kure Zone at 0400 today, leave Sasebo Zone at midnight on the 1st and enter Bako Zone at midnight on the 2nd.

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 100. Date: 1 Dec. 41

There have arrived in the Takao Area in the past two days: ComDesRon 5 in the NATORI; NAKA to join DesRon4; Units of Number Two Base Force; CHOGEI (believed to be tender for two subdvs). All of these units are under command of CinC Third. CinC Second has shifted from Kure to Sasebo Area in the ATAGO apparently en route South China Waters.

*Secret*

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 101. Date: 1 Dec 1941

Absolutely reliable agent in Bangkok reports that on the 29th conferences were in progress considering plans to force the British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai,

present, intends to consider the first invader as her enemy therefore Japan  
 es this landing in Malay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang.  
 . Thai would then declare war against the British and call on Japan  
 elp. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff  
 o. Up until 25 November Thai government circles have been sharply  
 ed between pro-British and pro-Japanese but now those favoring Japan  
 to have silenced the anti-Japan group and intend to force Premier Pibul  
 ke a decision. They expect early and favorable developments.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 102. Date: 2 December 1941

C Second Fleet [handwritten: in ATAGO] and the Cinc Third Fleet have  
 their appearance in the TAKAO Area. The Commander Southern Expe-  
 ary Force in the CHOKAI has arrived at SAMA, HAINAN.

U. S. Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to  
 y all but a limited number of Codes.

ee I-class submarines were sighted bearing 070 distant 180 miles from  
 ON, course 180 speed 15.

de (9) ORANGE Submarines sighted at 0230 GCT 2nd Latitude 13-10,  
 de 110-00 East course 180 speed 10.

orted at CAMRANH Bay 21 ORANGE transports with a six plane patrol  
 ead.

---

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 27

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer  
 for burning when of no further use

Tokyo Yokohama area at present time, Kamakura and Nitta Marus X  
 ama Dock Yard finished, not long ago, 2 escort ships X 2 transports left  
 ama last Thursday in November one carrying aircraft, the other Navy

O HRF Date 5 December 41 Serial No. 12-129

ator: NAVATT TOKYO

: OPNAV

nation:

INCPAC

INCAF

OM 16

---

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer  
 for burning when of no further use.

is from Shanghai who are of military age are being transferred to Japan  
 aining thought for purpose of serving on German ships which are now  
 pan. In this connection 80 have departed in last 10 days average age of  
 men 30 years. A great deal of pressure is being brought to bear on French  
 ssion by 9 Shanghai officials to bring about the discharge of Anglo Ameri-  
 villian volunteer members of police reserves for the purpose of replacing  
 with Italians and Germans. The following information from British In-

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telligence who gave it a reliability classification of B2: Kamakura, Nitta and Argentina Maru carrying personnel, oil, supplies, and building material have visited Caroline Islands since September; Majuro, Mejit, and Katherine Islands are being specially developed; laborers numbering 8000 have been landed at Jaluit.

CBO S Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-102

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

COM 16

NAVATT CHUNGKING

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification): *Confidential*.

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

In response to the reference (Cincpac Serial No. given below). The unidentified modern vessel was a 10,000 ton cargo ship which has been converted into a sea-plane carrier.

Characteristics: Flush deck, with raised foc's'l, with raked bow and cruiser stern, mounting 14.7" gun on elevated platform forward, and 14.7 gun on poop deck.

**RAISED FORE CASTLE AND FLUSH DECK.**

Ref: No. 11-827

Subref: No. 11-759

CBO MRQ Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-103

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Information:

CINCPAC

Action:

CINCAF

OPNAV

COM 16

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

State Department advises:

Jap troop and supply ships commenced making Saigon November 21, and have disembarked approximately 20,000 men, using all wharves possible. From Friday to Wednesday, 10,000 further troops came by train from the north. Present concentration of troops in South Indo China believed about 70,000 with estimates as high as 120,000 although latter figure discredited as being too high. Large number of trucks landed, carrying materials and men inland, in a large movement, of such size that it appears to point to immediate action against Siam. All above received from Saigon, following from Hanoi, all reports on November 26 unless otherwise noted.

On the morning of November 25, the mayor of Haiphong notified all affected parties the Japs were going to commandeered all stores being shipped to China and to this end ordered that they must have all keys to all bonded storehouses prior to noon that day, despite the fact that protest was made by the French. He advised also that those concerned should exercise their own judgment as to compliance with the order. Report from Hanoi further stated that recently augmented stores and military gear, landed at Haiphong, (consisting principally

of gasoline and railway equipment, including rolling stock) are being further shipped south.

It is said Nipponese intend to buy as many as 500 native boats, and have, in fact, acquired a great many along the coast of Tongking Province, which they have moved south. Tuesday, the U. S. Consul at Hanoi obtained report from dependable sources, stemming from Governor General's Office to the effect that the latter had learned from an agent of proposed Japanese move. This movement was said to be contemplated in the form of simultaneous Army-Navy action, sea forces to open hostilities on Isthmus Kra, while land forces attacked Thailand. Same information was credited with statement that the above advances would be made without advance warning in form of ultimatum or declaration of war.

Wednesday report from Hanoi stated that there has been considerably more activity in the way of landing and movement south of armed forces, 4000 men having been disembarked in the last few days. A special train will carry about 1500 south on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week. Tongking is said to contain some 25000 (estimated) Nipponese troops with 90 planes present at Gialam.

CBO HRF Date 29 November 41 Serial No. 11-891

Originator:

OPNAV

Action:

CINCAF

Information:

CINCPAC

COM 16

COM 14

#### U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

During period mentioned in your 182250 United States merchant vessels were in the vicinity of Ellice and Gilbert.

CBO FWR Date 29 Nov '41 Serial No. 11-879

Originator:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

Action:

NAVOBS AT WELDLINGTON

#### U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Kamakura Nitta and Argentinia Marus have been engaged since September in hauling materials in the form of supplies, oil, construction supplies, as well as personnel to the mandate islands X On one trip to the Marshall group, 3000 workmen were carried and disembarked at Jaluit X Two trips have been made to the Caroline Islands X Awaiting transportation, seemingly, at Yokahama Naval pier, is approximately 8000 Wadts gasoline in drums X Development of the Marshall group is proceeding on the following islands: Katherine (Ujae Atoll), Majuro X Mejit X Watt (Ailuk)

CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-823

Originator:

NAVATT TOKYO

Action:

OPNAV

CINCPAC

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

COM 16

COM 14

# 792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following report received from commanding officer of a foreign merchant ship by the office of the Naval attache at Shanghai: Left Hongkong for Shanghai, Sunday, November 23. While on the way, saw numerous transports. There were approximately 3 or 4 ships sighted during each watch the first three days of this week. They were travelling in a general southerly direction. Transports were sailing either alone or in groups of few ships.

Following is also noted by the Shanghai attache's office: There is an unusually small amount of supplies on the military docks in Shanghai.

CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-834

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAVATT CHUNGKING

NAVATT TOKYO

COM 16

## U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following Jap naval ships sighted:

Northeast Amoy 20th course southwest 10,000 ton modern ship fitted as sea-plane carrier with catapult. On deck 8 seaplanes Navy type 95.

Off Swatow: 19th; course South, light cruiser and destroyer Holhow 17th: 20 merchant type ships left heading for Formosa off Saigon 15th: 7 transports.

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-759

Originator:

ASST NAVATT

SHANGHAI

Action:

CINCAF

Information:

CINCPAC

NAVATT TOKYO

NAVATT CHUNGKING

OPNAV

COM 16

## U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

The following 5 ships, previously Japanese merchant motor ships, arrived here with names blocked out and painted grey—Atutasan, Mitsui line. 1 more same type.

Sato Nyk.

2 sister ships Tekashi Maru, Ockshima Steamship Co.

They were armed with 10 to 16 AA guns apiece. The ships with 10 guns have mounts placed for 6 more machine guns. They had an average of 7 3-inch dual purpose guns with the other guns being automatic and seemed to be approximately 50 caliber.

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-751

Originator:

ASST NAVATT

SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAVATT TOKYO

NAVATT CHUNGKING

COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classification: ) Confidential

Paraphrase

is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

pping here is now normal. No large movements seen either north or south coast to date. About 24,000 troops with large amount of military equipment sailed from Woosung between the 15th and 23rd. Several trucks leaving seen to be newly camouflaged, mostly green in color. This type of camouflage is unusual in this locality. 184 landing boats besides others on 5 vessels included in the above equipment. Could not obtain exact check.

O WBM Date Nov. 25 41 Serial No. 11-761

nator:

SST NAVATT

HANGHAI

n:

PNNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAVATT CHUNGKING

NAVATT TOKYO

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classification: ) Confidential

Paraphrase

is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

2115 November 24 about 1,000 miles east of Guam, the ANSAC clipper and 4 Japanese seaplanes flying south at 10,000 feet.

O WBM Date Nov 25 41 Serial No. 11-766

nator

WARDEN WAKE

OM 14

n:

COM 14

INFORMATION:

CINCPAC

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classification: ) Confidential

Paraphrase

is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

re transports departed Woosung Saturday with undetermined number of s and small boats X Present at Woosung on the same day were eight transports of from four to twelve thousand tons each. activity was noted between Shanghai and Darlen X 2000 troops arrived ghai from Nanking by rail Thursday night. ne observers believe that the transports which left Woosung last week possibly going to northern Formosa avoiding shipping lanes. Upon leav- Woosung these vessels did not change course until out of sight of the pilot .No convoys were seen along coast and foreign vessels from Hong Kong t only a few scattered transports south-bound with troops and landing boats. e 10,000 ton special landing craft carrier which departed Shanghai 18th ighted 20th off Wenchow on southwesterly course.

O WJE Date 24 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-725

nator:

T NAVAL ATTACHE SHANG-

AI

n:

PNNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAV ATT CHUNGKING AND

TOKYO



794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

Reliable report at Singapore of monoplane with two engines and one rudder making reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15th X Repeated on the 16th November by single wing silver flying boat number of engines undetermined

CBO S Date 22 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-686

Originator:  
NAVATT SINGAPORE  
Action:  
OPNAV

Information:  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

Transports with limited number horses troops and roughly 115 landing boats assorted equipment trucks and anti-aircraft guns sailed from Shanghai from 14th to 17th X 7 ships of similar type are present X Hasidate sailed Canton 14th Nov X 1 minelayer transport 6 destroyers 3 torpedo boats departed Amoy X 2 destroyers 1 troop ship and cruiser of the Natori class were anchored off Bias Bay 15th Nov X 2 destroyers sighted on southerly course south of Hongkong on 16th Nov X Night of 17th Italian escort vessel Eritrea departed Shanghai with 180 tons Diesel oil bound Okon X 14th observed 12 transports downstream and 18 upstream at mouth Pearl River X From 10 to 14 Nov master sighted 17 transports southbound at intervals between Crown Colony and Woosung

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-626

Originator:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
CINCAF

Information:  
CINCPAC  
OPNAV  
NAVATT TOKYO  
NAVATT CHUNGKING  
COM 18

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

Close to 14000 Japanese troops with about 80 tanks and 20 field pieces have arrived here from Nanking during the past 5 days by rail believed awaiting water transportation from this point X During the first part of November lesser number of young recruits were sent inland from Shanghai after their arrival from Japan.

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-627

Originator:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
OPNAV

Information:  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF  
NAVATT TOKYO  
NAVATT CHUNGKING  
COM 16

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

1000 troops left Swatow 15th Nov X Installation machine gun mounts being completed here after arrival on several vessels which appear to have been only recently taken over X 3 outbound ships Shanghai were observed to carry sections of trestles on deck sections were 60 feet long by 8 feet high by 8 feet wide and made of creosoted heavy timbers X Woosung military base has shown intense activity since Nov 15th X There are an unusual number of ships present which include former merchant vessels of 10000 tons and up average X 10 transports departed 19th 8 of these were carrying troops 32 more transports anchored lower Whangpoo X Landing boats still constitute part of outgoing equipment.

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-630

Originator:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
OPNAV

Information:  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF  
COM 16  
NAVATT TOKYO  
NAVATT CHUNGKING

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

On 16 and 17 November, planes, apparantly Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts. On the 16th the plane was a twin engine monoplane and on the 17th a flying boat. The flying boat was on a generally north and south course, speed 125. These flights indicate a daily patrol from Jaluit, over Gilberts, to an area south near shipping routs.

Truk and Saipan were each recently reinforced with half a squadron of bombers and half a squadron of fighters.

Several unknown ships have been reported near Ellice and Gilbert. Also, reports have been received of Japanese liners carrying either troops or laborers to Mandates.

NOTE—The source of the above report is the New Zealand Naval Intelligence.

CBO MRQ Date 19 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-550

Originator:-  
ALUSNOB  
WELLINGTON

Action:  
OPNAV  
Information:  
CINCPAC

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Strict regulations being enforced in Camranh Bay area. The following from a responsible foreign traveler on an orange ship which anchored in Camranh Bay last month while riding out a typhoon: Japanese building activity being rushed. Freighters observed in harbor discharging cargo. French 75's on surrounding hills, 4 long range rifles on hills overlooking outer bays with a number of minor caliber guns. Island inner bay has 4 small guns.

CBO 19 Nov '41 Date FWR Serial No. 11-564

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAVATT TOKYO

NAVATT CHUNGKING

COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following obtained from supposedly accurate French military source regarding military situation in Indo-China as of Nov 12 X. Amassing of great amount of gasoline, ammunition and oil X. Japanese forces present reported to be as follows X. Cambodia-Saigon area 31,000 X. Tongking 24,700 X. South part of Annam 2,500 X. It is reported by reliable traveller from that vicinity that large amount of heavy artillery has been landed at Saigon and Haiphong during past thirty days.

CBO HRF Date 17 November 41 Serial No. 11-498

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAV ATT TOKYO

COM 16

NAV ATT CHUNGKING

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Mouth of Pearl River 18 cargo vessels upstream 29 down Sunday to Thursday X. 6 transports present at Shanghai Friday X. Same day Canton minesweeper with vice admiral's flag departed gun boat Saga X. Minelayer Yaeyama class sighted 9th Canton outbound X. Kuma type cruiser and 2 torpedo boats Tuesday Blas Bay X. 6 destroyers X. 3 torpedo boats X. 1 transport arrived at Amoy Wednesday X. 1 Sendia class south of turnabout Island Tuesday.

CBO HRF Date 16 November 41 Serial No. 11-486

Originator:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
CINCAF

Information:  
CINCPAC  
OPNAV  
COM 16  
NAVATT CHUNGKING  
NAVATT TOKYO

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Below Hongkong Nov 6 13 transports 2 trawlers 28 motor boats on southerly course X Off Turnabout Island Nov 4 17 ships ranging from 2000 tons to 10,000 tons in a convoy headed southwesterly X Departed Saturday Nov 2 from Canton, Shimushu X Following day gunboat Saga was seen at Pearl River X Monday Nov 4, cruiser Natori departed Amoy X In period between 1 and 4 Nov 7 transports left Shanghai X Loaded as follows X 2 with rail-way trucks and coaches one each old locomotives X Tanks and trucks remainder with miscellaneous military gear including 49 landing boats

CBO HRF DATE 16 November 41 Serial No. 11-245

Originator:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
CINCAF

Information:  
CINCPAC  
NAVATT CHUNGKING  
NAVATT TOKYO  
OPNAV  
COM 16

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

During the last two weeks Jap troop trains passing through Tehchow and Shihnei from North Pingham Line enroute Tsingtao total approximately 40 or 50 trains X Movement has now been carried out X No indications of Nip divisions being transported north China to Manchuria during the month of October X Movement of 20 trains Taiyuanfu Shansi to Tsingtao via Shihnei and Tehchow just commencing

CBO JMS Date 9 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-235

Originator:  
ASST NAVATT PIEKING  
Action:  
OPNAV

Information:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
NAVATT CHUNGKING  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF  
COM 16

798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Supposedly accurate report from sources in Hongkong X Left outward bound Monday on Pearl River, 28 trawlers and 35 transports for undetermined points X Haiphong, today, Japanese forces to the extent of 12,000 men disembarked, with more ready

CBO HRF Date 8 November 41 Serial No. 11-194

Originator:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
OPNAV

Information:  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF  
COM 16  
NAVATT CHUNGKING  
NAVATT TOKYO

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Please forward brief summary by dispatch ahead of full report on information requested below X For your information, there is now being sent you by mail 14th N D Intelligence report 1927 of 30 October concerning Edward John Coquelle, who is confined in Honolulu X He was according to his statment, born French and is a naturalized U S citizen (1939) having taken papers in San Francisco X Coquelle's avowed nephew, Alfred Munson, now on Midway, is involved in confession made by the former in which he admits addressing secret plans to Mrs. Alice Coquelle at 3229 21st Ave., San Francisco X Plans were intercepted here, and were contained in a suitcase sent by Coquelle from Midway in the sirius during October X U S attorney wishes C N O to have investigation of Coquelle's service record made X Also desires San Francisco authorities study records to ascertain whether or not Mrs. Coquelle has been naturalized and check on her personally X Coquelle avers he was a member of Army Intelligence and was with overseas armed forces in first world war

CBO HRF Date 7 November 41 Serial No. 11-172

Originator:  
COM 14

Action:  
OPNAV

Information:  
COM 12

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

16 destroyers and 14 other naval vessels, probably transports or auxiliaries were observed far away, anchored in Wakasa Bay, Obama Harbor area X Above are Japanese and were sighted on the thirtieth of October.

CBO HRF Date 6 November 41 Serial No. 11-153

|                      |                  |
|----------------------|------------------|
| Originator:          | Information:     |
| ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI | CINCPAC          |
| Action:              | NAVATT CHUNGKING |
| CINCAF               | OPNAV            |
|                      | COM 16           |

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

The following Japanese naval craft have been observed: Monday the 27th 10 transports in ballast averaging 6000 tons each anchored off Namow Island Swatow X Tuesday 10 small transports south Hongkong course southwest loaded with cargo X Sailed Amoy 1 destroyer and cruiser Kuma X A vessel departed Shanghai with 600 troops X Sighted at the mouth of the Pearl River during the past week 34 transports have passed upstream and 21 downstream.

At Shanghai the Italian escort vessel Eritrea continued to load oil in drums small lots as obtainable X

German ship Quito left Shanghai night of 31st escorted by 2 Jap gunboats X Its cargo included large quantity of Diesel oil and antifouling paint X Its destination is believed to be Kobe

CBO DCG Date 5 Nov Serial No. 11-118

|                       |                   |
|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Originator:           | Information:      |
| ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI | CINCPAC           |
| Action:               | NAV ATT CHUNGKING |
| CINCAF                | NAV ATT TOKYO     |
|                       | OPNAV             |
|                       | COM 16            |

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following information from Navatt Chungking relaying from chief of SRKO intelligence:

Report from private agent Hongkong states that Orange Fleet has been mobilized at Sasebo since 20 October, although he is in doubt as to the reliability of the above information X Probable origin British X London notified local attache of a general mobilization recently, and he, it is believed, repeated information X He has been asked to check through the naval attache at Hongkong X Original report from London did not give date or place X Chinese claim of Japanese naval concentration at Chianan or Gulf of Siam is without confirmation, although there is the usual local unit activity in those places.

CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-734

|                  |                      |
|------------------|----------------------|
| Originator:      | Information:         |
| NAVATT CHUNGKING | ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI |
| Action:          | CINCPAC              |
| CINCAF           | OPNAV                |
|                  | COM 16               |
|                  | COMSOPAT             |

800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Although the Chinese maintain claims that the Japanese intend to attack Siberia in the near future, foreign observers claim this hinges upon Russian failure in the West X Chungking Russian Attache refuses to make statement concerning Russian strength in the East, although suggesting that severe weather handicaps Japanese action as well as sufficient Russian strength to give Nipponese severe punishment X Chinese also insist the Japs are sending four unidentified divisions into Manchuria and are holding four more in readiness in Northern China X British Naval Attache doubts this latter since he claims the Chinese obtained it via backdoor, information being originally transmitted by me to the Soviet Embassy in my 62/4 Oct. for checking, and by the British Attache to London also for cross check.

CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-736

Originator:  
NAVATT CHUNGKING  
Action:  
CINCAF

Information:  
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI  
CINCPAC  
COMSOPAT  
OPNAV  
COM 16  
NAVATT PEIPING

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U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

The following were sighted:

Thursday—10 trawlers heading south, near turn about island.

Thursday—Orange convoy, course southwest, consisting of 11 cargo ships and 4 tankers sighted off Amoy.

Monday—20 trawlers proceeding southwest off Wenchow with destroyer, 1 transport.

Saturday—2 transports loading small boats at Woosung X Yangtze entrance 2 transports outbound with landing craft and few troops on board.

Sharps Peak Jap naval garrison below Foochow for past 2 weeks abandoned station on the morning of the 25th.

FOR25/

CBO FWR Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-750

Originator:  
ASNAVAT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF

NAVAT CHUNGKING  
NAVAT TOKYO  
OPNAV  
COM 16  
Information:

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) Confidential

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

2300 Thursday 13 orange transports were seen off Wenchow Tuesday on a southwest course X A hospital ship departed Shanghai from upriver with ~~2000~~ wounded X Seen off Wenchow on Wednesday afternoon 9 transport averaging ~~3000~~ tons moderately loaded, with no troops reported.

CBO EBR Date 27 Oct. 41 Serial No. 10-703

Originator:  
ASST NAV AT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
CINCAF

Information:  
CINCPAC NAVATTS  
CHUNGKING, TOKYO  
OPNAV, COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) Confidential

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

It is reported that all Jap tankers are being armed with 2 guns. Izumo, converted carrier, was launched at Kobe October 30th and was moved to the dock formerly occupied by the Zulkaku. The main Japanese Fleet departed on 28 October for the Kure area. Master of foreign vessel order charter to Nips states that a guard ship is now stationed at Tsucaru strait and signals all passing ships for name, nationality, and destination.

CBO MRQ Date 5 Oct. 41 Serial No. 11-117

Originator:  
ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI  
Action:  
OPNAV

Information:  
CINCPAC  
CINCAF  
NAV ATT CHUNGKING  
COM 16

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 28

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*S-e-c-r-e-t*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., November 28, 1941.

Memorandum for: Admiral.

Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands.

1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon at 1430.

2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not be carried in any aircraft.



3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the Marshalls, Truk and Ponape was stressed with particular reference to Jaluit, Eniwetok, Kwajellen, Rongelap, Wotje and Maloelap.

4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference and is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnaissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective.

5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive armament and photographic equipment from Wake on the selected day, departures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installations in the Mandates it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of the planes Jaluit and Truk respectively. The Jaluit plane returning via Maloelap, Wotje, Kwajellen, Rongelap and Pokaakku. The Truk plane returning via Ujelang and Eniwetok. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time.

6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over Ponape enroute to Port Moresby was assigned Ujelang, Ponape and Kapingamarangi (Greenwich Island).

7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their takeoff.

[s] E. T. LAYTON.

---

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 29

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Classified

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Incoming

From: Togo, Foreign Minister.

To: Consul Honolulu.

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th.

Togo.

Date: 6 Dec. 41.

---

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Classified

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Incoming

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

1. The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning the 5th entered port. They expect to depart port on the 8th.

2. On the same day the LEXINGTON and 5 heavy cruisers departed.

3. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 Battleships

3 Light cruisers

16 Destroyers

Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

KITA.

Date: 5 Dec. 41.

---

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified

From: Foreign Minister.

To: Kita, Consul, Honolulu.

Strictly Secret.

Incoming

Would like you to hold on to your list of code words (also those used in connection with radio broadcast) right up until the last minute. When the break comes burn immediately and wire us to that effect.

Togo.

Date: 3 Dec 41.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified  
From: Kita.  
To: Foreign Minister.

Incoming

On the afternoon of the 3rd a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the 4th about 1100 tons; one stack, and had a 4 inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.

KITA.

Date: 4 Dec. 41.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified  
From: Kita.  
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Incoming

At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser of the Honolulu class hastily departed.

KITA.

Date: 4 Dec. 41.

Cincpac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Consul Kita in Honolulu sent following as #245 on 3 December, 1941.

From: Ichiro Fujii.  
To: Chief of 3rd Section of General Staff.

1. I wish to change method of communication by signal to following:

Signal #

- |                                               |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Battleship divisions including screen..... | Preparing to sortie.  |
| 2. Aircraft carriers.....                     | Preparing to sortie.  |
| 3. Battleship divisions including screen..... | All dep. 1-3 Dec.     |
| 4. Aircraft carriers.....                     | Several dep. 1-3 Dec. |
| 5. Aircraft carriers.....                     | All dep. 1-3 Dec.     |
| 6. Battleship divisions including screen..... | All dep. 4-6 Dec.     |
| 7. Aircraft carriers.....                     | Several dep. 4-6 Dec. |
| 8. Aircraft carriers.....                     | All dep. 4-6 Dec.     |

2. (A and B.)

Lanakal beach house will show one light before midnight and two after midnight during the hour number representing the signal:

| Hour           | Signal # |
|----------------|----------|
| 2000-2100..... | 1        |
| 2100-2200..... | 2        |
| 2200-2300..... | 3        |
| 2300-2400..... | 4        |
| 2400-0100..... | 5        |
| 0100-0200..... | 6        |
| 0200-0300..... | 7        |
| 0300-0400..... | 8        |

(C) During daylight star bot at Lanakal showing masthead star indicates signals 1-4. Star and roman numeral three indicates signals 5-8:

Signal

|        |      |
|--------|------|
| 1..... | *    |
| 2..... | *    |
| 3..... | *    |
| 4..... | *    |
| 5..... | *III |
| 6..... | *III |
| 7..... | *III |
| 8..... | *III |

# 804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(D) At the times indicated a one hour light in the attic window of Kalama house indicates the corresponding signal:

| Hours     | Signal # |
|-----------|----------|
| 1900-2000 | 3        |
| 2000-2100 | 4        |
| 2100-2200 | 5        |
| 2200-2300 | 6        |
| 2300-2400 | 7        |
| 2400-0100 | 8        |

(E) In the KGMB Want Ads at 0945, these ads have following signal meaning:

| Want Ad                                    | Signal # |
|--------------------------------------------|----------|
| Chinese rug for sale. Apply P. O. Box 1476 | 3 or 6   |
| Chicken farm for sale. " " " "             | 4 or 7   |
| Beauty Operator wanted. " " " "            | 5 or 8   |

2. If the above signals cannot be made from Oahu a bonfire on Maui about 6 miles north of Kula Sanatorium between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road at point Lat. 20-40 and Long. 156-19 will be made for several days between 1900 and 2200. It can be seen from the south west or south east of Maui and the hour at which it is shown will have the following signal meaning:

| Hour    | Signal # |
|---------|----------|
| 19-2000 | 3 or 6   |
| 20-2100 | 4 or 7   |
| 21-2200 | 5 or 8   |

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 30

(Exhibit No. 30 consisted of two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japanese log on the reverse side recovered from a Japanese submarine. These items were returned to Captain Layton.)

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 30A

(This exhibit consists of a photostat of a Japanese log which appeared on the reverse side of Exhibit No. 30. This photostat will be found reproduced as Item No. 113, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 30B

### LOG OF ATTACK

- 1300 Completed last work on the tube (TN: midget sub?). Went aboard.  
Waves fairly high.
- 1500 OAHU I. sighted. Radio station, red light, and surf (?) sighted. L 20°.  
This ship 90°.
- 1615 Barbers Point Light seen operating. L 40°.
- 1800 Cruising submerged, depth 25 meters.
- 1815 According to intelligence reports, ships present in the harbor on the 5th are as follows:  
5 BB's, 3 CL's, 16 DD's docked.  
4 HONOLULU Class CL's, 5 DD's.
- |      |       |
|------|-------|
| 1 m  |       |
| 5 Lt | 180 m |
| 7    | 220 m |
| 12   | 430 m |

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 31

(Exhibit No. 31 consisted of a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from positions five miles south of Pearl Harbor, which was recovered from a Japanese submarine. This sketch was returned to Captain Layton.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 31A

(Exhibit No. 31A consists of two photostats of Exhibit No. 31, being a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from a position five miles south of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from a Japanese submarine. These photostats will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 114 and 115, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 32

(Exhibit No. 32 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese midget submarine. This chart was returned to Captain Layton.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 32A

(Exhibit No. 32A consists of three photostatic copies of Exhibit No. 32, as follows:

1. Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese midget submarine, bearing the original Japanese characters.
2. *Ibid*, with the English translations of the Japanese characters.
3. Photostatic copy of the reverse side of the Japanese chart mentioned in Item No. 1 above.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 116, 117, and 118, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 33

(Exhibit No. 33 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese submarine showing defensive installations. This chart was returned to Captain Layton.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 33A

(Exhibit No. 33A is a photostatic copy of Exhibit No. 33, being an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese submarine, showing defensive installations. This photostatic copy will be found reproduced as Item No. 119, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 34

RESTRICTED

## STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

## STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, 1941

A2-12(05)  
Serial 1525UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 14, 1941.

The following Staff Instructions are published for the guidance of all persons attached to or serving with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, and also the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, while both commands are administered jointly.

The 1938 edition of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Instructions are hereby superseded and all copies should be destroyed.

W. W. SMITH,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff.

Approved:

H. E. KIMMEL,  
Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

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## STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 1941

## DISTRIBUTION LIST

| COMMAND                                                                      | No Copies |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet                              | 40        |
| Opnav                                                                        | 10        |
| Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet                             | 5         |
| Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet                              | 5         |
| Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet                                        | 5         |
| Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet                                      | 5         |
| Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet (including Subordinate Command) (3 each) | 6         |
| Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet                              | 2         |
| Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet                           | 2         |
| Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet                              | 2         |
| Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet                            | 2         |
| Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet                             | 1         |
| Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet                            | 2         |
| Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet                            | 1         |
| Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet                          | 2         |
| Compatwing Two                                                               | 1         |
| Commander Mine Squadron THREE                                                | 1         |
| Commander Transports, Base Force, Pacific Fleet                              | 2         |
| Commanding General, Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force               | 5         |
| Commandants 11th, 12th, & 14th Naval Districts (each 2)                      | 2         |
| Fleet Flagship                                                               | 5         |
| Fleet Personnel Officer                                                      | 1         |
| Total                                                                        | 107       |
| Spares                                                                       | 40        |
| Grand total                                                                  | 147       |

## STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

## SECTION I. COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTY

111. The composition of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is as indicated in the following paragraphs.

112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.

113. The below tables indicate in general the assignment of duties to the members of the Staff. Primary functions are indicated at the top of each column; the officer whose number appears first after each of the subheads under (a), (b), (c), or (d) is the leader in the duty specified:

## COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—00

Chief of Staff—01.

Assistant Chief of Staff—02.

Personal Aides—01, 05, 15.

Staff Duty Officer—14.

| (a) OPERATIONS                                                                                                                           | (b) ADMINISTRATION                                                                                                                              | (c) WAR PLANS                                                   | (d) MAINTENANCE                                                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.<br>Estimates, Plans, Orders, Instructions. 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.                                       | 01, 05, 20, 21, 25, 75, 90, 95, 96.<br>Correspondence Files, Records, Legal Matters, Flag Allotment and Office, Print Shop, Flag Personnel. 05. | 16, 17, 18, 19, 86.<br>Estimates, Plans Orders. 16, 17, 18, 19. | 10, 90, 95.<br>Overhauls, Docking. 50.                                       |
| Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.<br>Schedules, Training, Exercises, Reports of Exercises. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 50, 90, 95. | Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.<br>Secret and Confidential Registered Publications. 20, 21, 33.                                     | Marine Corps matters. 86.<br>Landing Force. 86.                 | Repairs, Alterations. 50, 90, 95.<br>Technical Services. 50, 18, 20, 90, 95. |
| Tactics. 11, 12, 13, 15.                                                                                                                 | Guard Duty, Uniforms, Calls, Celebrations, Ceremonies, Band, Boats, Official Cars. 15.<br>Characteristic Cards. 50, 18, 90, 95.                 | Mobilization plans. 16, 17, 18, 19, 86.                         | Bureau of Ships Activities. 50.                                              |
| Anchorage, Anchoring, Getting Underway, Operating Areas. 11, 12, 13, 15.                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                 | Joint Army and Navy Operations. 16, 17, 18, 86, 11.             | Navigation. 50, 12, Bureau of Ordnance. 90, 95.                              |
| Joint Army and Navy Operations. 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 86.                                                                                  | Athletics and Recreation. 15, 96.                                                                                                               | Logistic Readiness for War. 16, 17, 18, 19, 50, 86, 90, 95.     | Aviation. 95.                                                                |
| Ship and Airplane Movements. 11, 12, 13, 95, 15, 20, 50, 90.                                                                             | Requisitions, Surveys, Ship's Service. 50.                                                                                                      | Radio and Sound (Signal Equipment. 18, 20, 50, 22, 15.          | Aerological. 96.                                                             |
| Navigation. 12.                                                                                                                          | Landing Force and Parades. 86, 15, 90.                                                                                                          | Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.                              | Mines, Chemical Equipment. 90.                                               |
| Logistics. 50, 12, 90, 95.                                                                                                               | Annual Report. 05. (Assisted by each member of the Staff).                                                                                      |                                                                 | Base Hospitals. 75.                                                          |
| Intelligence. 11, 25.                                                                                                                    | Intelligence. 25, 26, 20, 05.                                                                                                                   |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Censorship. 25, 05.                                                                                                                      | Censorship. 25, 26, 05, 20.                                                                                                                     |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Aerological. 96, 95.                                                                                                                     | Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.                                                                                                              |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.                                                                                                       | Aerological and Personnel. 96.                                                                                                                  |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Security. 21.                                                                                                                            | Security. 21.                                                                                                                                   |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Propaganda. 05, 25, 26.                                                                                                                  | Medical (Sanitation, etc.) and Religious Activities. 75.                                                                                        |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Damage Control. 50, 11, 90, 75.                                                                                                          | Public Relations. 27, 25, 26, 05.                                                                                                               |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Chemical Warfare and Mines. 90.                                                                                                          | Damage Control. 50, 90, 75.                                                                                                                     |                                                                 |                                                                              |
| Base Hospitals. 11, 75.                                                                                                                  | Base Hospitals. 75.                                                                                                                             |                                                                 |                                                                              |
|                                                                                                                                          | Customs and Agricultural Inspection Liaison. 75, 96.                                                                                            |                                                                 |                                                                              |

NOTE: Detailed assignments of duties are contained in section II.

## COGNIZANCE AND DUTY

114. The following numbers are employed to identify the duties of the officers attached to the Staff:

- 01—Chief of Staff.
- 02—Assistant Chief of Staff.
- 05—Flag Secretary.
- 11—Operations Officer.
- 12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.
- 13—2nd. Assistant Operations Officer.
- 14—Staff Duty Officer.
- 15—Flag Lieutenant.
- 16—War Plans Officer.
- 17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.
- 18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
- 19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
- 20—Communication Officer.
- 21—Communication Security Officer.
- 22—Radio Officer.
- 23—Assistant Communication Officer.
- 24—Assistant Communication Officer.
- 25—Intelligence Officer.
- 26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.
- 27—Public Relations.
- 30—Assistant Communication Officer.
- 31 to 43—Communication Duty and Coding Officers.
- 50—Maintenance Officer.
- 75—Medical Officer.
- 86—Marine Officer, (Assistant War Plans Officer).
- 90—Gunnery Officer.
- 95—Aviation Officer.
- 96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.

115. The following table shows the reliefs for members of the Staff who may be absent for any reason:

| PRIMARY DUTY                             | RELIEF                                                          | REMARKS                                             |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 01—Chief of Staff.                       | 02—Assistant Chief of Staff.                                    | (02 is same as 11.)                                 |
| 05—Flag Secretary.                       | 25—Intelligence Officer.                                        |                                                     |
| 11—Operations Officer.                   | 16—War Plans Officer.                                           | 16—Relieves if available, otherwise 12 relieves 11. |
| 12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.    | 13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.                            |                                                     |
| 13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.     | 12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.                           |                                                     |
| 15—Flag Lieutenant and Athletic Officer. | 26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.                              | 20—Relieves for visual communications.              |
| 16—War Plans Officer.                    | 17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.                            |                                                     |
| 17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.     | 18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.                            |                                                     |
| 18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.     | 19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.                            |                                                     |
| 19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.     | 18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.                            |                                                     |
| 20—Communication Officer.                | 22—Radio Officer.                                               |                                                     |
| 21—Communication Security Officer.       | 30—Assistant Communication Officer.                             |                                                     |
| 22—Radio Officer.                        | 20—Communication Officer.                                       |                                                     |
| 23—Assistant Communication Officer.      | 24—Assistant Communication Officer.                             |                                                     |
| 24—Assistant Communication Officer.      | 23—Assistant Communication Officer.                             |                                                     |
| 25—Intelligence Officer.                 | 26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.                              |                                                     |
| 26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.       | 25—Intelligence Officer.                                        |                                                     |
| 27—Public Relations Officer.             | 05—Flag Secretary.                                              |                                                     |
| 30—Assistant Communication Officer.      | 31—Assistant Communication Officer.                             | Senior CWO.                                         |
| 31 to 43 inclusive—Communication         | Watch Officers and Coding Board.                                |                                                     |
| 50—Maintenance Officer.                  | 13—Assistant Operations Officer.                                |                                                     |
| 75—Medical Officer.                      | 05—Flag Secretary.                                              |                                                     |
| 86—Marine Officer.                       | 05—Flag Secretary; (and Gunnery Officer for Landing Force etc.) | War Plans Section by 16, 17, 18, 19.                |
| 90—Gunnery Officer.                      | 95—Aviation Officer.                                            | Assisted by 12.                                     |
| 95—Aviation Officer.                     | 90—Gunnery Officer.                                             | Assisted by 96.                                     |
| 96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.    | 95—Aviation Officer.                                            | Assisted by 05 for personnel.                       |

SECTION II. INDIVIDUAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTIES.

200. *Chief of Staff—01—Personal Aide.*

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785—786).

- (a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.
- (c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
- (d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
- (e) Signs correspondence as follows:
  - (1) Routine Matters.
  - (2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.
  - (3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
  - (4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
  - (5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.
  - (6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers.

201. *Assistant Chief of Staff—02—See Operations Officer (11).*

202. *Flag Secretary—05—Personal Aide.*

- (a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail.
- (b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders, movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication.
- (c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected therewith.
- (d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current instructions and properly distributed.
- (e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, inconsistent or overdue communications.
- (f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information.
- (g) Supervises the handling of U. S. and Guard Mail within the Fleet.
- (h) Printing.
- (i) Legal and disciplinary matters.
- (j) Signs correspondence "by direction" for:
  - (1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment.
  - (2) Correspondence consisting of information or appropriate minor action only.
  - (3) Receipts and tracers.
  - (4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications.
  - (5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel.
- (k) Controls Flag Office Allotment.
- (l) War Diary.

203. *Operations Officer—11—(Assistant Chief of Staff 02).*

- (a) Assists the Chief of Staff as required, signing correspondence in his absence as "Assistant Chief of Staff".
- (b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment activities.
- (c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations for revision of same.
- (d) Prepares problems and exercises.
- (e) Assignments of vessels to special duties.
- (f) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations orders, and plans and movement orders.
- (g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises.
- (h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation plans.



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- (i) Navy Relief Force.
- (j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas.

### 204. *First Assistant Operations Officer—12.*

- (a) Acts as Fleet Navigator with corresponding cognizance of navigational equipment, charts, etc.
- (b) Assists in all the duties under the cognizance of the Operations Officer.
- (c) Coordinates the duties of Operations Officer with those of the War Plans Section.
- (d) Acts as member of the Schedule Board.
- (e) Commander-in-Chief's Night Order Book.

### 205. *Second Assistant Operations Officer—13.*

- (a) Assists the Operations Officer in all the duties of that office.
- (b) Responsible for maintaining location plot and movement report system for vessels of the Fleet.
- (c) Edits Quarterly Fleet Organization information.

### 205A. *Staff Duty Officer—14.*

(See paragraph 226).

### 206. *Flag Lieutenant—15—Personal Aide.*

- (a) Acts as Fleet Signal Officer; supervises the dissemination of tactical signals, under the Fleet Communication Officer; is responsible for the efficiency of Fleet signalling operations and material.
- (b) Fleet Athletic Officer; liaison officer with Fleet Recreation and Morale Officer based ashore.
- (c) Boarding officer.
- (d) Has cognizance of:
  - (1) Matters relating to ceremonies, salutes, honors, and official calls.
  - (2) Entertainments.
  - (3) Club privileges, invitations, etc.
  - (4) Uniform.
  - (5) Boats, boat crews, and official cars.
  - (6) Military and Medical Guard Dpties.
  - (7) Band or orchestra.
- (e) When on board during working hours, attends the side.
- (f) Maintains flag combat bill.
- (g) Acts on requests for bands, parades, visits to ships, etc.
- (h) In charge of Admiral's mess attendants.

### 207. *War Plans Officer—16.*

- (a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.
- (b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
- (c) Member of Schedule Board.
- (d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.
- (e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters,—via District Commandant if appropriate.
- (f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
- (g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.
- (h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.
- (i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet.

### 208. *Assistant War Plans—17.*

- (a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
  - (1) Fleet estimates and plans.
  - (2) Collaboration with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of

**Naval Districts.**

- (3) Liaison with Army on War Plans matters.
- (4) Duties of 18 when that assignment is vacant.

**209. Assistant War Plans—18.**

- (a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
  - (1) Review of subordinate plans, including those of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Naval Districts.
  - (2) Prosecution of current War Plans tasks and projects.
  - (3) Action on administrative matters and correspondence in which War Plans has an interest.
  - (4) Logistic studies and data.

**210. Assistant War Plans—19.**

- (a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
  - (1) Office administration and correspondence.
  - (2) Compilation and assembly of data.
  - (3) Specific custody of War Plans publications and files.

**Fleet Marine Officer—86.** (See paragraph 222).

**211. Fleet Communication Officer—20.**

- (a) Responsible for the efficiency of Fleet communications.
- (b) Supervises training in Fleet communications.
- (c) Assists Operations Officers and War Plans Officers with strategic operations and with war plans.
- (d) Prepares Fleet communication plans.
- (e) Directs activities of flag radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.
- (f) Collaborates with "96" concerning radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.
- (g) Supervises activities ashore of communication stations when manned by Fleet personnel.
- (h) Supervises the assignment and utilization of Fleet radio frequencies.
- (i) Coordinates with "50" on matters of communication material.
- (j) Responsible for registered publications.
- (k) Supervises communication watch officers.
- (l) Cryptographic and radio security, with "21".

**212. Communication Security Officer—21.**

- (a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
- (b) Is responsible for security of Fleet Communications and directly those of Fleet flagship:
  - (1) Inspection of radio traffic handled by Fleet flagship.
  - (2) Inspection of communication plans and orders of subordinate commanders.
  - (3) Supervision and control of monitor watch.
  - (4) Preparation of Fleet Letters and orders on communication security.
  - (5) Recommendations for improvement of cryptographic aids.
  - (6) Recommendations for distribution and allowances of cryptographic aids.
  - (7) By personal contact and instruction improve security of communications.
- (c) Is in immediate charge of Radio Intelligence Unit.
- (d) Is in charge of Commander-in-Chief's registered publications library. Signs all routine transfer and destruction reports and inventories "by direction".
- (e) Is responsible for production and security of U. S. F. publications and other classified publications and printed matter issued by the Commander-in-Chief.
- (f) Advises concerning and ensures security of handling of secret and confidential correspondence.
- (g) Is responsible for the organization and training of the Fleet Coding Board.

**213. Fleet Radio Officer—22.**

- (a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
- (b) Assists "50" in regard to technical aspects of Degaussing.
- (c) Recommends assignment of Radio frequencies to 20.
- (d) Supervises radio, sound and landwire communications and material installations of the Fleet.

- (e) Initiation and conduct of radio training operations in the Fleet.
- (f) Instruction and training of radio and sound personnel.
- (g) Liaison with commercial radio and cable companies.
- (h) Material inspection reports of radio and sound installations in the Fleet.
- (i) Recognition and identification installations in the Fleet.

**214. Intelligence Officer—25.**

- (a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
- (b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).
- (c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
- (d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
- (e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
- (f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
- (g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.
- (h) In charge of censorship.
- (i) Internal Security of ships.
- (j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

**215. Assistant Intelligence Officer—26**

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

- (a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
- (b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.
- (c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
- (d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

**216. Public Relations Officer—27.**

- (a) Liaison officer with the Press.
- (b) Releases all Fleet publicity requiring the Commander-in-Chief's review.
- (c) Maintains file of clippings from current periodicals.
- (d) Maintains photographic file.
- (e) Maintains biographical file of flag and commanding officers.
- (f) Cognizance of Staff library.
- (g) Motion Picture Officer.
- (h) Assists in recruiting activities in collaboration with the Bureau of Navigation.
- (i) In charge of Staff photographer.
- (j) Assists 15 (Flag Lieutenant) in connection with press releases for visitors, visits, social activities, athletics, and other recreational subjects.
- (k) Publicity liaison with other U. S. government activities.
- (l) Propaganda in time of war.
- (m) When directed assist "25", and "26" with censorship and collaborates in intelligence matters as necessary.
- (n) Reviews ship's papers in the fleet.
- (o) Reviews congressional records, bills, etc.

**217. Assistant Communication Officer—30.**

- (a) In addition to the following, assists the Fleet Communication Officer as directed.
- (b) Is in charge of internal distribution and conduct of Flag rapid communications within the Flagship.
- (c) Is in charge of the Flag Communications Office, including personnel, routine operations, files, forms, and publications.
- (d) Coordinates the duties of the Communication Watch Officers and Coding Watch Officers.
- (e) Under Flag Secretary, has duty as officer responsible for receipt, routing, custody, and dispatch of secret mail.
- (f) Responsible for cleanliness and upkeep of the Flag Communication Office and communication spaces.

**218. Communication Watch Officers—31, 32, 33, 34.**

(a) Communication Watch Officers stand communication desk watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the provisions of the Communication Instructions and such orders and instructions as may be issued by the Fleet Communication Officer, Fleet Radio Officer, or Assistant Communication Officer.

(b) A Communication Watch Officer is the Flag Division Officer. He is assisted in this assignment by the communication watch officers who are designated as Junior Division Officers for the Flag Division.

(c) Communication Watch Officers must become proficient in the use of codes and ciphers and be familiar with Fleet Operations, routine, and staff procedure. In addition to performing routine code and cipher duties they may be assigned coding board duties at a battle station.

(d) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of non-registered communication publications which he shall keep corrected.

(e) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of the Registered Publications which he shall keep corrected.

**219. Coding Board Officers—35, 36, 37, 38, (39, 40).**

(a) Coding Board Officers stand Coding Board watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the instructions issued by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(b) They shall familiarize themselves with all cryptographic systems in use and become proficient in their proper use.

(c) They shall assist the Fleet Security Officer in matters of Fleet Cryptographic Security.

(d) They shall familiarize themselves with the duties of Communication Watch Officers to the end that they may stand Communication Watch Officer watches when required.

(e) All Coding Board Officers shall assist Fleet Security Officer in the correction, custody, preparation, and care of registered and classified matter.

(f) The Coding Board of the Fleet Flagship is required to perform Flag Coding Board functions, as directed.

**220. Fleet Engineer and Maintenance Officer—50.**

(a) Docking and overhaul schedules.

(b) Engineering performances.

(c) Repairs, preservation and alterations of ships of the Fleet.

(d) Fleet repair and docking facilities.

(e) Tests and upkeep of material.

(f) Design, construction, and operation of machinery and governing instructions.

(g) Orders for and reports of military and material inspections.

(h) Damage Control.

(i) Allowance lists (Bureau of Ships), requisitions and surveys.

(j) Ship's Service store activities.

(k) Training of engineering personnel.

(l) Member of Schedule Board.

(m) Fuel and provisioning schedules.

(n) Ship's characteristics cards and logistics.

(o) Supply Department matters.

(p) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans.

(q) Makes recommendations on design of new ships (Bureau of Ships cognizance).

(r) Degaussing.

**221. Fleet Medical Officer—75.**

(a) Keeps himself informed by inspections, and advises Commander-in-Chief of the sanitary conditions of ships of the Fleet.

(b) Prepares a periodic Fleet Medical News Letter.

(c) Acts as liaison officer with civilian medical activities.

(d) Interests himself in making such provisions for medical services at bases as may not be otherwise provided for.

(e) Customs and agricultural inspections.

(f) Shall obtain for, or advise Units of the Fleet in the obtaining of Bills of Health and the securing of pratique in accordance with local and foreign health regulations.

(g) Holds periodic conferences with medical officers of the Fleet for the

purpose of standardizing practices not specially provided for by regulations and for other purposes in the interest of increased efficiency of the medical department.

- (h) Has cognizance of religious activities.
- (i) Has cognizance of and advises upon Damage Control Activities within the purview of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

**222. Fleet Marine Officer—86.**

- (a) General cognizance of matters concerning Marine Corps and Fleet Marine Force.
- (b) Data on organization, strength, equipment, etc., of Marine Divisions, Defense Battalions, and Detachments.
- (c) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with the following:
  - (1) Plans for amphibious operations.
  - (2) Seizure, establishment, and defense of advance bases.
  - (3) Demolition and related operations.
  - (4) Logistic data (Marines and Army).
  - (5) Review of Marine Corps subordinate plans.

**223. Fleet Gunnery Officer—90.**

- (a) Supervises gunnery, training, gunnery exercises, and the care and upkeep of the armament of the Fleet.
- (b) Keeps informed of the efficiency in gunnery and the condition of the armament of the Fleet.
- (c) Advises in regard to tactical maneuvers for obtaining advantageous range bands, greatest fire effect, and dispositions for the best use of the armament.
- (d) Prepares outlines of schedules of gunnery exercises for the Fleet and advises concerning detailed schedules prepared by Force Commanders.
- (e) Supervises small arms training and exercises of the Fleet.
- (f) Consults with Aviation Officer in connection with aircraft and antiaircraft gunnery.
- (g) In charge of the following matters, consulting with Operations Officer regarding tactical aspects:
  - (1) Mining and sweeping exercises and material.
  - (2) Torpedoes and torpedo practices.
  - (3) Smoke screens, both offensive and defensive.
  - (4) Chemical warfare service—Material and training of personnel. (In collaboration with Fleet Maintenance Officer).
- (h) Supervises courses of study in Ordnance and Gunnery technical schools of the Fleet.
- (i) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans and in matters of liaison with Army.
- (j) Reviews military and material inspection reports.
- (k) Consults with Fleet Maintenance Officer on Damage Control.
- (l) Exercises particular supervision over recommendations for changes to "Orders for Gunnery Exercises," "Gunnery Instructions" and other ordnance, gunnery and fire control publications.
- (m) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships (Bureau of Ordnance cognizance).
- (n) Member of Schedule Board.
- (o) Advises on gunnery features of tactical plans and publications.
- (p) With 86 has cognizance of matters involving landing forces.
- (q) Handles matters affecting training, assignments, rating, and qualifications of gunnery personnel (consults with 96).

**224. Fleet Aviation Officer—95.**

- (a) Advises with reference to:
  - (1) All aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining to policy with respect to:
    - (A) Material.
    - (B) Personnel.
    - (C) Gunnery and Bombing.
    - (D) Radio.
  - (2) Aircraft Operations, and aviation shore facilities.
  - (3) Coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.
  - (4) Employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analysis and reports thereon.
  - (5) The development of aircraft tactics, gunnery and doctrine.
  - (6) Naval air operating policy.

- (b) Assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of War Plans.
- (c) Keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.
- (d) Assists Operation Officer in the preparation of Fleet Schedules dealing with aircraft and aircraft services.
- (e) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery. Handles Aircraft Gunnery Reports.
- (f) Member of Schedule Board.
- (g) Has cognizance of, keeps informed of aircraft material matters.

**225. Fleet Aerological and Personnel Officer—96.**

- (a) In charge of the aerological office and keeps the Commander-in-Chief and members of his staff advised of weather conditions as concerns the planning and executions of Fleet Operations. Assists War Plans Officer.
- (b) Advises with reference to the establishment of new aerological units in matters concerning:
  - (1) Equipment.
  - (2) Personnel.
  - (3) Weather information required.
- (c) Coordinates aerological activities in the Fleet, including:
  - (1) Collection and dissemination of weather reports.
  - (2) Weather forecasts and advisory storm warnings.
  - (3) Aerological research.
- (d) Exercises supervision over the training and instruction of aerological personnel.
- (e) Prepares such weather summaries as are required in connection with orders for Fleet Problems and Tactics.
- (f) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with atmospheric ballistic information pertaining to gunnery.
- (g) Advises with reference to exchange of weather information between the Fleet and the U. S. Weather Bureau or other activities maintaining meteorological facilities.
- (h) In charge of all matters relating to:
  - (1) Orders for officers and enlisted personnel.
  - (2) Naval Reserve Officers on active duty.
  - (3) Transportation in ships of the Fleet.
  - (4) Congressional mail regarding personnel matters.
  - (5) Action on leave requests for all officers and preparation of endorsements for signature of Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Secretary, depending upon the rank of officer requesting leave.
  - (6) Examinations and promotions.
  - (7) Navy Relief and Red Cross.
- (i) In charge of entertainment and welfare of enlisted personnel.
- (j) Shore Patrol.
- (k) Liberty for the Fleet.

**226. Staff Duty Officer—14.**

- (a) Such Officers as may be designated by the Chief of Staff shall stand a day's duty in port and a watch on the Flag Bridge at sea when a watch is established.
- (b) The officer having the day's duty shall:
  - (1) Receive routine reports.
  - (2) Act on routine matters.
  - (3) Act as necessary on matters when the officer having cognizance and his relief are absent, informing officers concerned of action taken as soon as possible.
  - (4) Attend the side when the Flag Lieutenant is not available. The procedure for tending the side is laid down in Section X of these Staff instructions.
  - (5) Regulate movements of Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff boats in absence of Flag Lieutenant or outside of working hours. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Staff Duty Officer and Flag Lieutenant informed of the movements of the Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff Duty boats.
  - (6) Keep informed as to Staff Officers on board or absent from the ship.
  - (7) In the absence of the Flag Lieutenant see that boarding calls on visiting men of war are made by an officer from Fleet flagship.

(8) Receive aerological forecasts from the Aerologist and when bad weather is forecast transmit the necessary information to the ships present.

(9) Initial all dispatches, taking action if necessary when action officer is not on board.

(10) See that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff are kept informed of all important matters, and particularly that they are informed promptly upon their return to the ship of all important matters that occur during their absence; and similarly keep the Operations Officer informed of all ship movements observed by the signal watch.

(11) Examine all mail received during the absence of the Flag Secretary or his regularly designated relief, and decide what action if any shall be taken.

(c) Day's duty will begin at 0900, except Sundays and holidays when it will begin at 1100. The sequence will be uninterrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea when regular watches are set.

(d) The duties of the Staff Duty Officer assume particular importance when, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, or other members of the staff, he is called upon to make decisions in cases of emergency, or on matters which cannot be delayed for reference to higher authority or to the officers having cognizance. This fact makes it imperative that all officers standing duty keep themselves informed as to existing situations, the policies of the Commander-in-Chief and the usual and proper manner of taking action on all matters which may arise.

(e) In important emergency cases the Staff Duty Officer will take such action as may be necessary. Instructions should be obtained by the most expeditious manner of communication with the Chief of Staff and, failing to locate him, with the Commander-in-Chief. The Operations Officer should, if practicable, be fully informed of the situation.

(f) When civilians or officials, other than personal friends of the Commander-in-Chief or officials whose status is a matter of doubt, come on board the flagship to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, he shall first present them to the Chief of Staff, Flag Lieutenant, or in their absence, to the Operations Officer.

(g) Should an emergency arise necessitating action involving the Fleet Relief Force, the Staff Duty Officer will carry out the following:

(1) Notify the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer.

(2) Send staff boats to landing, keeping one at ship as may be advisable.

(3) Land field radio and signalmen if BASRAD is out of commission.

(h) *Assignment of Berths.* Requests for berths are received occasionally by the Staff Duty Officer for immediate action during the absence of the Operations Officers. To assist the Staff Duty Officer in assigning berths, an anchorage chart is kept in the Operations Office, together with a copy of current instructions. See also the Commander-in-Chief's current letter in regard to anchorage assignments.

(i) In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff, he shall take steps to correct any defects in external Fleet routine which would constitute an adverse reflection on the Fleet.

(j) *Leave—Relief for Day's Duty.* (1) The Day's Duty list for Staff Duty Officers is prepared on the basis that the sequence will not be interrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea. Nor is it to be interrupted by absence on duty, illness or leave.

(2) Staff Duty Officers are "Relief Officers" in inverse order of seniority. A Relief Duty List is posted in the Staff Duty Book. When an officer stands a relief duty watch, he will inform the senior watch officer. The next officer on the list then becomes the "Relief Duty Officer."

(3) For extended periods of leave, greater than 10 days the Relief Duty Officer will take the duty for the officer scheduled for the Day's Duty. For shorter periods of leave, officers are expected to arrange for their own reliefs by agreeable shifts with other Staff Duty Officers. In every case, inform the Senior Staff Duty Officer of the arrangements made.

#### SEA WATCHES

(k) An officer of the Staff shall be on the bridge at all times when the Fleet flagship is underway in company with vessels of the Fleet acting as a unit.

(l) He is the representative of the Commander-in-Chief on the bridge and bears the same relation to him that the Officer-of-the-Deck bears to the Captain of the ship. He shall keep himself informed of the location of all units and ships in

whatever disposition or formation the Fleet is at the time; whatever land or lights are in sight; whether either are likely to be seen; and of all other particulars which may be of use to the Commander-in-Chief in keeping the ships of the formation out of danger.

(l) In case of emergency, when neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Chief of Staff is on the bridge, he shall make such signals as are required by the circumstances, reporting his action immediately to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and the Operations Officer. **ACT FIRST, REPORT AFTERWARDS.** Under all other conditions the formation shall not be maneuvered without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, under these latter conditions, the Staff Duty Officer shall report the circumstances to the Operations Officer. Also, he shall call the Flag Lieutenant and Operations Officer to the bridge at once if immediate action is required—otherwise those officers shall be informed of the time when their presence on the flag bridge will be required and the reasons therefor.

(m) He shall promptly report to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Chief of Staff, all land, shoals, rocks, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, discolored water, vessels, or wrecks sighted; all changes of weather or shifts of wind; all signals made; all changes in speed, formation, disposition, or course; in general, all occurrences worthy of notice.

(n) He shall handle all dispatches which in port are routed to the Officer having the day's Staff duty.

(o) When the Flag Lieutenant is on the Bridge he will handle all tactical signals, relieving the Staff Duty Officer of this function of his usual duties.

(p) *Record of events.*—A Record of Events during the watch will be kept by the Staff Officer on watch assisted by a duty yeoman. This record will include items of importance, movements, major and minor contacts with the enemy, aerial and submarine activity, weather information, etc. **THE RECORD OF EVENTS** will be typed in quadruplicate, signed by the Officer on watch and handled as follows: Original to be placed in a file folder in Flag Plot. (This folder will be kept in Flag Plot until the completion of the exercise, when it shall be turned over to the file yeoman by the yeoman securing the watch). At 0800 each day the three copies of the **RECORD OF EVENTS** covering the watches of the preceding 24 hours shall be turned over to the **Flag Office** for the following distribution: one copy to the Admiral, one copy to the Chief of Staff, and one copy to the Operations Officer.)

(q) When necessary to make a signal to change course or speed to avoid a vessel or unit having the right of way, make such changes great enough, and execute the signal soon enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the other officers of the deck as to your intentions. Avoid crossing ahead of vessels or units having the right of way.

(r) When fog closes in:

(1) Order bridge radios manned if not already in effect.

(2) Order fog buoys streamed.

(3) Order fog searchlights manned.

(4) Comply with Fleet Communication letter—2RL-41 summarized briefly as follows:

(a) Take soundings at short intervals to ensure safety of the formation.

(b) Designate a ship to: At least half-hourly or oftener; obtain bearings from shore radio direction finder stations, and radio bearings of ships in company.

(c) Plot all bearings and soundings on a chart. This ensures safety.

(d) Establish a transmitting and receiving watch, (on distress frequency).

(e) Provided Radio, restrictions so permit broadcast in plain language followed by International Code: visibility conditions, names of ships in company, position, and time of origin GCT. If other ships reply to this safety transmission shift to 422 kcs. and exchange information.

227. The night order book is written by the Commander-in-Chief for guidance of officers having night watches. Each officer having a night watch shall initial the book after reading the orders, and before relieving the watch. The night order book is prepared by the Fleet Navigator (12).

228. Nothing herein is intended to contravene existing regulations or to preclude taking such additional precautions as may seem desirable.



## SECTION III. BATTLE STATIONS

300. The Combat Organization of the Staff is covered in a separate confidential issue of this section. It is distributed to the flagship and flag personnel only.

## SECTION IV. FLAG OFFICE PERSONNEL AND GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

401. The authorized Flag Allowance of yeomen is:

|                       |    |
|-----------------------|----|
| Chief Yeoman.....     | 3  |
| Yeoman 1st class..... | 4  |
| Yeoman 2nd class..... | 5  |
| Yeoman 3rd class..... | 6  |
| Total.....            | 18 |

Yeoman on board are assigned in general as follows:

- 1 Yeoman—In general charge.
- 1 Yeoman—Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Lieutenant.
- 1 Yeoman—Flag Secretary and Division Officer.
- 3 Yeomen—Operations and Assistant Operations Officers.
- 2 Yeomen—War Plans Officers.
- 2 Yeomen—Communication, Radio, and Comm. Security Officers.
- 1 Yeoman—Intelligence Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Aviation Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Gunnery Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Engineer and Maintenance Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Aerological Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Files and Correspondence Classification.
- 1 Yeoman—Outgoing Mail Desk.
- 1 Yeoman—Communication Office.

These assignments will be augmented by yeoman strikers. Yeoman strikers will also be assigned to other Flag Office details, such as incoming mail, File Section, Tracer desk, etc.

402. Assignment of yeomen will necessarily depend largely on their individual aptitude for certain duties, and their availability. One Pharmacist's Mate is included in the Flag Allowance and is assigned to the Fleet Medical Officer. One Marine Sergeant Major is assigned to the Marine Officer.

403. Whenever an officer finds that he requires additional clerical assistance, he will apply to the Flag Secretary. Additional clerical assistance can in this way be secured with a minimum of delay and without interfering with the routine of the office.

404. The Chief Yeoman in charge has general supervision of the Flag Office and personnel under the Flag Secretary, who is in direct charge of the offices of the Commander-in-Chief. The Chief Yeoman in Charge is responsible for the cleanliness of the offices and storerooms, for the carrying out of the office instructions, for the conduct and proper performance of duty by the enlisted personnel and for regulating watch lists, liberty and leave in accordance with existing instructions and orders. He will supervise the drawing of office supplies against the flag allotment, issuing of stationery, etc., and exercise care that expenditures are kept within requirements.

405. *Routine Duty.* (a) Routine hours of duty in flag offices and print shop are as follows:

|                    |              |
|--------------------|--------------|
| Daily.....         | 0800 to 1600 |
| Half Holidays..... | 0800 to 1130 |

(b) *Handling of work outside regular office hours.* Routine work outside of regular office hours will be handled by the yeoman of the officer desiring such work done, when that yeoman is on board, otherwise by the duty section. There is always a duty printer on board who sleeps in the print shop.

(c) No uncompleted work shall be stowed away in office desk drawers, but shall be kept above the desks in labeled baskets or envelopes, and available to the staff officers concerned, or to the duty section, if required.

406. *Handling of mail upon arrival in port.* The taking up and distribution of mail upon arrival in port will, without exception, be an "all hands" job. All yeomen will prepare routing sheets and assist in clearing up all mail received. No liberty will be granted on arrival in port until such mail has been received, routed and distributed to the cabinets of the officers concerned.

**407. Liberty and Leave.** (a) Liberty and leave for the flag office personnel will be regulated to conform, as closely as work will permit, to that of the flagship. Subject to the approval of the officers for whom the yeomen work, after routine working hours, or Saturdays after 1130, Wednesday afternoons, Sundays and holidays, will be considered routine liberty periods. Liberty cards are issued under the supervision of the Division Officer for all flag personnel.

(b) All requests for other than regular liberty shall first be referred to the officer for whom the yeoman works, the Flag Division Officer and to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for designation of relief if required, then to the Flag Secretary for approval or disapproval. If the request is one for leave and is approved by the Flag Secretary as Head of Department, it will then be sent to the Executive Officer for issuance of formal leave papers.

**408. Cleanliness of Offices.** (a) The cleanliness of flag offices and storerooms will be under the supervision of the Chief Yeoman in Charge. Each yeoman will be required to keep his own desk neat and clean, as well as the desk of the officer for whom he works. Offices will be cleaned daily, prior to 0800, and a field day shall be held between 1200 and 1300 each Friday.

(b) Flag offices, shops, storerooms and other spaces will be included in the commanding officer's inspection of adjacent ship spaces. Personnel in charge of offices, shops, storerooms and other flag spaces shall have their spaces open and ready and shall stand by for inspection at the times designated in the daily schedule issued by the flagship. Yeomen shall have the drawers of their desks neatly stowed and ready for removal should they be directed to do so by the inspecting officers.

**409. Flag Office Duty Section.** (a) The Flag Office personnel will be divided into duty sections of not less than three men, one of whom shall be a competent stenographer. Duty changes at 0900 daily, Sundays excepted. The Duty Section will function in the Flag Office during the following hours:

|                     |              |
|---------------------|--------------|
| Daily-----          | 0730 to 0815 |
|                     | 1130 to 1300 |
|                     | 1600 to 2200 |
| Half Holidays-----  | 0730 to 0815 |
|                     | 1130 to 2200 |
| Whole Holidays----- | 0730 to 2200 |

(b) The duty section will handle all emergency work outside of regular working hours and if the Outgoing Mail Yeoman is not on board, will mail all signed outgoing correspondence. The entire duty section will remain in the flag offices during the hours specified in subparagraph (a) except:

(1) Only one rated man need remain in the flag office during mealtimes.

(2) When the press of work permits and when in the discretion of the senior duty yeoman their services are not immediately required, members of the duty section may be allowed to attend the evening movies on deck, subject to call; however, one rated member of the duty section shall remain in the flag office during the authorized absence of the rest to attend the movies. From time to time, if the Staff Duty Officer grants permission to do so, the offices may be locked and keys turned over to him, during movies, smokers, etc.

(3) When the Flag is based temporarily ashore, the Duty Section will maintain a continuous one-man security watch in the Flag Office during the following hours:

|                    |              |
|--------------------|--------------|
| Daily-----         | 1600 to 0800 |
| Half-holidays----- | 1200 to 0800 |
| Holidays-----      | 0800 to 0800 |

This watch will be armed, the primary duty of which is to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the Fleet War Plans Offices and all other Flag Offices of the Commander-in-Chief. This Security Watch will normally be sufficient to remain in the Flag Office after working hours. The entire Duty Section is available for call by the Staff Duty Officer at any time.

(c) **Handling of mail and correspondence.** Before going on liberty the incoming and outgoing mail yeomen will inform the senior duty yeoman of any special instructions, who in turn will inform his section. Special instructions may be:—To watch for special correspondence expected in the incoming mail—to see that certain U. S. or guard mail is dispatched. File numbers will not be entered on incoming mail by the duty section unless the correspondence is of an urgent

nature, in which case a file number will be entered on the routing sheet and file yeoman notified when he returns from liberty. Incoming correspondence shall be made ready for the examination of the Staff Duty Officer with minimum delay and report shall be made to him that it is ready for his examination. *On board ship*, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential and other important correspondence from the Staff Officers' rooms and retain such correspondence in the Flag Office overnight, distributing it immediately after 0800 the following working day. *In offices ashore*, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential correspondence from the desks of the Staff officers and deposit it in the locked cabinet provided for this purpose. Just prior to 0800 the next working day, the correspondence shall be returned to the respective officers' desks.

(d) *Security of Flag Offices.* The duty section will stand watch in the main flag office. The offices will be secured promptly at 2200 and keys turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. If, for any urgent reason, it is desired to keep offices open after 2200, permission should be requested from the Staff Duty Officer. Flag offices shall never be left unguarded. Outside regular working hours a constant check should be kept on the Staff offices, operations office, and file room to see that it is either occupied by staff personnel, or locked. If it is necessary for everyone to leave flag offices on duty, the last person to leave will lock offices and take keys with him, posting a note on main flag office door as to who has keys. Offices should be reopened as soon as possible.

(e) *Visitors to flag offices.* No general visitors will be permitted. Other than flag personnel admitted by senior duty yeoman, only officers and men on duty, or persons accompanied by staff duty officer, will be permitted in the flag offices outside of working hours.

(f) *Waste paper baskets in Cabins and Staterooms.* Waste paper baskets in Admiral's Cabin, Chief of Staff's Cabin and Staff officers' staterooms will be emptied and the contents burned, or stowed in flag office pending burning, at the following times:

|                              |      |
|------------------------------|------|
| Regular working days.....    | 1500 |
| Half and Whole Holidays..... | 1115 |

410. *Security of Classified Matter.* All personnel of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief whose duties require handling of classified matter, shall acquaint themselves with the Navy Regulations and other instructions pertaining to the security of classified matter.

(a) *Offices, Print Shop, Multilith Shop, Flag Plot Officers' Staterooms.* Flag personnel are responsible that classified matter under staff routing, or in spaces in which flag activities are paramount, is constantly attended. *Attended, as employed herein, signifies that the matter is receiving care while being used, or that it is under surveillance with respect to possible pilferage or perusal by unauthorized persons, or that it is under lock.*

(b) *Trash and waste.* Will be removed from flag activities and burned at times specified in subparagraph 409 (f). Should the incinerator be secured, or out of commission, such rubbish will be returned to flag offices, flag plot, print or multilith shops for retention awaiting suitable opportunity for its burning. The Senior Duty Yeoman will personally supervise collection and burning as set out in 409 (f). However, during routine hours of duty (see Article 405), this may be done by a rated yeoman designated by the Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(c) *Keys.* The key to the flag storerooms, the keys to the flag offices and mimeograph shop, and duplicate keys to the print shop and multilith shop are in the custody of the Flag Secretary. The Chief Printer and the Duty Printer will each retain a key to the print shop, and the Multilith Printer will retain a key to the multilith shop. Keys to the Flag Office files will be in the custody of the Flag Secretary, Gunnery Yeoman, File Yeoman, or Duty Yeoman. At the end of working hours, whenever classified matter is being produced in the print shop or multilith shop, the keys to the print shop galley racks and stowage locker will be placed in the main flag office key locker. During office hours the key to the flag offices will be in the main flag office. When offices are secured for the night, the keys to confidential files will be placed in the main flag office key locker and the keys to the flag offices turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. Except as herein specified, personnel are forbidden to have duplicate keys to flag offices and print shop spaces in their possession.

(d) *Files, Lockers, Storerooms.* Access to the flag storeroom by other than

regularly authorized personnel may be had upon application to the Flag Secretary. In all cases when a confidential file jacket is to be removed from the flag offices, a receipt will be required from the recipient.

(e) Nonconfidential file jackets should be obtained from the File Yeoman or in his absence from the duty yeoman. If the file jacket is to be removed from the flag office, a receipt will be signed by the recipient.

(f) Classified matter may be removed from the Print Shop only at the instance of the officer for whom the work is being done, or an officer of the Staff. Classified matter will not be allowed to remain in the multilith shop overnight, but will be stowed under lock in the print shop stowage locker.

#### SECTION V. HANDLING OF CORRESPONDENCE

501. (a) *Incoming Mail*, is delivered to the Incoming Mail Desk.

(b) Upon receipt of Registered U. S. Mail in the Main Flag Office, it shall be taken immediately to the Secret Mail Officer or the Chief Yeoman designated as Secret Mail Yeoman. In their absence the mail shall be taken to the Duty Communication Watch Officer who shall open it and extract the envelopes marked "SECRET". A receipt for the envelopes so retained shall, in all cases, be obtained on the "Incoming Registered Guard Mail Log". The envelopes marked "CONFIDENTIAL" shall be returned to the Flag Duty Yeoman. All "SECRET" mail received by the C. W. O. shall be logged in the book provided for that purpose, and then taken to the Staff Duty Officer who shall open it in order to determine its urgency. If the Staff Duty Officer retains any of the Secret Mail his receipt therefor shall be obtained. All Secret Mail shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer at the first opportunity.

(c) Incoming *personal* mail for the Commander-in-Chief will be delivered to his orderly and placed on his desk. If Admiral is not on board, it will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and will be delivered upon the Admiral's return to the ship.

(d) Incoming personal mail for other staff officers will be delivered by a Flag Office messenger immediately upon its receipt in the Flag Office. In the absence of any Staff Officer his personal mail will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and delivered to him upon his return to the ship.

502. *Urgent Correspondence*. When URGENT correspondence is received on board, routing sheets shall be prepared immediately, an URGENT tag securely attached to and visible on the routing sheet, and correspondence delivered by hand to the Flag Secretary, or in his absence, to the Staff Duty Officer. Such correspondence shall be shown to Action Officer and a copy delivered to him if desired, prior to routing to other officers. If a copy is delivered to Action Officer, a notation of this fact will be made on routing sheet. If file yeomen are not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be assigned a file number by the Duty Yeoman and handled as indicated above. No correspondence, or other papers, shall be kept visible as the top paper on the correspondence. If correspondence or other papers are of an urgent nature and no URGENT tag accompanies it, the officer concerned shall indicate to this yeoman that the matter is urgent and the latter shall then attach an URGENT tag.

503. *Routine Correspondence*.

(a) *Incoming Mail Yeoman*. Opens all incoming mail immediately upon its receipt, except U. S. registered mail, which is handled in accordance with subparagraph 501 (b), above. (See Section VI for method of handling registered U. S. mail by receiving officers.)

Logs the envelope number and descriptive data of all correspondence received via registered guard mail and U. S. Mail.

Carefully checks all incoming mail to insure that it is complete and the listed enclosures are attached, or in case enclosures have been forwarded under separate cover keeps a memorandum check-off record of such enclosures so that they can be readily identified and properly distributed upon receipt.

Passes correspondence to File Yeoman and then, after File Yeoman has assigned office file numbers, prepares routing slips for all matter received except certain routine reports designated by the Flag Secretary, and MAILGRAMS. MAILGRAMS received by registered mail are logged and then sent to the Flag Communication office without being taken up on routing slips.

After routing slips have been typed, detaches memorandum routing slip and delivers mail to Chief Mail Yeoman in Charge. From data shown on the retained memorandum routing slips, maintains the Incoming Mail Log in loose-leaf form.

This log shall be a permanent record of all correspondence received and will show:

- Date of receipt.
- Office of origin.
- File and serial number of office of origin.
- Date of correspondence.
- Subject.
- Circus file number of jacket in which permanently filed.
- Serial number of routing slip on which correspondence has been taken up.
- (b) *File Yeoman*. Assigns file numbers. (See Article 505.)
- (c) *Chief Yeoman in Charge*. Routes correspondence.
- (d) *Flag Secretary*. Confirms routing of correspondence, or changes routing where required.
- (e) *Tracer Yeoman*. Removes routed correspondence from the outgoing basket of the Flag Secretary, detaches duplicate routing sheet, stamps date of delivery to first officer indicated in order of routing and delivers the correspondence, (except URGENT—see Article 502), through routing cabinet to officers concerned in accordance with the assigned order of routing.
- Files duplicate routing sheet as a tracer against outstanding correspondence in the office.
- (f) *Yeoman Concerned*. Takes cognizance of and removes all correspondence from routing boxes of officers for whom he works and delivers to officers as directed.

When the officer for whom he works is absent, he will return the correspondence checked to that officer for information, to the Tracer Yeoman, to be checked to the next officer in the order of routing, and deliver Action correspondence to the assigned relief officer.

(g) *Officer Concerned*. In general, papers will pass from one officer to another via Tracer Yeoman as indicated on the routing sheet.

Correspondence requiring action will be routed first, if the Flag Secretary deems it necessary, to the Action Officer, the latter being responsible that other interested officers are consulted before letter or endorsement is prepared.

Correspondence routed for information should not be placed in the routing cabinet for an officer temporarily absent until it has been noted by all other officers checked for information.

Ordinarily, when necessary data is available, action should be completed on correspondence within forty-eight hours after receipt.

Any officer desiring to hold correspondence, in order to compile data, reports, etc., should return the correspondence to the files and draw it from the files when needed.

A list will be furnished each officer on Tuesday showing all correspondence which the records of the Flag Office indicate has been in his possession since the preceding Tuesday. Officers indicated as being charged with the correspondence should check this list and mark in the column provided the items which they have in their possession.

(h) *Yeoman Concerned*. Prepares outgoing letter or endorsement as directed (See Article 504).

Keeps outgoing basket of officer for whom he works empty—delivering routed correspondence on which action is required or taken to Tracer Yeoman.

Insures that officer concerned has initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet and that notation is made when action is taken by a method other than a letter or endorsement.

(i) *Tracer Yeoman*. Delivers through the routing cabinet, correspondence on which routing is incomplete.

Scrutinizes all correspondence on which routing is complete to see that no correspondence requiring action goes to file and that officers concerned have initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet.

The correspondence to be finally cleared by the Tracer Yeoman falls into three classes:

(1) Incoming letters on which no action is required, or on which dispatch action was taken and so noted on the original routing slip.

(2) Incoming letters which were endorsed or are the basis for additional correspondence.

(3) Letters originated by the Commander-in-Chief with no incoming correspondence attached.

When correspondence described by (1) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip, initial in the space pro-

vided on the original routing slip under "Tracer," and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman. However, if there is a cross file, the duplicate routing slip shall not be destroyed but will be attached to the correspondence for filing.

When correspondence described by (2) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip (unless it has a cross file number) initial in the upper right-hand corner of the file copy of the Commander-in-Chief's action, and on the original routing slip, and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman.

**504. Outgoing Mail.**

(a) *General.*—Dates and serial numbers will be stamped by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman after the letter is actually signed. The original sheet of correspondence of a personal nature shall not bear a file or serial number. The originator's yeoman shall address envelopes for this class of correspondence.

The use of staples in fastening correspondence should be limited to printed or mimeographed letters of two or more pages. Staples shall then be used in the upper left hand corner.

Letterhead paper shall be used for the original sheet and all copies of correspondence.

(b) Correspondence for signature shall be prepared and assembled as follows:

(1) Sheets shall be arranged in numerical order from bottom to top, i. e., page one on the bottom, last page or endorsement on top. Enclosures to the entire correspondence shall be in alphabetical sequence, fastened directly behind the letter or endorsement to which it is an enclosure and securely fastened by brass fasteners, with ends turned over the face of the sheet. When enclosures are too bulky to be attached, then a separate slip with notation should indicate that the enclosures have been temporarily retained by the originator.

(2) In preparing endorsements, reference should be made to the basic correspondence as prescribed by Fleet Regulations.

(3) In preparing a letter, the original shall: Indicate the distribution, acknowledgement (if desired), signature, and obtain file number from file yeoman or, in the case of a reply, assign same file number as has been placed on the routing sheet of the incoming letter plus the originator's symbol number.

Ascertain that there is a:

(A) Green file copy (pinned on top of a complete copy of the incoming correspondence with the routing sheet on the bottom.)

(B) Yellow information copy. The day following the mailing of correspondence, information copies shall be bound and routed to all officers. After completion of routing, these copies shall be destroyed.

(C) Pink Copy. This is retained by the tracer yeoman until the correspondence is signed, after which it is sent to the outgoing mail desk and subsequently returned to the originator bearing the date and serial number.

(4) The original and all copies shall show in the upper right-hand corner the initials of the yeoman typing the letter and the originator's symbol number immediately following the file number.

(5) Correspondence shall be clipped together with paper clips in the following order: Original and copies for information addresses; file copy (green); information copy (yellow); pink copy. The green copy shall extend at least an inch to the right side of the correspondence to permit the initials of the originator (indicated by red diagonal mark) as well as other interested officers (indicated by pencil diagonal mark).

(c) *Correspondence to be printed.* Four copies shall be typed, original on green paper, copy on white bond for the printer, one yellow information copy and one pink copy. The word "PRINT" shall be typed on the left side of the last page, opposite the signature, and immediately over the word "DISTRIBUTION." When the green copy (original) has been signed, it will pass through the outgoing mail desk to be numbered and dated, and for the preparation of a printing order.

(d) *Correspondence to be mimeographed.* In order to reduce the amount of typing required for letters that will be mimeographed, the yeoman doing the typing will insert a green sheet provided for this purpose under the stencil when cutting the latter. When this impression copy has been signed by the Admiral or Chief of Staff, the Flag Secretary affixes his authentication, using a stencil stylus, and the stencil and impression copy are then delivered to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman for entry of date and serial number, mimeographing, (done by the Mimeograph Yeoman), and ultimate mailing. (Article 504 (j) (10)).

(e) *Multiple Address Letters.* Multiple address letters are those addressed to more than one office. The original of the multiple address letter shall be

made on green paper, and one onion skin copy shall be made for each addressee. These onion skin copies shall be checked off by the yeoman preparing the correspondence, an arrow check being placed immediately after the office addressed. All action copies of multiple address letters shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary. The original (green), arranged in the manner prescribed in Art. 504 (b) (5), will be signed by the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff and is kept as the file copy.

(f) When a letter is required to be rewritten, the pink copy shall be removed from the file on the tracer desk and all copies of the letter as originally prepared shall be immediately destroyed except the one copy on which corrections have been indicated. This copy shall be attached to the pink copy of the letter as rewritten and will be returned with the pink copy to the yeoman of the officer taking action. With the exception of recommendations on a subject made by various staff officers, these instructions shall also apply to rough drafts of letters or endorsements. Copies of letters on which corrections have been made and rough drafts of letters or endorsements shall not be filed in the correspondence files unless retention in the file is indicated.

(g) Letters that have not been signed should be returned to the tracer yeoman in order that the latter may inform the originator accordingly, meanwhile returning to him the pink copy.

(h) When correspondence is signed by other than the Commander-in-Chief, the following words shall be typed immediately below the name of the officer signing:

| SIGNED BY                                                                       | SIGNATURE | Typewritten                                         |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Chief of Staff                                                                  | —         | NAME<br>Chief of Staff                              |
| Operations Officer when Chief of Staff is absent                                | —         | NAME<br>Acting Chief of Staff                       |
| Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (Authentication of multiple address letters). | —         | NAME<br>Flag Secretary      NAME<br>Flag Lieutenant |
| Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (for single address letters).                 | —         | NAME<br>by direction                                |

(i) When information addressees are directed to take action by copy of letters or endorsements, such copy shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary.

(j) When correspondence is ready for signature the following procedure shall be followed:

(1) Deliver to Tracer Yeoman.

(2) *Tracer Yeoman.* Uses the pink copy for tracing correspondence circulating through the staff for initialing. When correspondence is initialed by all officers except Flag Secretary and Chief of Staff, delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(3) *Chief Yeoman in Charge.* Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

(4) *Flag Secretary.* Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and that it is in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

Brings to the attention of officers concerned any conflicting or inconsistent orders or instructions.

Authenticates all multiple address letters, and copies of letters or endorsements directing action. Signs single address letters.

Releases printed and mimeographed letters for mailing.

(5) *Tracer Yeoman.* Removes correspondence from the outgoing basket of Flag Secretary.

Delivers correspondence signed "By direction" to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pink.

Places unsigned correspondence in the Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet and indicates by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed in Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet for signature or initialing.

(6) *Chief of Staff's Orderly or Yeoman.* Removes correspondence from Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet, and delivers to Chief of Staff for initials or signature.

Removes correspondence from outgoing basket of Chief of Staff and delivers to Tracer Desk.

(7) *Tracer Yeoman.* When correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff, places it in Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet, indicating by

notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed on Commander-in-Chief's box for signature. Delivers mail signed by the Chief of Staff to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pinks.

(8) *Flag Secretary*. Removes correspondence from the Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet. Sees that all correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff and delivers to the Commander-in-Chief for signature.

(9) *Tracer Yeoman*. When correspondence has been signed by the Commander-in-Chief removes pink copies from tracer file, and attaches same to the letters to which they belong; delivers them to Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

Makes daily check on pink copies where letters are outstanding.

(10) *Outgoing Mail Yeoman*. Insures that correspondence is complete; enclosures, if any, attached; properly arranged (See Art. 504 (b)); initialed by Flag Secretary; signed; that there are sufficient copies for all action and information addressees; that each copy of CONFIDENTIAL correspondence is so marked; that information and pink copies have been prepared where necessary.

Returns correspondence which is found to be delinquent in any of the above respects to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for corrective action.

Stamps serial number (except on personal letters) and date on original and all copies; stamps date of mailing on file information and pink copies, and initials file copy.

Provides for the registry of all records of proceedings of Naval Courts and Boards, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL correspondence and other correspondence as directed. Maintains a record of all registry numbers and records the serial file number or other description of the correspondence for which each register number is used.

Is responsible for the correct addressing of envelopes for all mail passing over the Outgoing Mail Desk and for its being placed in the mail properly protected to insure its delivery free from damage by normal handling. In connection with the former, he shall keep himself informed of the location and prospective movements of all ships and transfers of all Flags.

Requests instructions from Flag Secretary regarding mailing of multiple addressed letters, operation orders, plans, etc., to Commanders who are absent when several of the vessels under their command are present with the Commander-in-Chief.

Under the direction of Flag Secretary determines the distribution and number of copies necessary to be printed or mimeographed using "U. S. Fleet Mail Distribution Lists" or such other distribution as may be assigned. Prepares Distribution Memorandum on Printing Orders.

Prepares Printing Order and forwards with White copy of the letter to be printed to print shop. The print shop shall send the Printing Order with each proof to the yeoman designated to proof-read it. This yeoman shall initial in the space provided for each proof and when correct in all respects and considered ready for printing the yeoman shall refer the final proof and the printing order to the originating officer, who shall, if he approves for printing, initial on the Printing Order in the space "Read and found correct". The Flag Secretary will release all letters for printing and distribution. The green (file copy) is held by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman until the letter is printed and mailed, when it is given to the Tracer Yeoman for necessary action. Yellow and pink copies, are handled in the same manner as for other outgoing correspondence. The date sent to the print shop, instead of the date of mailing will appear on the file copy. When distribution is made and entered in the outgoing mail log, a printed copy with original "Printing Order" securely attached thereto, shall be sent to file.

**NOTE:** The Mimeograph Yeoman will mimeograph the required number of copies shown on the Distribution Memorandum.

A copy of each mimeographed letter originating in the office of the Commander-in-Chief will be marked "INFORMATION COPY", and will be handled in the same manner as other "Information" copies.

When the Distribution Memorandum is released for mailing by the Flag Secretary, the Outgoing Mail Yeoman mails the printed or mimeographed letter and furnishes the Tracer Yeoman with the necessary copies for a Staff Distribution; stamps date of mailing and initials on the Distribution Memorandum; sends file copy to the Tracer Yeoman with the Distribution Memorandum securely attached thereto.

Assigns and maintains a record of serial numbers, in their proper numerical sequence, of Operation Plans, Operation Orders, U. S. and Pacific Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc.



Insures that when required, URGENT tags are securely attached to the correspondence, and to the outside envelope. (See Article 502).

Removes any SPECIAL NOTICE tags before mailing.

Handles all guard mail, incoming and outgoing, and will promptly inform Flag Secretary of any variation from the scheduled trips called for by Fleet Regulations. Logs registered number, originator and addressee of all incoming registered guard mail. Delivers incoming mail to Incoming mail Yeoman, and has outgoing mail ready for Guard Mail Petty Officers at the designated times. When the ship is at the Navy Yard, is responsible that necessary guard mail trips are made to the Commandant's Office.

At the end of each day, checks numerical sequence and enters in the outgoing mail log, loose leaf form, all correspondence mailed that day. This log shall be a permanent record of correspondence mailed and will show:

- (1) Serial number of letter.
- (2) Cincpac file number of jacket in which filed.
- (3) To whom sent.
- (4) Date of letter.
- (5) Subject.

The above data shall also be entered for all mimeographed and printed letters dated and serialled that day, even though they are not mailed on that day. A note "Mailed on \_\_\_\_\_" shall be made in "Subject" column of log and the date of mailing inserted on the date the mimeographed or printed letter is mailed.

Confidential and Secret correspondence will be so designated in the log and, in the case of secret correspondence, the subject will not be entered.

When correspondence has been entered in the log, gives file copies to Tracer Yeoman, pink copies to the yeoman of the officer taking action as indicated by the officer's number (not the initials of the yeoman).

Arranges yellow information copies in numerical sequence and prepares routing sheets next morning and delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(11) *Tracer Yeoman.* Takes appropriate action being governed by the preceding provisions of this Article.

(12) *File Yeoman.* Handles correspondence as directed in Article 506-1.

**505. FILE NUMBERS.** The file yeoman will assign file numbers to all correspondence. If the File Yeoman is not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be handled as directed in Article 502. In assigning file numbers to correspondence, the File Yeoman shall use the U. S. Navy Filing Manual as the basis for filing arrangement. Correct file numbers are essential in order to locate correspondence readily. A new jacket shall be prepared for each new number so assigned.

**506.** In addition to the standard file numbers assigned to outgoing correspondence, the originator's symbol number and a serial number will be used. The originator's symbol number shall be placed after the file number and enclosed in parenthesis. The serial number will appear after the word "Serial" and will not be in parenthesis. New serial numbers will be started on each January 1st, and will run throughout the calendar year. The first figure of all CONFIDENTIAL serial numbers shall be a "0".

**506-1.** The File Yeoman shall:

Scrutinize correspondence to see that none goes to file unless complete action has been taken; that routing sheet has been initialed by all officers and the Tracer Yeoman and that original routing sheet is attached to correspondence.

Prepare correspondence for file, retain spare copies in the spare copy file when action is so indicated on routing sheet.

File correspondence. CONFIDENTIAL correspondence must actually be placed in the jackets by the File Yeoman himself. He may utilize his assistants for filing correspondence of a lower classification.

Check off, in colored pencil, all entries in the incoming and outgoing mail logs to see that all mail received and originated has been checked to file. Undue delays shall be reported after check has been made with the Tracer Yeoman.

Keep an up-to-date Index of the files.

Cooperate with the Tracer Yeoman in preparing the Weekly List of Outstanding Correspondence.

**507.** Where correspondence treats of more than one subject, it shall be filed under the principal subject, and cross-index tracers prepared and filed under the other subjects treated or referred to. Cross-index tracers shall be printed on white paper.

**508.** Yeomen preparing correspondence shall type the file number appearing on the routing sheet, the symbol number of the originator in parenthesis and

the word "Serial" below the file number after which the serial number will be entered by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

**500. FILING OF PRINTED MATTER.** Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc., must be kept in an unbroken serial titled "file for ready reference" in addition to being placed in the subject file jacket. Care must be taken to make cross-index files complete and to make sure that signed copy is filed.

None of the above matter will be removed from the files merely because it has been cancelled or superseded, but a notation to this effect shall be made on the file copy showing reference numbers of the dispatch or letter cancelling and superseding it. Extra copies held for issue will, however be destroyed. Whenever the number of spare copies of a particular publication is low, or a request for spare copies is large, the requests will be referred to the Flag Secretary. Normally requests from ships should be handled by Type commanders.

**510. WEEKLY CHECK OF OUTSTANDING CORRESPONDENCE.** On Tuesdays of each week a sight check will be made by the Tracer Yeoman of all outstanding correspondence that records indicate has been in the possession of an officer since the preceding Tuesday, and a list prepared for each such officer showing correspondence thus outstanding. The duplicate routing sheet will be used as a "tickler" tracer for checking outstanding letters in the office. A notation will be made on the outstanding correspondence sheet showing the date the check was made and the officer who acknowledges having each piece of correspondence in his possession on that date.

**511.** If, after making a thorough canvass of the offices, no trace can be found of a letter that has not moved in its routing from one officer to another within the past week, the outstanding correspondence sheet will be delivered to the Flag Secretary with a report of the search.

**512.** Lists of outstanding correspondence checked to the Admiral and Chief of Staff will be delivered to the Flag Secretary.

#### SECTION VI.—CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET CORRESPONDENCE

**601.** Confidential mail shall be handled in accordance with Article 410 and the following:

(a) All correspondence classified as **CONFIDENTIAL** will have the word "**CONFIDENTIAL**" stamped and typed, or printed in the upper left-hand corner, under file number, of each sheet.

(b) All routing sheets for confidential correspondence shall be printed on blue paper and are plainly marked "**CONFIDENTIAL**".

(c) All confidential correspondence will be filed in separate filing cases known as "the **CONFIDENTIAL** files".

(d) All confidential correspondence placed in U. S. or Guard Mail will be placed in double envelopes with the inner envelope stamped "**CONFIDENTIAL**". Confidential correspondence forwarded by U. S. Mail or Guard Mail must be registered.

**602. SECRET** correspondence shall be handled in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) *Storage and Handling.* (1) **SECRET** correspondence files shall be kept in a safe under the immediate supervision of the Secret Mail Officer; except correspondence regarding War Plans which may be retained by the War Plans Officer, and that concerning Communication Intelligence which may be retained by the Fleet Security Officer.

(2) The yeomen assigned to the War Plans Officer and the Secret Mail Yeoman are authorized to handle secret correspondence. Secret correspondence shall not be typed or handled by any enlisted personnel other than the yeoman who have been so authorized. Secret correspondence must not be permitted to pass out of the personal custody of staff officers at any time.

(b) *Incoming Mail.* (1) The Secret Mail Officer, or in his absence, his authorized relief, the duty communication officer, will receive all incoming Officer Messenger Mail, and show same to the Flag Secretary or in the latter's absence to the Staff Duty Officer.

(2) Incoming mail marked **SECRET** will be handled by the Secret Mail Officer subject to instructions by the Flag Secretary.

(3) The Secret Mail Yeoman, under the supervision of the Secret Mail Officer, shall log all incoming **SECRET** correspondence, attach secret routing slips, and deliver to the Flag Secretary for routing.

(4) The Secret Mail Officer or the Secret Mail Yeoman shall deliver the **SECRET** correspondence to the staff officers concerned. Receipts shall be obtained for all

SECRET correspondence left in the custody of officers. Officers not having authorized secret stowage shall not retain correspondence overnight.

(c) **Outgoing Mail.** (1) An officer desiring to originate a SECRET letter shall prepare a rough draft in long hand or dictate the letter to a yeoman authorized to handle secret correspondence. The letter shall be typed and delivered by personnel authorized to handle secret documents to staff officers concerned for initialling and signature.

(2) The file copy of outgoing secret correspondence prepared by the War Plans Officer may be retained in his files. In such cases a copy of the letter shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer for filing in the secret correspondence files.

(3) SECRET correspondence will be forwarded in accordance with Article 76(4), U. S. Navy Regulations.

(4) Outgoing SECRET mail will be marked with an identification number of five figures preceded by CINCPAC or CINCUS as appropriate. Franked cards bearing a return receipt shall be enclosed with each letter and will indicate the identity of the letter by both the serial and shipment numbers.

#### SECTION VII. LIBRARIES

701. Every effort will be made to maintain an office library of official publications required for reference by members of the Staff. Officers are requested to advise the Flag Secretary of publications they desire to have ordered.

The office library consists of various books and pamphlets such as:—Annual Reports, Regulations, Bureau Manuals, Registers, Directories and miscellaneous publications. The library will be added to as publications are received from time to time. Any publications carried in the library which have become obsolete will be submitted to the Flag Secretary, who will issue the necessary instructions as to their disposition.

Each publication is listed and assigned a serial number, and filed according to that number.

The File Yeoman will be responsible for the proper classification and filing of the library.

702. The Commander-in-Chief's Library is maintained under the supervision of the Fleet Public Relations Officer. It consists principally of non-fiction although some works of fiction may be included. The books are kept in book cases in the Admiral's and guest cabins and elsewhere as necessary. The Fleet Public Relations Officer will publish to the staff a list of books on hand and lists of additions as received. All members of the staff are invited to make use of the facilities afforded by this library. It is desired to augment and improve the Commander-in-Chief's library. To this end suggestions as to books which should be obtained are requested from all members of the Staff. Keys to the bookcase of the Commander-in-Chief's Library will be kept in the key locker in the flag office.

#### SECTION VIII. RAPID COMMUNICATIONS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

##### PART A—GENERAL

801. *Drafting of Despatches.* (a) In order that the Commander-in-Chief may set an example of propriety in drafting of despatches, all officers of the Staff will familiarize themselves with the provisions of Communication Instructions relative to that subject. Communication watch and coding board officers should bring to the attention of originating officers all violations of these instructions and recommend necessary corrections. In no case will a change in a despatch be made without the consent of the originating officer.

(b) An officer originating a non-classified or restricted despatch will have the message typed by his own yeoman, or duty seaman. After it has been initialed by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain the initials of the information and releasing officers and supervise the transmission of the despatch.

(c) An officer originating a classified despatch will write or type the message on an outgoing classified despatch blank. After initialing by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain initials of the information and releasing officers, have the despatch encrypted and supervise its transmission.

(d) All despatches will normally be released only by the Admiral or Chief of Staff. In case of emergencies or special circumstances, despatches may be released by other members of the Staff.

(e) An officer desiring to have a message passed to supplementary addresses for action or information will inform the communication watch officer who will prepare the necessary despatch or procedure signal and obtain initials of originating, information and releasing officers.

**802. Security of Communications.** (a) Visual methods or landline will be used for transmission of despatches whenever practicable. *The use of radio for transmission of administrative despatches shall be kept at a minimum.*

(b) If a delay in the delivery of a despatch is acceptable, such message should be sent by despatch mail (mailgram). Mailgrams should be used particularly for transmission of despatches to information addresses when it is desirable that their radio calls do not appear in the heading of the radio despatch.

**803. Distribution of Despatches.** (a) Copies of all outgoing and incoming non-classified and restricted administrative despatches are provided for the Admiral, Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Staff Duty Officer, Flag Secretary and Communication Officer. Outgoing despatch books also contain a copy for the originating officer. Incoming despatch books also contain an action copy and two information copies which are available to any member of the Staff who may request such copies from the communication orderly. The Communication Officer's copies of despatches will be placed on a file in the Staff Office where they will be available for perusal by all members of the Staff.

(b) Only one copy of outgoing and incoming classified administrative despatches (other than restricted despatches) will be made. Paraphrases of secret and confidential despatches shall be kept at a minimum and will be furnished only at the specific request of officers, and must be returned to the coding room for burning when no longer needed. Paraphrases of secret messages will be furnished only to the action or originating officer, and shall be receipted for in the same manner as registered publications.

(c) Only four copies of the translations of tactical despatches will be made for distribution to appropriate boards.

**804. Routing and Delivery of Despatches.** (Internal) (a) Correct and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer.

(b) The Staff Duty Officer should see all despatches when the action officer is not on board. In such cases instructions will be requested by the orderly from the Staff Duty Officer as to whether the latter will accept responsibility for the message or whether it should be held for the action officer.

(c) Whoever initials the message for the action officer and accepts the action copy assumes full responsibility for taking the required action and for informing the designated action officer of the action taken.

**805. Movement Reports.** (a) The movement report sheets and cards will be corrected and maintained by communication personnel under the supervision of the communication watch officer designated as Movement Report Officer.

(b) Movement reports of the flag plane will be originated by the pilot making the flight and will be prepared and released by the flagship.

**806. Fleet Coding Board.** (a) The fleet coding board will consist of four officers of the Staff and five officers detailed by the Commanding Officer of the Fleet Flagship.

(b) The fleet coding board will be charged with encrypting and decrypting messages sent or received by the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet flagship, as directed by the Fleet Communication Officer.

(c) The Communication Security Officer will be responsible for the organization and training of the fleet coding board.

**807. Shutting Down Transmitters.** Except in case of emergency, permission for securing transmitters must be obtained from the Fleet Communication Officer.

#### PART B—INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL

**808. Administrative Communication Organization.** (a) The following stations will normally be manned:

- (1) Main radio room;
- (2) Signal bridge;
- (3) Main communication station;
- (4) Flag communication office;
- (5) Coding room.

(b) The communication watch will normally consist of:

- (1) Communication Watch Officer
- (2) Coding Board Officer
- (3) Communication Supervisor

- (4) Communication Yeoman
- (5) Communication Orderly
- (6) Radio Supervisor
- (7) Signal Supervisor
- (8) Radio Operators
- (9) Signalmen

(c) The communication watch officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business, effective organization, frequency plan in effect, circuits up, visual signalling conditions, and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(d) The coding board officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(e) Relief Communication Watch Officers. The first and second relief communication watch officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office during working hours. The second relief communication watch officer will stand watch for 0800 until after lunch. The first relief communication officer will stand watch from after lunch until 1530, at which time he will be relieved by the communication watch officer with the day's duty. Other relief communication watch officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(f) The first and second relief coding board officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room during working hours. The watches will correspond to those stood by relief communication watch officers. Other relief coding board officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(g) Communication Supervisor. The communication supervisor will stand a day's duty under the administrative organization in the Main Communication Station. He will act as an assistant to the communication watch officer. The time of relieving and hours on watch will be the same as those prescribed for the communication watch officer. The watches for the communication supervisors will be arranged by the Senior Chief Radioman and will be approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(h) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain continuous watches in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge respectively. The watches for supervisors will be arranged by the leading radio and signal chief petty officers and will be approved by the flagship's Radio and Signal Officers, respectively.

(i) Communication Yeoman. Communication yeomen will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. The watches will be arranged by the Senior Communication Yeoman and approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(j) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. When the flagship is underway a continuous watch will also be maintained on the Flag Bridge. Orders for the communication orderlies will be promulgated by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(k) Watches prescribed in the preceding articles will not be exchanged without permission of the officers concerned.

**809. Tactical Communication Organisation.** (a) The following Stations will normally be manned:

- (1) Main Radio Room;
- (2) Signal Bridge
- (3) Main Communication Station;
- (4) Flag Communication Office
- (5) Flag Bridge Radio Station;
- (6) Flag Bridge Communication Office;
- (7) Coding Room.

(b) The communication watch normally consists of:

- (1) Communication watch officer;
- (2) Coding board officer;
- (3) Two communication yeomen;
- (4) Two communication orderlies;
- (5) Communication Supervisor;
- (6) Radio Supervisor;
- (7) Signal Supervisor;
- (8) Radio Operators;
- (9) Signalmen;
- (10) Additional members of coding board as necessary.

(c) Communication watch offices shall maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Bridge Communication Office. Off-watch communication watch officers are available for handling administrative traffic and coding duties as the situation requires.

(d) Coding Board Officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room. Off-watch coding board officers are available for coding duties as the situation requires.

(e) The Chief Radiomen assigned to the Flag Allowance shall maintain a day's duty watch in the Main Communication Station, and a continuous watch as radio supervisor in the Flag Bridge Radio Station. This watch list may be augmented by qualified first class radiomen as required.

(f) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain a continuous watch in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge.

(g) Communication yeomen shall maintain continuous watches in the Flag Bridge Communication Office and the Flag Communication Office.

(h) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit continuous watches in the Flag Communication Office and on the Flag Bridge.

**810. Duties of Communication Watch Officer.** (a) The communication watch officer is in direct charge of the communications of the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) The communication watch officer is responsible for the efficiency of the communication watch and will require an alert and military watch of all communication personnel.

(c) The communication watch officer is responsible for complete and rapid internal distribution of despatches and for the expeditious handling of outgoing traffic.

(d) The communication watch officer is responsible for the handling of encrypted despatches and the efficiency of the coding watch.

(e) The communication watch officer must be fully cognizant of the effective organization of the Fleet and is responsible for setting up and maintaining the communication channels required by the organization.

**811. Duties of Coding Board Officers.** (a) The coding board officer is in charge of the operation of the Commander-in-Chief's coding room.

(b) The coding board officer is responsible for expeditious, accurate and efficient encryption and decryption of despatches.

(c) The coding board officer must be fully cognizant of the rules for cryptographic security and will ensure strict observance of these rules in the handling of the encrypted traffic of the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) The coding board officer is responsible for the custody of the cryptographic aids, publications and devices in the coding room.

**812. Qualification of Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board Officers.** Upon reporting for duty communication watch officers and coding board officers must undergo sufficient instruction to qualify taking over a watch. To be considered qualified a communication watch officer or coding board officer must:

(a) have a working knowledge of Communication Instructions, Basic Communication Plan, Frequency Plans and Tactical Instructions;

(b) have a working knowledge of the call systems, the General Signal Book and Signal Vocabulary;

(c) have a thorough knowledge of the U. S. Fleet Staff Instructions and Staff Organization;

(d) have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the communication plant of the Fleet Flagship;

(e) be proficient in the use of all cryptographic systems held by the Commander-in-Chief.

(f) have a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of communication and cryptographic security and their application.

**813. Routing of Despatches.** (a) Full and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer. A despatch must be seen by every officer having a possible interest in it. Intelligent and complete routing requires a thorough knowledge of the Staff organization and a careful application of this knowledge to each despatch.

(b) Copies of dispatches concerning routine reports and requests should not be delivered to the Admiral. Such despatches will be marked "NN" and the Admiral's copy will be delivered to the Assistant Communication Officer for disposition.

(c) Classified despatches, other than restricted, shall be routed to the Chief of

Staff, Operations Officer, Communication Officer and Communication Security Officer in addition to action or information officers. The Chief of Staff shall be the first to see classified despatches and shall approve the routing prior to further delivery. When the Chief of Staff is not available despatches may be shown to the action officer prior to final approval of the routing.

(d) The flag is responsible for delivery of messages addressed to the flagship. Copies of such messages and copies of messages which are not addressed to, but which are of interest to the flagship, shall be delivered to the flagship communication office for internal distribution.

814. *Delivery of despatches.* (a) The communication watch officer will be responsible for requiring orderlies to deliver all messages promptly between 0800 and 2230 unless otherwise directed. Between 2230 and 0700 messages will be delivered to action and information officers when so directed by the communication watch officer. In case of doubt, messages will be delivered regardless of the hour. Priority despatches will always be delivered to the action officer immediately.

(b) Delivery of all traffic accumulated during the night will be completed by 0900 daily.

(c) Speed in delivery of despatches, especially those of priority precedence, is essential and the system must not be allowed to delay action. However, it is also essential that despatches be accurately written up. It is the responsibility of the communication watch officer to insure that a complete and accurate copy of all despatches is delivered to the proper officers as soon as possible.

815. *Emergencies.* (a) The communication watch officer should bear in mind that speed in the delivery of a message indicating an emergency is the primary consideration.

(b) Make use of the telephone as well as messengers. Above all, do not let the system delay action.

(c) Call relief watches as necessary to assist in handling the situation and retain them on watch as long as required.

(d) Be prepared to handle any emergency at night. Before turning in leave clear and definite instructions to be notified immediately in the case of any unusual occurrence.

816. *Encrypted Despatches.* (a) If time permits, the encryption of each outgoing encrypted despatch will be checked prior to transmission by an officer other than the one who encrypted the despatch. If time does not permit the encryption to be checked prior to transmission it will be checked as soon as possible thereafter.

(b) All intercepted encrypted despatches will be delivered to the coding room where they will be decrypted for information if traffic conditions permit.

817. *Intercepted Traffic.* Intercepted traffic of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief will be written up and distributed for information. Each copy will be marked "Written up for Cincpac information."

818. *Radio Logs.* Radio logs shall be kept in accordance with Articles 1413-1417, Communication Instructions, 1937. The communication watch officer will examine radio logs carefully during his watch for despatches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, for violations of communication instructions, for intercepted despatches of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief, and to ascertain that circuit discipline is being maintained.

19. *Transmitting and Receiving Data.* Transmitting and receiving data will be recorded by the radio operator or signman as indicated below:

#### *Radio*

- (1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
- (2) Frequency
- (3) Operator's sign.

#### *Visual*

- (1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
- (2) System
- (3) Signman's sign.

820. *Communication Files.* (a) General File. The general file includes one copy of each message transmitted or received. Service messages (except despatches) shall be stapled to the message to which they refer. Procedure signals not classified as service messages and messages not bearing time groups shall

be filed according to time of receipt or delivery. Classified mailgrams (other than restricted) shall be filed in the classified files and a tickler filed in the general file.

(b) Shore station Schedule Files. A copy of each message received by I or F method shall be filed in these files. A separate file shall be maintained for each shore station. Messages shall be filed by shore station serial numbers.

(c) Movement Report File. A copy of each notice or modification to the Ship Movement Report Sheets shall be placed in this file.

(d) Flag Files. The flag file includes one copy of each message originated by the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, or written up for information of the Commander-in-Chief. These messages shall be filed in chronological order of time groups under the headings incoming and outgoing.

(e) Alnav File. A copy of each alnav message shall be placed in this file in order of alnav number.

(f) Fleet File. A copy of each fleet message shall be placed in this file in order of fleet number.

(g) Classified Files. Translations of classified despatches shall be placed in these files in order of coding room serial number. Secret despatches shall be placed in a file separate from the regular classified files.

(h) Tactical Translation Files. The tactical translation files contain one copy of the exact translation of each encrypted tactical despatch and one copy of each plain language tactical despatch. Messages will be filed in chronological order of date time groups.

821. *Composition and Standard Distribution of Message Books:*

|                             |   |                       |
|-----------------------------|---|-----------------------|
| (a) Outgoing Circuit        |   |                       |
| Front Cover                 | — | General File          |
| First copy                  | — | Station File          |
| Second copy                 | — | Flag File             |
| Third copy                  | — | Originator            |
| Back copy                   | — | Ship                  |
| (b) Outgoing Administrative |   |                       |
| Front cover                 | — | General File          |
| First copy                  | — | Flag File             |
| Second copy                 | — | Originator            |
| Third copy                  | — | Admiral               |
| Fourth copy                 | — | Chief of Staff        |
| Fifth copy                  | — | Operations Officer    |
| Sixth copy                  | — | Flag Secretary        |
| Seventh copy                | — | Staff Duty Officer    |
| Eighth copy                 | — | Communication Officer |
| Ninth copy                  | — | Station File          |
| Back cover                  | — | Ship                  |
| (c) Outgoing Tactical       |   |                       |
| Front cover                 | — | Translation File      |
| First copy                  | — | Flag Plot             |
| Second copy                 | — | Flag Plot             |
| Back cover                  | — | Coding Board          |
| (d) Outgoing Umpire         |   |                       |
| Front cover                 | — | Translation File      |
| First copy                  | — | Umpire                |
| Back cover                  | — | Coding Board          |
| (e) Incoming Circuit        |   |                       |
| Front cover                 | — | General File          |
| First copy                  | — | Spare copy            |
| Second copy                 | — | Advance action        |
| Back copy                   | — | Check copy            |
| (f) Incoming Administrative |   |                       |
| Front cover                 | — | Flag File             |
| First copy                  | — | Action                |
| Second copy                 | — | Admiral               |
| Third copy                  | — | Chief of Staff        |
| Fourth copy                 | — | Operations Officer    |
| Fifth copy                  | — | Flag Secretary        |
| Sixth copy                  | — | Staff Duty Officer    |
| Seventh copy                | — | Information           |
| Eighth copy                 | — | Information           |
| Back cover                  | — | Communication Officer |



|                             |   |                  |
|-----------------------------|---|------------------|
| (g) Incoming Tactical       |   |                  |
| Front cover                 | — | Translation File |
| First copy                  | — | Flag Plot        |
| Second copy                 | — | Flag Plot        |
| Back copy                   | — | Coding Board     |
| (h) Incoming Contact Report |   |                  |
| Front cover                 | — | Translation File |
| First copy                  | — | Flag Plot        |
| Second copy                 | — | Flag Plot        |
| Back cover                  | — | Ship             |
| (i) Incoming Umpire         |   |                  |
| Front cover                 | — | Translation File |
| First copy                  | — | Umpire           |
| Back cover                  | — | Coding Board     |

#### SECTION IX. REGISTERED AND OTHER SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS

901. The Communication Security Officer is responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Department for the custody of all registered publications.

902. A Communication Watch Officer, designated as Registered Publications Officer, is the custodian of registered and other secret and confidential publications. He shall receipt to the Fleet Communication Security Officer for all registered publications and for other important confidential, secret or restricted documents which must be accounted for by the Commander-in-Chief.

903. All registered and other important publications shall be catalogued to show their receipt and the safes in which they are stowed. No registered publication shall be issued except on written receipt of an authorized individual, which receipt shall be obtained at the time of issue. Other confidential or secret publications and important documents shall be handled in a similar manner.

904. In accounting for registered publications when preparing quarterly returns, each publication actually must be sighted by the officers taking the inventory.

905. Confidential and secret publications shall be kept only in authorized storages.

906. The Coding Board Officer on watch shall be responsible for the publications in the communication office safes. The Registered Publications Officer shall make a weekly inventory of the contents of the communication office safes.

907. The Registered Publications Officer shall be the only person regularly in possession of the combinations of safes containing un-issued registered publications, except for: (a) communication office safes; (b) War plans safe; (c) Security Officer's safe. In order that access to any safe may be had in the absence of the regular custodian, the Registered Publications Officer shall maintain in sealed envelopes the combinations of all safes assigned to the Staff. These sealed envelopes shall be kept in the communication office secret safe. Prompt report shall be made to the regular custodian of a safe whenever the envelope containing the combination thereto is opened for any purpose.

908. The Registered Publications Officer shall change the combination of all safes when he first receipts for the registered publications, and from time to time thereafter; particularly subsequent to the opening of a safe by another officer.

909. The Registered Publications Officer shall keep a record of all "shipment memoranda" to insure receipt of all new matter. He is responsible that all publications in his custody are corrected to date. It is desirable that members of the staff correct their own publications; but even though they do so, their work shall be checked by the Registered Publications Officer, who is responsible for their being corrected.

910. When not actually in use, war plans shall be stowed in the safes especially provided for them. Corrections to the war plans shall be made under the direction of the War Plans Officer. War plans shall not remain out of the above safes overnight. The War Plans Officer shall have custody of all War Plans in use by the War Plans Section, receipting for them to the Registered Publication Officer.

SECTION X. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLAG AND SHIP.

*A — Station keeping and maneuvering of flagship.*

1001. When in formation, the flagship will normally maneuver in obedience to signal in the same manner as other vessels of the formation.

1002. The Commander-in-Chief will, however, as circumstances warrant, verbally direct the flagship to make changes in course, speed, or position.

1003. When, for any reason, the movements of the flagship are no longer to be directed by the flag, the Captain of the flagship will be so informed. He will be further informed as may be practicable, of the interval during which he is expected to act independently.

1004. When in position, the commanding officer is responsible for the station keeping, course, and speed of the flagship as circumstances dictate.

*B — Honors.*

1005. Responsibility for rendering proper honors lies with the flagship except that no gun salutes shall be fired without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Advance information as to honors shall be furnished by the Flag Lieutenant or Staff Duty Officer.

*C — Personnel*

1006. Officers of the Staff shall be careful to preserve the unity of command of the flagship. To this end they shall give no orders to the officer-of-the-deck except in an emergency. Personal requests may be made to subordinate officers of the flagship but official requests to the ship shall always be made direct to the Captain or Executive Officer. Such requests should be headed, "The Admiral desires you.-----Etc."

1007. The Flag Division Officer and the Division Officers will be the Communication Watch Officers or Coding Board Officers so designated.

1008. Leave and liberty for all men assigned special duty with the flag will be regulated by the Flag Secretary who will regulate it to conform as closely to that of the flagship, as flag work will permit. (See Article 407(a)). The flagship will regulate, control, and administer the following functions pertaining to flag personnel:

- (a) Reports, inspections, records and accounts, and advancements in ratings.
- (b) Personal requests (via Flag Secretary).
- (c) Disciplinary matters.
- (d) The division parade is assigned by the flagship. The Flag Division Officer is in charge at division parade. He reports to the Executive Officer at quarters, the number of unauthorized absentees.

1009. The following instructions govern the routine muster or flag personnel:

- (a) All flag personnel except the marines will muster at quarters with the flagship.
- (b) The marines assigned as flag allowance, will muster with the ship's marine detachment.

1010. Flag Division personnel will be stationed for abandon ship drill and will report at quarters for this drill unless excused. At fire and collision drills and general quarters, Flag division personnel will, when men detailed by the ship have failed to do so, secure ports, etc., in offices and other places devoted strictly to Flag activities. The Flag division, will not go to quarters for these drills except that radio and visual communications will actually be manned.

1011. The Flag division officer and the junior Flag division officers will conduct bag and bedding inspections of the Flag Division. The ship will provide berthing and messing for all personnel of the Flag Division. Flag Division personnel under the direction and supervision of the Flag Division Officer will clean all compartments dedicated exclusively to Flag use. Boat crews, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the barges and staff boats; the signal force, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the Flag Signal Bridge and Flag Conning Tower.

1012. All members of the Staff shall be assigned battle stations which will be manned when "General Quarters" is sounded. Enlisted men of the Flag not required for Staff Battle Stations will be assigned to ship battle stations. Enlisted men of the Flag will stand Flag condition and cruising watches, but will not stand ship cruising watches.

1013. The Flag Lieutenant is in direct charge of the boat crews, chauffeur, signal force, Admiral's mess attendants, boats, and automobiles (Band and

Orchestra is assigned), and is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for their appearance, training and performance. The ship is responsible for maintenance and upkeep. The Flag Lieutenant, and, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, regulates the employment of the Staff motor boats and the Chief of Staff's barge when it is used as the Staff duty boat. He will prepare the schedules for all staff motor boats, prescribing the routine hours for securing and the places of securing away from the ship and will furnish information as to liberty of boat crews, after securing, to the Flag Secretary. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Flag Lieutenant, and in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, informed of the movements of the barges and the staff motor boats.

1014. The Commanding Officer of the Flagship shall be responsible that all safety precautions of the barge and staff gig be made as are required by existing regulations and instructions.

#### *D—Routine Reports*

1015. In order that the routine reports to the Commander-in-Chief may be complete and uniform, the Commanding Officer of the flagship is requested to promulgate the following instructions:

##### *(a) AT ANCHOR*

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall make reports to Commander-in-Chief as follows:

- (a) The hours of 0800, 1200 and 2000.
- (b) Ship's Movements.
- (c) All marked changes in the weather.
- (d) Display of storm signals.
- (e) All occurrences worthy of notice.

(2) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report salutes fired, exchanges of official calls, shifting of personal flags and movements of ships to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and to the Flag Lieutenant, or in the absence of the Flag Lieutenant to the Staff Duty Officer.

(3) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall announce requirements for Staff attendance at the accommodation ladder by loud speaker: "Staff Gangway". Boat gongs shall also be sounded in number equal to the number of side boys required in attendance; e. g., for Admiral and Vice Admiral, eight (8) gongs; for Rear Admiral, six (6) gongs; and for Captain, four (4) gongs. The above procedure shall be carried out by the Officer-of-the-Deck in sufficient time for the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Flag Lieutenant, or, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, to reach the Quarter Deck and properly meet visiting officers. When the Commander-in-Chief is leaving the ship, the Officer-of-the-Deck will notify the Flag Lieutenant, or in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, and the Chief of Staff, when the barge or automobile is alongside.

(4) The signal Bridge supervisor shall report all movements of ships getting underway, or coming to anchor, shifting of personal flags, exchange of salutes, and any occurrences worthy of notice to the Officer-of-the-Deck.

(5) When the Admiral has retired, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make necessary reports to the Staff Duty Officer who will indicate what action is to be taken.

(6) During the night the Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Staff Duty Officer only such movements of ships as he deems necessary. The Signal Bridge supervisor will report to the Flag Lieutenant or to the Staff Duty Office, prior to 0800, any movements of ships occurring during the preceding night.

##### *(b) UNDERWAY*

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Commander-in-Chief via the Staff Duty Officer on watch on the Flag Bridge:

- (a) The sighting of land, rocks, shoals, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and discolored water.
- (b) All vessels or wrecks discovered.
- (c) All marked changes in the weather.
- (d) All occurrences worthy of notice.

If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make the above listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's Staff Duty.

(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer-of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff Duty Officer on watch.

(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0800, 1200 and 2000.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 35

My

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac file no.  
A16/WPPac-46(16)  
Serial 063W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.  
Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

H. E. Kimmel.  
H. E. KIMMEL.

[i]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac File  
A16/WPPac-46(16)  
Serial 056W.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 21, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.  
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.  
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.

Enclosures:

- (A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.
- (B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

## 838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley,  
P. C. CROSLLEY,  
Flag Secretary.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[ii] U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five)

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<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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SECRET

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE  
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac-46

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<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[3]

SECRET

**U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE  
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)**

**INTRODUCTION**

**CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)**

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4]

**CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS**

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

- a. In Part I the order of presentation is:

Chapter I—Task Organization.

Chapter II—Assumptions.

Chapter III—Information.

- b. In Part II are incorporated:

Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.

Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O-1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes [5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6]

**CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS**

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operating Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task assigned at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

|                                              |           |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Task Force One.....                          | A-1, etc. |
| Task Force Two.....                          | B-1, "    |
| Task Force Three.....                        | C-1, "    |
| Aircraft Scouting Force.....                 | D-1, "    |
| Submarines Scouting Force.....               | E-1, "    |
| Minecraft Battle Force.....                  | F-1, "    |
| Base Force.....                              | G-1, "    |
| Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.....         | H-1, "    |
| Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier..... | J-1, "    |
| Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier..... | K-1, "    |

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a brief and summarized estimate of the situation as an addendum to his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be appended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group commanders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One will be "a-1".

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#### CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9]

#### PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

##### CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants



of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

*Task Force One.*—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

*Task Force Two.*—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

*Task Force Three.*—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10]

#### CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:

##### 1. TASK FORCE ONE Commander Battle Force

|                                  |        |
|----------------------------------|--------|
| Batdivs 2, 4.....                | 6 BB   |
| SARATOGA.....                    | 1 CV   |
| Crudivs 3, 9.....                | 5 CL   |
| Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9..... | 4 OCL# |
|                                  | 2 DL   |
|                                  | 16 DD# |
|                                  | 2 AD   |

(Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)

##### 2. TASK FORCE TWO Commander Aircraft Battle Force

|                                                |       |
|------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Batdiv 1.....                                  | 3 BB  |
| Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN.....                    | 1 CV  |
| Crudiv 5.....                                  | 4 CA# |
| Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50..... | 1 OCL |
|                                                | 8 DD  |
|                                                | 2 AD  |

(Includes Atlantic Reinforcement of 4 CA.)

##### 3. TASK FORCE THREE Commander Scouting Force

|                                      |       |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| Crudivs 4, 6.....                    | 8 CA  |
| Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA.....          | 1 CV  |
| Desrons 4, 5.....                    | 2 DL  |
|                                      | 16 DD |
| Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6.....     | 5 DM  |
| Available Transports Base Force..... | — AP  |
|                                      | — APD |

2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.

2d Marine Air Group.

[12] 4. *TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force)* Commander Aircraft Scouting Force

|                                           |        |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|
| All units of Aircraft Scouting Force..... | 107 VP |
|                                           | 2 AV   |
|                                           | 2 AVP  |
|                                           | 4 AVD  |
| Utility Squadron from Base Force.....     | 10 VJR |

5. *TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force)* Commander Submarines Scouting Force

|                                                              |       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School.. | 30 SS |
|                                                              | 2 OSS |
|                                                              | 1 SM  |
|                                                              | 1 ODD |
|                                                              | 3 AS  |
|                                                              | 2 ASR |
|                                                              | 1 AM  |

6. *TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force)* Commander Minecraft Battle Force

|                                          |      |
|------------------------------------------|------|
| All units of Minecraft Battle Force..... | 1 CM |
|                                          | 8 DM |

7. *TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force)* Commander Base Force

|                                                          |              |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less | 8 DMS        |
| Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ.                                  | 4 AF         |
|                                                          | 6 AT         |
|                                                          | 1 AH         |
|                                                          | 13 AO        |
|                                                          | 2 AR         |
|                                                          | 1 ARD        |
|                                                          | 2 AK         |
|                                                          | 2 AE         |
|                                                          | 1 AKS        |
|                                                          | 10 AM        |
|                                                          | 4 AG         |
|                                                          | Utility Wing |

[13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

9. *TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Coastal and local defense forces.

10. *TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement, composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.

[15] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. General Assumptions

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive

elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reinforcements will be made in the Far East.

[16] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

[17]

CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

*Section 1. General Information*

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are contained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1).

Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. [20] The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

## *Section 2. Enemy Information*

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the execution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

## *[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action*

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area.

[23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas of lines of communication.

h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of usual routes.

[24]

## PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

### CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east;

e. Defend Samoa in category "D";

f. Defend Guam in category "F";

g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;

j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;

k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25]

### CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.

c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

- c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
- f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
- g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
- h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
- [26] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
- k. Continue training operations as practicable.
- l. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
- m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

*Phase IA*

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
- b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
- c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
- d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the associated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
- e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
- 2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansel Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
- f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
- g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
- [27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian reas and the West Coast.
- i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
- j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.
- k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
- l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.

*Phase II and subsequent phases*

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at this time are:

- a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island Area.
- b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
- c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
- d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
- e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28]

## PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

## CHAPTER I. PHASE I

*Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE*

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the navy basic plan.

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[29] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3121. *Task Force Two* will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

c. 1. *Special Information.*

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers  
750 men  
6 5"/51 caliber guns  
12 3"/50 caliber AA guns  
30 0.50 caliber machine guns  
30 0.30 caliber machine guns  
4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men  
2 5"/51 caliber guns  
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers  
101 men  
4 5"/51 caliber guns  
4 3"/50 caliber AA guns  
4 0.50 caliber machine guns  
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers  
620 men  
4 5"/51 caliber guns  
8 3"/50 caliber AA guns  
20 0.50 caliber machine guns  
16 0.30 caliber machine guns

NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

[32] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3152. a. *Special Information.*

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall area.

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deployment suitable for this eventuality.

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.

b. *Task.*

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.

3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing attack training.

3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

[34] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3161. *Task Force Eight* will:

Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

[35] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3171. *Task Force Six* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine*.

[36] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

*Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)*

3181. *Special Information.*

The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category "D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3182. By this *Fleet Plan*, *Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)



**U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE  
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)**

**PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT**

**CHAPTER I. PHASE I.**

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

*Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern  
Naval Coastal Frontier)*

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five and Ten* perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] **Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE**

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief may direct.

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the commander-in-chief.

[39]

**CHAPTER II. PHASE IA**

**Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE**

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

3213. Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40] **Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO**

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41] **Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE**

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reinforce *Task Force Two* as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[42] **Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)**

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence.

Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941, tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. *Tasks.*

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at discretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways facilities.

#### [45] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3252a. 1. *Special Information.*

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA  
BUNGO CHANNEL  
KII CHANNEL  
TSUSHIMA  
NAGASAKI  
SHIMONOSEKI  
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

*Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE*

3311. *Task Force One* will:

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex —), and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3321. *Task Force Two* will:

Reinforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3331. *Task Force Three* will:

- a. Continue training for landing attacks.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations involving landing attacks.
- c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
- d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3341. *Task Force Nine* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3351. *Task Force Seven* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

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**PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT**

**CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA**

[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3361. *Task Force Eight* will:

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*

3371. *Task Force Six* will:

- a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
- b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:

Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3391. *All task forces concerned:*

Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53] **CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN**

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54] **CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS**

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be

made when the execution of Phase IA is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

| From                                  | To                                                                             | Unit transferred                                                                   | Transfer effected                                                      | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Taskfor 1.....                        | Southeastern Pacific For.<br>Taskfor 3.....                                    | { 2 OCL.....<br>1 Desdiv.....<br>1 CL.....                                         | } When directed..<br>W-Day.....                                        | For rotation on patrol until J-Day.                                                                                                                                                                |
| Taskfor 2.....                        | Taskfor 3.....<br>Atlantic Reen.....                                           | 1 CA.....<br>4 CA.....                                                             | W-Day.....<br>When directed..                                          | For rotation on patrol until J-Day.<br>If Atlantic Reen. is detached.                                                                                                                              |
| Taskfor 3.....                        | Taskfor 2.....<br>PSNCF.....                                                   | 2 CA.....<br>{ 12 VPB.....<br>1 AVD.....<br>1 AVP.....                             | When directed..<br>W-Day.....                                          | If Atlantic Reen. is detached.<br>{ Administration remains.<br>Units may be rotated.                                                                                                               |
| Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).       | PNNCF.....                                                                     | { 12 VPB.....<br>1 AVD.....<br>1 AVP.....                                          | W-Day.....                                                             | { Administration remains.<br>Units may be rotated.                                                                                                                                                 |
| Taskfor 7 (Undersea Force).           | PNNCF.....<br>Taskfor 3.....                                                   | { 2 SS.....<br>1 ASR.....<br>NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.                                  | W-Day.....<br>W-Day.....                                               | { Administration remains.<br>Units may be rotated.<br>Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.                                                                                                               |
| [56]                                  |                                                                                |                                                                                    |                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Taskfor 8 (Minfor).                   | Hawaiian NCF.....                                                              | { 1 CM.....<br>8 DM.....                                                           | J-Day.....                                                             | Until further orders.                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For). | Taskfor 3.....<br><br>Taskfor 2.....                                           | 1 AO.....<br><br>2 AO.....                                                         | W-Day.....<br><br>J-Day.....                                           | Base Samoa, released on J-Day.<br>For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.<br>For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released. |
| All Forces.....                       | Taskfor 9.....<br>Hawaiian NCF.....<br>Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control Force). | 10 VJR.....<br>As directed.....<br>Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii. | J-Day.....<br>When directed..<br>Prior to scheduled date of departure. | Until further orders.<br>For escort duty. To revert on completion.                                                                                                                                 |

[56]

## PART IV. LOGISTICS

## CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic requirements as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

[56a]

## CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and personnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the supply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX, Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b]

CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospital space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c]

CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d]

CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore establishment.

[57]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58]

CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by Annex III to this Plan.

[59]

CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-Chief.

[60]

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] *Section 1. Phase I*

United States Pacific Fleet  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

Operation Plan No. 1-R5

*Initial Task Organization*

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus  $\frac{1}{2}$  mincraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus  $\frac{1}{2}$  mincraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from Task Force Six, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from Task Force Seven for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscofor Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by *Commander Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to Task Force Three.

[82] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine*.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven*.

[83] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two*.—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[84] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

(f) *Task Force Eight*. (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under Commander *Task Force One*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic services to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
United States Pacific Fleet.

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

*Section 2. Phase IA*

*Tentative*

United States Pacific Fleet,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
Place  
Date.

*Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.*

*Initial task organization*

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One.* Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two.* Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One*



plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three*.

(c) *Task Force Three*. Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* for fueling at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

[69]

#### PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

##### CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

##### Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5  
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from *Task Forces One and Two* at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase IA being transferred to *Task Force Four*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,  
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*  
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*  
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force  
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two*.

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three*.

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENIWETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA  
BUNGO CHANNEL  
KII CHANNEL  
TSUSHIMA  
NAGASAKI  
SHIMONOSEKI  
TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).

(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).

(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

[74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[I-1]

#### ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

#### *Patrol and Sweeping Plan*

No.

#### INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force One.
- (b) Task Force Two.
- (c) Task Force Three.
- (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
- (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
- (f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
- (g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
- (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
- (i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2.

#### *Phase I*

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

[I-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

- (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
- (c) Covering.
- (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
- (e) Routing shipping.

#### *Phase IA*

*This Fleet will:* (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward of Nanpo Shoto;

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

#### Subsequent Phases

*This Fleet will:* (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which further directives will be issued later.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.

[I-3] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reenforcement this subparagraph is inapplicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Force Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(c) *Task Force Three*, reenforced with one cruiser each from *Task Forces One and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL* or *NAUTILUS* from *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force), also further reenforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander *Task Force Nine*) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication lines, operating in general as follows:

[I-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reenforcement is detached) on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred miles from land. Reserve such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on outward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[I-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols required by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise the commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[I-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reenforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Two* to *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[I-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gaining information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian [I-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Commander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander *Task Force Three*.

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight J-Day in latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at time and place designated by commander of that *Task Force*.

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet forces.

(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area.

[I-9] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.

(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will permit.

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[I-10] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii and West Coast.

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare").

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy, modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O-1.

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic Reinforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[I-11] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five apply.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
United States Pacific Fleet.

[II-1]

ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. ———

*Initial Task Organization.*

- (a). *Task Force One.*
- (b). *Task Force Two.*
- (c). *Task Force Three.*
- (d). *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).
- (e). *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).
- (f). *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.

1. (a) *Information.*—(1) This plan covers the initial operations in the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[II-2] 3. (a) *Task Force One.*—(1) Transfer available large light cruisers and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and proceed to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two*.

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reenforced, from the area to the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as developments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of *Task Force One*. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* which it may be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.

[II-3] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and rejoined, if the Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* carry out further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reinforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Force One*. Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and developments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGELAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Reconnoiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.

[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accurately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular interest are:

- ships and aircraft;
- storage tanks;
- power plants and radio installations;
- docks;
- air fields;
- storehouses and other buildings;

guns and observation posts;  
mines;  
channel and beach obstructions;  
other defense installations;  
beaches suitable for landing operations;  
extent of anchorage area;  
hydrographic, topographic, and  
meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should circumstances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making initial flights over enemy territory.

[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join *Task Forces One* and *Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*. *Task Force Three* will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* and the Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs obtained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Commander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, *Task Force One*, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance to the objectives of attack.

[II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;  
other ships;  
fuel tanks;  
power and radio installations;  
troop concentrations;  
storehouses;  
other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on *fixed* objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One*.

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force One*.

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) If Atlantic Reinforcement has been detached, transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two*.

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation beginning J-Day.

[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each cruiser which will eventually join *Task Force Two*.

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength



to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

[II-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) report enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two* to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* on Five J-Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase IIA of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.

(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders.

(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred seventy-seven degrees East.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location.

Admiral,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
United States Pacific Fleet.

[III-1]

#### ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

#### Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.

1110. Effective.

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effective coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O-1 Rainbow Five.

1170 to 1178. Effective.

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports. No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a carrier from its oscillating circuit.

1180. Effective.

1190. Effective.

1212. Effective.

1220. Effective.

1530. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.

[III-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.

2131. Effective.

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.

No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of the O. T. C. of a Task Force.

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc) or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maximum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force Commanders.

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operating area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-3] \* for inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight; or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course,

dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6610. Effective.

7000 (less 7100). Effective.

[IV-1]

#### ANNEX IV

##### *Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases*

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the information available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the command and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases concerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organization commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization commanders present.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 36

Sep 9, 1941.

[1H]  
Op-12B-2-djm  
(SC) A16/EF12  
Serial 066012  
D-33956

*Secret*

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.

Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.

2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. R. STARK.

ROUTING AND TRANSFER SLIP—NAVY DEPT., ROOM 2055

(SC) A16/EF12.

Document No. 33956

SUBJECT: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac-46)

Date received 8-12-41

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[2H]

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## UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

CinC File No.  
A16/WPPac-46(16)  
Serial 064W  
*Secret*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).  
Reference: (a) WPL-46.

Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for approval.

2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this Plan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted when completed.

4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as they are developed.

5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of prospective operations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risk of serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be incurred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handicapped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made available to him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine

vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and equipped marine force.

6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually existing and the forces actually available.

H. E. Kimmel  
H. E. KIMMEL.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 36A

[4H] [Stamped:] Received S-C files, Room 2055. Aug. 12, 1941. Route to:  
12. Op File No. (SC A16/FF12. Doc. No. 33956. Copy No. 2 of 5.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

A16/WPPac-46(16)

Serial 064W

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).

Reference: (a) WPL-46.

Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for approval.

2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this Plan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted when completed.

4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as they are developed.

5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of prospective operations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risks of serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be incurred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handicapped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made available to him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and equipped marine force.

6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually existing and the forces actually available.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[7H]

CHARGE SLIP

C. N. O. FILES

File No. (SC) A16/FF12

Serial No. 006012 D-33956

Date Sep. 9, 1941

From CNO

To: CincPac.

Subject U. S. Pac. Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.

Enclosures Doc. 33956—CincPac Ltr. of July 25, 1941 to CNO on same subject. (Orig. & 3 copies.)

Charged to Comdr. Griswold

Charged by Lt. N. M. Blake

Date May 28, 1945.

Received by

For Admiral Hewitt.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 37

Date 22 November, 1941.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

OUTGOING

|                                              |          |                       |                |    |
|----------------------------------------------|----------|-----------------------|----------------|----|
| From CINCPAC [11 PAC]<br><br>To COMPATWING 2 | Info To: | Classification: Plain | Originator: 12 | HO |
|                                              |          | Precedence: Routine   | Release: #1    |    |
|                                              |          | System: LL            | Show to: 13 95 |    |

Heading: Z F5L 220130 M9U GR3

[1J]

URSER 0780 AFFIRMATIVE

Ref: CLASSIFIED.

Pw #2 0131A/22  
MHASent at 0131/TT  
Flag file. TS 01976

(At this point in Exhibit No. 37 there appears:

1. A copy of a routing slip bearing Cincus routing No. 10548 and date 19 November 1941.
  2. A memorandum form bearing handwritten notations.
- This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 120 and 121, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[4J]

[Endorsed:] A4-3/FF12-7 A4-3/VZ  
PW2/A4-3/0780PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 19 Nov. 1941.*Confidential*

From: The Commander Task Force NINE.  
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
Subject: Revised Schedule for Remainder of Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.  
Enclosure: (A) Two copies of proposed revised schedule.

1. Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of Task Force NINE for the remainder of the second quarter.
2. Approval of enclosure (A) is requested.

P. N. L. Bellinger  
P. N. L. BELLINGER  
10543

(The enclosures mentioned *supra*, being two copies of proposed revised schedule for November and December 1941 for the Commander of Task Force Nine, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 122 and 123, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## HEWITT EXHIBIT No. 38

(This exhibit consists of two parts, viz, Exhibit Nos. 38A and 38B.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 38A

INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE CONSUL-GENERAL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41-12/2/41

SECRET

1-466

WEDNESDAY, 1 OCTOBER 1941

0900 o MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.—Out.—Have him call.  
 0912 i NJ to OG for birth date. NI.  
 1108 i Man to MURAOKA re sports.  
 1115 i MIKAMI to SAKAI. NI.  
 1255 o MURAOKA asks Tamako /female name/ to come to see them next week.  
 /This has all the earmarks of straight social talk./  
 1257 o SAKAI tells wife /?/ that they won't need the car this Sunday.  
 1305 o Man asks HBD for thick drawing paper and a fountain pen. NI.  
 1310 i XX to MIKAMI ordering a car for 2.15.  
 1320 o SEKI to NAKAMURA of HBD re paper and maps. /No localities indicated./  
 1324 o To HBD for supplies.

End

1-467

THURSDAY, 2 OCTOBER 1941

0900 o To NISHIKAWA.—Out.—Have him call.  
 1028 i Universal Motors says the parts are ready at any time.  
 1042 i MURAOKA to NISHIKAWA /commercial; NI/.  
 1055 i Man to SAKAI re XP. Routine info.  
 1115 o To MIKAMI asking him to call XX.  
 1121 o To RCA for messenger.  
 1121 i For closing hours.  
 1134 i TAKAGISHI to XX inviting him for next Monday, the 6th, at about 2:00.  
 T. also thanks XX and apologizes for keeping him up late. T. remarks that XX was "high" at the /wedding/ party /of Sumida's son/ and yelled a lot and XX says he remembers having a good time, but doesn't remember yelling. T. will call for him.  
 1140 o XX to Mrs. ? saying he has just learned from Mr. TAKAGISHI that he was pretty bad the other night. He apologizes for his behavior and seems to be sincerely remorseful. She says that the incident T. referred to was quite late when XX entered the maid's room and got tangled with the maid. He says he learned about it from T. She giggles and is amused at his contrite heart. He asks what time the Incident /not War/ took place.—About 1:30. /It seems that MIKAMI failed to show up when he was supposed to and XX got beyond his depth in *sake*. He forgot somethink there that night, and Mrs. ? /Sumida/? asks when she may return it to him. They both laugh unroariously at the "missing link" of his evening's adventure. She asks whether he is at home and learns that he is at the office. She refers to it as "that", which leads to more merriment, and says she will send "that" up this afternoon.  
 1145 o NI.  
 1330 o O. G. to Rev. IKEZAKI re girl that lives at Koloa, born 7 Feb. 1916.

1-468

FRIDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1941

0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX.—Not in.  
 0905 i NAKATSUKA to XX re the Advertiser spread about Senator Gillette's remarks on the subversive activities of X. N. asks XX whether the accusations are just.—No, they are only rumors.—Do you have any idea how the rumor started?—No. I don't know at all what activities are referred to as leading to the X in Hawaii.—Have you heard anyone from the American Government asking you questions? According to Senator Gillette, the FBI and Army and Navy Intelligence services desire such an inquiry. He gives the idea that they are more or less following the activities of X. /They both agree that very foolish state-



ments often get into the papers./ . . . Have you heard anything about the Japanese on the Pacific Coast?—No, I don't think so.—You feel they are just as loyal as the Js. in Hawaii, then?—Yes, I think so.—They, of course, you deny all what he says.—Yes, I deny it.—Categorically deny it?—Oh, yes.—He mentions here that some organizations send funds to Japan or help distribute propaganda films in the U. S. Do you feel that these allegations are true or not?—No, I've never heard about the Army /apparently misunderstood N. to say the Army was sending them/ sending films here.—You deny that X is taking part in any subversive activity, of course?—Yes. /N. will let XX look over whatever he writes on this matter./

- 0911 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to SAKAI re data on man named NITTA. NI.  
 0938 i NAKATSUKA to XX reading his story re Senator Gillette's allegations of "unconsular" activities on the part of X. XX then asks N. to wait a moment.—What for?—I am preparing a statement for you.—You mean you are translating your J. statement into English?—Yes.—Are you writing a long statement?—No. /N. then continues reading his story. XX asks for his phone number and says he will call him back./
- 0949 o SEKI TO NAKAMURA of HBD for paper.  
 0959 o XX to NAKATSUKA saying he put the matter in very simple Japanese, but believes N.'s story covers it very well. XX adds that he has heard for the first time of the Japanese military league in the U. S. which is accused of subversive activities on the West Coast. XX requests N. to look at his paper of 4 and 5 January. VX called XX's attention to the fact that Gillette made a statement on the 4th and the following day a S-B editorial referred to him. XX approves N.'s story including XX's denial that the J. War Office distributed films in America.
- 1008 o SAKAI to KAWAMOTO at NJ.—Out at a meeting.—Have him call.  
 1053 i /FPM/ Man tells OG he has received a letter which indicates that the Federal Govt. is going to treat all dual citizens as aliens beginning 1 October. Can X do anything about it?—No.—Thanks.
- 1139 i KONISHI to SAKAI. Routine request for data.  
 1355 i NAWATANI to YUGE. /A very cryptic brief conversation in which great surprise was expressed at some telegram or wireless message received. No details given./

1-470

#### SATURDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1941

- 0952 i KATSUNUMA asks OG re Nakazo FUJII. He has died in Hilo and his friends have phoned to find out what *ken* he is from. They are all embarrassed about the funeral /i.e., they don't know which *kenjin-kai* will take charge/. Call 98310.
- 1037 o OG to KATSUNUMA saying he is not listed, but his younger brother, Nobuta, is given. Yamaguchi.
- 1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. XX approves N.'s story re Gillette's accusations. N. asks whether XX has had any communication re the two NYK ships coming here.—No; none; I have read about them in the paper. I wonder where they got the information. I haven't received any letters from Japan since July. I haven't received any information at all about this.
- 1050 i KONISHI to MURAOKA re XP of a Korean.—That's impossible. The Koreans are in the same position as the British or Germans with regard to dual citizenship.—This is a student at the University who has been told he must XP before he can be eligible for an exchange scholarship.—After a check, I find that it is impossible for a Korean to XP.
- End

1-471

#### SUNDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1941

Not Covered

1-472

#### MONDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1941

- 0945 i NAKATSUKA asks XX about ships. They agree that the rumors are persistent, but no official confirmation has been received.

- 0957 i NOMURA /f/ to MURAOKA re passport issued in 1889 (28 Nov.) to Sanzuchi IWASAKI. Proof of arrival and date of marriage of parents lacking.
- 1012 o KOTOSHIRODO /?/ to man. /Very brief, indistinct./
- 1047 o SAKAI to MIHO.—He's at National Mortgage; call 6221.—Have him call. He sent a check to cover some fees. We asked him to send cash.—Alright. /A sign of the times. Fees paid in in cash are not subject to control or are easily kept out of reach of the controllers. X refuses all checks now./
- 1053 o No answer. NR.
- 1102 o NOMURA to MURAOKA again.—We find we have the record. He came in 1887 on the 11th of December on the Wakaura Maru, ship No. 4.
- 1120 i Man /possibly Dr. \_\_\_\_\_ of Maui/ to LG arranging to see her /at X?/ this afternoon.
- 1127 o XX to cook saying he will not require lunch. /He also went to hear Bowles at PPU./
- 1137 o /NR/ No answer.
- 1205 o SAHARA to Mr. BEERLY /?/.—He's busy.
- 1207 i Woman to MURAOKA re picnic.
- 1300 o SEKI to NAKAMURA.—Out.—When will he be back?—He's gone to McCully.—I'll call again.—Shall I have him call?—No, I'd rather call myself for it may be evening before I call.
- 1303 o OG to friend re picnic this Saturday. NC.
- 1316 o ? to KOGO.—Out.—When will he be back?—Probably about 4:30.—I'll call.

1-473

- 1359 o SAKAI for ?—He's left.
- 1404 o OI to his OG for ?'s number.—6361, local 105.
- 1405 o OI to Mr. AUSTIN /?/ at 6361, local 105. OI says the secretary of X returned here in 1940 on a diplomatic passport. Is he a blocked national?—I think he probably would be.—You do?—Sure, no doubt . . . What's his name?—Mr. YUGE. He has over \$1,000 in one of those three banks.
- 1410 o YUGE to SUZUKI at YSB saying he made deposits the 14th June and 26th July of this year. YUGE's balance at beginning of business 26th July was \$7.51; on 14th June, \$562.87.
- 1420 o MURAOKA to woman saying the letter is ready. This evening MURAO-KA will be out till about 7:30 this evening.—I'll see you tomorrow.

End

1-474

TUESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1941

- 0932 i YSB To TSUKIKAWA re balance. On 1 June of last year your balance was \$642.44. On 14 May of this year it was \$730.02. On 26 July it was zero.
- 0936 o TSUKIKAWA to OI giving the data of the preceding.—If you have no balance, it can't be frozen.
- 1026 i Man asks for date of his XP.
- 1031 o NI.
- 1203 o SAKAI to his wife. NI.

End

1-475

Wednesday, 8 October 1941

- 1147 i NAKATSUKA to XX re simplified XP procedure. N. asks whether "Stimson's bill" seems to XX to be a good one. XX has a stock answer to any and every question: I don't know.—N.: Do you think that will eliminate a lot of trouble?—I don't know.—Do you think it will help us eliminate the dual citizenship problem?—I don't know what the attitude of the J. Govt. will be.—What is your personal opinion then?—"I can't have my personal opinion if I do not know the attitude of our Government."—Don't you know for yourself whether it would help or not?—No, I can't say.—I think it would be a good thing for both sides to know

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which side of the fence the dual citizens are going to be on.—Anyway, I will wait and see whether our Government has "an attitude to this law or not".—Do you have any word on J. ships' being scheduled?—None, except in the newspapers.

1315 ? NI.

1355 i /FPM/. Too brief.

1400 i /FPM/. Girl to SAKAI re XP applied for around New Year's. Yoshito HIROTA. NC.

1406 i /Cont. of 1400 conversation./ SAKAI: Your XP arrived 3 July, #433.—I had heard nothing about it.—The details aren't here yet, but I will look them up by tomorrow.

End

1-476

Thursday, 9 October 1941

0918 o XX to woman at NATSUNOYA TEA HOUSE, saying he forgot to bring home the *syohin* /could be 'trophy, prize'; 'stolen goods'; 'commodity, merchandise'./ last night. Please put the smaller package of photographs in an envelope. I am sending some one to pick them up.—Alright.

1028 i Man at NATSUNOYA /?/ to SAKAI saying that he will send his KT to X by mail.

1040 i Man re deferment of J. military service. He asks OG whether the request must be sent to the village office in Japan.—Yes.—But if the P. O. here should "open" these requests for deferment, wouldn't there be a lot of trouble?—Why don't you come up to the office with it? /It developed later that was for advice only. The forms must be sent in by the individual direct to the village office and should reach that office as soon after 1 December as practicable, especially in view of the uncertainty of mail connections with Japan./

1130 i Brief. NI.

1140 o MURAOKA to GOTO re arrival of XP permits for several members of the Goto family. Please come up for them and we will take the final step in XP procedure.

1253 i Re XP; NC; NI.

1322 o To MIKAMI requesting him to come to X.

1325 o ? to NAKAMURA of HBD asking him to come to X this afternoon. /A thing that never fails to impress me is the fact that N. is not only "familiar" with higher members of X staff, but he tells them he will not come up when they ask him to or picks his own hour. No one else is so discourtuous, to X, as N. is./—I can't make it today.

1328 i Woman asks OG whether she can get money through to Japan.—We don't know. /Later switched to SAKAI./—Is it hard for people born here who do not hold J. citizenship but who are now studying in Japan to be naturalized Japanese?—They will have to follow the regular procedure and apply to the Minister of the Interior. Sometimes it takes 2 months, sometimes it takes longer.—You see, I have children in school there and they won't pay money out to them because they are American citizens. Aren't they Japanese?—No, they are foreigners. They will not release funds to them.—Can they acquire J. citizenship here?—No, they must be in Japan to be eligible for naturalization.—Where can I take steps to have them naturalized?—Do all this in Japan. It cannot be done here.

1435 o SEKI to NYK.—We have word that a ship is coming here about the 20th.—Is it bound for Mexico?—I suppose so.—Are you free Saturday?—Yes.—Then let's have a game. /Golf./

End

1-478

FRIDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1941

1305 o OG to woman. NI.

1400 i Man to VX.—Call 5243.

1457 i Re XP of KONO. SAKAI had to send the \$3.00 check back and request cash. Caller wondered why he wasn't trusted. S. explained that it was the "freeze" that made the new plan necessary.

End

1-479

SATURDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1941

- 0930 i NAKATSUKA to XX, saying the J. short-wave broadcast this morning /6:30-?/ reported that some ships were definitely going to be sent to America to bring passengers from Japan and to pick up some to take back.
- 0932 o SEKI to restaurant reserving places for lunch for four: TSUKIKAWA, YUGE, SEKI, and one other. About 1 o'clock.
- 0933 o NI.
- 0934 o SEKI to ISHIZAKA arranging to meet in front /of X-?/ at a little before 1:00. They are going to lunch together and plan to play /golf/ about 2:30. ISHIZAKA then tells SEKI that both AP and UP news indicates that on the 15th the Tatuta Maru will sail, on the 22nd the Taiyo Maru will sail for Honolulu from Kobe. From San Francisco the Tatuta Maru will sail direct for Japan while the Taiyo Maru will come to Honolulu and return. The Nitta Maru will proceed to Seattle. Today is Sunday in Japan and I have had no wire from the head office.
- 0939 i NI.
- 0955 i NI.
- 0957 i /FPM/ To OG. Very brief.
- 1000 o /FPM/ Re picnic. NC; NI.
- 1012 i Girl to OG, arranging picnic. NC; NI.

End

1-480

SUNDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1941

No activity

1-481

MONDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 o MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.—Out.—Have him call.
- 0930 i Woman says she wants to send parcels on the ship that is coming to Honolulu, but supposes that is not permitted.—We can't say about that.
- 0932 o SEKI to MIKAMI re football and tennis tickets /apparently the police game/.
- 1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. The first edition of the H. S.—B. Saturday reflected that X had had no word re the ships, but this was changed in the second edition after receipt of official news from Tokyo. No news since Saturday.
- 1049 i Woman re request for deferment of J. military service which she wishes to send on the steamer leaving here the 15th. He suggests that she send it registered. Rest NI. If she sends it through X, however, he requests her not to send it before December, for the dates are 1 December to 31 January of the following year. /Time and again I have observed that 9 out of 10 calls connected with deferment are from women. Apparently they look after this detail of keeping their husbands or sons out of the J. Army./
- 1135 o MURAOKA to Mrs. FUKUMOTO, a language school principal, re a questionnaire which he will send her by mail since he hasn't time to bring it down. It may be that he had a child at her school, /Makiki J. L. S./?, but no real clues are given.
- 1144 o MURAOKA to Mrs. KIRIHARA asking her to telephone X tomorrow morning after 9:00.
- 1320 o OG orders tickets in Japanese for VX as a private individual, not as VX /to what?/.
- 1433 i KANEKO to YUGE asking whether it is alright to give the wording of the cable from the F. O. to X to the press as received.—Yes, I think so. /YUGE starts to ask a question put as K. hangs up on him./

—END—

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1-482

TUESDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1941

- 0910 1 For? — Still at home.  
 0940 1 KIRIHARA to MURAOKA. Mostly about arranging a social affair early enough in the day to permit children to attend. Later M. tells K. that Saturday is a holiday because of the great ceremony at the Yasukuni Shrine /enshrinement of war dead/. They will get together then.  
 1003 1 NAKATSUKA to XX saying there are 800 J. residents who are going to leave the Pacific Coast. Have you heard how many are leaving here? — The NYK is making all arrangements and I can't say what the whole number is. — Do J. nationals have to clear any papers with you first before leaving for Japan? — No.  
 1026 1 HBD to NAKAMURA of HBD. — He's left here.  
 1307 1 Castle & Cooke re pensioners. — Person in question not here yet.  
 1330 o SEKI re some printing jobs.  
 1343 o Re camphor and formallin.  
 1420 1 "Have NAKASUJI call 91043 if he comes in."  
 1430 o /FPM/ Man calls re passport. Matanosuke MURAKAMI. Routine check if arrival.  
 1443 1 MacNaughton /?/ of Castle & Cooke asks SAKAI for addresses of these persons who are C&C pensioners now living in Japan. Under General License No. 32, C&C are permitted to make these monthly remittances to them, but the Bank of Hawaii has no J. funds available. Should we approach the YSB or Sumitomo direct? — The secretary in charge will call you back tomorrow. He has left for today.

End

1-483

WEDNESDAY, 15 OCTOBER 1941

- 0913 1 Kiichi KUWAHARA applied for XP in August. He is expecting a new KT on the next ship. Shall he bring it in?—Yes.  
 0925 1 DATE to SAHARA, reporting death of SHINJIRO SHINO. He wonders whether it has been reported.  
 0927 o SAHARA to DATE. Yes, it was reported on the day he died.  
 1152 1 Re application for deferment of J. military service. Routine.  
 1206 1 /FPM/ Sports talk. They will play Saturday afternoon. /One of the junior members of the staff and a friend./

End

1-484

THURSDAY, 16 OCTOBER 1941

- 0853 o Sakai to ISHIHARA.—Out.  
 0858 o Sakai to OHIRA at NJ.—Out.—Have him call.  
 /Ichimatsu OHIRA is NJ collector./  
 0902 1 Nakatsuka to XX.—Not in; call back.  
 0913 1 NAKATSUKA to XX, saying he will be up in 15 or 20 minutes to see XX.  
 0915 1 KUWATA to Sakai re application for deferment. Routine.  
 0918 1 Woman asks whether she can get her /son's or husband's?/ application for deferment off on the Taiyo Maru. OG thinks so. The woman is worried for fear the J. Govt. will not grant deferment. OG thinks everything will be alright.  
 0928 1 /FPM/ Man to X, saying something is at 5 o'clock today, or something at 9 o'clock.  
 1000 1 Calling in to ask about the draft deferment request.—He should send it in.  
 1024 1 NAKATSUKA to XX, reading to him in English interview for S-B 10/16 re his ideas for the consular probe suggested by Senator Gillette.—"How do I say about the Hawaii-born Japanese?"—No. I make little reference to the Hawaiian born Japanese. The talk is all more or less all pertaining to the when I say the Japanese people of Hawaii, I take it for granted that that's the older people.—Yes.—Because otherwise I

I would say Americans of Japanese ancestry.—Yes. And you remember, one place I said: 'The elder Japanese also gladly send their American born sons into the Army'.—"Oh, yes, yes" /rapidly expressing understanding/.—That gives the impression that all along I've been talking about the older Japanese.—Yes, that's alright.—Because the younger Japanese, well, everybody would take it for granted that they are loyal. /Hearty laughter by XX in which N. soon joins. XX breaks in with:/ "Yes, yes; quite natural." /More laughter by XX, of a polite sort./—N: Do you want to mention anything about your X here? I have omitted it because I knew it is very delicate.—I think it alright just as you say now. Thank you. Goodbye.

1039 o To HBD for supplies. NI.

1-485

1043 o To a pharmacy for a substitute for medicine formerly gotten from Japan.—Will send up ½ lb.—If OK, may get more.

1045 i Dr. \_\_\_\_\_ to XX, inviting him to dinner on the 19th at YMCA /?/ at 6:30.

1053 i To Sakai re request for deferment.

1055 i NC; NI.

1135 o OG to Mackay Radio /FPM/. OG: ..... message received this morning.—What number is it?—HC 169 SN /?/—169, one moment . . yes, here it is.—It's the third word.—Third word? OG: The first.—The first?—First.—1 uhh 00 930.—Yes.—Do you want that word checked?—I want this tenth word checked.—Tenth?—Yes.—That's J U U G.—The next one.—The next one, G O N A N I G O N I T E?—Yes. I wish to have you check if it is G O N A N A.—It should be G O N A N A. OG: So we'd like to check on that.—Yes. I'll check that up.—And who is calling?—The Japanese Consulate /no particular person/.

1209 i From Mackay Radio: This morning you got a message from Toko by Mackay Radio and you wanted a confirmation of the next to the last word. That's G O N A N A N I G O N I T E.—I see /repeating it/.

1310 i To Sakai about the draft deferment, whether he needs to report. NI.

1320 i NI.

1434 o NI.

1440 o Lee for taxi right away to go up to X.

End

1-486

FRIDAY, 17 OCTOBER 1941

0900 i YAMASHIRO no other name given, but X understands/ to X. Y. sent off a letter concerning the deferment for Tomimatsu SHIGETOSHI. Received under date of August 5 from Japanese city or town hall a nolsy or vigorous letter, saying he was to return to take his physical exam for conscription. What is the best way to reply? Native village is Takaoka Prefecture, Hikujo Country, Kurotsuchi Village. He was born August 8, 1920. X will see. Please wait. X tells him to send off something as soon as possible and then wait until January anyhow.

0905 i Girl in English: "Ah wanta inquire where to have where the Japanese go to see about th' expatriation papers. Can you tell me?" /Apparently someone who wants to have her maid expatriated. Accent mainland American, probably Southern. Calls in long distance./—At this office.

0925 i Inquiry whether OK to forward draft deferment by mail.—OK, but tomorrow is a holiday, so if you get stuck don't come in then.

0987 i NI.

1000 i NAKATSUKA to XX, reporting the latest news just in "that U. S. merchant ships have been ordered from the Chinese and Japanese waters. Of course, this isn't straight from the Navy Department, but it's what some people . . . . . Have you received any word to that effect?" /No answer. Perhaps XX doesn't quite understand./ N: We have some word even in Honolulu that ships down here have been ordered to stay away from the Asiatic waters . . . . The only reason is that the Navy considers the situation in the Pacific quite serious. I think that's the only interpretation.—XX replies that he hasn't heard anything about it.

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... wants to know when it came in /as he didn't quite get it the first time, when conversation was in English/.

- 1017 i To Muraoka /private; NI/.
- 1027 o Muraoka to someone in connection with private plans. NI.
- 1047 i Evidently a mistake.
- 1203 i NI.

1-487

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1941

No Activity

(Japanese Holiday)

1-488

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1941

Out of commission

1-488

MONDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1941

- 0840 o /FPM/ Muraoka /?/ to /?/ re: sports. NI
- 0845 o Muraoka /?/ to Nishimoto. Is out.
- 0846 o Muraoka /?/ to Suzuki. re: tennis. NI
- 0847 o Muraoka /?/ to /?/ who is out.
- 0848 o Muraoka to Fujikawa. Are you coming to the party? NI
- 0855 o Muraoka to Sasaki. NI.
- 0856 i NI
- 0857 o Muraoka to another Muraoka. FPM
- 0859 o To Mr. YOKOTA of Occidental Life. Not in yet. Have him call 2243, Mr. MURAOKA.
- 0859 i To VX. Not in yet, but soon.
- 0904 i OI calling re: a conscription deferment for someone.
- 0908 i To MURAOKA. NI /about the party and getting gelshas/
- 0956 o To RCA for messenger.
- 1003 i Man asks how soon he must hand in his application for deferment.
- 1028 o MURAOKA to NISHIMOTO inviting him to a party at the Natsunoya the 26th.
- 1030 o MURAOKA to TOMIKO (?) inviting him to dinner Sunday. Apparently not private invitation for the price of \$2.00 is mentioned.
- 1031 o NC; NI
- 1035 i . . . . Call 5243 (Line #2)
- 1100 i Woman to Muraoka. NI.
- 1120 i YSB to TSUKIKAWA saying a draft has come for him.
- 1126 i KURISHIMA to Muraoka re tennis and other sporting events. Later there was mention of 5 cases of liquor for the big event. There will be exhibition game.
- 1-489
- 1136 o MURAOKA to Mrs. HIROKOTO (?) re tennis next Sunday. NI
- 1147 i NI
- 1248 i re office hours.
- 1249 i Re XP. The man XP'ed a number of years ago and then later had his J. citizenship restored. His father or an elder man wants to get his status with regard to (J. ?) military service cleared up. SAIKI asks him to come to the office to talk it over. (It seems that the boy is now trying to dodge J. military service after becoming a Japanese citizen. "Restoration" of J. citizenship should automatically XP from American nationality, because "restoration" requires an act on the part of the individual and is not on a par with the accidental citizenship acquired by birth. This dual citizen lost his J. citizenship when he XP'ed and then lost (or should have) his American citizenship when he had the J. citizenship restored.)
- 1305 o An outsider calls out for information re a form he is filling out. NI.
- 1325 o KUNIYOSHI of K. store in Mollili to old man. He had asked for his KT in connection with XP. Call 8323 and ask for Takazu.
- 1328 o KUNIYOSHI to ? complaining that his XP has not come yet.

1334 o KUNIYOSHI to 4221 re his BC (Birth Certificate). There is a discrepancy in the birthdate. K. is much perturbed but J. girl at 4221 tells him not to worry. The old man was probably late in registering K's birth with X and didn't wish a scolding or fine for late registration, so gave a later date. The Board of Health date is here taken as the correct one.

1448 ? (FPM) NI

End

1-490

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1941

0910 o NI (Muraoka about beer for the party!)

0915 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI.

0917 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI.

0918 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. In! NI. /More about the beer. 4 or 5 cases?/

0926 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA. NI. /a geisha—to arrange for THE party/

1003 o MURAOKA to FUJIKAMA. NI.

1004 o MURAOKA /?/ to SAKATA Bon Ton. Out.

1016 i NISHI of NYK to YUGE reporting that they have received a definite telegram that the ship will be off port 10 a. m. day after tomorrow /i. e. Thursday/

1019 i NAKATSUKA to XX—has he had any word as to the exact arrival time of the Tatsuta. Yes. It will arrive on the 23rd and not on the 24th. But he doesn't know the exact time of its arrival (!). Can't think of anything else.

1045 o MURAOKA to Sec of Hawaii re SHIOMATSU (or CHIYOMATSU or CHINOMATSU). Secretary's man wants "everything on the card."

"His birth September 5, 1873.

"Arrival November 2, 1906."

"Is that the only arrival?"

"I see several times he went back to Japan."

He will have to check and find out just when he first came. Continues re wife Hina, now dead.

Also re one SUZUKI.

1059 o Muraoka to pal. NI.

1103 o Muraoka to ----- NI.

1121 o Muraoka to Mr. Medeiros re Yamashiro' CHIYOMATSU (Chiyomatsu YAMASHIRO?) when he came etc.

1-491

1145 i KANEKO to VX saying the prospective repatriates are very numerous and the accounts connected therewith are most troublesome. Many of them are trying to get permission from Washington to get money from New York and so on etc. we are having an awful time with them.

VX—How about sending them up here to pay their fare?

K—That's all right, but there are immigration problems too.

VX—Let's take the whole matter up with Mr. Strench.

K—You mena with Coleman?

VX—Yes. With Coleman.

K—What about white passengers?

VX—White passengers?

K—Yes. The head office has arranged for some haole musicians to sail with us. A Mr. Si—— Si——

VX—Mr. SIROTA?

K—Yes. Mr. and Mrs. There is a group going first class to Shanghai. They are Americans.

VX—People going to Shanghai must take a transport. There is no other way.

K—These people are "foreign correspondents" of some "news service". They must be newspapermen.

VX—The name is not NEWMAN, is it?

K—No.

End



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1-492

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1941

Out of commission

1-493

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1941

- 1400 o Muraoka to — tai (female). M.—“The person is not a passenger.”  
 “He didn’t come back then.” “No. He didn’t.”  
 1413 i Inquiring “one information about my girl friend.” NI  
 1414 i Inquiry. Hard to hear. NI.  
 1427 o To RCA for messenger.  
 1434 i fragment. NI.  
 1554 i F.P.M. NI  
 1603 i KATO to KANEKO. “How late will you be open?”  
 Planning details, beds etc. NI.  
 1618 i Dialogue between KANEKO and XX re: who is to issue the tickets and  
 how they will be paid for. Apparently the rates are much lower for  
 this trip than the usual ones. Kaneko is worried because many of the  
 passengers have paid in yen and the company keeps its books in dollars.  
 Kaneko says taking into account the discount they will get only about  
 \$69.75 for \$85.00 and suggests that the “simplify” the system perhaps  
 keep receipts in dollars or yen/ and cable to the main office for authority  
 to do so.  
 1816 i Seki to KOTOSHIRODO asking him to come over. He will.  
 2032 o N.R. Man (not VX) asks for taxi.

End

1-494

FRIDAY 24 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 ? (FPM) Re sailing of TATUTA.  
 0912 o  
 0934 i Re deferment. Routine.  
 0943 o Re deferment.  
 0947 i NI  
 1010 i Man to MURAOKA re meeting at NATSUNOYA (Tea House) Sunday  
 morning early, which they wish to postpone a week.  
 1020 o Seki to MIKAMI asking him to come to take XX to ship in very few  
 minutes. He wants to be there before 1100.  
 1048 i Redeferment. NI  
 1112 i Re BC; NC; NI.  
 1105 o Seki to SAKAMOTO re cameras. Have your cameras all gone up  
 15%?—No, only 10%—One of my friends wants to buy but they had  
 sold all—we’re out of those foreign made ones too. No new ones come  
 in, and everyone bought before the price rise on 1 Oct. We have  
 super DX and super-6 with meter—How much are the Super-6’s?—  
 \$176—Is that the best one you have?—No we also have some for \$219—  
 Does that include the case?—No.—I may be in soon to look them over.  
 1110 i FUJITA of YSB to X saying he would like passage on the TAIYO.  
 A letter has come from the Yokohama office ordering me home. X prom-  
 ises to arrange passage.  
 1130 o To NAKAMURA. Out.  
 1138 i Very noisy. NI.  
 1153 i Re deferment. NI.  
 1255 i Some sort of query. Very faint/ NI.  
 1-495  
 1345 i For xx. Mr. NEWMAN calling. N. arrived yesterday on the Tatsuta.  
 Mr. MAEDA said he would speak to XX re NEWMAN’s going back on  
 the Taiyo. XX saw Maeda—but hedges when asked if anything had  
 been arranged. He hasn’t “approached” the NYK yet, but he will “have  
 a talk” with them. N. dropped around to see XX but got to his office a  
 little too late today, so missed him. N. is busy this afternoon having  
 eyes examined—is getting new glasses made here before he goes back.  
 N. won’t be able to make it before XX goes home at 3. Could he (N.)  
 see him early tomorrow morning. He has a letter from Mr. KISHI of  
 of the Joho Kyoku. “He has a few things that he wants you to get for  
 him so I can take them back. Also N. has to get a reentry visa to

Tokyo. He spoke to Mr. Kishi, and also to Mr. Yokoyama and also to some of the people in the foreign office and they said the best thing would be first to start it thru here and the application has to be made and it will have to go thru the regular channels but they may facilitate it from the other side. XX thinks that in that case they will have to refer the matter to the Foreign Office. Says that in fact "about anybody that came thru now we have to refer it back." Laughter by XX/ Does XX think tomorrow would be all right to do that? He does. N. says they know all about him over there and thinks approval will be just a routine matter. He will drop around tomorrow morning ok.

- 1312 o To KANEKO NYK from SEKI of X who will come to the point at once re a long cable which KIMURA came and sent on the 8th of August to the tune of \$45.82. The cable was sent to Tokyo to NYK main office. X would like payment please. OK.
- 1315 o To XX HAKUBUNDO from X to order some small swords (or small trees) for some of the people sailing on the boat today. OK. Apparently left addresses during earlier personal call.
- 1330 i Some inquiry re Japanese made products or Japanese nationality ?/. X doesn't know either. NI/

End

1-496

SATURDAY, 25 OCTOBER, 1941

- 0925 i Man discusses entering his son in a J. school. The boy is without J. citizenship and the authorities in Japan will not admit him. Caller wonders whether X cannot write a letter to the authorities that will explain the situation in Hawaii and facilitate the boy's admission. S. says the boy must go thru the regular procedure of having his J. citizenship restored. He must apply to the foreign minister for naturalization. As a person of J. descent, the procedure applied is different and simpler. It is called the "restoration of citizenship" instead of "naturalization" even in cases such as this one where the boy never was a J. citizen because he was not registered at X (born subsequent to 1 December, 1924). XP procedure must be instituted here, while citizenship restoration proceedings must be instituted in Japan.
- 0929 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to Sakai saying the FBI is investigating the consular agents and also the members of the NJ branch office (for Kauai). They are accused of being Army or Navy officers. K. suggests the giving the NJ men identification cards to prove they are members of Domei News Agency.
- 0955 o SEKI to MIKAMI asking him to come to X.
- 1013 o Sakai to Mr. Creighton at S-B. Creighton sent the money yesterday with Mr. Newman. The amount was \$20. N. has an appointment with Mr. Kishi (error for Kita?) this morning. The secretary must have the money before he can send the wire (for permission for Creighton and Newman to travel on the Taiyo). S. can't send the wire without the money, and it has been mislaid somewhere. C. promises to get it into X's hands by noon.

End

1-497

- 1427 o Yuge to IKEZAWA at YSB. /This line got deep in the rain. Very hard to catch/. What the main trend of the conversation is I don't know, tho the conversation sounds important. Something is "funny—strange." Whether a man / one of the three getting off the Harrison?/ is from Tokyo or Yokohama. Also mention of the "situation being bad." Some mention of the Pensecola Hotel having something. The following sequence cannot be vouched for, but the words *sounded* like the following:  
 "You're not returning."  
 "No."  
 "Keep pistol, eh." /This line in English?/  
 "Yes I have, because the situation is so bad." /The last sentence in a very grave voice, and clear./

End

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1-498

SUNDAY 26 OCTOBER 1941

NO ACTIVITY

MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1941

- 0855 i NI. Wrong number.
- 0900 i MURATA of Waialae to inquire about the notification of arrival at military age. Is referred to book stores or newspapers, advised to mail it on the Taiyo.
- 0915 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA retennis. NI
- 0926 i Inquiry about method of forwarding military age attainment forms. Either thru X or personally is ok.
- 0943 i Inquiry about expatriation procedure. Is advised to visit X for help
- 1026 i Inquiry regarding first steps in expatriation procedure. Is informed takes about 3 months.
- 1030 i Pan Pacific Union callion. NC. Not able to come to lunch today.
- 1117 o To Hakubundo from Muraoka re engraving on trophy cup. NI.
- 1130 o NC/ Ran out of blank cylinders at this point until 1420.
- 1135 o To RCA. (NR) On 25th of this month 33 word telegram in code was sent. How much is cost of telegram? \$4.79.
- 1424 o Seki to OI discussing some sort of "applicants" /for passage on the Taiyo/? until the 31st. Apparently the X doesn't want to handle them.
- 1437 o To RCA. "Will you send a messenger boy?"
- 1443 o XX to RCA. Your message #154 /poss. 164?/ which we received today has two pages. We received one page. She will send the other right over. Now XX says they have received three pages already! It's all right!
- 1450 i To OG. Very brief.
- 1458 o NI.

End

1-500

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1941

- 0820 o NI
- 0828 i To Sakai/?/ Not in.
- 0907 o Conversation with YANE wanted to write it, but hasn't a pen or anything, so can't /a country woman/. NI.
- 0921 i NAKATSUKA to SAKAI ?Also asks if Kita is there. No./ Asking about IIZUKA, his dates etc. SAKAI was working there but "doesn't keep track of the dates."
- 0928 i NAKATSUKA for XX—Not in. "What's happened to him this morning?" Gets phone #4416.
- 0929 i For Muraoka. Inquiry from KONISHI re FUKUDA, Michizo of Yamaguchi prefecture, Oshima county, Okika village. M. will phone him after he has looked it up.
- 0940 o To KANEKO from SEKI at X. Is K. returning? He is. Then he must be busy, but S. will trouble him with a little business re: the forthcoming Taiyo call. S. has received a cable that the Taiyo will be here on the 1st instead of the 31st. Also a cable that there is on board a man Taro TOKUNAGA who was on the Asama Maru / and of course had to go back/ who wants to get off here and take an American boat to S. F. Doesn't know whether he is a man of wealth or influence or not. They aren't clear if there are two of them or only one. If S. finds out he will call.
- 0956 o SEKO to KANEKO/?/ regarding 2 passengers on the Taiyo, one from San Juan, the other from Philadelphia. American(s?) and honorary consul(s?) Pardin is a high personage who was returned to port on order of the government as he is going to the mainland on the Taiyo. They have orders from the Foreign Ministry?/ to put them off and take care of them. Doesn't know how old. They/?/ are Roman Catholics. Then the problem arises about the money the said passengers will need. Will arrange about it later.
- 1000 o To Rosecrans for Taxi.
- 1004 i FPM. Very brief.
- 1008 o To Secy. of Hawaii. Line is busy.

1012 i KONISHI TO MURAOKA request for information on RIKIZO and his wife—how long have they been on Kauai.

1-501

They came September 9, 1898. Re: OYAMA. M. doesn't know. Re: SAITO, Kuishi and Fukuishi: get their dates also.

1020 i SHIMOKURI re: filing of report on conscription attainment of military age. Will they receive it? They will. He'll bring it.

1022 o To NAKAMURA at /YSB:/ inquiry about yesterdays rates. N. says they are changing all the remittances for Japan into dollars, and they are paid in Yokohama. The price is about \$24—24 points. /This?/ is to pay for a telegram so what will \$5.93 be in yen? N. says the rate is about \$24 for ¥100 / then giggles and opines that \$24 is quite a bit to pay tho that is the rate they give their guests!/  
 1058 i NAKATSUKA reads long rebuttal by Kita denying acquaintance with Tadaake IIZUKA /see papers for 10-28-41/ N. at one point says he wants "to clear (Kita) from this case" by pointing out that IIZUKA was here in 1935, long before Kita.

1110 o TUGE to OI. NI.

1131 i Family talk. NI.

1140 o To RCA for messenger.

1141 o For time.

1150 ? (FPM) NI.

1152 i NISHI to Sakai. NI.

1200 o No answer.

1201 o MURAOKA to HIGA (girl) asking for her father. He invites him to come to the office this afternoon about 3,30.

1415 o (FPM) The ship will be in on the 31st.

1420 o Sakai to ITAGAKI re one cloisonne vase belonging to to the honorary J. consul at San Juan, probably an American, but whose name we do not know. Things could be handled infinitely better if we knew the other man's (recipients?) name. (It is from the present or the previous Foreign Minister to the honorary consul at San Juan. There is no price indicated.) Itagaki: I think we had better wait till it arrives and then see how to handle it.

1-502

1432 o Sahara to YOKOYAMA /?/ Out. Have him call if he gets back by 3 o'clock.

1434 o Seki to SATO. Out. (To MIYAMOTO) Seki wishes to talk over with SATO the question of 4 yards of some kind of cloth.

1440 i Re various children of a man who died on Kauai.

1441 i Re office hours. Up to three. Caller then asks whether a child born two months ago, but of whose birth the family had just learned, cannot be registered immediately with X and thereby acquire Japanese citizenship—No. It is absolutely impossible.—Isn't there any way it can be done?—No. None whatever—(as a matter of fact there is a way called "restoration" of J. citizenship, but the child would have to be in Japan in order to have his previously non existing J. citizenship "restored".)

1445 i An eldest son wishes to return to Japan and asks what steps he must take as an eldest son who has an eldest son born here who was not registered at X within the prescribed period. He wants the child to be a J. citizen—After two weeks it is impossible to give the child J. citizenship if not registered at X.—Isn't there any way?—If you return to Japan with the child "restoration" proceedings may be inaugurated—You can't restore J. citizenship here?—No. there is absolutely no way of doing it here. After two weeks have elapsed the child is an American and nothing else.—Even if my ignorance of the child's birth until today prevented registration at X?—That has nothing to do with it. If the child's birth was registered with the Board of Health, take documentary proof along with you and the whole thing can be arranged in Japan.

1447 o —to UEDA. Out. Have him call tomorrow morning for a correction.

1448 o Sahara to KAWAMOTO re mistake in data. Please bring for correction.

1450 o To RCA for messenger.

1451 i Woman to OG re XP procedure. Routine.

1450 i Same woman for further details. She asks whether she has to have her parent's consent. They are opposed; she is 19—You will have to have their consent if you are under 20, for you will have to have them sign

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the petition (Caller is under considerable strain. Her parents want her to return to Japan and want her to keep her J. citizenship but she wants to cut loose from it entirely.).

End

1-504

WEDNESDAY, 29 OCTOBER, 1941

- 0905 1 (FPM) Woman asks whether it is true that all baggage must be on the docks early—Yes (She then asks about deferment of military service.).
- 0945 1 Inquiry as to the meaning of "Maru".
- 0946 1 /can't hear it because of noise in record—something about a chokusen—straight line/.
- 0947 1 NISHIMURA, Mataso, asking something about enlistment.
- 1021 1 To SAKAI re: Conscription levies. Routine.
- 1022 o to NYK. YUGE calling for "Take" YOSHIOKA giving information re CHRICHTON, Colvil M. directing him to issue a ticket for him. He is on the Taiyo. Also re: a NEWMAN /to take care of him?/.
- 1034 1 Fragment.
- 1035 o To S. B. to Mr. CHRICHTON—will he come up and fill in the application for a visa. They hear he is trying to go to Japan and /they?/ have received a wire from Japan. C. will come in this afternoon.
- 1103 1 Inquiry whether there is time to get an exemption claim back for the conscription summons. This boat will be okay.
- 1105 1 To MURAOKA. NC. Somebody too busy to play today.
- 1111 o For Mrs. SMYTHE of the Senate chamber. Call 59471.
- 1111 o To 59471. Mrs. Smythe speaking. Would like a copy of the M-day bill. Doesn't know if they have any more. Will check and mail one.
- 1302 1 Inquiry as to hours of business.
- 1318 1 Inquiry about conscription. deferment.
- 1326 1 Inquiry about conscription deferment.
- 1333 1 Inquiry about conscription deferment. X will receive them.
- 1341 1 Inquiry about sending money to Japan. Country person. NI.

1-505

- 1540 o to RCA. Will you send a M. B.
- 1712 1 No answer

1-505

THURSDAY, 30 OCTOBER 1941

- 0645 o Staff member to sister (or sister-in-law) about groceries. NI.
- 0901 1 Man to Sakai. NI.
- 0926 1 to MURAOKA re something he wishes to send to Japan by Parcel Post/ Will there be duty levied on it?—We can't say. A great deal depends on the man inspecting the particular parcel in question. Old or new, one or many—all these considerations enter in.
- 0927 o to Mr. Hallett ABEND at RH Hotel. (Connection with Abend not made.)
- 0935 o OG to Nakatsuka for address of ABEND, who is supposed to be living at the RH Hotel. OG reports he wasn't there this morning/ N. suggests she try the Moana. (Then to XX) SB wants a list of the Taiyo Maru's departing passengers. We haven't a complete list yet. There may be further applications. We have turned the matter over to NYK. Would you permit us to publish the list Monday?—I think it is all right.
- 0944 1 A haole at our place wants to send some chocolate candy to Japan. Is that permitted?—I imagine so but I don't know.
- 0945 o OG to Moana for ABEND—Not in. Have him call 2243.
- 1002 1 FPM. Man re deferment. Routine.
- 1020 o XX to ABEND at Moana. Not in. Shall I page him? Tell XX called. —I left that message for him. He will call you when he comes in.—When do you think he will come in?—I don't have the information when he will come back. The message is in his box and under his door and he will receive it as soon as he comes into the hotel. I have not any urgent need (XX interrupts for a long laugh) but I am one of his old friends and would like to hear his voice.
- 1030 o KAWAMOTO of NJ re deadline for applications for passage. Saturday noon.
- 1033 1 SATO to Seki. NI.

1-506

1100 i Man asks whether he can send 5# sugar and 2 or 3# nails to his parents. Yes, but there may be duty to pay. NC; NI.

1105 o Seki to merchant re bill. NI.

1107 o NI

1108 o Seki to MIKAMI. Out. Have him call.

1114 i Dr. Wickerson at Moana Hotel to XX. OG says XX is out and she can't make out Wickerson's name. W. insists he found a message requesting him to call XX. (Could Dr. Wickerson be Hallet Abend's nom d'exile? Or was the note to Abend put in the wrong box?) Call 4416.

1116 i MIKAMI to Seki asking him to come over.

1120 i Elderly man to Sakai re XP ed deferment.

? i Dr. Wickerson to XX. XX wanted ABEND, not W.

1205 i Komatsuya Hotel to YUGE re the allotment (of space on the Taiyo) according to *ken*. Is there any distinction made with regard to citizenship status?—All circumstances are taken into consideration. The fundamental division is into *kens*.

1210 i Girl to X. He's left. Re XP.

1252 i Re application for passage on the Taiyo. The usual system. (What is the usual system? Via NYK).

1255 KANEKO to VX. Out. Have him call 6198.

1315 i To MURAOKA re number of declarations of applications. Quite a number left.

1340 i Miss IMAMURA to Muraoka. NI.

1355 i Girl asks for YAGI, ABE, AND HORI. None of them there. (The three lads who transferred from the Harrison to the Taiyo here last week.)

1413 i FPM. TOGASHI mentioned, but this conversation was interrupted by the next one. NC.

1500 o NI

1-507

1502 o NI

End

1-508

FRIDAY, 31 OCTOBER, 1941

0848 o Muraoka to ? saying the tennis matches will start at 10 o'clock Sunday.  
0849 ABEND to XX. Out. When will he be in? In a few minutes—When I got in yesterday your office was closed. I am going out this morning, but I will call him later in the day.

0851 o Muraoka. NI.

0855 i Woman to Muraoka re deferment. Routine except that M. tells her X will be closed Monday, a holiday.

0902 i Re deferment. Routine.

0913 o Seki to OI of JCC. Out; I'll have him call.

0923 o To Glabe wireless for ISHII. Out.

0934 i Re deferment.

0935 i Re deferment.

0940 o Seki to HARADA. He left a few minutes ago. Then to Mrs. H. asking about a cool room for a (Mr?) TAKEMURA arriving the next day or so (presumably on the Taiyo) who will be here a week before proceeding to the states. She has already had word from XX to this effect and is going to give him a cool room being vacated very shortly.

0945 i Re deferment. Question by woman as usual.

0946 i SHINAGAWA to Seki re deferment (First re office supplies). Seki mentions ABE and his prices. (ABE appliance Co.?) NI/

0950 o Muraoka to INADA ordering groceries.

1108 o XX to KIMURA re necessary supplies. Replenishment of the oil is the main thing. (Long discussion but nothing of interest. K. seems very cooperative. He is trying to make arrangements for cleaning a place for the customs searches. He expects the ship to dock about 0800. He expects to be down at the dock at 0730. Both are in good spirits.)

1116 o Yuge to MIKAMI asking him to come to X.

1123 o NI

1-509

1127 i SAKAMOTO requests information as to data of his family.

- 1145 i Query re an application for XP.  
 1148 o Muraoka to friend.  
 1152 o Muraoka to Toshio (first name). Sports. NI.  
 1154 o Muraoka NI.  
 1155 o Muraoka NI.  
 1155 i Seki to Yuge re some financial matters and how to treat the public funds collected /for the Taiyo/.  
 1238 i Query re conscription.  
 1239 i for SEKI. Out /?/.  
 1244 i Inquiry for someone—Not in.  
 1305 o Muraoka to NAKAMURA. Sports. NI.  
 1306 o Muraoka. NI.  
 1308 i Inquiring re afternoon hours.  
 1308 o Muraoka to KIMURA. Out. Left message. NI.  
 1315 o KITA to someone re Monday being a holiday. v. brief.  
 1320 i OTANI (woman) to SAKAI. Something about a copy of the census register. She wants to take it home and he'll get it that evening or something. She has to make the proper moves it seems to re-register the fishing boats previously confiscated. He is explaining to her the difference between having the boat owned by one's own son who is a citizen and having it owned by a stranger or mere acquaintance who acts as a dummy. /But they agree that it amounts to the same thing./ He asks her to be sure to return the papers he is lending her and she promises to—she probably won't work at it after 9 PM this evening.  
 1341 o YUGE for SEKI. His superior over there /in Japan/ says that /it/ is good. IWANAGA is /on?/ the boat. Yes, probably. So there is only TOKUNAGA. Something about loading /chocolate?/ onto the boat. The words hachi hachi are mentioned toward the end of the talk. One says hachi hachi /literally eight eight/ and the other says "I understand." /The recorder doesn't!/. This expression is used for a game of cards. Also for a squadron of 8 battleships or 8 cruisers.  
 1407 o X to Mr. NEWMAN. Can he come tomorrow or Tuesday since Monday is a Japanese holiday. He'll try to come tomorrow.  
 1448 o to NYK for Mrs. Nishi? Asks where KANEKO is. He is phoning. Here he comes. K. is so distorted I can't understand him at all.

End

1-511

SATURDAY, 1 NOVEMBER 1941

- 1038 o NI.  
 1110 o To Yamashiro Hotel for a children's room, (for whom?)  
 1128 i Man asks for correct spelling (in Japanese) of new premier's name.  
 1140 i NI.  
 1149 i to Seki. FPM. Caller went down to the ship to see if he could locate the cosignee thru the purser's office, but no such message had been left there at all. As a matter of fact? did come—I made enquiry thinking one of the passengers might have brought it in his baggage, but again the quest was unsuccessful.—Is that so?—The Embassy (probably J. embassy in Washington) intervened with the treasury to facilitate entry. I don't think there would have been any trouble—Is it a big thing?—Yes. Rather. (In the part recorded no name was mentioned, no article was specified. I have no clue as to the nature of the article.)  
 1241 o NR.  
 1306 o Seki to Kyorakkan (hotel) asking for one room up to the departure of the Taiyo on the 4th. She tells him to wait. (Cut off in the rush, but gist elsewhere in log as monitored direct.  
 1300 i NR.  
 1309 ? FPM Re mail on Taiyo.  
 1310 i Kyorakkan (a hotel) (a call-back) to Seki asking how many guests there are.—One.—When?—Right away.—What food? Probably occidental.—(K. will take him. Not sure who it is, but probably one of the diplomats or other leading man from the ship.)  
 1315 i Man wants to send a package on the Taiyo but has heard that she will take no mail. He wonders whether this was a J. govt. decision.—No. It was the American Govt's decision.—I heard that the P. O. was turning down and returning packages already mailed. There are mobs

of Japanese at the P. O. who want to mail letters and parcels.—They can't get anything very definite out of the P. O. The P. O. apparently doesn't know itself what it can accept and what reject.

1-512

1317 o Seki to Mrs. Harada asking her how the matter of the room was finally decided this morning. When they came back from the ship this morning Mr. IWANAGA alone (of the diplomats?) came here. A little later Mr. TOKUNAGA called in about a room and I had to report that matters were a little hard to manage just then. FUJITA is leaving shortly and his room will be free then. Mr. TOKUNAGA said he has a *futon* of his own and would be glad to sleep in the closet or anywhere if space could be spared. Food can be arranged for them, but the main thing is a place to sleep—I discussed this with Mrs. Yuge and she thought they could stay at XX's house—But it would be not quite proper for a married couple to stay there (Does Seki think XX would neglect to observe the canons of diplomatic immunity as he did the night of the Sumida wedding when he got drunk and chased the Sumida maid round and round, the bedpost?)—Fujita's room would be free on the 4th and the Tokunagas could take it then. How long would they want a room?—Till Friday—If they could stay somewhere till Tuesday we could take care of them—If they were an older couple they could stay at XX's without hesitation, but they are a newly married (or young married) couple which complicates matters. (They both laugh knowingly). In full realization of the risks involved in a young woman's staying at XX's. Mrs. H. agrees to ask Mr. HASIYA to move to a small room for two nights to make way for the TOKUNAGAS if no other suitable place can be found.

1325 o Seki to Kyorakkan re the young couple. Seki tries to be sure a married couple will be welcome there. (The hotel is often used by people less interested in the enduring bonds of life.) She says it will.

1452 o NA. Fragment while caller was waiting for XX.

1545 o to ? for messenger boy.

1547 o NI.

1605 o To Pensicola Hotel. NR; NA.

16-? 1 re; Age for draft /American/.

1-512-A

(Addition entries missed on first log)

0907 i Inquiring re passenger on Taiyo. Haven't got list yet.

? ? To 6907. The awful nes breaks. The Taiyo will not take any mail! The P. O. says so. Washington has sent a cable to the postmaster.

0945 o To Mackay radio for messenger.

0950 i What time did Taiyo get in?

1000 i Personal call for Sakai?

1007 i Fro Sakai in good english from Alice YONENAKA. Could I come and see you this morning. Wants to bring her copy of certified census registra rather her mothers. /Probably getting expatriated/. He tells her to bring her sheet and he'll look it over.

1047 i Wrong number.

1050 i FPM/ Inquiry re; report of residence abroad for deferment of J. military conscription.

1108 i NI

1135 o for HIROKAWA of registry department of P. O./different Hirokama no doubt/ to check on the mail situation. H. only knows what he heard and picked up. Refers X to P. M.

1137 o To P. M. Not in. Asst. P. M. will be in about 1230.

1159 ? Fragment re XP.

1202 o To NYK. Message from Minister of Communications via XX which is referred to TAKASAMA at 2772 /?/. Gives his own number as 4416.

1213 o XX to KUSUNOBU /?/ his cook /?/. Wants lunch for four people at his residence. /Probably KIMURA is one.

1215 o XX to /maid at home?/ In about 10 minutes 4 guests will be coming. But no one is there and cook is out!

1217 o XX to /another kitchen?/ Today is a *wedding day*. Therefore SO SORRY! /Poor Kimura?/

1218 o He tries again. Hooray! Success. Orders a simple meal not party style since he planned to have them at his home originally, he says.



# 890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1-512-B

0956 1 OI calling about "educational films" /?/. Afterward talking about a Kwanto style doll /?/ /Wasn't there some question whether one could be carried as an "award" to some American commission or something? Apparently the verdict was negative from the tone of the voices.

—End—

1-513

SUNDAY, Nov. 2, 1941

1510 1 Rang a long time; finally answered but callee not there.

End

1-514

MONDAY, 3 NOVEMBER, 1941

0909 1 from SOGA. Recently Mr. TOKUNAGA has come from the Foreign Office and Japan. Am inviting him for dinner, also Dr. Motokazu MORI and VX/& others?/6 P. M. tonight. Some possibility of another farewell at the boat. Invitee will have to excuse himself from that if he can. At the first part of the conversation SOGA explains, I think, that he knows, or knows of TOKUNAGA thru Mr. Ken HARADA, his son's wife's brother, who is in the Foreign Office, tho born in Hawaii. Not very sure of this tho.

0934 1 From OMI Shoten. When will the Hikama get to Yokohama?

0955 1 NI

1004 1 Conscription. Routine.

1024 1 NI

1028 1 NI

1221 o Routine. NI.

1224 o to HARADA /?/. If he comes in have him call X.

1355 1 HARADA asking about Taiyo mail situation as concerns the notification of attainment of conscription age reports which have to arrive by Nov. 31 in order to comply with Japanese law. Is asked to call tomorrow since today is a Japanese holiday. They say that since the Taiyo is out, another boat will probably be all right.

1400 1 NEWMAN to XX. Would like to come up for a few minutes right away.

1508 1 Inquiry. Woman with no passport is worried /lest the boat return to Hawaii?/. She introduces herself as an ordinary woman. Probably interesting but not urgent just now.

1611 1 NI.

1-515

#2 log

0820 1 NR. Star Bulletin calling. Call after 9:00.

0839 1 NI

1046 1 NI. Re deferment.

1047 o OI of JCO to Chamber of Commerce (Hamilton) asking whether there has been word on mail situation. No word from Sam King either. The postal inspectors expect word this afternoon.

End

1-516

TUESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER, 1941

0918 1 Man to Muraoka re 3 games (tennis?) tomorrow.

0927 1 FPM. NAKATSUKA to XX. XX has no news from Washington re mail situation. XX wanted the Taiyo Maru to take mail to Japan. (See the S-B.) XX "Mr. King knows (the character of) Mr. Haan." This in answer to N's remark about the "fight" between the two.

0936 1 /VX and YOSHIOKA/ YOSHIOKA seems *furious* at something. Sounds as tho he thinks he is being cheated. Perfectly *enraged*. Something about /the authorities?/ not thinking it worth while to telegraph on the advice /or request or for the sake of/ a nikkel\* or a whole boat load of them. (\*nikkel American citizen of J. ancestry.). YOSHIOKA cites the discrimination shown towards the nikkel—the numerous personal questions asked etc. etc. compared with the treatment accorded other Americans and VX /?/ replies that it is discrimination, isn't it? Perhaps

he is talking about the questions asked of the incoming Taiyo passengers. Anyhow he is still furious and very indignant. Also something about the mail being held up. Towards the end of this long harrangue Y. suggests that VX intercede—just how is not clear—possibly thru the Federal courts, for the nordsai bansho is mentioned. Probably the effects of red tape plus extra work, worry and anxiety have added fuel to Yoshioka's rage. He is very disturbed to say the least. They cool down enough to laugh a bit toward the end.

- 1028 i TAKAYANAGI. NI.
- 1002 i Re deferment.
- 1003 i Re deferment.
- 1045 i From a fellow returning to Japan regarding military service there. Is advised to explain to Japanese authorities his real address (in Japan) and they will understand.
- 1053 i KANEKO to VX re baggage. Inspected yesterday at 7 and today again—they have been trying to get cigarettes. Will VX help as they can't get enough? He will. Discuss sailing time etc.
- 1126 o SEKI to TOKUNAGA /?/ to say that DOI is waiting for him at X. /A little other talk—can't get it easily./

1-517

- 1142 i VX to XX—He's busy with someone in "that room" (the lowered-to-inaudibility voice indicated that it was a conference which she had instructions not to interrupt). Tell him when he finishes to please wait on the matter of the (NYK?) company's telegrams.
- 1144 o /to RCA?/ "Your messenger just came in here and and took 3 messages back. We'd like you to hold them, return them, if you will please. O. K.
- 1203 i To SEKI to inquire as to a reasonable price for stockings, eh! Bought 1 dozen.
- 1327 i FPM. For TAKAGISHI. Out. Gone to Ala Wai.
- 1345 i To SEKI from TOKUNAGA. /very blurred, but something about a car, probably asking SEKI to have him driven somewhere either by taxi or by X car.
- 1350 o To Hiberly. XX would like to come down. Make date for 2:10.
- 1405 o to KYORAKKAN asking if TOKUNAGA has gone out yet. No—not yet. Well, the car is "dry", so please have him wait a little please.
- 1407 i for SAKAI. He's out till 3.
- 1407 i Wrong number for Easy Appliances.
- 1435 i Fragment
- 1450 o XX Will you send a messenger boy.

End

1-518

WEDNESDAY, 5 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 0917 ? NC; NI
- 1002 i Re deferment.
- 1005 i WEST of UH wants name of XX.
- 1007 i JARAKI of Mitsukoshi to VX.
- 1023 i NI; NC
- 1038 i Re expatriation; NI
- 1058 i Inquiry re mail
- 1005 i HARADA to IWANAGA; wanted to invite him to dinner tonight, but since it is an hour earlier than usual will invite him for lunch. Did. Something about HACHIYA and Nov. 24th. Can't get last part at all.
- 1113 i For /VX?/ from YOSHI at NYK.
- 1115 o NI.
- 1343 o For messenger boy.
- 1449 i NAKATSUKA to XX re KURUSO. Is XX planning any reception? Hasn't yet decided. XX has received a message. It will take about 5 days from Hong Kong. Foreign Office message said he would arrive by clipper, but didn't say when he would arrive here. XX doesn't know much about KURNSO. Wife is real Caucasian. Oh! Oh! Oh! Ah! Ah; "She's quite a Japanese lady. She eats Japanese food and is very polite and looking very nice.
- 1457 i NC; NI.
- 1459 o NI.

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- 1636 o to (4)? YUGE to Mrs. NISHI. She asks him to call and gives him the number 67182 /that of the boat/.  
 1640 i KANEKO to YUGE arranging about working and the tickets etc. tomorrow morning. /A lot of accounting still to do. Long discussion./  
 1711 i About sailing.  
 1-519

THURSDAY, 6 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 1000 i NI.  
 1020 Seki to Nakamura of HBD. NI.  
 1035 i NAKAMURA to Seki. NI.  
 1045 o Routine data call. Very lengthy.  
 1055 o Sakai to George SAKAMOTO re deferment.

End

1-520

FRIDAY, SATURDAY, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 7 TO 9

Out of Commission.

1-521

MONDAY, 10 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 0905 o Sakai to PAA asking about arrival of clipper. About 1700 tomorrow.  
 0910 i NAKATSUKA to XX re delay in arrival of KURUSU—VX and I will go out to meet him—The N. J. says he is going to stay at the B. H. Hotel—That's right.—Are you going to have a lunch for him?—No. I'm not organizing any parties—Will there be a private party at X?—Yes. I think so.—When is he leaving?—He will stay overnight.  
 0915 i Komatsuya Hotel to Sakai re XP. NI  
 0918 i Girl for VX re KURUSU. Not in yet. Please have him call to let us know when the Ambassador is arriving.  
 0918 o Muraoka to friend re cup (athletic trophy). NI Very lengthy. Sports chatter.  
 0925 o Muraoka to friend re sport. NI.  
 0927 i Nakatsuka to XX asking whether KURUSU will call on governor and army and navy leaders here—I don't know. No word yet.—Are any of the leaders of the J. community going with you to meet him?—SATO [pres. of JCC and UJS] may go. On Saturday morning he was sure whether he would be allowed to go to the landing at Pearl City. He will check with the authorities today.—Who is going to be at the dinner?—Not decided yet; we are still discussing the matter—There will be about 10 guests. XX—Any haoles?—No. A strictly Japanese gathering.—What time will it start?—About 6.30.  
 0930 i ITAGAKI to Seki re the possibility of sending parcels to the Embassy re American Railway Express.  
 0938 i For XX; busy; for VX; "You'll have to call him" "Oh shux. What's the number." "5243".  
 0943 o To tell—?—that tho tomorrow is a holiday the stores will probably be open. Will he make preparations to get in touch with them and have them stay closed.  
 0951 o To ONOH to Sumitomo Bank. Tell him that party is postponed till tomorrow at 6.30 because of delay of clipper etc. Will be at official residence.  
 1030 i To XX from Pan Pacific telling him about Education week and that Mr. Long is speaking. She is hoping XX and VX could come. Sorry—today they both have to attend to "my friend's luncheon."—Yes. VX too. Too bad.

End

1-522

TUESDAY, 11 NOVEMBER, 1941

Holiday; closed.

- 1207 o Seki to Morimura saying KURUSU has been delayed a day and as a result XX's kitchen help has been driven crazy. Seki then asks M. to come over with KIKAWA /?/ this evening about 1800 for dinner with XX [to help eat up the excess food prepared.]  
 1208 i Seki to ? announcing delay and inviting him to XX's house.

1-523

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1941

- 0839 o For MASASHIMA. Shall she have him call? He's out, will be back about 10. He's at the corner of Kukui and Hall where /he/ just sent a blacksmith. Something about No. 2 /house beyond a Chinese family's?/ She finally has X call at 10.
- 0845 i Wrong No.
- 0855 o Yuge /?/ calling Bob. Not in.
- 0915 i FPM Routine inquiry
- 0930 i For XX from Mr. FORE /?/ of the Airlines. Wants to come up this morning. OG says OK. /Probably going to explain what happened to the plane!/  
 0933 o To SASAKI at YSB. Muraoka re sports.  
 0935 o Muraoka re sports.  
 0937 o For cigarettes. NI  
 0939 i Re Illumination for the party. NI.  
 0954 i To Seki. The party is off. Much laughter about something.  
 0958 o To "Jimmy" from NAKATA. "You tell one of my boys come get me at the Japanese Consul right away." NI.  
 1000 i Routine re J. conscription.  
 1015 o to ? No come down yet. NI  
 1035 o From MORIOKA. NI  
 1048 o to KUSANOBU /?/ re seating arrangements. 15 persons can't be divided well. How about 16? Also about times etc.  
 1130 i Lt. Riddick to XX reporting clipper left Midway at 7.30 this morning.  
 1133 o To S/B/ to NAKATSUKA. Not in.  
 1145 i Inquiry on KURUSU. OG doesn't exactly know. Inquisitor gets hot at such ignorance. 5:10 she says.  
 1150 o To HBD for NAKAMURA from Seki to ask how the photographs turned out. Be careful of them.

1-524

- 1325 o To Royal Hawaiian Hotel. SEKI went down yesterday to make a reservation and asked XX to tell hotel that plane is coming in this afternoon.  
 1345 o Inquiry re China Clipper. 5:15

End

1-525

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1941

- 0925 o To P.A.A. from X. What time is the China Clipper leaving for the coast?" . . . "Three o'clock." X thought it was 1 or 5. Mr. KURUSU must be there at 2.  
 0935 o NI. XX asking when plane is leaving for S. F.  
 0942 i NAKATSUKA of S. B. to OG. XX did give KURUSU a private party last night (according to OG).  
 1001 o to II airways re China Clipper.  
 1025 o Wrong no.  
 1030 i KAWAZOE to VX. He's phoning. Call on other phone.  
 1045 i KAWAZOE to SSKI tho he really wants VX.  
 1147 o NI  
 1155 i From a man from Royal Hawaiian who has called SEKI's home and can't make himself understood there. "The ambassador is putting up a real fight to pay his own bill. He's not to pay it, eh?" "Yes (!) Mr. YOUKI is to get the bill and he will pay.

End

1-526

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1941

- 1045 o For someone who is out.  
 1048 o For TSUSHIMA—out. For FUJIKAWA. Morioka calling.  
 1050 i For MORIOKA from TSUSHIMA. The cup is finished. NI.  
 1103 o To HBD. Fragment.  
 1302 o MURAOKA. NI.

End

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1-527

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1941

- 0930 o Official at X wants someone to call him.  
 0948 o To Mackay radio. "Will you send a messenger boy?" XX.  
 1058 i To SAKAI from CLAUDUS /?/ who will come tonight to his house about 8. One asks the other if he has seen the new Shimpo /weekly/. There is a discussion of the necessity /of having or of not having/ bonds. Asks whether he has studied the problem in relation to the freeze. They are worried about the future possibility of war and especially something that ABEND has lately written /probably Shimpo has quoted from the last "Life"/, also worried about the future of commerce.  
 0915 o To Mackay Radio. XX has received message #238, but has received only page 1, not page 2. M. says last night they sent two pages at about 7 o'clock. Then, at 7.25, he sent corrected copy of page 1. Seattle made a mistake, so they sent a corrected copy of page one. Page 2 is all right.  
 1115 i To XX. Busy. Nakatsuka.

End

1-528

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1941

No activity

1-529

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1941

- 0946 i Inquiry re expatriation.  
 1005 o to — KANE from SEKI. This morning they are paying bills.  
 1045 i TAKAHASHI /woman/ re: the fate of a 25 year old U. of H. graduate of dual citizenship who has become a public school teacher. He has never been registered as a Japanese citizen. First step is to get registered etc.  
 1316 i From KOMATSIYA about "yesterday's case" / The hotel is apparently handling the deferment petitions of KOICHI and FUJIKAWA. NI.  
 1340 o SEKI to OI. Something about paying /?/ for registration. Instructions have come by cable from the minister. There is some other problem to it tho. They were advised, after conversations with the American government, that there might not be any necessity of registering /the money?/. So SEKI thinks it is ok. /Some diggerel about somebody from X marrying a fatty /?/ Seems to be between a Miss DO and KIMURA of the bank.

End

1-530

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1941

- 0905 i FPM. Muraoka on tennis.  
 0910 o To HBD. MORIOKA to NAKAMURA whom he asks for FUJIMURA with whom he discusses tennis at length.  
 0915 o MURAOKA—tennis  
 0917 i from a man who wants to speak to the "one who uses cables." Caller is Eigo CHIROMA—a senior at U. H. who is making a sociological study of the Okinawas in Hawaii. Would like to get statistical material about their occupation status, distribution, numbers, how many have left for Okinawa etc. X doesn't have those facts. C. says the Jiji Annual has some information—he thought they had got it from X. X says they don't keep record of how many come and go, and especially this was a long time ago—They keep "just if they come and report—but don't keep track of the numbers. C. asks how he'd get the materials. X says to ask the Okinawa people "they have some sort of club you know,"—but he doesn't think they have such records. But X thinks he can get the general idea. Refers him to immigration.  
 0928 i To SAKAI re hospital bill.  
 0954 o To SATO Music Store saying the radio at the official residence of XX last evening and for some time past has been so when you listen there is freekune /?/ —something the matter with it anyway. Asks him to come up and look at it.  
 1007 o For Mr. /UE?/ MASE. Out. Call 2634.  
 1008 o To OYAMA. Out. Try 6311 /?/.  
 1120 i From Mrs. NISHI to say goodbye.

End

1-531

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1941

- 1009 o Fragment
- 1028 o MURAOKA to girl. Someone is to bring "bron paper" (birth certificate) in within two weeks.
- 1127 i to MORIMURA /?/ frag.
- 1415 o YUGE to N. Y. K.'s TAKEI. NI
- 1437 i From ONODA of Sumitomo who supplies or is supplied some data on addresses and names in Japan.

End

1-532

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1941

No activity—Holiday

Friday, November 21, 1941

- 0930 i FPM./ Mistake in log?/ Sounds like UEMURA to maud. "They haven't come yet, have they?" "No."
- 0934 i Routine. NI
- 0955 o Asking YAMAMOTO about a souvenir for a deceased friend. /Has he/ received it? Yes.
- 1011 o URAOKA to YAMAGUCHI. Wants to get some information re him or his mother. Y. apologizes—he has received the letter from X but has been too busy to answer. Will answer in 2 or 3 days. M. says Saturday till noon, other days till three /for him to come in?/
- 1022 o Something is at 6 tonight. gurōbu?
- 1027 i to MURAOKA re club affairs.
- 1033 i From OAHU JUNK CO. re matter called about previously. the YAMAMOTOT business. No one is around now. This evening /we?/ will inform /him?/ and tomorrow a. m. he will let you know how much it is.
- 1347 i to SAKAI from MACHIDA. The pictures are finished. Shall she bring them? No. He'll pick them up.
- 1420 i to SAKAI from KOMATSUYA with a new ——? Paketto HIROSHIMA on August 23. "I don't remember attaching and due /paper?/ on it." Probably NI.

1-533

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

- 0050 o X for U. S. Coast Guard for Mr. Anthony. (Someone speaking for Mr. VX.) re letter rec'd from CG. CG is preparing new passes for everyone who has legitimate business on the waterfront and has requested list of such people from X.

End

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1941

- 1008 o FPM re the evening KURUSU was here—asks for the bill for photographs of the occasion. \$27.50.
- 1128 i NAKATSUKA to XX telling him about a Frederick Kuh U. P. report from London of a provisional agreement between J. and U. S. in Washington. XX:—"Is it from London?/!/ It is! N. also reports that the new dual citizenship bill has been approved by the House sub-committee. Provides for compulsory renunciation of foreign citizenship by persons in U. S. Gov't. or armed forces, and voluntary renunciation of foreign citizenship by all others holding dual citizenship. XX heard on the Tokyo radio about the Tatsuta, but hasn't received any official word—he says. He doesn't know if there will be a ship to Hawaii.
- 1157 i From applicant for XP. "For a person in the government service it is very inconvenient to be a Japanese citizen." Wants to hurry.
- 1402 o To Mackay for messenger.
- 1410 o To HBD. Muraoka for either NAKAMURA or FUJIWARA. Gets F. re tennis.

End

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1-535

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1941

- 0931 o From SAHARA /?/ Something about Saturday. NI. Not regular X call.
- 1025 i For SEKI from SATO SHOTEN about a bill.
- 1102 i To SAKAI from YAMAMOTO. Something about an order for 2,000 cases of something Friday, and about the price, and about a wire in connection with them.
- 1131 o To AKAYAMA (girl) from MURAOKA. NI
- 1140 o to MACKAY. X for messenger.
- 1258 o for ? Out. If he returns have him call SAKAI
- 1317 o re Sa to Kinjiro and Saito Karoku /to a girl/ The place isn't written in. Please drop in and sign them.
- 1357 o To Mackay for messenger.

End

1-536

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941

- 0924 i to SAKAI from /Selichi/ HAYAMA /Pharmacist of Honolulu Pharmacy Co./ Your photographs are finished. OK. I'll get them tomorrow or the next day.
- 1014 i girl /INAGE/?/ asking for a census registration person. She was registered /in Japan/ 24 years ago, but the receipt has been lost. What to do? Girl explains she is calling for a girl whose /parents/?/ have died and because of her job it has become inconvenient not to have it /XP/ Finally some satisfactory arrangement is made.
- 1041 o MURAOKA to girl, ISHIURA giving an address and family information in Japan. Also re some relative in Pahoa. NI
- 1045 i Fro SEKI from YSB re some "usual bills". YSB wants to write a letter about it.
- 1342 i To SEKI from MIYAMOTO of YSB. It is \$14.00. They have finished the investigation of cash on hand; will bring it up.
- 1343 i NAKATSUKA to XX. N asks him to answer Sen. GILLETTE'S charges. XX says he has heard from the Japanese radio that the Tatuta is coming to L. A. and Balboa. "I received no information at all from Tokyo. I was very sorry."
- 1502 o to NAKASHIMA or ? MOKIOKA? for a date. She puts him off till Tues. of next week.

End

1-537

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941

- 0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX asking for a reaction to Sen Gilette. Asks XX if he knows that Jack Wakayama has said that the Hawaiian Japanese Civic Association would welcome an investigation. XX asks if he is here in Honolulu! /XX is well uninformed on most subjects!/ XX says he has repeated that same statement many times already and thinks that is enough. He feels that if there were an investigation things would be more than 100 percent OK. N. says if they do find some un-American activity going on, the sooner the better so they /the U. S./ can get rid of them. /Friendly agreement and polite laughter Curtaln/.
- 0922 i About date for some dinner in past. NI
- 0950 o Private call by someone from Star Bulletin. Everybody /at X?/ is out. What to do? They'll be there in a few minutes.
- 0952 o Man to girl. NI
- 1005 i for SAKAI from man. Lunch date.
- 1030 i FPM Routine inquiry re nationality
- 1038 o Short conversation but can't get it. Something about "three o'clock."
- 1052 i From ONO of Osaka Shoten re attainment of military age form.
- 1100 o to RCA re message received this morning. No. 1070 want to check. "On first page, second line, 8th word : CCFGR; 10th word, ITLJS; on page two, line 2, 9th word: P(B?) MEDZ; last line, first word, IRWPB and third word ZZGRO, and the ninth, FPOEN.
- 1125 i Is SAKAI there? This afternoon at 1.30 I'm coming to your /house/.

- 1328 i FPM about something /someone has left?/ in a drawer.  
 1338 o SAKAI asking about films. They (the store?) called about them this morning whether to send them or not. They agree that someone is to bring them over.

1-538

- 1442 i to MURAOKA from MIKAMI re deferment of conscription blanks. If born in August 6, 1905 you don't need to fill out the blank do you. No, you don't. Or if born in 1925 you do not need to, do you. No. Thank you.

End

1-539

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1941

- 0905 o SAKAI to ? about doing something on a commission basis. Also wants him to take some pictures of the graduation /or a member of the graduates?/ Wants 2 pictures. /Personal NI  
 0925 i Pro VX. "Will you call his other phone?"  
 0936 o FPM from VX. Sounds important, but very hard to get because of faulty recording./ Mention of a /black?/ smith's shop of Fort St, and a few isolated words, but no other clue.  
 0950 i For SAKAI from HAYASHI /can't get this message but tone sounds legitimate and innocent./  
 1015 o to OKUMURA /having something to do with/ children. His "card" in the X is incomplete. Will he come in and finish filling it out? He will.  
 1025 o for NAKASHIMA. Out. Have him call 2243. Caller not or VX. Man.  
 1150 o For Yoshino, a girl /from MURAOKA/ This is the same girl that put him off before. Sample talk:  
     Yoshino?  
     Yes.  
     How about it?  
     I don't know what you're talking about.  
     Don't say that!  
     Have you some matter to talk about?  
     Of course.  
     What is it?  
     etc. NI  
 1200 o XX /home?/ wants to eat right away.

End

1-540

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30

No activity

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

- 1000 o to RCA, for messenger  
 1045 o to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. \$45.82. They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation but SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation is. (Doubt is S does either!)  
 1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi despatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent. First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not had any information from TOKYO to prepare for possible closing (he says). He saw "a few lines," in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self.  
 1150 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday. This morning /It was set?/ at 9.30, -- no 10. At X? Yes. /This conversation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./  
 1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling.



**898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

1326 o YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the office.  
/Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/  
1330 o for NAKASHIMA. Date with her.  
1352 o to a girl. NI  
1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out. When back? 3 or 4. Well then please  
/have him call me? First part was missing/.

End

1-541

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941

1429 o to TANAKA. Has he sent the things. Yes. The price will be about \$30  
since prices are going up. Too bad. NI  
1429 i MURAKAMI to SAKAI re Fujino. "Is it all right or do we have to  
send a letter first? The latter M. will come over. XP. NI.

Discontinued

/! Sic transit gloria mundi!/  
RX  
R. P. P.

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 38B

INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE VICE-CONSUL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41—12/2/41

SECRET

2-247

WEDNESDAY, 1 OCTOBER 1941

0915 o VX to MIKAMI for a car at 3:45.  
1143 i XX to VX. XX is going to Waikiki at about 2:30.

End

2-248

THURSDAY, 2 OCTOBER 1941

1027 o VX to KIMURA.—He's out.—I'll call again.

End

2-249

FRIDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1941

1011 o VX to KAWAZOE at NJ dictating a statement in reply to Gillette's state-  
ment. /See NJ for text./ Interrupted.  
1016 o VX to KAWAZOE, continuing the statement. K. reads it back as a check.  
1020 o VX to KAWAZOE /?/ of the HH with the same statement on the Gillette  
question.  
1030 o VX to KAWAZOE at HH /?/ adding that the S-B carried on 4 January a  
statement by Senator Gillette, followed the next day by a S-B editorial.

End

2-250

SATURDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

2-251

SUNDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1941

Not Covered

2-252

MONDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1941

0925 o /To #4./ VX tells wife that he will have lunch at the Pan-Pacific.  
/Gilbert Bowles, Sr., spoke./

End

2-253

TUESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1941

- 0913 1 Woman to VX.—Out. /Woman speaks in English at first and then later in Japanese. It was probably MORIMURA who answered./—When will he be back, do you know?—Very shortly. And what is your name, please?—/She falters a little in her embarrassment and says:/ I just wanted to talk to him personally.—I see.—I suppose that's all right, isn't it? /M. hangs up without answering or giving her a chance to finish./
- 1000 1 /FPM/ /Verbatim, woman speaking:/ It is the second street toward the sea from King. It's just in front of this Castle Church. You probably know it, don't you? The Makiki Church that looks like *o-shiro* /Japanese for "castle"/. It's just the other side of McKinley High.—Oh, is that so? I think I can find it quite easily.—Between Pensacola and Piliol.—Oh, I see.—Most anybody knows it, because it's just this side. There are several apartments around a court. The entrance to the court is just across the street from the entrance to Makiki Church, this *o-shiro* church.—I see.—So I think you will find it easily. 1116-A Elm Street.—Is there any indication at the gate of the house or . . .?—Well, the number is out on the . . . /Indistinct/.—You see, 1116-A faces Palm /?/ Street and 1116-A is inside the court.—Alright, quite right.—I'll look for your tomorrow, then. Thank you very much.—Shall I take Mr. XX?—Ah ha, please.—And my wife?—Please. Thank you very much.—Not at all.—Goodbye.
- 1121 1 /From #4/. /Due to technical difficulties I couldn't understand anything. Neither could the principals./

End

2-254

WEDNESDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1941

- 1405 o VX to MIKAMI /?/ to send a car to X. Do you know Elm Street?—No, but I'll check it.—The number is 1116-A Elm Street.

End

2-255

THURSDAY, 9 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

2-256

FRIDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1941

- 1125 ? /FPM/ VX and woman. It is apparent that a picnic is being planned for this weekend. Woman reports there will be 5 or 6 to a car.
- 1401 1 MIKAMI to VX.—Send a taxi over.
- 1415 1 /FPM/ From #4: Mrs. VX to VX. NI.
- 1427 o To #4: VX to wife. VX will soon be home.

End

2-257

SATURDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1941

- 0958 1 YAMADA asks VX whether XX and VX can come to Shunchoro on Monday evening, the 13th, at 6:00.—Yes.

End

2-258

SUNDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

2-259

MONDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1941

- 0925 1 /FPM/ ? to VX re nature of the ships being sent. The word *hikiage* /evacuation/ is to be avoided, and "temporary relief" used in connection with these ships.
- 0940 o VX to Kamura.—Out.—Have him call.

900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

0947 o VX to KUCHIBA.—Not in.

0950 ? /FPM/ ? and VX. A few remarks about mail just received after a long delay.

End

2-260

TUESDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1941

0952 o VX to KAWAMURA of HH. The Nitta Maru is being replaced by the Hikawa. /K. thinks this is "very interesting."/

1000 o OG to "Trouble".

1000 o OG to Repair Service, wondering why 5243 cannot be connected with 6091.—Try again, and dial slowly.

1005 o VX to KAWAZOE, saying the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the Hikawa Maru. /Probably this *Kawazoe* is at NJ./

1010 o /To #4:/ VX to wife saying a cable has come for him. He has talked the matter over with the NYK. /No clue given here as to the nature of the discussion, but it may be that VX and family will return to Japan on the "evacuation ship"./

1020 i Mrs. HAMAMOTO to VX, who can hardly understand her at all. She is one of the fastest chatterers ever heard here./ At 5 o'clock Saturday she invites herself up to see him.—How about 7 Thursday evening?—If business should make it impossible for me to see you, how may I reach you by phone?—8428. /She jumbles it so in pidgin English that neither VX nor I could understand her. After long shots wide of the mark, he finally asks her to give it in plain Japanese. It turned out to be 8429./

1040 o VX tells ? that the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the Hikawa Maru.

1203 i Castle & Cooke to VX re three pensioners of the Wai'alua Ag. Co.—The person in charge of these matters has just gone home. Will you call 2243 after 1:00?

1430 i KANEKO to VX notifying him of the arrival of a cable re the ships being sent. Passengers and mail; no cargo. There are to be 1000 persons on the Tatuta Maru and 500 or 600 on the others. There are no reductions from the full rate. Third class is \$165. There are so many uncertainties that the rest of the conversation was conjecture of little interest.

End

2-261

WEDNESDAY, 15 OCTOBER 1941

No activity

2-262

THURSDAY, 16 OCTOBER 1941

0943 i ~~xxxxxxx~~ VX to /Mikami/? re the October 6th issue of *Life*; buy 5 copies. /Note: issue contains two articles of possible interest./

1130 o To OI re the Women's Club /Fujin Kai/ something-or other wants to find out if it is today or tomorrow.—It is today. /He finds this out after a pause in which he apparently asks someone./

1148 i KANEKO to VX to speak of what they discussed before; quotes rates: 1st Class, \$205; 2nd Class, \$105; 3rd Class, \$58; Children ?/?, \$49. Says if they lowered "compartments" to \$165 they would be losing about \$40 per person; also, the rates are set; says he'd like to have an order to do that.—VX says not X's business to decide. The practical details are up to the Company; also, the money allotted to X is Govt. money and the Govt. /Japanese/ is responsible for spending it. All that will have to be decided in Japan. /Apparently K. has hinted that X might make up the difference. K. then brings up the practical problem of provisioning the ship /with fuel?/. They have already applied for it, I hear. There are about 800 /feet?/ of pier. They go on talking about problems apparently connected with the ship.—K: Well, it (*Taiyo Maru*) will get in on the 31st, won't it? One week before that /... / Something about leaving the matter until the 22nd—about a week before the ship comes in, I think./

End

2-263

FRIDAY, 17 OCTOBER 1941

- 0921 i Mrs. GADDIS to VX. Finds out that it *is* the same TOJO they knew. /This was former War Minister in Japan/. Mrs. G: "Didn't he have something to do with aviation once, sometime ago?"—VX: Well /laughing a little/ I don't know about that. /Then VX confirms that Elchi TOJO and Hideki TOJO are one and the same person./
- 1101 o VX to KAWAZOE of NJ, dictating newspaper release. See NJ.
- 1105 o Ditto to other KAWAZOE, of HH. /After dictation, K, asks if VX has heard anything special about the Tatuta or the Taiyo. VX has not, so they agree that everything probably is alright./
- 1126 o VX to Sumitomo Bank for Ono-san /manager/ to ask about *Hadte no ken* /?/. Ono says will tomorrow a little before 8:00 be alright. It is.
- 1348 i From HARADA to make a date for a conference about 1:20 tomorrow.

End

2-264

SATURDAY, 18 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

(Japanese Holiday)

SUNDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1941

Out of Commission

2-266

MONDAY, 20 OCTOBER, 1941

- 1018 i KANEKO to VX. VX explains that it is not true that X is deprived of all funds. X is permitted to draw out money to provide necessary food and shelter for the staff. VX explains to K the difference between a diplomat and a consul. K implies that some of his staff may be transferred to China, especially Nanking.
- 1031 i KANEKO to VX asking whether he thinks the Taiyo and Tatsuta Maru will get here. VX thinks so. Then K. mentions that there is someone who wants to pay for his passage here, but VX says it cannot be sent out of the U. S. if paid here. (The inference is that fares should be paid at the other end to avoid the freeze.)
- 1035 i TAKEO of NYK to VX. T. says the accounts (connected with the special trips of J. vessels) will be handled at X. T. will handle all the details as usual except that all expenditures and receipts from whatever source must be entered in a separate set of books. T. will go up this afternoon to talk it over with XX, VX, and company.
- 1112 o /Technical disturbances/. VX to TAKEI (?) re difficulties in making the arrangements.
- 1520 o VX to KIMURA re a dinner for the crew. XX thinks it may be possible in the case of the Taiyo, but there will be no time in the case of the Tatuta. XX thinks it may be all right to have the purser, the (merchant marine) captain, and the Engineering officer to dinner. We could even limit it to the (merchant) captain and the engineering officer if the others are busy.
- 1525 o VX to KANEKO, apparently a call back. K asks what the word "permit" means (on the ticket issued by X). "This transportation ticket is issued for The Imperial Japanese Government." Is *for* correct? — Yes. — It seems to me it should be *by* or *through*. — No. This is for the Customs (U. S. or Japanese?) K. continues to find fault with the ticket, but VX defends it legally. Finally VX comes around to K's view that it should have been *by*, not *for*. No sooner does he make this admission than he reverts to his old position that *for* stands for "in the interest of", "for the benefit of," "on behalf of."

End

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2-266 A

1550 1 F.F.W.M. Probably NYK.  
 NYK "This passage ticket is issued for and on behalf of the Imperial Japanese Government."  
 VX—"O. K. I think."  
 NYK—"Consul General for Japan . . . . no Japanese consulate general at Honolulu—is that wrong."  
 VX—"All right I think /repeats/.  
 NYK—"Then the X will do the Japanese part?"  
 VX—"Yes."  
 / Apparently the N.Y.K. is printing special tickets for the 3 forthcoming trips to make clear that the government is in charge./

2-267

TUESDAY, 21 OCTOBER 1941

0956 1 Request in pidgin about deferment. VX refers her to 2243. /W. N. ?/  
 0956 1 Above caller. Girl at X explains that since this is a case of re-deferment she has from Dec. 1 till Jan. 31. If it were for the first time it ought to be gotten in quickly, this month.  
 1020 o VX to —. Saw — (?) yesterday re the bond procedure. The money will be released from the X funds in the Y. Specie Bank and the treasury department has OKed this.  
 1031 o VX to YSB. Miyamoto—tells him the treasury in Washington has OKed the money proposition the release of funds. /But I'm not clear who got the message in the first place/.  
 1142 o VX to Matsuda. He's out. This is Miyamoto. Have Matsuda call when he comes in please.  
 1155 o VX to Mrs. UYETAR for Mrs. MATSUDA, wife of YSB's MATSUDA. Not here. I'll call her later then.

End

2-268

WEDNESDAY, 22 OCTOBER, 1941

Out of commission

2-269

THURSDAY, 23 OCTOBER, 1941

No activity

2-270

FRIDAY, 24 OCTOBER, 1941

0916 1 re deferment. Routine.  
 1135 1 Woman to VX. Please call 2243 (X)  
 1152 1 To VX—Call 2243.  
 1325 1 Fragment.  
 1326 1 From KANEKO to VX asks him if he (VX) sent the cable for him about the Taiyo Maru business. VX did, for it was necessary. VX says they are negotiating with the State Dept. about the money they have taken in. Thinks it will be ok. Some mention of the "search" by the immigration officials /?/. Apparently that is ok too.  
 1355 o VX to KANEKO—out; for HIRADA /?/ also out; for KIMURA—call 58234. Re the estimate of receipts from the Taiyo. They are 3rd class 417 (before from 200 to 400). First class about 23. Second class, 33. Won't exceed \$1000 /what?/.  
 1405 1 Fragment.

End

2-271

SATURDAY, 25 OCTOBER, 1941

0929 1 NI  
 0935 1 KAWAMOTO of NJ to VX saying the FBI is conducting an investigation on Kauai of Consular Agents according to a letter received today from the Branch Office (of the NJ) on Kauai. It seems that HAMADAYO and FUNAGAYO (in May) and HAKAMA (?) are in question. Please let me have names. The people are scared; I will let you have the names (apparently by mail or messenger, for nothing more was said).

End

2-272

SUNDAY, 26 OCTOBER, 1941

No activity

MONDAY, 27 OCTOBER, 1941

2-273

0916 i To VX from KANEKO /?/, Discussion of the various details of the forthcoming Taiyo visit; licenses, the issuance of tickets; the collection of fares; about someone who is a nikkel—a woman, and that there is time to settle the thing /about her/ because there is still four days / the Taiyo comes four days after this conversation/; how /to send/? something that is quite heavy; about a further "conference". They agree to take in money from the 27th on, and think they can collect it under the special license.

1025 i FPM/ From NYK? Still talking about special licenses, etc.

1108 i Very brief.

1420 i Mrs. VX to VX / recording extremely bad/

XXXXXXXXXX

End

2-274

TUESDAY, 28 OCTOBER, 1941

0945 o VX /?/ to NIO /? phon./ wants to consult with him about —— Re. the X's ambition to hold an examination this month (until the 31st of Oct.). The Minister without Portfolio, then the Minister of Education is conferring an award of honor to the Commissioner(s?) for Japanese Affairs/? not positive that this is right/.

0952 o to 4. NC. NI.

1005 i YOSHIOKA to VX, No reply yet to telegram sent to —— Inchikau /?/ in Washington on 22nd. Y. has heard nothing of the extent of understanding reached by the negotiations there, and has heard that they have broken down. VX says that there has been a reply by cable re certain frozen funds. The Foreign office has received a reply from the State Department which amounted to (question about the following) "Get them (the particular funds in question?) out of the country." Y—Is there anything especially interesting about this contract situation? VX—/Interrupting hurriedly/ "Wait . . . that is . . . that is . . . that is . . . wait a moment . . . that is right."

Y—Something has come here, hasn't it?

VX—I think so. XX has (unable to make out.)

1355 i FPM YOSHIOKA of NYK to ? re a matter that had been taken up with the collector of Customs. The matter concerns the X clerk, MORIMURA. (Switched to VX). Y. to VX re license for oil for the Taiyo. When she gets in her tank will inspected and checked against the log. That's all right.

End

2-275

WEDNESDAY, 29 OCTOBER, 1941

1055 o VX to TOYAMA /Edt. of Jitsugyo No Hawaii/. He has just stepped out to the barber's. VX asks about a serial text of the M-day law being published in the English section. VX wants 5 or 6 copies since X hasn't received and from the legislature yet.

1105 i FPM. Information wanted re /Joe Gin Gee/ phone clerk in a store they say. Allen D. Smythe, Chief Clerk Territorial Senate.

End

2-276

THURSDAY, 30 OCTOBER, 1941

0927 i KANEKO to VX re the method of counting passengers. Are children to be counted as half or as full passengers?—As adults if unaccompanied—A lot of these are dual citizens—Many of them have no passports at all and may have trouble when they reach Japan. Then, since they have no reentry permits they will have trouble when they attempt to come

back here later. (This is the very problem that Mrs. NISHI scolded her husband of spilling to Sumitomo bank employees the other day). To facilitate the landing of these passengers in Japan each child should have an excerpt from his KT as proof of at least his parent's Japanese citizenship. They should also have BCs along. The passengers will be classified on the passenger list as Japanese and as American citizens.

0956 o VX to TAKEI. KANEKO answers saying T. is out. T. is sick and took yesterday afternoon off.

1050 ? VX to KANEKO. They will meet at official residence at 6.30. K—Goro TAKAYANAGI (Manager of Honolulu Fire Insurance Co., whom VX does not know), TAKAGISHI, TAKAHASHI, IMAZAWA, Hiroshi(?) KODAMA, SHIRAKAWA, and somebody's wife (whose name I could not catch) were all going to Japan together on the Taiyo.

1146 o VX to wife. She hasn't got back yet.

1332 i Mrs. VX tells VX that KANEKO called him.

1414 o VX to KANEKO re the plans for the search etc. Both seem perfectly satisfied. Taiyo will sail at 5PM Tuesday. VX says the alien registration blanks have to be filled out if not previously registered. (NC due to shortage of blanks.)

End

2-277

FRIDAY, 31 OCTOBER 1941

1135 i KANEKO to VX. They discuss putting the names of arrivals in the newspapers. They think customs inspections will take quite a long time and that many will read in the papers of their relatives and friends before they are able to debark.

1425 o VX says it's a civil case and he doesn't know much about it. About something that is in the newspapers.

End

2-278

SATURDAY, Nov. 1, 1941

1140 o VX to KAWAZOE saying he has heard that the Taiyo is taking no mail. Is that true?—Yes. It is.—Is there to be an inspection of the mail?—Yes.—Who ordered it?—The postmaster—Has word to this effect come from J. Embassy?—No.

End

2-279

SUNDAY, 2 NOVEMBER 1941

1048 o Seki to ? re: something that has come from Washington.

End

2-280

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1941

0859 i NAKATSUKA wants a complete list of passengers, Come down in person.

1044 i Routine re NYK. Something from Washington. XX is out.

1045 i VX to someone re mail situation.

1146 o VX asks for MIKAMI—out.

1218 o VX asks where HIROSHI is. Calce says didn't he go somewhere with XX. Isn't he at X now? VX seems perplexed. Does calce know SAKAI /name uncertain/ of X? He does. Does he know his house? Yes. Then please come up to X now.

1226 i /from taxi? VX asks to take him to dock at 2PM. He wants to see 1. the immigration station. 2. The harbor master. 3. Hibberly. VX also him to go to the P. Hotel at 1.30 / A moment later he changes this, since apparently the P. hotel is considered too hot—and says he is to take VX to the three places previously planned.

1655 o To NYK. VX calling to get Hibberly's number.

1658 o To Hibberly home, but H. is down at boat. She advises him to call the customs inspector. VX—"Thank you for my troubling you!" Mrs. H. "Bye bye."

End

2-281

TUESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 1052 o to Hiberly's office /from XX?/. Call 2458.  
 1054 i From (4). Re: Conscription notification. Routine. X says such notices will probably go on an American boat since the P. O. is receiving mail.  
 1106 i From (4). KANEKO to VX re overtime of customs. K. wanted them to work to ten, but Hiberly thought they should work shorter hours.  
 Rest NI.  
 1110 o VX to wife. NI.  
 1112 i Wife to VX. NI.  
 1138 i From Nippu Jiji (which calls us first and keeps them waiting) to X.X. /Not SOGA—sound like KABO but isn't/ re: the Washington tie-up of the mail. Says Star-Bull reports that X has phoned the J. ambassador about it and asks what their (X's) expectation is re the outcome of the protest. XX rather thinks the outcome will be favorable. XX says it was the Ambassador (muko wa) that called him to ask about it. /More details but stopping here./  
 1534 o For girl's older brother. Not in. From VX.

End

2-282

WEDNESDAY, 5 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 1009 i ONOH of Sumitomo to VX. Not in.  
 1037 i Re expatriation. NI.  
 1500 i \$26,000 /approximate receipts?/ from YOSHICKA /?/ Talking about the accounting for the voyage.

2-283

THURSDAY, 6 NOVEMBER, 1941

No activity

FRIDAY TO SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 7 TO 9

Out of commission

2-284

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1941

- 0936 i To VX from OI of JCC. re the welcome for Ambassador KURUSU. The plane will come tomorrow. He has his wife with him. They talk about getting in to the field and the situation in reference to greeting the ambassador. OI says he will inform SATO and ———? The ambassador will stop overnight. X is going to put out a party for him.  
 0944 FPM VX (probably) to someone re picture taking in connection with the arrival tomorrow. Decide to have none because of the "big news" that it would be. Re the party. VX wants it to be a formal affair. /Possibly to newspaper editor or reporter?/  
 0950 o to /KOMO?/ telling him that clipper is down at Midway with motor trouble and will be 22 hours late. He is very tired so the party will be formal. Wants also to /neglect?/ the newspaper reporters interview. Also talk about taking a picture.  
 0952 FPM "Value \$70 for 2 cases freight prepaid."—substance of telegram being explained to someone. Looks like someone is sending freight to the J. Embassy in Washington. They will go to get them Wednesday. If it is, a thousand and ten kin /or 1000 ten-kins?/. The charge is \$3. Of course they will get it; then take it over there to weight it. "Please erase the address and substitute J. Embassy, Washington."  
 ? ? Re the party being simple.  
 1002 o VX to KAWADA /?/ asking the president of the company or someone in his place to come to the "pahtee" tomorrow night at X at 6.30. Callee will tell him.  
 1005 o VX inviting SOGA of NJ to the "pahtee". There will be 14 or 15 guests in all.



906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 1010 o VX gets girl, asks for father MORI whom he invites to the simple "pahtee". MORI is willin. Asks if KURUSU is going to stay at the R. Hawaiian.  
1015 o VX to TSUDA /?/ asking him to "pahtee".  
1041 i VX from ? whom he has left word to call him. "Pahtee".

End

2-285

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1941

Holiday; closed

2-286

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1941

- 0940 i To FUKUYA /?/ from MIYA/TO?/ of the YSB re payment of telegraph charges. X will pay tomorrow.  
0942 i XX telling NAKATSUKA that he hasn't heard from KURUSU for 2 days so doesn't know. Thinks he is coming at 4 p. m. XX wants to know "if the plane left Midway this morning." N. doesn't know—suggests Pan American can tell. XX says no social events because XX has wired that he is tired.  
0945 i from a bank? No statement has come etc.  
0947 o To NJ to KAWAZOE from VX. A telegram has just come from KURUSU. He will arrive this afternoon. Left Midway 7:25. According to K's wish a news reporter is not to meet him—only a representative.  
1045 o To OI from VX. KURUSU is coming at 5:10 today. The seating order is SATO, SUGIMOTO, MORIFUJI, SUMITA, MORI, MATSUDA, KIMURA, ONOH, SOGA, MAKINO.  
1105 i Inquiry re J. census registration. Reporting a death.  
1320 i About the plane's arrival /to a guest/.

End

2-287

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1941

- 1015 i KAWAZOE to VX inquiring re KURUSU's movements. Wants to know the Navy's representative. Knows already the army's. X boy has forgotten the Navy's. Wants to know about all other movements of KURUSU.  
1030 i NAKATSUKA to VX. NI (See S. B. 11/13/41)  
1045 i Is someone there? Girl. NI.  
1445 i Hung up.

End

2-288

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1941

- 0955 i From Mrs. VX. Domestic business. NI.  
1040 o To (4). VX to YOSHI /?/ at NYK re: receipts from the Taiyo Maru. Does he want the cash? No. The figures. They haven't figured out the tax bill yet. They will send it over as soon as finished.

End

2-289

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1941

- 0932 i "trying very hard to get the telephone number of the Nuuanu Sotoshu /Soto sect of Buddhism—a zen sect/ (American woman speaking from the voice). No. is 5120. "It is listed under Rev. Kumagata /?/

End

2-290

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1941

No activity

2-291

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1941

- 0945 i KAWAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse reactions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K/. K. says /I think/ that previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas propaganda. But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have. Not in Japanese either.
- 1117 i FPM. Fragment
- 1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. \$10,000, \$12,000 /the amount they have on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they figure the taxes, the bond, and all.
- 1317 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very brief.

End

2-292

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1941

No activity

2-293

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1941

No activity

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1941

No activity—holiday

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1941

- 0900 o /to maid at home?/ telling her there is a wedding for 9 or 10 guests.
- 1037 o for Mr. MORI from VX replying to a communication via his wife yesterday. Re going to NAMIKI's. VX on discussing it with his wife thinks it will be good /to go?/ Something about 6 volumes of books. /Sounds like a social engagement./
- 1408 FPM Since other "has had no opportunity, will mail be o. k.?" VX says it will.

End

2-294

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

No activity

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1941

No activity

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1941

No activity

2-295

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941

No activity

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941

- 1109 o VX /?/ coming home quick. OK.
- 1150 o to YAMAMOTO from VX. Has he got some unused congratulations? Y. says the insurance company has them. VX asks how many there were. Y. doesn't know. They're all thru with them.
- 1320 o No ans.

End

908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2-295

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1941

- 0920 o VX for YAMAMOTO of /YSB?/. Then seems to have FUJITA instead. "The master (Y) is out." VX has something on his mind, but apparently decides not to tell FUJITA. He asks him to have Y. call him when he returns.
- 0926 i from? (KAWA, HARA, ZAWA?) to VX who wants to see him for a minute. ? is busy, how about next week. /Long pause/. VX—"If /the round trip/ takes only about 20 minutes couldn't you come?" He finally will, but it has taken a great deal of persuasion, and he is obviously reluctant for he is alone, it being Saturday.
- 0935 o to SATO (SAITO?) from VX who says he wants to have a conference about the recent daitoto ogikawa's recent request /don't get it. Do you?/
- 0946 o VX to OI. VX has been talking to YAMAMOTO about there being practically no malt (or possibly yeast. Much confusion about this word. Might also mean ostentation, display, a good thing, good news, a bait, a tempting offer) in town. (Y. brought up the question.) Discuss the problem of the difficulties of the J. here.
- 1026 i From ONODA of the Sumitomo Bank to VX inviting him to a meal or something tomorrow. VX is busy except for lunch (There are some others coming, XX and Harada, not many). Can VX come to his place about 1 pm. VX can and will. /Line very noisy/.

End

2-296

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1941

No activity

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

No activity

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941

No activity

Discontinued

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 39

69512—IC

- (J) Hello, is this Mori?
- (H) Hello, this is Mori.
- (J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
- (H) Not at all.
- (J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?
- [Handwritten in margin:] Prompted. Reluctant hesitation.
- (H) Yes, lots of them fly around.
- (J) Are they large planes?
- (H) Yes, they are quite big.
- (J) Are they flying from morning till night?
- (H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.
- (J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
- (H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.
- (J) Is that so?
- [2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.
- (J) Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa- here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in . . . ? . . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

[Handwritten in margin:] Great surprise at J. end?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about. Strikes attention.

[4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are very bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the Japanese conferences.

[Handwritten in the margin:] Then they discuss the Southern advance [of Japanese into French Indo-China] every day.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

[Handwritten in the margin:] Seemed not to understand the question about climate.

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate recently.

[Handwritten in the margin:] Long delay.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war.

It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

[Handwritten in margin:] M[ori] tries never to hear about the fleet.

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't [know whether] all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

[Handwritten in margin:] Red Christmas flower with long stems [explanation of poinsettia omitted in translation].

\*(J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

[Handwritten in margin:] (J) has a hard time understanding sake (repeats 4 times).

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

[Handwritten in margin:] (J) is surprised that British liquor came in.

[Handwritten in margin:] Taishō jijūsho Takagishi (understood as Takaguchi) repeated 5 or 6 times. Sake is in style here, but there is no kazu-no-ko. Last year there was everything.

(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiye Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roes for this year's New Year celebration.

[Handwritten in margin:] Who is this "he"—Ogawa? Presumably it is.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

[7] (H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Thank you.

(J) Off phone.

[Handwritten in margin:] Tried to raise Tōkyō again.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 40

TWO REPORTS, SUBJECT JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—  
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

*Confidential*

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District Date: 9 Feb., 1942

Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson,  
USNR

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941—9 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending in 14ND.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (See first page of details)

References:

Copy to: ONI (5) 14ND (3)  
CinCPac (1)  
Com14 (1)  
FBI-Hon (2)  
MID-HD (2)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A ONI File No.:

*Synopsis.*—On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the Germany Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has been found that KUEHN's signal system ever was employed.

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

DEDUCTIONS: Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

Approved.

I. H. MAYFIELD  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
District Intelligence Officer.

[1]

WBS/zw

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:

- (a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
- (b) Com 14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
- (c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
- (d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 5-1-41.
- (e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI), 5-31-41.
- (f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 7-17-41.
- (g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
- (j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHI-RODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

- (A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800 22-30 November, 1941.
- (B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.

1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed very important.

[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

(Secret military message No. — by Chief of Consulate's Code)

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.

From: Fujii

Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows:

(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) battle force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

- 1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
- 2. All battle force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
- 3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
- 4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
- 5. All battle force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
- 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
- 7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
- 8.

(2) Signal

1. Light in Lanikai beach house at night—One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time, indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

—When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen cloth indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama house from 7 pm to 1 am every hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".

5. "KGMB want ads" advertisements 9:45 am—

(a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6".

(b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7".

(c) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates "5" or "8".

In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of Kula sanitarium and Haleakala road which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "Exex" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6"; 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "4" or "7"; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8".

[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3 December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of this family.)

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the indicated markings.

[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a "Lanikai beach house"; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.



7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by Agent McCarthy:

"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied "Kuehn's house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or to furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period. [7] It was pointed out by many of the residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they

are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (Jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office."

[8] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following incident:

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA, who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kulu (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).)

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regarding investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight—actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes. At 8:40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe fire signal seen.

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan—"Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island—

where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

"However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December, 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in part:

"... Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed.

[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 December 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanatorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject light any matches."

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sanatorium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being prepared on FURUKAWA.

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships at sea.

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is Ichio FUJII.

[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.

17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu, from Japan, board the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special

board of inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at Mollili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been discovered.

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was made; with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case is continuing.

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:

Miss Kimie DOUE  
Takaichi SAKAI  
Katsukichi MURAOKA  
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO  
Kanaye SAHARA  
Hiyoshi SHIGEFUJI

22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [14] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.

30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, these men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on

31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".

[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and Allen, is submitted for information:

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936 KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty shop brought in only about \$80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the [18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for \$40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was \$6,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was \$9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of \$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the \$40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely fictitious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signaling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in

harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was



accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new \$100.00 bills, some \$20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Malunlu Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Malunlu Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reappeared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from

the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very similar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.)

48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the \$14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original \$14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, \$5,000.00 in new \$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given \$2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through, Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following information appeared on the suspect card:

"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu (Occupation) None at present

Formerly (1918) officer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNS had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Government, through the Consulate.

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December, 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this

office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)

Pending—14ND.

6 February, 1942

ENCLOSURE (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November 1941

| Date       | Time | Types of Ships |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |
|------------|------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
|            |      | BBs            | CAs | CLs | CVs | SSs | DDs | DMs | AVDs | (#) |
| 11/22----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 8   | 2    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 8   | 2    | 32  |
| 11/23----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 8   | 2    | 32  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 22  | 4   | 2    | 28  |
| 11/24----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 4   | 1    | 26  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 21  | 4   | 2    | 27  |
| 11/25----- | 0800 | 3              | 6   | 1   | 1   | 4   | 24  | 5   | 2    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 10  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 26  | 8   | 3    | 37  |
| 11/26----- | 0800 | 3              | 10  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 24  | 8   | 2    | 34  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 23  | 8   | 3    | 34  |
| 11/27----- | 0800 | 3              | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 23  | 8   | 3    | 34  |
|            | 1800 | 3              | 11  | 1   | 2   | 4   | 28  | 8   | 3    | 39  |
| 11/28----- | 0800 | 1              | 8   | 0   | 2   | 4   | 11  | 4   | 3    | 18  |
|            | 1800 | 6              | 8   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |
| 11/29----- | 0800 | 6              | 7   | 6   | 1   | 2   | 24  | 4   | 3    | 31  |
|            | 1800 | 6              | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |
| 11/30----- | 0800 | 5              | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 25  | 4   | 3    | 32  |
|            | 1800 | 5              | 7   | 5   | 1   | 2   | 26  | 4   | 3    | 33  |

Key: BB—battleship; CA—heavy cruiser; CL—light cruiser; CV—aircraft carrier; SS—submarine; DD—destroyer; DM—light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD—seaplane tender (destroyer type).

(#)—Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

ENCLOSURE (B): Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941

#### BATTLESHIPS (BBS)

0600—At moorings (ARIZONA, NEVADA, OKLAHOMA)--- 3  
 0658—NEVADA underway----- 3  
 0705—ARIZONA underway----- 3  
 0748—NEVADA cleared----- 2  
 0801—ARIZONA cleared----- 1  
 1045—PENNSYLVANIA entered----- 2  
 1053—CALIFORNIA entered----- 3  
 1102—MARYLAND entered----- 4  
 1110—TENNESSEE entered----- 5  
 1123—WEST VIRGINIA entered----- 6  
 1155—PENNSYLVANIA moored----- 6  
 1210—CALIFORNIA moored----- 6  
 1232—MARYLAND moored----- 6  
 1240—TENNESSEE moored----- 6  
 1306—WEST VIRGINIA moored----- 6  
 1547—UTAH moored (#)----- 7  
 1648—UTAH moored (#)----- 7  
 1800—At moorings----- 7

#### HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)

0600—At moorings----- 11  
 0625—NORTHAMPTON underway- 11  
 0632—CHESTER underway----- 11  
 0640—SALT LAKE CITY underway 11  
 0718—NORTHAMPTON cleared----- 10

#### HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)—continued

0727—CHESTER cleared----- 9  
 0735—SALT LAKE CITY cleared-- 8

#### LIGHT CRUISERS (CLS)

0600—Underway in harbor  
 (DETROIT)----- 1  
 0637—DETROIT cleared----- 0  
 1138—HELENA entered----- 1  
 1131—HONOLULU entered----- 2  
 1148—ST LOUIS entered----- 3  
 1200—PHOENIX entered----- 4  
 1212—RALEIGH entered----- 5  
 1250—HELENA moored----- 5  
 1300—HONOLULU moored----- 5  
 1300—RALEIGH moored----- 5  
 1305—PHOENIX moored----- 5  
 1328—ST. LOUIS moored----- 5  
 1350—DETROIT entered----- 6  
 1510—DETROIT moored----- 6  
 1800—At moorings----- 6

#### AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVs)

0600—At moorings (LEXINGTON, ENTERPRISE)----- 2  
 0735—ENTERPRISE underway----- 2

(#) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and used as a target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a battleship.

# 926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ENCLOSURE (B); *Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941—Continued*

| AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS)—continued |    | DESTROYERS (DDS)—continued |    |
|-----------------------------------|----|----------------------------|----|
| 0838—ENTERPRISE cleared           | 1  | 1300—MONAGHAN entered      | 21 |
| 1800—At moorings                  | 1  | 1308—TUCKER entered        | 22 |
| SUBMARINES (SSS)                  |    | 1318—CONYNGHAM moored      | 22 |
| 0600—At moorings                  | 4  | 1330—FARRAGUT entered      | 23 |
| 1254—ARGONAUT underway            | 4  | 1333—CASE entered          | 24 |
| 1300—TROUT underway               | 4  | 1336—MacDONOUGH entered    | 25 |
| 1340—ARGONAUT cleared             | 3  | 1340—PHELPS entered        | 26 |
| 1350—TROUT cleared                | 2  | 1345—CASSIN moored         | 26 |
| 1800—At moorings                  | 2  | 1350—ALYWIN moored         | 26 |
| DESTROYERS (DDS)                  |    | 1350—REID moored           | 26 |
| 0600—At moorings or underway      | 26 | 1407—DOWNES moored         | 26 |
| 0602—MUGFORD cleared              | 25 | 1412—TUCKER moored         | 26 |
| 0605—GRIDLEY cleared              | 24 | 1425—WORDON moored         | 26 |
| 0608—MAURY cleared                | 23 | 1435—DALE moored           | 26 |
| 0612—BAGLEY cleared               | 22 | 1440—CASE moored           | 26 |
| 0617—HENLEY cleared               | 21 | 1446—MONAGHAN moored       | 26 |
| 0620—CRAVEN cleared               | 20 | 1446—HULL moored           | 26 |
| 0621—PATTERSON cleared            | 19 | 1459—DEWEY moored          | 26 |
| 0623—BALCH cleared                | 18 | 1459—FARRAGUT moored       | 26 |
| 0625—HELM cleared                 | 17 | 1515—PHELPS moored         | 26 |
| 0628—RALPH TALBOT cleared         | 16 | 1530—MacDONOUGH moored     | 26 |
| 0630—FANNING cleared              | 15 | 1800—At moorings           | 26 |
| 0632—McCALL cleared               | 14 | MINESWEEPERS (DMS)         |    |
| 0640—DUNLAP cleared               | 13 | 0600—At moorings           | 8  |
| 0641—BENHAM cleared               | 12 | 0610—GAMBLE underway       | 8  |
| 0647—CONYNGHAM cleared            | 11 | 0612—MONTGOMERY underway   | 8  |
| 1205—WORDON entered               | 12 | 0615—BREESE underway       | 8  |
| 1221—ALYWIN entered               | 13 | 0625—RAMSAY underway       | 8  |
| 1228—CONYNGHAM entered            | 14 | 0652—GAMBLE cleared        | 7  |
| 1232—CASSIN entered               | 15 | 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared    | 6  |
| 1236—HULL entered                 | 16 | 0657—BREESE cleared        | 5  |
| 1243—DALE entered                 | 17 | 0700—RAMSAY cleared        | 4  |
| 1245—REID entered                 | 18 | 1800—At moorings           | 4  |
| 1247—DOWNES entered               | 19 | SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)    |    |
| 1254—DEWEY entered                | 20 | 0600—At moorings           | 3  |
|                                   |    | 1800—At moorings           | 3  |

## UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

### INVESTIGATION REPORT

#### Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District. Date: 14 Feb. 1942.

Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects. Copy to: ONI (5) 14ND (3)  
CinCPac (1)  
Com 14 (1)  
FBI-Hon (2)  
MID-HD (2)

Source File No.: 14 ND #54A. ONI File No.:

Synopsis: During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such

facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.

Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inaccurate as to destroyers.

Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was engaged in this espionage activity.

The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.

Deductions: Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to protect battleships in the harbor.

Approved: I. H. MAYFIELD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
District Intelligence Officer.

[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

References:

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject, 2-9-42.

(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAMI, 2-6-42.

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a). It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and (b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.

2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those communications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter discussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December, 1941.

3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor, and their entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consulate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] area for the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings to the Consulate. The *modus operandi* of MORIMURA and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.

(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above

despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.

5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister TOGO by the local Consulate:

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th

From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300, on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, between 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message was sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the Lexington and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One (ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to Tokyo.

7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735, the same morning.

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore, correct.

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed, before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.

11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now used as minelayers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as to all destroyer-type ships are presented: At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon of 5 December, the four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, and at 1612.

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of interest:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the fourth.

There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.

14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington:

On the evening of the fifth the battleship WYOMING and one sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 17 destroyers; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock: 4 light cruisers; 2 destroyers. (CA and CV ALL —) PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet.

The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts: The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the following are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYOMING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0800, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day—four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three seaplane tenders (AVDs)—which to the untrained observer might have appeared also to be destroyers.

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered at 0830, cleared at 0920. [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the harbor.

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms "moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in drydock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.



21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 1248, was called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic) :

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123 :

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further comment thereon is offered.

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco:

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.

The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner Lurline is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo:

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the fourth. About 110 tons; one stack; and had a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.

[8] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT's crew went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December, 1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4, 14.)

C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU. (Paragraph 5.)

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9.)

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it is concluded that:

A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the erroneous reports.)

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane's *Fighting Ships*, readily available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battle-ships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was surprisingly inaccurate.

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).

Pending.

[1] ENCLOSURE (A): *Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese consul general, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.*

21 MARCH 1941.

(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.

29 APRIL, 1941

(To Tokyo)

The American Army transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

14 MAY, 1941

(To Tokyo)

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Emmons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

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7 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units [3] of the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

13 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)

Reference San Francisco MSG #92:

SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

26 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by Clipper the 25th.

27 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Chungking—Burma Road—Trucks

28 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)

Daniel Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4] managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

8 JULY, 1941

(To Tokyo and Washington)

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that American pilots are joining the China air force: The local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspapers reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

15 JULY 1941

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the west coast and [5] loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

26 JULY 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspect-

ing the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

2 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo )

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not [6] announced) entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

23 SEPTEMBER, 1941

(To Tokyo)

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

18 NOVEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma road trucks 3000—2 ton trucks.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 41

7 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that the annexed pages 1-28 are true and correct photostats of original documents on file in Frupac.\*

THO. H. DYAR,  
Captain, U. S. Navy.

S I S TRANSLATIONS 1200-1299

DIPLOMATIC "KO", "PA" & "LA" SYSTEMS

|         | Date  | Addressee | GR  | Next to last code group | Received | Transmitted |
|---------|-------|-----------|-----|-------------------------|----------|-------------|
| FBI has | 3 Dec | T         | 165 |                         |          |             |
|         | 3 Dec | T         | 188 |                         |          |             |
|         | 3 Dec | T         | 56  |                         | 1254     | 1315        |
|         | 3 Dec | SF        | 59  | Same                    | 1254     | 1318        |
|         | 3 Dec | W         | 59  |                         | 1255     | 1318        |
|         | 3 Dec | T         | 18  |                         | 1657     | 1707        |
|         | 3 Dec | T         | 25  | Same                    | 1718     | 1726        |
|         | 3 Dec | SF        | 27  |                         | 1718     | 1730        |
|         | 4 Dec | T         | 16  | IYJIE                   | 1834     | 1848        |
|         | 4 Dec | T         | 41  | YUAHE                   | 1833     | 1850        |
|         | 5 Dec | T         | 42  | BYJVE                   | 1804     | 1806        |
|         | 5 Dec | SF        | 45  | IHSGZ                   | Same     | 1136        |
|         | 5 Dec | Sea       | 45  | IHSGZ                   |          | 1139        |
|         | 5 Dec | T         | 43  | IHSGZ                   |          | 1136        |
|         | 5 Dec | W         | 45  | IHSGZ                   |          | 1132        |
|         | 6 Dec | T         | 138 | OXAQA                   | 1258     | 1304        |
|         | 6 Dec | T         | 47  | UEVTA                   | Same     | 1801        |
|         | 6 Dec | W         | 49  | UEVTA                   |          | 1805        |
|         |       |           |     |                         | 1801     | 1807        |

\* (Incorporated into Exhibits 56 and 57—June 27, 1945.)

*Secret*

## FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

## DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii

WBS/wbs

Memo for: The File.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, Honolulu.

Ref: (a) FBI-Hon. Inv. Rpt., dated 26 Dec. 1941, subject: Japanese Activities Honolulu, T. H.

1. Capt. I. H. Mayfield, USN, former DIO-14ND, was interviewed regarding reference (a) on 17 March 1944, in the presence of Capt. Peyton Harrison, USNR, present DIO-14ND, and the undersigned. Upon reading reference (a) in full, Capt. Mayfield made the following observations, in substance:

(a) Ref. (a), p. 2, 2nd full par.—Statement that the material was not inventoried is correct.

(b) Ref. (a), p. 4, 3rd full par.—I did receive some of the enciphered Consulate traffic from RCA after 1 Dec. 1941 and before 7 Dec. 1941. All was delivered immediately by officer messenger to Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, USN, O-in-C of the combat intelligence "unit" at NYPH. Insofar as Comdr. Rochefort provided me with "clear" versions of portions of that traffic, I furnished FBI-Honolulu with copies thereof.

(c) Ref. (a), p. 6, 1st full indented par.—Meeting of Mr. Shivers, Lt. Col. Bicknell, and myself took place in the DIO office about 1100, 11 Dec. 1941, after the Commandant directed me to get in touch with Mr. Shivers and work on the matter immediately.

(d) Ref. (a), p. 7, top line—To my knowledge, it was never established that anyone ever used the signaling system to communicate with the enemy.

(e) Ref. (a), last page, 2nd and 3rd lines from top—The action taken by me was to notify the appropriate District and Fleet staff officers with whom I had been maintaining liaison on such matters—Comdr. Rochefort, and Lt. Comdr. E. T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer.

W. B. Stephenson,  
W. B. STEPHENSON,  
Lieutenant, USNR.

23 January, 1942.

Copies of the within messages given to FBI and MID today by Lt. Kimball.

W. B. S.

1941 DEC 7 AM 3 20

ZL MRHU68 TOKIO JG 19 9 PM 7TH

Urgent 92494 koyanagi rijiyori seirinotu-goo arunituki hattori minami kinen bunko seturitu kidino kyokingaru sikyuu denpoo aritasi stop

Togo.

[Ostensible meaning: Regarding the state of adjustment [of what?] from Director KOYANAGI [stated by a thoroughly reliable source to stand for "England"]. An urgent wire is requested re the sum collected for the establishment of the reference HATTORI [code for "relations strained"] MIANIMI [code for "America"] Memorial Library.]

"Relations strained with U. S. & England" is purport, acc. to the same source. (The document from which this translation was made was not received until after 7 December 1941.)

DENZEL CARR.

6 JUNE 1945.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 42

7 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that the amended page is a true and correct copy of an original document on file in Vrupac.

THOS. H. DYER,  
Captain, U. S. Navy.

(Exhibit No. 42 consists of a paper showing part of the decryption process of the Japanese "PA" code. This paper will be found reproduced as Item No. 124, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 43

U. S. NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

Office of the Captain of the Yard

I hereby certify that the attached photostats consisting of four sheets are true copies of part of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard Duty Officer's Information Sheets, which are a part of the records of the Office of the Captain of the Yard, the originals of which records are on file in the Office of the Captain of the Yard.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the Captain of the Yard to be affixed, this seventh day of June, 1945.

S. F. CRAVEN,  
Captain, U. S. N.,  
Captain of the Yard.

U. S. NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR HAWAII, U. S. A.

Office of the Captain of the Yard

Restricted

DUTY OFFICERS' INFORMATION SHEET NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

1. The following information is furnished for duty officer as of 1200, December 6, 1941:

*Prospective Arrivals*

2200 Litchfield out.

Ship, ANTARES. Time, 0600. Day, 12-7. Berth, XXX K-3. Pilot, 1. Tug, 142-153. \*S. F. W. D. H. L., ARGONE.

Antares will require customs and agricultural inspection.

Prospective arrivals: \*PLUNGER to SB 12-7, \*POLLACK to SB 12-7, \*POMPANO to SB 12-7, 1500 Sunday. Sunday 1400, \*NAVAJO towing YC-736 12-8 to M-1 Yardcraft take tow in "Turning Basin".

\*"All require agricultural inspection (Inspector not notified).

*Prospective Departures*

Ship, HENLEY. Time, 1645. Day, 12-7. Tug, XX.

Rail, 0840 12-8 Coal dock to K5.

DUTY TUG

SECTION LEADER

12-6 153-Holzhaus, B. M. 1c.; 142-Fielder, C. B. M.

Dispatchers: Kennedy, C. Q. M. & Shepard, B. M. 1c.

12-7 130-Campbell, B. M. 1c.; 38-Lt. Comdr. Boltz; Dispatchers, Jones CQM Vigil, BM1c

*Other Information of Interest*

1930 12-6 NEOSHO Hickam Buoys to F-4, pilot 4, tugs 142-153, lines NAS.

0100 12-7 COCKATOO & REEDBIRD sweep channel.

0900 12-7 NEOSHO F-4 to M-3, pilot 1, tugs 142-153, lines NAS/CASTOR.

0100 12-8 CONDOR & CROSSBILL sweep channel.

The dredge "TURBINE" is working in the drydock channel and all traffic incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel.

The dredge "WEEBER" is working in the South Channel off Hospital Point. All traffic incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel. Duty Officer can control movements of tugs and mud scows, and getting dredge cleared by telephone 4219.

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The Anti-Torpedo Net will be closed from sunset to sunrise. To be opened and closed only upon orders from the Captain of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or the Yard Duty Officer. Can be reached by telephone 3254 or via the Signal Tower.

The Assistant Captain of the Yard (Comdr. H. R. Hayes) 'phone 2141.

Pilot's home phones: Otterson Alea 63175; Green Alea 63931; Hannus Alea 63827; Carlson 714 15th St., Hickam Housing Area.

Inshore patrol—CHEW; Ready duty destroyer—12-6 MONAGHAN; 12-7 RAMSAY; Night flying NAS none reported.

12-6

Duty Officers: Yard Lieut. McIlhenny; Security Lt. (jg) Lewis.

12-7 Lt Comdr. Welden; Ens. Peabody.

\*S. F. W. D. H. L.—Ship furnishing working detail for handling lines.

CC: Hull Superintendent, Public Works Officer, Power Plant, Master Rigger, Pilot, File.

H. R. Hayes

H. R. HAYES,

Commander, U. S. Navy,

Assistant Captain of the Navy Yard.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 43 there appears a sketch captioned "Berth Numbers", dated December 6, 1941, relating to Pearl Harbor. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 125, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CAPTAIN OF THE YARD

### LIST OF SHIPS PRESENT AS OF 1130

RESTRICTED  
December 6, 1941 1941

|                               |                                               |                                                                         |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| B-1 Cachalot                  | K-1                                           | D-5                                                                     |
| B-2 Helena Oglala             | K-2                                           | D-6                                                                     |
| B-3                           | K-3                                           | D-7 Zane Washmuth Trever Perry                                          |
| B-4 Argonne Tern              | K-4                                           | D-8                                                                     |
| B-5                           | K-5                                           | D-9                                                                     |
| B-6 Mugford Sacramento Jarvis | C-2                                           | T-1                                                                     |
| B-7                           | C-3                                           | T-2                                                                     |
| B-8                           | C-4                                           | T-3                                                                     |
| B-9                           | C-5                                           | T-4                                                                     |
| B-10                          | C-6 Phoenix                                   | XP1                                                                     |
| B-11                          | X-1                                           | XP2                                                                     |
| B-12                          | X-2 Dobbin Wroden McDonough Phelps Dewey Hull | WB1                                                                     |
| B-13 Rigel                    | X-3                                           | WB2                                                                     |
| B-15 Cummings Tracy Preble    | X-4 Solace                                    | SUBBASE                                                                 |
| B-16 New Orleans Ramapo       | X-5 Allen Balt. Nava.                         | Litchfield Narwhal Pallas Gudgeon Dolphin Tautog Sumner Hulbert Widgeon |
| B-17 Sanfrancisco             | X-6                                           | PT 20-30442                                                             |
| B-18 Pruitt Seward Ontario    | X-7 Blue Helm                                 |                                                                         |
| B-20 Socley Grebe             | X-8 Reid Case Tucker Whitney Conyngham        |                                                                         |
| B-21 St Louis Honolulu        | X-9                                           | DD1 Penna Cassin Downes                                                 |
| B-24 Bagley                   | X-10                                          | DD2                                                                     |
| M-1                           | X-11 Patterson Talbot                         | DD3                                                                     |

## LIST OF SHIPS PRESENT AS OF 1130—continued

|                        |                                          |                                                                        |
|------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| M-2                    | X-12                                     | YFD2 Shaw                                                              |
| M-3                    | X-13                                     | MARREY Swan                                                            |
| M-4 Castor             | X-1 Monghan Dale Farragut<br>Aylwin      | West Loch Pyro Henley                                                  |
| F-1                    | X-15                                     | HONO                                                                   |
| F-2                    | X-16                                     | HONO                                                                   |
| F-3 California         | X-17                                     | Hickam: SS Haleakala                                                   |
| F-4                    | X-18                                     | Coal Dock Bobolink Vireo<br>Turkey                                     |
| F-5 Maryland Oklahoma  | X-19                                     |                                                                        |
| F-6 West Va, Tennessee | X-20                                     | Inshore Patrol Chow                                                    |
| F-7 Arizona Vestal     | X-21                                     |                                                                        |
| F-8 Nevada             | X-22 Curtiss                             | Ready Duty Destroyer Mong-<br>ghan                                     |
| F-9                    | X-23 Medusa                              |                                                                        |
| F-10 Tagier            | D-1                                      | Net Depot Reedbird Crossbill<br>Condor Cockatoo Chengho<br>AshYN7 YNgl |
| F-11 Utah              | D-2                                      | YP109 YN53                                                             |
| F-12 Raleigh           | D-3 Gamble Breese Montgom-<br>ery Ramsay | SOPA COMBATFOR CALI-<br>FORNIA                                         |
| F-13 Detroit           | D-4                                      | IN:                                                                    |

9:25: Lay out fire hoses.

9:30: Fire #1 drydock. Out of hand get more men down there.

9:35: Torpedo at Off Club wharf unexploded. Wilder notify Capt. of Yd. I notified Capt. Yd.—Wood.

9:40 Fuel off. Lower tank. 1 tank blew up.

10:00 False alarm.

4208, 3224, 3287.

Ship Hughes FD—3224

10:25: Murphy called saying: boats Wolse & Miduj have truck.

10:25: 59591—Hold trucks with in readiness. Can't get thru our lines out.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 44

## U. S. S. YNG-17

## CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached six sheets are true copies of pages of the signal log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and command.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

J. D. Robinson,  
JOE D. ROBINSON,  
Lieutenant (jg), USNR,  
Officer in Charge.

YNG-17

(Copies of pages of the signal log of the *USS YNG-17*, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 126 through 131, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)



HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 45

U. S. S. YNG-17

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached seven sheets are true copies of the quartermaster's log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and command.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

J. D. Robinson,  
JOE D. ROBINSON,  
*Lieutenant (jg), USNR,*  
*Officer in Charge.*

YNG-17

(Copies of the quartermaster's log of *USS YNG-17*, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 132 through 138, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 46

NAVY YARD PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached one page is a true copy of the log of the signal tower, navy yard, Pearl Harbor, for the method stated thereon, and that the original log is kept under my custody and command.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the Captain of the Yard to be affixed this fifth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

S. F. CRAVEN,  
*Captain of the Yard,*  
*Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

(A copy of the log of the signal tower, navy yard, Pearl Harbor, for 6-7 December 1941, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 139, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 47

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0845 dated 4 September 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 0845"), with attached copy of Hawaiian Department ltr. AR 311.5 Rev Of HCF-41, Subject: Annex VII and Enclosure (B) to Annex VII to 14ND-JCD-42.

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 05710 dated 30 June 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 05710"), Subject: Annex VII to 14ND-JCD13 (Joint Security Measures: Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base. WP#5.

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0604 dated 10 June 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 0604"), with attached copy of CNO Secret ltr. file Op-30B2-BP(SC) A7-2(2)/FF1, Serial 059230, dated 20 June 1941, Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base, and Enclosure (A), copy of Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

R. E. Keeton,  
R. E. KEETON,  
*By direction of the Commander in Chief,*  
*U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.*

(A copy of Cinpac Routing Slip No. 0845 dated 4 September 1941, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 140 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER  
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

AG 311.5—Rev of HCF-41.  
Subject: Revision of HCF-41.  
To: Custodians of HCF-41.

20 AUGUST 1941.

1. Herewith new cover sheet and Inclosure "B" Section VI, ANNEX VII HCF-41 for insertion in Register No. 21 of document now in your possession.
  2. Present cover sheet marked "to be published later" will be destroyed.
- By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G. D.  
Assistant Adjutant General.

INCLOSURE A—ANNEX No. VIII HFC-39; 14 ND-JCD-13

AIRCRAFT DEPARTURE, APPROACH, AND RECOGNITION PROCEDURE—OAHU AREA

To be published later.

INCLOSURE B—ANNEX No. VII HCF-39; 14 ND-JCD-13

HARBOR CONTROL POST, HONOLULU AND PEARL HARBORS, OAHU, T. H.

(To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the joint committee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study and report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for Communication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses.)

(Copies of Cinpac Routing Slips Nos. 0604 and 05710, dated 10 June 1941 and 30 June 1941, respectively, and referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 141 and 142, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1 Serial 059230

*Secret*

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts.  
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.  
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.  
Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.  
Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.
2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

Copy to: Op-12

## [1] HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

1939

28 March 1941

ANNEX NO. VII SECTION VI JOINT AGREEMENTS. JOINT SECURITY MEASURES,  
PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE.

## I. GENERAL

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14ND-JCD-13) are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

## II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation; it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

## III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication.

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following stations:

## ARMY

Hawaiian Air Force  
18th Bombardment Wing  
14th Pursuit Wing  
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade

## NAVY

Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor  
Naval Air Station, Kaneohe  
Ewa Landing Field  
Waialeale Radio Station

**b. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations:**

**ARMY**

**NAVY**

|                                     |                                 |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| *Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. | Wailupe Radio Station           |
| Headquarters, HSCA Brigade          | Senior Officer Present Afloat   |
| Hq. Prov. AA Brigade                | Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor |
| Hq. Hawaiian Air Force              | Naval Air Station, Kaneohe      |
| 18th Bombardment Wing               | Marine Air Group, Ewa           |
| 14th Pursuit Wing                   |                                 |

**[3] c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows:**

**ARMY**

**NAVY**

|                                 |                     |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office)     | 14th Naval District |
| CP, H. S. C. A. B.              | 14th Naval District |
| CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam) | 14th Naval District |

**d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Commander, Base Defense Air Force.**

**4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the movements of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication:**

**a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.**

**b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations:**

**ARMY**

**NAVY**

|                                                            |                  |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| CP, PH Gpmt, Ft. Kamehameha                                | Wailupe          |
| CP, Hon. Gpmt, Ft. Ruger                                   | Destroyer Patrol |
| Additional stations that may be determined to be necessary | Mine Sweepers    |

**c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above.**

**5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.**

**6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of [4].**

**7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.**

\*Net Control Station.

## IV. JOINT ANTI-AIRCRAFT MEASURES

8. *Arrival and departure procedure, aircraft.*—During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inslosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*—Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery.*—When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning anti-aircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*—The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

[5]

## V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition and bombs will exchange information concerning the types, quantities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made without specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer.

## VI. SMOKE SCREENS

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field area from air attacks.

## VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District).

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commandant,  
Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding,  
Hawaiian Department.

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 48

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAC

Heading MUX 031835 GR 10 BT

2 Submarines and tender longitude 159-12 latitude 21-05. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.

Date 3 DEC 41. Crypto-Group 740. CBO MRQ. Circ. No. 12-89.

|               |              |                  |
|---------------|--------------|------------------|
| Originator:   | Action:      | Information:     |
| PLANE 3 VP 12 | COMPATWING 1 | SOPA             |
| 031835        | COMTASKFOR 2 | CINCPAC, COM 14, |
| COMPATWING 1  |              | COMPATWING 2,    |
|               |              | PEARL            |

Classified Incoming  
 U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

NPM 823 030040 Priority

Sound contact reported lat 20 30 Long 158 23 at 1000 X Desron 4 investigate X  
 Battleships operate east long 158 X Detroit Victor 123 during night. Confidential.  
 Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.  
 Date 3 Dec 41. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO OCF. Circ. No. 12-73.

|              |             |              |
|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| Originator:  | Action:     | Information: |
| COMTASKFOR 2 | DETROIT     | COM 14       |
| 030040       | COMDESRON 4 | COMBATFOR    |
|              | COMBATDIV 1 | CINCPAC      |

Classified Incoming  
 U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

NPM NR 814 Confidential Priority

Gamble in lat 20-30 long 158-23 reports clear metallic echo picked up bearing  
 007 true distant 2800 yards X Lost echo bearing 101 at 4300 yards about 3  
 minutes later change of range appeared too rapid for submatine.  
 Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.  
 Date 3 Dec. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO JSM. Circ. No. 12-58.

|             |              |              |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Originator: | Action:      | Information: |
| NEVADA      | COMTASKFOR 2 | SOPA PEARL   |
| 022336      |              | CINCPAC      |
|             |              | COM 14       |
|             |              | COMBATDIV 1  |

Classified Incoming  
 U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

4205 1845 Priority

Searched western border and most of northern half east 9. No contacts.  
 Confidential.  
 Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR.  
 Date 28 Nov. Crypto-Group 816. CBO DCG. Circ. No. 11-886.

|             |         |               |
|-------------|---------|---------------|
| Originator: | Action: | Information:  |
| CIG 1.4     | CTF 1   | CTF 2 CINCPAC |
| 1845/28     |         |               |

Classified Incoming  
 U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
 CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

1704/28 GR 33

Abandon search in time to join Task Group 1.1 by 0000. Confidential.  
 Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR.  
 Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-876.

|              |               |              |
|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Originator:  | Action:       | Information: |
| COMTASKFOR 1 | COMTASKGR 1.4 | TASKFOR 1    |
| 1704/28      |               | COMTASKFOR 2 |
|              |               | CINCPAC      |

944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Incoming

1133/28 GR 17

Keep clear area cast 9 at least 15 miles. Confidential.  
Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR.  
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-871.

Originator:  
COMTASKFOR 1  
1133/28

Action:  
BOGGS

Information:  
CINCPAC  
TASKFOR 1

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Incoming

281050 P GR 44

-P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y-

Task Group 1.4 with 3 Destroyers search area cast 9 for submarine X Task Group 1.1 and 1.5 keep 50 miles. From area cast nine (9) until daylight approach on point option from west. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR.  
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 28. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-870.

Originator:  
COMTASKFOR 1  
281050

Action:  
COMDESDIV 6

Information:  
TASK FOR 2  
TASK FOR 1  
CINCPAC

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Incoming

Secret

280835 P GR 36

-P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y-

Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 positive that a submarine was in area cast 9 during Helena firing approach about 1900.

Ref #11-857 extreme vigilance against subs in operating areas especially during sorties and entrances . . . subs conduct submerged operations only in cast 5 and cast 7 . . . depth bomb all contacts suspected to be hostile except in cast 5 and 7.

Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt(jg) USNR.  
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 137. CBO. FWR.

ORIGINATOR:  
HELENA  
280835  
COMTASKGR 1.5  
COMTASKFOR 1

ACTION:  
COMTASKGR 1.5  
COMTASKFOR 1

INFORMATION:  
SERIAL NUMBER  
11-872  
CINCPAC  
COMTASKFOR 2

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Incoming

0042

Priority

Your 2105 investigated scattered slicks character indefinite. Confidential.  
Ref.—Investigate and report on oil slick sighted by patrol plane.  
Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.  
Date 4 Nov. Crypto-Group 740 CBO DCC Circ. No. 11-70.

ORIGINATOR:  
DALE  
0042/04

ACTION:  
COMTASKFOR 1

INFORMATION:  
CINCPAC

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

945

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

~~932399~~

Routine

Found scattered patches and streaks lub oil latitude 20-10 longitude 157-41 sound search result negative. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.

Date Nov 4 41 Crypto-Group 740. CBO WBM. Circ. No. 11-66.

ORIGINATOR:

ACTION:

INFORMATION:

WORDEN

COMTASKFOR 1

CINCPAC

~~932399~~

COMTASKFOR 1

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

4205/Z 032133 P GR 30 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

Priority

Task Force One about twelve hours ago crossed area of oil slick reported by patrol plane number five. Light airs prevailed all night.

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ens. USNR.

Date 11/3/41, Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO LJO. Circ. No. 11-63.

ORIGINATOR:

ACTION:

INFORMATION:

COMBATSHIPS

CINCPAC

~~932133~~

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

MUX

~~932035~~

Searched area 15 mlie no result. Priority. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy W. M. Klepper Lt(jg) USNR.

Date 3 Nov. Crypto-Group 740. CBO DCC. Circ. No. 11-59.

ORIGINATOR:

ACTION:

INFORMATION:

PLANE 5 VP-11

COMTASKFORCE 18

CINCPAC

COM 14

SOP AT PEARL

COMPATWING 2

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

MUX

~~931920~~

Confidential

Investigating suspicious oil slick position 20-15 157-40. Priority.

Certified to be a true copy A. S. Gordon Lt (jg) USNR.

Date 3 Nov. Crypto-Group 740. CBO. DCC. Circ. No. 11-58.

ORIGINATOR:

ACTION:

INFORMATION:

PLANE 5

COMTASKFORCE 1

CINCPAC

VP-11

COM 14

~~931920~~

SOP AT PEARL

COMPATWING 2

CofS X. F Sec X. Fl Lt X. Oper X. Avia. X. Gun X. AOO X. FCO X.  
FSO X. AOO X.



946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAC

Z 123C 1932 06G1 Q M1C WING TORY 06F2 BT

PRIORITY

Investigating suspicious vessels lat 21-05 long 159. Confidential.  
 Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR.  
 Date Oct 16 1941. Crypto-Group 740. CBOWBM.

ORIGINATOR:  
 PLANE 3 VP-23  
 1923/18

ACTION:  
 COMTASKFORCE 1

INFORMATION:  
 SERIAL NO. 10-331  
 SOPA PEARL  
 CINCPAC

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 49

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:  
 Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 03210"), with attached copy of ComPatWing Two Confidential ltr. file C A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14, Serial 0348 of 9 April 1941, and copy of Com 14 Mailgram DTG 120001 of April 1941, Subject: Annex Baker to Commander Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941.  
 are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.  
 [SEAL]

R. E. KEETON,  
*By direction of the Commander in Chief,  
 U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.*

(A copy of Cincpac Routing slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 143, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Mailgram]

From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)  
 Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H.  
 120001 April 1941

Action To: CincPac, Pacific Fleet Force  
 Commanders & Type Commanders  
 ComPatWing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer,  
 Capt. Yard, C. O.'S Dist. Activities  
 & Units as per Distribution List  
 of N.B.D.O. Operation Plan No.  
 1-41 with Annexes A,B,C,D, & E.

Information: CincPac  
 Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with paragraph (X) of Naval Base Defense Officer Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, revision of Annex Baker (Naval Base Defense Air Force Operational Plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replacement of Annex Baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH,  
*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,  
 Commander Naval Base Defense Force  
 (Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)*

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,  
*Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.*

[1]

NAVAL AAI STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H. April 9, 1941.

ANNEX BAKER TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41  
DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1941

*Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.—Task Organization*

(a) *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)). The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol Squadrons.
- Shore-based VO—VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group* (Senior VF Squadron Commander. The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. *Information:* This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

[2] *Assumptions:* As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) *Search and Attack Group.* (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) *Air Combat Group.* (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile condition of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus

ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,  
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,  
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1]

COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO,  
Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.  
HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

*Addendum I to naval base defense Air Force operation plan No. A-1-41*

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

*I. Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

*II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch guns and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a com-

plete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present plans are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

### III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) A single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

### IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] IV. (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

#### V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. [6] *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force).* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Army pursuit squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

- (a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

*Material readiness*

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

*Degree of readiness*

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes.

Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—One hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory planes and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

P. N. L. BELLINGER, *Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,*  
*Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,*  
*(Commanding Patrol Wing TWO)*

F. L. MARTIN,  
*Major General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.*

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,  
*Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.*

[1]  
 C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)  
*Confidential*

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,  
 FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,  
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

*Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan*  
 No. A-1-41

*Conditions of readiness and readiness reports*

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

*Material Readiness*

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

*Degree of operational readiness*

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

- 1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters, fifteen minutes.
- 2. All types—30 minutes.
- 3. All types—one hour.
- 4. All types—two hours.
- 5. All types—four hours.

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

[2] 3. *Readiness Reports:*

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commanding Patrol Wing TWO).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 50

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 20 December 1941.

PW2/A16-3/0850

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Task Force NINE (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Operations on December 7, 1941.

1. On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, forces under my command were disposed as follows: Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE at Midway, Patrol Squadrons ELEVEN, TWELVE, FOURTEEN at Kaneohe, TWENTY-ONE, TWENTY-THREE AND TWENTY-FOUR at Pearl Harbor, all tenders except WRIGHT at Pearl Harbor; WRIGHT enroute to Pearl Harbor from Midway.

2. The condition of readiness in force was Baker 5 (50% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing maintenance work. In addition to the above, three squadrons (VP-21 at Midway, VP-23 at Pearl, and VP-11 at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice). This was augmented by specific duty assignments on December 7 which required six planes from Patrol Squadrons FOURTEEN, TWENTY-FOUR and TWELVE to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

The general orders listed above were modified by circumstances and planes actually ready for flight were as follows:

VP-21 7 planes—in the air conducting search 120° to 170° to 450 miles from Midway.

4 planes—on the surface at Midway armed each with 2 five hundred pound bombs and on 10 minutes notice.

VP-11 12 planes—ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

VP-12 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

5 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

VP-14 3 planes in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges.

3 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

4 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

VP-22 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

VP-23 11 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

VP-24 4 planes in the air conducting inter-type tactics with submarines.

1 plane ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

Total 72 in the air or ready for flight in 4 hours or less.

In this connection it may be stated that the 4 hours notice was primarily set to permit rest and recreation of personnel and was in no wise, a criterion of material readiness. For example, one plane of VP-23, theoretically on 4 hours notice, was actually in the air 45 minutes after the first bomb dropped.

To summarize the foregoing, at the moment the first bomb dropped, aircraft of this command were in the following condition:

14—in the air (7 on a search from Midway).

58—on the surface ready for flight in four hours or less.

9—undergoing repairs.

81—Total.

Illustrative of the efforts made by personnel, one of the nine planes undergoing repairs took off for a search at 1335, local time, loaded with 4 one thousand pound bombs.

3. A narrative of events of the day follows:

Time (LCT)

0700 14-P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.

0715 Message coded and transmitted to base.

0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer.

0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer.

0740 Relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander in Chief.

0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer.

0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar.



0758 Message ordered broadcasted to all ships present quote "AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL" unquote (An identical message was sent by Cincpac).

0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone (Received by some of the planes in the air at 0805).

From this time on an accurate chronological account is impracticable.

The Commander Patrol Wing TWO arrived at the Operations Office during the first attack and approved the orders that had been issued. Telephonic communication with the various squadrons at Pearl Harbor was established in order to supplement and possibly accelerate the radio transmissions. As was usually the case, it was difficult to communicate with Kaneohe. The page printer had gone out of commission and it was quite difficult to obtain a telephonic connection. Immediately upon termination of the first attack, an endeavor was made to determine the sectors of the search actually being covered. It was determined, with some difficulty that, of all planes at the bases of Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor, only 3 were still in commission. These were dispatched to fill holidays in what appeared to be the most promising sectors for search. In addition, available planes from the Utility Wing were ordered out. The 2 planes still available for duty at Kaneohe were ordered by telephone to cover the sector between 280 and 300 degrees. The one plane still available at Pearl Harbor had some difficulty in being launched due to the wreckage and fires of other planes in the way. About this time the second attack came in. Fire was opened by tenders of this command and from machine guns mounted in planes on the ground or removed from the planes to extemporized mountings with greater arcs of fire. As a result of this second attack, all communications, radio, telephone and page printer were knocked out of commission. Immediate steps to restore communications were taken while the second attack was still underway and communications personnel, who unfortunately have not yet been identified, proceeded to repair the radio antenna during the height of the attack. Before the end of the second attack, radio communications were established by utilizing all the facilities available, including some of that uninjured on the tenders of this command. Shortly thereafter, telephonic communication was reestablished and information was received that the 2 planes at Kaneohe previously reported as ready for service had been destroyed. Accordingly, orders were issued for the 1 plane at Pearl Harbor, which had somehow escaped uninjured during the second attack, to cover the sector from 280 to 300 degrees. The Commander Patrol Wing ONE at Kaneohe felt that the orders to cover the sector 280 to 300, which had been transmitted to him by telephone for the 2 planes on the ground, required his taking action and he accordingly diverted 14-P-1 and 14-P-3 from the sectors that they had been searching. Information of this action was not received by me.

The Fleet Aviation Officer, Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. N., kept in constant touch by telephone and made many valuable suggestions. Various members of my staff maintained communications with Army information centers and requested that attempts be made to track the retiring Japanese planes by RADAR. Unfortunately, the CURTISS RADAR was placed out of commission by the damage sustained by that vessel. During the mid-afternoon, 14-P-2 reported being attacked by enemy planes and was thereafter not heard from for 2 or 3 hours. As it was felt that this plane had been shot down and a hole thus left in what appeared to be the most promising sector of the search, every effort was made, as additional planes from whatever source became available, to plug the gap.

All hands exerted their utmost efforts to get more planes ready for flight and to arm them for offensive action. Three more patrol planes were reported ready at Pearl Harbor and dispatched, each carrying 4 one thousand pound bombs. Thirteen SED planes, loaded with 500 pound bombs, came in from LEXINGTON and were pressed into service. Nine were dispatched to search a sector to the north, while the remaining 4 were ordered to attack 4 Japanese troop ships reported off Barbers Point. This report proved to be unfounded.

The accompanying charts indicate the search as actually conducted. The urgent necessity for conducting daily searches since December 7 and for putting all planes possible back in commission, together with urgency for immediate operations, have precluded an exhaustive analysis of the events of the day. Certain highlights however may be of interest:

All planes in commission had guns on board together with full allowances of service ammunition. During the first attack, fire was opened from the guns as mounted in the planes, and when it was discovered that these were not effective for fire from the ground due to structural interference, many personnel removed these guns from the planes and set them up on benches in vases and opened up an effective fire against the second attack. As nearly as can be determined, a total of 4 Japanese planes were shot down by personnel of patrol plane squadrons by this method.

Two planes of Utility Squadron One conducted an extensive search although these planes being of a noncombatant type were not equipped with machine guns. Despite the lack of defense against attacks by hostile aircraft, the pilots of these planes persisted in their search until the threatened exhaustion of their fuel forced their return to Pearl Harbor. The devotion to duty of these pilots will be made the subject of a special report.

These and numerous other instances of distinguished conduct occurred which Commander Task Force NINE has not yet had time to investigate.

4. Attention is invited to the following dispatches and mailgrams indicating the extensive searches conducted by units of this command during the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, from Wake and Midway:

|                          |                |
|--------------------------|----------------|
| Cincpac 280450           | } of November. |
| 280447                   |                |
| 040237                   |                |
| ComTaskForce NINE 291124 | } of December. |
| 292101                   |                |
| 292103                   |                |
| 302359                   |                |
| 050323                   | of November.   |

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to:  
Comairscor.

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 50 (A)

Classified outgoing

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

From.  
CINCPAC  
To:  
COMTASKFOR 2  
COM 14

Info To:  
COMPATWING 2  
COMBATFOR  
COMBASEFOR

Twelve planes marine flight from two eleven are to base Wake accordance Myser 101825 of 10 November X Enterprise provide transportation X After departure Pearl on 28 Nov form Task Force Eight consisting of Enterprise Chester Northampton SaltlakeCity and Desron six and pass command task force two to Real Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry out normal operations in Hawaiian area X proceed to arrive 2000 miles 070 degrees from Wake at 0700 on 3 Dec X ply off marine planes that vicinity and upon receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl X enroute to and from Wake pass through point affirm four hundred miles south of Midway X Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide security while at Wake X communications radio condition nineteen guard NPM primary Fox continuously X comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 3 Dec and direct Wake report comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes arrive there X comfourteen furnish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight X Wake submarine patrol tambor triton will be advised X Narwhal and Dolphin are enroute Pearl at 1200 gct on 27 Nov they were about 300 miles east of Wake

956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

280447 Nov 41

11-860  
Classified outgoing

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAC

From:  
CINCPAC  
To:  
COMPATWING 2

Info To:  
COMSCOFOR  
COMBATFOR  
COM 14  
COMBASEFOR  
COMAIRBATFOR

Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search enroute X provide one squadron relieve Midway planes on 30 November X after arrival both squadrons direct them comply my 280447 X present intention return Wake squadron Pearl about 5 December

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPAC

*Secret Mailgram 292103*

ORIGINATOR:

CTF 9  
292103

ACTION:

COMPATRONS 21, 22  
COMTASKGROUP  
9.2

INFORMATION:

CINCPAC  
COM 14  
COMSUBSCOFOR  
CO NAS MIDWAY  
CO NAS WAKE

Operation order 981 x Information Cinpac 280447 and 280450 x Task Force 8 Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City 6 DD transporting Marine Figron which will base on Wake x Planes will be launched 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT on December 3 x Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass point 400 miles south of Midway x Departed Pearl forenoon 28 Nov. x Wright expected arrive Midway from Wake 3 December x Mission cover route and provide security for TF 8 while in vicinity of Wake in order to obtain information possible enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial striking power during period carrier will be launching marine planes x Tasks Patron 21 search as (?) indicated; Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight search sector 280-280 degrees to longitude 165 degrees thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to Midway; Dec 1 sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using 8 planes; Dec 2 sector 200-237 to 525 miles using four planes; Dec 3 sector 206-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 4 sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes; Dec 5 sector 126-168 to 525 miles using 6 planes x Patron 22 search as indicated; Dec 1 depart Midway daylight using 2 plane sections sector 226-240 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake; Dec 2 sector 000-102 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092 to 500 miles (?) using six planes: one plane be 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 2400 GCT unless otherwise directed by visual: remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs; unless otherwise directed unload bombs at 0230 GCT December 4 x On December four x On Dec 4 take off daylight for Midway x On December 5 take off at daylight for Pearl xray critical period entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. x Logistics fuel as required x Special provisions use zone 0 times x Task Force 9 basic communications and aerological plans x Frequency plan fox Comtaskforce 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl x Maintain radio silence except for contact (?) reports and emergencies x Arrange for bases to broadcast Mo's on schedule without request x.

Date 11/30/41. Crypto-Group Mail. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-974

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

*Mailgram 292101 Mailgram*

Operation Order 982 special provisions use zone plus 12 time x Task force nine basic communication and aerological plans

Frequency plan fox information Cincpac 170429 of October x Comtask force 9 in fairdet at nas Pearl x Mission conduct daily

Patrols from outlying bases in order to locate possible enemy forces threatening their security x Tasks search area within

100 miles of Midway daily using sector search plan number 2 x Be prepared to shift base to Wake x Take offensive action only

If planes or bases are actually attacked or on further orders from Cincpac x Report all contacts except United States naval

Vessels x Coordinate activities with subs operation from Midway x This order effective upon completion of opord 981 x

Date, 11/30/41. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-973.

Originator, CTF 9, 292101. Action, COM PATRON 21. Information, CINCPAC, COM 14, NAS MIDWAY (VIA VP 21), COMSUBSCOFOR.

Classified  
Outgoing

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Date

Grp. Ct.

From CINCPAC. Mailgram to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, COM-PATWING 2.

Info Mailgram to: COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, LEXINGTON.

Originator 11. Release 99. 292101. Show to 12.95.

Myser 01825 of 10 Nov Marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes Midway X Lexington provide transportation X on 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form Task Force 12 under Comcruscofor consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland desron five less desdiv ten X task force twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 120 degrees from Midway at 2230 Oct on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X Comtaskfor nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane fight X communications radio condition 19 guard continuously nrm primary fox X Com 14 inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on 8 Dec and require Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X Com 14 pass this report to Comtaskfor 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be advised

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Copy

Secret

AMGM

Deliver to Compatron 21 operation order 983 information Marine scoron 231 will base Midway 18 planes X Taskforce 12 Lexington 3 CA 5 DD will launch 400 miles 130 degrees from Midway on December 7 at GCT 2230 X mission cover launching position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight December 7 X logistics fuel as required tasks 5 planes search section 120 to 170 degrees to distance 450 miles arriving outer limit at 2230 GCT X 2 planes arrive launching position by 2230 and escort Marscoron 231 to Midway X remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs and await orders at Midway unless otherwise directed unload bombs at 0200 GCT December 8 X special provisions

Date 6 December '41; Crypto-group pl/MG; CBO HRF/HJG.

Originator Comtaskfor 9, Page 1 of 2 pages 950323. Action, NAS Midway. Information, Cincpac, Lexington, CO Maraigr 21, Commarscoron 231. Serial No. 12-296.

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAC

Classified

Copy

Incoming

Secret

AMGM

Use zone 0 time X Comtaskfor 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl radio silence except for contact reports and emergencies use task force 9 basic communication and aerological plans frequency plan fox

Copy and return to Adm. Bellinger

MAILGRAM

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

A. S. F. stand. form No. 13

U. S. S. Wright

Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for distribution an handling as a regular dispatch

From: Comtaskfor 9  
To: NAS Midway  
Mailed at: PH TH 1124  
To: Compatron 21 (Mail)

291124

Your squadron departs for Wake daylight December first X Detailed orders via Patron 21 X Mission cover Route Taskforce 8 including carrier proceeding westward X Task on thirty November using six planes search sector 153-195 degrees to 500 miles X Patron 21 enroute Midway will search adjacent sector to eastward X For Patron 22 X Present intention return your squadron about 5 December to Pearl X Arrange schedule for base broadcast MO's without request on 364 Kilocycles to cover return your squadron and arrival Patron 21 X Maintain radio silence except for contact reports and emergencies.

Authenticated: -----  
Signature, name and rank.

Copy and return to Admr. Bellinger

A. S. F. Stand. Form No. 13  
U. S. S. Wright

MAILGRAM

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for distribution and handling as a regular dispatch

From: COMTASKFOR 9  
To: NAS Midway  
Date: November 30, 1941  
Mailed at: NAS, PH, TH, 2359  
To: NAS Johnston

302359

Detailed plans and orders arriving via Patron 21 planes prior sunrise tomorrow minday X First day operations require quote December 1 depart Midway daylight using two plane sections search sector 226-249 degrees to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake unquote if necessary leave one pair planes Midway with orders depart directly for Wake upon receipt of papers from Patron 21 X INFO ADEE deliver to Compatron 21 X Action ADEE to Compatron 22.

Authenticated: -----  
Signature, name and rank.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 51

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
*Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., 27 Oct. 1941.*

*Secret*

PW2/A16-80027

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.

Reference: (a) Compatwing TWO SECRET ltr. A16-3 serial 0026 of Oct. 22, 1941, with Comairscfor SECRET 1st end. A16-3 of Oct. 23, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. In view of the urgent nature of the subject matter of reference (a), and, in view of the fact that the Commander Scouting Force is now at sea, a copy of reference (a), is being forwarded herewith direct.

P. N. L. Bellinger,  
P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: Comscfor.

A16-3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
*Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 23, 1941.*

*Secret*

*First endorsement to Compatwing TWO SECRET*

Letter PW2/A16-3/0026 dated October 22, 1941.

From: The Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Via: The Commander Scouting Force.

Subject: Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendations of the Commander Patrol Wing TWO. This concurrence is emphatic with respect to the employment of carriers of present design.

2. The recommendation for change in Naval Policy to permit inclusion within the Naval Aeronautical Organization of Air Striking Groups of high performance landplane bombers and landplane interceptor fighters, for the protection of advanced Fleet Air Bases, meets with the hearty endorsement of the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force. Landplane bombers and fighters with the characteristics as described are definitely tools that Naval Aviation requires today in its varied missions. Upon enlargement of the scope of Navy Policy, the corresponding procurement and training programs should be prosecuted.

3. The inherent delays in accomplishing the change of policy with its attendant modifications in training and procurement plans, seriously influence the factor of time, which is now not one of our superiorities to be exploited. Accordingly as a stop-gap measure, if not already provided for, the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, considers that the westward movement of the Pacific Fleet must be accorded the full support of an Army Air Striking Force in joint effort under the unified command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

J. S. McCain.

Copy to: Compatwing TWO.

Ln

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 1941.

PW2/A16-3/0026

Secret

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.

Via: (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.

(2) The Commander Scouting Force.

Subject: Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.

1. In examining the types of aircraft that are listed in the scheme of procurement of the 15,000 plane program, it is noted that, except for those planes based on carriers, there are no types that are considered really valuable as combatant units capable of carrying out offensive action against enemy units afloat, or ashore in the face of efficient enemy opposition. The strategical background of the Pacific indicates that in a war in the Pacific there will be many occasions where Fleet aircraft will have to take offensive action against objectives at islands which are strongly defended by anti-aircraft batteries and by shore-based aircraft. The utilization of carrier aircraft for this purpose involves placing the carriers within range of hostile shore-based aircraft. Carriers of present design are very vulnerable to bomb hits and the value and chances of success of their employment against bases defended by shore-based aircraft must be weighed against the chances and consequences of failure. Patrol Planes, which have the requisite range, are relatively slow and vulnerable to fighter and anti-aircraft opposition. It is respectfully submitted that the Fleet is not adequately prepared for a campaign in the Pacific until, in addition to present types of aircraft, it is provided with an air striking force of high-speed long-range landplane bombers, at least equal in performance to the B-17-E. It is my opinion that such bombers should be available in sufficient numbers to permit continuous effective bombing attacks to be made against shore objectives from Wake, and from such other suitable island bases as are available. In addition, for the protection of bases from which this air striking force would operate, there are needed high performance interceptor fighters in adequate numbers to provide for interception, under RADAR direction, of approaching hostile air attacks.

2. If we are provided with a suitable Air Striking Force of long-range shore-based landplane bombers, it is possible that carriers need not approach within range of hostile shore-based aircraft until hostile air bases have been destroyed or, by sustained attacks, have been made untenable. By such means, and it is believed, only by such means, can a rapid successful Pacific campaign be accomplished without *disproportionate losses to our own forces*. It is undoubtedly the intention of ORANGE initially to fight a war of attrition, utilizing shore-based aircraft, shore batteries, mines, and submarines to inflict maximum damage to our surface forces, while his own fleet is maintained intact in the hope of attaining equality or superiority to our fleet. It is my considered opinion that *our present plan of action gives him a fair chance of succeeding in the attainment of this objective*. He will undoubtedly throw his most modern aircraft into the campaign, sending them to the theatre of operations from the homeland via the chain of island airports in existence, in a steady flow of fresh replacements. It is therefore essential that the fields in the immediate theatre of operations be made untenable at the outbreak of war, and also, successively, his most advanced airports as the campaign progresses.

3. The following courses of action are strongly recommended for accomplishment under unexcelled priority as of the most vital importance to national security:

(a) Obtain the immediate initial assignment of an Army Air Corps Air Striking Force to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. It is believed that the composition of this force should be approximately as follows:

(1) Three groups, each of sixty (60) long-range high-speed landplane bombers equal or superior to the B-17-E.

(2) Three groups, each of sixty (60) interceptor fighters of the best performance available.

(b) Develop Wake and Midway air fields under highest priority so that each may accommodate not less than one-third of the bombers and fighters simultaneously.

(c) Expedite and expand the RADAR installations at Midway and Wake.

(d) Expedite and expand anti-aircraft defenses at Wake.

(e) As soon as possible, station one group of interceptor fighters at Wake, and one group at Midway. Provide Johnston and Palmyra with smaller detachments of interceptor fighters. Station one group of bombers At Midway. Station two bomber groups and remainder of interceptor fighters in reserve in the Hawaiian Area. This disposition will provide for defense of Wake and Midway, while the bombers at Midway are beyond range of attack from hostile shore-based aircraft, but are in position to proceed immediately to Wake to start offensive operations.

(f) Initiate action to modify Naval Policy to augment the mission of the Navy Aeronautical Organization to provide Air Striking Forces of long-range high-speed landplane bombers to the Fleets, and landplane interceptor fighters for protection of advanced air bases used by Fleet Aircraft.

(g) Initiate action to include in the Navy aircraft procurement program the requisite quantities of long-range high-speed landplane bombers and interceptor fighters.

4. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification *other than SECRET*.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 52

[1]  
PW2/A16-3/(022)

Je.

PATROL WING TWO,  
January 16, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force. (2) The Commander in Chief, U. S. FLEET.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Aircraft".

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons, but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection". As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will practically be the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.



[2] (b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

4. It is therefor urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

(a) For Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[3] 6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the USS WRIGHT and the USS SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb stowage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from ammunition depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (Officer and enlisted, additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[4] 8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary

- personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War Requirements.
- (d) For Keehi Lagoon.
    1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.
  - (e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.
    1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.
  - (f) For Midway.
    1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.
  - (g) General.
    1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.
    2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: Comairscofor  
Com. 14  
NAS P. H. TH  
Prosp. C. O., NAS Kaneohe.

[1]

Je.

PATROL WING TWO,  
January 16, 1941.

PW2/A16-3/(022)

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force. (2) The Commander in Chief, U. S. FLEET.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO-Readiness of.

References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Aircraft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

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4. It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

(a) For Patrol Wing TWO

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[3] 6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the USS WRIGHT and the USS SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

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2. Increase and improve bomb stowage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from ammunition depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (Officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[4] 8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War Requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon.

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway.

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General.

[5] 1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: Comairscfor  
Com. 14  
NAS P. H. TH  
Prosp. C. O. NAS Kaneohe.

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 53

Chg. from SECRET to  
CONFIDENTIAL by Op Nav  
(015723)

PW2/A16-3/  
(0003)

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 11, 1940.

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Via: (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.  
(2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.  
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb Loading and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizant of this Exercise in advance and a detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammunition now stored at the Naval Air Station.

2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the time element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the times involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500 pound type bombs:

| <i>Event</i>                                                                            | <i>Time required</i> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| First bomb delivered to squadrons.....                                                  | 50 minutes           |
| Last bomb delivered to squadrons.....                                                   | 2 hours              |
| Fuses delivered to squadrons.....                                                       | 1 hour 05 minutes    |
| Tail vanes delivered to squadrons.....                                                  | 1 hour 40 minutes    |
| Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron with four bombs on each plane.....         | 6 to 7 hours         |
| Time required to belt a complete machine gun ammunition allowance in each squadron..... | 4 to 6 hours         |

3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has been taken. However, some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct and should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as follows:

(a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 500 pound type available in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current transfer of one hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred 100 pound bombs to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in connection with the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-SIX, leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Lualualei ammunition depot, and on board the U.S.S. WRIGHT a total number of the heavier type bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads for the four squadrons now comprising this Wing. These are distributed as follows and represents all naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area:

|              | NAS PH | Lualualei | Wright | Totals |
|--------------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| 1000 lb..... | 48     | 573       | 61     | 682    |
| 500 lb.....  | 48     | 1151      | 81     | 1280   |
| 100 lb.....  | 48     | 2446      | 314    | 2808   |

The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufficient for use in the Pearl Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a source of supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases from which squadrons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this Wing will be required to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply of bombs should be available at each such base.

(b) The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, is inadequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is necessary to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It is urgently recommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each type to provide at least one complete bomb load for the number of the squadrons to be based thereon.

In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor is located on an island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO from the ammunition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of the transportation by water.

Trucks via ferry seems to be far the most practical method of transportation. At present there is only one ferry available for such use. This is not considered sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desirable in order to make sure that two will be continuously available.

(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the immediate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufficient to store at least one complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the squadron and a complete allowance of pyrotechnics.

(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insufficient bomb handling equipment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger lift cranes (2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to expedite the unloading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two such traveling cranes for each squadron is considered a minimum. The above has not been requested by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds and authorization to purchase these items should be given high priority.

(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing. It is recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased and that the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve plane squadron. At least two additional squadron allowances should be provided for each Wing to provide equipment for use when operating from widely separated bases.

(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered inadequate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied with twelve of the MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol Squadron equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplied with twelve MK XXXI Torpedo Skids.

(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belting machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be increased to twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron and each tender.

(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service 500 pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs be designed with a lifting lug as an integral part of the bomb. It is further recommended that the specification for all bomb crates, tail vane crates, and ordnance equipment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.

4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: (direct) Comdt. 14th N. D. NAS, PH, TH CincUS Comscofor

UNITED STATES FLEET

A16

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

U. S. S. HULBERT, FLAGSHIP,

(S1)

Naval Air Station,  
San Diego, California.

*Confidential*

First endorsement to

PW-2 Secret ltr. A16-2/

(0003) of 11 Dec., 1940.

From: The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) Commander Scouting Force.

(2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Forwarded.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b), present plans call for the expeditious development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready" ammunition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other bases, or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be possible to maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or in the event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transportation. Adequate stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of bombs at Ford Island must be provided.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time

and cost of procurement. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, San Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment consisting of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor, to transport ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type of equipment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford Island, where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For transportation over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei to Kaneohe, heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations from commanding officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of equipment required to meet special local conditions should be given careful consideration.

4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of Mk. III bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simultaneous loading on both wings.

5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommendations contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squadrons of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics necessary to equip patrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern. The need for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the utmost importance.

6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

A. L. BRISTOL.

Copy to: COMPATWING 2.

[1] A16/0054/  
(0202)

(Chg. from SECRET to  
CONFIDENTIAL By OpNav  
015723

UNITED STATES FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,  
Feb. 5, 1941.

*Confidential*

Third Endorsement to  
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3  
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.  
Reference:

(a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41  
(0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.

(b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of  
1/16/41.

1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.

2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-in-Chief stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended increased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with adequate handling and loading equipment.

3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as a vital feature of Fleet readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands immediate and direct action.

4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorsement are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection with the general problem of provision for arming and re-arming at various places.

It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to minimize or delay the needed action at *Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor*, on the recommendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.

5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be permitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements that exist *now* at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out frequently in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be in eventual excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in this area.

6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.

7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate in this directive.

8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:  
Comscofor  
Comairscofor  
Comairbatfor  
Compatwing TWO  
Com-14  
NAS P. H.

[1] PW2/A16-S/  
(0008)

Chg. from SECRET to  
CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav  
(015723)

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
December 11, 1940.

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via:

- (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
- (2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.
- (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb Loading and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizant of this Exercise in advance and a detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammunition now stored at the Naval Air Station.

2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the time element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the times involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500 pound type bombs:

| Event                                                                                      | Time Required     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| First bomb delivered to squadrons-----                                                     | 50 minutes        |
| Last bomb delivered to squadrons-----                                                      | 2 hours           |
| Fuses delivered to squadrons-----                                                          | 1 hour 05 minutes |
| Tail vanes delivered to squadrons-----                                                     | 1 hour 40 minutes |
| Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron<br>with four bombs on each plane-----         | 6 to 7 hours      |
| Time required to belt a complete machine gun<br>ammunition allowance in each squadron----- | 4 to 6 hours      |



3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has been taken. However, some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct and should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as follows:

[2] (a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 500 pound type available in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current transfer of one hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred 100 pound bombs to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in connection with the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron TWTNTY-SIX, leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Lualualei ammunition depot, and on board the U. S. S. WRIGHT a total number of the heavier type bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads for the four squadrons now comprising this Wing. These are distributed as follows and represents all naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area:

|               | NAS PH | Lualualei | Wright | Totals |
|---------------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| 1,000 lb..... | 48     | 573       | 61     | 682    |
| 500 lb.....   | 48     | 1,151     | 81     | 1,280  |
| 100 lb.....   | 48     | 2,446     | 314    | 2,808  |

The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufficient for use in the Pearl Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a source of supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases from which squadrons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this Wing will be required to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply of bombs should be available at each such base.

(b) The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, is inadequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is necessary to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It is urgently recommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each type to provide at least one complete bomb load for the number of the squadrons to be based thereon.

In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor is located on an island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO from the ammunition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of the transportation by water.

[3] Trucks via ferry seems to be by far the most practical method of transportation. At present there is only one ferry available for such use. This is not considered sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desirable in order to make sure that two will be continuously available.

(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the immediate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufficient to store at least one complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the squadron and a complete allowance of pyrotechnics.

(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insufficient bomb handling equipment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger lift cranes (2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to expedite the unloading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two such traveling cranes for each squadron is considered a minimum. The above has not been requested by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds and authorization to purchase these items should be given high priority.

(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing. It is recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased and that the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve plane squadron. At least two additional squadron allowances should be provided for each Wing to provide equipment for use when operating from widely separated bases.

(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered inadequate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied with twelve

of the MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol Squadron equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplied with twelve MK XXXI Torpedo Skids.

(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belting machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be increased to twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron and each tender.

(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service 500 pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs be designed with a lifting lug as an integral part of the bomb. It is further recommended that the specification for all bomb crates, tall vane crates, and ordnance equipment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.

4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: (direct)  
Comdt. 14th N. D.  
NAS, PH. TH  
CincUS  
Comscofor

UNITED STATES FLEET  
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

U. S. S. HULBERT, FLAGSHIP,  
NAVAL AIR STATION,  
San Diego, California.

A16  
(S1)  
*Confidential*  
First Endorsement to  
PW-2 SECRET ltr. A16-2/  
(0003) of 11 Dec., 1940.

From: The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via:

- (1) Commander Scouting Force.
- (2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Forwarded.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b), present plans call for the expeditious development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready" ammunition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other bases, or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be possible to maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or in the event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transportation. Adequate stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of bombs at Ford Island must be provided.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time and cost of procurement. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, San Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment consisting of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor, to transport ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type of equipment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford Island, where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For transportation over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei

## 972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

to Kaneohe, heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations from commanding officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of equipment required to meet special local conditions should be given careful consideration.

4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of Mk. III bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simultaneous loading on both wings.

5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommendations contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squadrons of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics necessary to equip patrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern. The need for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the utmost importance.

6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

A. L. BRISTOL.

Copy to: COMPATWING 2.

[1] A16/0054/

UNITED STATES FLEET

(0202)

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,  
(Chg. from SECRET to  
CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav  
015723

*Confidential*

Pearl Harbor, T. H.,  
Feb. 5, 1941.

Third Endorsement to  
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3  
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.  
Reference:

- (a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41 (0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.
- (b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.

2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-in-Chief stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended increased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with adequate handling and loading equipment.

3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as a vital feature of Fleet readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands immediate and direct action.

4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorsement are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection with the general problem of provision for arming and re-arming at various places. It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to minimize or delay the needed action at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, on the recommendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.

5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be permitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements that exist now at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out

frequently in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be in eventual excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in this area.

6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.

7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate in this directive.

8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Comscofor  
Comairscfor  
Comairbatfor  
Compatwing TWO  
Com-14  
NAS P. H.

---

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 54

PATROL WING TWO

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,  
25 Nov. 1941.

PW2/A4-4/  
(8298)

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To:

The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO.  
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-THREE.  
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.  
The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.  
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWELVE.  
The Commander Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN.

Subject: Watch and Duty Schedule for December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Watch and Duty Schedule.

1. Enclosure (A) will be followed as the Watch and Duty Schedule for the period December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

L. C. Ramsey,  
L. C. RAMSEY,  
By direction.

Copy to:

Compatwing ONE.  
Compatron 21.

Enclosure "A"

|                   | M 1 | T 2 | W 3 | T 4 | F 5 | S 6 | S 7 | M 8 | T 9 | W 10 | T 11 | F 12 | S 13 | S 14 | M 15 | T 16 | W 17 | T 18 | F 19 | S 20 | S 21 |
|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Patron 22(1)..... | W   | W   | W   | W   | W   | S   | S   | SST | W   | W    | W    | W    | P    | DP   | T    | T    | T    | P    | T    | T    | S    |
| Patron 22(2)..... | W   | W   | W   | W   | W   | S   | S   | W   | SST | DP   | W    | W    | S    | P    | T    | T    | T    | T    | P    | DP   | S    |
| Patron 23(1)..... | DP  | WT  | WT  | WT  | WT  | DP  | S   | W   | W   | SST  | W    | W    | S    | S    | P    | DP   | T    | T    | T    | P    | S    |
| Patron 23(2)..... | BLD | WT  | P   | DP  | WT  | SST | SST | W   | W   | W    | SST  | DP   | S    | S    | T    | T    | T    | T    | T    | P    | S    |
| Patron 24.....    | BLD | DP  | WT  | P   | WT  | S   | SST | DP  | W   | W    | W    | P    | S    | S    | T    | T    | P    | DP   | T    | T    | S    |
| Patron 11.....    | BLD | WT  | WT  | K   | WT  | S   | SST | W   | W   | SST  | DP   | W    | S    | S    | T    | T    | DP   | T    | T    | T    | S    |
| Patron 12.....    | BLD | WT  | WT  | WT  | K   | S   | S   | SST | W   | W    | SST  | W    | S    | S    | T    | T    | DP   | T    | T    | K    | DP   |
| Patron 14.....    | BLD | WT  | K   | WT  | WT  | SST | DP  | W   | SST | W    | W    | K    | DP   | S    | K    | T    | T    | K    | DP   | T    | K    |

T—Fleet or Wing tactics.  
 BLD—Bomb loading drill.  
 P—Pearl Harbor ready duty division.  
 K—Kaneboe ready duty division (other division of squadron secured).  
 DP—Dawn Patrol; division making dawn patrol secures upon completion; other division normal duty 0700-1300 except Saturday and Sunday.  
 S—Secured.  
 SST—Tactics with submarines.  
 WT—Wing Tactics.  
 W—Regular Working Hours.

|                   | M 22 | T 23 | W 24 | T 25 | F 26 | S 27 | S 28 | M 29 | T 30 | W 31 | Jan 1 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Patron 22(1)..... | W    | P    | DP   | S    | W    | S    | P    | W    | W    | W    | S     |
| Patron 22(2)..... | W    | W    | P    | S    | W    | S    | S    | DP   | DP   | W    | S     |
| Patron 23(1)..... | DP   | W    | W    | S    | DP   | S    | S    | P    | P    | W    | S     |
| Patron 23(2)..... | P    | W    | W    | S    | P    | S    | S    | W    | W    | P    | S     |
| Patron 24.....    | K    | DP   | W    | S    | W    | DP   | DP   | W    | W    | W    | S     |
| Patron 11.....    | K    | W    | W    | S    | K    | S    | K    | W    | W    | W    | S     |
| Patron 12.....    | W    | W    | K    | S    | W    | DP   | S    | W    | W    | DP   | S     |
| Patron 14.....    | W    | W    | K    | S    | W    | K    | W    | W    | W    | DP   | S     |

PW2/A4-3(4)/  
(3288)  
*Restricted*

Wn

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 25, 1941.

*Operation Schedule No. 45-41 (Week of Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1941)*

|                | 26<br>Wed | 27<br>Thurs | 28<br>Fri | 29<br>Sat | 30<br>Sun | Dec. 1<br>Mon | 2<br>Tues |
|----------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| Curtiss.....   | SPH       | SPH         | SPH       | SPH       | SPH       | T1            | T1        |
| Tangier.....   | UK        | UK          | UK        | UK        | UK        | UK            | UK        |
| Wright.....    | ABE       | ABE         | ABE       | ABE       | ABE       | ABE           | ABE       |
| McFarland..... | UK        | UK          | UK        | UK        | UK        | SPH           | SPH       |
| Hulbert.....   | SPH       | SPH         | SPH       | SPH       | SPH       | SPH           | SPH       |
| Swan.....      | PG        | PG          | SPH       | SPH       | SPH       | SPH           | SPH       |
| Avocet.....    | SPH       | SPH         | SPH       | SPH       | SPH       | SPH           | SPH       |
|                |           | RD          | DP        |           |           |               |           |
| Patron 11..... | G4 V8     | G4 V8       | G4 V8     | SHW       | SHW       | F1 V8         | F1 V8     |
|                | RD        | DP          |           |           |           |               |           |
| Patron 12..... | G2 L1 L2  | G2 L1       | G2 L1     | UK        | SHW       | F1 V7         | F1 V7     |
| Patron 14..... | UK        | UK          | UK        | RD        | DP        | E1            | E1        |
|                | DP G2 F1  | G2 F1       | RD G2 F1  |           |           | G2 F1         | G2 F1     |
| Patron 21..... | V4 VC9    | L2 VC9      | L2 VC9    | DP        | SHW       | L1 VC9        | L1 VC9    |
| Patron 22..... | ABE       | ABE         | ABE       | ABE       | ABE       | ABE           | ABE       |
| Patron 23..... | E1        | E1          | E1        | SHW       | RD        | E1            | E1        |
|                | F1 G3     | F1 G3       |           |           |           | F1 G3         | F1 G3     |
| Patron 24..... | Y1 VC10   | VC10        | G1 V4     | P1        | SHW       | V4            | V4        |

E1 Familiarization.  
F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.  
ABE Advance Base Operations.  
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.  
G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.  
G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.  
G4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.  
PG Plane Guard.  
P1 Inspection.  
RD Ready Duty.  
SHW Holiday Routine.  
SPH Services Pearl Harbor.  
T1 Tactics.  
UK Upkeep.  
Y1 Night Flying.  
DP Dawn Patrol.

Ready Duty Tender: HULBERT.

L. C. RAMSEY,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Operations Officer,  
Patrol Wing TWO.

*Distribution*

Squadrons (each) 10  
Tenders (each) 10  
NAS PH TH 20  
NAS Kaneohe Bay 20  
NAS Maui 20  
FAD OOD 3  
PatWing TWO Photo. Unit 2

Wn

PW2/A4-3/VZ/  
(3287)  
*RESTRICTED*

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 25, 1941.

*Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1941)*

Wednesday, Nov. 26. #Patron 24 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VJ-1 (3 landplanes) practice landings 1800-1900. 2 (JRS planes) will operate without lights in areas C-7 and C-11 altitude 10,000 feet towline 7000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

**Thursday, Nov. 27.** Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (9 planes) will return to Pearl Harbor from operating areas at sea.

**Friday, Nov. 28.** Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

**Saturday, Nov. 29.** VJ-1 (1 PBY) takeoff 1800. Will operate without lights in areas C8, C9, C10 altitude 10,000 feet towline 7000 feet.

**Sunday, Nov. 30.** NONE.

**Monday, Dec. 1.** #VCS-9 (8 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

**Tuesday, Dec. 2.** Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. Navigation flights to Maui and return. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

L. C. Ramsey,

L. C. RAMSEY,

Commander, U. S. Navy,

Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appear two schedules of Patrol Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being "Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution" and "Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution". These schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 144 and 145, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Wn

PW2/A4-3/VZ/  
(3231)

Restricted

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, 1941.

*Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week of Nov. 19-25, 1941)*

**Wednesday, Nov. 19.** #Patron 21 night bombing 2030-2200 area VS2. Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, VS1 above 2000 feet.

**Thursday, Nov. 20.** NONE.

**Friday, Nov. 21.** Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

**Saturday, Nov. 22.** NONE.

**Sunday, Nov. 23.** NONE.

**Monday, Nov. 24.** Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

**Tuesday, Nov. 25.** Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. Ramsey,

L. C. RAMSEY,

Commander, U. S. Navy.

Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A4-3(4)/  
(3230)  
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, 1941.

*Operation Schedule No. 44-41 (Week of November 19-25, 1941)*

|                | 19 Wed                  | 20 Thurs                | 21 Fri                  | 22 Sat | 23 Sun                | 24 Mon                  | 25 Tues                 |
|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Curtiss.....   | UK                      | UK                      | UK                      | UK     | UK                    | SPH                     | SPH                     |
| Tangier.....   | UK                      | UK                      | UK                      | T1     | T1                    | T1                      | T1                      |
| Wright.....    | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE    | ABE                   | ABE                     | ABE                     |
| McFarland..... | SPH                     | SPH                     | SPH                     | UK     | UK                    | UK                      | UK                      |
| Thornton.....  | PG                      | PG                      | PG                      | PG     | PG                    | PG                      | PG                      |
| Hulbert.....   | UK                      | UK                      | UK                      | UK     | UK                    | UK                      | UK                      |
| Swan.....      | PG                      | PG                      | PG                      | PG     | PG                    | PG                      | PG                      |
| Avocet.....    | UK                      | UK                      | UK                      | UK     | UK                    | UK                      | UK                      |
| Patron 11..... | DP                      | SHW                     | RD E1                   | DP     | SHW                   | RD G4 V4                | DP G4 V4                |
| Patron 12..... | { RD F1<br>V5 V6 }      | { DP F1<br>V5 V6 }      | P1                      | UK     | T1                    | T1                      | T1                      |
| Patron 14..... | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE    | ABE                   | UK                      | UK                      |
| Patron 21..... | { G2 F1 Y1<br>L1 VC10 } | { RD G2 F1<br>L1 VC10 } | { DP G2 F1<br>L1 VC10 } | SHW    | { RD G2 F1<br>L1 V4 } | { DP G2 F1<br>L1 VC10 } | { RD G2 F1<br>L1 VC10 } |
| Patron 22..... | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE    | ABE                   | ABE                     | ABE                     |
| Patron 23..... | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE                     | ABE    | ABE                   | UK                      | UK                      |
| Patron 24..... | E1                      | SHW                     | E1                      | RD     | DP                    | E1                      | E1                      |

|     |                                   |     |                        |
|-----|-----------------------------------|-----|------------------------|
| E1  | Familiarization.                  | RD  | Ready Duty.            |
| F1  | Free or Fixed Machine Guns.       | SHW | Holiday Routine.       |
| ABE | Advance Base Operations.          | SPH | Services Pearl Harbor. |
| G2  | High Altitude Horizontal Bombing. | T1  | Tactics.               |
| G4  | Bombing Maneuvering Target.       | UK  | Upkeep.                |
| PG  | Plane Guard.                      | Y1  | Night Flying.          |
| P1  | Inspection.                       | DP  | Dawn Patrol.           |

**DISTRIBUTION**

|                           |    |
|---------------------------|----|
| Squadrons (each).....     | 10 |
| Tenders (each).....       | 10 |
| NAS PH TH.....            | 20 |
| NAS Kaneohe Bay.....      | 20 |
| NAS Maul.....             | 20 |
| FAD COD Pearl Harbor..... | 3  |

L. C. Ramsey,  
L. C. RAMSEY,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two.

PW2/A4-3(2)/  
(3229)  
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, 1941.

*Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment (Week of November 19-25, 1941)*

|                          |                                                 |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Patrol Wing Two.....     | V4, VC10, L1, L2.                               |
| Carrier Air Groups.....  | V1, V2, V3, VS1, L3. Illio Point target, Kahuku |
| Marine Air Group 21..... | Point Target (except 25 & 26 Nov.)              |
| VO Wing.....             | V7, V8.                                         |
| CA Wing.....             | VU3.                                            |
| CL Wing.....             | VA9, VC9.                                       |
| VCS-5.....               | Kahuku Point Target 25 and 26 November.         |

L. C. Ramsey,  
L. C. RAMSEY,  
Commander, U. S. Navy  
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

Wn



# 978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PW2/A4-3(2)/  
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

## Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution:

|                                         |    |
|-----------------------------------------|----|
| CinCPac                                 | 5  |
| Comairbatfor                            | 5  |
| Comscofor                               | 5  |
| Combatships                             | 5  |
| Combatdiv ONE                           | 5  |
| Combatdiv FOUR                          | 5  |
| Comcrubatfor                            | 5  |
| Comcruscofor                            | 5  |
| Comcrudiv THREE                         | 5  |
| Comcrudiv FOUR                          | 5  |
| Comcrudiv FIVE                          | 5  |
| Comcrudiv SIX                           | 5  |
| Comcrudiv NINE                          | 5  |
| PatWing ONE Units (each)                | 5  |
| Patwing TWO Units (each)                | 5  |
| Lexington Air Group                     | 11 |
| Enterprise Air Group                    | 11 |
| Saratoga Air Group                      | 11 |
| Marine Air Group 21                     | 20 |
| C. O., U. S. S. LEXINGTON               | 10 |
| C. O., U. S. S. ENTERPRISE              | 10 |
| C. O., U. S. S. SARATOGA                | 10 |
| C. O., N. A. S., Pearl Harbor           | 20 |
| C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe Bay            | 20 |
| Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit          | 5  |
| C. G., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field | 27 |
| Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field  | 27 |
| Commander Hawaiian Air Force            | 5  |
| Combatfor                               | 4  |
| Comsubscfor                             | 4  |
| Comdt. 14 N. D.                         | 8  |
| Combasefor                              | 2  |
| Cominbatfor                             | 2  |
| Comutwing, Basefor                      | 5  |
| Subron FOUR                             | 5  |
| CG; KSC, B, Fort DeRussy                | 5  |
| Comdesbatfor                            | 5  |
| C. O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor     | 2  |
| C. O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger       | 2  |
| C. O., U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA            | 5  |
| FAD OOD PH TH                           | 3  |

## Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution:

|                                        |    |
|----------------------------------------|----|
| CinCPac                                | 5  |
| Comairbatfor                           | 5  |
| Comscofor                              | 5  |
| Combatships                            | 5  |
| Combatdiv ONE                          | 5  |
| Combatdiv FOUR                         | 5  |
| Comcrubatfor                           | 5  |
| Comcruscofor                           | 5  |
| Comcrudiv THREE                        | 5  |
| Comcrudiv FOUR                         | 5  |
| Comcrudiv FIVE                         | 5  |
| Comcrudiv SIX                          | 5  |
| Comcrudiv NINE                         | 5  |
| Compatwing ONE                         | 5  |
| Patrol Wing ONE (All units—each)       | 5  |
| Patrol Wing TWO (All units—each)       | 5  |
| Lexington Air Group                    | 2  |
| Enterprise Air Group                   | 2  |
| Saratoga Air Group                     | 2  |
| Marine Air Group 21                    | 4  |
| C. O., USS LEXINGTON                   | 2  |
| C. O., USS ENTERPRISE                  | 2  |
| C. O., USS SARATOGA                    | 2  |
| C. O., NAS Pearl Harbor                | 6  |
| C. O., NAS Kaneohe Bay                 | 6  |
| Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit         | 4  |
| CG, 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field   | 27 |
| Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field | 27 |
| CG, Hawaiian Air Force                 | 5  |
| Combatfor                              | 3  |
| F. D. COD PH TH                        | 3  |
| VJ-1                                   | 5  |
| VJ-2                                   | 5  |

PW2/A4-3/VZ

PW2/A4-3(4)/  
(3176)  
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO, Wn  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 11, 1941.

Operation Schedule No. 43-41 (Week of November 12-18, 1941)

|                | Wed<br>12        | Thurs<br>13   | Fri<br>14     | Sat<br>15 | Sun<br>16 | Mon<br>17     | Tue<br>18 |
|----------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| Curtiss.....   | UK               | UK            | UK            | UK        | UK        | UK            | UK        |
| Tangier.....   | SPH              | SPH           | SPH           | SPH       | SPH       | SPH           | SPH       |
| Wright.....    | UK               | UK            | SPH           | SPH       | SPH       | SPH           | SPH       |
| McFarland..... | ABE              | ABE           | ABE           | ABE       | ABE       | ABE           | ABE       |
| Thornton.....  | SPH              | SPH           | SPH           | SPH       | SPH       | SPH           | SPH       |
| Hulbert.....   | ABE              | ABE           | ABE           | ABE       | ABE       | ABE           | ABE       |
| Swan.....      | SPH              | SPH           | UK            | UK        | UK        | UK            | UK        |
| Avocet.....    | UK               | UK            | UK            | UK        | UK        | UK            | UK        |
| Patron 11..... | RD V1            | DP G2 L1      | G2 L1         | RD        | DP        | E1            | G2 L1     |
| Patron 12..... | E1               | RD            | DP            | UK        | RD        | E1            | E1        |
| Patron 14..... | ABE              | ABE           | ABE           | ABE       | ABE       | ABE           | ABE       |
| Patron 21..... | { DP G1<br>L1 L2 | F1 V1<br>VC10 | RD F1<br>VC10 | DP        | SHW       | { G1<br>L1 L2 | G2 L2     |
| Patron 22..... | ABE              | ABE           | ABE           | ABE       | ABE       | ABE           | ABE       |
| Patron 23..... | ABE              | ABE           | ABE           | ABE       | ABE       | ABE           | ABE       |
| Patron 24..... | ABE              | ABE           | ABE           | ABE       | SHW       | UK            | UK        |

F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.  
E1 Familiarization.  
ABE Advance Base Operations.  
G1 Master Horizontal Bombers,  
Qualification Practice.  
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.  
RD Ready Duty.  
SHW Holiday Routine.  
SPH Services Pearl Harbor.  
UK Upkeep.  
Y1 Night Flying.  
DP Dawn Patrol.

Ready Duty Tender: THORNTON.

L. C. Ramsey,  
L. C. RAMSEY,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

Distribution  
Squadrons (each) 10  
Tenders (each) 10  
NAS PH TH 20  
NAS Kaneohe Bay 20  
NAS Maui 20  
FAD OOD 3

PW2/A4-3(2)  
(3175)  
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO Wn  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 11, 1941.

Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment (Week of November 12-18, 1941).

Patrol Wing Two..... V4, VC10, L1, L2.  
Carrier Air Groups, Marine Air  
Group 21..... V6, V8, V9, V10, VS1, L3, L5, L6, Kahuku Point and Illio  
Point targets.  
VO Wing..... V1, V2, V3.  
CA Wing..... A7, A8, A11.  
CL Wing..... VU3, VA3.

L. C. Ramsey  
L. C. RAMSEY,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A4-3/VZ/(3174)  
**Restricted**

Wn  
 PATROL WING TWO  
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 10, 1941.

*Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week of Nov. 12-18, 1941)*

**Wednesday, Nov. 12.** Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet. Patron ELEVEN (Kaneohe) night bombing 1830-2000 in area VS2.

**Thursday, Nov. 13.** #Patron TWENTY-ONE night bombing 1830-2000. Area VS2. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

**Friday, Nov. 14.** VJ-2 (6 landplanes) practice landings 1830-2100. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4.

**Saturday, Nov. 15.** NONE.

**Sunday, Nov. 16.** NONE.

**Monday, Nov. 17.** #VCS-9 (10 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

**Tuesday, Nov. 18.** Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

**NOTE:** Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. Ramsey  
 L. C. RAMSEY,  
 Commander, U. S. Navy,  
 Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A4-3/VZ/

Wn  
 PATROL WING TWO,  
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

**RESTRICTED**

*Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution*

|                              |   |                                    |    |
|------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|----|
| CinCPac-----                 | 5 | Lexington Air Group-----           | 2  |
| Comairbatfor-----            | 5 | Enterprise Air Group-----          | 2  |
| Comscofor-----               | 5 | Saratoga Air Group-----            | 2  |
| Combatships-----             | 5 | Marine Air Group 21-----           | 4  |
| Combatdiv ONE-----           | 5 | C. O., U. S. S. LEXINGTON--        | 2  |
| Combatdiv FOUR-----          | 5 | C. O., U. S. S. ENTERPRISE--       | 2  |
| Comerubator-----             | 5 | C. O., U. S. S. SARATOGA--         | 2  |
| Comeruscofor-----            | 5 | C. O., N. A. S., Pearl Harbor--    | 6  |
| Comerudiv THREE-----         | 5 | C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe Bay--     | 6  |
| Comerudiv FOUR-----          | 5 | Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp.          |    |
| Comerudiv FIVE-----          | 5 | Unit-----                          | 4  |
| Comerudiv SIX-----           | 5 | C. G., 18th Wing Air Corp,         |    |
| Comerudiv NINE-----          | 5 | Hickam Field-----                  | 27 |
| Compatwing ONE-----          | 5 | Headquarters, 14th Wing,           |    |
| Patrol Wing ONE (all units-- |   | Wheeler Field-----                 | 27 |
| each)-----                   | 5 | C. G., Hawaiian Air Force----      | 5  |
| Patrol Wing TWO (all units-- |   | Combatfor-----                     | 3  |
| each)-----                   | 5 | F. A. D., C. O. D., P. H., T. H.-- | 3  |

(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appears a schedule of Patrol Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being "Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution." This schedule will be found reproduced as Item No. 146, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

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PW2/A4-3(4)/  
(3110)PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,

Restricted

Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 4, 1941.

## Operation Schedule No. 42-41 (Week of November 5-11, 1941)

|                | 5<br>Wed       | 6<br>Thurs     | 7<br>Fri | 8<br>Sat | 9<br>Sun | 10<br>Mon   | 11<br>Tues  |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| CURTISS.....   | ABE            | ABE            | ABE      | ABE      | ABE      | SPH         | SPH         |
| TANGIER.....   | SPH            | SPH            | SPH      | SPH      | SPH      | SPH         | SPH         |
| WRIGHT.....    | UK             | UK             | UK       | UK       | UK       | UK          | UK          |
| McFARLAND..... | ABE            | ABE            | ABE      | ABE      | ABE      | ABE         | ABE         |
| THORNTON.....  | PG             | PG             | PG       | PG       | PG       | PG          | PG          |
| HULBERT.....   | SPH            | SPH            | SPH      | SPH      | SPH      | ABE         | ABE         |
| SWAN.....      | SPH            | SPH            | SPH      | SPH      | SPH      | SPH         | SPH         |
| AVOCET.....    | PG             | PG             | PG       | PG       | PG       | PG          | PG          |
| PATRON 11..... | RD G3<br>Y1 V4 | DP G3<br>Y1 V4 | G3 V4    | RD UK    | DP       | RD G3<br>L2 | DP G2<br>L2 |
| PATRON 14..... | UK             | UK             | UK       | ABE      | ABE      | ABE         | ABE         |
| PATRON 21..... | F1             | F1             | RD F1    | DP       | RD       | DP G1       | RD G2 G3    |
| PATRON 22..... | VC10           | VC10           | VC10     | L1       | L1       | L1          | L11 VC10    |
| PATRON 23..... | ABE            | ABE            | ABE      | ABE      | ABE      | ABE         | ABE         |
| PATRON 24..... | UK             | UK             | UK       | ABE      | ABE      | ABE         | ABE         |
| PATRON 24..... | DP             | RD             | DP       | UK       | SHW      | ABE         | ABE         |

E1 Familiarization.  
 F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.  
 ABE Advance Base Operations.  
 G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.  
 G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.  
 G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.  
 PG Plane Guard.  
 RD Ready Duty.  
 SHW Holiday Routine.  
 SPH Services Pearl Harbor.  
 UK Upkeep.  
 Y1 Right Flying.  
 DP Dawn Patrol.

## Ready Duty Tender:

HULBERT 5-8 Nov.

SWAN 9-11 Nov.

L. C. Ramsey  
 L. C. RAMSEY,  
 Commander, U. S. Navy,  
 Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two.

## Distribution:

Squadrons (each) 10  
 Tenders (each) 10  
 NAS PH TH 20  
 NAS Kaneohe Bay 20  
 NAS Maul 20  
 FAD OOD 3

PW2/A4-3/VZ  
(3109)PATROL WING TWO  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION

Restricted

Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 4, 1941.

## Fleet Aid Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week November 5-11, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 5. \*Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Thursday Nov. 6. \*Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Friday, Nov. 7. \*VO-1 (9 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (12 planes total) will return to Pearl Harbor from operations at sea with Fleet at about 2130.

Wn

## 982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

*Saturday, Nov. 8.* None.

*Sunday, Nov. 9.* None.

*Monday, Nov. 10.* Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-1.

*Tuesday, Nov. 11.* Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

\*Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. RAMSEY,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing, TWO.

PW2/A4-3(2)  
(3108)

Restricted

PATROL WING TWO, Wn  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
Pearl Harbor, T. H. November 4, 1941.

*Aircraft gunnery area assignment (Week of November 5-11, 1941).*

|                          |                                   |                                |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Patrol Wing TWO-----     | V4, VC10, L1, L2                  |                                |
| Carrier Air Groups-----  | } V6, V8, V9, V10, L5, L6. Kahuku |                                |
| Marine Air Group 21----- |                                   | Point and Illio Point targets. |
| VO Wing-----             | V1, V2, V3.                       |                                |
| CA Wing-----             | VU3, VA3.                         |                                |
| CL Wing-----             | A7, A8, A11.                      |                                |

L. C. RAMSEY,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appear two schedules of Patrol Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being "Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution" and "Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution." These schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 147 and 148, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 55

All maps checked in "Blue" pencil are in "PA-K2" transposition system and were taken out, read and translated.

All maps checked in "Red" were thought to be in more complex systems (probably machine) as there were no indicators by which they could be readily identified. No machines held at Honolulu.

Copies of all messages were forwarded to Washington.

(Exhibit No. 55 is a statement of RCA Communications, Inc., Honolulu, T. H. listing certain Japanese cable messages from Honolulu in November and December, 1941. This statement will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 149, 150, 151 and 152, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 56

(A copy of a coded message, appearing at this point in the Exhibit, from Togo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, dated 4 December 1941, will be found reproduced as Item No. 153, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Dec. 4, 1941.

#01250 "La" system.

From: Togo, Jap foreign minister.

To: Jap Consul Honolulu, T. H.

Ki kan ko in tai pi su to nital (shi) ru ru hon nen do nen ma tsu shō  
yo si kyū ga ku sanstōri ke tsu tei se ri

Ha i fu ga ku nite so ben arita . . . ku na ho yō nin nital (shi) te wa kyū  
ryō no yū wo ri o sai kō kyō yu seipi to shi kaku jin hi go ro no kin tai o  
shin sha ku noue kikan sai ryō niyo (ri) te ki tō ga ku ha i fu ga ku ni te si  
kyū aritashi

sa ha ra 80 dollars. 93 dollars. mu ra o ka 83 dollars. ji dai dō 44 dollars.  
i zu re nio kan pipi ji tsu pi shi ben

Togo.

The following has been authorized as the annual year-end bonus for employee  
typist of your office. It is desired that you stay within the allowances. For  
key personnel ten percent is considered the top amount. You may pay a suitable  
amount at your own discretion after deducting indebtedness.

Sahara, \$80. \$93.

Muraoka, \$83.

Jidaidō, \$44.

All above chargeable to government expenses.

#125 "LA" System. 4 Dec. 1941.

From: Jap. Foreign Minister—Togo.

To: Jap. Consul, Honolulu, T. H.

[Rec'd on 5 Dec. '41, trans—before 7th]

(A copy of a coded message, appearing at this point in the Exhibit,  
from the Japanese Consul at San Francisco, to the Consul at Hono-  
lulu, dated 3 December 1941; and a coded message, with translation,  
from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo,  
and the Consul at San Francisco, dated 3 December 1941, will be found  
reproduced as Items Nos. 154 and 155, respectively, EXHIBITS-  
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

3 DEC. 1941.

Urgent #321 "LA" System

From: Japanese Consul Muto, San Francisco, Calif.

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu, T. H.

Sen si tsu no wa ri a te tsu gō a ru nitsuki ta tu ta ma ru jō sen ki bō  
no kan in ka zo ku jū sha sū kaku to be tsu ni shi kyū go kai den kō.

MUTO.

Due to the necessity of arranging accommodations, desire you report by dis-  
patch the number of members of the families of officials, by rank, desiring  
accommodations on the TATSUTA MARU.

(Two coded messages, with translations, dated 3 December 1941,  
from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, bearing Nos. 852  
and 1240, appear at this point in the Exhibit. They will be found  
reproduced as Items Nos. 156 and 157, respectively, EXHIBITS-  
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Rec'd these on afternoon of 5 Dec. '41 along with a few plain language and  
some misgs in less secret systems.

Read plain and less secret systems and was nothing but junk.

Immediately set to work making tests against all systems on hand, working  
backwards from current system in use.

Nothing coming to light so it was decided to reverse the process of deciphering,  
allowing for the encoding party to have either purposely encrypted the msgs in  
this manner or possibly to have made an error in using the system employed due  
to confusion. This netted results. Ref. Exhibit # 57.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear:

1. No. 2451 from Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December 1941.
2. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 1.
3. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 2.
4. No. 2452 from Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December 1941.
5. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 3.
6. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 4.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 158 through 163, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(Military secret).

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941

(PA-K2)

#245 (In 2 parts, complete)

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

|                                                         | Meaning                                   | Signal |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------|
| Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units. | Preparing to sortie.....                  | 1      |
| A number of carriers.....                               | Preparing to sortie.....                  | 2      |
| Battleship divisions.....                               | All departed between 1st and 3rd.....     | 3      |
| Carriers.....                                           | Several departed between 1st and 3rd..... | 4      |
| Carriers.....                                           | All departed between 1st and 3rd.....     | 5      |
| Battleship divisions.....                               | All departed between 4th and 6th.....     | 6      |
| Carriers.....                                           | Several departed between 4th and 6th..... | 7      |
| Carriers.....                                           | All departed between 4th and 6th.....     | 8      |

## 2. Signals.

### I

Lanikai<sup>1</sup> Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

|                                       | Signal |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
| One light between 8 and 9 p. m.....   | 1      |
| One light between 9 and 10 p. m.....  | 2      |
| One light between 10 and 11 p. m..... | 3      |
| One light between 11 and 12 p. m..... | 4      |

### II

|                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m..... | 5 |
| Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m.....  | 6 |
| Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m.....  | 7 |
| Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m.....  | 8 |

### III

Lanikai<sup>1</sup> Bay, during daylight:

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

<sup>1</sup> Between Waimanalo and Kallua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

## IV

Lights in the attic window of Kalama House<sup>1</sup> will indicate the following:

| <i>Times</i>   | <i>Signal</i> |
|----------------|---------------|
| 1900-2000----- | 3             |
| 2000-2100----- | 4             |
| 2100-2200----- | 5             |
| 2200-2300----- | 6             |
| 2300-2400----- | 7             |
| 0000-0100----- | 8             |

## V

K. G. M. B.<sup>2</sup> Want Ads.

- A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
- B. CHIC. CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
- C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium<sup>4</sup> at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

| <i>Time</i>    | <i>Signal</i> |
|----------------|---------------|
| From 7-8 ----- | 3 or 6        |
| From 8-9 ----- | 4 or 7        |
| From 9-10----- | 5 or 8        |

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded radiograms on forms of RCA appear:

1. No. 246 from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo, dated 3 December 1941, with handwritten notations.
2. Another copy of No. 246 without handwritten notations.
3. *Ibid*, being the message sent the San Francisco Consul.
4. *Ibid*, being the message sent the Washington Embassy.
5. No. 247 from Kita in Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941.
6. *Ibid*, being the message sent the San Francisco Consul.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 164 through 169, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941 (PA-K2).

#247

Ship report.

2nd. Military transport (Name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.

3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

(A copy of the coded radiogram from Kita to Tokyo, No. 248, on form of RCA, dated 3 December 1941, will be found reproduced as Item No. 170, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

02480 3rd [WA I OO MIN GU] Paragraph SU I ZYOO KI BO KAN 2 SE KI SYUTU KOO. SONO TA I.

<sup>1</sup> A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

<sup>2</sup> A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

<sup>4</sup> At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.



986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Honolulu (Kita).  
To: Tokyo.  
3 December 1941 (PA-K2).  
#248

Ship report. December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movements.

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 56A

SECRET

Registered Mail—  
Return Receipt Requested  
Secret

DW/wps

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE  
Sixth, Floor, Young Hotel  
Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND/A17  
Serial No. 217  
15 June 1945  
From: District Intelligence Officer, 14ND  
To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN,  
Office of the Secretary of the Navy  
Subj: Pearl Harbor Disaster Investigation.

1. The enclosed copies of material from the files of this office are forwarded herewith as requested by Mr. John Sonnett, Counsel for subject investigation.

2. The urgency of delivery of these documents is such that they will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer messenger. Authority is hereby granted to transmit these documents by registered air mail within the jurisdiction of the United States Mail and Naval Postal Service.

H. S. BURR,  
Acting.

Encls.: Sixty-six (66) photostats of miscellaneous material dealing with the decoding and translation of cable messages sent by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, prior to 7 December 1941.

"KO" SYSTEM

"PA" SYSTEM

SENT FILE

Completed—Tfc. Taken Off

RCA RADIOGRAM FILED AT SF REC HERE 1941 DEC 6 PM 4 39 [HST]

1494 30 SAN FRANCISCO CALIF 6 628P  
L C Shokin Honolulu

Takakuwanoken tesuuryoo beisisuno shookimo kelyelnite shookankyoosei konnanto omowaru, American Trust Nitsuki naimitsuni torishirabe tarutokoro dooninwa dookookelyu olmatsuete suusendoru attosaitobiru torikumi koshoonaku shiharaware orumoyoo tookoonimotsu kawarikin ryuuyoono keiseki-nakiya.

SHOKIN.

[Suppressed; undelivered in Honolulu.]

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear:

1. No. 252, dated 5 December 1941, from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo.
2. No. 250, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
3. No. 249, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
4. *Ibid*, showing decipherment and English translation.
5. No. 248, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
6. *Ibid*, showing decipherment and English translation.

7. No. 247, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
8. *Ibid*, showing decipherment and English translation.
9. No. 246, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
10. *Ibid*, showing decipherment and English translation.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 171 through 180, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

**"KO" SYSTEM**

**"PA" SYSTEM**

**RECEIVED FILE**

Completed—TFC Taken Off

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu appear:

1. No. 128, dated 6 December 1941.
2. No. 126, dated 4 December 1941.
3. No. 92466, dated 4 December 1941.
4. No. 92461, dated 3 December 1941.
5. No. 90094, dated 3 December 1941.
6. No. 278, dated 22 November 1941.
7. No. 360, dated 22 November 1941.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 181 through 187, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

**"L A." SYSTEM**

**RECEIVED FILE**

Completed—TFC Taken Off

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear copies of the following coded messages:

1. No. 384, Part 1, dated 27 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.
2. No. 384, Part 2, dated 27 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.

Parts 1 and 2 of this message will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 188 and 189, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

**#384**

27 November 1941.

From: Ambassador Nomura, Washington, D. C.

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu.

Detailed regulations re the proclamation mentioned in my #1042 and 1124 to Tokyo were announced by the State Department on the 19th. They are roughly as follows:

1. The procedure for requesting a permit to depart the country must be at least within 30 days of the day of departing. Exceptions to the above are as follows:

(a) Regular embassy personnel: Consular personnel, other officials and families and their servants, and important personages may get an "exit visa" by going to the State Department.

(b) Persons who can show proof that they are a part of the crew of foreign men of war.

(c) No permit will be required of a wife or child under 4 accompanying the spouse & father.

[2] 2. In the following categories, permits will not be issued for any person, whose departure the U. S. considers would be harmful:

(a) Any person possessing secret information regarding national defense plans, preparations, equipment, or organization.

(b) Any person who might directly or indirectly communicate the information concerning the above to a foreign power.

(c) Any persons who have been engaged in obstructing national plans of the U. S. for the benefit of defense of any third power or U. S. KEIBO.

(d) Any person who has been attempting to interfere with or delay the defense plans or military of any nation of the Western Hemisphere working for the defense of the Hemisphere.

(e) Any persons who have been attempting to incite revolution, [3] bring about a war, or who has been attempting to interfere with U. S. defense plans, or plans for the defense of any third power.

3. Inspecting officials may revoke the departure permit of any person who refuses to permit an examination.

4. In regard to permits for entering the country, the Secretary of State may grant such after inquiring of the Army, Navy, Police, and Immigration authorities regarding the person concerned.

5. There is no stipulation which would exempt consular officials if they came under any of the above list of exceptions, and official will when entering or leaving the country be required to produce proof that they are not engaged in any subversive activities.

The full text is being sent air mail.

(Part 1 of 2 Parts)

27 November 1941.

"LA"

From: Nomura—Wash. D. C. # 384

To: Jap. Com—Honolulu

Re my Mss 1042 & 1124 to Tokio.

Migi fu Koku Nimo tozu (Ki) Ku sai so ku wa 19th zu Ke o Motte Koku mu syō yori ha tu pi yoō sera reta . . . ru ga sono gai ryaku sano goto . . . si.

1. Syu tu Koku Kyo Ka sin sei tetuzuki wa (begun special code) sukunakutomo OLBY (end sp. cde.) syu tu Koku yo tei hi no 30th i zen ni na subeku Migi no rei gai ta ru be Ki mo no wa

(A) sei si Ki ni Mito (me) ra re ta ru taisikan in. Ryōzi Kan in nō ta no gaikoku seifu Kan ri oyobi sono Ka zo Ku zu i in. Zyn sya Yō nin wa tan ni Koku mu syō sa syō Kyo Ku yori syu to Koku sa syō *zi* ((begin Eng. sp.) EXIT VISA (end Eng. sp.)) o to ru tu Ku ru on hi tu yō to su ru no mi

(B) Gaikoku seifu syo yū no gun Kan no ri Ku mi in tosite syō Mei sa re ta ru Mo No

(C) o tu to Ni si ta gō tu Ma. O ya kon *GO* si ta bō zyū 4 sai i Ka No Ko wa Kyo Ka o hi tu yō to sun zu

2. I Ka Ni Ka Ka qu ru zi rei wa United States no ri e Ki o gai su ru Mo No tosite syu tu KoKu Kyō Ka o a ta e zu

(A) United States seifu No Kyo Ka Na Ku si te United States KoKu bō no Ki KaKu. Zyu n bi. Se tu bi. Se tu ri tu bu tu NiKan (si) su ru hi mi tu zyō hō o yū su ru mo no

(B) Migi NiKan (si) su ru hi Mi tu tū sin o hō hō no tyo Ku se tu ta ru to Kan se tu ta ru to o to wa zu gaiKoKu seifu e un Ka ten to su ru mo no

(C) United States *Kei bō ma ta wa* dai 3 KoKu no *Kō e Ki* ma ta wa *bō ei* no ta me ni United States ga sal yō se ru sei sa Ku no Kō Ka o so gai si ti en subeKi Ka tu dō Ni zyū zi subeKi mo no

"LA"

(Part 2 of 2 parts)

27 November, 1941.

From: Nomura—Washington, D. C. #384

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu, T. H.

(D) Sei han Kyū bō ei no ta me sei han ei nai no koku ka ga to ri ta ru kei kaku ma ta wa hei dan o so gai sen en se si men to su ru mo no.

(E) United States nitai (si) bō dō. Sen sō o zyaku ki si United States koku bō ma ta wa dai 3 koku bō ei no ta me no United States no sei sa ku ni hi tu yō na ru si gen o ha kai sen to su ru mo no.

3. Syu tu koku kan ri kan wa syn tu koku sya ga hi tu yō na ru ken sa o kyo hi su ru to ki wa syu tu koku o tei si su ru ko to o u.

4. Nyū koku nikan (si) te wa 1 tei no syo si ki niyo (ri) ru syu tu gan o na si ta ru no ti kaku syū yori no wa hyō sya 1 mei a te. Ri ku kaigun syō.

Ren pō kei sa tu kyo ku, i min kyu ku no kan ri o Motte k. sei su ru Kaku syō ūnkaī no i ken o ki ki ta ru no ti koku mu tyō kan wa kyo ka ha tu kyū kan ni si rei su

5. Ryo kan no ri e ki o gai su to Mito (me) mu ru zi rei sono ta nikan (si) te wa tai yō syu tu koku no baai to dō yō na ru mo nyū koku no sai ni wa gaikō kan ryōzi kan o zyo gai su ru ki tei na ku. Ryo kō ko zin te ki zi mu yū ran ma ta wa tū ka no mo ku te ki o Motte 1 zi et te ki ni nyū koku sen te su ru gaikoku seifu kan ri wa kyo ka sin sei i gai ni kan ri tosite no ti i o syō mei si ka tō kō te ki ka tu dō ni zyū. zi sezarū ko to o a ki ra ka ni su ru o hi tu yō to su

Migi ki so ku [te ki su to] wa o tu te ku ← sō su on

(A copy of the coded message No. 767, dated 26 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 190, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

#767 "LA"

26 November, 1941.

From: Nomura—Washington, D. C.

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu.

Betuden (# . . .) Yokohama December 2nd syō go Los Angeles tyaku dō 14th Dō ha tu dō 16th Ba ru bo a tyaku dō 24th.

Expects depart Yokohama noon 2nd arrive Los Angeles 14th, depart 16th and arrive Balboa 24th.

(A copy of the coded message No. 638, dated 26 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 191, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#638 "LA"

26 November, 1941.

From: Nomura—Washington, D. C. #381.

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu.

No. 6 Nikan (si) Koku mu syō ka ka ri kan yori ta tu ta Ma ru zyō sen syn tu koku hō zin nikan (si) te wa to ku be tu no toriha karan o motte syn tu pan zen sai syō gen do 10th zen no OO sei a yū kō to mito (me) mō ru ko to ni toriha karan  
SHU SHU

to ru nituki migi ni ma ni ō yō sudeni hei tu koku kyo ka sin ei o tei hei tu sesime ra re ta ki mu ne mōsu ko se ri.

I have just learned from an official of the state department that a special procedure will be applied to Japanese who desire to depart via the Tatsuta Maru. Departure permits must be acquired within a period of ten days prior to sailing. Those wishing to make that ship would best put in their request for permits.

(A copy of the coded message No. 302, dated 25 November 1941 from Consul General Muto in San Francisco to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 192, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

25 Nov. 1941.

From: Consul General Muto, San Francisco #302.

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu.

Upon the expiration of the Anti-Comintern pact on the 24th of November, it has been decided to renew the pact for a period of 5 years. Today the 25th it is planned that the emissaries of Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukoku, Kō, and Spain will affix their names to a 5 year renewal. Furthermore those who will participate in this agreement have been increased by the seven countries of China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, Slovakia, and KURENATIA.

"LA"

25 November, 1941.

From: Muto—San Francisco, #302.

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu.

Bō kyō kyō tei wa CH nen November 24th o motte ki kan man ryō su ru o motte sen pan rai kan kei koku kan nisi (te) zi go no kyō ryo ku tai yō nituki kyō gi son ru ke tu ka sa ra ni ko re o 5 ka nen en tyō su ru ko to to na ri hon 25th Berlin nioi (te) hi . Doku . i . man . kō . sei 6 ka koku zen ken niyu (ri) en tyō gi tei syo no tyō in o ko na wa ru ru yo tei na o sin gi tei syo ni a ra ta ni ki tei sera reta . . . . ru san ka tetsuki nisi taga (1) sa ra ni tyū ka min koku . Rumania . [Bu ru ga ri ya] . Finland . Denmark . [Su ro bu a ki a] oyobi [Ku ren a ti a] no 7 ka koku wa hon 25th bō kyō kyō tei ni san ka su ru ko to to narita ri.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Copy of coded message No. 345, dated 25 November 1941, from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Washington showing decipherment.
2. Copy of Part 1 of coded message No. 375, dated 18 November 1941, two pages, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.
3. *Ibid*, Part 2.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 193 through 196, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received

18 Nov. 1941.

"L A"

From: Washington

To: Jap. Con. Honolulu—Cir. #375 (Part 1).

(Sent to Tokio as #1127)

November 14th zu ke o mette Dai to ryō wa 1918 neu May 22nd kō fu. 1941 nen June 21st shū sei hō ri tsu dai 114 gō nimotozu (ki) yō shi sa nogoto ki shu tsu nyū gu sei gen oyobi kin shi nikan (shi) su ru 1 so ku no sei tei ji tsu shi ka to o mei ze ri

(1) How ki so ku no ji tsu shi i go nioi (te) wa United States shi miu wa United States (Panama un ga chi tai . hi tsu oyobi zen ryō i ki ryō su i o fukumi mu) ni shu tsu nyū su ru ni sai shi koku mu chō kan sono ta kan kei kan kan ha tsu ku (kō) no ryo ken o hi tsu yō to su sen in mo ma ta a na ji

(2) Gaikokujin no shu tsu koku ni sai shi te wa koku mu chō kan ma ta wa sono shi tei su ru kan ri no ha tsu kō se ru kyō ka o hi tsu yō to si ka tsu taisho 1 — neu chō kan . i miu kan sono no shi tei su ru mi na to ni kagi (ri) ru tadashi koku mu chō kan ga United States no ri e ki o gai su ru to mito (me) ru to ki wa shu tsu koku wa kyo ka sa re ga ru be shi

(3) Hon ki so ku no ji tsu shi i go nioi (te) wa gaikoku jin no nyū koku ni sai shi te wa (2) to dō yō no kyo ka o hi tsu yō to shi United States no ri e ki o gai su ru to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa kyo ka serare yu (new Para)

(4) shu tsu koku ma ta wa nyū koku sen to su ru mo no wa hi tsu yō to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa su be te sono sho ji su ru bun sho, bu tsu pin sono ta o ken sa sa ru be shi.

(5) Gaikoku no mi na to yori United States no mi na to ni nyū kō su ru sen pa ku no gaikokujin ta ru sen in nital (shi) ha tsu ku serarota ru nyū koku kyo ka wa jō ken zu ki nishite ka tsu gō ri te ki hi tsu yō no baai ni kagi (ri) ka tsu i min kan ga sono nyū koku ga United States no ri e ki ni han se zu to mito (me) ta ru to ki nyū koku no shi kaku o a ta e ra ru be shi tadashi migi wa sen in no shō ko sho ru i tei kyō nikan (shi) su ru 1940 neu June 5th no dai tō ryō rei dai 84 kei 9 gō o hen kō su ru mo no ni a ra zu

(6) Gaikokujin ni ha tsu kō serareta ru shu tsu koku oyobi nyū koku kyō ka no yū kō ki kan wa shu tsu koku oyobi nyū koku kyo ka ha tsu kyū kan ma ta wa koku nu chō kan niyo (ri) sono shu tsu nyū koku ga ga tsu shū koku no ri e ki ni han su ru to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa i tsu ni te mo ko re o shū ryō seshimu ru koto o u

(7) Hon fu koku no kaku ki tel wa to ku be tsu ni ki tel su ru baal monozo (ki) ki ki son no hō rei no tsu i ka ta ru mo nun mishite hen kō shū sei su ru mō no ni a ra zu bel jo

NOMURA.

(Part 2)

(8) kaku kan chō wa hon fu koku oyohi kou go ha tsu pu seraru be ki fu koku ki so ku mei rei nimotozu (ki) ku koku mu chō kau no ken gen shi tsu kō nikan (shi) koku mu chō kan ni kyō ryo ku su ru ko to o yō shi koku mu chō kan no yō kyū a ra ba migi mo ku te ki no ta me to gai kan ri ka ka ri nin no kin mu o tel kyō subeshi (New Para)

Hon pō shi tsu kō o tau tō su ru zen kau ri wa 1918 nen May 22nd no hō ri tsu oyobi 1941 neu June 21st no shū sei hō no i hō bō shi oyobi i hau sha no torishirabe narabini sho ba tsu ni sai ze o tsu ku su ko to o mei zu (New Para)

(9) 1941 nen June 3rd no dai to ryō dai to ryō rei dai 8766 gō dai 6 [pa ra gu ra fu] dai 1 bu wa ko re o ha i shi su (nen Para)

Na o hon ken ki so ku wa imada ha tsu pi yō kō hō o mi za ru mo jō hō niyoreba kokn mu chō kan wa ken ji sō chō to kyō ryo ku shi te dai to ryō fu koku nishitaga (1) 1918 nen May 22nd hō ri tsu oyohi 1941 nen June 21st no dō shū sei hō niyo (ri) dai tō ryō yori fu yu serareta ru ken gen nimotozu (ki) Gaikokujuin no shu tsu nyū kokn nikan (shi) su ru ki so ku o sudemi sei tel shi ahi kaku kan pō ni ha tsu pi yō serau be ki omonmki nishite migi niyoreba shu tsu koku sen to su ru gaikokujuin wa koku mu shō no shu tsu koku kyo ka o hi tsu yō to shi ka tsu shu tsu kokn kyo ka shin sei wa su ku na kn to mo shu tsu koku sen to su ru hi yori 3jū hi i zo ni shō na su ko to o yō su ru omomuki na ri,

NOMURA

On November 14 the President ordered the enforcement of the law #114 of May 22, 1918, as Amended June 21, 1941 regarding the prohibition and restriction of leaving and entering the country. Main points follow:

1. After this law is put in to effect, when American citizen enter or leave the U. S. (including the Canal Zone, all territories, and territorial waters) a passport issued by the Secretary of State and other interested authorities. This applies to ship's crews.

2. Foreigners when leaving the country must obtain permission from the Sec. State or his designated official, and are limited to harbors designated by the Sec. State, the immigration authorities in Taisho I-nen. However, the Sec. State is to refuse permission when he believes it to be against the interests of the U. S.

3. After this law is put into effect, the same sort of permission is required for foreigners entering the country, and when it is considered to be against the interests of the U. S. permission is not granted.

4. When it is considered necessary to enter or leave the country all documents, goods, etc. must be inspected.

5. Foreign crew members of ships entering U. S. ports from foreign ports in cases of reasonable necessity, provided that they have permits to enter and it is not against the interests of the U. S. may enter the country (in the opinion of immigration officials), are entitled to entry. However, the above does not change Presidential order (84 kel 9gō) of June 5, 1940 concerning offering of documentary proof of crew members?

6. The validity of permits for entering or leaving the country received by foreigners may be terminated at any time the Sec. State or (other officials) consider that entry or departure is against interests of U. S.

7. Provisions of this law except in the case of special provisions shall not be changed or ammended. (Part not clear—looks like additions to damage law.)

## Part II

8. It is necessary for all government officials to cooperate in the enforcement of the Sec. State's authority under this ordinance and all future ordinances, rules and orders. For the purpose of the above aim, if it is requested of the Sec. State he shall offer the services of a competent official.

Former Officials charged with enforcement of (this law Honpō?) are ordered to investigate and punnish violaters and prevent violation of the law of May 22, 1918, and ammendments of June 21, 1941.

9. Presidential order #8766 #6 paragraph first part is abolished.

Although this law has not been publicly proclaimed, according to intelligence reports, the Sec. State in cooperation with the Attorney General under authority delegated by the Presidential ordinance based on the law of May 22, 1918, and Amendments of June 21, 1941 are about to publish the rules for entering and leaving the Country in all official publications. According to the above (information?) foreigners desiring to leave the Country will need permission from the State Dept. and, although applications for leaving are few, it is believed that it will take more than 30 days.

(A copy of coded message No. 367, dated 17 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 197, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received  
"LA"

17 Nov. 1941

From: Washington.

To: Jap. Con.—Honolulu. Cir. #367.

(Have delivered to: San Francisco; and (Note: 6 other addresses not decoded)

Dai 2313 gō nikan (shi) (new Para)

Zai Bei tei koru ryōji kan ni zo ku su ru fu dō san . bihim . ki ro ku bun syo wa tō ro ku no yō na ki nitsuki sa yō go shō cho ai na ri ta shi —

NOMURA.

Re: #2313. Wish to advise you that registration of real property, furniture, and documents belonging to Consulates in the U. S. not necessary.

(A copy of coded message No. 029, dated 15 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 198, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received  
"LA"

15 Nov. 1941.

From: Washington

To: Jap. Con. Honolulu—# 029.

(Sent following to Tokio as #1101.)

SHUTU

Puerto Rico

Kon pan jō in ni tel WOFU serareta . . . . . ru Hawaii [pu e ru to ri ko] bō ei dō an nai yō gai ryaku sanotori (new Para)

Dai tō ryō wa sono sai ryō niyo (ri) bō dō. shin ryaku tō no yo bō ma ta wa Hawaii

chin a ku tō no ta me ni Nagasaki [pu e ru to ri ko] ryō nai, no United States ri ku kaigun, o, shi su ru ko to, o u, ka tsui ku an, no, ta me, ni, jin, shin, ho go, rei, o, tel shi, shi kai gen rei, o ha tsu su ru ko to o u —

Nomura

A digest of a bill for the defense of Hawaii and Puerto Rico submitted in the Senate today—

(Last part not clear but general meaning seems to be) That the President may at his discretion for the prevention and suppression of invasion and rioting declare martial law in Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

(A copy of coded message No. 110, dated 14 November 1941, from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 199, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

*Received*  
"LA"

14 November 1941.

From: Tokio.  
To: Jap. Con. Honolulu #110.

(Re ys mag. #215 of 11 November)

Hon tsuki 11th tō chi shō kin ha tsu den shō se ri—

Togo.

Money was sent from here by cable on the 11th of this month.  
? Denshō-telegraphic inquiring

(A copy of coded message No. 217, dated 13 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 200, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

13 Nov. 1941.

*Received*  
"LA"

From: Washington.  
To: Jap. Con. Honolulu.

(Following rec'd from Tokio as #217 on 13th)

11th United States taishikaus nital (shi) zai honpō United States taishi ki kan oyobi sono sho ku in wa taishikau oyobi sono sho ku in kei *yx* honpō tō ke tsu rei nimotozu (ki) zai san hō koku o na subeki mu ne tsū hō se ri mottomo ryōji daihikan nitsuki te wa United States dō yō fu dō san. bi hin oyobi ki ro ku bun sho nikan (shi) su ru hō koku o men jo se ri—

Togo.  
NOMURA.

11th. We were informed that, based on the Japanese freezing regulations, the Japanese Ambassador to the U. S. and his staff must make a property report. However, according to a consular representative reports on real property, furniture, and documents belonging to the Embassy are not required.

(A copy of coded message No. 356, dated 10 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 201, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

10 Nov. 1941.

*Received*  
"LA"

From: Washington.  
To: Jap. Con. Honolulu (#356 Circular).

Ei ga kaisha yori Ku ru su taishi no [ka me ra in ta bi yū] o ki bō shi ki ta re ru to ko ro dō taishi, ko go i kō, o tashikame, none,

Beg End

EX 1DBO QU

orikaishi kalderi Anitashi.

NOMURA.

A picture company desires a "camera interview" with Ambassador Kurusu. Find out his wishes and reply by telegraph.

(A copy of coded message No. 088, dated 8 November 1941, from Morishima in New York to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 202, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]



Received  
"LA"

8 Nov. 1941.

From—New York.  
To—Jap. Con. Honolulu. Circular #088.

(Sent to Tokio as #496 on 5 Nov.)

Gaikoku . . . jin houpō shu tsu koku tatsuzuki no wa zu ra wa sa o un  
nun se ru [to ri pyu n] ki ji o sai hau ba ku shi ta ki nitsuki sa ki orika' reshi go  
kai den kō (new para)

1. Gaikoku . . . jin honpō shu tsu koku ni sai shi nai mu. Okura tō no kan  
ken yori WA to ku no hi tsu yō a ru kyo ka nai shi shō mei sho (shu tsu pan  
shin rin ma de no mo no zen bu a fuku (mi) mu) no shu ru i oyobi migi shu no  
ku ni yō su ru hi sū < long (new para)

JIN

2. kou ji to ku be tsu ha i sen ni bin jō ka ta mōsu i de ta ru United States MC  
nishite migi kyo ka shō tō no shu to ku ta ni a wa za ri shi ta me jō sen de ki  
za ri shi mo no a ri

MORISHIMA.

Request information to refute "Tribune" article complaining about troublesome  
procedure for foreigners leaving Japan by return telegraph—

1. Foreigners at the time of leaving Japan must obtain permission or identifica-  
tion cards from officials of the Home office and the Finance Ministry (includes  
everything up until sailing ??) this requires days. (Not very clear).

2. Americans who applied as passengers on the special evacuation ship because  
they had not obtained permission [or, because their permits were not in order]  
could not go on board—

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Handwritten decipherment of coded message No. 026, dated  
7 November 1941, from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San  
Francisco; and No. 004, dated 5 November 1941, from  
Kita to the Japanese Consul in New York.

2. Copy of coded message No. 027, dated 5 November 1941, from  
Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in  
Honolulu.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 203  
and 204, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

Received  
"LA"

5 Nov. 1941.

From—Washington  
To—Jap. Con. Honolulu #027

Zen mei yo ryoji nital (shi) su ru ki nen hin mu ze i tsu kan ka ta te ha i  
fu ni no mu ne 3rd koku mu shō yori kai to arita ri

NOMURA

The State Department has replied to the effect that arrangements have been  
made to pass commemorative articles of previous honorary consuls duty free.

(A copy of coded message No. 364, dated 5 November 1941, from  
Tokyo to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced  
as Item No. 205, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received  
"LA"

5 NOVEMBER 1941.

From—Tokio  
To—Jap. Con. Honolulu #364

Kon pan hi Bel ko sho nikan (shi) Nomura taishi o ho sa se shi mu ru ta me  
Ku ru su taishi o kyō ha su ru ko to to na re ru to ko ro do taishi wa United  
States Seifu kō i te ki a tsu sen niyo (ri) 7th Hongkong ha tsu [ku ri tsu  
pa <] ni te to Bel subeku yū ki shokika taïdo 5th to chi o shu tsu pa tsu se ri.

tsuitena dō taishi ki chi to cha ku no sai wa shikaru . . . . be ku ben gi kyō  
yo aritashi—

Togo.

Ambassador Kurusu is being rushed to the U. S. to assist Ambassador Nomura in the present conferences. The Ambassador through the good offices of the U. S. Government will go to the U. S. on the Clipper leaving Hongkong on the 7th, and departed from here with his staff on the 5th. Give him all facilities possible when he arrives there (Honolulu).

Togo.

5 Nov. 1941.

From—Morishima #002 "LA"

To—Jap. Con. Hono. T. H. Ref yr msg. #003

Tō chi chaku ha tsu hi zu ke sai den aritashi

Request you repeat telegram date of arrival and departure this place

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Copy of coded message No. 302, dated 4 November 1941 from Kita to the Japanese Consul in New York, showing handwritten decipherment.
2. Copy of coded message No. 273, dated 2 November 1941, from the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to the Honolulu Consul.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 206 and 207, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

2 NOVEMBER 1941.

Received

"LA" Urgent—

From—San Francisco

To—Tokio #269 Honolulu Cir. #273

Ta tsu ta ma ru kon 2nd gogo . . . ji bu ji shu tsu nō se ri jyō kyaku 1 tō  
164.2 tō 63.3 tō 635 mei na ri u chi doku jin 2. Italy jin 1. France jin 1 mei

Muro

The Tatutu Maru departed today at 2 P. M. without incident. Passengers: 1st Class, 164; 2nd Class, 63; 3rd Class, 635; including 2 Germans, 1 Italian, and 1 Frenchman.

[SECRET]

## MISCELLANEOUS

### SENT AND RECEIVED

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear seventeen coded Japanese messages covering the period 19 November 1941 to 2 December 1941. These messages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 208 through 224, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

The following are special usages for the "WA" and "WO" (PA) codes:—

#### 1. "WA" Code:—

This usage is primarily for use in encoding messages classified as "strictly secret", is the same as some that have been in use in the past, and is effected by the transposition of letters. There are the following five methods:

(a) Using units of 5 letters: Chose two key words (such as KANDA and KUDAN). Transpose according to these words. From the list chose one of the three letters (C-G-Q) and place this letter in the 2nd and 4th position of your 5-letter indicator. Choose at will a vowel (Y included) to fill in the 1st, 3rd and 5th position and put them together. Examples: ICICI—AGAGA—UQUQU. Since this type of transportation is common in these codes we will not go into detail re the transposition.

(b) Like (a), this method is by using units of 5 letters. Take two words from the key word list (this is SANSEI and SUISEI) and transpose the text in accordance with the numerical arrangement of the letters. Make up the indicator of the letters "Z", "J", and "X" with a vowel chosen at random. That is:—IZIZI—EJEJE—OXOXO.

(c) As above, 5 letters form a unit. Take three key words from the list (such as TOKYO—KYOTO—OSAKA) and transpose groups in accordance with the numerical position of the letters in the separate key words. The indicator is formed by choosing one of the two letters "T" or "D" and adding a vowel at random. Thus:—ATATA—UDUDU.

(d) In this method 7 letters will be considered a unit. One key word is taken from the list (such as OTOHIME) and the letters transposed by means of the numerical position of the letters of the key word. To form the indicator group take one of the following ("B"—"V"—"P") and add a random vowel. Thus; ABABA—IVIVI—OPOPO.

(e) Seven letters will be considered as a unit. Take two key words from the list (such as KUMAGAI—NAOZANE) and transpose accordingly. For an indicator choose one of the two ("M" or "N") and add a vowel of choice. Thus: IMIMI—ENENE.

2. Special usage for the "WO" code: This is supplementary to the usages given in above section. These are like paragraph 1, but are used in telegraphic messages only.

(a) Nine letters will be considered as a unit. Take a key word such as (TAGONOURA) and transpose accordingly. For the indicator take one of the two consonants "L" and "R" and put them in positions 1, 3, and 5. Add vowels of choice in positions 2 and 4. Thus: LOLOI—RURUR.

(b) Choose a key word of 11 letters (such as ODANOBUNAGA) and transpose accordingly. For an indicator put one of the following two consonants (T or D) in 1, 3, and 5 positions, add a vowel of choice, thus: TOTOT—DIDID.

(c) Choose a key word of 13 letters such as HANAYORIDANGO and transpose accordingly. For a key word place either H or F in positions 1, 3, and 5 and add a vowel of choice in positions 2 and 4. Thus: HAHAH—FIFIF.

(d) Choose a key word of 19 letters such as (KINOKUNIYABUNZAEMON) and transpose accordingly. For a key word use (K or G) as above.

(General) Be careful not to use a "WA" indicator on a "WO" message.

3. Method of encoding remainder or supplementary group:—The following method will be in case of both "WA" and "WO" codes.

(a) It is based on 5 letters. On the days listed on the left use the key to its right:—

|         |            |
|---------|------------|
| 1st and | 6th—54321  |
| 2nd and | 7th—43215  |
| 3rd and | 8th—32154  |
| 4th and | 9th—21543  |
| 5th and | 10th—15432 |

(more but too abbreviated)

#### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 57

Rec'd the attached on night of 7 Dec. 41. Page 19 attached furnished break by which all were read by 11 Dec. '41. (Process of enciphering was reversed by encoding person)

(A copy of the coded message No. 02490, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 225, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#02490 Galmudaijin Tokio from Kita.

4 Dec. 41

3rd Go Go England Gun kan I Se Ki Honolulu Koo Nyuu Koo 4th  
soo tyoo-syutu koo. Ton suu 11~~00~~ ton nai gai. En to tu 1 po n. 4 [in ti] Hoo  
zen go kaku 1 Mon. Tan kai syoku paragraph Nao Nyuu koo tyoku go zyoo  
riku su I hei wa ei ryoozi (ryoozi dairi) kan ni te yuu bin bu tu wo u ke to ri.

From: Kita #02490.

12/4.

To: Foreign Minister.

3rd. gogo Eikoku gun kan 1 se ki honoruru kō nyū kō 4th sō chō shutsu kō. ton su 1100 ton nai gal. en to tsu 1 po n. 4 (in chl) hō zen go kaku 1 mon. tan kai shoku.

nao nyū ko choku go jō riku su 1 hei wa ei ryōji kan ni te yū bin bu, tsu wo u ke to ri itaru

On the afternoon of the 3rd a British Man-of-war entered Honolulu, and departed early on the 4th. About 1100 tons; one stack, and had a 4 inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.

KITA.

From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokio

December 4, 1941

PA-K2

#249

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft.

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

(A copy of coded message No. 02500, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 226, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#02500 Secret "PA" (#365)

4 DEC. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min, Tokyo.

4th gogo . . . . gi 1 kel zyun [ho no ru om] niokorn to JJ migi kō. —

From: Kita #02500 12/4.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

4th gogo 1 kel jun (ho no ru ru) Kata hyaku shutsu kō.

At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser of the Honolulu class hastily departed.

Kita

No translation to match this one—Rec'd on night of 7th Dec. '41. 4 copies same way, to 4 different address. Gist: regarding funds

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Copy of coded message No. 02510, dated 5 December 1941, from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
2. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Consul in Seattle.
3. *Ibid*, to Tokyo.
4. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
5. Copy of coded message No. 02520, dated 5 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 227 through 231, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

#02520 Urgent.

1. 5 nichi kin yō bi a sa ōden 239 no sen kau 3 nyū kō se ri shutsu dō kikan 8th paragraph.

2. dō jitsu [RE KI SIN TON] oyobi jū jun 5 shutsu kō.

3. Migi niyori 5 nichi gogo zai ha ku kan sen sanotōri.

Sen Kan 8 kei jun 3 ku chi ku Kan 16.

Nyū kyo chū no mono Honolulu ka ta 4 oyobi ku me shi son 2\_ \_ \_ \_  
chi ku kan 2\_ \_ \_ \_ \_

5 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

(PA-K2)

"252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message "239" arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.

3 light cruisers.

16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and - - - - were in dock.

\*Available, J19 dated 29 29 November.

JD-1: 7280

(D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

(A copy of coded message No. 02530, *infra*, dated 6 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 232, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

# 368

From: Kita

To: F. M. Tokyo

6 DEC. 41.

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

Delivered 1248

Transmitted 1304

#02530 Secret "P. A."

(#368)

6 DEC. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio.

Kiden (dai . . . gō) 123 matsudan nikanshi (Para).

1 Bei how do ni a ri te wa October ko . riku gun wa Beg. Eng KE [c] LA [am] EK [p] ZI [—] DI [da] YC [vi] IW [s] ZI [—] VY [N] AA [.] KE [c] AA [.] IØ [End spell] ni olte so sai ki kyū u hei no yō sei ni chaku shu si sū hyaku no ki kyū wo chū mow se shi nominarazu ki kyū ni yoro ha wa i . Panama pō [Bō] ei wo mo kō ryo shi wo ru omomu (ki) na ru to koro tō chi ni 9 [KAN] shi te wa shin zyu wan fu kin wo tan sa se ru mo so re to wo mo wa ru ru ba sho no sen tei oyobi kei ryū shi se tsu tō na shi wo ra zu ma ta ki kyū fu yō kun ren mo mi za ru wo niotte i ma no tokoro so sai ki kyū se tsu chi no chō kō su ra mito (me) zu ka tsu sō kyū ni wa ji tsu geu seraru (ru) mono to wa mito (me) gata (ku) shi shikashite mo shi ji tsu geu surin to mo shin ju wau ni kin se ku se ru [hi tsu ka mu] [fu ō do] [e wa] hi kō jō no ri chaku riku su i ni tai suru so ra no kai gū wo OU—D—K za—Y beikara (zu) yue (mi) shiu ju wau ki kyū pō ei—E—F geu Y—ze ki suru ki kai wa sō tō ta buw mi mo ko sa raru (ru) mono to —N dau seram (ru) (para) (2) kan 1—ku se ru tokoro sen kan wa gyo rai pō syo mō wo yū se zu shō sai hikitsuku (ki) chō sa hō—G ran koto to su.

(#368)

#02530 Secret "P.A."

6 Dec. 41.

From: Kita

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

Kilden (dai . . . gō) 123 matsudan nikanshi (Para)

Bei hou do ni a ri to wa October ko. riku gun wa Beg. Eng  
c am p — da vi s — N . c . end spell

KE LA EK ZI DI YC IW ZI VY AA KE AA 10 ni oite so sai ki kyū u hei no yō  
sei ni chaku shu si sū hyaku no ki kyū wo chū mou se shi nominarazu  
Bō

ki kyū ni yoru ha wa i. Panama pō ei wo mo kō ryo shi wo ru omomu (ki)  
KAN

na ru tokaro tō chi ni 9 shi te wa shin zyu wan fu kin wo tan sa se ru mo so  
re to wo mo wa ru ru ba sho no sen tel oyobi kei ryū shi se tsu tō na shi wo  
ra zu ma ta ki kyū fu yō kun ren mo mi za ru wo wotte i ma no tokoro so sai  
ki kyū se tsu no chō kō su ra mito (me) zu ka tsu sō kyū no wa ji tsu  
gen seraru (ru) mono to wa mito (me) gata (ku) shi shikashite mo shi ji tsu  
gen surm to mo shin ju wau ni kin se ten se ru [hi tsu ka mu] [fu ō do]  
[e wa] hi kō yō no ri shaku riku su i ni tai suru so ra no kai gū wo OU—D —K za  
—y beikara (zu) que(m) shin ju wan hi kyū pō ei -E -F gen y- a ri kore wo A-  
ze ki suru ki kai wa sō tō ta bun ni no ko sa raru (ru) molso to—N dan serau (ru)  
(Para)

(2) kau 1-ku se ru tokoro sen kan wa gyo rai pō gyo mō wo yū se zu shō sai  
hikitsuku (ki) chō sa hō—G ran koto to su

From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941.

PA-K2

#253 Re the last part of your #123<sup>a</sup>.

1. In the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage  
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered  
four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the  
use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii  
is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of  
Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected  
the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training  
for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there  
are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine  
that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made  
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways  
of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa<sup>b</sup>, there are  
limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability  
there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack  
against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are  
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

<sup>a</sup> Not available.

<sup>b</sup> Kana spelling.

(Copies of two coded messages No. 02540, dated 6 December 1941,  
one from Kita to Washington and the other from Kita to Tokyo will  
be found reproduced as Items Nos. 233 and 234, respectively, EXHIB-  
ITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

(369)

#02540 Urgent "PA"

6 Dec. 41.

From: Kita

To: Koshi Wash—Foreign Min. Tokyo

(1) 5th yū koku sen kan [wa i ō min] oyobi su i po 1 nyū kō shi 6th  
zai ha ku kan sen Sano tori (Para)

# 1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

San kan 9 kel jun 3 su i po 3 ku chi ku kan 17 oyobi nyū kyo chū no kel  
jun 4 ku chi ku kan 2 (jū jun kū po wa zen bu jutsu dō shi a ri). (Para)  
(2) kan tai ni i jō no kū ki wo mito (me) zu. (Para)  
Zai . . . taishi sano tōri u gi te se tan.

December 6, 1941.

From: Honolulu  
To: Tokyo  
PA-K2  
#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ----- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

4 Dec. 1941.

From: Togo (Foreign Min. Tokio) #01260 "PA."  
To: Jap. Com. Honolulu.

Kan chō fu gō a tsu ka i (Para)

1. i rai shi wo ke rn bu tsu ken ryō hō mo sunniyakani wa ta so re ta shi
2. ō ku ma a te mu su me nyū gaku su chi chi

From: Tokyo.  
To: Honolulu.  
(Date not given. Approx. Dec. 4, 1941)  
PA-K2.

6.  
#125.

Restricted distribution.

1. Please turn over immediately both items which I requested.
2. -----

(Japanese)

ARMY 7379

Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

No msg to match this translation.

"PA"

4 Dec. 1941.

From: Togo—Foreign Min.—Tokio #92466 Urgent.  
To: Jap. Con.—Honolulu.

.20

Ki kan in ka do ku ki chō nikaushi te wa tō hō ni oite mo se tsu kaku kō ryao  
shi wo ru nitsui (tewa) wo tsu te nanibun no gi denpō (dai . . . gō) su ru ma de  
ma ta re to shi (para)

Hon den a te sa ki zai jo ku wo oyohi DOXO kaku koō XPJVEU  
womotte mi

We are now giving consideration to the question of the return home of the families of members of your department. Until you hear further, please hold it up.

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu.  
December 4, 1941.  
PA-K2.

Circular 2466.

We here are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families. Therefore, wait where you are until I wire you at a later date. This message addressed to -----.

(Japanese)

ARMY 7380

Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

(At this point in the Exhibit there is a paper on which appears decipherment and plain language Japanese. The numeral notation "851" also appears thereon. This paper will be found reproduced as Item No. 235, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

From: Foreign Minister 92461  
To: Kita, Consul, Honolulu

12/3

*Strictly secret #92461*

Would like you to hold on to your list of code words (also those used in connection with radio broadcast) right up until the last minute. When the break comes burn immediately and wire us to that effect.

Togo.

This msg was an extra, picked up on night of 7th Dec '41. Not dated or numbered.

From: The Foreign Minister ~~999~~ See A  
To: All Hands

*No date.*

Well known to you all is the fact that the empire is at this instant confronted with the gravest crisis in its history, and the problem of reducing that crisis is exclusively one of diplomacy. Those within and without the government expect big things of the Foreign Office and indeed I have a deep respect for the activities of the members of this department. The fact that I am so frankly giving you my opinion from the envoy to the head of an office is that I wish to encourage you one and all. Even tho we would rather be at home and even tho conditions are bad at this time we are diplomats and if our conduct is such as to disrupt our unity we may not only obstruct the course of diplomatic aims, but may stand in the way of our presenting a solid front; and by so doing place ourselves in a position of having no excuse to give. So at this time especially let us put our best foot forward and present a solid front to the world.

"PA"

Tei koku ga | i ma | ya | chō koku | i rai | mi zō | no koku nan | ni | sō gū | shi | wo  
ru | koto | go shō chi no tōri | na ru | ga | ko no | (*nan koyoku*) do kai ni wa | mo  
tsu pa ra | gai kō | ni yoru | no | hoka | na ku | chō ya kyo | wo | gai mu  
shō | ni | taishi | ta dai | no | ki tai | wo ka ke | tō shō in | (The personnel of the  
said) no kō dō ni | taishi | shin jin | na ru | kan shin | wo | mo chi | wo ru | gen  
jō | na ru | ni | tsui (te | wa) te | wa | zai gai | shi (Ambas.; envoy, minis.)  
shin | ha ji me | kaku | kō | kan chō | ni oite ki tan | na ki | i ken | wo | gu  
shin | seraru (ru) ru wa Nihon | yo ro ko bu | tokoro | na ru | mo | konosai i ya  
gyakua (NA) ku | mo | gai sei | shoku in | ni | shite | shō zen tai no dan | ke  
tsu | wo | mi da ru | ga | goto (ki) kyo so

ni | i zu ru | koto | a ra ba | gai kō | shi sa ku | no | shin kō | wo | sa ma ta  
gu ru | nominarayu | kyo koku 1 chi sho pan | no | mokutaki | ni | ma i shin | LW  
wo ru | sai chō ya no | ki tai | ni | taishi te | mo | mō (shi) wa ke na ki | shi dai  
nitsu (tewa) go jo sai | na ki | tō | na ga ra | konosai | tokuni shō | nai gai | wo | a  
ge te | 1 gan to shi | gai kō | no | ki | no | wo | jū bun | ni | ha tsu ki | suru | sū  
tokushu to mo 1 sō | kan in | wo to ku | rei | seraru (ru) yō itaskitashi.

(At this point in the Exhibit there appears on a radiogram form of RCA with the following: 'Japanese Consulate General November-December 1941 Messages' appearing in handwriting. This form will be found reproduced as Item No. 236, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This message dated 6 Dec. 41 was rec'd on night of 7th and furnished break by which others were read. Break found on night of 8/9 at 0200 9th Dec. '41. No copy of code msg. to match this one.



1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tojo, Foreign Min.  
To: Consul Honolulu

01280.

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th.

KE 12/6

(At this point in the Exhibit there appears a paper with decipherment in handwriting and also what appears to be some plain Japanese text. This paper will be found reproduced as Item No. 237, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received attached on night of 7 Dec. '41.  
Could not immediately identify or decrypt.  
Copies sent to Wash, D. C.  
Unable to do anything with this one.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear on radiogram forms of RCA :

1. Message dated 1 November 1941 from Kita to Tokyo.
2. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
3. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
4. Message dated 12 November 1941 from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
5. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

The foregoing quoted messages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 238 through 242, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

12 Nov. 1941.

#078 "LA" (581-582)

From: Kita To: Jap Consul San Francisco and Minister at Washington,  
D. C.

Ku ru su taishi yori.

Honshi tishite wa i zon na ki mo sho han no ji jyō sha hon ken ka hi no ketsu tai wa ki taishi ni o ma ka se—Ku na o honshi no no bu be ki ten to o ki zu ki no ten San Francisco a te shikyūdenjo aritashi.

From: Ambassador Kurusu

I have no objections and will leave the divisions on the various items to your Excellency. Furthermore if you think of any items that I should include in my statement please wire me at San Francisco.

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear two items, as follow :

1. A receipt form for radiograms of RCA.
2. A coded message dated 1 December 1941 from Kita to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 243 and 244, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

1 Dec. 1941.

#082 J-19 (K-10) transposition (38)  
(Enciphered with 30 Nov key)

From: Kita

To: Minister at Washington, D. C.

Gakuki (?) 26th

1 nitsuki G 25th nashi 2 nitsuki zai Bei taishi ate gō jig 29th 2403 no tori ri 24th taki "L" 13th nari CH Beg. Sp. Mochi

Regarding references to items in circular #2403.

Note: Circular #2403 not available.

(Copies of two coded messages, each dated 1 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 245 and 246, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941 (J19)

#241 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #119\*

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on;

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on;

(1) Fuel is plentyfull and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns cannot be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231\*\* were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring to 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

\*JD-1: 7158.

JD-1: 7294.

\*\*Available, MEIZI dated 23 November.-----

(A copy of coded message No. 2420, dated 1 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 247, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Unable to do anything with this one.

(Copies of two coded messages, each dated 2 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 248 and 249, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

2 Dec. 1941.

#244. J-19 (K10) transportation (362)

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

(Gai N 17th P 26th) kida gō jig 29th 2437 M 23rd 2 inkanshi 1 zai shoku nen sū wa hon nen G 6th Beg. date 10th End date zuke 5 shin jig 29th 69 oyohi ōden 152 no tori.

Regarding reference to items in circular #2437 (m)

Note: Circular #2437 (m) not available.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Message dated 2 December 1941 from Kita to Tokyo bearing the one word "Haruna."

2. Copy of a "Skeleton" form for accounting purposes employed by RCA and relating to a message dated 3 December 1941 from the Japanese Consul, Honolulu, to Tokyo.

1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

3. *Ibid*, with respect to another message dated 3 December 1941. The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 250, 251, and 252, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 57A

"LA" system.  
Received by Kita.  
Prior to 7 Dec. '41.  
Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41—by us.  
To: GAIMUDAIJIN. Tokio.  
From: KITA.

#180 "LA" 30 SEPT. 41.  
April 28th zu ke ki sin dai 69 Gō nikan (si) paragraph May 29th Yokohama ha tu ni tu ta ma ru tu mi tō kan a te ni mo tu 2 ko no u ti 1 ko wa o ku ri zyō (1460 Gō) ni begin english spelling ō ri na ma] ri ma ga kaku ai tei ma to ma bei] Ryo 9 - to a ru to ko ro ze i kan tetuzuki ni hi tu yō na ru nituki migi nai yō syō sai sikyū go kai den aritasi.

Trace baggage.

To: GAIMUDAIJIN. Tokio.  
From: KITA.

#174 "LA" 23 SEPT. 41.  
United States yori Chungking ha ken no gun zi si se tu [ma gu ru da long sound] dai (dairi no dai) syō. [Ma ku mo ran] repeat indicator Tyū sa 1st Repeater. [Su gi ne long sound] 1st Repeater. [Su sa long sound ran do] 1st Repeater No 1 kō wa 22nd repeat indicator [ku ri tu pa long sound] ni te 2nd repeater tō ti tyaku. Su long sound hi go 2nd repeater Manila kei yu to si no ha zu.

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

To: KOSHI. Washington.  
From: KITA.

(Re yī Cir #278) #955 "LA" 18 SEPT. 41.  
1. (1 Ka 3 Dan No Nyō) Sō Ryōzi ki ta na ga o 417 \$ 56 paragraph.  
Fu ku ryōzi o ku da o to zi rō 277 \$ 65 paragraph  
Syokilca . . . Sei yu ge kyō no su ke 252 \$ 45 paragraph  
Syokilca . . . Sei yu ge kyō no su ke 252 \$ 45 paragraph  
Syokilca . . . Sei se ki kō ki ti 209 \$ 61 paragraph  
Syokilca . . . Se mo ri mu ra ta da si 133 \$ 00 paragraph  
2. Migi i zu re mo ko gi tu te kan zyō (ta dasi mo ri mu ra wonozo (ki) ku) paragraph. Yokohama syō kin ginko Honolulu si ten paragraph.  
4 period tō kan ka ni sono ta no seifu ki kan na si.  
Finance.

To: RIYOJI Shanghai  
From: KITA.

17 SEPT. 41.  
KA TU YA MA KEN ZI E KI YO HA RA SYOKIKA YORI paragraph [PU RE SI DEN TO. TEI RA long sound] Gō NI TE OCTOBER 1st KI TI TU KU PA.

Arrival of Katsyamo here from Shanghai Oct. 1 via Pres. Tyler.

To: GAIMUDA IN TOKIO  
RIYOJI Shanghai  
(HPPAF QRXM)  
#245-LA.  
From: Kita

17 SEPT. 41.

GAIMU. . . SYŌ DEN SYO SI 3 MEI (KU GA MI TI SA DA. WA TA NA BE MA KO TO. TA TI MA SA YO SI) [PU RE SI DEN TO. TEI RA long sound] GŌ NI TE 16th TŌ TI HA TU OCTOBER 1st KI TI TYAKU NO YO TEI NITKUI SIKARU BE KU GO TE HA I KŌ PA

Kugam, Watanobe, Tajima, sailing on Tyler for Shanghai. Welcome them.

# 216

To: GAIMUDAIJI TOKIO  
From: KITA

#214 "LA"

KIDEN (dai . . . . Goo) GOO 1781 NIKANSI paragraph 1. KOKU POO KEN KIN BEI KA 483 Dollars (TOO KE TU REI ZI TU SI GO SYUU NO SE RU MONO) paragraph NAO SYOO KIN KA RI I RE KIN NIKANSI TE WA OODEN (DAI . . . . Goo) 133 WO MOTTE GO SYOO NIN KA TA RIN SEI \$483 for defense fund

# 208

"LA" system.

To: Shanghai?

Baki zeki jū ge ki shi ta to i tsu te o ru za Japan kō ku bu tai wa hyō shi ki a ru ko re ra no hei wa shi se tsu o ba ku ge ki su ru ho do gi ryō se tsu re tsu de nai ko to wa Japan kō kū bu tai no i ma ma de no sen ka yori mi te a ki ra ka de a ru.

Togo.

It is being said that Japan has bombed and strafed (non military establishments) but one has only to think of the war results scored to date by the Japanese air force to realize that our air force is not so unskillful as to bomb these establishments marked as non-military.

Togo.

# 140

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

From: Kita

#193-LA

30 JULY 41.

Japan hō sō kyō kai e sanotōri paragraph sin ha tyō niyo (ri) ru Hawaii mu ke hō sō tyō syu sei se ki kiwamete fu ryō na ri 19 meters 25 meters 31 meters niyo (ri) ru dō syu mo ku no [te su to] hō sō o o ko nai sei se ki sai ryō na ru mo no i o e ra bu ko to to si te wa i kan.

To Japan Broadcasting Co.: Your new frequencies are lousy for Hawaii. Please go back to 19-25-31 meters.

#121

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

From: Kita

#160-LA

11 JULY 41.

Sin nin syo khi ki ko mon (ki van 6 ka tuki) [ra ti mō a] wa Chungking ni ita (ri) ru to 9th [ku ri tu pa long sound] ni te tō ti ki kō Begin English spelling tetnzuki tai man tel—syu sai ban san kai se ki zyo China ga [de mo ku ra si long sound] no ta me zen sen se ru o syō yo si ta ru u e Japan wa gun zi zyo sa te tu o ki ta si tu tu a ru nomi narazu sono bu ryo ku niyo(ri) ru sin ti tu zyo ken se tu wa ta koku no ken ri o ki son si zi ko no syo gai to na ru ku ni ni ku tu zyo o a tō ru mu no nisite zen zen si tu pa i ni kō si tu tu a gi kaette mon zi yū oyobi ryō do syu ken no ta me ta ta kai tu tu a ru China o mei syu to su ru sin no sin ti tu zyo ko ko ni ken se tu o min to si tu tu a ru mu ne ne ze tu si ta ru omomuki na ri.

Movements and opinions of Chiang Kai Shek new adviser, Latimore.

#120

To: Gaimudawin Tokio

From: Kita

#160-LA

11 JULY 41.

Ta ki den syo si yori paragraph go sin ei . yo se ki yaku ta te 2 sya ku. yo ko 1 sya ku 5 Sun. A tu sa 1 Sun

#112 Night of #028

To: Koshi Washington

Gaimudaijin Tokyo

From: Kita

#155-LA

30 JUNE 41.

Tō ti Germany mei yo ryōzi yori kō bun o motte 30th i kō dō ryōzi daipikan o hei sa su ru mu ne tū ti arita ri pa

Memo from German Consul. He closes shop for the 30th.

1006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

#109

To: Gaimudaijin Tokyo

From: Kita

#151

28 JUNE 41.

To kan ka si da si kin na si (kan Tyō fu gō a tu kai)

#107

To: Gaimudaijin Tokyo

From: Kita

#149 "LA"

28 JUNE 41.

[Kin me ru] tai syō wa [ma ku mo ri su] tai sa tai dō 25th [ku ri tu pa long sound] na te tō ti ni ki kan se ri pa

Admiral Kimmel and Capt McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

#105

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

From: Kita

#147—LA

27 JUNE 1941.

Chungking sei ken gi zyu tu go mon Begin English spelling sō dan ge ma ru man za doku pe 9—wa Washington yu ki no to 22nd [ku ri tu da long sound] ni te tō ti ni ki kō si ta ru ga ei zi si syo hō niyoreba dō nin wa [bi ru ma] dō ro niyo (ri) ru syo ku ryō un pan yō [to ra tu ku] su long sound sen dai kō nyū no yō mu o o bi o ru omomuki na ri kyū sun so ya

Chungking—Burma Rd—Trucks.

"KO" system.

Sent by Kita.

Prior to 7 Dec. '41.

Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41—by us.

#310 "KO"

7 Nov. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min.—Tokio.

Nyū man nite ni sashō wo atae tarutokoro sonogo dōnin yari how sha no shi rei niyori (ru) wo motte taiyo maru yō sen wo tori ya ninru muno mōshiide mokka tōchi taizai kyū ———

After granting Newman's visa, he informed us that he has cancelled his passage on the Taiyo Maru and will remain here for the present.

#287 "KO"

25 Oct. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min. Tokyo.

Kiden (dai 96 zō) nikanaki (Para)

"Nyū man" fu November 4th tōchi hatsu no Tai nite ki nin itashitashi omonur (ki) notokoro dōnin nital (shi) (suru) honpō nyūksku sashō wo hakyu shi (zo) sashitsuka (e) naki ya shi ka chō tomo (o) uchilawa (sei) no ne ori kaeshi (go) kaiden kō (irai hō).

Re: Your #96. Newman wishes to return to Japan on the Taiyo Maru leaving here Nov. 4th. After conferring with the head of the department concerned, please let me know if you have any objections.

From: Kita (Secret).

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

"In ta < na sho naru. nyū su, sa < bi su" ki sha Beikoku jin *Beg Eng. Sp.* CRICHTON—COLVIN *End Sp.* yori honpō nyūksku sashō hakkyū kata negalide aritaru takaro honnin fu honnen July made Tokyo ni we (o) ri taru omomu (ki) nite kel shi sō kan hakkyū no tai hō (taizai no tai. honpō no hō) kyoka shō (May 19th zu ke *Beg. Sp. A End Sp* dai . . . 476 zō) wo sho ji su (para)

Dōnin fu November 4th tōchi hatsu no Taiyō maru ni jō sen hibō naru omomu (ki) nikuki (tewa) migi sashō hakkyū no ka hi shikyū (go) sengi no ne denpō (dai . . . . . go) nite (go) kaikun kō (irai hō)

Mr. Crichton Colvin an American of the International News Service has requested a visa for a stop-over in Japan. He expects to leave here on the Tatuta Maru sailing Nov. 4th. Instructions requested.

#209 "KO"

7 AUG. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min—Tokio.

Ryō mei tomo sashō tori ya me kata mōshicle taru nikuki go ryō chi ainaritaski.—

Visas were refused in both case. Your indulgence is requested.

#189 "KO"

28 JULY 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min—Tokio.

Nanibun no gi shi kyū gō kaiden kō bu.—

Some sort of answer requested.

# 181 (2nd) "KO"

22 JULY 41. System

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

This office has a request from a Mr. W. R. B. McBain, manager of the Shanghai firm of George-McBain, and his wife Mrs. V. W. K. McBain for a visa to visit Japan. These people spend a good deal of their time in Shanghai, and have been residing here for the past six weeks. They wish to stop over between ships in Japan, and state that they have visited there many times before. They both have on two previous occasions (19 July 1939 and 25 Aug. 1939) obtained visas in Shanghai. They returned to their home country in 1940. Have you any objections to these visas? Answer to that question requested.

# 181 "KO" # 130-22nd

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

zai Shanghai Sp. Eng GEORGE-McBAIN-CO. End Sp. (1 Sp. Eng. THE-BUND End Sp. sho zai) shi hai nin England jin Sp. Eng. W. R. B. McBain End Sp. oyo (bi) dōnin tsuma Sp. Eng. V. W. K. McBain End. Sp. no ryō nin yori honpō tsū ka sashō hakkyū kata negalide aritaru tokoro migi ryō mei wa 2 jō 1 nen kan Shanghai ni zai jō seru mono ni shite 6 shū kan zen kyū ka kyū yō notame to fu tōchi ni taizai shi konpan ki nin no to ki sen no ri ka e tō no tsugō niyori (ru) 1 jin honpō ni jō riku itashitashi omomu (ki) nite nao ryō nin tomo jūrai Nippon e wa sū ji tokō sern koto aru mune shiu (mōsu) ta te wo (o) ri sono ryoken niyoreba saikin nioite shō wa jū 4 nen July 19th oyo (bi) dō August 25th tsu ju ke nite so re zo ri Shanghai sōryōji no sashō wo e te do jū 5 nen honpō myokoku no mune ki myū ari (Para).

Migi nital (shi) (suru) tsū ka sashō wo tae (go) sashitsuka(e) naki ya orikaeshi (go) kaiden kō (i rai hō).

#165 "KO"

10 JULY 41.

From: Kita. #119 of 10th.

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

Ref: your circular 1381—

9th

Gokuhi (Para) April kyū German jin 1 mei Belkoku jin 1 met Belkoku jin 1 mei (Para)

Migi izure no shuppatsu seru hayu

Strictly secret: 9th. One American and one German should have departed by now.

"KO" #76

29 MARCH 1941.

From: Kita

To: Gaimudaijin Tokyo —

WA

Sp. Eng. H O L C O M B E End Eng. fu imada tokan ni shutsu to seyn nao

WA

1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"ha ri son" gō fu honpō nika ki kō seza (ru) nitsuki (tewa) dōnin fu "ma ni ra"  
in tyoku kō seru mono to shi ryō seraru (ru).

• CHOKKO.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo.

Holcomb has not arrived in the past ten days. Furthermore as the Harrison (steamship) will not return to our country the subject person is the one who is going direct to Manila.

"PA-K2" system

Received by Kita

Prior to 7 Dec. 41

Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41—by us 24a

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

RADIO UNIT

Commandant, Navy 128 % Fleet Post Office

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., 15 June 1945.

Top Secret.

From: Captain T. H. Dyer, U. S. Navy.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Office of the Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Exhibit 41, Forwarding of.

Enclosure: (a) Photostatic Copies, Pages 29 to 286 of Exhibit 41.

1. Enclosure (a) is forwarded at the request of Mr. Sonnett.

T. H. Dyer,  
T. H. DYER,  
Captain U. S. Navy.

Top Secret.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached Pages 29 to 286, inclusive, are photostats of original documents contained in the files of FRUPAC.

T. H. Dyer,  
T. H. DYER,  
Captain, U. S. Navy.

(NOTE—See record page 420)

WB

909S on 22 November 1941.

From: Togo—Foreign Min—Tokio. - #278 (PA)

To: Jap. Con. Honolulu.

(su i tō kan ri wa jō sei kyū ten no sai sa ki ji kō denpō (dal . . . . . gō) arita (shi) shi (Para)

1. sai nyū kin oyobi sai shutsu kin wa sono tō ji ni okeru ti ka mo ku be tsu no chō shū ma ta wa shi shutsu zu mi no ru i kej kin gaku (Para)

2. ho dan kin no shu ru i be tsu kin gaku (Para)

3. ta te ka e kin no chō shaku (Para)

4. kō kin no ho yū zan gaku oyobi shō rai shi to mi ko mi gal yō (Para)

5. kin kyū sho bun kiden (dal . . . . . go) yō en WT kō no.

GONPWIC

Note: the above msg. was also received here from Ninto—San Francisco with his number #368 on it, at 456 P on 22 November 1941.

Not translated.

13 Nov. 1941.

From: Consul General Muto, San Francisco, #285

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu (PA)

1. Even tho the Imperial Government has urged strongly that the U. S. reconsider its shipments of aviation gasoline to Vladivostock, it has been of no avail. Recently we called to the attention of the Soviets the fact that one of our ships

was sunk off the Japanese coast by a mine of Soviet manufacture, but the affair is still unsettled. Her main forces are now fighting the Germans and she is trying to follow a policy of procrastination elsewhere. We have since September controlled our military and followed a policy of non-aggravation with the Soviets while there is information to the effect that the Soviet's Far Eastern and Mongolian armies are appearing on her Moscow front. Although she is controlling any activity on the Soviet-Manchukoku border that would give rise to trouble, she also appears to have plans up her sleeve for use in case worse come to worst.

2. Since the establishment of the mutual defense agreement between us and French Indo China we have been progressing with plans to turn the south of French Indo China into a military base. The authorities there have since the middle of September been holding up import and export authorizations and are afraid that we are about to regiment the Annamites through the Greater East Asia policy and pressure is increasing against our rapprochement, and are obstructing many pending measures through a policy of delay. Our policy against this is fast taking form. Ambassador Yosizawa and party had arrived there by the end of October and plans starting several investigations using Hanoi as his headquarters. (Sumita the former official there is assisting).

3. England is hoping for active cooperation from Tailand whom she considers necessary for the defense of Malay, P. Ruma, and Singapore, but Thai appears to be maintaining a strict neutrality as between England and ourselves.

The Dutch East Indies stoutly maintains her stand that we have occupied French Indo China as a base from which to attack them and will not furnish us supplies, and also they have refused to even exchange products ship by ship on the barter system.

The Malay-Singapore areas are hastily strengthening defenses and reports say are nearing completion. On the other hand the Russo-German war will probably draw-out the war between Germany and England and in the end looks like a British victory, while we're stuck in the China incident and as a result of economic pressure from the U. S. will be impoverished, if their plans are realized. So apparent has their Anti-Japan attitude become of late that their attitude toward our ships and our evacuating citizens and our remaining citizens has been greatly stiffened.

13 NOVEMBER 1941.

"PA"

From—Muto—San Francisco #285

To—Jap. Con.—Honolulu

(Part 1 of 2 parts)

(Gakuh) dai 5 hō (Para)

1. Teikoku Seifu wa U.S.S.R. nitaishi Beikoku yori no kō ku ki yō [ga so rin] no Vladivostock yu sō nikanshi shin jin no han sei wo u na ga shi ta ru mo ra chi a ka zu ma ta ho ku sen Nihon kai gan no U.S.S.R. sei no fu ryū su i rai (ki ken su i i ki se tsu tei ni to mo nai fu se tsu se ru tsu MJ) nikanshi U.S.S.R. ga wa no chū i wo kan ki se ru mo mi taiketsu ri ni hō chi suru tō ji koku no zen gun ji ryoku to Germany ni taisuru tei kō ryoku to wo ta no mi sen en shu gi to ri ki ta re ru ga sai kin ni ita (ri) Nihon wa tai so kō ge ki wo wo ko na wa za ru be shi to no mi tō shi no mo to ni September i rai gun tai wo sei sō shi Moscow zen men ni kyokute gun oyohi Mongolia gun a ra wa re wo ru omonu (ki) no jō hō a ri mau so koku kyō no kin chō ya ya kau wa shi so ga wa mo nichī mau wo shi ge ki suru gagoto (ki) hō dō wa yo ku sei shi wo ru mo mau 1 no baai no himitsu jun hō kō sa ku wa kore wo ket jo ku shi wo ru mono nogoto (ki) shi (Para)

2. nichī futsu in kyō dō pō ei sei ritsu go wagahō wa nau bu futsu in wo gun ji ki chi toshite sei pi shi shi ta ru tokoro futsu in tō kyoku wa September chū Jesu i kō tai nichī yu shutsu nyū kyo ka wo shi bu ru tō shō kyoku te ki tei kō wo na shi aruiwa wagahō ga ka kyō wo tsū ji te tai au nau jiu kō sa ku wo na sau ko to wo wo so re ka kyō no tai datsu se tsu kiu ni taisuru a tsu pa ku wo kyō ka shi ma ta kaku shu keu au taiketsu no sen en sa ku wo kō ji wo ru mo tai sei toshite wa wagahō no futsu in ni tisuru ha a ku ryoku wa chaku chaku to su su mi tsu tsu a ru HYMJ to yū be ku yo shi za wa taishi 1 kō mo October ma tsu shuppatsu fu nin no to ni tsu ke ru ga [Ha no i] wo hou kyo toshite kaku hau no kō sa ku ni no ri da su yo tei na ri (jū rai no su mi ta kikau wa kai shō se ri) tsu zu ku sho un.

#285

Part 2 of 2 parts

Malay

3. England wa [ma re ←] [pi ru ma] oyohi Singapore pō ei jō no yō chi ta ru [tia] koku ga wa ga jin ei ni tō zu du no ki ken wo nō shi sen to se tsu kvoku



## 1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

te ki se ku dō wo ko ko ro mi [tai] wa ko no kan nichī ei no kan ni a ri te chū  
ritsu i ji ni kyū kyū ta ru a ri sa ma wo ri (Para)

Ran in wa wa ga ku ni ga futsu in wo ki chī toshite ran in wo kō ge ki suru  
gagoto (ki) ko to na ki mu ne wo gen ji tsu no kō dō (tatoeba futsu in yori no  
te tsu pe i) niyori te shi me sa za ru kagi (ri) wagahō no gun ji ryoku wo ma  
su gagoto (ki) ran in bu tsu shi wo 1 sai kore wo kyō kyū suru a ta wa zu to no  
tatemae wo ken ji shi wagahō yori no 1 fu ne go to no [ba ← ta ←] sei no tei  
an mo kyo hi shi wo re ri (Para)

Malay

[ma re ←] Singapore hō men ni oite wa kou shun rai chaku chaku toshite  
pō pi wo kyō ka shi kan sei nichī ka zu ki tsu tsu a ri to no hō a ri ta hō doku  
so sen sō no ke tsu ka ei doku sen chō ki ka shi ke tsu kyoku ei ga wa no shō ri  
to narube (ku) shutsu wo mō shin shi Nihon wa China ji hau ni yoru koku zu  
shō mō. Beikoku yori no kei zai a tsu pa ku no ke tsu ka hi hei no 1 to wo ri  
do ru mono to kau dau se ru mono ka ei tō kyoku no gen dō sai kin to mi ni  
tsu yo go shi to na ri ro ko tsu na ru tai nichī te ki sei wo shi me shi hou pō sen  
pa ku. hikia (gu) hō jin. zai ryū min tō ni taisuru tai do i chī ji ru shi ku  
kō ka se ri (kō).

12 Nov.

From: Consul General Muto (San Francisco)

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu

*To be handled with greatest secrecy*

1. This latest big campaign of the Germans which started on October 2nd is aimed at the control of European Russia through the occupation of Moscow and later the annihilation of all the remaining field forces of Soviet Russia. This objective has already to a great degree been realized, for the main strength of the Russians has been broken and the occupation of Moscow is merely a matter of time, it would seem.

Along with the defeat of the Russian Army unrest is growing among the people; and with this it would appear that the collapse of the Spanish Government is no longer a matter for worry. (Plans are under way for cutting off British and American supplies for Portugal). It appears that from now on Soviet Russia will hardly be an aggressive competitor.

The order of these events to the conclusion will be to secure the line Leningrad-Moscow-Halikov (?)—Rostov; then to reorganize their mobile units and even tho they are weary occupy the Caucasus.

This tracking down of the Soviet Army should not only deal a heavy blow to the British, but should throw some doubt into the business of bribing the Spanish Government with which is being carried out through the cooperation of the U. S.

Even tho there is the possibility of a quick settlement of the Russo-German conflict, looking at it from a standpoint of the ability of the Russians to resist (as I explained in a previous article), they have already turned down peace through surrender, and the Germans are not likely to take the role of appeasers.

2. England has not been resting since the outbreak of the Russo-German War, but has taken advantage of the respite to concentrate her force, and even tho the Russo-German war has come to the close of one phase already the plans for an invasion of England has been abandoned and it seems that Germany plans to continue her air warfare and blockade and at the same time start operation to occupy certain areas in the Near East and Mediterranean Sea. Even Britain can guess this, and is taking measures to strengthen her positions in the Near East. Because, as before, sea power in the Medit. Sea rests in the hands of the British, she threatens the supply lines of the Axis in North Africa, and it can be guessed that the German Medit. Sea campaign will be aimed at breaking that(?)

After the outbreak of the Russo-German War, sabotage has broken out in the occupied countries of Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia fostered by the Communist party, but the German policy of pressure has reduced this pretty much until we believe it will hardly affect the future course of the war.

The U. S. has progressed toward abandoning her neutrality to the extent of patrolling the waters of certain areas and has issued orders to shoot at German boats within that area. Also she has occupied Iceland and Greenland, and sent troop to certain bases in South America and is approaching a state of participation in the war, and the fact that she is hesitating is due to public opinion at home.

12 Nov. 1941.

"Pa System" ("K-2 transp. reversed")  
 From—Muto—San Francisco—#287 (23)  
 To—Jap. Con.—Honolulu, T. H.

(Part 1 of 2 parts)

Gokuhi (Para) *ō hei jō hō dai 5 hō* (Para).

1. October 2nd kai shi no how nen do sai go no doku gun dai sa ku sen wa Moscow kō ryaku wo shu gan toshiti a wa se te so ren zan zon ya sen bu tai wo ge chi me tsu shi motte gen tō ki zen ni ō ro kaku ho wo mokutaki to suru mono na ru tokoro migi mokutaki wa *BJPF* tai han ta tu sei seware ō ro no so gun shu ryoku wa kai me tsu shi Moscow no hō i kan ra ku mo pa tai ji kan no mon dai to mi ra re wo re ri (Para).

U. S. S. R. min shin wa ji koku gun ha i sen totomoni fu an ta ka ma ri tsu tsu a ru mo migi mo motte tadachini [su] sei ken no hō kai wa ki shi gata (ku) [po ru ga] i tō no shi *ODHS* narabi (ni). Ei Bei yori no bu tsu shi ni ta yori shun ki son e jun jun pi ni sen shin subeku kaku te U. S. S. R. no shō kyoku te ki tel gyo wa ken go to mo kei jo ku seraru (ru) mono to mi raru (ru) (Para).

Hin sa ku sen shū ryō ren doku koto wa [re min gu ra ← do] Moscow [ha ri ko fu] [ro su to fu] no sen wo kaku ho shi jaku CJ [kan] but tai wo no ko si MD ta ru u e riku kō gun no dai ku wa *UYPT* gu be ki mo [ko ← ka sa su] kō ryaku wa hikitsuyu (ki) wo kona wa ru be shi (Para).

Kei no *mō shū* ni so gun mo tsu i en to suru ni a ta ri Ei no rō ba i ō u be ku mo na ku Bei to no (go) kyōroku ni yoru bu tsu shi en go wo motte [su] sei ken wo ju bu shi tsu tsu a ru mo sono kō ka-utaga (i) wa shi (Para).

Nao 1 bu ni doku so kyū sen se tsu a ru mo zen ki U. S. S. R. no tel kō kei gaku yori mi te U. S. S. R. wa tadachimi ku tsu *WEDO* te ki kō wo na sa za ru be ku ma ta doku toshite mo da tō [po ru shi e pi zu mu] no tachiba yori migi no *kyo zen wa ni okeru* de za ru be shi (i ka u me ze.)

Part 2 of 2 parts

#287

("PA" (K2 transp.))

2. Ei wa June doku so sen po tsu pa tsu i rai kyū yō wo na shi u hon do pō  
 wa

Ei ryoku wo ma shi te ji shin wo e ta ru tokoro doku mo tai so sen 1 dan ra ku to na ru mo tadachim tai ei jō riku sen wa na sa za ru be ku tai Ei kō shū to fū sa wo kyō ka suru totomoni chi chū kai kin tō kō ryaku wo kai shi subeshi to mi raru(ru) ei toshite mo kore wo yo sō shi Iran Iraq [shi ri a] chaku tsu ra nu ru kin tō hō men no hei ryoku jō taishi totomoni do no da ki ko mi ni kyō hon shi wo re ri 1 pō chi chū kai no sei kai ken wa i zen toshite ei no te ni a ri ta me ni doku i ho ku a en sei gun wa ho kyū ro wo wo pi ya ka sa re ren kyō ni a ru mono nogoto(ki) ku doku no chi chū kai sa ku sen mo ma zu ko no jō tai kai han na mokuteki to subeshi to sō zō *G/NC* (Para)

3. Doku so sen kai shi go doku sen ryō chi no 1 bu (Norway . futsu . [yū gō] Bulgaria tō) oyobi [chi e ko] ho go ryō ni wa kyō san tō ki kō wa re zin min no [sa no ta← ju] tō no tame 1 ji sō jō wo ko ri ta ru mo doku no kyō a tsu hō oso(ke)

shin to *BOKZ* ryoku nayori migi wa dai tai yo ku a tsu serare doku no kou go no sen sō su i kō no pō gai to na ru gagoto(ki) koto na ki mono to mito(me) raru(ru) (Para)

4. Beikoku wa shō kai ku e ki no se tsu tel . dō chi e ki nai no doku i kau tel kō ge ki mei rei no ha tsu shutsu [gu ri←n ran do] [a i su ran do] no sen ryō tō yori sarani-1 po wo su su me chū ritsus *BB* no ha i ki . shō sen bu sō tō no kyo ni i den to hei wo ri ta hō hei nanbei sho koku ni oite gun ji ki chi kaku to ku . sū zi ku sei ryoku ku chi ku ni do ryoku shi san sen ka mi 1 e no gen jō ni oite nao shun jun hei wo ru wa gun pi to koku nai yo ran to ga kore wo yu ru sa za ru ta me na ru gagoto(ki) shi (kō) nitaishi shoku (wo wa ri).

QA=(  
 QE=)

"LA" SYSTEM SENT BY KITA

Prior to 7 Dec. '41. Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41 by us 44a.

5 Dec. '41.

Ooden (Dai . . . Goo 221 nikansi (paragraph (Ba n ka Long sound)

Dai kin kan zyoo tyuu selfu kan kei no hi yoo no mi si ha rai mi sai na ru ga migi si ha rai zu mi nove wa zan gaku 16224 dollar(s) 13 cent(s) to na ri poo too ooden (dai . . . goo) dai 1 koo no gaku to ga tu si too kan hon ken tokubetu kan zyoo tyoo zi ri wa 2610.

79716-46-Ex. 149, vol. 2-23

# 1012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From Kita FM Tokyo

5 Dec. 41.

In reply to #221 (Banker)

Auditing accounts with government expenditures only not completed. Upon settlement of above will have balance of \$16,224.13.

Special students expenses \$2610??

From: Kita, Jap C. G. Honolulu

To: Jap. Consul, Seattle

(Name)----- (Japanese) formerly a resident of your place, original residence Hiroshima, Ken. As a gun (county) Nakara (village) Azauebara (ward), says he landed in your city 1898-9 with the manager of the Sakamoto-Hotel in your place. Question him as to year, month, and date of arrival and name of steamer and inform me.

KITA.

#346 "LA"

26 Nov. 1941.

From: Kita #991.

To: Jap. Con. Seattle, Wash.

Mo to ki chi zai ryū honpo . . . zin i tsu kan da i chi so ku (i ka ho jo se, FLB TGZ CCV pu or fu a man) (tō 5 zyū 6 sal. Gen se ki begin sp. code Hiroshima ken DA HY QU a sa gun na ka ha ra nu ra a za u e ba ra) wa 1898.9 nen go ro ki chi sa ka mo to [ho te ru] a tsu kai ni te ki chi ni zyō ri ku se ru omomuki no to ko ro zō nin no to rai nen tsuiki hi oyobi sono zyō sen mei o torishirabe no ue go hai den kou (i rai hō).

KITA.

Kenseki, permanent abode.

#233 "LA"

24 Nov. 41.

To: Gaimudin Tokio.

From: Kita.

September 16th tō ti ki kō no ko ga den syo si ni bei ka 2 hyaku \$ (kō kin ni a ra zu) to te ka e oki ta ru to ko ro sel ri no tu gō zyō migi to tu to ma ru bin o motte hen kin sesime gin (se) ra re to si.

Spent \$200.

#224

18 NOVEMBER 41.

To: Gaimudalyn, Toki.

From: Kita.

United States ha ken repeat indicator [ bi ru ma rō do ] 1st repeater [ to ra tu ku ] un yu si dō gi zyu tu sya no sen pa tu tai tosite [ ri tya long sound do . E mu. Zyo n zu | tai i ni in so tu seraru ru 4 zyū 6 mei wa 16th tō ti ni ki kō se ri na o 1st repeater ni si yō tyū no [ to ra tu ku ] wa mo tu ka 3 zen 5 hyaku dai dai bu bun 2 ton han zu mi sin ga ta sya na ru yo si.

CAPT. RICHARD M. JONES.

Etc.—Burma Road-Truck,  
3500—2 Ton Truck.

#331-LA

18 NOVEMBER 41.

223

From: Kita.

To: Ryōji S. F., Koshi Wash. #069.

Gaimudalyn in Tokio. #223.

[Kuritupa-] oyobi [Hawaii kaku tō ken syū kō sen paku wo not(ki) ku] tō tisyutunyū kō sen paku no hatu tyaku wa kongo 1 sai ha tu pi yō serare taru mune 17th tō ti yūmukensakan yori hatu pi yō aritari (?)

Local postal inspectors (Yūmukensakan) announced on the 17th that from now on arrivals and departures of Clippers and ships (except for Hawaiian (local) mail ships?) will not be published.

#321-LA

12 Nov. 41.

978 (1)

From: Kita.

To: Kashi—Wash. #978.

Kyoji—S. F.—#027 (Re yr Cir #356).

Kurusu taisi yori 1 Honsi tosite wa izon naki mo syohan no zi zyō yori honken kahi no ketutel wa ki taisi ni omakase itasitaku | nao honsi no nobubeki tentō okizukinoten San Francisco ate sikyū denpo aritaisi.

Following from Ambassador Kurusu:

Although I have no objections, for various reasons, I would like you to take care of Washington's decision in this affair.

Wants same thing forwarded immediately to San Francisco. (Maybe the results of above.)

#316-LA

11 Nov. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Koshi, Washington. #075

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo. #213

[Su tin son] rikugun tyō kan wa 3rd gi kai nitaishi Hawaii ni gaikokujin wa zen | zin kō | no | wa ri ni | ta tu si | tai gyō ma ta wa ha kai te ki | kō i | no | ki ken | sei dai | na ru | ten o si te | ki si | hi zyō si | zyō tai | son zai si ma ta wa | sin ryaku | no kyō i | a ru baal Hawaii oyobi [po ru to ri ko] no ki kai gen rei | fu koku | no ken gen | OK o | dai tō ryō | ni fu yo | ka ta | yō sei | se ru omomuki na ru ga 4th Washington | ha tu | tū sin | niyoriba [kin gu] dai gi si | wa migi wa | kan min | no tyū zi tu | to | ai koku sin | nitaishi | su ru | ba zyo ku | na ri to no kō gi te ki [su tel to men to] o | ha tu pi yō | si ma ta | tō ken ti zi | mo suden! 1st R wa dō ti zi ni | fu yo serare o ru o motte | ka ka ru | ri tu pō | no hi tu yō | na ki mu ne | ka ta ri ta ru | omomuki na ri.

Yō su ru ni kan pan rikugun | ga wa | no | tel an | wa | dai tō ryō | yori | tyo ku se tu | tō ti | rikugun so rei kan | ni | si rei | su ru | to niyori kai gen rei o si kō | seshime N to suru ni ori.

#316-LA

11 Nov 41.

Secy of War Stimson on the 3rd pointed out to Congress that the aliens in Hawaii amount to one tenth of the total population and emphasizing the danger of strikes and sabotage *destructive activity* he demanded that in case of the existence of an emergency or an attack, the President should be granted the right to declare martial law in Hawaii and also Porto Rico. According to information from Washington on the 4th, Delegate King issued a protesting statement to the effect that the above was an insult to the loyalty and patriotism the [local] government and people. The territorial governor also retorted that since the power to declare martial law was already vested in the governor of the territory there was no necessity for such legislation.

In short, the recent army proposal was to permit the President to directly order the local military commander to put martial law into effect.

#305-LA

6 Nov. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Ryoji, Seattle, Wash, #060

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #206

Tai yō ma ru 5th go go 7 zi 40 fun bu zi syu tu pan se ri na o dai 3 syu yū bin bu tu 2 zyu 3 tai tu mi ko mi ta ri.

Do i kan to ku kan yori kan sen kyo ku tyō ni mo migi no syu si dentatsu ka ta i rai arita ri.

The taiyō Maru departed safely at 7:40 pm on the fifth carrying 23 bags of 3rd class mail.

The above information has been received from both Manager Doi and the chief of the Marine Bureau (Harbormaster?)

#290-LA

1 Nov. 44

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington. #072

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo. #203

Tai yō ma ru 1st bu zi nyū kō se ri bei ga wa toriatsukan bu ri dai tai Tatsuta Maru nitaishi su ru to dō yō na ri. Na o do i zimushokan yori kan sen kyo ku tyō ni mo migi no syn si dentatu ka ta i rai arita ri.

The Taiyō Maru arrived safely on the 1st. It is being handled by the Americans in the same manner as was the Tatsuta Maru.

The above information was received from both Doi, an official in the office, and from the Chief of the Shipping Bureau.

1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

#285-LA

25 Oct. 41

From: Kita  
To: Koshi, Washington. #065  
Gaimndaijin, Tokyo. #196

Hō koku ki gen se tu pa ku se ru to ko ro tō kan oyobi kan in no hō koku wa ko re o na subeki ya hō koku zyō no honkan ko ko ro e to tomoni sikyū go kai den aritashi.

Since the time limit for reporting is near, shall this office and its staff report? Please telegraph immediately instructions and items of the report.

#279-A

24 Oct. 41

From: Kita  
To: Koshi, Washington #101

Ka han zi niu no [fu i ra de ru fu i a] oyobi [san, zyu a n] tyū zai tel koku mei yo ryōzi nitaishi hon daijin yori ki neu hin (7 hō ya ki ka bin 1 ko su tu) o | so re zo re | zō tel su ko to to na ri mizi wa zai bel taisikan a te | ki ba ko 2 ko to si 22nd syu tu pan no tai yō sen | i wa na ga | yōzi ni | ta ku sō se ru nitsuki tū kan oyobi ten sō ka ta o torihakarai aritashi.

The Foreign Minister is presenting a commemorating gift to the recently de-signed honorary consuls at Philadelphia and San Juan (cloissonné flower vase each). These are being sent in two wooden boxes addressed to the Embassy (Wash.) in the case of Consul Iwanaga who is a passenger on the Tanyō Maru sailing from here on the 22nd. It is requested that arrangements be made for their clearance through customs and ultimate delivery.

22 OCT. 41

From: Kita  
To: Koshi, Washington #100  
Ryozi, San Francisco #053

Tel koku seifu | tyō yō sen | tai yō ma ru | hon 22nd | gogo 3 zi Yokohoma a syu tu pan | si ri | na o | dō sen ni wa kan to ku | no ta me | i wa na ga | hi ra ku | (ho zyo B M B) ryōji oyobi dō it to mo yo si (ho zyo zen on ( ) | tie sin syō | zimusyoku (dō i wa | kai un | kan to ku kan | no | si kaku | ni te) o zyō sen | sesime ta ri.

The Taiyō maru, requisitioned by the Imperial government, sailed from Yokohama today the 22nd. Consul Iwanaga Hiraku (——) and Doi Tomoyoshi (——) an official in the Communications Department were given passage by the Kantoku. (Doi is qualified as a shipping Kantoku).

#275-LA

22 Oct. 41

From: Kita  
To: Koshi, Washington #099  
Ryōzi, San Francisco #052

Tai yō ma ru zyō kyaku sano tōri: (I ka 5 dan 6 gyō no hyō):

| Koku se ki          | 1 tō | 2 tō  | 3 tō  | Gō kel. |
|---------------------|------|-------|-------|---------|
| Japan zin.....      | 5    | 20    | 124   | 149     |
| Hf kel bel zin..... | 1    | 28    | 150   | 179     |
| XYYE zin.....       | 2    | 11    | Nashi | 13      |
| England zin.....    | 1    | Nashi | Nashi | 1       |
| Gō kel.....         | 9    | 59    | 274   | 342     |

The passengers on the Taiyō Maru are as follows (Table below of columns and 6 rows):

| Nationality                       | 1st class | 2nd class | 3rd class | Total |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| Japanese.....                     | 5         | 20        | 124       | 149   |
| Americans of Jap. extraction..... | 1         | 28        | 150       | 179   |
| Americans (?).....                | 2         | 11        | None      | 13    |
| English.....                      | 1         | None      | None      | 1     |
| Total.....                        | 9         | 59        | 274       | 342   |

#274-LA

22 Oct. 41

From: Kita

To: Koshf, Washington #051

Gaimudaijin, Tokio

Ryōji, Sanfrancisco #028

Tai yō ma ru ni 1 to 5 zyū mei 2 to 8 zyū mei gu rai no yo yū a ru nituki o mi ko mi niyori ta tu ta ma ru no brin o ben gi tō ti ni ti tai yō ma ru zyō sen ni fu ri mu ke ra re ta si / na o kaldenaritashi.

Since there is room for 50 first class and 80 second class passengers on the Taiyō Marn; it is suggested that the Tatsuta Marn allotment be made use of and transfered to the Taiyō Marn here. Please reply by telegraph.

#272-LA

20 Oct. 41

From: Kita

To: Ryōji, San Francisco from Tokio #094

#022

Koku mu shō wa ma e da jimmushokau no Honolulu oyobi San Francisco zyō riku / sasitukae na ko re ga tetsuzuki o ryō se ru mu ne 20th zai kyō bei talshikan yori tū ti ko se ru nituki migi ta tu ta ma ru/nyū kō/no sai dō zimushakan e den ta tu aritasi.

The State Department has no objection to the landing of Maeda (jimmushokan) at either Honolulu or San Francisco and will omit formalities, according to information received from the American Embassy in Tokyo on the 20th. Please transmit the above information to Maeda upon the arrival of the Tatuta Marn.

#266-LA

10 Oct. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Koshi, Washington #058.

Gaimudayin, Tokyo #187.

Sinbun hō dō niyoubo mo tu ka | tō ti ni a ru [kin gu] dai gi si wa hon kau koku se ki hō | kai sei hō an wa United States ga | pō te ki ni 2 zyū koku se ki mondai o kai ke tu sen to su ru mo no ni te sono kau zen na ru kai ke tu wa | kan kei koku | to no | kō syō | noyo(ri) ra za ru kagiri ki tai si e zu | yotte dō dai gi si wa Washington | ki kan go | rikugun syō | ga wa | to ron kyō gi noue kan kei koku nitali su ru kou se ki | ri da tu kan i ka | yō sei no | ke tu gi an | o | gi kai ni | tei syu tu | su ru | i kō | na ru | mu ne ka ta ri ta ru omomuki na ri.

According to information in the newspaper, Delegate King who is here at present says that as for the plan for a revision of the territorial nationality law, the United States wants to settle the problem of dual citizenship, but a complete settlement without negotiating with the interested countries cannot be expected. Consequently after the Delegate return to Washington, and has conferred with the War Department, it is his intention to introduce into Congress a resolution requesting provisions for the breaking off of nationality from the countries concerned.

#264-LA

4 Oct. 41.

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington, #058.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo. #185.

Sen zi so ti hō an ([e me dē. bi ru]) sin gi no ta me September 15th yori hi ra ka re ta ru Hawaii ken rin zi ken kai wa dō hō an o tu ka si 3rd ken ti zi wa ko, re ni syo mei o-ryō se ri dō hō wa sen zi nioite ke ru so ti tosite | to ku be tu | kei sa tu tai. syō bō tai. i ryō han tō no so si ki. bō kū se tu bi. ko kyō si | se tū oyobi dō ro no ri yō. syo ku ryō oyobi bu tu ka no tō sei. ryū gen torisime tō nikansi omomuki su ru kō han | na ru | ken gen o | ken ti zi ri | fu yo se ru mo no nisite | migi so ti | ji tu si | no ta me no yo san hyaku 5 zyū man \$ o | kei zyō | se ru mo no na ri | several Jap characters su.

The Special Session of the Legislative of Hawaii which opened from September 15th for the purpose of considering legislation for war time action "M-Day Bill", passed the aforesaid bill and the Territorial Governor affixed his signature to it on the 3rd. This bill invests far-reaching authority in the Territorial Governor in case of war, chief provisions of which are: the organization of special police and fire fighting forces and medical squads, etc., anti-air preparations, the utilization of community installations and highways, the regulation of food supplies and commodity prices, the control of rumors, etc. In order to put the above measures into effect a budget of \$500,000 is being appropriated. Details by mail.

# 1016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

#262-LA

From: Kita.

2 Oct. 41.

To: Koshi, Washington.

Ryoji, San Francisco #044.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #183.

September 30th sa ra ni ta no 2 se ki mo | bō tō | ōden dō yō | ko re | o Hawaii  
kan zu me | kaisya ni ba i hyaku si | sai ban syo no tetsuzuki o ryō se ri.

Once more on September 30 two other boats were sold, in the same way as explained in my previous telegram, to the Hawaii Canning Co., court procedures being followed.

#256-LA

From: Kita

29 SEPT. 41.

To: Koshi, Washington.

Ryoji San Francisco #040

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #177

Re my #156

Zyō ken | tu ki | sya ku hō | no mu ne | ke ru tel | o mi to ru 7 se ki no u ti 2  
se ki wa 26th hyō ka ga ku ni | sō tō | su ru | ka haku | o motte ko re o | gyo  
seu | to mi tu se tu ma ru | kan kei | a ru | bei zin | kei ei | no Hawaii | kan zu  
me | kaisya ni | ba i kyaku | si sai ban syo | no tetsuzuki o ryō se ri.

Migi niyori gyo | sen kyū syo yū sya wa bō tō | ōden notōri | ba | kyaku | ka  
kaku tyū yori hyō ka ga ku no 2 wa ri (1 se ki wa \$2,110 ta wa \$1,017) oyobi  
sai ban hi yō (1 se ki wa (\$178.86) sen to. Ta wa 185\$80 sen to) o | sai ban syo |  
ni | nō nyū | no ha zu.

Na o | ta no 5 se ki mo dai migi ni na ra u Ko to to na ru mi ko mi na ri.

Na o ma ta migi wa min zi zi ken tosite wa kai ke tu | o mi ta ru si dai ni te |  
kei zi | mondal wa na o no ko sa re o ru mo ko no hō mo dai tai kandal ni | so  
ti | seraru ru | mi ko mi.

released

appraised value

value, price

29 SEPT. 41.

Two of the seven fishing boats reported released according to stipulations were sold on the 26th at prices comparable to their appraised values to the Hawaii Canning Company which has a very close connection with the boats, and court proceedings were dispensed with.

In connection with the above, the former owners, at the beginning, as in my telegram, must pay to the court out of the selling price 20% of the appraised value (\$2,110 for one boat and \$1,017 for the other) and also court costs (\$178.86 for one and \$185.80 for the other).

It is expected that the same procedure will be followed in the cases of the other five boats.

However, the above being a civil case, a decision is expected, but criminal procedure still remains, but this also is expected to be disposed of with leniency.

15 SEPT. 41.

#232-LA

From: Kita

To: Ryoji, San Francisco.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo.

Honpō kan ri | ha ya ka wa ki yo si | na ru mo no hon non April ki ti ni | nyū  
kō | si ta ru omonuki na ru | to ko ro | hon nin imada ki ti | tai zai tyū | na ra ba |  
gaikoku seifu kan ri | koku mu syō | tō ro ku | o na sa si te ra re ta si | sudeni | ki  
ti | o ha na re ta ru | nioite (te) wa sono | syu tu kō | nen tuki hi | oyobi | sen mei |  
sono ta san kō | to narube ki | zi kō | go kai den aritaski.

Hayakawa Kiyoshi, a gov't official of this country, intends to enter your port in April of this year. If he is still in your city, please register him with the State Department as a foreign gov't official. If he has already left your city please investigate and reply by cable giving the year, month, and day of departure and as many other details as possible.

#229-LA

2 SEPT. 41.

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington #050  
Gaimudaijin Tokyo #159

2nd ei zi si wa 1st tō yō mu ke tō ti ki kō no galkoku sen (sa ki ni doku ki ni | syū ge ki | serareta ru Egypt sen [za mu za mu] gō no si ma | i sen to syō si koku se ki oyobi sen mei o ha tu pi yō se zu) ni yaku 5 zū mei no bei zin hi kō ki sō zū sya oyobi gi si bin zū si o ru to ko ro | kō wa sono yu ki | sa ki | o hi si o ru mo seno sen pa tu tai wa suden [bi ru ma] koku kyō oyobi [bi ru ma . rō do] no kei kai hi kō ni a ta ri o ri ma ta migi | kō wa kyo | ka o e te gun syo ku o si ri zo ki ta ru mo no na ru mu ne hō dō si o re ri

2 SEPT. 41.

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzan which was recently attacked by German planes, but this name and nationality was not announced) entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although this group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

#228-LA

28 AUG. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Koshi Washington #027  
Ryoji San Francisco  
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #156

Sono go sa ra ni | se ki nitali R1 bo tu syū | han ke tu 1st R (kei 9 se ki) ta no 1 se ki nitali sya ku hō | no | han ke tu | arita ru to ko ro bō tō ōden | ken ti ji tō | no | un dō sō kō se ru mo no no | ko ko hu | 26th Washington ha tu | tū sin niyoreba | si hō hō syō | nioite wa migi 1st R arita ru | mo no | ro | u ti 7 se hi nitaishi na ra ta me te | dō syō | no mau zo ku | subiki United States si min rai | ba i kyaku su ru | ko to o | zū keu ni | i zu re mo | hyō ka ga ku | no 2 wa ri oyobi sai ban hi yō narabini sin pa ku | zi tai | no | fu sai ga ku | o motten ko re o | kyū | syo yū sya | ni hon kyaku | su ru | mu ne | ke tu tei | o mi ta ru omomuki na ri.

28 AUG. 41.

Subsequently, still another boat was adjudged confiscated (total 9 boats) and one other boat was released, as in my earlier telegram, and after the effective intervention of the Territorial Governor and others, according to information from Washington on the 26th, the Justice Department has decided that seven of the aforementioned boats be sold to United States citizens to satisfy the stipulations of the Department, and that the former owners should pay back 20% of the appraised value plus court costs together with the indebtedness on the boats themselves.

2 AUG. 41.

#199 LA

From: Kita.

To: Riyozi, San Francisco #020.  
fm Tokio #065.

Ta tu ta | ma ru | Honolulu | ki kō | ka ta | August 1st yū sen | yori | si rei zu mi.

The Tatsuta Maru will arrive in Honolulu August 1, loaded according to instructions from the NYK.

31 JULY 41.

#195-LA

From: Kita.

To: Koshi, Washington. #019  
Riyozi, San Francisco. #018  
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo.

Ta tu ta ma ru wa San Francisco yori Japan mu ke | Tyo ku kō | subeki omomuki na ru tokaro, hon 31st nyū kō no | a sa ma | ma ru wa nyū syn tu kō to mo | hei zū to | ko to na ru to ko ro ni | ki sen rei mo a ri ka tu | ta tu



# 1018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ta ma ru no tō ti ki kō ni wa tu mi mondai na ku kitagata Japan mu ki zyo kyaku | 2 hyiku sū zyū mei tai ki si o ri ha ta ma ta tō ti ze i kan moite wa dō sen no syu tu nyū kō ni wa nan ra si syō nakarube ki mu ne gen mei si o ru | moite wa dō sen no tō ti ki kō ka ta ko | ha i i | aritasi.

Since the Tatsuta Maru will sail directly from San Francisco to Japan, the arrival and departure of the Asama Maru entering this 31st will be different from usual. Moreover when the Tatsuta Maru enters this port there will be no loading problem. Two hundred and some persons will board, and it has been announced, that the local customs authorities will not obstruct the arrival and departure of the ship.

#194-LA

From: Kita

30 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington, #044

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #141

30th ei zi si | ha tu pi yō niyoreba tō ti China sōryōzi wa tyū bei taisi yori China galkō kau oyobi ryōzi kan wa | tō ke tu rei | no ti ki yō o men zyo | sa re ta no | kau ri | nituki te wa kō ryo tyū | na ru mu ne no denpo ni se tu si | o ru omomuki na ri.

According to a report in an English language paper on the 30th a telegram has been received by the local Chinese Consul General from a Central American Ambassador to the effect that steps are being considered to exempt Chinese diplomatic and consular officials from the application of the freezing order.

#912-LA

From: Kita.

30 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington, #143.

Gaimudaymi Tokyo #139.

Zai bei honpō si kin tō ke tu rei no zi tu si wa hi sa si ki i zen youmoyo ki serare i ta tu to ko ro ni te tō kan oyobi hō zi simbun nioite sono zi to si no baal | pam Ki zai ryū min 1st R ni a tō bi si ei kyō wa kei bi ni te yū ryo no vō na si mu ne si dō s ki ta ri ta ru ta me 26th Ri hon rei no zi, tu si o 2d R mi ru ni oyobi mo 1st R wa sa si ta ru dō ta ru dō yō o mi se zu tu i de | hon rei no te si yō bu ri | ha tu pi yō | saki 1st R no ei gyō Japan, mu ki sō kin Japan hin yu niyū nitali te mo | zi tu sai te ki | sei gen kiwamste kan dai na ru o mi to zen zen hoi sei mi ta ti ka e re ri.

Na o 2nd R yo ki se ry Japan mu ke sō kin oyobi bei ka hō sai no sō fu wa sō tō ga ku ni no bo ri o re ri.

Na o ma ta tō ti United States ga wa wa hi bei sai a ku no zi tai ni ta ti, itari ru mo 1st R ga United States hō o | zyu N syu su ru kagin nan ra yū ryo no yō na ki mu ne kyō tyō si o re ri.

#192-LA

Since the enforcement of the law freezing Japanese credits in America has been anticipated for a long time, at this office and through the Japanese language newspapers all the residents were warned of the effects upon them in case it was put into force, and even with the enforcement of the law on the 26th, the residents did not show any particular disquietude. The methods of application of the law were announced and since the actual restrictions on the residents' businesses, remittances to Japan, and importation of Japanese goods were considered quite lenient, they were accepted calmly. The remittances to Japan in anticipation of the freezing order and also the hoarding of U. S. currency has amounted to a considerable sum. Furthermore the United States authorities here have emphasized that although in the midsts of the worst anti American circumstances the residents have nothing to fear so long as they obey U. S. laws.

#187-LA

From: Kita.

26 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington, #042.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #134.

[Fu o re su ta ru] Kaigun zi kan wa kō kū kyo ku tyō [Ta wā zu] syō syō oyobi fu ku kan tai dō. Bei kan tai oyobi kaigun gun zi si se tu si sa tu no ta me 26th [a ra me do] yori kaigun ki niyorisin zyu wa N to tya ku no ha zu, na o dō, ki ni ti tō ti nioite ki ru hompō oyobi China no | si san | tō ke tu | zi mu syo ri | no ta me | ōkura syō ka ka ri kan 6 mei rai tyaku no ha zu na ri pi Assistant Sec'y of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide, will leave Alameda in a navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and

military installations. In the same plane 6 officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

#174-LA

From: Kita.

15 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington.

Riyoji, San Francisco, #014.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #125.

14th yo | tō ti | hō sō | kyo ku | wa | mo tu ka [So] ren ki sen | 2 zyū sū | se ki sei gan | ni syū tyū | si kanete [So] ren mu ke | yu syu tu | kyo ka arita ru ki kai ru i. Bu bun hin. Ku tu. Kō kyū [ga so rin] tō Vladivostok mu ke | tu mi | da si | no ha zu na ru mu ne hō sō | se ri.

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West Coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc. which had previously been released for export to Russia.

#173-LA

From: Kita.

15 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington #087.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #124.

Italy ryojidaikaku wa 10th ko re o hei sa se ri | na o dō ryōzi wa honkan nitaishi dō kan kō kin no | bu oyobi kan in si yū kin zen bu wa sai kin ni itari yō yaku hi ki da si kyo ka o e ta ru mu ne oyobi dō ryōzi oyobi shokikansai | mei wa to mo ni sai bunkan zai kin o mei zai ra re dō ryōzi wa New York zai zyū no ha ha hō mon noue 31st San Francisco ha tu Tatsuta Maru (shokikansai wa 18th tō ti ha tu ya wa ta ma ru) ni te fu nin no ha zu na ru mu ne ka ta ri kō bun syo | sono ta | tō kan i ta ku no mōsu i de na si.

The Italian Consulate was closed on the 10th. The Consul has at last obtained permission to withdraw a portion of the government funds and all of the private funds of its staff members. The Consul and one secretary have ordered the resident civil official to take over the post and after the Consul has visited his mother who resides in New York he will proceed to his new post on the Tatsuta Maru sailing from San Francisco the 31st (the secretary will proceed on the Yawata Maru sailing here the 18th).

No agreement was made to entrust official or other documents to that office.

#117

#083

8 JULY 41.

A report regarding the Washington report of the later part of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force. The local China Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the China military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?). Furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th 200 men have already (Toppa sever) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

8 JULY 1941.

#163-"LA"

From: Kita #117 of 8th Re your Msg 539

To: Foreign Min. Tokio—Minister Washington #083

May ma tsu Washington ha tsu tsu wa Bu ku ← gun hi kō shi no China ku ← gun san ka nikau(shi) hō dō se ru to ko ro June 10th tō chi China sōryōji wa migi san ka ka ta dō sōryōjikan nō shu tsu gan se ru mo no hyaku mei in ta tsu shi (dai bu bun tō chi hi kō tai zu ki) Washington China rikugun bu kan ni migi mitai (shi) su ru so chi ka ta shi ji o mo to te tsu tsu a ru mu ne shinbun shi ni ha tsu pi yō se ru ga sa ra ni 5th no ei ji shi niyoreba migi wa sudeni 2 hyaku mei o to tsu pa se ru mo ō naru to koro china sōryōzi wa meirei ni yo(ri) ru omomuki o motte migi nikan(s) su ru genmei o sake taru omomuki nari.

3 JULY 41.

Con't. It has been decided to confiscate 7 ships (total 8 ships). [no korizyū 1 seki no uti?] 3 vessels have been released under bond and 2 have already gone fishing.

# 1020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

This matter of seizing fishing vessels is of a difficult nature: it is fishing season (?) and as it has a large influence on local food supplies, the authorities concerned are observing it. (?) [Part not clear—seems to be something about outrage against Japanese.] There is a movement to buy the confiscated ships (by U. S. Gov't?) and to release them under bond. At the same time Delegate King is making endeavors and those in Washington should make representations.

3 JULY 41

#159-LA

From: Kita

Gaimudaijin—Tokyo #114

Koshi—Washington #931

114 (1) 3rd Re My May 084 [Regn Mog (?) 529 (5)]

Sono go sara ni 7 seki ni taishi botusyu no hanketu ari (kel 8 seki) no korizyu ? 1 seki no uti 3 seki wa RI [Bondo] syakuhō RI o yuru sareuti 2 seki wa sude ni syutu gyo seri.

Nao Honken RI Gyosen R2 yoku ryū wa yō ya ku sei gyo kini iri no ku ka mondai ni serare oru tōti syoku ryō mondai ni zyū dai elkyō ari to site kankel tō kyo ku no tyū mo ku su ru tokoro to nari honpōzin kankel sya ga wa kyō bō tō ō den. . . . No botu syū han ketu aritaru R2 Gyosen no harai sage oyobi yoku ryū R2 Gyosen no RI [Bondo] skahuhō kata undō tyū naru to tomo ni [kingu] daigisi ni oi y (te) honken do ryoka tyū naru hoka tōkentizimoti kaku Washington ni oi (te) toku ni setu syō no hazu nari.

28 JUNE 41

# 152-LA

From: kita

To: Ryoji Hongkong # (?)

Gaimudaijin—Tokyo # 110

110 (1) 8th Re. yr. msg 459 (Zyōkō)

United States tō bu ni oite yūryoku naru [toratuku] kōtūzigyō o kelei saru, yosi naru Daniel—Arnstein, Harold—Davis, Marco—Hellman no, 3 me i wa 28th [kuritupa—] nite Hongkong ni mukai taru ga dō nin ra wa mazu konmei ni itaritaisi enzyo butu si yu sō so ku sin no kentī yori [biruma ⊙ ro—do] kōtū zyō tai tyō sano hazu naru omomuki nari—

Daniel Arnstein, Harold Davis & Maco Hellman, transportation managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via clipper for Honkong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China)

#114-LA

17 JUNE 41

From: Kita

To: action Min. Wash. D. C. #925

Info: Foreign Min. Tokio #103

Mei dai ya kyū bu 1 kō 2 jū mei wa Hawaii ya kyū reu mei | no shō hei ni ō ji ya kyū si ai no ta me 21st Yokohama ha tsu | ya wa ta ma ru ni te | tō chi rai kō no yo tei na ri shi to ko ro United States ga wa wa 1 kō no sa shō o kyo ze tsa shi ta ru omomuki ni te | tū chi shō shu sha ga wa yori how kew wa hotondo ma i new honpō oyobi Hawaii sō go ni o ko na wa re o ri sudeul jer n. bi o to to no e o ru shi dai ni te mo a ki ka tsu kai neu July kei ō ya kyū bu rai kō no sai mo sa shū 1 ō kyo ze tsu serareta ru nital (shi) tō gi shō hei sha to ri shi hi pu ji ji yori cho ku se tsu zen taishi no a tsu sew o i rai shi sa shō o to ri tsu ke e ta ru zew rei a ri kow kai mo dō go a tsu sew o e ta ki mu ne ne gai i de arita . . . nitsuki migi sa shō ka ta nikaw (shi) koku mu shō ni mōsu i re ka ta shikaru be ku go ha i ryo aritashi (i rai hō)

Group is Visas were refused for a Me— U. baseball team. Kita is requesting that Jap. Ambassador use his influence to get the visas authorized.

16 JUNE 41.

#143-LA

From: Kita

To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio #102

Info: Minister—Wash. D. C. #024

Zai dai Germany ryoji Dairikan sei sa mikan (shi) (para) 16th tō chi Germany mei yo ryōzi [ran gei] (Germany kel United States shi min nishite bo e ki shō) ni tashikame tā ru to ko ro hon ken wa Washington German taishikan yori tsū chi ni se tsu shi ta ru to ko kon go no sō chi nikan (shi) te wa 1 ni dō taishikan no shi ji ni ma tsu omomuki na ri

Because of return of honorary German consul have been requested by German Embassy in Washington to handle German affairs here.

#140—"LA"

13 JUNE 41

From: Kita

To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio #49

(Have forwarded by mail to San Francisco & Manila.)

San Francisco ha tsu ki daizlu a te denpō dai 92 gō ohū dan nikan (shi) (Para)  
[Pu re shi den to pun pi a su] gō wa hi tō mu ke ri ku hei yaku 9 hyaku mei  
(kō ku ← in oyobi shu hyū shi kan sa ← hyaku mei o fukumi mu) o tō sai shi  
11th tō chi chaku 12th hi chi mu ke shu tsu pan se ri—

Ref. San Francisco msg #92.

S S Pres. Pierce with about 900 army men embarked (including some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

7 JUNE 41

#134—"LA"

From: Kita

To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio. #074

Info: Ambassador Wash. D. C. # 201

(Have forwarded by mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle).

1. 4th Washington ha tsu tsū shu wa [Rpt End] Kimmel [klu me ru] tai shō  
Kimmel wa dō hi Washington niol (te) Kaigun chō kaw to no kai daw o kai shi shi  
ta ru mu ne oyoai dō tai shō no Washington hū mow wa tel rei te ki no mo no na  
ru mu ne hō dō se ri (Para.)

2. 6th tō chi Kaigun tō kyo ku ha tsu pi yō niyoroba Kimmel no kei kaku nimo  
tozu (ki) to chi hō meu ni a ru kaw tai wa ko re o su—ku mi ni wa ka chi ko ri ku  
mi in kyū yō no ta me chi ku ji tai ri ku mi 1 ji kai kō seshimu ru ko to to na ri ta  
ru to ko ro sono shū tsu pa tsu ki oyobi kaw mei wa ha tsu pi yō shi e za ru  
omomuki na ri

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Dept. officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units of the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

#133 "LA"

6 JUNE 41.

From: Kita

To: Foreign Min. Tokio #003

10th tō chi ha tsu ta tsu ta ma ru mi te nai sen jin. kei 8 mei (mi tsu kō  
sha 2 mei. ho go sō kau sha 6 mei) tō chi i min kyo ku no te niyo (ri) Yokohama  
oyohi Kobe mu ke (Yokohama nai chi jin 3 mei. Kobe jū che jin 3 mei chō sen  
jin 2 mei) sō kan seraru ru ha ju na ri (spectable) *wei hai wei*

8. Jap nationals sailed the 10th on the Tatsuta (2 stowaways and 6 deportees) having been deported by the immigration authorities bound for Kobe and Yokohama.

Yokohama, 3 Japs.

Kobe, 3 Japs; 2 Koreans.

# 129 "LA"

8 JUNE 41.

From: Kita

To: Foreign Min. Tokio—#009

Punahou school

Tō chi [ pu na ho . su ku — ru] yori tai wa n sei tō kaisha jū yaku to ke chi ta  
da mi chi nital (shi) 22nd yori kyo kō seraru ru dō kō hyaku new sai ni shu tsu se  
ki ka ta shō tai jō o ha tsu shi ta ru omomuki na ru to ko ro dō nin no shu tsu se ki  
ni wa tō kan toshite wa nan ra i zon na ki nitsu ki ryo ken ha tsu kyū ne gai i de  
ta ru sai war shikaru be ku aritashi—

100th celebration of anniversary of Punahou

The Punahou School is extending an invitation to Mr. Tadamichi Taketi, director of the Taiwan Pottery Co. to attend the 100 year birthday celebration. I have no objection to his attending and request you issue necessary passport.

# 1022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

#126 "LA"

29 MAY 41.

From: Kita —

To: Foreign Min. Tokio—#089.

Info: Hongkong—#001.

[ku re fu en su] gai shō no 1 kō wa ran in gō shū oyobi (spec. table) New Zealand [QU] hō mon o o e Washington yu ki no to 26th [ku ri tsu pa ←] ni te tō Chi ni ki kō se ri—

Cravens of the Foreign Office after visiting N. E. I., Australia, and New Zealand put in here on the clipper en route to Washington, D. O.

#123 "LA"

27 MAY 1941.

From: Kita (#087) 7th

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

(Regarding your msg. to Wash. D. C. #186 of 8th).

(Have forwarded by mail in code to Wash., D. C.).

Reg. Eng. Sp. T RA DE — WI N D [QU] 26th shu tsu kō se ri June ma tsu Yokohama chaku no yo tel—

The Trade Wind left port on the 26th and should arrive Yokohama the end of June.

#121-LA

24 MAY 1941.

From: Kita (#014)

To: Min. San Francisco.

ta ki (ka ju o) den sho sbi ta tsu ta ma ru ni te kichi ni mu ka e ri en sho shi toshite no kaw i tsū kaw ka ta go ha i i o ki kō—

Code clerk TAKI is heading for your office via the TATWTA MARU. Your good offices are requested in helping him through customs.

#120 "LA"

23 MAY 1941.

From: Kita (#085) 3rd

To: Foreign Min. Tokio (Re. your msg. #281)

Info: Wash., D. C.

(Spec. table) New Zealand End. sp. table Sp. Eng. mi ni ster—of—la nd a, f ra n k—la n g stone End Eng oyohi zen shu shō Sp. Eng. J. go r do n—coat es End Eng tō 8 mei wa 21st Washington yu ni no to ji [ku ri tsu pa ←] ni te tō chl ni ki kō se ru to ko ro 1 kō wa Washington niol (te) England kai gai ryō do oyobi United States kaku dai hyō to kai gō. bu ki tai yo hō nimotozu (ki) ku kai gai ryō do en jo mondal kyō gi no ha zu na ru omonuki na ri—

The New Zealand Minister of Lands Frank Langstone, former premier G. Gordon Coates and party of 8 put in here on the 21st by clipper enroute to Washington. They plan to discuss problems concerning the protection of British and U. S. territory.

# 115-LA

14 MAY 41.

January 8th Futū 19 Ōshin Nikanshi

Tō ti ku gun zō kyō no tame B17 gata bakugeki ki 2 zyū 1 dai wa [e mon su] tyū zyō si ki no moto ni 13th go go 3 zi 5 zyū 9 fun San Francisco hatu hentai hi kō o motte 14th gozen 5 zi zyū 8 fun tō ti [hitu kamu] hikō zyō nitōtyaku seri sei migi— si

From: kita

To: Gaimudaijin—Tokyo

With respect to message #19 of January 8th. For the purpose of reenforcing of the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. General (Emonsu)

Emmonds, departed San Francisco at 1559 the thirteenth flying in formation and arrived Hickham field at 0558 the 14th.

#114-A

14 MAY 41.

079 (1) 0400

From: kita

To: Gaimudaijin—Tokio

When there is a request for a passport to Hawaii from Kusuda Kakushin missionary bishop (?) of the *Hikashsi Honganji* (a temple) (home address: Niigata, go?

Nishibori Dōri 7 Banti, 7 Banko), if there is no objection from the investigation of his record, please forward passport at once. He has applied (Tofu Suru?) as a successor to Okiji (奥江) who returned home every November. (Request message)

14 MAY 41.

979(1) ~~9499~~

From: Kita

To: Gaimudaijin Tokyo—

Higa si hon gan zi ha kan to ku *fu kyō si ku su da kaku sin* (hon se ki ni—ga ta si ni si bo ri dō ri 2 ban ti 7 ban ko) yori Hawaii kuki ryo ken ka fu ka ta ne gai ide aritaru baai hon nin no mimoto otorishirabe no ue sasitukai naki ni olte wa dō ryo ken hatu kyū ka ta sikyū Tonhakanal ainamtashi—(ex'xaby'qu) dō nin wa kaku nen November kikoku se ru oki zi (fu ku kō no kō ☉ toti noti) fukyō so no *ketu in hozyū* to site to *fu su ru mo no na ri* (i rai hō).

974 (1) ~~9199~~

1 MAY 1941.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo #074.

(ga u su) shin niu beikoku Chū shi taishi wa fu nin no to 30th (pu re shi den to ga—fu i—ru do) gō ni te. dō chi ni ki kō se ru ga dō taishi wa cho ku se tsu Chungking ni O mo mu ku yo kei na ru omomuki na ri.

Gauss, the newly appointed American Ambassador to China, en route to his new duty put in here on the 30th on the President Garfield. He plans going direct to Chungking.

9721 ~~9999~~

From: Kita

30 APRIL 41.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo #072

Infor: Manila #004

Za tsu shi (tai mu) (rai fu) (fu ō chū n) shu hi tsu narabini ha tsu kō nin (hen ri — . ru — su) wa dō nin tsu ma (ku re a . bu — su) [(pen . ne — mu)] dō han 30th (ku ri tsu pa —) ni te Manila ni mu kai ta ru ga dō nin tō wa Hongkong kei yu Chungking ni itari — Yaku 2 ka getsu kan tō yō ryo kō no we ki bei kaku chi kō en ryo kō O O ko nō ha zu na ru omomuki Shinbun ni hō ze ra ru

Mr. Henry Buse (Luce) Managing editor and publisher of Time, Fortune and Life and Claire Booth (pen name) took the Clipper for Manila on the 30th. They plan to go to Chungking by way of Hongkong. After a trip of about two months they plan, upon returning to the states, to conduct a series of lectures at various places. This information from the news papers.

#104-LH

29 APRIL 41.

071(1)2100

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaijin—Tokyo.

The American Army Transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 28th via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th—

It is believed that this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

#071

29 APRIL 41.

From: kita.

To: Gai—

Bei rikugun yūsōsen [Washington] gō wa riku hei z ☉ 500 gunyō kamotu 24, 300 ton otōsai 11th New York Hatu Panama San Francisco kei yu 26th sōtō tōti tyaku rikubei 2,000 kōkū gaku sei 12 mei oyori gunyō kamotu oriku age sita runoti no korino hi tōyu kiriku hei 500 o no se 27th syutu patu seri.

Nao dōsen wa kowro taiseliyō hōmen ni syū kō siguntai narabini zaitō yōhikiage beizin noyu sō ni zyū fi su ru omomuki nami (kyū).

28 APRIL 41.

## 1024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

#101-LA

From: Kita.

To: #011 Consul General, San Francisco.

#004 Infor. Consul, Los Angeles.

Shi mi zu narahini ya ma ji ryō tai gi shi 25th (ra — rin) gō ni ti Los Angeles mu ki shu tsu pa tsu se ri Los Angeles yori ki chi ni o mo nui ku ha zu go san kō ma di

For your information Shimiju and Yarnaji, members of the diet, departed here the 25th on the Lurline for Los Angeles. From Los Angeles they plan to proceed to your city.

#98-6A

087(1)0100

21 APRIL 41.

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaisin—Tokyo.

President Roosevelt's eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt, together with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed for Manila on the 21st. The local newspapers said that both men said that any statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington. Perhaps it is Chungking—

21 APRIL 41.

[Ro Daitōyō tyōnan [marin] tali [zieimusu rōzuberuto] wa [tōmasu[ syō syo totomoni 20th [kuritupa—] nite tōti tyaku 21st Manila muke syutupatu sitaruga tōti sinbun wa sono yuki saki simel nitsuki ryōnin tomo genmei o sake o riotu te Washington yori hatu piyō aru hazu naru motabun Chungking Naru mune hōzi o re ri sei migi de si]

#94-LA

19 APRIL 41.

019

From: Kita.

To: Consul, San Francisco.

fu kn da deu sho shi, 18th tō chi ha tsu ya wa ta ma ru ni te ki chi ni mu ka e ri deu sho shi, toshite no kau i tsū kau ka ta go ha i ryo kō

Radio *Industry employee* (?) Fukuda departed here the 18th for your city. Because of his position please use your influence in getting him through Customs.

From: Kita #84.

To: Foreign Minister.

Later seizure proceeding have been instituted against the other 18 of the 19 ships mentioned in my previous dispatch. After considerable deliberation a court judgment was obtained under which the 1st of the ships was confiscated by the U. S. Government. Even tho it was to be put up at auction, judging from examples on the mainland, by the time the price is so reduced by sale at auction the owner gets nothing.

Furthermore the parties concerned get quite a blow from the customs as a result of this seizure. Already steps are being take to claim loss of a standpoint of damage to the boats, and in one case authoritz has been gained for a release from bond. Later on such steps will be taken in all cases.

0841 (1400) Re My MSG 062X

From: Kita #84.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Sono go jū 9 se ki chū no jū 8 se ki nitaishi te mo bō tō ōden dō yō no bo tsu shū (so) shō tel ki sa re ta ru to ko ro tashi ta no kō ran nioite sai sho no 1 se ki nitaishi dō sen wo ga tsu shū koku seifu ni bo tsu shū no me ne han ke tsu arita ri

ha  
dō sen wa tsu i de kyō ha i ni fu seraru be ki wa zu na ru mo dai tai tai ri ku nioite ke ru sen rei dō ri kau kei sha no shin sei niyori sono tsū sen ka ga ku kei gen noue sho yū sha ni wa rai sa ge ra ru ru ko to to na ru mi ko mi na ri.

No o ze i kau no gyo sen yo ku ryū niyori kau kei sha wa ei gyō jō ta tai no da ge ki o u ke gyo seu ni mo son shō o shō zu ru to ko ro yori kanete shin sei chū no to ko ro sono u chi 1 se ki nitaishi (bond do) sha ku hō kyo ka sa re ta ru ga o tsu te ta sen mo dō yō kyo ka sa ru ru mi ko mi

[Have forwarded by mail by code to: Ambass. in U. S.; S. F.; L. A.; Seattle;]

#82—"LA"

From: Kita (re yr 919).

To: Foreign Minister—Tokio.

5 APRIL 41.

Sono go hi Kuku tyū 2 zyū 6 mei wa repeat indicator kyō Cō zai tosite no koku ha tu 1st repeater nital (si) yū zai o syō fu ku si . ta wa kō ben mosikuwa mu zai o mōsu ta te ta ru to ko ro ga tu syū koku hō tel ken zi wa kō sya nital (si) sa ki no Kyō Cō zai tosite no koku ha tu tu o korike (si) (rpt ind koku ha tu 2nd rpt ri yu ni fu bi no ten a ri si ta me) a ra ta me te gi syō zai oyobi kyō Cō zai tosite koku ha tu i zu re mo mo tu ka sin ri tyū na ri hon ken sai ban no ke tu ka wa ma tu ta ku yo sō o yu ru sa za ru mo (koto ni ba i sin in no dai ta su ← wa bei zin ni te sō tō fu ri o ma nu ka re zu) koku, ha tu sono mo no wa ko re ma de no kei ka ni tyō si kanarazu si mo honpō zin gyo gyō o ku ti ku sen to su ru sei zi te ki ha i kei nimo tozu (ki) ku mo no to wa mto (me) ra re zu

Na o i sai wa March 4th zu ke futū (#-----) kō 68. dō hi zu ke Kimitu (#-----) kō 75 oyobi April 2nd zu ke futu (#-----) kō 193 nituki go syō to ai na ri ta ku kon go no sin ten bu ri zu i zi denpo su.

Re charges against the owners of the confiscated fishing boats.

#81—"LA"

059 (1) 1500

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

Consulate—Manila.

3 APRIL 41.

Holand's Foreign Minister, his wife, and the Colonial Minister (Tokumu Gaimuken daijin) arrived here from San Francisco on the 2nd via clipper and departed for Batavia via Manila on the 3rd. Local newspapers stated that this inspection of the Netherlands Indies at this time is noteworthy.

#959.

3 APRIL 41.

Holland foreign minister [fu on. Kure fuensu] wa fuzin oyobi takumu Gaimuken *ex puewou* [Tya-rusu. Ueruta—] dō han 2nd.

San Francisco yori raityaku 3rd [Kuritupa—] nite Manila kelyu Batavia ni mukai taru ga tōti sinbun wa sono ranin sisatu wa zisetu ga ratyū moku o yō su ru mune hōdō sloreri migi desu.

#78—"LA"

1 APRIL 41.

March 7th Zuke bei 1 Futū 29 kisin nikansi.

Irainin yori ne gai ide aritaru nituki *ki sōri no ki gō* wa go murito wa zon zu ru mo April 10th Yokohama Syutupan Yawata Maru bin nite gosō fual nari uru yō kaku betu no go hairyoaigōgitsai (Iraihō).

#78

058 (1) 1st.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Ref: #29 of March 7.

With respect to the request of the client (Irainin) although I realize that is unreasonable, please forward by mail on the ya Wata Maru which departs from Yokohama on the 10th of April. I appreciate your special efforts.

#77—"LA".

29 MARCH 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

Tō ti ki kō no honpo sen no ri ku mi in tyū kaku Nen October 26th zu ke tū 2 futū (# . . . ) 144 ki sin go tū da tu niyo (ri) ru si mon syō mei o honpo syū | tu pa tu kō niol (te) u ke zu si te rai kō migi syō mei ka ta ne gai i zu ru mo no a ri migi nital (si) (tō kan niol (te) wa kaku nen ki daizin ha tu San Francisco a te denpo dai 99 gō go kun da tu niyo (ri) syō mei ryō tosite bei ka kin 1 \$ o tyō syū si ki ta ri ta ru to ko ro fu ne ga wa no se tu mei niyoreba honpo kan kai kan tyō niol (te) wa hon ken syō mei o mu ryō ni te a tu kai o ru omomuki na ru ga | dō syō mei ryō wa bō tō ki sin no syu si ni mi ru mo kan kai kan tyō zi mu tosite ō toriatukan u be ki mo no na ru ya ni kai serare katagata zen ki 1 \$ no syō mei ryō wa hon ken toriatukau bu ri kaku tel zen no go ke tu tel na ru ten ni mo ka e ri mi hon syō mei ryō wa honpo dō yō mu ryō to su ru ko to da tō na ru ya ni si ryō seraru ru nituki te wa hon ken i ma 1 ō go sen gi none migi ni toriatukau sikaru . . . be ki ya.



# 1026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Answer requested by the return despatch.  
re passports for sailors on Japanese ships calling at the Port of Honolulu and other U. S. Ports.

#72—"LA"

27 MARCH 41.

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

mo ri mu ra siyokika—sei 27th tyaku nin se ri  
Moumura reported for duty on the 27th.

#66—LA

21 MARCH 41.

From: Kita (forwarded by mailing code to Washington).

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

According to dispatches from Auckland and Sydney. The light cruisers *Brooklyn* and *Savannah*, the destroyers *Case*, *Shaw*, *Cummings*, *Tucker* arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers *Chicago* and *Portland*, the destroyers *Clark*, *Cassin*, *Cunningham*, *Downs*, *Reid* arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed from there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" (gaibu) until they arrived. The maintainance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was reported.

#66—"LA"

21 MARCH 41.

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

(have forwarded by mail in code to Washington)

[ō ku ran do] oyobi Sydney ha tu tū sin niyoreba kei zyu n [bu ru tsu ku rin] oyobi [sa ba na] ku ti ku kan [kei su] [syō] [ka min gu su] [ta tsu Ka←] wa 17th [ō ku ran do] ni. Ma ta zyū kyu n Chicago oyobi Portland ku to ku kan [ku ra←ku] [ka sin] [ka ni gu ha mu] [da un zu] [rei do] wa 20th Sydney ni i zu re mo sin zen hō mon no ta me nyū kō. Zen sya wa 20th [ō ku ran do] ha to ta bun sin zyn wa n mu ke' ki kan no to ni tu ki kō sya wa sa ra ni [bu ri su ben] ni mu kō be ki mu ne hō zi o ru to ko ro tō ti sinbun wa migi kan tai wa syū tu kō no sai fu←syō i ri no mei rei o a ta e ra re ta ru ga to hyū March 9th [pa go—pa go] tyaku 11th yo ru syu tu kō se ru mo mo ku te ki' ti tō tyaku ma de zen zen gai bu ni si ra re zu yo ku sono kō dō no hi mi tu o ho go si e ta ru wa dai sei kō na ri to hō zi o re ri

#64—LA

18 MAR. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

When the two Honganji missionaries: *Azakawato Mitanijin* (?) home address: Shlmane kin, jti gun, kamata muna and okamoto taiyū, home address: Tokyo, Suginami ku, kamlogi ku bo (?) #730 request passports from there to Hawaii (from Washington (?)), if there is no objection after an examination of their records, please expedite the forwarding of the passports. Both men are coming to fill vacancies.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Hon gan zi ha fu kyō si gen se ki shlmane ken ō ti gun ka wa to mu ra a za ka wa to. mi ta ni gi in oyolei gen se ki Tokyo si su gi na mi ku ka mi o gi ku bo 730 o ka mo to tai yū no ryō migi yori Hawaii yu ki ryo ken ka fu ne gai i de arita . . . ru baai so re zo re mi mo to o torisirabi none sasi tukae na ki niol (te) wa dō ryo ken ha tu kyū ka ta ontorihakarai aritashi migi ryō mei to mo ke tu in ho zyū no ta me to rai su ru mo no na ri (i rai hō).

15 MAR. 41.

Tomii taisai yori sono tōri.

Honsi oyobi Ikegawa Siyokika. Sei December Tatu ta Maru nite ki to tō tyaku no hazu. Dōhi gogo 11 ji kiti hatu [san taufue←] sen [nanba←] 24

oyobi [spell eng.] chief ni Chicago made [konda—to mento] mata wa [Daburu. Betudo. Ru←mu] 1 oyobi [Rōwa←Ba←su] 1 ryū ho aritashi.

Nao 23rd (hiyō) Chicago hatu liberty kankaku ltd ni Washington made dōyō no [atukomode←syon] go ryū ho kōse |

The following from Ambassador Tomii:

I and Ikegawa, 1st secretary to embassy, expect to arrive your place (San Francisco) on the December Tatura Maru. Will depart [San Francisco] the same day at 2300—by Santa Fe Chief #24 request that you reserve 1 double bed room compartment and 1 lower berth.

Also please reserve same accommodations on the Liberty Limited departing Chicago on the 23rd for Washington.

From: Kita #062.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Ga tsu shū koku hō rai ken ji wa 4th ze i kan no kan ri ni u tsu sa re a ru kan kei gyo sen jū 9 se ki chū no 1 si ki nitaishi 1 sei to 2 sei to ji sha kan ni o ko na wa re ta ru u ri ra ta shi wa dō sen nitaishi su ru kau sa tsu o shu to ku sen ga tame fu sei shu dan o motte ra o ko na. Wa re ta ri to no ri jū so shō o rai ki se ri. O tsu te ta no jū 8 se ki mo dō yō tetsuzuki to ra ru ru mo no to su i so ku sa ru.

Suit has been instituted to confiscate. One of the 19 fishing boats taken into custody. Other suits in the 18 other boats will probably follow.

Gaimudaijin Tokyo.

Koshi Washington 90072.

Riyoji San Francisco 60072.

Daiate #58—"LA".

Kiden (dal . . . . goo) 124 nikansi paragraph. Ryo hi tyuu fu na tin wa too ti ni te si ha rai no baai wa too kan ta tu ta ma ru tai yoo ma ru tokubetu kan zyoō ni ku ri i re kekkyoku wa too ke tu seraru (ru) koto to a i na ru nitul (tewa) Migl ryo hi mi soo fu na ra ba kiden (dal . . . . go) goo dai 2437 goo matudan no syu si ni zyūn zi fu na tin wo nai ti ba rai to si migl wo koo zyo se ru gai san gaku no mi go soo kin arita (si) paragraph. Zai . . . . taisi bei San Francisco ni ten den se ri. (Wo wo)

Steamer Pares eyedred.

6 DEC. 41.

From: Shokun.

In the Takakuwa case it seems difficult to force payment of the fee, the business being conducted with American capital. The American Trust is secretly conducting an investigation. It appears that the same person through a partner paid several thousand dollars addressed to Oimatsu, drawing on an "at sight bill." Is there no evidence of misappropriation of the funds held at that (your?) bank?

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Ambassador Kurusu delayed two days by clipper engine trouble left Midway and arrived here safety 1700/12.

KITA.

#320

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 57B

MESSAGES ENCODED AND RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEC. 1941

"PA"

27 JAN. 42

From: Chetgoai Thia #010

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

OB

Ho ku hei kohu kyō [ WH an fu an ] hon shun no tai gun wa ka shu hei ka wo tokoro Nishite

tai kelsateu tai zoo a in se ya ku 1 man sū FIUM 1 bu wa 21st St [ pi ru ma ] ga wa e shiu shi tsu se ru ga te pan no han ge ki VV a hi koku kyō sen ni hi ki ka he

# 1028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

shi tai ji tsū. Ma ta sei bu koku kyō [ mei sa ta ya ] do i pi 8 wa 22nd te ki no  
IK AU MI JE NI YO RJ.  
kū ba ku wo u ke shoku on zei kun 1 i kel gi.

HARADA

(in bad shape)

KIERU

The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 100. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to PIRUMA. --- At ME - SATAYA they were bombed by the enemy.

"LA"

15 JAN 1942

From: Foreign Minister #001

To: Ryōji Hanol

Kaku new ki shi shu 1475 nikan (shi) (new Para) Kin 8 sen 3 hyaku jū en / na ri / kan pi / wa ta shi / ki ri / hi / yori zō ga ku den sō su---

Togo.

Note

(No copy of coded msg. on hand—obtained from Army).

?

Re your (claim) of last year 1475

I am telegraphing increased amt of 3310 yen gov't expenses from private fund.

Togo

"PA" (Army) #012

From: Harada

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Thailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Thailanders who have become Japanese, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

28 JAN. 1942

"PA" (Army)

From: Harada # 012 (Re your Msg. # 431).

To: Foreign Minister—Tokio—

1. kon kai | ken kyo | no | ka kyū | wa | en shō | ha | no | kyo tō | ni | shite | sa  
ku | kow | shikirini | ryū gen hi go | wo | ru fu | shi | su pa i | kō i | no |  
kō | na ru | kakawara (zu) | tai ga wa wa | hō nin | shi zen | ta ru | mono | na  
ri | (new para)

2. fu ryō | ka kyō | no ni jū | koku se ki | na | mon dai | to ni | ta ra zu |  
ni  
nyō | te ki | kō i sha | wa | na pi to ta ri to mo gen zen | torishima (ri) | wo |

tsu  
yō su | i wan ya | kō nich ka ni mī VT koku | se ru tai jin (zen chi en ma i shi

ho wo  
FULW | (mī tsu pi shi) shutsu | chō in | son po n | No | goto (ki) | wo | ko ma ma  
ni-suru wa | a ku | rei | wo | no ko su | mono | ma ru | mī yori shu kai | ei tai ko  
(sei ma i gyō mī A — | mī | tsu pi | shi | to to | tokoro | hi ki | a ri) no | rei | ba |

byo  
| ku | wo | ou tsu te | tsu i kyū | suru | yo tei | na ri | on riu pyo tei i —

HARADA

28 JAN. '42

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo #038 (Re yr msg. #061)

To: Minister Saigon

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including --- to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on 19 January I desire (these) details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal entry into Singapore (This day will be published by the information bureau)

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of the imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime ministers' broadcast #43) tell stories to the children.

(b) Have Shinto & Buddhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military music. (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades.

Togo

"LA" (Army)

28 JAN. 1942.

From: Foreign Minister Tokio. 038.0 (Re yr msg. 061) (Re My Circular 590 (f).

To: Koshi Saigon—

January 19th ji kan kai gi | ni te | Singapore | kan ra ku no sai | nioi (te) ke shu sen shō | gun ku ga | gyō | ji | ji tsu shi yō kō ke tsu tel se ru | to ko ro | sono SYD | I'B | UL gu no | tōri | ni | tsuki | | o | fukumi | o ki no | ne | hi tsu yō | ko sai wa shikaru be ku shi dō serarota shi (new para)

1. gyō ji no ji tsu shi | wa | Singapore nyū jō su ki Kōshi hi ni kagi (ri) (ki hi wa jō hō | kyo ku | yori ha tsu pi yō | su) hi bo tsu MA de ni shū ryo | seshimu ru ko to (new para)

2. kan ra ku | no | hi | yori | nuū | jō | shi ki tō hi MA de kaku ko ni koku ki | o | kei yō | su ru | ko to (new para)

Nyū jō | shi ki | tō hi wa (i) shō go o ki shi zen koku min wa zai sho nu te ei rei narabim | kō gun ko ta HE ki nen o | sa sa ge | sōri -- daijin | no kan | wa hō sō go no ban 43 shō ni shō wa shi (ro) jin ja ji in tō wo | kan ra ku | hō koku sai (ta te ma tsu ru . tsu ge ru) Ozobi sen su kan su i ki gan sai | o | o ko nai (ha) kan kō sho ga ku kō . sho dan tai tō | nioi (te) wa | shu ku ga | shi ki | o | o ko nō | ho ka kō gun i | ka zo ku no i mon. jin ja | san pa. bu dō i. | tai | i ku | tai kai . kō en kai . bu sō . on ga ku kō shin . cho chi ku sono ta koku sa ku kyō ryo ku | no ji tsu sen o te ki | gi | ji tsu shi | su ru ko to

Na o | shu ku ga gyō | ji | ji tsu | shi ni a ta ri | te wa zō sau o so gai shi . shi zai | o | ran pi | shi | bō kū ni kyo ge ke | o | shō seshimu ru ko to | o | sa ku ru | shu shi yori | nai chi | mi oi (te) wa | chō chin | gyō re tsu . ha ta | gyō re tsu | tō wa | o ko na wa a ru | ko to | to | na ru o ru | to ko ro | China | man shū | no oi (te) | wa | chi hō to ku shu | ji jō | ni ō ji | o | ma tsu ri | sa wa gi | ni | o chl i ra za ru gen do | nioi (te) | kan kei | ki kan | to | kyō gi | no | ne | te ki gi | so chl | serare | sashitsukae | na shi—

Togo.

000 26 JAN 42

Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

000—Jan 26, p. m. (Army) "Pa"  
Gaimudaljin Tokyo

Too ti ka kyoo no fu ryoo bun si so syuu kei hoo soo u ke u ri no a ----- si tu no de ma kiden (dal ---- goo) to ba si si min wo sa wa ga se wo ru tokoro zyuu rai too ha no ei. Bei zin kon ke tu ka zo ku wa tai zin tosite i zen zyuu ni ki kyo si wo nyoo. Na ka ni mo zen ki ka kyoo to renraku dan mo -- NT -- mono a ru mo yoo ni te poo tyoo syoo hakarigata (si) sa nitui (tewa) tai ga wa ni tyuu i si ke ri on zel syu tel i kei gi pe?

HARADA  
Chlengoa!

# 1030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo  
To: Shaghal #710  
Net #1947

In relation to your despatch numbered 842 There is no objection to handling the Belgium Embassy's — despatch — in the same fashion as an enemy country's despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian intrests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve — of your secret message — there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.

In relation to

22 Dec. 1941.

"PA" (Army)  
From: Tokio.  
To: Shanghai 710  
Net 1947

842

kiden (dai-----gō) nikanshi (new Para)  
fu

Belguim tai shi ji gyō 940 tei deupō (da . . . . gō V A F A V G I N G O K wai ta ki koku ni taisung nichii to dō yō no tariatsuka(1) mo na shi G I J O (go) sashitsukae na shi Belgium jin oyoki Belgium ken e ki nitaishi te wa nai chi oite wa tokubetsu no so chi mo to ri mo ra za ru mo China gen chi mi oite kimtsu (dai . . . . go) ho ji ma ta wa ken e ki ho zon no ken chi yori tokuni nan ra ka no so chi wo to ru no ki tsu yō a ru baai ni oite wa to ki koku mi okom jun ji teriatsuka(1) wa re (go) sashitsuka(e) na shi.

(New para) Naw dai Shanghai zai ho toshite shi kō kan chō chō ka kō e ten den se ri ni tsui (tewa)

CKIOQ

method handling banking:  
gold silver deposits etc.

31 Dec. 1941.

"PA" (Army)  
From: Peiping  
To: (no heading #759

Kon a kai sen mi to mo nai China ni oite te ki koku gin kō. jū kei kei gin kō tō nitsui (tewo) sa shi wo sa e ta ru kin gin ozohi gin kō ken ho jo ka narabi (ni mi ha tsu kō ken wo {e} fuku (mi mu) wa kaku chi BYYM Tsinan) no to ku shu ji jō tsū mi miyori te sho bun suru koto na ku kon go ni okeru tei koku no zen pan te ki shi sa shuku to no kan ren ni oite sō gō te ki kewchi ni ta chi te kore wo ho ni ha i i ni mo to ni FIGL Manchukuo miyori sho nyō surn mono to su

(New para) ki (Para)

1. sa shi mo sa e a rn kin gin ozobi gin kō kew wa sashiatari gun no kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon go wa gin kō (shō kin wo you tei su) ni you nyō suru koto za

2. Migi 1. # no kin gin oyobi gin den ken wa gen so ku toshite you nyū sa ki gin kō wo shite wagahō ni yū ri mi un yō she shi mu ru mono to suru mo hitsuyō mi ō ji ki mo yo nyū wo mi kai ri toshite sa shi GC sa e gin hō mitaishi ka shi tsu ke wo na su koto ma ta wa kan ri wo kai jo suru ta me yo nyū no ha rai tō do shi doku jō su koto wo mito (me) su bu ru koto # (new para.)

ō ku ra shō wa yō su re ba yo nyū sa ki gin kō nitaishu ryū ga new sho (new) no ta me no nen kaku wo kō fu suru koto # (new para)

3. gun wa kyaku kan ri tō wo gen chi kō a in kikan no chō mi i nin surn koto # (new para)

Migi 1. mu nikanshi jū yō na ru mono wa chū ō no shi zu wo ma chi te kore rei wo ko no koto to shi nai yō sureba gen chi ni oite sho ri in kai wo so shi ki pan koto # (new para)

—H kō ho ku shi gen gin no sho ben nitsui {tewa} te wa hon ken to wa shutsu tsu ko RZ. so chi wo to ru oyohi wo mito (me) wo shite ru mono to su gyaku ka u BN AMRI

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one months wages, and future matters will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank.

"PA" (Army)

22 DEC. 1941.

From: Tokio

To: Net #1950

China ni okern te ki koku gai kō kan (ryōji kan wo (e) fuku (mi) mu | ) oyobi wagahō ni oite ei gyō nai shi shū shoku wo yu ru sa zu | sono shū nyū no mi chi w-o to ze tsu se shi me ta ka | te ki koku jin no sei ka tsu hi shi ben nikanshi te wa shu ju kan kei chō to kyō gi no kekka | izure baai niyori te wa Nihon seifu ni oite yo san wo kei jō suru yō a ru koto to narube (ka) ki mo sashiatari no sochi toshite wa betsuden (dai 2651go) ni yoru koto to se ru nitsui (tewa) migi niyori so chi serareta (shi) (para)

2. yo kin zen bu wo 1 ka tsu [ bu← hyō ] shi yo kin na ki shun MJ ni mo kore niyori shi ben shi ya ru an mo kō ryo shi ta ru ga wagahō ga shi yū zai san wo sho bun shi ta ru | ka ta chi | wa kore wo sa ku ru yō a pa wo motte te be koku jin kan ni nin i ni sō go fu jo se shi mu ru yō go shi doku arita (shi) # (new para)

3. Wagahō su sa shi wo sa e ra re ta ru te ki koku no jū kei kei gin kō no na ma gin oyobi gin kō ken tō wa sa QI ni kō a in YY se tsu lin kai no (go) kettai su kore wo gun kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon ga gin gin kō ni yo nyū suru koto to na ha wo ru tokoro mi ka e ri ka wo u ku be ki te ki san yo nyū gin kō na ki chi ni oite wa migi son zai suru kō kan to renraku noue sho LD serareta (shi) CURB go

Rest garbled—

RECEIVED FROM U. S. ARMY—HONO—SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEC. 1941 COPIES OF THEIR TRANSLATION

From: CHEFOO

To: TOKIO

Sano Tori.

(KYU BA) 10 ---- CHINA IO SE PERU O ---- GERMANY ITO SE ---- SE BELGIUM TO HAND. BELGIUM OHEHA BEGIN ENGLISH SPELL. S END ENGLISH O ---- EN ---- NI TONA. EGYPT KANKA HA ---- MAN SYU KOKU KAI NI. MAN SYU KOKU NA I. RO TYO KA ---- HA ENGLAND NI. FUTU KOKU ISEI. ---- ONAHE. CHINA KATOHA. ARGENTINA GORU UN (NYU ---- NEA) NI IHA. NE ---- NYU ---- KYO ---- 1 NIIHA 1 (NYU ZI ---- DO) NO 2 NI IHA. (NYU ZI RAN DO) NO 3 ---- I ---- (---- KA ---- GU A) I HENI. (RO SUTARI KAN) IHENI I (KO RON BIA) IHENI RE (HON DE YU RASU) KA SENA. URUGUAY NI IKA. NORWAY KANUGE RE NORWAY FU ZO KU KAN 1 HYO KANA RE. (ARA SUKA) KARU EN.

#663 A

JAN 19

From: Tokio

To: Shanghai

KIN HYAKU EN KIKAN ATE DENSO SU HARADA . . . SEI ESYU KO ARITASI

#634 A

JAN 19

From: Tokio

To: Shanghai

JANUARY 20th GEN ZAI NIOI (TE) KE RUKI KAN HO KAN NO DENSIN FUGO SYO WA ZYU 4 NEN YU GO DAI 5 GO KUN REI NIYO (RI) DENPO ARITASI PA

#635 A

1032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

JAN 21 1942

From: ?

To: Tokio

ENGLAND NINITO

KEI. NASEKA.

GERMANY NAOK NA HE.

BELGIUM ---- INI SO IHA. ROITO. OIHE MO ----.

NANAHANA ANA NARU ---- RO ---- K HESETO. POLAND KA ---- HA

GEN SEL. KAKA SEI SA ----. KA HENAS ---- RU ---- KUN KE

HE OHENA KORUKA.

///Ø

CHINA HERU. RU SENUN YU ---- HETO SEAKA TOKA

HOLLAND KANA OHE. ORU. IOSE.

TAI KOKU NAO.

CANADA ISE SEI ISE NI.

BAI SESEMI SENI ZI ---- S NIRUNI.

MEXICO RU.

PERU NANA ---- NARU HEO HEHE ARU I ---- KAONI IKA

BOLIVIA TONI.

EGYPT NISE

MAN SYU KOKU I O S INA.

SPECIAL CODE . . . . TIHA OK IOI

(NIKARA GA) IHAO ---- INOI

KOSUTA RIKA) IHA OA IOI

SPEC. CODE . . . -O (C SI ZIGO HYO KA. ZEN ---- YO ---- O)

(NYU 1 NE 4) I NA HE I IHE HA.

SPEC. CODE . . . . I NAHE KI HEHA PUN SPEC. CODE . . O TO

PARAGUY O TO

URUGUY I HENI MI HENA

PANAMA KATO ---- S KANA HA (TOKU SIN BAN GO ---- RON HASU

ZI (SON DAI 1 KA ---- NASA SU ---- HYO DAI 2 KA TO OK

KANAHANA)

DENMARK RU SE (SONO TAFU ZOKU ISI ---- 5 SATU)

NORWAY KAKA HANA ---- KA HA HE FU ZO KU KANZI HYO

KA HANA. KA HA HE.

(ARA SUKA) RUNI.

KASI ---- IKA. ORU. TOE. TONI.

HI ZOKU ---- NIKA. NINA

TUBAKI ---- HETO. HENA.

KA ---- DE ---- RO HETO. HE NA

YANA GI ---- HARU

Rest of msg lost due to station interference.

From: Kalgan

To: Tokio

1-20-42

CANADA KARU HE

(KYU BA) KARU HE

PERU ISEO

HOLLAND O O

ENGLAND REPEAT INDICATOR NIKI NA ANIKA HE LST

REPEATER

FRANCE KAKA HA

BELGIUM OHE IKO HENI

HUNGARY HATO

EGYPT HERU) ---- I IRU

TURKEY HA IHA UHA IO

CHINA KASEI

PORTUGAL KANASE

MAN SYU KOKU HEO

ARGENTINA NII

SIAM NINA  
 (KORON BIA) REPEAT INDICATOR INA NAKI NAHE 2ND REPEATER  
 (NIKA RAGA) 2ND REPEATER  
 (KOSU TARIKA) 2ND REPEATER  
 (NYU GI NEA 1ST REPEATER  
 NYU ZI ZE RAN DO) 1ST REPEATER  
 (HON ZYU RAsu) KASEHA  
 (ARA SUKA) KAKA SE (IZYO KOKU MEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU  
 KANAMO ZI)

#643

From: Chefoo  
 To: Tokyo

JAN 20.

As follows: (KYŪ BA) May mean emergency, -- emergency code? -- or may be the first in the list of names of countries appearing in this message.

The message is impossible to translate as it is. However, it should be taken in connection with # 647 A, which shows a similar list of names of countries with varying ~~w~~e letter groups after them. We may have here a new code in use, or possibly the suggestion of new code groups to be used for the countries in future -- the latter, however, seems pretty crude.

In connection with the former suggestion, should we not consider # 635 A, which seems to call for a new code to be put in use on January 20th, the date of this message?

RSS

# 663 A

From: Kalgan to Tokyo

JAN 20

(Kindly refer #635, #663, #674. Letter groups after names of countries seem to indicate that message is in connection with code.)

Groups in Parenthesis in this message are as follows:

Line 2. Cuba

Last line. Colombia

Second page:

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

New Guinea

New Zealand

Honduras

Alaska KAKASE (In the above, that which follows names of countries are all in Kana)

1/23/42

#643 A

FUNADA

Canada—KARN HE

Cuba—KARN HE

Peru—ISEO

Holland—OO

England—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

France—KAKA HA

Belgium—OHE IKO HENI

Hungary—HATO

Egypt—I IRU

Turkey—HA IHA UHA IO

China—KASEI

Portugal—KANASE

Manchukuo—SYU KOKJ HEO

Argentina—NII

Siam—NINA

Columbia—INA NAKI NAHE

Nicaragua—INA NAKI NAHE

Costa Rica—INA NAKI NAHE

New Guinea—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

New Zealand—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

Honduras—KASEHA

Alaska—KAKA SE (IZYŌ KOKN MEINO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO ZI)



# 1034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 9

From Peiping #227 to Tokyo (Urgent)

Your wire No. 160 says, "Official Yoshihara of Kalgan has been ordered as from the 6th to take a post at DAIYA. Please have him leave immediately". Is this not a mistake? Please investigate and reply immediately.

1254 A

MARCH 9

From Tokyo (Urgent) #174 to Peiping

With regard to our wire #718 of last year.

1. Regarding the elevation of the status of Settlements, those who have MOSU SEI KOSHI (Note: Might not SEI, which follows MOSU in other parts of this message also, be something else, such as IDE or SUSUMI? The only translation which would fit the context in any way would be "Voice" so that MOSU SEI KOSHI would be "sent in their voice" i. e., "reported") are as follows. If the arrangements of all the offices are completed, we expect to put the establishment (of elevation of status) into effect on the 1st of April. Although we have received reports direct from the chiefs of the branch offices of Paotao and KAISHUU, we should receive reports from KOOWA and JYONI, so please arrange to have these reports in first.

2. With regard to governmental orders; in the case of colonies only, it will be alright to put into effect the completion of organization, in line with previous experience, and after sufficient leadership.

3. With regard to the desires of making the Settlement Chief's position an honorary one, especially bear in mind the relationship with Article 69 of the Regulations of Establishment. SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. HOTEI (Settlement Chief System; however, honorary position).

2. KAISHUU (Council System) No report from JOSHUU Consul.

3. TAAKU (Council system) DENPOO Consul General has sent report. However, no report regarding governmental order.

4. TYOOTEN (Council system) Report received from Tsinan Consul General.

5. KOOWA (Settlement Chief System, Salaried) No report concerning governmental order.

6. Paotao (Settlement Chief System. However, honorary) No report from KOOWA Consul General, therefore, also no report x x x x regarding governmental order.

1255 A

funada

MARCH 9

From Peiping

#229 to Tokyo

Regarding your message #157.

Because of the phenomenal rise in price of building materials, an additional amount of approximately Yen 10,113.70 (for building materials) and Yen ----- 805.80; making a total appropriation\* of Yen 35,919.00 which will be necessary or else the work cannot be completed, we are informed by the workmen. This situation here makes the (increase) unavoidable. Wherefore, we request that the difference amounting to Yen 8,212.50 may be sent as a supplementary appropriation. In case this seems, upon consideration, difficult, we will have no recourse (here) but to reduce the amount (of the building) SPECIAL CODE.

#1260 A

\*There seems to be something lack, or in error, in the figures, as they do not work out properly. The message does, however, indicate something of the difficulties being encountered by the New Order in a rapidly rising cost price.

RSS

From Peiping #220 to Tokyo

Circ #170 to Nanking. Shanghai.

With regard to our wire Extra No. 56

The various offices concerned with the establishment of Settlements have carried out temporary enactment, and there being considerations to make in con-

MARCH 9

nection with this, it is desired that arrangements be made to MAI BIRO (?) the rules and regulations. Further the newly established Settlements are Paoting, Shanhaikwan, Tanshan, KOOWA, Paotao, Haichow, TYOTEN, Tangku, SINGOO, Chefoo and Kalfeng, totalling 11.

Further, the matters in the rules, which are short of those necessary towards putting the matter into effect, (which must be known with regard to putting the matter into effect) are 1. To put into effect on April First. 2. The book of names which is to be built up for the first (election) will be built up by the 15th of that month in accordance with the rules of February 1st, 1943. (In Article 83 of tax regulations: the first period levy, 6 months from the end of July, of the business tax; those having paid income taxes for this period will have votes by virtue of their having paid a business tax. Therefore, ----- elections are not to be held ----- will be alright. 3. In respect to the establishment of colonies, the directors of the colonies will be appointed by the consuls and their period of service will be until there is an election which will take place in accordance with regulations. The question of whether or not these three points are necessary is being considered.

(NOTE: It is believed that SHOWA ZYUU 8 NEN, 1943 in above message might be a mistake for some previous year)

1261 A

FUNADA

MARCH 10

From Peiping #183 to Tokyo  
Circ. #181 Tientsin

There being also a strong desire on the part of the military in this area, it has been decided that following the conference of the heads of legations and consulates (?), on the 18th. (only one day) at 9 a. m. a conference of consuls having charge of military affairs (Note: HEIJI which has been translated "military affairs" might also be translated "everyday affairs") will take place. Above for your information SPECIAL CODE. Further, Consuls, heads of branch offices and heads of dispatched offices (might be instead "Higher officials of consulates, branch offices and dispatched offices") will remain as they are. From . . . . . office (s) it will be alright to dispatch consul (s) or Vice Consul (s) so kindly include this SPECIAL CODE.

1262 A

MARCH 11

From Shanghai to Hankow  
Extra

----- there has been no order as yet and (we) do not know when the order will be issued. Details will be sent by mail.

1263 A

FUNADA

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent)

Circ. #455 to Tientsin. Taiyuan. Tatung. Hankow. Canton.

With regard to No. 1, our wire. A 3 GOKUHI (?)

Send in immediately SPECIAL CODE. Further, SPECIAL CODE.

1265 A

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent) #019 to Shanghai Minister

Re: my message No. 017

Temporary enactment documents from Hangchow and xxx KAKOO xxxx are at hand. However, no requests as to governmental orders have arrived.

1266 A

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent) #159 to Canton. Shanghai Minister

Re your wire No. 169.

Concerning the enforcement of the Settlement Chief System, this is approved as of March 10th. Further, by way of assurance it is advised that there is a need for revision of the details of regulations for the enforcement of governmental orders.

1267 A

FUNADA

1036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent) #032 to Peiping  
#183 to ?

Re; your wire No. 90

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect.)

1268 A

MARCH 11

From Tokyo to Peiping  
Extra

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.

Regarding your wire No. 175.  
From Yosano to Harada.

The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received \_\_\_\_\_ in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire to \_\_\_\_\_ as has been done thus far.

1269 A

FUNADA

MARCH 11

From Taiyuan *Urgent*  
#028 to Tokyo, Kalgan.  
Your Circular #612, Paragraph 9.

Hashimoto is at present caring for the writing (secretarial work?) at the Settlement School, and the telegraphic work alone, and in April the new organization of the colony, official business, and the putting into operation of the new tax for the colony, are all pressing duties \_\_\_\_\_. If (in addition) this man is expected to DAIKOO (teach for another; become a substitute teacher?), we expect that troubles not a few will arise concerning the completion of the official business. Further, this man's wife is at present pregnant and the doctor has forbidden travel before the end of May, which situation \_\_RU FUTU GAN this interpreter (Hashimoto) will complete business connected with the Colony (organization) by the end of May, and completing that stage will be sent on to his new post in Kalgan early in June \_\_\_\_\_ regarding which, after an examination of the situation, we ask that special consideration be given, and permission be given that the removal to his new post of this interpreter be postponed until the end of May

#1270 A

RSS

MARCH 12

*Urgent*

From: Tokyo  
To: Peiping Consul General  
Regarding your message #221 (1259 A)

1—The Department Orders at present in force base the power of control in the settlements under enforcement regulation paragraph 5 (Paragraph 19 of the Law regarding the Duties of a Consul, applicable to occasions when decisions shall be made by a special order). But this section does not apply to subordinate consular offices and sub-stations.

2—Having said which, however, in colonies under the authority of a subordinate consular office or sub-station, there arise not a few circumstances in which unreasonable situations \_\_\_\_\_ with regard to the resident head. In such situations there is no other way but to act in the name of the head (consul) of the main consulate; so after consultation with the head (or heads) of the department, we wish to send you a further message regarding the practical method of handling such situations.

#1274 A

MARCH 12

From: Peiping  
#028 to Nanking MINISTER,

Upon the visit of your excellency, the Ambassador, to this place, the total of all expenses paid out was Yen 24,898.67, and the sum received was YEN 15,000. The balance of Yen 9,898.67 has been advanced and paid by this office, for which we request reimbursement by wire. Further, the receipted bills will go forward to you by air.

#1275 A RSS

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo #191  
To: Peking.  
#021 to Shanghai Ambassador.

With regard to Settlement Chief, Settlement System, and the selection of people (officers?) of the settlement and their treatment (salary, housing, etc.), please bear in mind the following and instruct appropriately SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. The Settlement Chief system will be applicable only when an appropriate person is being obtained for the settlement. Therefore, the settlement chief will be thought of as a principle, and to hurry the selection of people for the settlement will be considered wrong.

2. The settlement chief, without regard for whether he is salaried or honorary, in connection with the business of the Settlement, (based on the ----- restrictions of Article 69) will take full responsibility with respect to the failure of business. Therefore, a spare time settlement chief is wrong.

3. With respect to the Chief of the Settlement and the other leaders, the character, the insight, etc., will be considered seriously before selection; the treatment (same as above) also, it is considered, should not be considered merely from the budget but should be arranged from considerations of the status, (rank) of the settlement (set by the government) and the candidate himself (it is understood of course that the amount of payment made must not be too much).

(Because of these considerations), the chief of the settlement, his assistants and directors and the treatment of these ----- should be, it is considered, arranged after your approval is given.

4. Further, with regard to Settlement Chiefs, their assistants, and directors, consideration is made of the future changes in personnel, and it is desired that arrangements be made in such a way that people will serve the settlements for long periods.

1276 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo  
#163 to Canton

Travel and other expenses to the amount of Yen 3,408.90 and being sent by wire to your excellency as agent.

*Items*

Travel expense for bring out the family of Consul Oozeki, Yen 171.50; Return expense to Japan of the family of Consul Kobayashi, Yen 145.30; Travel expense of Vice-Consul Uyeda to Nanking and Shanghai, Yen 1,051.00; Sato, going to his post, Yen 111.70; Expense of transferring Shiroto, Yen 167.00.

#1277 A

In the humble judgment of the translator, the balance of the message is not worth bothering about.

MARCH 12.

From: Peiping  
#002 Nanking Minister,  
Circ. #185 Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao.

Regarding your circular #020.

In our area we are continuing under the organization of the Women's Defense Association, and have not set up a New Women's Organization as yet. The

## 1038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SHUU (Masses, popular) Women's Defense Association is a specialty of the Army, which is directing it, and goes on the principle that the president (of the association) should be the leading woman of the region, (here) the wife of the head of the Settlement being the president, and the wife of the Consul advisor.

#1278 A RSS

From: Shanghai

MARCH 12.

# 498 cut in to Nanking, Peiping.

Following the recent sudden drop in emergency messages, the postal receipts from the sale of stamps etc., and from all other sources up to the 10th (having fallen) a plan to limit (expenditures?) in the interests of thrift (economy) has been announced and will be put into effect immediately. (This information is given out after a conference with the Chief of the TAI KOO Communications Department, who is in the city on a trip).

# 129779 A

From: Manchuli.

# 023 to TOKYO Hsingking.

Although we fully understand that the matter of the arrangement for a train on the Soviet side for Ambassador Satoo and his entourage, who is to arrive here on the 19th and that same day enter the Soviet, is in the hands of the Home Office, we would appreciate a wire about the matter merely that we may have the information, in this office.

# 1280 A

From: Tokyo

MARCH 12.

# 036 to Harbin

Although the matter raised in your ordinary wire of # 34 should be approved, should not the completion of the work be done according to the estimate for the building submitted last year? We desire to have the amount NOOJI (?) (definitely settled?)

# 1281 A RSS

From: Tokyo

MARCH 12.

# 053 to HANKOW

Regarding your message HI number 154 of February 17th., the announcement of the regulations regarding promotion (or, advance in salary) was completed in our Out-bound message # 18 of last December 31st.

# 1282 A

From: Tokyo -

MARCH 12.

# 182 to Hsingking Minister.

Regarding your message # 169.

As travel for Government Officials appointed abroad ----- FOREIGN ----- MO KU ----- Yen 8.200 special supplementation has been made, and will be sent in advance by wire. Kindly transfer Mutankiang's share (to that office).

# 1283 A RSS

MARCH 13

From: Tokyo

To: Hsingking Minister

Extra-numeral message.

To Communications Official Ogawa, from Nomura.

Replying to your extra-numeral message, both of the gentlemen are going along with the Ambassador on his journey, and are expected to start today, the 13th, in the evening. After they have started we will communicate with you again.

#1286 Q A

MARCH 13

From: Shanghai

To #065 To: Canton

To: Consul Kimura, in Hongkong, from Sone

With regard to your humble servant's message of the 10th. Ryuu Suu Ketsu (parenthesis is probably an explanation of how to write the name in Chinese characters) sends information that Ryuu Saku Min and others are to sail from

Hongkong on the ----- boat of the 15th. The Ryu family have again and again asked that you would take the trouble to arrange it so that they could travel along on the same boat, so if that is possible, I beg you to take the trouble to make the arrangements.

#1287 A RSS

MARCH 13

From: Nanking

#002 to Peiping.

Circ. #021 to Kalgan, Canton.

Regarding your Circ. #186 ( A)

At present they are engaged in urging the ----- organization of a real Women's Defense Association in Naichi (Japan proper), but here, in general (we are proceeding) under the direction of this Office, the Chief of the Department of Military Affairs, The Defense Command, the Chief of Staff, the Commandant of Guards of the Navy, and the Chief of the Military police being advisors. Matters having to do with defense, and related to military matters, are first taken up by our office, with the military department involved, and then we proceed to guide them; this is the plan under which we are working.

#1288 A

MARCH 8.

From: Tokyo

To: Hankow

We desire that you send a message to Daiya.

#1289 A RSS

MARCH 9.

From CANTON

To # 195 to Tokyo

Circ. # 069 to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai

Regarding my message # 182.

In view of the fact that the Army authorities here report having recently received from headquarters (Tokyo), we have been pressing the study of a definite plan for caring for enemy allens living, and causing them to do their cooking for themselves jointly, in order to reduce the cost of living, and we have been making preparations as far as was possible to carry this out in accordance with your message of December last, 4th and following columns (or lines), and especially in accordance with column (or, line) 1 and the upper (or, former) part of column 4 (or, line 4). However, the Army's proposition is something approximating internment, which we feel is unfortunate (literally, not interesting). In general, we have expressed our opinion that enemy aliens (with the exception of those subject to exchange) should be encouraged of their own accord to form groups, and thus to bring down the expense of living for each individual. This is sent to keep you informed.

# 1256 A

The above message seems to be connected with # 1214 A.

MARCH 10.

From: Nanking Minister

# 266 to TOKYO

Cir. # 146 to Hsingking, Canton, Hankow and 1 other.

Chungking Broadcast (8th).

1. The United States is dispatching a commission to New Delhi to offer encouragement in the matter of the protection of India and the construction of a route for transportation of supplies to China. This information comes from a source with direct contact with the White House.

2. The Chungking government has dispatched their ~~Ambassador~~ Minister to Turkey, Choo I Shun (instructions how to write in Chinese characters) to Iran to conclude a treaty of commerce, and also to arrange for the exchange of ministers.

## 1040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

3. According to a dispatch from Angora, the former United States Ambassador to Moscow, Steinhart, called upon the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 7th., and the call lasted for more than an hour; moreover, -----TAI MI, German Ambassador, is reported to be returning to his country for consultation with his government.

4. The Chiang Kaishek held a long conference with the British Ambassador on the 7th.

5. After the arrival of the visiting commission, Chiang Kaishek will organize through the Burmese Cultural Society for the observance of a Burma Day, on the 8th., when the British Ambassador, Go Tetsu Jō. (Wu Tieh-cheng), Ō Bun Kō (Weng Wen-hao), and TIN KA FU (Chen Kuo-fu), are to broadcast to the Burmese people.

# 1257 A RSS

MARCH 9.

From: Peiping Minister

# 037 to Tokyo

Peter Hansen, a citizen of Germany, resident here, (at present 62 years of age) in charge of the Yale students abroad of the Peking TOO-SOO FU KO DOO HEI 6 ZYUU GOO (believed to be the name of an institution, Possible, P(eking) his U(niversity) M(edical) C(ollege) "with an average of about sixty students ?) has expressed the request that we confer with the Home Office regarding and secure a visa that he may attending a meeting of the Yale Students Abroad, to be held in the building of the K. K. Laygold Company, Kyoobashi Ku, Tokyo City. We request that you will send us instructions in reply by wire.

# # 1258 A

MARCH (

From: Peiping

# 221 to Tokyo

Regarding my message # 220

In the case of the new organization of a settlement in any Consular area or sub-consular area, the head of the mindan shall, has formerly, according to the fifth article of the rules, met with the consul and (carried out) the GAITOO JIKOO (literally, applicable items) appropriate items of the detailed regulations, and has been accustomed to appoint the members of the settlement governing body on their first meeting. There is some doubt here, however, as to whether this method of handling is acceptable, and so we request your wired instructions in reply.

# 1259 A RSS

MARCH 11.

From: Nanking

#276 to Peiping,

Circ. #2450 to Tokyo, Hsinking, Canton.

Chunking Broadcast (10th)

1. Chiang Kai Shek spoke, in general, as follows at the gathering of CHU SUU KI NEN (CHU is probably for CHUGOKU to mean China, but it is not known what the SUU might be. KINEN denotes anniversary or memorial, but contact with several Chinese in Honolulu failed to produce any knowledge of an anniversary on the 9th.) on the 9th.

"During my visit of half a month in India, I received a hearty welcome from the Indian government and the Indian people. China and India are in agreement with each other(?) and are great countries. With the nobility and the leaders of India, I had meetings at which our hearts were opened and the people have been inspired into cooperating with each other mutually and without regard for party or faction. The Indian government too, has now decided to fight. I hope that England will give political freedom to India and that the power of anti-aggression might be thus strengthened. The idea that India should be proud of China's 5 year fight has been conveyed to the Indian people and a recognition of our country has been brought to them sufficiently. I believe firmly that should Japan invade India, India will have the ability to destroy Japan.

2. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chiang Kai Shek met the Minister from Holland and a (military) Attache (under said minister) and also the Australian Minister (Igston).

1234 A

FUNADA.

From: Tokyo (Urgent)

#032 to Peiping

#183 to ?

Re; your wire No. 90.

MARCH 11.

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect).

1268 A

From: Tokyo

To: Peiping

Extra

MARCH 11.

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.

Regarding your wire No. 175.

From Yosano to Harada.

The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at least, recently, received \_\_\_\_\_ in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (dissatisfied), so that they no longer desire down to \_\_\_\_\_ as has been done thus far.

1269 A

FUNADA.

From: Tokyo

To: Hsingking Minister.

MARCH 12.

Regarding your extra-numeral message:

The wire forwarded [Handwritten:] (forwarding will be completed) by the night of the 11th.

#1271 A

From: Tokyo

To: Harbin

MARCH 12.

Regarding your extra-numeral message of the 7th:

Although we have made investigations here, as per your wire, there is no evidence of larceny.

#1272 A

MARCH 12.

From: Peiping

#186 Cir. to Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Kalgan

Recently, in Japan proper, a union of all the women's organizations was carried out, and in every place a Women's Defense Organization have been set up, so that one imagines that the form of the new women's organization can be seen appearing. For the information of this office, we beg to trouble you to inform us by wire as to the system of controlling the new Women's Organization in your area.

#1273 A RSS

From: Canton

#210 to TOKYO

Cir. #077 to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping.

Regarding your circular #181

MARCH 12.

At noon today the resident Japanese of every class gathered at the Canton Jinja (shrine), and under the organization of the Resident Japanese Colony, reverence to the flag, bowing to the direction of the Imperial Palace, and prayer



## 1042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

before the flag was followed by the reading of the Imperial Rescript by the Minister, a message of congratulation from the head of the advisory body of the Colony, greetings from a representative of the Army, and holy voices joined in the Banzai were had. Thus solemnly and splendidly was the second affair in celebration of victory carried out. China is involved in the celebration of the Old New Year through the 15th (of March), but (after that) a mass meeting of every class (of people) is planned to celebrate the second occasion of victory in the war.

#1284 A

---

MARCH 13.

From: Tokyo  
To: Peiping  
Extra-numeral.

To Telegraphic official, Kato, from Nomura.

Your telegram and your volume have been respectfully read, but here we have been so upset by the events following the death of Onishi, and now the departure of Mr. Akiyama for the Soviet that I have been unable to carry out your wish. Please grant a little more time, much as I regret to ask for it.

#1285 A RSS

---

22 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Tokio.  
To: Net #1950.

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one months wages. And future matter will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank.

(rest garbled)

Decrypted traffic.

---

31 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Peiping  
To: (no heading) #759.

Method handling banking; gold silver deposits, etc.

Decrypted traffic.

---

22 DECEMBER 1942.

From: Tokio.  
To: Shanghai #710  
Net #1947.

In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling the Belgian Embassy's ----- despatch #----- in the same fashion as an enemy countries despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve ----- of you secret message ----- there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.

In relation to

Decrypted traffic.

---

JANUARY 26-PM-#000.

Gaimualjin Tokyo

Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

HARADA.

Decrypted traffic.

28 JANUARY 1942.

From: Foreign Minister Tokyo #038 (re your m-s-g #061)  
To: Minister Saigon

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including-----to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on 19 January I desire these details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal entry into Singapore (this day will be published by the Information Bureau).

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony—

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime Minister's broadcast #43 tell stories to the children.

(b) Have shinto and Bud-d-hist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips), celebration ceremonies by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military music, (emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades.

Togo.

27 JAN. 1942.

From: Chengoai Thia #010

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

-----(-garbled)-----

The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to Piruma ----- at me ----- Sataya they were bombed by the enemy.

HARADA.

28 JAN. 1942.

From Harada #012 (Re your msg #431).

To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

-----1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Tailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanized, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

JAN. 21.

681 A

From: Canton

To: Naking, Peking, Shanghai

Since the investment of Hongkong, our army has lost no time in using transports, and opening up transportation, although the permits were limited (at first) only to those who were actually engaged in carrying on the fighting, but from the 15th of this month, the SHIROGANE MARU, GUYO MARY and 6 other bottoms, scrapped ships of the NAI KA-----Transport Co., have been put into operation from the controlled territory, and the general populace and freights are being carried.

However, between this place (Canton) and Makao and between Hongkong and Makao, traffic has not yet been opened up.

# 1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

17 JAN. 1942.

603A

From: Tokyo  
To: Hsingking

-----When we had an interview with the diplomatic representative (of Russia, the context shows,) on the 13th., (we said that) from the news which came to this office from a certain daily news agency, it was stated on the authority of a Chinese-----telegram in November that an American vessel had been sunk as the result of striking a mine. The United States, after some difficulties, had ignored this matter, it was reported, but (we inquired) if he did not think this was an American tanker: also, we asked if there were absolutely no case of Russian vessels sinking after striking a mine. The diplomatic representative denied absolutely that there was any truth in the former statement; regarding the latter statement he said that last year-----government-----a Soviet vessel struck a mine in Pita (Peter) Bay and received injuries, but was able to make port safely. Aside from this, there had been no cases of Soviet vessels striking mines, and this he wished received as his reply.

604 A

From: Tokyo  
To: Hsingking

17 JAN. 1942.

----- The Soviet newspapers are reporting on the 15th, under the caption "From the Progress of the Greater Asia Struggle" under dateline of the 12th the public announcement of the United States that since the opening of hostilities that country has sunk 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 1 gunboat, 1 mine-sweeper, 10 transports, 4 freight ships, total 29 ships. ----- The losses of the American Navy are reported to be 1 battleship, 3 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 1 target ship, total ----- (All lost in the attack on Hawaii.)

131 A

From: Peking  
To: Nanking  
Shanghai  
Canton  
Hsingking

19 DEC. 1941.

News from Yen-an-Fu (Communist Headquarters)

----- Chungking broadcast (says that) taking example from the Axis strategy of attack, the Allies received the suggestion that an immediate attack upon Japan should be attempted. The Yen-an-Fu Kaiho Nippo (writes) already in point of fact we are allies with Great Britain and the United States. The war against Japan is nothing more than a screen, this war merely offering an opportunity for the Anglo American front to develop another attack upon the Axis Powers, which is something we should find it important to realize at this time. Among the Axis Powers, the most important is Germany, and the harming of Germany is the main purpose of the world-wide strategems. That is to say, taking advantage of the crisis in Germany is, as a craft (strategem) the expansion of the line of operations on the Continent is most important. The importance of the war in the Pacific to the British and Americans is clear, and the Imperial command for China in this connection is the pressing of war against aggressor nations regardless of consumption (of materials) and the overthrow of Hitler will be victory for China (?) so at the present time cooperation with the Allies plus the greater and greater extension of the policy of long-time resistance, is the method of hastening the total victory of those opposed to the Axis Powers ----- This is the attitude which the paper (Kaiho Nippo) explains.

130A

From: Peking  
To: Nanking  
Shanghai  
Hankow  
Yenan-fu report -----

19 DEC. 1941.

The official newspaper of the Chinese communist party Kai Ho Niti To (Kaiho Jih Pao) in the editorial on the 13th said that Japan's purposes in the present

war are to incite peoples of all of the south sea areas in order to secure the resources (of that area), expel British and American interests—act in union ----- Germany and Italy ----- to increase her power. Japan's southward advance is, at the same time, the strengthening of the policy of encircling southwestern China, and also of grabbing the Pacific, and is truly inseparable from the China Japanese war.

On this critical occasion you (?) must calmly build up a battle line of all anti-Japanese parties of the Pacific countries. All of China military forces must attack actively; together with this the 8th Route Army, and the new Fourth Army must open up Rokoho opposition, begin a counter action against border friction, stirring up the Chinese people of the South Seas against the Japanese. Make most important duty of stirring an anti-war feeling among the people of Formosa, and strengthening the plans toward carrying this out.

(FUNADA)

II

100 A

DEC 18 0443

From: Buenos Aires

To: Tokyo

Today the seventeenth all local papers carried the speech of the Navy Minister before the Diet in Tokyo, showing great respect. (In the report of American losses) 3 battleships, a mine layer, transport, (one each?) but in addition the loss of 1 aircraft carrier, which is in the present report, seems not to have been reported, so I ask your honorable inquiry into the matter.

/s/ HORIKIJI,  
Japanese Ambassador.

77 A

DEC 16.

From: Nanking

To: Tsingtao, Amoy, Hsingking, Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin.

Regarding the rejection by the British military in Hongkong of the well intentioned advice (to surrender) on the 16th the special propaganda chief made the announcement; the rejection by British of the humane advice tendered by Japan lays upon the barbarous British the entire responsibility of the exposure of a million several hundred thousand compatriots to the horrors of war. Our compatriots (?) in Hongkong, Yotai, notice of subjugation compatriots ----- in line with the ----- national policy we are pushing the plans in connection with the greater Asia war in a positive manner, and at this time we appeal to you people to strive from the protection of your Asiatic country and drive out (expunge) the humiliation of your country which has been practised by the English for a hundred years. I earnestly desire that you will work for the revival of East Asia ----- along this line he gave out his interview.

From: Tsinan

To: Tientsin

Peking

Nanking

DEC 16 81 A.

In the tactics employed against the harming of the road (railroad) by the local maintenance guild, all of the Chinese living within your area (our area?) have been commandeered, materials and domestic animals have as far as possible been confiscated, and everything possible has been carried out to prevent (colling up—the word used of snakes colling to spring). About a month and a half have passed since the beginning of these tactics and the efficacy ----- carrying out was becoming evident, then the Japan Anglo-American war began and again there are evidences that the enemy in this area are beginning to crawl about again.

The army lines of communication ----- and the regular communication systems are constantly sabotaged (it is attempted). On the night of the 9th, 10 ri (25 miles, if Japanese "ri"; 39.30 kilometers. If Chinese "li" is intended, then the distance would be 6.54 kilometers). South of Daimon station, on the Shimpo line, and attempt was made upon the roadbed (no harm was wrought); on the ----- Kosai line, in the neighborhood of Senshu village a freight train was

## 1046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

wrecked : and the like. This chief in charge of the line, and the guard have been warned that in case of trouble due to carelessness, they cannot escape punishment. According to ----- Okai Sen, in that section after the local police had applied appropriate encouragement (or pressure) the conduct of the Chinese, while not showing anything which could be definitely defined, has, nevertheless, steadily shown a tendency to trust more than formerly, with the arrival of the news of Japanese victories. This information is sent for your information.

---

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Manchuli

Ambassador Sato and entourage (Minister Morishima, secretaries Takeuchi and Yuhashi and 5 other people) are expected to arrive at your city at noon on the 19th and then enter Soviet Territory on the same day. Please arrange.

1200 A

---

MARCH 2.

From Shanghai to Tientsin. Peiping ?

The smallpox cases in this area during February (new cases) numbered 21 of which 11 were Japanese and the total of cases since the beginning of the year has come up to 50 of which Japanese are 27.

1201 A

---

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to ?

The trend (or "indications") in 1 of your wire (\*-----) approved (or "understood"). However, ----- (perhaps, "the wording of the wire leads to misunderstanding" and so please explain to ----- that the ----- is not higher than the starting point.

1202 A

---

FUNADA.

MARCH 2.

From ? to Canton

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been Special Code as from 2nd (first name "Seiichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

1203 A

---

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Shanghai

Please send Special Employee Fukada (first name "Ippai") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

1204 A

---

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to ?

Special Code with regard to hiring on the spot

----- (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, ----- have been decided.

1205 A

---

FUNADA.

MARCH 2.

From ? to Canton

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been SPECIAL CODE as from 2nd (first name "Seiichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

1203 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Shanghai

Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippel") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

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Special Code with regard to hiring on the spot

----- (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, ----- have been decided.

1205 A

---

FUNADA.

MARCH 2.

From Shanghai to Tokyo

With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.

1206 A

---

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Paotao

Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the the same basis as a special employee ----- if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen, please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.

1207

---

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Peiping

Former Special Code, Konji Hasegawa has been Special Code as from February 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.

Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

---

FUNADA.

From Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 2.

With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.

1206 A

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From Tokyo to Paotao

MARCH 2.

Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the same basis as a special employee-----If it is different to hire him at 110 Yen, please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.

1207

---

From Tokyo to Peiping

MARCH 2.

Former Special Code, Kanji Hawegawa has been Special Code as from February 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.

Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

FUNADA.

## 1048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 2.

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From Tokyo to Puotao

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From Tokyo to Peiping

MARCH 2.

Former Special Code, Kanji Hawegawa has been Special Code as from February 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.

Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

FUNADA.

---

From Tokio to Hsinking

MARCH 2.

Because we find, after consultation with the War Department, that there is a necessity of reinvestigating Si Mei (perhaps names), please send back report on your examination along with papers relating to this affair.

1209 A

3-5-42

YAMASHIRO.

---

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
March 4, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1210-1224 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,  
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

---

From Canton to Tokyo

MARCH 3.

Extra

With regard to your wire (extra) (#---) of the 3rd.

Wire No. 71 from NAN DAI (perhaps "Southern Platform" i. e., "Southern Station") to this office should have been replied to in General Wire No. 48 of February 20th, but we are sending again by way of assurance.

1210 A

---

From Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 3.

Extra

From Takahashi to Telegraph Officer Akiyama: How is the (previous) question coming? Please reply as to progress made.

1211 A

---

From Canton to Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Tokyo

MARCH 4.

With regard to taxation in China as assessed at the present time, it is thought that studies are being made in the central office. In this area, it has been decided, in view of the special situation here, that an agency for the purpose of studying this question, the China Tax Rates research committee would be formed through the advice of the SANSHOO (may be "Three Leaders?") meet-

ing, with the local Chamber of Commerce and the league of Commodity Importers and Distributors as a center, and that this agency would be made an agency of inquiry (perhaps "on tax matters").

1212 A

FUNADA.

From Amoy to Tokyo

MARCH 4.

And with regard to your wire 1212 of last June.

Police Chief ----- TIN KAN. Policemen, Tadashi Harada, Eichi Taniguchi, Ankichi (?) Nakamura, SI JUN SEI (?) above are higher investigators. Police Chief RIN KEI (perhaps "position held concurrently") with that of Policeman. RYUU TEN SIN (?) (above -----) Chief of Police, Zempo Yamashita, Takashi Asakura, Ryuzoo Fukumoto (above Special Duties).

1213 A

FUNADA.

From Canton to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, Swatow and Hoihow

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wires Nos. 133 and 400.

Although the fact of our wire No. 173 is present (Although the information set forth in our wire No. 173 are true) and although we should (eventually) have to carry on in accordance with above (information), if a request (or "petition") has to be submitted every month with respect to facility in obtaining loans as dealt with in this question, it would mean an unending series of repetitions. Thus, it is thought that one application (or "petition") should cover at least a period of about 6 months, in order that control and business may be facilitated.

Also with respect to the beginning of your wire No. 400: the proclamation on this question has been considered in this city since quite early ----- The leadership and organization has been towards cutting down the living expenses of enemy citizens as much as possible, but if these enemy citizens are to continue as at present, to live separately and to live under conditions no different than previous to the war, we cannot hope to limit the living expenses of these people merely by means of leadership (encouragement). In our area, (therefore) a study is being made with regard to the advisability of housing all of the enemy nationals in a definite area, of having them live jointly and of them letting them cook and eat jointly. If this is possible, the living expenses of these people will fall 100 yen per head, or 500 yen for 5 people, as reported in our wire as aforementioned ("-----").

1214 A

FUNADA.

From: Canton

MAR. 4.

To: Shanghai, Peiping, Tokio, Nanking

The transition (or changes) as is now taking place is a matter of concern to us ----- for the preservation of peace and ----- Therefore, measures to meet this should be immediately effected. Due to the disruption of trading on the authorized (legal) lists as well as with the under-cover transactions, it is necessary to strengthen control of the market as much as possible. Also to effect reforms in currency ( ? ), and to contrive measures of ----- Concrete measures will be effected in Davao in the near future.

Of course, it is doubtful whether the above remedial measures are more urgent than those concerning mobilization; however, locally measures will be taken to counteract violent economic changes from the tenth.

1215 A

MAR. 4.

From: Nanking

To: Tokyo

Please remit by cable the sum of 36,703.48 yen to cover costs of the following: 31,164.65 yen for steel fencing (including 65 yen for changes in construction) as per agreement; 5,538 yen 3 sen for young persimmon plants; and 80 sen to cover shortage for trees already paid for and transplanted.

1216



# 1050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo  
To: Hankow

MARCH 4.

The proclamation (Number 7) announcing (taking FUTUROO as an error for FUKOKU, announcing, proclaiming; which modifies the noun kokuji, proclamation—a not unusual tautology in Japanese). the setting up of a Branch office of the Greater Asia Bureau (in Hankow?) and the official opening of that branch office on the 28th., as well as the ----- order Number 4 regarding the superintendent of this branch office, and the area of his authority (this area of authority being that suggested in your telegraphic message number 12), were officially published in the Government Gazette of March 4th. UN (no meaning can be assigned) --It is desired that you send a wire (in confirmation of this, or recognition of this ?) to the Greater Asia Bureau.

#1217 A

From: Tokyo  
To: Shanghai

MARCH 4.

Regarding your telegram number 4:

Yen 7,811 are being advanced from the Incidental Actual Cost Fund for the price of impliments and garments for Japanese fencing, including the hakama (a pleated skirt-like garment). Yen 2,627 will be sent forward by wire from the WA TASHIKIRI (which we interpret to be a fund from which payments can be made without voucher) for MEN SOMO (Men = cotton; some kind of a cotton garment), Chinese clothing, and accessories. FUN (Is the character to divide, Chinese reading, used for STOP ?) (Cf. UN in previous message).

Further, we desire a wired message giving detailed estimates on the basis of the various commodities, (in explanation) of your appended statement in your telegrams giving a total for the loan fund of Yen 3,342.

#1218 A

From: Canton  
To: Tokyo

MARCH 4.

WA-----, of this office, has never traveled to Sansootoo (which we presume to be a place name). Since the situation in that place is not clear to us, we desire to send En Kido, the official entrusted with such matters, at this time, on a two weeks trip (The exigencies of travel make such a time allowance necessary) to investigate the situation of the Japanese resident there, and of the schools and for this trip we ask your approval (REN RA E; not clear; possibly, "contact" (renraku) something.)?

#1219 A

MARCH 4.

From: Peking  
To: Tokyo

MARCH 4.

(We have found this message practically undecipherable)

Line 1...1 your wire number...57 and the same number 385 SOO (School RAI SA YOO KOKU subject) In regard to -- RA Kai -- being, original document ----BOO number in N----- GO PYU have do not have---- GI RYOO SERARURU TO ---- KO ---- next (or succeeding) message number ----87 GOO TYOO ---- and regular report regarding the residences, regarding ---- FUN -- Within this month should be sent in.

#1220 A

MARCH 4.

From: Tokyo  
To: Shanghai

Special employee and radio expert Uchida, who is employed in the fifth department of the Investigation Bureau, being about to depart by air route on the 4th, we desire to advance temporarily (or perhaps, he desires us to advance temporarily) the expenses for his stay here and the TIN HOO (?) of the purchase cost of supplies.

#1221 A RSS

From Tokyo to Nanking

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wire No. 190.

Please wire contents of No. 1100 as that wire has been lost through fire. Further, NO. 99 has already been approved by means of Return Regular (wire) No. 3800.

1222 A

From : Tokyo to Shanghai

MARCH 4.

188 bundles (rolls, or batches) of EKIN ZAI, (perhaps TEKKIN ZAI for "steel rods" or "steel building materials"), 10 tons and 298 kilograms have been shipped on Talei Maru which left Moji on Feb. 27th. KOO SIN

1223 A

From : Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 4.

-----your wire No. 1329 of last year.

As yet----- please----- after-----.

1224 A

FUNADA.

SECRETS

SIGNAL OFFICE,  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
March 6, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1225-1239 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,  
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

From Tokyo to Helhow

MARCH 5.

With regard to your wire No. 19.

Will send upon issuance of permits, 2 thousand 7 Yen each from Real Government Expenditure and 1655 Yen (each) from Special relief and control fund, Miscellaneous, as follows:

Vice Consul Hirata, Kikuchi, Kaneko (officials) (for 3 persons from Real Government Expenditure).

Three sets of equipment, their number and use as follows:

Reception room hat racks, 3.

Reception room long chair, 2. Out of three, one will be one used at present.

Inside Chair, 4, out of 6, 2 will be ones used at present.

Round table, 3.

Tea Table, 3.

Dining table for dining room, 3.

Side board for Dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desk for library, 3.

Chair for Library, 3.

Bookshelves for Library, 3.

Miscellaneous shelf for living room, 3.

Inspector Fujii, Assistant Inspector Imai, and -----Omura (for three people) from Miscellaneous Special Relief and Control Fund.

Following are three sets of equipment, their numbers and use.

Hat rack for reception room, 1, used by Inspector Fujii.

Long chair for reception room, 1, the one presently in use.

Inside chair, 2, same as above.

Round table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Tea table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Dining tables for dining room, 3.

Sideboards for dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desks for library, 3. Those being used presently.

# 1052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Chairs for library, 3.  
Bookshelves for library, 3.  
Miscellaneous shelves for living room, 3.  
1225 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 5.

From: Shanghai  
To: Canton, Tokyo

Regarding the outgoing telegram from Consul Katagiri of Klukiang to his excellency.

Umeda, Chief police, was enroute to Shanghai, changing his post of duty, when he received a telegram indicating an emergency (or sudden change) (in the condition of) his wife, and immediately turning back is now enroute again to Klukiang. The lady, however, is not yet out of the critical state and requires nursing, so this office has received a telegram (requesting) the postponement of his shift of post for the present. The above circumstances seem unavoidable to us, so we request that you will take the necessary steps to secure especial permission.

#1126A

---

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo  
To: Kalgan

Referring to your message number 127.

While (normally) the total cost of the repairing of the straw mats in the Consul's residence HAMA (MA=room, and this may refer to some special room in the residence) and also in the unoccupied residences should be paid (from headquarters), in other government offices (it is the custom) for the resident in the official residence to pay one quarter of the cost of the repairs and this we desire to have assessed. SPECIAL CODE Yen 506.62 and from the Police Out-right Expenditure Fund Yen 2,209.21 SPECIAL CODE. Further, as regards the portion for the unoccupied residences, it will be made an especial grant this once only. Hereafter when a resident is assigned, the necessary repairs expense shall be defrayed from the appropriations for that purpose.

#1227A RSS

---

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo  
To: Swatow

March salary and special allowance; His Excellency Yen 893.69; MAEJIMA SPECIAL CODE (Is this not probably Vice-Consul, as in following message?) Yen 581.21; (including balance of February salary plus removal and family allowance); Yoshida, Yen 280.49; Kawasaki Yen 242.74; Total, Yen 1,998.13 which will be sent (by wire=the probable meaning of SPEC CODE) to your excellency as agent.

#1128A

---

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo  
To: Amoy

March salaries and special allowances to a total of Yen 3,582.06, will be sent by wire to your excellency as agent.

Items:

Your Excellency, Yen 1,220.38; Consul Mizumoto, Yen 772.49; Vice-Consul Imashiro, Yen 518.44; Gi-----, 285.09; Tadashi, and Aoki, each Yen 212.49; Sugihara, Yen 112.98 (Yen 28.68 and his special allowance are earmarked for repayment); Morii, Yen 247.70. The end.

#1229A RSS

From: Tokyo  
To: Hsingking

MARCH 5.

This message, number #1230 A, is so full of lacunae that any translation seems impossible. It is one of several such messages from Tokyo to the Hsingking Consulate, apprizing them of the news that is appearing in Russian papers. There also seems to be some report of an article in the Rome Times (if there is such a paper) regarding Soviet-Japanese relations, and something about the Soviet Consulate and staff in Japan. Unless the lacunae can be filled in somewhat, re-grouping would probably accomplish nothing.

#1230 A

From: Tokyo  
To: Canton  
Extra numeral message.

MARCH 6.

Your messages number 44, number 53, and numbers 141 and 151 being missing, we desire a clear cut answer regarding them. (Or possibly an "explanatory answer").

#1231 A

From Shanghai to Peiping, Tientsin, Tokyo, Nanking

MARCH 6.

Collection of taxes at Shanghai KAI KAN (would probably mean "Association Hall" but it is thought that SHANGHAI KAI KAN is the name of an official building in Shanghai) for the month of February as follows, totalling 9363 Yuan, and amounting to 40 percent of amount for same period last year. (details will be sent by mail).

Tax collections 8160

Sur-taxes (assessments and SUI SAI (probably, "collections of delinquent taxes")). 443

Special Sur-taxes (Imports and transfers) 731.

Tonnage taxes, 20

Total 9363 (Please do not publish for outside purposes)

1232 A

From Peiping to Tokyo

MARCH 6.

Although we have rented the Sanitation (or "Sanitary") KONSU (might be abbreviation of "KONSUTORAKUSHION" for "Construction" or "Constructions"), the repairs necessary through the houses in order to make them usable will take a long time, and therefore, although we have (or "there are") quite a few people who are being transferred here and are arriving with their families, the situation is such that there are no houses in which to place these people. Therefore, as a temporary measure (or "a measure to meet the immediate situation") the houses (mentioned) in temporary enactment of our wire No. 182, are necessary, and we ask that you send us the necessary amount for rentals after arranging for permission to rent said houses.

1233 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 6.

From Manchull to cut in Tokyo, Hsinking

ROZOHATUKII (the name of the German in question) a 48 (?) year old German National, who arrived in Manchuria from Berlin in December of 1939 and has been head of the -----, a German transportation firm, here, wishes to evacuate to Dairen together with his family (wife and 1 daughter or nine daughters). We find that the situation (political) is alright, and that (this person's records (?) are authentic, but would like to know if we may issue a visa (would like to know if you have any objections) to issuing) to him, (to them). Please reply immediately.

1234 A

MARCH 6.

From Shanghai to Canton  
From Nakane to Vice Consul Ueda.

Matsumoto is at present holding an important (a necessary) post with the Funds Chief (chief of the department of capital) that gets at the present time

## 1054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

a salary (a treatment) of about 700 yen per month. If he is to be raised to an assistantship in the near future, but cannot obtain more than he presently gets, it will be difficult to keep him on (prevail on him). So, in that case, will you search for another suitable man.

1235 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Canton

We have already sent your wire No. 165 by means of our wire No. 139.

Regarding No. 167 we are now ----- (probably "carrying on consultation with -----")

Regarding No. 171, although there has been no ----- (maybe "objections") from all the ----- (maybe "department heads"), it is believed that the message has been wired to the assistants, (secretaries) of these (people).

1236 A

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Nanking

There is a supply of 58 thousand yen to cover expenses of buying land for your office ----- The Minister (of cabinet) ----- that plans be made within the year ----- and a part of the land (for office buildings) be surveyed, and that enactment be carried out temporarily after proper investigation. Also, in this case ----- the training room (or "area") ----- the plan ----- is desired.

1237 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Nanking

Regarding your wire No. 36, will send after obtaining permit, ----- (probably "1140 Yen") out of the fund for ----- police offices under Consulates in China, as being the amount of expenses to the end of the year -----

1238 A

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Shanghai

With regard to your wire Regular No. 463

The BAN NOO.—("Bannoo" means omnipotent, Bannooyaku, a cureall) according to our experience is not very efficient and goes out of commission very often, and so we have not been giving permits on it. It is difficult therefore to approve of it and ask that the 825 Yen be sent back.

1239 A

FUNADA.

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
March 7, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1240-1253 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,  
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

From: Tokyo  
To: Nanking

MARCH 6.

March allowances for Shiotaki and Takemitsu, both special employees, is being sent by wire to your excellency as follows:

(1) Shiotaki's share, including the special allowance, Yen 1,062.50; (2) Takemitsu, ----- DOKU KIN (the statement of a sum of money, in Japanese, usually begins with the character KIN) Yen 544.36. Total Yen 1,606.86.

#1240A

From: Tokyo  
To: Shanghai

MARCH 6.

The plan is for Asakura to leave Kobe by the Taiyo Maru on the 17th, and everything connected with his landing, place to stay and the like is the responsibility of the Contact Department of your office.

#1241A

From: Tokyo  
To: Nanking

MARCH 6.

To Councilor Nakamura from Minister Nichidaka.

Mr. Yasuoka will be busy throughout the entire year and will have no leisure until early next year, so he desires to resign from the position as a formality.

#1242A RSS

From: Tokyo  
To: Kalgan

MARCH 6.

KI SU FUTU (possibly, KIDEN or KISIN FUKU=Your reply wire) Regarding (your reply wire) #124:

SA -- POO SPECIAL CODE. (Can't do anything with it)

Yen 6,000 Special Code. (KIN comes before and NARI after a statement of a sum of money, in Japanese).

Yen 6,000 from the Special Police Outright Expenditure Fund.

Yen 2,000 From the Outright Expenditure Fund of the Expense budget of the City Police (dep't ?) resident in the Consulate.

(KAN=official, KOO=public; indicate the general classifications in the Japanese governmental budget, we believe. MO KU we do not understand).

#1243 A

From: Tokyo  
To: Shanghai #257

MARCH 6.

We desire to have Secretary Shimoda, who is at present traveling in your area, return to duty in Shanghai immediately. Please wire us as to his date of sailing.

(The above does not sound right. We suspect that either the telegram was to be forwarded to another point under the Shanghai Consulate, and was sent from Tokyo at the request of the Shanghai Consul to adjust a difficult matter, or else "Shanghai is in the wrong place and should modify "area", the purpose of the message being to have Shimoda return to duty in Tokyo).

#1244 A

From: Kalgan  
To: Tokyo

MARCH 6.

Regarding your message #72 of last year:

As we have rented house and land for the diplomatic officials resident abroad, we ask that you send one half year's rental, Yen 1,200, by wire.

#1254 A RSS

From Kalgan to Tokyo

MARCH 6.

And with regard to No. 33

Please send 3, AI BOO YEN (?) (3,000 Yen) Special Code XXXXXXXXX the amount of expected shortage to the end of the year in SHUYOO IHI (might be "housing", "expropriation" as in "land expropriation", "training").

1246 A

From Tokyo to Nanking  
Extra

MARCH 7.

As it is suspected that your wire No. 137 has not yet arrived, please send again.

(NOTE: ----- happens to be UTAGAI)

1247 A

## 1056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 7.

With regard to your wire (-----) Extra.

Please make of our wire No. 244 KETSUGO (could be either "a missing number" or "a combination"). No. 3 from the Minister has not been sent because of a mistake here ----- it has been was sent on 7th of this month, (today).

1248 A

FUNADA.

From Peking to Tokyo

MARCH 7.

Extra

From Kato to Telegraph Officer Homura

I believe that you have KOOHAI (probably "seen", or "your attention has been 'drawn to'") our wire No. 216 (1) (2) (or "sections 1 and 2 of our wire No. 216") and the wire addressed you (2). It is especially requested that (the action mentioned) be carried out immediately.

1249 A

FUNADA.

From Tokyo to Hsinking

MARCH 7.

At the time of the (meeting) mentioned in our wire No. 89 (RUNOFU, name of a Russian representative) said that he had learned of the change of the Japanese Ambassador to Russia through a newspaper article (Red Party Organ dated 4th) and that Ambassador Sato (the newly appointed Ambassador), through having been Foreign Minister in the Hayashi (General Senjuro Hayashi, Premier Feb. to May 1937) cabinet, is well known to the Soviet Side. To this, I (this officer) said, that Ambassador Tatekawa (the previous Ambassador) had, because of ill health, been desirous of returning to Japan, that the Soviet Union knows that all of the Japanese Ambassadors to the Soviet Union in the past have been first class men of excellence (this clause is somewhat indefinite), that we believe that the Soviet Union well understands just where the purpose of the Japanese government lies, in having especially picked this new Ambassador who is a former Foreign Minister, a senior (old timer) in the diplomatic field, and who has a thorough knowledge of Soviet affairs, that we here, on this occasion, should calmly solve the various problems under discussion such as regular shipping schedules, TAIKA (might be "exchange", "freight accumulation" or "compensation"), petitions between Japan and Russia (?), Visas, and floating docks, and that another forward step would thus be taken in the friendship between the two countries. To this RUNOFU replied that he understood, and that everything will be done towards the solving of the problems as (his) ideas concerning them were the same as (I) had mentioned.

1250 A

FUNADA.

From Tientsin to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo, Peking, Thingtao, and Tsinan.

MARCH 7.

According to the Economic Weekly for the first week in March, the general situation, all commodities have a tendency of falling because of the effect on business of the doubt (distrust) of the rural (inland) areas. Cotton yarn and cloth opened with a tendency of being supported to some extent by the rural areas (probably "business inland") because of rapid and secret tendencies of speculators (?).

Rates falling; Dry goods, 44.60 Yen. Cotton Yarn (8 UMA 20 TE) 1.460 Yen. MEN FUN (perhaps "cotton waste" but from context, it is thought that this might be a mistake for MUGI FUN or MUGI KO, flour) the import of Shanghai powder (flour) is progressing smoothly, and as the CHUZAI KA (perhaps "stock here") settles down, and the movement of material stops because of low rates in the interior, the rates weaken-----25.903 Yen IJIRUSHI (?) 24.85 Yen. Sugar, a fall was seen because of the appearance of controlled com-

modities in the city towards the end of the previous week and the tendency of 1 JUN in the buying rate in the interior, Refined sugar, 235.80. Raw Sugar, 188.40. Peanuts, rates falling on both nuts and oil because of fall in Shanghai through lull in the year's exports, Nuts, 53.50 (highest on 6th) Oil, 104.90 (also highest on 6th).

1251 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 7.

Tokyo to Kalgan

With regard to the application for a permit to establish the Association (perhaps "Corporation") of MU KYOO (perhaps a mistake for MOO KYOO, Mongolia) Engineering and Building Industries; this has been carried out temporarily in accordance with your wire, Regular No. 97 of the 5th of last month. Please reply on following points:

1. Is it necessary, in accordance with Article 34 of the Civil Law, to especially make of said corporation a Juridical Corporate Person?

2. Is it impossible to attain the objectives (of said corporation) under the rules and regulations presently followed by the League of Industries (mentioned above) (Note: Last probably means "League of Engineering and Industrial workers" Also, it might be more correct to say, in above first three lines, "the Inner Mongolia Engineering and Building Corporation")?

3. What were the characteristics of the League(s) of Mongolian Engineering and Construction companies in the past?

4. Will the League of this industry be abolished upon formation of above corporation?

5. It has been reported that the head of said corporation Fujishima arrived there and that the establishment of said corporation took place under the direction of your office; is this true? (Note: The last might be a confirmation rather than a question.)

1252 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 7.

From: Tokyo

To: Hankow

To Business Representative Takano, resident in Daiya.

The expense appropriations for your office for the current year are as follows below. These will be sent by wire to Consul General Tanaka (at Hankow ?) and you are to receive them as delivered from that office. Within the Organization (or, Foundation) Fund of Yen 8,000 you are to pay immediately for repairs and equipment (it being understood that expenditure for desks and desk chairs shall be according to the plan), this grant to be completely repaid within the current year.

Government Expense, Actual Expense, Yen 60.

Ditto, Outright Expense, Yen 250.

Telegraphic Expenses for a diplomatic office abroad, Yen 25.

Expense for the Foundation of a diplomatic office abroad, Hankow office, Daiya branch office, and equipment fund, Yen 8,000.

Further, employees daily (wage) GEN 0 Yen. (Gen is probably an error for some figure) Typists within Yen 70, 11 may be employed. When appropriate people have been found, proceed on the basis of temporary action.

# 1253 A RSS



# 1058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 58

TOP SECRET

Op-20-4-mp  
Serial 0003520  
(SC) A17-24(1)

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,  
Washington 25, D. C., 28 Jun 1945.

From: The Secretary of the Navy,  
To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant,  
Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.  
Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the following dispatches, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

|               |                           |               |
|---------------|---------------------------|---------------|
| COM 14 260110 | COM 16 291028             | COM 16 021100 |
| COM 16 261331 | COM 16 30 Nov 41 Ser 12-2 | COM 16 041502 |
| COM 16 270355 | COM 16 010245             | COM 16 051402 |
| COM 14 280240 | COM 16 010913             | CINCAF 060006 |
| CINCAF 281430 | COM 16 011422             | COM 14 060114 |
| COM 16-281510 | COM 16 020355             | COM 16 071025 |

ASTNAYATTACHE SHANGHAI 270830

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.  
Washington 25, D. C., 27 Jun 1945.

Op-20-G-mg  
Serial 000751520  
(SC) A6-1(10)

### Memorandum

From: Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).  
To: Mr. John F. Sonnett, Rm. 1083-A, Navy Bldg.  
Via: Capt. F. O. Willenbacher (Op-20-4).  
Subj: Dispatches—Forwarding of.  
Ref: Secret Letter, no serial, to Op-20-G, dated 23 June 1945, signed by H. Kent Hewitt/John F. Sonnett.  
Encl: Duplicates of dispatches requested in subject reference.

1. In compliance with subject reference, the files of this office were searched and duplicates, copies of which are enclosed, made of the following list of dispatches:

|                             |                |
|-----------------------------|----------------|
| COM 14* 260110              | COM 16* 010913 |
| COM 16* 261331              | COM 16 011422  |
| COM 16 270355               | COM 16 020355  |
| COM 14* 280240              | COM 16* 021100 |
| CINCAF 281430               | COM 16 041502  |
| COM 16* 281510              | COM 16 051402  |
| COM 16* 291029              | CINCAF 060006  |
| COM 16 Certified typed copy | COM 14 060114  |
| COM 16 010245               | COM 16 071025  |

2. Asterisked items contain information requested in subject reference. Unasterisked items are included as considered of interest by you in conversation with Lt. Comdr. G. E. Boone this morning.

3. It is requested that Op-20-4 place the enclosures in proper legal form for presentation to Mr. Sonnett, and make delivery to Mr. Sonnett.

4. In accordance with current practice, these materials have been upgraded in classification.

J. N. Wenger  
J. N. WENGER.  
Captain, U. S. Navy.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified

Incoming

Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X.

Same garble table X no change in shore addresses XX.

Date 30 Nov 41 Crypto group 87

Originator: Com 16 Action: Opnav.

CBO HMC Serial No. 12-2

Information:

Cincaf

Cincpac

Com 14

Authenticated:

F. S. LOCKARD,  
Ens., USNR.

Certified to be a true copy to the original.

/S/ P. W. Cann,  
P. W. CANN,  
Commander, USN.

Naval Message—

SECRET

Navy Department

| Drafter                                                                 | Extension number | Addressees                                               | Precedence                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| From: COM 14.<br>Released by<br>Date: 26 NOVEMBER 1941                  |                  | Asterisk (*) mailgram addressee<br>For action:<br>OPNAV. | Priority. X<br>Routine.<br>Deferred. |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by A. V. PERING.<br>Paraphrased by<br>Routed by |                  | Information:<br>CINCPAC.<br>CINCAF.<br>COM 16.           | Priority.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred.   |

Unless otherwise indicated this despatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

If operational check below.

Original held by GI 260110

Originator fill in date and time:

TEXT

For past month commander second fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units: Second fleet, third fleet including first and second base forces and first defense divisions, combined air force, desron three alrron seven, subron five and possible units of batdly three from first fleet

In message concerning these units South China fleet and French Indochina force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako and Takao

Third base force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with second fleet commander

Combined air force has been assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved to Hainan

Third fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako

Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified second fleet unit and submarine division or squadron

Crudiv seven and desron three appear as an advance unit and may be en route South China

# 1060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise alrron twenty four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

| Phone Extension Number: 2827                                | Addressees                                                   | Message Precedence              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 26 November 1941. | For Action:<br>CINCPAC.<br>OPNAV.<br>COMFOURTEEN.<br>CINCAF. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by: P. R. White.<br>Paraphrased by: | Information:                                                 | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

Reported by ONI by

Serial 23-41

261331

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Morning comment comfourteen two one ten of twentysixth X traffic analysis past few days indicate cinc second directing units of First Second Third Fleets and Subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X for purposes of clarity units expected to operate in South China area will be referred to as first section and units expected to operate in mandates will be referred to as Second Section X estimated units in first section are crudiv seven X airron six defense division one X desron three and subron six XX second section crudiv five X cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru X desrons two and four X subron five X desdiv twentythree X first base force of Third Fleet X third base force at Palao X fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv Six and Batdiv Three may be included in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX balance Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including desron five will take station in Formosa Straits or further south X there are slight indications today that desron three crudiv seven and subron six are in Takao area X combined airforce units from empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X *our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure Area* X our lists indicate cinc combined in Nagato X cinc first in Hyuga and cinc second in Atago in Kure area X cinc third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X cinc fifth in Chichijima area X comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China Fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from central or north China probably torpedo boats XX Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX directives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X special calls usually precede formation of task force used in area operations X cinc second X Third and cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X traffic from navminister and engs to cincs of fleet appear normal X *evaluation is considered reliable.*

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

**SECRET***Naval Message—Navy Department*

| Phone extension number                                      | Addresses                                                 | Message Precedence                   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 27 November 1941. | For action:<br>CINC AF.<br>CINC PAC.<br>OPNAV.<br>COM 14. | Priority. X<br>Routine.<br>Deferred. |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by A. V. PERING.<br>Paraphrased by  | Information:                                              | Priority.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred.   |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

27/0355

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT.

**TEXT**

Last two days several despatches in four numeral Army cipher handled on Navy circuit involving Commander Oka combined Army Forces Imperial Headquarters.

Commander Oka combined Army Taiwan.

Vice commander combined Army forces Sama.

Make original only, deliver to Communications Watch Officer in person. (See Art 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

**SECRET***Naval Message—Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number                                    | Addresses                | Message Precedence                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| From COM 14.<br>Released by.<br>Date: November 28, 1941.  | For action:<br>OPNAV.    | Priority X.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred. |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by A. L. BRAUN.<br>Paraphrased by | Information:<br>CINCPAC. | Priority.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred.   |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

28/246

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See art. 76 (4) Nav Regs.

**TEXT**

Following received by British consul from usually reliable source X Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one December without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at Songkhala XX. (Singora)

Passed to Code Room for routing. LWP

Only incorrect detail was date.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

## 1062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number 2227.                                | Addressees                                       | Message Precedence              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 28 November 1942. | For Action:<br>CINPAC.<br>OPNAV.<br>COMFOURTEEN. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by P. R. WHITE.<br>Paraphrased by   | Information:                                     | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.  
 Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.  
 Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT.  
 [Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 26-41 281510

## TEXT

Comment artolusoa Shanghai two seven zero eight three zero x Isuzu (cl) in Formosa Straits Sunday x subtender and four subs probably subron six plus Magoya Maru tender x last sentence believed to be sendai (cl) plus two desdlvs xx other items no comment xx additional info from CI Nitta Maru sailing Yokosuka to Takao twenty ninth with military supplies xx two senior construction officers and four thousand men status not known ordered mandates xx unidentified ship believed to be light cruiser has apparently relieved Kashii as flagship southern expeditionary fleet x this ship now in Camranh Bay Saigon area xx

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

*Naval message in Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number                                            | Addressees                                        | Message Precedence              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: ASTNAVATTACHE SHANGHAI.<br>Released by<br>Date: 28 Nov. 41. | For action:<br>COM 16.                            | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom<br>De/coded by<br>Paraphrased by                     | Information:<br>N A V A T T A C H E<br>CHUNGKING. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in  
Serial 26-41

270830 CR0554

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.  
 Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

C orange naval craft sighted by master foreign vessels X Saturday Canton departed Hasidate and one torpedo boat Otori class X Chinwang Tao arrived two armed trawlers with depth charges on decks one auxiliary three thousand ton fitted for mine laying X Sunday Amoy sailed cruiser Natori class X Monday afternoon off Turnabout Island four submarines and large sub tender course south XO Tuesday position twenty one north and one hundred fifteen east unstated number transports with troops course southwest X Many transports this week between Hongkong and Shanghai heading south number with troops X Wednesday observed by passenger from Shanghai Maru one hour before entering Nagasaki Harbor 8 warships believed lead by cruiser Naka proceeding south good speed.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Article 76 (4) NAV Regs.

## SECRET

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number: 2027.                               | Addressees                                                   | Message Precedence              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 29 November 1941. | For Action:<br>CINCPAC.<br>CINCAF.<br>COMFOURTEEN.<br>OPNAV. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| FOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by WHITE.<br>Paraphrased by         | Information:                                                 | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

[Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by Serial 24-41. 201020

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

Recent developments from RI X Encrypted addresses noted in traffic past two days quote "Comdr First Patrol Force" unquote X This force headquarters apparently in Yokosuka or Palao X Other addresses of same nature X Quote "Fifth Air Battalion" unquote at Takao X Quote "Comdr Airborne Troops" unquote X [hand written: (probably Takao—FN)] Location undetermined X Quote "French Indochina billeting detachment" unquote in Saigon Area X Quote "Third Fleet headquarters" unquote probably at Yokosuka X cinc Third shifted flag from Ashigara to Nagara X cinc Southern Expeditionary shifted flag from Kashii to Chokai X tentative identification X New arrivals Takao Area that may be placed in first section my Two Six One Three Three One X Desron Four X Airron Seven Chitose type and one command that appears to be a Subron XX Hiyel and Kongo now appear definitely associated with these units in First Section but no movement noted on these XX Following from CI translation today from Cinc Second Fleet to key radio stations and Cinc Combined indicates he will leave Kure Zone four hundred today leave Sasebo Zone midnight first and enter Bako Zone midnight second X Remainder message not clear.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

## SECRET

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number: 2027                               | Addressees                                          | Message Precedence                 |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 1 December 1941. | For Action:<br>OPNAV.                               | Priority XX<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| FOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by A. L. BRAUN.<br>Paraphrased by  | Information:<br>CINCAF.<br>CINCPAC.<br>COMFOURTEEN. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred    |

Indicate by asterisk Addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

[Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by Serial 25-41.

010245.

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GOT

## TEXT

Please cancel my One Fifty today XX Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X Same Garble Table X No change in Shore addresses

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

# 1064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

## Naval message—Navy Department

| Phone Extension Number .2027.                              | Addressees                                          | Message Precedence              |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 1 December 1941. | For action:<br>OPNAV.                               | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by WHITE.<br>Paraphrased by        | Information:<br>CINCPAC.<br>COMFOURTEEN.<br>CINCAF. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in. Serial 25-41.

#10013

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

From RI X Arrivals in Takao area past two days X Comdesron Five in Natori X Naka to join Desron Four X Units of number two base force and Chogei X Last named ship considered to be tender for two divisions submarines X All these units now under command Cinc third X Cinc second in atago shifted from Kure to Sasebo comm zone apparently en route South China waters

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

## Naval message—Navy Department

### NAVY DEPARTMENT

| Phone Extension Number                                      | Addressees            | Message Precedence                    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| From: COM SIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 2 December 1941. | For action:<br>OPNAV. | Priority<br>Routine XXXXX<br>Deferred |
| FOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by A. A. MURRAY.<br>Paraphrased by  | Information:          | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred       |

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

#22355

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Need sequences for Twentynine Thirty November purple

[Handwritten:] Have been sent: 29 Nov. at 2129 on 29 Nov. 30 Nov. at 2200 on 1 Dec.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (14) NAV REGS.

## SECRET

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number: 2927.                              | Addressees                                          | Message Precedence                 |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 2 December 1941. | For action:<br>OPNAV:                               | Priority XX<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| To: Coderoom<br>Decoded by WHITE.<br>Paraphrased by        | Information:<br>CINCPAC.<br>CINCAF.<br>COMFOURTEEN. | Priority XX<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

921100

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

Cinc Second and Third in Takao Area X Comdr Southern Expeditionary Force in same Area X Broadcasts to fleet units now being sent by Takao or Bako Radio in addition Tokio XX Alusna Tokio Six hundred and Shanghai Twenty three hundred both of the first no comment XX Ambassador Bangkok Thirtieth requested permission destroy all but limited number codes

[Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by 0Y 27-41

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

## SECRET

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number: 2927.                              | Addressees                            | Message Precedence                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 4 December 1941. | For action:<br>OPNAV.<br>COMFOURTEEN. | Priority: XXXXXX.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred. |
| FOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by<br>Paraphrased by               | Information:                          | Priority.<br>Routine.<br>Deferred.         |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

941502

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time SCT

## TEXT

Five numeral intercepts subsequent to Zero Six Hundred today indicate change of cipher system including complete change differentials and indicator subtractors X All intercepts received since time indicated checked against all differentials three previous systems X No dupes

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.



## 1066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

## Naval message—Navy Department

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

| Phone Extension Number 2927.                               | Addressees            | Message Precedence              |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 5 December 1941. | For Action:<br>OPNAV. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by WHITE.<br>Paraphrased by        | Information:          | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

051482

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

Fuji key for twenty-nine November indicator Baker Yoke King Dog inter Three Fifteen Nineteen Twenty Sixteen Five Twentyone Seven Seventeen Eighteen Six Two Four One Twelve Eight Thirteen Eleven Nine Fourteen Ten X Form third period November two affirm Baker Cast Dog easy six affirm George hypo inter Seven affirm Eight affirm Nine affirm Baker Cast Ten Baker Thirteen affirm Dog easy Fox George fourteen affirm Baker Cast Dog Seventeen affirm Baker Cast Eighteen Baker Twenty Dog Twentyone Cast Twentytwo Cast Twentythree Cast XX Tokyo circular Twntyfour Thirtythree requires additional blanks in four love and five love X Key for Two December Baker Yoke Netat George Prep Fourteen Six One Twentytwo Eleven Thirteen four Twenty Twelve Five Nineteen Twentyone Seventeen Nine Three Sixteen Eighteen Eight Two Fifteen Ten Seven X Following form correct for Tokyo circular Twentyfour Fifty only One Baker Dog easy Two Baker Three Baker Four Baker Dog easy Fox George hypo Five Baker Six Baker Seven Baker Cast Eight Cast Nine Cast Ten Cast George Dog easy Eleven Cast Twelve Cast Fifteen Cast Sixteen Cast George hypo inter Seventeen Cast Dog Twentytwo affirm X Note SGPT repeat SGST is Maru Maru X Advise if you want circular Twentyfour Fifty Singapore attaches great importance to two messages mentioned above XX Tokyo circular Twenty-four Thirtythree of Twentyninth apparently in purple machine X Again request you furnish twentyninth sequence

[Handwritten:] sent in 29/2129

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

## Naval message—Navy Department

| Extension number                                                    | Addressees            | Precedence                      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| From: CINCAF.<br>Released by<br>Date: 6 Dec. 1941.                  | For action:<br>OPNAV. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom: 1311.<br>Decoded by CANNING.<br>Paraphrased by PURDY. | Information:          | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

000006 CR 0132

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

To differentiate C I traffic from others recommend you assign additional external indicator this use with RIP 66. This is necessary in order that decoding be done by proper personnel.

2nd Copy to 20G----

Distribution: 20G-----Action.

Record copy: 20P-----20T-----

Files: General-----CNO-----20-----20A-----

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

## SECRET

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Phone Extension Number 2027.                                | Addressees            | Message Precedence                 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| From: COMSIXTEEN.<br>Released by<br>Date: 7 December 1941.  | For Action:<br>OPNAV. | Priority<br>Routine XX<br>Deferred |
| TOR Coderoom<br>Decoded by WATCH OFFICER.<br>Paraphrased by | Information:          | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred    |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

071025

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence. Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date.....Time.....GCT

## TEXT

New code for emergency use given in Tokyo serials Twentyfour Zero Nine X Two Four Twenty Three Question X and Twentyfour Fifty X Messages in plain language will contain one or more code words sufficient to communicate secret message X Example XX Quote "Japanese and blank troops clashed" end quote represented by code word Hijikata comma and Russia by Kubota XX A message similar to following would be sent X On fifteenth Secretaries Hijikata and Kubota have been appointed to duty in your office Stop XX All messages in this system to have word Stop Repeat Stop at the end instead of Owari X Forwarding you first two above despatches third sent this morning QX Key for Twentyseventh indicator Baker Yoke Hypo Baker Dog X Twelve Fourteen Seven Thirteen Nine One Nineteen Six Eight Seventeen Two Sixteen Eleven Three Fifteen Eighteen Four Ten Five total Nineteen X Where Singapore referenced Tokyo circular Twentyfour Thirtythree they apparently meant above Twentyfour Twentythree

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

## TOP SECRET ULTRA

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington 25, D. C., 4 Jul 1945.

Op-20-G-mg  
Serial 000761820  
(SC)A6-1(10)

## MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).

To: Adm. H. Kent Hewitt—Rm. 2750, Navy Bldg.

Via: Capt. F. O. Willenbucher (Op-20-4).

Subj: Dispatches—Forwarding of.

Ref: Secret letter, no serial, to Op-20-G, dated 3 July 1945, signed by H. Kent Hewitt.

Encl: Duplicates of dispatches requested in the reference.

1. In compliance with the reference, the following dispatches are forwarded:

CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28)

1068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28)  
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 23)  
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, encl. F)  
CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 Jun. 29)

Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches Intercepted Station S

2. It is requested that Op-20-4 place the enclosures in proper legal form for presentation to Mr. Sonnett, and make delivery to Mr. Sonnett.

J. N. Wenger  
J. N. WENGER,  
Captain, U. S. Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,  
Washington 25, D. C., 6 Jul. 1945.

Op-20-4-imp  
Serial 0003720  
(SC)A17-24(1)

From: The Secretary of the Navy  
To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant  
Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.  
Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.  
Encl: (A) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches (Nos. 5077 to 5085, inclusive; Nos. 5257 to 5267, inclusive).  
(B) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing documents, CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 23); and CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, encl. F).  
(C) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing document, CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 Jun 29).

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C), containing the following documents, certified in jacket forms NJA 24, are forwarded herewith for use in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

*Enclosure (A)*  
Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches (Nos. 5077 to 5085, inclusive; Nos. 5257 to 5267, inclusive).

*Enclosure (B)*  
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 23); and CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, encl. F).

*Enclosure (C)*  
CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 Jun. 29).

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that enclosures (B) and (C) are classified TOP SECRET. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these documents to this office is directed.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 50

CQ DE JVJ JUD  
PRESS DE JVJ/JUD HR NW  
BC AT ~~0800~~ DEC 3RD

(The first part is missing)

KYOOSANGUN KOOGKIO MEIZESIJITU IJOONOGTOKU GENTI-  
NIOKERU  
SHOOKYOONO SOOKOKUWA IZENSINKOKUO KIWAME JIMII JUUDA-  
IKA SITUTUARUMO BIMYOONARU KOKUSAIKANKYOOONI SIHAISARE  
KAROOJITE KEISIKIJOONO SHOOKYOO GASSAKUNO HATANWO  
BIHOOSITUTUARU JOOKYOODPEARU TUGINI JUITIMATUCHUU WA-  
GAHOONO JISSISERU SHUYOOAKUSENJO MIRUNI MOTTOMO DAI-  
KIBIBONARUWA SANTOONANBUNI BANKYOSURU KYOOSANGUN  
SANTOOJU----OYOB I DAISYAKUJUGOSI (YAKUNIMAN) NITAISSURU  
MONONISITE GOHIMIMEIYORI KAKANNARU SOOTOOSSENWO

KYOOKOOSI SUDENI SONOSHURYOKUO HOTTONDOYAKUSI SALANI  
 KONKYOTI FUKUME---SIKISHOKU TIKASOSIKINO EKIKETUNADO  
 MOKKA SAKUSENWO KIZOKUCHUU DE---JUGATUGEJUNYO---JIS-  
 SICHUUNO SADSEISHOO NA UNIARJ CHUUOO DAIKYUJUGUN  
 OYOBI DAITISINI TAISURU FUNSE---SAKNAWA SONOGCHAKU-  
 CHAKU HNKAO KAKUDAICHUDE ATTAGA WAGAGUNWA JUITI-  
 GATUJUHI UMONKOONO DOOKUTUJINTINI YOTTE KESSITEKI  
 TEKOOWO TUZUKERU TEKINII---KOOSI TEKISI SENGHOYAKU-  
 GOJU HORYO NISENNIHYAKA SANJOUHATINO DAISENKAOGETA  
 IPPCOWAGA KUUGUNWA KYOZETUSANAJU HI IRAIRENI CHUUN  
 ---OKERU OKUTIBAKUZEINI KOWOOSI HEAN SOOKEI RE---O  
 (TAMASITTAOARA) BUKOO (BUSITEGARA) KANYOO (ME---  
 YOOSHOOWO KAN---NI WAGAHOOYOKUK ANI SESTUSTUTUARU  
 MATA HOKUSINOKEWU DAISNJI TIANKYOOKA UNDOOWA JUITI-  
 GATUIT---I YOAI N WASTALI TENKAI---ALITUTU DAITJI DA  
 --- MINSHUUNO JIEIAYOKUNO KYOOKUTO SOOKYOO SISOOSENN  
 JUNBIKAN---O OOKUHYOOTU SERUNITAISU SALANI TAEKI KEI-  
 ZAISENJO FUKASS---KANMI STINOJITUO A--- OUNI SASUME-  
 RARE TUTUARI HOKUSSNO TIANNO KAKURITUTO KESZAIK-  
 ETUNO TAMENI HONWUDOC---U IKAKUNARU JIKKOOWO MSAM  
 ---KIKOTO KITISARRU RA AN JU---TUUKWASOREZKRE (CEN-  
 CHONA BOOKHOOJOSIMESI NITBTKENWO GUKUMETE JUUITI-  
 TUKI MATUNOENKEI TUUKANZAKKOO SOOGAKUWA GUSAN---JU  
 ENWOSANSURUNI SOATTASU NAJA SEGINKENWA ROKUWOKUISSEN  
 GOHYAKLUMANEN (HAKUNENMATU GOWOKUHASSEN M NDEN)  
 TOKYUUZOKSETAIGIKENWA NIWOKUSSEN NADHYUJOUNE (SAKU-  
 NENMATU ITIWOKUKYUUSNKYUUSYAKUMANEN) WOSEMESEMENTA  
 MANSHUU CHUUGINKENWA JUUITIKUI NIJUHHIGENZAI JUUJO-  
 UINANSSEN GOHYAKUMANEN (SAKUNENMATU KYUOOUKU NANASE-  
 NYONHYAKUMANTMEN) NIGEKIZOOSI CHUGOKURUGO JUNBI JUNBI-  
 GINKOKENWA NIJUGOHI GENZAI KYUOKUNISEN MANYENNI  
 NODORI SAKUNENMATUNO NANAOKU ISSENMANWO HARUKANI  
 UWAMAWATTA MYOOGI---KENWA NIJUHIENZAI IMOKU GOHYA-  
 KUMAN (HAKUNENMATU KYUSENSANBYAKUKAN TONNA) KONOH-  
 KANI CHUUSINI OKERU GUMPYONO RYUTUDANAGA SOOTONI  
 NOBORUTO MURLAREWUNODE JUITIGANA MATUNO ENKEITUUKA  
 RYUTUDAKA HATIJUOKU TOPPAWA UGOKANUTOKORODEARI HON-  
 NENMATUNO HAKKODAKAWA NAITEIDI---OOKEIHYAKUOKUYENNI  
 NOBORUNO DEWANAIAKAA CHOMKUSAETEIRU AR DE JVJ

Bad echo and interference causing bad copy.

2338 P RD

12275 KC

CQ DE JVJ

PRESS DE JVJ HR NW BC AT 9839 DEC 3RD.

DOMEI GAIKEI MUGI 164 217 224 746 782 794 WATAMI 285 294

294 KAWARAZU PARA KAWARAZU BEIMENSIKYOO NITIBEI KAIDANNO  
 KEJZOKUWO KOOKANSITE BOOSEKISUJI NYUORURINZU SUOIKABU-  
 SIKI SUJINOKAINI JOOSINSITA RONDONHATU KABUITIBAWA KYOKU-  
 TOJOSEI NITAISITE YAYARAKKAN TEKITONARI KIHAIWA SIKKARITO  
 NATTAGA JITUKADUHUSOKU NITORI KIKIWA IZENSHOORYOO KINBUTI  
 SHOOKENRUI -WA KENCHOO KOOGYOOKABU KYOOCHOO KOKUNAI  
 TETUDOOKABU UWAMUKI SEKIYUKABUWA SIKKARI NANAKINKOO  
 KABUWA GALEITEKENCHOO. KOOJOOGINKO KABUWANIPPOINTO HAN-  
 GATAJOOKSIN GAIKOKUSAINO NAKADEWA NIHONSAITO SINASAIGA  
 SANPOINTO NAIGAIKOOTOO SITANOGA MEDATTEA MATAI SA TOLA  
 KIHAI RUPEE NAMARI KABU KOOSAI DORU TIRIKU KOMUGIKABU  
 SIKYOMICHA KU DORU SANJIGENZAI 49324 524 IMI 49324 534 ATTOTA-  
 TAZU AR NM TU DE JVJ VA VA

2350 G RD

12275

Bad echo and interference plus weak sig.

# 1070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

9199 SKED

HR BC AT 1999 3 DEC. 1941

DOMEI HAMAITOMAEYORI 1599 NASI NASI 1538 1544 PARA  
GAIKEI ASA 5999 5999 URITES MATAI 3612 4998 3698 2494 NAMA-  
RI 5799 TOLA KIHAI RUPEE KABU MICHAKU DORU 49324 534 ATOTAT  
AZU TAIRIKU KAWARAZU PARA

994 WASINTONNI KAWAKAMIHATU NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISIIWA  
UERUZO KOKUMUJIKANNO YOOSEINIYORI NIHIGOZENJUJI NIJUPPUN  
(NIHONJIKAN SANHIGOZENREIJI NIJUGOFUN) KOKUMUSHOOWO  
HOOMON DOOJIKANTO SANJUGOFUNNI WATATTE K Aidanwotogeta  
MIGIK Aidanwa RUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOONO MUNEOUKE UERU-  
ZUJIKANGA SHOMONDAINI TUKI NIHONSEIFUNO SETUMEIOMOTO-  
META MONOTOMIRARERU UERUZUJIK TONO K Aidanwooeta NO-  
MURA KURUSU RYOOTAISIIWA KISHADANNI TORIKAKOMARE NAGARA  
TAKUMINI YOOTENWO HAZUSITE TUGINOGOTOKU NOBETA K Aidan-  
NO NAIYOONI TUITEWA NANIMO MOOSIAGERU WAKENIWAIKANAI  
WAREWAREWA TADA UERUZUJIKANNO GOWOKEICHOOSITANI SUGIN-  
AINODA

995 WASINTON NIHI KAWAKAMIHATU KOKUMUSHOO TOOKYOKUWA  
UERUZU JIKAN NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISII K Aidan ---- KATATT-  
UERUZUJIKANWA DAITOORYOONO MEINIYORI NOMURAKURUSU  
RYOOTAISII NO RAIHOOWOMOTOME DAITOORYOONI HOOKOKUSURU-  
TAME NIHONSEIFUNI TAISI ARUSHUNO SHOOGOOWO NASITAMONOD-  
EARU

996 WASHINGTONNIHI KAW----KIHATU NOMURAKURUSO RYOOTAI-  
HI OYOBI UERUZUJIKANNO K Aidanwa NIHUNOZEN JUJIGOUJUGOFUN  
SHUURYOO KORENITUZUITE RUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOOWA SHOOGO  
SUTIMUSON RIKUGUNCHOOKAN NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKAN OYOBI  
KAZEDE HIKIKOMORICHUUNO HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANNO DAIRITO-  
SITE UERERUZU KOKUMUJIKANNI HOWAITOHAUSUNI SANSHUOOTO-  
META MIGINIKANSI HOWAITOHAUSI TOOKYOKUWA (KAIGOOWA  
TANNI SHOHANNO UTIAWASE NARABINI KYOKUTOO JOOSEINO KEN-  
TOOWO OKONAUTAMEDERE ARU) TOHAPPYOOSITA

997 SINGAPOORUNIHI SINGAPOORU SEICHOOWA NIHI EIKAIGUNWA  
ARATANI KYOKUTOO KANTAIOHENSEI KOREOMOTTE KATTENO SI-  
NAKANTAIOMO HOOGANISHIME EIHONGOKU KANTAIOYOBI EITI-  
CHUUKAI KANTAIO DOOYONOTIHO FUYOSITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA  
NAO KONOKANTAIWA EISINAKANTAI HARABINI HIGASIINDO KAN-  
TAINIKAWATTE KYOKUTOO HOOMENBOOBINI ATARUBEKI MONO-  
DEARI JIJITUJOO GOOSYUU NARABINI NYUUIJIRANDO KANTAIMOK-  
ORENI HENNYUU SERARERUONOTO KAISERARERU

998 NYUUYOOKUNIHI EEPHI SINGAPOORU DENNICOREBA SINNINGO  
EIKYOKUTOO KANTAI SIREICHOOKAN TOMASU FUIRIPPUSU TOMASU  
FUIRIPPUSU TAISHOOWO NOSETA SINEISENTOOKAN PURINSU OBU  
UERUSUGOOWA SIREICHOOKANKIO KAKAGE JAKKANSEKINO YUURY-  
OKUNARU GUNKANTOTOMONI NIHI SINGAPOORUNI NYUUKOOSITA  
EIKOKUGA SENSOOJUNBINO TAME SHURYOKUKANWO KYIKUTOONI  
HAKENSITANOWA PURINSU OBU UERUSUGOOWA SAISHODEARU IPPOO  
SINGAPOORU TOOKYOKUWA HOKANIGUNKAN SUUSEKIGATIKAKU  
NYUUKOOSURU YOTEIDEARUTO HAPPYOOSITA

NM TU DE JVJ/JUD.

9126 G TR

15889

MANUAL

PRESS DE JVJ HR NW BC AT 1939 DEC 3 RD

NOMEI 999 WASINTONNIHI NOMURA KURUHU RYOOTAISIIWA  
UERUZUJIKAI KAIKENNOTAME IHIGOZENJUJI NIJUPPUN KOKUMUSH-  
OONI TOOCHAKUSI TAGA MATIKAMAETA KISHADANNO SITUMONNI  
TAISITEWA AKUMADE KOOSHOONI HAIZENWO TUKUSUMUNE SIN-  
NATAIDODE OOSHUUSTA MAZU NOMURATAISIIWA IWAKU NIHONSEI-  
FUWA HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANNO TUE ARAYURU CAKUDOKARA  
SINCHOONI JUKURYOSITERU NIHONNOTAIDOWA DEKIREBA SEN-  
SOOWO SAKERUKOTONIARU SENSOOWA KESSITE NANIGOTOWOMO KAI-  
KETUSINAIISI NANIBITOMO SENSOOWO NOZOMUMONOWANAI ) TUEDE  
KISHADANKARA KURUSUT AISINI IMADA DORYOKUSITE K Aidanwo

SEIKOONI MITIBIKIURU KIBOOGA ARUTOWO OUMA TONOSITUMONGA  
BETANONITAISI TAISIWA MOTIRONTMOWAL

• (Interference local)

RIKUGUNCHOOKAN NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKANOO SANSHUSU RUUZU  
ERUTO DAITOORYOOWO CHUUSINNI ITIJIKAN JUGOFUNNIWATARI  
SEV USHUNOOB U KAIGIGA OKONAWARETA MIGIKAIGINO NAIYOONI  
TUITWA KANZENNI TINMOKUGA MAMORARETERUGA TAINIISEISAKU  
KYOOGITO SINZERARET RU NAO HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANWA KAZE-  
NOTAME KOKUMUSHOO HOWAITOHA USU IZURE IMO KAWODASA-  
NAKAT #11 RONBONNIHI EIKAIZUNSHOOWA GOOSHUUKANTAI SHO-  
ZOKA OUNYOOKAN SIDONI ZOOGA (673# TON) TKOUKISHUUKAN SHU-  
TAIERUMARUKI'GOO (94# TON) TOGOOSHUU SUITKIDE KOSENSITA  
KIEATOMONI TINBOTUSITAMUNE HAPPYOOSI TA SENTOONO JIJITUWA  
HAPPYOOSARENAIGA JUITIGATU NIJUROKUIH IZENNOBOOHITO  
IWARE SIDONI GOO JOONWAZENBU UKUEFUMEIDAGA SHUTAIERU-  
MARUKUGOO NORIKUMIINWA ITIBU KYUJUIARETATO IWA RERU  
#12 KANFERANIHI GOOSHUUS NIHIYORU JUNYOOKAN PARAMA-  
TOA GOONO GEKITINNITUKI TUGINOGOTOKU HAPPYOOSITA GOO  
SURUUPU GATA KEIJUNYOOKAN PARAMATTAGOOWA (106# TON)  
SUIRAINO KO GEKIOUKE GEKITINSARETA SHOOSAIWA IMADAFUMEI  
#13 NYUUYOOKUNIHI NIHIYUUPI GABOOJUSI TA EIKOKUR IONI YO-  
REBA HORENWA URAJIOSUTOKKU FUKINSUISKIO KOOKOOKINSI  
KUIKI I SITEISITA MUNEHAPPYOOSITA #14 RONDONNIHI EISEIFUWA  
SANHIYIGO KYOKUTOONIMUKE TUMIDASARERU EISHOOHINNI TAI-  
SITEWA SUBETEYUSHUTU KYOKAHEIO JISIURUMUNE NIHI HAP-  
PYOO STA

#152 P AN  
1588#  
MANUAL

PRESS DE JVJ HR BC AT 110# DO

DOMEI #14 WASHINGTON WAGA RYOOTAISINO UERUZUJIKAN  
HOOMONA TOKUNI RUUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOONO Y OKYUUGA KISONI  
NATYMONODE BEIKOKU DAITOORYOOGA KANSHAIANO KYUUKAO TO-  
TUJO TORIYAMETE UOOMUHUPURINGUSUYORI KIKANSURUTOYUU  
KEUNO KOTOGQRADAMO SOOZOOTUKUTOORI DAITOORYOOGA NITI-  
BEIKAIDANNO SUISINJOO NANRAKA JUUYOOJITAINO SENMEIONOTE  
HISSUYOOKENTO SITAKOTOGA UKAGAWARERU SHOOSOKUSUJIMO  
KAKU DAITOORYOO MIZUKARA MOND ANOSHORINI NORIDASITA  
KOTOWA KAIKANNOSEIHINI KIWAMET JUUY OOSEIGA ARUTOSI NIHI  
TUGIN KNYAIO HYOOMEISITA DAITOORYOO MIZUKARA KAIBANNI  
KAINYUUSITE SAIKINNOJITAI SENNEIO MOTOMETA KOTOWA SONOIZI  
SUKOBURU JUUYOODEARU #16 WASHINTONNIHI RUDAITOORYOOWA  
NIHINO NITIBEI KAIKANNITUKI UERUZU KOKUMUJIKANNI TAISITO-  
KUNI SITASIKUSHUJU ISJIOOKONATTA O TUTAERARERU DAKENI NI-  
HINO DAITOORYOO SINUUNKISHA KAIKENWA KONOTENNI SITUMONGA  
SHUUCHUUSARE KONNITINO KAIDANDE TEISHUTU SARETA TAINITI  
SHOOKAIWA SAIGOTUUCHUUNO KEISIKIO TOTOAMONO KS MATAWA  
KIGENTUKIDE KAITOOWOYOOKYUU SITAMONOKATONO KISH ADEAGA-  
WANO SITUMONNITAIHI DAITOORYOOWA SOREWAMOTOOMO BAKA  
ETA SITUMONDA BEIKOKUGAWANO TAINITI SHOOKAIWA MATOAKU-  
TANNA RU TEICHOONARU SHOOKAINI SUGINAITO KARUKUKOREO IS-  
SHUUSITA #17 SHANHAI KAWASEYORITUKI TAIEI TAIBEI KAWARAZU  
GAUNPYOO NIJUHATIEN NINOITIURI NIJUKYUEN CHOODOKAI PARA  
AKEI INOONS ONO TAKUSOOKENNINWA SENJI KASHOKURYOO SEISA-  
KUNO JUUYOOSHNI KANGAMI NAIGAITIWO TUJITE IKYANSERU  
SHOKURYOO SEISAKUWO KAKURITU SENTOSURUMONDE KONGO-  
NOONDAI TOSITETUGINO GOTOKUKITAI SARETIRU HITOTU NAIGAITI  
SHOKURYOO KOORYUUNO KAKURITU JUURAINO SHOKURYOO KOORYU-  
UGAYAYAMO SUREBAKAKKYO SHUGI WAZAWAI SAREKEIKAKU DOORI-  
NOUNYOOGA YINAKATA JIJITUNIKANGAME KONGOWA SHOKURYO-  
ONO HAIDUNWAMOTIRON SEISAN NTUITEMO KOORYUUSENTO SURU-  
MONODEARU SIKASITE SEISANKEIKA NAI AN JUUIKKANEN  
KEIKAKUWO KIJUNTOSI GAITI MANSHUUKOKUWO TUUJYAKU NIS-  
ENROPPIYAKU MANKOKUZOOSAN KEIK AKUWO JISHISI MOTESHOKU-

# 1072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

RYOO JIKYUURITUNO KYOOKAWO HAKARU MONODEARU FUTATU  
IMINKOKUSAKUNO SUISIN NIJUKKANEN HYAKUMANKO NO TAIMANI-  
MIN KEIKAKUWA MYOONENDOKARA DAINIKI KEIKAKUNI DU  
(GOKANEN) NIJUUNIMANKONO NAITINOOMINWO SOOSITUSUBEKU  
IKIKONDEIRU MITTU NAIGAITI RINSEINOTOOGOO RINSEIGA (HAYA-  
SISEIJI) NOORINSHOO NOMINARAZU NAIMITOKUMU SONOTANIBUN-  
KATU SARETEIRUMONOWO ITIGENKA SURUKOTO YOTOU HIRYOOSI-  
GENNO TANKYUU CHOOSSENSA OYOBIKYOOEI KENNAINOHIR YOO  
SINKYOOGENNO KAITAKUSURUKOTO NADODEARUGA KORENIYORI  
WAGANOO IN TAKUMURYOO GYOOSIWA SOOGOOTEKINI SONOKOKU-  
SAKU WO JITUGENSIURU KOTOTONAROO PARA TOKYOMAEHIKE 1977  
771 661 NASI 649 526 TAKANE 1993 771 YASUNE 1987 766 578 794 NASI NASI  
897 869 TAKANE 279 798 517 859 811 873 KASUNE 576 793 517 659 897 867  
HAMAITOGENBUTU 1599 PARA

9126 F AN  
15889  
MANUAL

PRESS DE JVJ/JUF/JUD HR BC AT 1139 DEC 3RD

DOMEI TOKYO WITUBUTUSOO A 141 151 481 299 555 599 319 758 745 576  
PARA 917 HANOISANHI NITIBEI KOOSHOOGA KIWAMETE KINPAKUSITA  
KOTOWA FUTUINCHOOYANO KANSINWOTAKAME TOOTI FURNSUGO  
SINBUNWA NITIBEI KOOSHOOWOMEGURU NYUUSUO RENJ U TOPPUNI  
KAYAGETERUGA IPPANNONINKIWA KIWAMETE REISEIBE OSI NITI-  
BEIKANYEGA JUUDAIKASI TAIHEIYOONI SAIKUWITAIGA TOPPATU-  
SITEMO FUTUINNAIBUNIWA NANNO DOOYOOMONAKU MUSIRO NITI  
FUTUIN KYOODOODOOEI KYOOTEIWA SARANIITIDANTO SONOTIKA-  
RAO HAKKISURUMONOTO HINERARITERU SUNAWATI ITIBUNIWA  
MADA HIYORI MITEKI TAIDOWO SUTEKIRINU MONOARUGA ZENTAI-  
TEKINI MITE NITIFU TUIN KYOODOOBOOEI KYOOTEINO SEISINWO  
NINHIKISI JITAINO JUU AIKANI TOMONATE KYOOTEINO HINKAGA  
HAKKISARU BEIKIMONOTOSITE FUTUINKANPENMO HAKENGUN  
SHUNOODUMO EIBEINO BOORYAKUNI SINCHOONARU CHUUIOSARAI-  
REISEINI JITAINITAISHO SENTOSITERU YOMDEARU SIKAHITE WAG-  
AENTIGUN OYOBI TOKUHATAISIFUWA KIWAMETE KINMITUNI RENA-  
KUSI KYOKUMENNO SUIINISOKUOO BANPANNOSOTINI IKANNAKIO  
KIHITERUGA FUTUINNOITIGA IWAYURU EIISI RAINNO TOKKAKU TIKE-  
INIARI GUNJIJOO SEIPIJOO TOMINI JUUY OOSEIO KAYUFAISITERUN-  
ODE KONGONO JOOSEINITAIBOSI KYOODOOBOOE KYOOTEIWA JISHI-  
TUTEKINI KYOOKASARERU MONOTO KITAISARERU (IKA) OYAKU)  
SINGAPOORUNI SINGAPOORU SICHOWA NIHI EIKA I GUNWA ARATANI  
KYOKUTOO KANAIOHENSEISI KORENIKATUTENO EIK OKU SINAKAN-  
TAIOMO HOGGANSSEIME EIHONGOKUKANTAI OYOBI TICHUUKAI KAN-  
TAITO DOOYONOTIHO FUYOSITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA NAO SININ  
EIKYOKUTOO KANTAI SIREICHOOKAN TOMASU FIRIP PUSU SHOOSH-  
OOWO NOSETA SINCEISENTOOKAN PURINSUOB UBRUSUGOO GA  
JAKKANNO YUURYOKU GUNKANWOHIKIITE NIHI SINGAPOORUNI  
NYUUKOOSITA WUSINTONNIHI NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAI SIWA NIHI-  
GOZEN JUJINIJUGOFUN KOKUMUSHOONI UERUZUJIKANWO HOOMON  
SANJUGOFU I NATATTE KAI DANSITA KOKUMU TOOKYOKUWA MIGI-  
KAIDAN SHUURYOOGO (UERUZUJIKANWA) DAITOORYOONO MEINI-  
CORI NOMURAKURUSU RYO OTAISINO RAIHOOWOMOTOME DAITOORY-  
OONI HOOKOKI SURTAME NIHON SIFUNI TAISI ARUSUONO SHOOK-  
AIONASITA MONODEARU) TOHAPPYOO WAGA RYOOTAISIMO KISHA-  
DANNO SITUMONNI TAISITE) WAREWAREWA TABA UERUZUJIKANNO  
HANASIO KEICHOOSITANI SUGINAI) TOKOTAETA

RUDAITOORYOOWA NIHISHOOGO SUTIMUSON RIKUGUNCHOOKA  
N NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKAN UERU U KOKUMUJIKANWO HOWAIT-  
OHAUSU INSHOMTISI ITIJIKANYONI WATARI TAINITISAKUO CHUU-  
SINNI KY OOGISITA RONBONNIHI EIKAIGUNHIOOWA GOOSHUUKAN-  
TAI SHOZOKU JUNYOOKAN SIDONIGOOGA (6739) FOKUKISHUUKAN  
SHUTAIERUMARUKU GOOTO (9499) GOOSHUU SUIIKIDE KOOSSENSI-  
TAKEKKA SOOHOM TINBOTU SITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA SENTOONO  
JIJITUWA HAPPYOO SARETENAIGA JUITIGATU NIJUROKUIH IZENNO  
BOOHITOIWARERU NYUUYOOKUNI YUUPIECA BOOJUSITA EIKOKU

RAJIONIYOREBA SORENWA URAJIOSUTOK FUKINSUIEKIO KOOKOO  
KINSIKUIKINI SITEISITA MUNESAPPYOOSITA

0254 F AN  
15880  
MANUAL

DOMEI GAI IS KA S U 521 275 118 BUENOSAIRE TOOTIEIKOKU  
TAISIKANWA HARUNJUUKUHI ITOOCHUUSHOOJI BURAKKURISUTO  
NIKUWABRUMUNE HAPPY OSITA CHUUNANBE TUJITESOOJIN  
KAIHSNO KOKUHYOOWA SAIHHODEARU KONOKEKKA ITOCHUUTONO  
IDANIKOROBNA UKETUMINIO KEIYAKUSEARU JONSON SHOOKA-  
IWA HUTUKA KEIYAKUHAKIO MOOSIIRETEKITA PARA  
019 RONDONNIHI CHAAIRU SHUSHOOWA NIHINOKAINNI JINTEK-  
IHIGEN CHOYOOREIO TEIANHI JUHATISAIKAR  
SUBETENODANSIO HEIEKINI CHOOCOHIURU KENCENWO YOOKY-  
UUSIKATU JIJONNIYOTEWA ROKUJUSHAINO DANHIOMO SHOOSHU-  
USIRU KOTOARUBEKI UNE FUGENSITA MICIHOOASWA DANHINO-  
MINARAZU NIUSHAIKARA S ANJUSHAIHADENO MIKONNOJOSINO  
CHOYOOWOMOKITEISITERUGASENTOMWOYOBISEIMEINIKIKENARU  
NINMU IWA MIZUKARA SIGANSITA FUJINNOMIO ATERUKOTOTO  
RUSAZUDEARU SIKASITE CHAATIRUWA CHOMBOSANYI KAUUDAI  
TEIANRIYUUTOSITE SANOGOTOKU SETUMEISITA HITOTU SINSETU  
KOOJOONO JUUGYOOSHA DOSHUUGA KINKYUUMO HITUY OONI SEM-  
ARARETERU KOTO HITOTU TOOYONIOKERU GUNTAIOIISI DOOH-  
OOMENNI OKERU DAIKINONO SENTOOKEIZOKUNO JUN IOSITEOKU  
HITUYOOARUKOTO HITOTU INDONIOITE SHOOSHUUSI KUNRENSITU-  
TU ARUTASUUNO GUN AINITAISII SINSIKISOOBIO ATAEMA MARANUK-  
OTO HITOTU EIKOKUNO ENSOSUSHI SEISANWIO KEIZOKUSESIMERU  
ITUYOOR UKOTO HITOTU KUUGUNNARABINI KAIGUNZOOKYOO  
KEIKAKUO KANSUISSE HITUYOOARUKOTO HITOTU DOKUGUNNO TAEI  
JOORIKUSAKUSEN OYOBI KUUSAKUNITAISII TAEZU BOODIOTUZUKIRU  
SITUYOORUKO 020 BERURINNIMI DOKUGUNSIREIBU HAPPYOO  
(TOOBUSENSEN) HITOTU ROSUTOFUTIKUNO SENTOOWA HIKITU-  
ZUKI KIEZOKUSANETRU HITOTU MOSUKUWA FUKINDEWA DOKUGU-  
BUTAIWA SARANI TEKIJINFUKAKU KOOGHE IO KIWAET A  
RENINGURAADO FUKINDEWA MOONOOGEKIO KOOATTANOTI MATA  
O DASHHUTUO KITOSITI  
OYOSI HYOOKETUSERU RAWOCAKOWOOWO YUKUTEKI YUSOOBUTAIO  
BA KUGEKISI SENTOOKI BAKUGEKISI  
MARABINI SEOK  
SANVEYIKA

ROKAKU HAKA

(Fading Bad)

1539 1544 PARA NM TU JVJ VA

0321 P AN  
15880  
MANUAL

S , Dec. 1941.

Hr Domei press

01 Tokyo 2/12 officially announced Yoshiaki Hatta former Minister Commerce Industry appointed new Minister Railways assuming post hitherto held concurrently by Viceadmiral Ken Terajima Communications Minister stop Also announced position Minister Overseas Affairs will be transferred to Hiroya Ino Minister Agriculture Forestry stop Latter hitherto concurrently held by Shigenori Togo Foreign Minister

02 Manilas 2/12 Manila bulletin reports high military authority close United States Far eastern forces emphatically declared quote there's been no general alert unquote in connection with reports United States forces Philippines been ordered standby for action.

03 Hsinking 2/12 five Soviet soldiers crossed border into Manchoukuo territory 1900 yesterday at point forty—South Tungning eastern Manchoukuo twas reported stop Said Japanese garrison troops shot dead two trespassers drove back three into Soviet territory.

04 Bangkok 2/12 Japanese Ambassador Teiji Tsubokami after meeting Thai-premier Luang Pabul Songgram this morning told press Thai premier told him



## 1074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

he regretted quote malicious propaganda spreading rumors Thailand Ha— unfriendly feelings toward Japan unquote

05 Berlins 2/12 high command communique Nazi forces driven deep Moscow defenses at more points however no details revealed sametime claimed more than nine thousand British prisoners including three generals taken in Libya added eight one four British tanks one two seven planes destroyed.

06 Londons 2/12 Admiralty announced six eight three zero ton Australian cruiser Sydney sunk in clash with German raider Seelmark which also sunk added action occurred sometime before 26/11

07 Washington 2/12 Japanese Ambassadors Nomura Korusu conferred with Undersecretary State Sumner Welles more than thirty-five minutes this morning stop All declined reveal nature today's discussion however learned United States made certain inquiries to Japanese government regarding situation in South seas stop After conference Welles immediately called on President Roosevelt and held lengthy conference.

08 Londons 2/12 Britain Decl—Faded out completely

0353 G TR  
13649  
Tape.

S 3 DEC. 41.

CK DE JUP/JAP  
DOMEI COPYRIGHT

13 Tokyo 3/12 United States probably believes she effectively restraining Japan by concentrating her naval force in Pacific but as irony fate would have it result is 80 percent United States Fleet quote immobilized unquote in Pacific while Germany been blessed with golden opportunity to give full play her naval activity in Atlantic writes naval editor Yomiurishimbun in front page today stop. Yomiuri editor thinks some eighty percent United States Navy now concentrated in Pacific consists seven or eight battleships three aircraft carriers some dozen out of fifteen heavy cruisers over fifty destroyers more than thirty submarines and large number auxiliary vessels all which now standing by Hawaii in addition two or three battleships and other units standing by west coast bases stop. Reviewing Japanese American negotiations Yomiuri editor opines United States apparently means to maintain peace in Pacific until 1946 when her two ocean fleet completed stop. Tightening ABCD encirclement against Japan as they do United States and Great Britain now throwing covetous eyes at Soviet fleet Far East which they wait to drag into ABCD camp stop. Yomiurishimbun however asserts quote its problematical whether Soviet Union play into Anglo American hands Soviet naval forces Far East consists more than hundred vessels including one cruiser five destroyers some ninety submarines two submarine bases and several river gunboats torpedo boats and minelayers and special service vessels in estimated Yomiurishimbun editor who outpoints Great Britain and United States paying special attention Soviet underwatercraft and air force stop. Yomiurishimbun declares quote survey Pacific situation clearly shows Japan seriously menaced by ABCD encirclement which United States tightening in order to realize her unholy design stop. But Japanese nation calmly watching situation with implicit confidence reposed in Imperial navy and army especially since both Prime Minister and concurrently War Minister General Tojo and Navy Minister Admiral Shimada assured nation before recent Diet session that full preparations been completed unquote Para.

14 Tokyo 3/12 Understood Vice Admiral Seizo Sakonji former minister air force ministry be appointed President semiofficial Imperial Oil Company succeeding Yoshiaki Hattai who appointed minister railways yesterday Para.

15 TOKYO 3/12 Financial experts expect total value yen linked currencies at end this year will top yen ten milliard mark inclusive Yen six milliard worth Bank of Japan notes yen seven hundred fifty million Bank of Korea notes yen two hundred fifty million Bank of Osaka notes yen milliard three hundred million notes Bank of Manchoukuo yen milliard notes Federal Reserve Bank China and yen hundred twenty million Bank of Mongolia notes stop. Incidentally its revealed circulation yen linked currency Japan controlled area East Asia at end of November exceeded yen eight milliard.

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~~002~~ SHUUGIINGIINO NINKIWA IKKANENKAN ENCHOONO HOORITUNI-  
YORI MYOONENSANGAT SANJUITISO MOTE MANRYOOSURU KOTONI  
NATTERUNODE JIKYDU KUSERU ORIKARA YOTEINOORI SOOINKY-  
OWO SIXOESRUKA INAKI UITEWA GIMONWO UGA SEIFUTOO-  
KYOKUTO SITEWA CCHOYUJINO BAYWNOITWO SHUUGIINGIINO  
SOSENKYOWO OKONAUHOOSINDE NOZONDERUKOTO WA CHUUMOKU-  
SARERU SUNAW NITROSENYEKIO SAIMO SEIN KOKUNO NOTINIOIT  
SOOSEKYOWO SIKOOSITA REIGARUNODE SEIFT T OKYOKUTO SITWA  
HIJOO JIKYOKU NOITE KOKUMIN SEKATURYOKUO HATUYOOSURU  
KOTOWA HITUYOONA KOTODEARUTO YUU TATEM MOTOZUKI  
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NANBU KYOOSANGUN GEKIMIE WA CHAKUCHAKU SUSUMERARE  
IMAYA DAINEDANKA HAI UGA JUITIGATU MATUJINUMADENI HAN-  
MESSRU SOOGOSEN KWA TEKISE 2446 IMI 2446 50RYO B8 IMI 685  
ROKUJUEIN JUUNI YOOHOO 1116 IMI 1116 WOKAZOETERU RONDON-  
NIHI IMKKGUNSHOO HAPPYOO EI KESUIJOO KANTEIWAS TIKHU-  
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SHANHAI ZAI YUUIJIN YAKUYONHYAKU GOJUMEIWA SANII OOTJ  
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BUBUNWA FUJOSIDE IMADA STO UHYAKU MEINO ZANRYUU-  
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RANYIN PANAMASENMO KORENITUIZUI SUBU KONOKEK A SHAN-  
HAIJW TU YOKU YORI KANZENNI KAKU USARERU KOTONINRA  
ZAINI ANT OOWA SINKOKUNA MONOGAAROO NOOFOOKKUNIH  
RARUFU BAADO IMI RAA BAADO JI HOWA NIHITOOTIDE  
ENZETUTOOKONA HYOONO KIKIO KYOOCHOOSEIA NOTI SANOGOTOKU  
NOBETA BEIKEIGUNWA TAI YOO NI FUSHOOJIGA OKOREBA SOREWA  
SHOOKIBONA MONODE WANAI KOTOWORIKAI SI BANZENNO JUN-  
BIONASSIERU BEKAGUNWA KESSITTENONNO JITURYOKUO KAS-  
HOOHY OOKA SITEW MATA EKN AT TAIESYOONI OITWA MUTJKIO  
KGUNDEWANKU KONOTAME BEIKOKUWA SONOKAIUNWO TAIHEYO-  
ONI SHUUCH UU AZENKAWO ER KUNATA NYUUYOOKUSAN  
SANHINO NYUUYOOKU TAIMUSUWA FGOOSHUU NYU UWIRANDEOGA  
BEIKOKUNI KUUGUNYI NARABIN KYUUKYUIE KYOOSURU KEN-  
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 SHUTUDOO KANSUIJOORYUU SENSEISHOO ANKOO (HAUSAKA EYA-  
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 DASII KOKUENNO TATINOBORUNOWO KAKUNIN SARANI HIKOOJOONO  
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 KORENITOMONAI HOOKOKUSAIKEN NARABINI CHOTIKUSAICENNO  
 GENKOO HAKKOOGENDONO KAKUCHOOWO KOORYOSI HOOKOKUSAI-  
 KEN NITUITEWA GENTKOO GOWOKUENNO GENDOWO BAIGANKUNO  
 JUUKUENNI HIKIAGERU KOTOTOSI MIGINITOMONAI RINJISIKIN  
 CHOOSEIHOO KAISINIKANSURU HOORITUANWO KITARUBEKI KITA-  
 RUBEKI TUUJOOGIKAINI TEISHUTUSURU KOTONI NAITEISITA SUNA-  
 WATI RINJISIKIN CHOOSEIHOONI MOTOZUITE SAKUNIEHARUYORI  
 HAKKOOSARETERU HOOKOKUSAIKENNO HAKKOAGAKUWA HONNEN-  
 JUITIGATU MATUNIOITE SANWOKUISSEN NANAHYAKUMANYEN NITA-  
 SHI HAKKOORYORYOKURA ITEMOKUHASSEN SANBYAKU MANYENTO  
 NATTERUGA KOKUMINCHOTIKU MOKUHYOOGAKUNO ZOODAINITOMO-  
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 KAI HAKKOOGENDONO BAIGAKU KAKUCHOOWO DANKOOSURU KOTONI  
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 TUITEWA DAINANAJUROKU TUUJOOGIKAINI OITE HAKKOOGENDOWO  
 GOWOKUENYORI GENKOO JUUKUENNI HIKIAGE SONOHAKKOOGA-  
 KUWA JUITIGATUMATUNI OITE GOWOKUGOSEN HAPPYAKUMANYEN  
 TONATTEORI HAKKOORYORYOKUWA GENZAINAO YONWOKUYONSEN  
 NIHYAKUMANYEN WONOKOSITERUGA RAINENDONIOKERU CHOTIKU  
 MOKUHYOOGAKUWA HONNENDONO HYAKUNANAJU OKUENYORI SA-  
 RANIBOOCHOO SURUMONOTO YOSOOSARERUNODE HOOKOKUSAIKENNO  
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 RURINSANHI DOKUGUNSIREIBU HAPPYOO (TOOBUSENSEN) HITOTU  
 MOSUKUWA SENSEDEWA DOKUHOHIE OYOB I SENSABUTAIWA  
 KYOORYOKUNARU BAKUGEKIKI NARABINI KYUUKOOKA BAKUGE-  
 KIKITAITO AIKOWOOSITE SEKIGUNNO GANKYONARU TEIKOO  
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 INFURETE TIMBOTUSITA (TAISEN) HITOTU DOKUKUUGUNWA  
 EIHONDO SHUHENNO SUIKIDE EIOOGATASHOSEN ISSEKIOSHU-  
 UGEKI DAISONSHOOWO ATAETA HITOTU DOKUKUUGUNWA NIHI-  
 YORUYORI SANHI MIMAINIKAKETE EIKOKU NANSEIKAIGANNO  
 KOOWANSISETUNI MOOBAKUOKUWA ETA 997 MOSUKUWASANHI  
 MOSUKUWA HOOSOOWA TOKUBETUSENKYOO HAPPYODE NANBUSEN-  
 SEN SENKYOONTUKI SANHI TUGINOGOTOKU HOOJITERU ROSUTOFUT-  
 IKU NITE DAIHANGEKISENNI DETA SEKIGUNWA TAGANAROOU  
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TARI KANTONNO SOOSAHONBUNI (KANTONSHOONANBU TANSUI TOO-  
HOKUHO SANJUKKIRONO SANSOKUNI KATAYOKUNO SOONANKIRA-  
SIKI MONOWO HAKKENSITA) TOKYUUDENARI GOOUOOKAHITE YUUR-  
YOKUNA SOOSATAIGA SITUDOOSITA) KAIKEI) KABUSIKISIKYOO  
SAKUHIKOOTOO ATOUKETE HAJIMEZITUYONA RIGUIURIGA ARISES-  
KOOKABU TETUDOOKABU HITTOONI SITAOSITINKI ITIJIHUANTEI  
NEUGOKIWAKYOOAI KUGUTONATTA KOREWAIPPOOKE TEUDOOHIG-  
YOONO KAIKETUNARABINI TUYOKITEKINA SENKYOKUJOOHOO TOYU-  
UTUYO ZAIRYOOGAATTA NIMOKAKAWARAZU TAHOOTETUDOO HIGY-  
OOKAIKETU NITOMONAU TINGINZOOGAKUO MAKANAU TAMENOKAKY-  
AKU UNTINHIKIAGE GAKYOKASARERU JIKINARABINI SONOTEIDOGA  
IMADAGIMONDEARI MATASEIHUNO TOOSEIKYOOKA ZOOZEIMONDA-  
INO NARIYUKIGA HAUNSIARETA TAMEDEARU MOTOMOSIKYOO  
SONOGONZENJI KYOOCHOOTONARI IPPARNI ITIDORUMIMAN GATA-  
HIKIMODOSI NAKANIWAITINAIISI SANDORUGATA KOOTOOSITA MONO-  
MOATTA NAONIHON KOOSHASAIWA TOOKYOOSI GOBUHANNO ITIDO-  
RUYASUNO HOKAMEDATTA UGOKINAKATTA PARA HAMAITOMAEHIKE  
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GENERAL ELECTION NEXTSPRING WITH EXPIRATION OF EXTENDED  
TERURE OF NIMBERS OF HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 3/31 73/31 ASAS 3  
CP CP CP DE JJC/JYD

DOMEIPRESS 91 TOKYOS 3/12 TOJO GOVERNMENT INTENDS HOLD  
GENERAL ELECTION NEXTSPRING WITH EXPIRATION OF EXTENDED  
TENURE OF MEMBERS OF HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 3/31 ? 3/31 UN-  
LESS UNFORESEEN SITUATION ARRISES TWAS AUTHORITATIVELY  
LEARNED PARA 92 WASHINGTON'S 3/12 IN FIRST LENGTHY STATE-  
MENT REGARDING JAPANESE AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS SECRETARY  
STATE HULL IN PRESSCONFERENCE REVEALED PURPOSE DOCUMENT  
HANDED JAPANESE ENVOYS LAST WEEK WAS TO CLARIFY BASIC  
ISSUS INVOLVED IN TALKS AS WELLS END COUFUSION ARISING FROM  
ACTIONS UTTERNCES OTHER GOVERNMENTS STOP ANSWERING FUR-  
THER QUERIES HULL SAID HAD NO INFORMATION WHEN JAPANESE  
REPLY BE FORTHCOMING STOP ALSO TOLD REPORTERS HE UNABLE  
GO INTO DETAILS WHEN ASKED IF JAPANESE ANSWER ROOSEVELT  
INQUIRIES HAVE MAJOR BEARING ON WHETHER TALKS CONTINUE.  
PARA 93 NEWYORKS 3/12 COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM INTER-  
CEPTED NAZIRADIO CLAIM GERMAN TROOPS WITHIN TWENTY SEVEN  
MILES MOSCOW HOWEVER ADMITTED QUOTE STRUGGLING AGAINST  
COLD INDESCRIBABLY BAD ROADS AS WELLS DESPERATELY FIGHT-  
ING ENEMY UNQUOTE PARA

94 TOKYOS 3/12 ALL JAPANESE RESIDENTS IN HONGKONG DECIDED  
EVACUATE AND RETURN JAPAN WITHIN FEWDAYS ASAHIS HONGKONG  
CORRESPONDENT REPORTED PARA 95 WASHINGTONS 2/12

DAVY DEPT BRITISH ADMIRALTY ANNOUNCED APPROACH-  
ES SINGAPORE MINED NAVY DEPARTMENT SAID MINED AREA EX-  
TENDS OFF SOUTHCOAST JOHORE AND VESSELS MUST ENTER THAT  
AREA OWN RISK PARA 96 BLTIMORE 2/12

DAVID LAWRENCE WELLKNOWN COMM WITHN BALTIMORE SUN  
ASSETS ALTHOUGH CHANCES JAPANESE AMERICAN TALKS COLLAPS-  
ING ANY MOMENT CANNOT DISMISSED NEVERTHELESS LONG AS  
THERE DIPLOMATIC TALKSNG THERE WILL REMAIN HOPE PECE AND  
AFTER FURTHER XXXXX EXCHANGES DOCUMENTS MEMORANDUMS  
SOME FORMULA MAY FOUND AND AT END CONVERSATION SOME OTHER

STEP INTERPOSED MAY SUCCEED MAINTAINING PEACEFULL RELATIONS ON DAY TO DAY OR WEEK TO WEEK BASIS PARA 97 TOKYOS 3/12 THAIMBASHY DENIED FOREIGN REPORTS ALLEGING THA MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES CONFERRED WITH MALAY MILITARY AUTHORITIES STOP EMBASSY DECLARED QUOTE THER IS NO TAUTH ABOUT THEALAND SENDING MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE WITH BRITISH MALAYSTATES COMMAND UNQUOTE END DOMEI AR.

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9319 VS

4 Dec 1941.

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PRESS PRESS DE JUP/JAP

HR NW BC AT 1300 DEC 4TH

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KOKUMINSHIMBUN DISCERNES IN AMERICAN MOVES INCRUDEING PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT QUOTE INQUIRIES UNQUOTE MADE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT QUOTE AMERICAN MOTIVES PLAYING FOR TIME TO TIGHTEN ABCD ENCIRCLEMENT AGAINST JAPAN ON ONE HAND ON OTHER TO SHIFT BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN WASHINGTON TALKS TO JAPAN STOP KOKUMINSNIMBUN ASSERTS THERES NO NECESSITY TO MAKE ANY REPLY ROOSEVELTS INQUIRES OUTPOINTING QUOTE THREPOINTS BASIC PRINCIPLE JAPANS FOREIGN POLICY ENUNCIATED BY PRIMEMINISTER TOJO BEFORE RECENT EXTRAORDINARY SESSION DIET AND ALSO SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR FO KURUSU TO WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FORM CALCULATING EXPEDIENCY WORKED OUT OVERNIGHT BUT CONTRARIWISE REPRESENTS WARNING SERVED ON UNITEDSTATES ON BASIS JAPANS LOFTY AIOPERATIONS AND FIRM DETERMINATION STOP WHILE JAPANESE AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON WASHINGTON KOKUMINSHIMBUN DECLARES JAPAN CANNOT LET GO UNCHALLENGED MOVES FRANTICALLY PURSUED BY ANGLOAMERICA STOP PAPER ASKS QUOTE WHAT MEANS PRINCEWALES ARRIVAL SINGAPORE QUERY WHAT MEANS MILITARY ARRANGEMENT MADE BETWEEN CHUNGKING AND UNITEDSTATES WITH REGARD T WESTERN CHINA QUERY WHAT MEANS AMERICAN LEASE THREE BRITISH ISLANDS INDIAN OCEAN QUERY WHAT MEANS TIGHTENING OF WARPREPARATIONS AUSTRALIA PHILIPPINES OTHER ANDLAOAMERICAN POSSESSIONS PACIFIC QUERY UNQUOTE KOKUMINSHIMBUN CONCLUDES QUOTE ITS NECESSARY THAT JAPAN KEEP UP STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO DISPEL AMERICAN MISUNDERSTANDING HER INTENTIONS GAT NOLESS NECES- SARE IS ON PART JAPAN UNQUOTE STOP ARGUING SIMILAR VEIN HOCHISHIMBUN CON TENSE SITUATION PACIFIC MUST AST- CRIBED ANGLOAMERICAN PREPARATIONS FOR UGORESSIVE WAR THEREFORE AS ANGLOAMERICAN MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBLETY FOR PACIFIC CRINIS IF ONE EVER COMES TOKYO 4/12

ARENTINE GEOVERNMENT NOT REP JAPANESE WROPOSALS FOR RESEWARL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TWO RICHEISCLOSED UPON RECEIPT OFFICER REPORTSTOP JFFICIALSSAIDINFORMATION FOR DUENO DESCRIBED PRESS PORTS THAT ARGENTINE DE- CISED TRADE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN RESULT CONTRACT AUTHORIZING UNITEDSTATES ARRINTINGS ENTIRE SUPPORT PRODUCTS AS QUOTE GAOUNDALES UNQUOTE SINCE QUOTE NEGOTIATIONS FOR RESEPARL STILL JAPENSES ARRIVAL 4/12 FORMATIONS JAPANESE NAVALBOMBERS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON DIVE- BOMBED CHINESE AIRFILEDS ANKANGRN SH PROVIDCE STOP ADDED AN JAPANESE

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# 1080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFERENCE 3/12 IMI 3/12 FRANKLY HULLS SAME ONE JA AMERICAN  
TALKS ABRUPT ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONTENT OF  
TALKS BETWEEN TOKYO WAS EXCESSIVELY UNTIMELY AT THEICAL OF  
JAPANESE AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS SOP HULLS REPEATED PURPOSE OF  
DOCUMENT HANDLED WISELY VOYS THE SE THEURCES WAS  
INCOMPREHENSIBLE ADDED AT THE WHE U  
DERRS OUTCOME OF CURRENT TALKS STOP ADEN REVELATION OF  
PARLEYS WGECH CONDUDD W UNDESTAD MUURL CONFIDENCE  
FURTHER THAT D A FUTURE PROSPECT OF TALKS STOP THEY  
SAD THAT DESSPOIDTD OVER UNSSANES QUOTE SUPPORT TIME  
DOCTR TOACTUALITISE FARST ADDIED MAIT INCRESSID WITH  
GREATEST CAUTION PARA  
17TOKYO 4/12 PRIEMIER EXPRESSED SHOCKED SURPRISE THAT  
EXPRESSIONS REGARDS FUTURE NEGOTIONS AS RESULT HULLS  
TALK 3/12 STRESSING UNSTATES CONCERNING BASIC ISSUES AND  
CRITIZE GERMANY WARASS ACTIONS STOP ONE PROMINEANCE  
WASHINGTON DISPATCHES TOGETHER OPENED THREE WAY EAST-  
ERN ECONOMY CONFERENCE STOP NEWS PAPERS SAW UNSTATES  
WOULD DROP QUOTE UNRELISTIC PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE DEEP  
DIFFERENCES EXISTING BETWEEN UNSTATES JAPAN ARES OUT OF  
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE AN POLILIES PHILOSOPHICAL UNQUOTE  
STOP PARA TOKYO 4/12 PACIFIC WAS FAST BECOMING INCREASING  
SERIOUS FOREIGN MINISTE R TOJO DECLARED IN BRIEF SPEECH  
OPENED THREE DAY MEETING STOP QUOTE ANGLO AMERICAN AND  
OTHER SO NTRIES STILL PREFER TO STAND JAPANS APEALS AND  
FAREAST HAMPERING JAPANS EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW OR-  
DER AI MS ATTAINING PERMENANT PEACE AND PROSPERITY  
FOR ALL TOJO SAID ADDED QUOTE AT TIMES LIKE THIS TIS MORE  
SIGNIFICANTE THAT REPRESENTIVES OF JAPAN MANCHUCKO AND  
CHINA GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS AND DECIDE MATTERS 4/12  
DETAILS LATTER DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDS  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE JAPANESE AMERICAN RELATIONS EX-  
PLAINED BY PREMIER TOJO BT TOJO TO GO AT REGULAR SESSION  
PRIVYCOUNCIL 1900 1230 WHEREXXXXX ACTIVE OPINIONS EX-  
CHANGE BY PRIVYCOUNCILORS PREMIER FORMIMIAS W 20 TOKYO  
4/12 LOCAL STOCK MARKET

7320 FAIR

1230 WF

CQ DE JAU2/JUO  
HR NW BC AT 2100 DEC 4

26/12 SINOCOMMUNIST LEADER LISTGNERAL CHUCHANKWEI TO-  
GETHER HIS TWENTYEIGHTSTAFF FFICERS BY JAS FORCES  
STOP SAID CPTURES DE WHEN JAPANESE FORSE ROUTED THEM  
SI OCOMMU AT JPINT SOUTH OAOITNOG CENTAL HOPE I PROVINCE  
PARA 21TO KYOS 4/12 IMI 4/12 DE AIALS LATTS DEVELOPMENTS  
SURROUNDS JAPAN AW AMERICANRE JAPANESE AMERICAN TALKS  
EXPLAINED BY PERIER TOJO FORMNINISA TOGO FOREIGN PRIVY-  
COUNCIL 1900 1230 IMI 1900 1230 WHERE ACTIVE OPININS EXCHANGED  
BY PRIVY COUNCILORS PREMIER FORMMINISA PAR A 22 TOKYO 4/12  
IMI 4/12 LOCAL STOCK MARKET KOMPLEMENTMETN  
AND CRITCIZE GERMANY JAPANESE STOP OMEPAPERS WASHING-  
TON DISPATCHES TOGETHER OPEN THREE XXXXXXXXXXXX WAY ECO-  
NOMIC CONFERENCE STOP NO FURTHER DOMES AR NM TU DE  
JAU2/JUO VA

7320 KC. FAIR  
1333 WF

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 60

28 JUNE 1944

## MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COMDR. BOONE

Subject: Japanese Diplomatic Traffic dated 1941.

Encl: (A) Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic messages on the Tokyo to Washington and Washington to Tokyo circuits from 1 January 1941 through 7 December 1941 which were missing or not translated.

1. At the request of Lieut. (jg) Connorton an inquiry has been made as to the sources from which intercepted Japanese Diplomatic traffic was received during 1941.

2. Mr. C. E. Fleming of GW recalls that during 1941 most of the Japanese Diplomatic traffic on the Washington-Tokyo and Tokyo-Washington circuits was intercepted by Station S. Some messages were missed due to static, atmospheric disturbances and incomplete coverage of all frequencies.

3. Other stations intercepting Diplomatic traffic were Stations A, W, S and H. These stations were assigned certain frequencies to cover. GX would have records of which frequencies were assigned to these stations.

4. Until the United States entered the war, little material was received directly from Western Union, Mackay Radio & Telegraph and other commercial concerns. Messages sent via these companies were often intercepted by RCA and forwarded to OP-20-G. After the outbreak of war, solid files were sent from these companies as well as from the All-America Cables & Radio Co. to OP-20-G.

5. It might be possible to trace some of the missing messages to the files held by the Army. During 1941 the Army and the Navy alternated days in processing Diplomatic traffic. It seems logical that the Army would have had a comparable number of unreadable and badly garbled messages as the Navy.

6. Any logs which dealt with the disposition of intercepted traffic and were originally held by GW have since been turned over to Lieut. Comdr. Murray and Lieut. Comdr. Raven.

SALLY T. LIGHTLE,  
Lieut. (jg), USNR.

Certified a true copy of a document on file In Op-20-G.

G. E. BOONE,  
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

28 JUNE 1944.

[1]

## Enclosure (A).

*Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic Messages on the Tokyo-Washington Circuit,  
1 January-7 December 1941*

| Month               | Total<br>msgs<br>sent | Msgs un-<br>account-<br>ed for | Msgs not<br>trans-<br>lated | Total<br>msgs not<br>available | Total<br>msgs<br>available |
|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| January.....        | 45                    | 15                             | 8                           | 23                             | 22                         |
| February.....       | 62                    | 18                             | 15                          | 33                             | 29                         |
| March.....          | 45                    | 29                             | 6                           | 35                             | 10                         |
| April.....          | 35                    | 11                             | 10                          | 21                             | 14                         |
| May.....            | 77                    | 27                             | 14                          | 41                             | 36                         |
| June.....           | 56                    | 18                             | 12                          | 30                             | 26                         |
| July.....           | 116                   | 42                             | 21                          | 63                             | 53                         |
| August.....         | 82                    | 29                             | 22                          | 43                             | 39                         |
| September.....      | 96                    | 33                             | 18                          | 51                             | 45                         |
| October.....        | 103                   | 27                             | 26                          | 53                             | 50                         |
| November.....       | 140                   | 37                             | 15                          | 52                             | 88                         |
| December (1-7)..... | 55                    | 12                             | 11                          | 23                             | 32                         |
| Total.....          | 912                   | 290                            | 178                         | 468                            | 444                        |



# 1082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## *Analysis of Japanese diplomatic messages on the Washington-Tokyo circuit, 1 January-7 December 1941*

| Month               | Total<br>msgs<br>sent | Msgs un-<br>account-<br>ed for | Msgs not<br>trans-<br>lated | Total<br>msgs not<br>available | Total<br>msgs<br>available |
|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| January.....        | 62                    | 21                             | 15                          | 36                             | 26                         |
| February.....       | 65                    | 22                             | 14                          | 36                             | 29                         |
| March.....          | 65                    | 21                             | 13                          | 34                             | 31                         |
| April.....          | 67                    | 26                             | 10                          | 36                             | 31                         |
| May.....            | 103                   | 35                             | 19                          | 54                             | 49                         |
| June.....           | 90                    | 33                             | 18                          | 51                             | 39                         |
| July.....           | 176                   | 53                             | 41                          | 94                             | 82                         |
| August.....         | 133                   | 44                             | 32                          | 76                             | 57                         |
| September.....      | 121                   | 36                             | 23                          | 59                             | 62                         |
| October.....        | 140                   | 57                             | 30                          | 87                             | 53                         |
| November.....       | 200                   | 42                             | 37                          | 79                             | 121                        |
| December (1-7)..... | 59                    | 17                             | 15                          | 32                             | 27                         |
| Total.....          | 1281                  | 407                            | 267                         | 674                            | 607                        |

28 SEPTEMBER 1944

Following is a rough count of the number of worksheets held by GL-6 in CA, J-19, J-22, LA, PA-K2 and PURPLE diplomatic systems for the period from 1 November 1941 through 8 December 1941.

| System      | Total # of<br>msgs. | # of msgs<br>translated | # not trans-<br>lated | # partially<br>broken |
|-------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| CA.....     | 7                   | 1                       | 6                     | .....                 |
| J-19.....   | 472                 | 75                      | 394                   | 3                     |
| J-22.....   | 192                 | 6                       | 146                   | 40                    |
| LA.....     | 650                 | 12                      | 481                   | 157                   |
| PA-K2.....  | 52                  | 13                      | 23                    | 16                    |
| PURPLE..... | 628                 | 417                     | 211                   | .....                 |
| Total.....  | 2,001               | 524                     | 1,261                 | 216                   |

Most of the worksheets have a teletype or station intercept sheet attached. Some have both the original and carbon of the teletype message attached.

Certified a true copy of a document on file in OP-20-G.

G. E. BOONE,  
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

Following is a survey of messages received by OP-20-G from 1-8 December 1941 showing the number received from each Station and the approximate time-lag involved. The information for this survey was taken from the GY Section Log for 1941 December.

| Station                      | # Msgs. | Time Lag |
|------------------------------|---------|----------|
| Sta. 1 Monmouth.....         | 9       | 2 days   |
| Sta. 2 San Fran.....         | 5       | 3 "      |
| Sta. 3 Fort Sam Houston..... | 4       | 3 days   |
| Sta. 5 Fort Shafter.....     | 1       | 4 "      |
| Sta. 6 Fort Mills.....       | 1       | 2 days   |
| Sta. 7 Fort Hunt.....        | 1       | 3 "      |
| Sta. 9 Rio De Janeiro.....   | 2       | 4 "      |
|                              | 2       | 1 day    |
|                              | 10      | 2 days   |
|                              | 1       | 3 "      |
|                              | 6       | 4 "      |
|                              | 2       | same day |
|                              | 1       | 1 day    |
|                              | 3       | 3 days   |
|                              | 7       | 6 days   |
|                              | 11      | 7 "      |
|                              | 8       | 8 "      |
|                              | 1       | same day |
|                              | 17      | 1 day    |
|                              | 3       | 2 days   |
|                              | 2       | 11 days  |

| Station                         | # Msgs. | Time Lag |
|---------------------------------|---------|----------|
| ALUSNA N. A.....                | 2       | 1 day    |
|                                 | 1       | 2 days   |
|                                 | 1       | 4 "      |
|                                 | 1       | 6 "      |
|                                 | 1       | 11 days  |
|                                 | 2       | 12 "     |
| Army.....                       | 1       | 1 day    |
|                                 | 1       | 6 days   |
|                                 | 2       | 7 "      |
| CA.....                         | 1       | same day |
|                                 | 4       | 4 days   |
| COM 16 122 SRI (Fort Dix?)..... | 3       | same day |
|                                 | 59      | 1 day    |
|                                 | 4       | 2 days   |
|                                 | 1       | 3 days   |
|                                 | 5       | 5 "      |
|                                 | 1       | 9 "      |
| G Amagansett.....               | 1       | same day |
| M Cheltenham.....               | 9       | same day |
|                                 | 2       | 1 day    |
|                                 | 2       | 2 days   |
| Photo.....                      | 1       | 7 days   |
|                                 | 1       | 8 "      |
| S Bainbridge.....               | 72      | same day |
|                                 | 12      | 1 day    |
|                                 | 1       | 6 days   |
| SISIS Army.....                 | 2       | 1 day    |
|                                 | 1       | 2 days   |
|                                 | 1       | 7 "      |
|                                 | 1       | 8 "      |
| W Winter Harbor.....            | 8       | same day |
|                                 | 2       | 1 day    |
|                                 | 1       | 3 days   |
| X Photo.....                    | 2       | 2 days   |
|                                 | 1       | 7 "      |

Certified a true copy of a document on file in Op-20-G.

G. E. Boone,  
Lt. Comdr. U. S. N. R.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.  
Washington, 6 January 1944.

*Memorandum to GY:*

1. Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray and Lieutenant A. L. Braun were Watch Officers on the "Security" or "Purple" watch during the last half of 1941 and the first half of 1942. Lieutenant Commander Lafore was in charge of the watch (later known as GY-2) from about February 1942, (relieving Lieutenant Commander Linn).

2. The security watch worked Purple traffic on alternate days, the Army working the other days.

3. The traffic, besides that received from the Army, was received by teletype. If dated an Army date, it was sent to the Army; if dated our date, we worked it and sent the work sheet with the original message attached to GZ. Therefore, in general, we kept no original teletype traffic. We, however, maintained a file for each originator and into these files we put garbled messages, confirming copies of messages from our intercept stations and duplicate messages. These files also contained messages for earlier periods (1939-40), which had never been worked. It is possible that at intervals the files were reduced by the burning of the older dupes. (Our recollections on this are not clear.)

4. GZ had access to our files and frequently used material from them.

5. All plain text messages which came in were given to GZ. We kept no file of them.

6. When the Army took over the diplomatic system (about June, 1942), these files were turned over to them along with the machine, pertinent aids, forms, etc.

R. W. Lafore,  
R. W. LAFORE,  
Lt. Comdr., USNR.  
A. A. Murray,  
A. A. MURRAY,  
Lt. Comdr., USNR.  
A. L. Braun,  
A. L. BRAUN,  
Lt., USNR.

## 1084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 61

[1]

29 JUNE 1945.

## JAPANESE PURPLE WORKSHEETS PROCESSED BY NAVY

A survey has been made of the file of purple worksheets held by OP-20-3GL-6 and GY section log for 1941 December in an attempt to determine the completeness of files of worksheets and translations and to account for any messages entered in the GY section log for which there are no worksheets on hand.

1941 DEC 7

| Circuit               | Sms #   | Gy Log # | Rec'd from   | Date rec'd | JD-1 # |
|-----------------------|---------|----------|--------------|------------|--------|
| MEXICO-TOKYO.....     | 474     | 6842     | PHOTO.....   | 12-13-41   | GIST   |
| MEXICO-TOKYO.....     | 475     | 6841     | PHOTO.....   | 12-13-41   | GIST   |
| MEXICO-TOKYO.....     | 476     | 6840     | PHOTO.....   | 12-13-41   | 7501   |
| TOKYO:                |         |          |              |            |        |
| NET.....              | 787     | 6707     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | GIST   |
| HSINKING.....         | 916     |          |              |            |        |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....   | 2492    | 6687     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | 7229   |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....   | 2493/1# | 6701     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | 7231   |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....   | 2493/2# | 6696     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | "      |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....   | 2495    | 6688     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | 7772   |
| TOKYO:                |         |          |              |            |        |
| CIRCULAR.....         | 1496    | 6686     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | GIST   |
| NANKING.....          | 531     |          |              |            |        |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....   | 2498    | 6694     | ARMY.....    | 12- 8-41   | GIST   |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....   | 2499/1  | 6682     | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41   | 7210   |
|                       | /2      | 6695     | STA. #5..... | 12- 8-41   | "      |
|                       | /3      | 6681     | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41   | "      |
| TOKYO-BANGKOK.....    | 854     | 6685     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | 772117 |
| TOKYO-BANGKOK.....    | 855     | 6733     | STA. #6..... | 12-10-41   | 7281   |
| TOKYO-BANGKOK.....    | 856     | 6732     | STA. #6..... | 12-10-41   | 7282   |
| TOKYO-BERLIN.....     | 1004    | 6702     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | 7232   |
| TOKYO-HSINKING.....   | 115?    | 6683     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | 7265   |
| TOKYO-NANKING.....    | 532     | 6697     | SISIS.....   | 12- 8-41   | 7237   |
| [2]                   |         |          |              |            |        |
| TOKYO-VICHY.....      | 581     | 6981     | ALUSNA.....  | 12-18-41   | GIST   |
| TOKYO:                |         |          |              |            |        |
| VICHY.....            | 582     | 6693     | SISIS.....   | 12- 8-41   | 7230   |
| BANGKOK.....          | 129     | 6716     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | "      |
| HANOI.....            | 129     |          |              |            |        |
| TOKYO:                |         |          |              |            |        |
| VICHY.....            | 583     | 6715     | COM 16.....  | 12- 8-41   | 7319   |
| BANGKOK.....          | 130     | 6692     | STA. #5..... | 12- 8-41   | "      |
| HANOI.....            | 130     |          |              |            |        |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 911     | 6658     | STA. S.....  | 12- 7-41   | 7205   |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 902/1** | 6624     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | 7143   |
|                       | /2**    | 6619     | STA. M.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /3      | 6623     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /4      | 6620     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /5      | 6633     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /6      | 6635     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /7      | 6631     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /8      | 6634     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /9**    | 6625     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /10**   | 6626     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /11     | 6630     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /12     | 6632     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /13     | 6637     | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41   | "      |
|                       | /14     | 6649     | STA. S.....  | 12- 7-41   | "      |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO..... | 1277    | 6672     | STA. S.....  | 12- 7-41   | N. T.  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO..... | 1278    | 6718     | STA. S.....  | 12- 9-41   | 7290   |

Messages received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but issued as Army translations (no worksheets in GL-6 files):

|                       |     |      |             |          |      |
|-----------------------|-----|------|-------------|----------|------|
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 905 | 6644 | STA. S..... | 12- 7-41 | 7150 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 906 | 6641 | STA. S..... | 12- 7-41 | 7183 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 907 | 6648 | STA. S..... | 12- 7-41 | 7145 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 908 | 6652 | STA. S..... | 12- 7-41 | 7146 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 909 | 6651 | STA. S..... | 12- 7-41 | 7151 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | 910 | 6650 | STA. S..... | 12- 7-41 | 7147 |

\*\* In GY section log listed as sent to Army, but issued as Navy translation and worksheet in GL-6 files

# PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

1085

1941 DEC 7

[3] Messages received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but no worksheets in GL-6 files:

| Circuit               | Sms # | Gy Log # | Rec'd from   | Date rec'd | JD-1 # |
|-----------------------|-------|----------|--------------|------------|--------|
| TOKYO-CIRCULAR.....   | GOGAI | 6698     | STA. #6..... | 12- 8-41   | .....  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | GC    | 6647     | STA. S.....  | 12- 7-41   | .....  |

(Disposition of this message in GY section log given as follows: "Army/GZ")

1941 DEC 6

|                   |      |      |             |          |      |
|-------------------|------|------|-------------|----------|------|
| TOKYO-BERLIN..... | 1002 | 6654 | COM 16..... | 12- 7-41 | 7174 |
|-------------------|------|------|-------------|----------|------|

(Message received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but issued as Army translation—No worksheet in GL-6 files)

1941 DEC 5

|                        |        |         |              |          |       |
|------------------------|--------|---------|--------------|----------|-------|
| BANGKOK-TOKYO.....     | 909    | 6712    | STA. #6..... | 12- 8-41 | 7314  |
| BANGKOK-TOKYO.....     | 910    | 6714    | STA. #6..... | 12- 8-41 | GIST  |
| BANGKOK-TOKYO.....     | 911    | 6713    | STA. #6..... | 12- 8-41 | GIST  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....      | 1416   | 6934    | ALUSNA.....  | 12-16-41 | 7765  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....      | 1417/1 | 6936    | ALUSNA.....  | 12-16-41 | N. T. |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....      | /2     | 6935    | ALUSNA.....  | 12-16-41 | N. T. |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....      | 1421   | 6569    | STA. W.....  | 12- 5-41 | 7137  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....      | 1422   | 6570    | STA. W.....  | 12- 5-41 | GIST  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO 1425..... | 1425   | 6939    | STA. #4..... | 12-16-41 | 7836  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO 1427..... | 1427   | 6938    | STA. #4..... | 12-16-41 | 7770  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....      | 1428   | 6616    | STA. #7..... | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....      | GOGAI  | 6608    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| B. AIRES-TOKYO.....    | 515    | 6614    | STA. #7..... | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| B. AIRES-TOKYO.....    | 516    | 6615    | STA. #7..... | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| -RIO.....              | 117    |         |              |          |       |
| B. AIRES-TOKYO.....    | 517    | 6617    | STA. #7..... | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| -RIO.....              | 118    |         |              |          |       |
| HSINKING-PEKING.....   | 31     | 6600    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | 7264  |
| [4]                    |        |         |              |          |       |
| HSINKING-TOKYO.....    | 805    | 6595    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | 7266  |
| HSINKING-TOKYO.....    | GOGAI  | 6592    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | 7263  |
| MEXICO-TOKYO.....      | 471    | 6709    | STA. #2..... | 12- 8-41 | 7312  |
| NANKING-TOKYO.....     | 855    | 6601    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| PEKING-TOKYO CIRC..... | 625    | 6749    | STA. #5..... | 12-10-41 | 7335  |
| PEKING-SHAI CIRC.....  | 626    | 6746    | STA. #5..... | 12-10-41 | 7334  |
| -TOKYO.....            | 779    |         |              |          |       |
| PEKING-NANKING.....    | GOGAI  | 6599    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| ROME-TOKYO.....        | 782    | 6937    | ALUSNA.....  | 12-16-41 | 7771  |
| ROME-TOKYO.....        | 784    | 6710    | STA. #5..... | 12- 8-41 | 7228  |
| ROME-TOKYO.....        | 785    | 6565    | STA. G.....  | 12- 5-41 | 7169  |
| ROME-TOKYO.....        |        | 6589    | STA. M.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....    | 2224   | 6603    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | 7236  |
| TOKYO-ANKARA.....      | 110    | 6593    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| TOKYO-ANKARA.....      | 111    | 6602    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| TOKYO-HSINKING.....    | 910    | 6747    | STA. #5..... | 12-10-41 | 7333  |
| TOKYO-HSINKING.....    | 913    | 6590    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| TOKYO-HSINKING.....    | GOGAI  | 6594    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| TOKYO-NANKING.....     | 525    | 6598    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | 7262  |
| TOKYO-PEKING.....      | 671    | 6597    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| TOKYO-SHANGHAI.....    | 1234   | 6596    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| TOKYO-VICHY.....       | 579    | 6607    | COM 16.....  | 12- 6-41 | 7298  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....  | 893    | 6560-41 | STA. S.....  | 12- 5-41 | GIST  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....  | 894    | 6555    | STA. S.....  | 12- 5-41 | 7235  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....  | 896    | 6558    | STA. S.....  | 12- 5-41 | 7140  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....  | 1200   | 6585    | STA. S.....  | 12- 6-41 | GIST  |
| [5]                    |        |         |              |          |       |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....  | 1261/1 | 6586    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | 7139  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....  | /2     | 6587    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | "     |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....  | 1262   | 6584    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | 7141  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....  | 1264   | 6582    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | 7166  |
| WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....  | 1265   | 6591    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | 7167  |
| WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....  | 1266   | 6588    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | 7198  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....  | 1268   | 6581    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | 7136  |
| WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....  | 1269   | 6711    | STA. #1..... | 12-8-41  | GIST  |
| WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....  | GOGAI  | 6583    | STA. S.....  | 12-6-41  | 7168  |

# 1086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1941 DEC 5

Messages received by Navy with no record of disposition made (no worksheets in GL-6 files):

| Circuit               | Sms #  | Gy Log # | Rec'd from  | Date rec'd | JD-1 # |
|-----------------------|--------|----------|-------------|------------|--------|
| TOKYO-NEW YORK.....   | -----  | 6552     | STA. S..... | 12-5-41    | -----  |
| TOKYO-MEXICO.....     | -----  | 6557     | STA. S..... | 12-5-41    | -----  |
| TOKYO-PANAMA.....     | -----  | 6556     | STA. S..... | 12-5-41    | -----  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON..... | SUMMER | 6566     | STA. M..... | 12-5-41    | -----  |

1941 DEC 3

|                          |       |      |              |          |       |
|--------------------------|-------|------|--------------|----------|-------|
| BANGKOK-TOKYO.....       | 892   | 6495 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7053  |
| BANGKOK-TOKYO.....       | 894   | 6723 | STA. #6..... | 12-0-41  | "     |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....        | 1497  | 6496 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | GIST  |
| BERLIN-TOKYO 1498.....   | 1498  | 6522 | STA. #7..... | 12-4-41  | 7132  |
| CANTON:                  |       | 6536 | STA. #7..... | 12-4-41  | 7138  |
| NANKING.....             | 232   | 6470 | COM 16.....  | 12-3-41  | N. T. |
| SHANGHAI.....            | 121   |      |              |          |       |
| TOKYO.....               | 115   |      |              |          |       |
| PEKING CIRCULAR.....     | 616/1 | 6512 | COM 16.....  | 12-4-41  | 7848  |
|                          | /2    | 6513 | COM 16.....  | 12-4-41  | "     |
|                          | /3    | 6514 | COM 16.....  | 12-4-41  | "     |
| TOKYO.....               | 763   |      |              |          |       |
| RIO-MEXICO.....          | 10    | 6642 | STA. #3..... | 12-7-41  | 7196  |
| [6]                      |       |      |              |          |       |
| RIO-TOKYO.....           | 490   | 6520 | STA. #7..... | 12-4-41  | GIST  |
| RIO-TOKYO.....           | 491   | 6521 | STA. #7..... | 12-4-41  | 7129  |
| RIO-WASHINGTON.....      | 34    | 6571 | PHOTO.....   | 12-5-41  | 7131  |
| ROME-TOKYO.....          | 774   | 6467 | STA. M.....  | 12-3-41  | 7016  |
| ROME-TOKYO.....          | 985   | 6516 | STA. W.....  | 12-4-41  | 7133  |
|                          |       | 6639 | ALUSNA.....  | 12-6-41  | 7133  |
| SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....      | 2208  | 6509 | COM 16.....  | 12-4-41  | N. T. |
|                          | 1048  |      |              |          |       |
| TOKYO-BANGKOK.....       | 827   | 6722 | ARMY.....    | 12-0-41  | GIST  |
| TOKYO-BERLIN.....        | 996   | 6515 | COM 16.....  | 12-4-41  | GIST  |
| TOKYO-HSINKING.....      | 899   | 6646 | STA. #5..... | 12-7-41  | 7260  |
| TOKYO-ROME.....          | 322   | 6472 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7097  |
| TOKYO-SHANGHAI.....      | 1224  | 6508 | COM 16.....  | 12-4-41  | GIST  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 874   | 6471 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7048  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 875   | 6478 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7057  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 876   | 6475 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7018  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 877   | 6477 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7019  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 878/1 | 6474 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7049  |
|                          | /2    | 6476 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7049  |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 879   | 6473 | STA. S.....  | 12-3-41  | 7020  |
| VICHY-TOKYO.....         | 109   | 6894 | ALUSNA.....  | 12-15-41 | GIST  |
| WASHINGTON-B. AIRES..... | 8     | 6492 | STA. S.....  | 12- 3-41 | 7100  |
| WASHINGTON-B. AIRES..... | 8     | 6567 | STA. M.....  | 12- 5-41 | GIST  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1241  | 6577 | STA. #1..... | 12- 5-41 | 7261  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1243  | 6493 | STA. S.....  | 12- 3-41 | 7050  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1243  | 6527 | STA. #7..... | 12- 4-41 | 7098  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1244  | 6523 | STA. #7..... | 12- 4-41 | 7099  |
| [7]                      |       |      |              |          |       |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1245  | 6491 | STA. S.....  | 12- 3-41 | 7051  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1247  | 6502 | STA. S.....  | 12- 4-41 | GIST  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1250  | 6578 | STA. #1..... | 12- 5-41 | GIST  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1251  | 6490 | STA. S.....  | 12- 3-41 | 7052  |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1255  | 6494 | STA. S.....  | 12- 3-41 | GIST  |
|                          |       | 6519 | STA. #7..... | 12- 4-41 | "     |

Messages entered in GY section log for which no worksheets in GL-6 files:

|                     |     |      |             |          |      |
|---------------------|-----|------|-------------|----------|------|
| HSINKING-TOKYO..... | 797 | 6510 | COM 16..... | 12- 4-41 | 7263 |
|---------------------|-----|------|-------------|----------|------|

(Not on translation: "Original transmission, dated 3rd available, too badly garbled to read." Issued as JD-1: 7263 under date of 5 Dec 1941)

|                       |      |      |              |          |      |
|-----------------------|------|------|--------------|----------|------|
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO..... | 1253 | 6579 | STA. #1..... | 12- 5-41 | 7126 |
|-----------------------|------|------|--------------|----------|------|

(Per GY log sent to GZ, but issued as Army translation)

1941 DEC 3—Continued

| Circuit               | Sms # | Gy Log # | Rec'd from   | Date rec'd | JD-1 # |
|-----------------------|-------|----------|--------------|------------|--------|
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO..... | 1256  | 6576     | STA. #1..... | 12- 5-41   | 7128   |

(Per GY log sent to GZ, but issued as Army translation)

1941 DEC 1

|                          |        |      |              |          |      |
|--------------------------|--------|------|--------------|----------|------|
| BANGKOK-TOKYO.....       | 815    | 6673 | ARMY.....    | 12- 7-41 | GIST |
| BANGKOK-TOKYO.....       | 888    | 6678 | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41 | GIST |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....        | 1395   | 6676 | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41 | GIST |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....        | 1396   | 6251 | STA. #7..... | 12- 2-41 | 7012 |
| BERLIN-TOKYO.....        | 1396   | 6675 | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41 | GIST |
| BERNE-HANOI.....         | No #   | 6408 | STA. M.....  | 12- 3-41 | 7044 |
| HARBIN:                  |        |      |              |          |      |
| TOKYO.....               | 161    | 6573 | STA. #5..... | 12- 5-41 | GIST |
| HSINKING.....            |        | 6458 | COM 16.....  | 12- 2-41 | "    |
| HSINKING-TOKYO.....      | 790    | 6574 | STA. #5..... | 12- 5-41 | GIST |
| MANILA-TOKYO.....        | 812    | 6671 | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41 | 7208 |
| MEXICO-TOKYO.....        | 461    | 6545 | STA. #2..... | 12- 4-41 | GIST |
|                          |        | 6754 | W; UI.....   | 12-10-41 | "    |
| MEXICO-WASHINGTON.....   | 069    | 6755 | W. U.....    | 12-10-41 | 7329 |
| [8]                      |        |      |              |          |      |
| NANKING-TOKYO.....       | 849    | 6455 | COM 16.....  | 12- 1-41 | 7013 |
| RIO-WASHINGTON CIRC..... | 334    | 6453 | STA. #7..... | 12- 2-41 | 7043 |
| TOKYO.....               | 486    | 6454 | STA. #7..... | 12- 2-41 | "    |
| SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....      | 2191   | 6572 | STA. #5..... | 12- 5-41 | 7234 |
| SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....      | 2192   | 6457 | COM 16.....  | 12- 2-41 | 7045 |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....      | 2436   | 6425 | STA. S.....  | 12- 1-41 | 6939 |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....      | 2439   | 6456 | COM 16.....  | 12- 1-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....      | 2443   | 6561 | ALUSNA.....  | 12- 5-41 | 7091 |
|                          |        | 6677 | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41 | "    |
| TOKYO CIRCULAR.....      | 2444   | 6432 | STA. S.....  | 12- 1-41 | 6984 |
| TOKYO-BANGKOK.....       | 814    | 6797 | STA. #6..... | 12-11-41 | 7374 |
| TOKYO-BANGKOK.....       | 824    | 6792 | STA. #6..... | 12-11-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-BANGKOK.....       |        | 6699 | ARMY.....    | 12- 8-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-BERLIN.....        | 900    | 6511 | COM 16.....  | 12- 4-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-HSINKING.....      | 892    | 6580 | STA. #5..... | 12- 5-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-HSINKING.....      | 893    | 6498 | STA. #5..... | 12- 3-41 | 7092 |
| TOKYO-MANILA.....        | 380    | 6674 | STA. #6..... | 12- 7-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-MEXICO.....        | 240    | 6424 | STA. S.....  | 12- 1-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-SINGAPORE.....     | 367    | 6721 | STA. #5..... | 12- 9-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-SINGAPORE.....     | 369    | 6706 | STA. #6..... | 12-11-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-VICHY.....         | 572    | 6575 | STA. #5..... | 12- 5-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-VICHY.....         | 573    | 6479 | STA. #5..... | 12- 3-41 | 7040 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 858    | 6427 | STA. S.....  | 12- 1-41 | 6940 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 860    | 6426 | STA. S.....  | 12- 1-41 | 6941 |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 861    | 6431 | STA. S.....  | 12- 1-41 | GIST |
| TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....    | 865    | 6428 | STA. S.....  | 12- 1-41 | 6983 |
| [9]                      |        |      |              |          |      |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1223   | 6488 | STA. #1..... | 12-3-41  | 7041 |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1225/1 | 6546 | STA. #2..... | 12-4-41  | 7042 |
|                          | /2     | 6452 | STA. #7..... | 12-2-41  | 7042 |
|                          | /3     | 6547 | STA. #2..... | 12-4-41  | 7042 |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1226   | 6497 | STA. #1..... | 12-3-41  | 7054 |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1227   | 6489 | STA. #1..... | 12-3-41  | 7055 |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1228   | 6487 | STA. #1..... | 12-3-41  | GIST |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1230   | 6480 | STA. #1..... | 12-3-41  | 7056 |
| WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....    | 1231   | 6544 | STA. #1..... | 12-4-41  | 7093 |

Message received by Navy, entered in GY section log, but no record of disposition made (no worksheet in GL-6 files):

|                    |  |      |            |         |  |
|--------------------|--|------|------------|---------|--|
| TOKYO-BATAVIA..... |  | 6499 | SISIS..... | 12-3-41 |  |
|                    |  | 6700 | ARMY.....  | 12-8-41 |  |

(Dups of same message.)



# 1088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 62

TOP SECRET

Serial 0001391916

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,  
Washington, 9 Jul 1945.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N.

Subject: Testimony and Documentary Evidence to be Presented Concerning Further Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Reference: (a) Top Secret Ltr. from Admiral Hewitt to DNI, dated 5 July 1945, Subj: Files, request for.

Enclosure: (A) Photostatic copy of Top Secret Ltr. from DIO-14ND to DNI dated 19 April 1942, Subj: Encrypted Despatch Traffic of Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, T. H., File 14ND/A8-5/OJ: EF37(I-95), with Enclosures (A) and (B).

1. Pursuant to Reference (a), Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

### FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

District Intelligence Office, Sixth Floor, Young Hotel

WBS/wbs

HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 19, 1942.

14ND/A8-5/OJ

EF 37 (I-95)

Secret

From: The District Intelligence Officer.

To: The Director of Naval Intelligence (Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch).

Subject: ENCRYPTED DESPATCH TRAFFICE OF JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, HONOLULU, T. H.

Enclosures:

(A) One copy of translation of Japanese Consulate General (Honolulu) Outgoing Message Log Book, classified as SECRET.

(B) One copy of translation of Japanese Consulate General (Honolulu) Incoming Message Log Book, classified as SECRET.

1. Enclosure (A), which was furnished this office by the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, is forwarded for information. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, also supplied this office with two copies of the same enclosure, one of which has been sent to the "Unit" at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and the other retained in the files of the District Intelligence Office.

2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, recently furnished this office with three copies of the incoming despatch log of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, one copy of which is transmitted herewith as enclosure (B), one copy of which has been sent to the Pearl Harbor "Unit", and one copy of which is retained in the files of the District Intelligence Office.

3. Before leaving Honolulu, the Japanese Consul General was given three alternatives in the matter of disposing of papers in his possession: (a) to take them with him; (b) to pack, seal, and store them here; or, (c) to throw them away. He elected to throw away a great deal of written matter, most of which was first torn into pieces. The material from which enclosures (A) and (B) were taken was found among the papers so thrown away and placed together by translators attached to the Military Intelligence Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the District Intelligence Office.

4. The urgency of delivery of this letter and enclosures (A) and (B) is such that they will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this letter and enclosures (A) and (B) by registered mail to the continental limits of the United States and by registered airmail within the continental limits of the United States.

I. H. Mayfield,  
I. H. MAYFIELD.

## TOP SECRET

## Enclosure (A)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
Honolulu, T. H., March 2, 1942.

The following is a translation of a form, printed in Japanese, on which radio messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H., were recorded:

## OUTGOING MESSAGES

## Telegrams, official

Secret ----- Ordinary -----

No. -----

File No. -----

Dispatched ----- month ----- day

From -----

To -----

Attached to -----

Subject: (gist of contents)

Disposal and development:

|            |          |             |           |
|------------|----------|-------------|-----------|
| From ----- | To ----- | month ----- | day ----- |
| " -----    | " -----  | " -----     | " -----   |
| " -----    | " -----  | " -----     | " -----   |
| " -----    | " -----  | " -----     | " -----   |
| " -----    | " -----  | " -----     | " -----   |

The Archives and Documents section -----

The Telegram Section -----

----- month ----- day

Person in charge -----

Remarks:

Entries were not made in all of the spaces provided on the above form. The symbols, A N (cryptogram?), R Y A K U (code), and H E I (ordinary message), were written over the printed characters for "Official Dispatches" and are represented in the translation by A, B and C, respectively. There were also used in this manner the Japanese characters Y U (pertaining to postal?) and M U (a negative term).

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                   |
|--------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1-B          | 1        | 1-4        | Matter re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's Society.                |
| 2-A          | 4        | 1-6        | Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                   |
| 3-A          | 5        | 1-7        | Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                   |
| 4-B          | 6        | 1-9        | Matter re Greek Ship heading toward Japan.                                            |
| 5-A          | 7        | 1-9        | Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                   |
| 6-B          | 9        | 1-11       | Report of gist of conversation with "ABEND".                                          |
| 7-B          | 10       | 1-11       | Conversation on meeting with newly appointed Commander KIMMEL.                        |
| 8-A          | 11       | 1-13       | Movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                             |
| 9-B          | 12       | 1-13       | Matter re social expenses for third period.                                           |
| 10-B         | 13       | 1-15       | Matter re invitation to luncheon for Ambassador NOMURA.                               |
| 11-A         | 14       | 1-16       | Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                    |
| 12-A         | 16       | 1-18       | Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan.                                            |
| 13-B         | 17       | 1-20       | Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan. (LACONICUS)                                |
| 14-A         | 18       | 1-21       | Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                    |
| 15-A         | 19       | 1-22       | Matter re visit to Japan by American citizens of Japanese ancestry without passports. |
| 16-A         | 20       | 1-23       | Matter re movement of U. S. warships.                                                 |
| [9] 17-B     | 22       | 1-24       |                                                                                       |
| 18-A         | 24       | 1-28       | Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                    |
| 19-A         | 27       | 1-29       | Matter re simplifying clearance of documents carried by Consul General NAKAMURA.      |
| 20-B         | 28       | 1-29       | Matter re proposal of Admiral RICHARDSON to welcome Ambassador NOMURA.                |
| 21-B         | 32       | 1-30       |                                                                                       |
| 22-B         | 34       | 2-1        | Report of arrival here of Ambassador NOMURA.                                          |
| 23-B         | 36       | 2-1        | Matter re reporting to Rear Admiral KIMMEL about appointment (NOMURA's).              |
| 24-B         | 37       | 2-3        | Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.                                                   |
| 25-A         | 38       | 2-6        | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                          |



# 1090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                                                 |
|--------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 26-A         | 39       | 2-7        | Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.                                                                                                                                 |
| 27-A         | 40       | 2-15       | Re sending telegram regarding information to the Military Command.                                                                                                  |
| 28-B         | 42       | 2-20       | Re designation of naval defense area in "Kaneohe" Bay.                                                                                                              |
| 29-A         | 43       | 2-21       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                        |
| 30-B         | 44       | 2-21       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                        |
| 31-A         | 45       | 2-24       | Re explanation of Minister (Foreign?) in the Diet.                                                                                                                  |
| 32-B         | 46       | 2-25       | Re report of names of persons accompanying Consul-General KITA.                                                                                                     |
| 33-B         | 48       | 2-26       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                        |
| 34-A         | 49       | 2-27       | Re Consul-General KITA'S cook accompanying him.                                                                                                                     |
| [5] 35-B     | 50       | 3-1        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                      |
| 36-B         | 51       | 3-1        | Re recrossing (of ocean) by CHINEI KANESHIRO.                                                                                                                       |
| 37-B         | 52       | 3-3        | Movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                            |
| 38-A         | 54       | 3-4        | " " " " " "                                                                                                                                                         |
| 39-A         | 55       | 3-4        | " " " " " "                                                                                                                                                         |
| 40-B         | 56       | 3-5        | Re granting of passport to KENJO KOHARA (or OBARA), missionary of the Hongwanji Sect.                                                                               |
| 41-B         | 57       | 3-6        | Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.                                                                                                                                |
| 42-B         | 58       | 3-6*       | Re correction of telegram.                                                                                                                                          |
| 43-A         | 59       | 3-10       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                        |
| 44-A         | 60       | 3-10       | " " " " " "                                                                                                                                                         |
| 45-B         | 62       | 3-14       | Re report of arrival in office of Consul-General KITA.                                                                                                              |
| 46-B         | 64       | 3-18*      | Re issuing of passports for traveling to Hawaii to GIEN MITANI and TAIYU OKAMOTO, missionaries of the Hongwanji Sect.                                               |
| 47-A         | 65       | 3-21       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                        |
| 48-B         | 66       | 3-21*      | Visit to New Zealand of U. S. warships.                                                                                                                             |
| 49-C         | 67       | 3-24       | Re information of Consul-General's cook going on board ship.                                                                                                        |
| 50-A         | 69       | 3-24       | Re movement of U. S. warships.                                                                                                                                      |
| [4] 51-A     | 70       | 3-25       | Re wireless messages and secret documents carried by Courier MORI.                                                                                                  |
| 52-A         | 71       | 3-26       | Re expenses for development of intelligence for year 1941.                                                                                                          |
| 53-B         | 72       | 3-27*      | Re report of arrival in office of secretary MORIMURA.                                                                                                               |
| 54-A         | 73       | 3-27       | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                         |
| 55-A         | 75       | 3-28       | Re visit to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.                                                                                                            |
| 56-A         | 76       | 3-29*      | Re passport visa for WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE.                                                                                                                        |
| 57-B         | 77       | 3-29*      | Re verification expenses of Seamen's registration.                                                                                                                  |
| 58-B         | 78       | 4-1*       | Re request to Prince KONOYE and Minister MATSUOKA for articles to be printed in publication commemorating the completion of the extension to the Japanese Hospital. |
| 59-B         | 81       | 4-3*       | Re arrival in port of Foreign Minister of the Netherlands.                                                                                                          |
| 60-B         | 82       | 4-5*       | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                      |
| 61-A         | 84       | 4-7* (?)   | Re arrival in port of Japan Christian Federation.                                                                                                                   |
| 62-B         | 85       | 4-8        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                      |
| 63-A         | 86       | 4-9        | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                         |
| 64-A         | 90       | 4-14       | " " " " " "                                                                                                                                                         |
| [6] 65-A     | 92       | 4-15       | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                                                                         |
| 66-A         | 93       | 4-17       | " " " " " "                                                                                                                                                         |
| 67-B         | 96       | 4-21*      | Re arrival in port of President Roosevelt's eldest son.                                                                                                             |
| 68-A         | 97       | 4-21       | Re movement of U. S. warships.                                                                                                                                      |
| (MU)-B       | 98       | 4-23       | Re receipt of decoding book for use on request telegrams.                                                                                                           |
| (MU)-B       | 99       | 4-23       | Re receipt of wireless code TA.                                                                                                                                     |
| 69-A         | 102      | 4-28       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 70-A         | 103      | 4-28       | Re arrival in port of British warship.                                                                                                                              |
| 71-B         | 104      | 4-29*      | Re transport "WASHINGTON".                                                                                                                                          |
| 72-B         | 105      | 4-30*      | Re trip of "HENRY LUCE" to Chungking.                                                                                                                               |
| 73-A         | 107      | 4-30       | Re seizure of crew members of the "COLUMBIA" by British warship.                                                                                                    |
| 74-B         | 108      | 5-1*       | Re taking of office by Ambassador GAUSS.                                                                                                                            |
| 75-A         | 109      | 5-1        | Re seizure of German subjects by British warship.                                                                                                                   |
| 76-A         | 110      | 5-6        | Re movements of U. S. Warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 77-A         | 111      | 5-8        | The local general emergency situation.                                                                                                                              |
| 78-A         | 113      | 5-12       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 79-B         | 114      | 5-14*      | Re granting of passport to travel to Hawaii to KAKUSHIN KUSUDA, priest of the Higashi Hongwanji Sect.                                                               |
| [6] 80-B     | 115      | 5-14*      | Re arrival of B-17 Bombers.                                                                                                                                         |
| 81-A         | 116      | 5-16       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 82-A         | 117      | 5-20       | Re aid fund to "Pan-Pacific Union".                                                                                                                                 |
| 83-A         | 118      | 5-21       | General situation.                                                                                                                                                  |
| 84-B         | 119      | 5-22       | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                      |
| 85-B         | 120      | 5-23*      | Re arrival in port of Labor Minister and party of New Zealand.                                                                                                      |
| 86-A         | 122      | 5-26       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 87-B         | 123      | 5-27*      | Re departure of "TRADEWIND".                                                                                                                                        |
| 88-B         | 124      | 5-27       | Arrival in port of Foreign Minister KLEFFENS of Holland.                                                                                                            |
| 89-B         | 126      | 5-29*      | Re passing through of MANUEL FOX.                                                                                                                                   |
| 90-B         | 129      | 6-3*       | Re according convenience to ? who is attending the centennial celebration of "PUNAHOU SCHOOL".                                                                      |
| 91-A         | 130      | 6-3        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                                                                           |
| 92-A         | 132      | 6-6        | Re boarding of German subject on TATUTA MARU (Dispatch #15 to San Francisco).                                                                                       |
| 93-B         | 133      | 6-6*       | Re deportation of Japanese and Koreans.                                                                                                                             |
| 94-B         | 134      | 6-7*       | Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the U. S. Fleet's visit to the mainland.                                                                               |

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                      |
|--------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [7] 95-A     | 136      | 6-9        | Re request of German subject MEHNERT KLAUS to board Japanese liner.                                      |
| 96-A         | 137      | 6-12       | Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.                                                         |
| 97-A         | 138      | 6-13       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                |
| 98-A         | 139      | 6-13       | Local general emergency situation.                                                                       |
| 99-B         | 140      |            | Re arrival in port of U. S. transport "PRESIDENT PIERCE".                                                |
| 100-A        | 141      | 6-14       | Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.                                                         |
| 102-B        | 143      | 6-16*      | Re arrival in port of British cruiser.                                                                   |
| 103-B        | 144      | 6-17*      | Re closing of German Consulate General in the U. S.                                                      |
| 104-A        | 146      | 6-20       | Re visit here by the baseball team of MEIJI UNIVERSITY (to the Minister #25).                            |
| 105-B        | 147      | 6-23       | Conversation of Italian Consul.                                                                          |
| 106-A        | 148      | 6-23       | Re arrival in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS.                                                                  |
| 107-B        | 149      |            | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                   |
| 108-A        | 150      | 6-27       | Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.                                                                             |
| 109-B        | 151      | 6-28       | Re arrival in port of Commander TACHIBANA (to the Minister #27).                                         |
| [8] 110-B    | 152      | 6-28*      | Re money loaned out by this Consulate.                                                                   |
| 111-A        | 153      | 6-28       | Re arrival in port of Americans on inspection tour of Burma Road.                                        |
| -C           | 154      | 6-30       | Re plot for disorder (riot) on "PENNSYLVANIA".                                                           |
| 112-B        | 155      | 6-30*      | Re correction in usage of code type TSU.                                                                 |
| 113-A        | 156      | 7-1        | Re closure of German Consulate.                                                                          |
| 114-B        | 159      | 7-3*       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                |
| 115-A        | 161      | 7-7        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                           |
| 116-B        | 162      | 7-8        | Re movement of U. S. warships.                                                                           |
| 117-B        | 163      | 7-8        | Re re-telegraphing of telegrams.                                                                         |
| 118-A        | 164      | 7-8        | Re participation of U. S. flyers in the Chinese Air Force.                                               |
| 119-A        | 165      | 7-10*      | Telegram by request of Nippon Yusen Kaisha.                                                              |
| 120-B        | 166      | 7-11       | Re number of foreigners with visas to pass through Japan.                                                |
| 121-B        | 169      | 7-11*      | Re size of Imperial Portrait.                                                                            |
| 122-A        | 170      | 7-14       | Re report of speech by LATTIMORE, advisor to CHIANG KAI SHEK.                                            |
| 123-A        | 171      | 7-14       | Re request for instructions regarding returning of the Imperial Portrait.                                |
| 124-B        | 173      | 7-15*      | Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                 |
| [5] 125-B    | 174      | 7-15*      | Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc.                                                                    |
| 126-A        | 176      | 7-17       | Re commencing of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet Union.                                     |
| 127-A        | 177      | 7-18       | Re status of employees. (to the minister #38).                                                           |
| 128-A        | 179      | 7-19       | Re wavelength of KOMB                                                                                    |
| 129-A        | 180      | 7-21       | Re return of Imperial Portrait.                                                                          |
| 130-A        | 181      | 7-22*      | Movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                                 |
| 131-A        | 182      | 7-22       | Re issuing of visa for passing through to McBAIN.                                                        |
| 132-A        | 185      | 7-26       | Re investigation of passengers on board YAWATA MARU.                                                     |
| 133-A        | 186      | 7-26       | Re arrival in port of ASAMA MARU.                                                                        |
| 134-B        | 187      | 7-26*      | Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                                       |
| 135-A        | 188      | 7-28       | Re arrival of the Under-Secretary of the Navy and Freeze Administrators.                                 |
| 136-A        | 189      | 7-28*      | Re arrival of Japanese liner.                                                                            |
| 137-B        | 190      | 7-29       | Re visa for Mr. and Mrs. McDAIN (McBAIN ?).                                                              |
| 138-B        | 191      | 7-29       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                                             |
| 139          | 192      | 7-30       | Re entry into American ports by Japanese liners.                                                         |
| 140-B        | 193      | 7-30*      | Effect on residence here of enforcement of the Freeze order.                                             |
| 141-B        | 194      | 7-30       | Re broadcast to Hawaii.                                                                                  |
| [10] 142-A   | 196      | 8-1        | Re exception of application of Freeze order to Chinese diplomats and Consulate. (to the Minister #44).   |
| 143-A        | 197      | 8-1        | Re itinerary of Courier OSHIO (to San Francisco #19).                                                    |
| -C           | 200      | 8-2        | Re departure and arrival of ASAMA MARU.                                                                  |
| -C           | 201      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Naval Code Book type S-II-E and related charts                                             |
| -C           | 202      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type YA, etc.                                                             |
| -C           | 203      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Common Code Book for the three Ministries, the Foreign, the War, and the Foreign (Navy ?). |
| 144-A        | 204      | 8-2        | Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type H-EI.                                                                |
| 145-A        | 206      | 8-4        | Telegram by request of Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                             |
| 146-A        | 207      | 8-5*       | Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                 |
| 147-A        | 209      | 8-7        | Re placing of the Coast Guard under the Navy.                                                            |
| 148-A        | 211      | 8-8        | Re visa for passing through to the Britisher McBAIN.                                                     |
| 149-A        | 212      | 8-11       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                                   |
| 150-A        | 213      | 8-13       | Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                                       |
| 151-A        | 214      | 8-12*      | Re bank "balance" of official funds. (to the Minister #47.)                                              |
| [11] 152-A   | 216      | 8-13       | Re cash in hand of this Consulate.                                                                       |
| -A           | 217      | 8-15       | Re employees of this Consulate.                                                                          |
| 153-A        | 220      | 8-18       | Telegram by request of Branch Office of the Yokohama Specie Bank dated August 15.                        |
| 154-A        | 221      | 8-19       | Movements of U. S. warships.                                                                             |
| 155-A        | 225      | 8-27       | Condition of Japanese people here.                                                                       |
| 156-B        | 226      | 8-28*      | Re treatment of Japanese Subjects in the U. S. by the Americans.                                         |
| 157-A        | 227      | 8-30       | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                           |
| 158-B        | 228      | 9-2        | Re survey regarding DOMEI broadcast.                                                                     |
| 159-B        | 229      | 9-2*       | Re unrecieved telegram.                                                                                  |
|              |          |            | Re passing through of American pilots.                                                                   |

# 1092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                 |
|--------------|----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 160-A        | 230      | 9-2        | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 161-A        | 234      | 9-4        | To OGAWA.                                                                                           |
| 162-A        | 235      | 9-5        | Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago.                                                       |
| -A           | 236      | 9-5        | Telegram by request of the Yokohama Specie Bank.                                                    |
| 163-A        | 237      | 9-6        | Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.                                                            |
| 164-A        | 239      | 9-9        | Re mail to Japan.                                                                                   |
| 165-A        | 240      | 9-13       |                                                                                                     |
| 166-A        | 241      | 9-13       | Re arrival in port of French warship.                                                               |
| [18] 167-A   | 242      | 9-13       | Re propaganda "pamphlets" of 5th columnists against Japan.                                          |
| 168-A        | 243      | 9-15       | Re transfer of official telegrams to this Consulate.                                                |
| 169-A        | 244      | 9-15       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                              |
| 170-A        | 245      | 9-17*      | Re arrival in port of Courier (to Shanghai #1).                                                     |
| 171-A        | 249      | 9-19       | Information concerning the military.                                                                |
| 172-A        | 250      | 9-22       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                              |
| 173-A        | 251      | 9-22       | Re departure of French warship.                                                                     |
| 174-B        | 252      | 9-23*      | Re arrival in port of military mission to Chungking.                                                |
| 175-A        | 253      | 8-24       | Re problem of U. S. and Japanese ship transportation.                                               |
| 176-A        | 254      | 9-25       | Re questions pertaining to financial report.                                                        |
| 177-B        | 256      | 9-29*      | Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats.                                                         |
| 178-A        | 257      | 9-29       | Movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                            |
| 179-A        | 258      | 9-29       | " " " " " "                                                                                         |
| 180-B        | 259      | 9-30*      | Re contents of baggages sent to this Consulate.                                                     |
| 181-A        | 260      | 10-1       | Re question of the Japanese Language Schools.                                                       |
| [19] 182-A   | 261      | 10-2       | Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.                                                                              |
| 183-B        | 262      | 10-2*      | Re problem of Japanese owned fishing boats.                                                         |
| 184-A        | 263      | 10-2       | Re transportation of British soldiers by American ships.                                            |
| 185-B        | 264      | 10-4       | Re measures for time of war.                                                                        |
| 186-A        | 265      | 10-6       | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 187-B        | 266      | 10-10*     | Re talks by Delegate KING.                                                                          |
| 188-A        | 267      | 10-13      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 189-A        | 268      | 10-15      | Re going to the U. S. of Chinese airmen.                                                            |
| 190-A        | 269      | 10-16      | Re training of Chinese airmen by the United States.                                                 |
| 191-A        | 171      | 10-17      | Re payment of boat fare (shipping charges) in Japan.                                                |
| 192-A        | 273      | 10-20      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                       |
| 193-A        | 278      | 10-23      | Re LEO SIROTA.                                                                                      |
| 194-A        | 283      | 10-24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                       |
| 195-A        | 284      | 10-25*     | Re granting of visa to the American, CRICHTON COLVIN.                                               |
| 196-A        | 285      | 10-25*     | Re report of assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff (to the Ambassador #65).                  |
| [14] 197-A   | 286      | 10-25      | Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance for members of this Consulate (to the Ambassador #66). |
| 198-A        | 287      | 10-25*     | Re granting of visa for entry into country to NEWMAN.                                               |
| 199-A        | 289      | 10-28      | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                     |
| 200-A        | 291      | 10-28      | ?                                                                                                   |
| 201-A        | 292      | 10-29      | Re transmission (of message) to .....?                                                              |
| 202-A1       | 295      | 10-29      | Re LEO SIROTA.                                                                                      |
| 203-B        | 299      | 11-1*      | Re arrival of TAIYO MARU.                                                                           |
| 204-A        | 301      | 11-4       | Re delay in departure of TAIYO MARU.                                                                |
| 205          | 303      | 11-4       | Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU.                                                          |
| 206-B        | 305      | 11-6*      | Re departure of TAIYO MARU.                                                                         |
| 207-A        | 306      | 11-6       | Re transmission (of message) to .....?                                                              |
| 208-A        | 307      | 11-6       | Survey of passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.                                                       |
| 209-A        | 308      | 11-7       | Re request for easy clearance for Consul IWANAGA.                                                   |
| 210-A        | 310      | 11-7*      | Re cancellation of trip to Japan of NEWMAN.                                                         |
| MU-C         | 311      | 11-8       | Re distribution of JIGO telegraphic code and attached decoding book.                                |
| MU-C         | 312      | 11-8       | Re sending of TAGO telegraphic code and attached decoding book.                                     |
| [15] MU-C    | 313      | 11-8       | Re second receipt of common indicator words and key book.                                           |
| 211-A        | 314      | 11-8       | Re according of convenience for clearance to passengers on TAIYO MARU and two other ships.          |
| 212-A        | 315      | 11-10      | Re movement of U. S. Fleet.                                                                         |
| 213-B        | 316*     |            | Re bounds of application of martial law in Hawaii.                                                  |
| 214-A        | 317      | 11-11      | Re number of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.                                                    |
| 215-A        | 318      | 11-11      | Re easing of freeze applying to Japanese governmental agencies in the United States.                |
| 216-C        | 320*     | 11-12      | Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU.                                                                    |
| 217          | 322      | 11-13      | From Ambassador KURUSU.                                                                             |
| 218-A        | 324      | 11-13      | From Ambassador KURUSU.                                                                             |
| 219-A        | 325      | 11-14      | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                     |
| 220          | 326      | 11-14      | Re conversation between Ambassador KURUSU and NEWMAN.                                               |
|              | 327      | 11-15      | Telegram by request of Vice-Consul OKUDA.                                                           |
| 221-A        | 329      | 11-18      | Revenues in connection with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU.                                             |
| 222-A        | 330      | 11-18      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                                                           |
| 223-B        | 331*     | 11-18      | Re suspension of announcement of ship sailings.                                                     |
| 224-B        | 332*     | 11-18      | Re stopping in port of technicians being sent to the Burma Road.                                    |
| [16] 225-A   | 333      | 11-19      | To.....                                                                                             |
| 226-A        | 334      | 11-19      | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                     |
| 227-A        | 335      | 11-22      | To.....                                                                                             |
| 228-A        | 336      | 11-22      | Departure of American convoy for Singapore.                                                         |



## DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                  |
|--------------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 229-A        | 337       | 11-22      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                            |
| 230-A        | 338       | 11-22      | " " " " " " " " " " " "                                              |
| 231-A        | 339       | 11-23      | Re movements of warships and ships.                                  |
| 232-A        | 240 (340) | 11-23      | Re disposition of telegraphic code.                                  |
| 233-A        | 341*      | 11-24      | Re demand of return of advances to courier KUGA.                     |
| 234-A        | 342       | 11-24      | Re Fleet training base.                                              |
| 235-A        | 343       | 11-25      | Re representation of interests.                                      |
| 236-A        | 344       | 11-25      | To .....                                                             |
| -A           | 347       | 11-26      | Telegram by request of the Specie Bank.                              |
| 237-A        | 348       | 11-26      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.                            |
| 238-A        | 350       | 11-28      | Miscellaneous military information.                                  |
| 239-A        | 352       | 11-29      | BK(?) (In Roman letters).                                            |
| 240-A        | 353       | 11-29      | BK(?) " " " "                                                        |
| 241-A        | 355       | 12-1       | BK(?) " " " "                                                        |
| [17] 242-A   | 356       | 12-1       | Re report of number of Consular staff and their families.            |
| 243-A        | 357       | 12-3       | Movements of warships and ships.                                     |
| 244-A        | 358       | 12-2       | Re personnel of Consulate.                                           |
| O            | 359       |            | Re burning of codes.                                                 |
| 245-A        | 360       | 12-3       | To .....                                                             |
| 246-A        | 361       | 12-3       | Re remittance of traveling expenses of families.                     |
| 247-A        | 362*      | 12-3       | B. S. (?) (Message reports movements warships).                      |
| 248-A        | 363*      | 12-3       | B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).                      |
| 249-A        | 362*      | 12-4       | Re entry in port of foreign warships and ships.                      |
| 250-A        | 365*      | 12-4       | B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).                      |
| 251-A        | 366*?     | 12-5       | Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU. |
| 252-A        | 367       | 12-5       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.                               |
| 253-A        | 368*      | 12-6       | B. K. (?)                                                            |
| 254-A        | 369*      | 12-6       | Ditto.                                                               |

## TO SEATTLE

|          |      |       |                                                                                                  |
|----------|------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [18] 1-B | 346* | 11-26 | Re investigation of date of crossing to United States by ICHISAKU ICHINUKIDA (request Telegram). |
|----------|------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

## TO LOS ANGELES

|     |      |      |                                                                         |
|-----|------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1-B | 15   | 1-17 | Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI and troupe. (request telegram)       |
| 2-A | 18   | 1-21 | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #14)                   |
| 3-A | 20   | 1-23 | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #16)                   |
| 4-B | 101* | 4-26 | Departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI. (to San Francisco #11) |
| 5-A | 175  | 7-16 | Re re-sending of telegram.                                              |

## TO SAN FRANCISCO

|          |      |                 |                                                                                                      |
|----------|------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1-B      | 2    | 1-6             | Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship. (to New York #1)                                               |
| 2-B      | 3    | 1-6             | Re date of arrival in and departure from San Francisco of Minister SUMA.                             |
| (1)-B    | 1    | 1-4 duplication | Re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's Society. (to the Minister #1)                 |
| 3-B      | 9    | 1-11            | Report of gist of conversation with ABEND. (to the Minister #6)                                      |
| 4-A      | 19   | 1-22            | Re trip to Japan without passports by American citizens of Japanese parentage. (to the Minister #15) |
| [19] 5-B | 35   | 2-1             | Re names of Ambassador NOMURA's party. (to the Minister #5).                                         |
| 6-B      | 63*  | 3-15            | Re journey of Ambassador TOMII.                                                                      |
| 7-A      | 83   | 4-7             | Re resending of telegram.                                                                            |
| 8-A      | 84*? | 4-7             | Re stopping in port of the Japan Christian Federation. (to the Minister #61).                        |
| 9-(A)    | 89   |                 | Re shifting of telegram(s).                                                                          |
| 10-B     | 94*  | 4-19            | Re departure of courier FUKUDA.                                                                      |
| 11-B     | 101* | 4-26            | Re departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI.                                                  |
| 12-A     | 107  | 4-30            | Re the seizure of crew members of the COLUMBIA by British warship. (to the Minister #73).            |
| 13-A     | 109  | 5-1             | Re seizure of German(s) by British warship. (to the Minister #75).                                   |
| 14-B     | 121* | 5-24            | Re request for easy clearance of courier TAGI (or TANOGI or TAKI).                                   |
| 15-A     | 132  | 6-6             | Re German boarding the TATUTA MARU.                                                                  |
| (1)-A-YU | 137  | 6-12            | Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #96).                              |
| 16-C     | 168  | 7-11            | Telegram of thanks of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.                                                         |
| 17-A     | 182  | 7-22            | Re investigation of passengers of the YAWATA MARU.                                                   |
| 18-B     | 195* | 7-31            | Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU.                                                              |

# 1094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## TO SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                           |
|--------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 19-A         | 196      | 8-1        | Re journey of courier OSHIO.                                                                                  |
| [80] 20-B    | 199*     | 8-2        | Re stopping in port of Honolulu of the TATUTA MARU. (re transfer of telegram #65 received from the Minister). |
| 21-A         | 224      | 8-25       | Re non-receipt of telegram.                                                                                   |
| 22-B         | 272*     | 10-20      | Re landing of Secretary MAEDA.                                                                                |
| 23-B         | 274*     | 10-22      | Re passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.                                                                        |
| 24-A         | 288      | 10-27      | Re delivery to Secretary MAEDA.                                                                               |
| 25-A         | 293      | 10-29      | Re physical examination of the passengers on board the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #68)                      |
| 26-B         | 309*     | 11-7       | Re departure of Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.                                                                  |
| 27-B         | 321*     | 11-12      | Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU? (to the Minister #78).                                            |
| 28-C         | 323      | 11-13      |                                                                                                               |
| 29-A         | 328      | 11-17      | Re resending of telegram.                                                                                     |
| 30-A         | 362*     | 12-3       | B. S. (to the Minister #247)                                                                                  |
| [81] - (C)   | 21       | 1-24       | Re reception program for Ambassador NOMURA. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU). "                        |
| - (C)        | 27       | 1-26       | " " " " " " " "                                                                                               |
| - (C)        | 26       | 1-28       | Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).                        |
| -C           | 29       | 1-29       | Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Secretary OKUMURA).                                         |
| -C           | 30       | 1-29       | Re sending of aide-de-camp by Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).         |
| -C           | 31       | 1-30       | Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Secretary OKUMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).                        |
| -C           | 68       |            | Re meeting the boat by Vice-Consul OKUDA. (to Secretary MORIMURA on NITTA MARU).                              |
| - (C)        | 74       | 3-27       | Private telegram of Consul General. (to FUMIKO TAKAO from OSAKA).                                             |
| - (C)        | 80       | 4-2        | To Ambassador KURUSU. (from TATUTA MARU).                                                                     |
| - (C)        | 91       | 4-15       | Private request telegram of Consul General. (to HARUNO YOSISE, Tokyo).                                        |
|              | 127      | 6-2        | Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General to the GAKUYODO in Canton).                         |
| [82]         | 128      | 6-2        | Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General to Mrs. MAKI, Tokyo)                                |
| -C           | 135      | 6-7        | Re declaration of residence of MASAO KADOFUJI. (to Villagemaster ENBUCHI, Otomari branch office, Karafuto).   |
| -C           | 145      | 6-20       | Condolatory telegram. (to wife of Councillor AKAGI in Shanghai).                                              |
| -C           | 198      | 8-2        | Re son of Consul NAKAUCHI. (to Consul Nakauchi, Los Angeles).                                                 |
| - (C)        | 219      | 8-16       | Request telegram of Consul General. (to translator MAZAKI from Shanghai).                                     |
| 1-A          | 1        | 9-8        | Re export of pineapple seedlings. (to Head of Section of Foreign Affairs, Formosa).                           |
|              | 270      | 10-17      | Re inquiry on condition of fuel oil supply. (to Secretary MAEDA on TATUTA MARU).                              |
| -C           | 294      | 10-29      | Re connection of Secretary —naga to American liner, etc. (to Consul IWANAGA on TAIYO MARU).                   |

## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS

|               |    |      |                                                                                                                         |
|---------------|----|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [83] (1)-A-YU | 4  | 1-6  | Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #2)                                                                         |
| (2)-A-YU      | 7  | 1-9  | Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                                    |
| 1-B           | 8  | 1-10 | Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #5)                                                                         |
|               |    |      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.                                                                                   |
|               |    |      | Re enquiry on advisability of trip to United States by the SUBARU SHOW.                                                 |
| (3)-YU-A      | 14 | 1-16 | Dispatched to: San Francisco and Los Angeles.                                                                           |
|               |    |      | Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #11)                                                                        |
|               |    |      | Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                     |
| (4)-B-YU      | 15 | 1-17 | Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI's troupe. (to Los Angeles #1)                                                        |
|               |    |      | Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.                                                                              |
| (5)-A-YU      | 24 | 1-28 | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #18)                                                                   |
|               |    |      | Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                                                     |
| 2-B           | 28 | 1-29 | Re proposal of Commander-in-chief RICHARDSON for reception of Ambassador NOMURA. (to the Minister #20)                  |
| 3-B           | 32 | 1-30 | Dispatched to: Ambassador in U. S., and San Francisco.                                                                  |
|               |    |      | Re offer of Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON to send aide-de-camp to meet the Ambassador (NOMURA?). (to the Minister #21). |
|               |    |      | Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco.                                                                           |

## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

| (Code ? No.)     | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                      |
|------------------|-----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [24] 4-B.....    | 34.....   | 7-1.....   | Conditions of Ambassador NOMURA's stopping in port here (to the Minister #22).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.           |
| (6)-A-YU.....    | 38.....   | 2-6.....   | Re movement of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #25).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.                |
| (7)-A-YU.....    | 43.....   | 2-21.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #29).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.               |
| (8)-A-YU.....    | 45.....   | 2-24.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #31).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (9)-A-YU.....    | 49.....   |            | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #34).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.               |
| (10)-B-YU.....   | 51.....   | 3-1.....   | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #36).<br>Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.         |
| 5-A.....         | 53.....   | 3-3.....   | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.<br>Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.                                                  |
| 6-A.....         | 54.....   | 3-4.....   | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #38).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.             |
| (11)-A-YU.....   | 55.....   | 3-4.....   | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #39).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.             |
| [25] (12)-B-YU.. | 58.....   | 3-6.....   | Re correction of telegram. (to the Minister #42).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                  |
| (13)-A-YU.....   | 59.....   | 3-10.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #43).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (14)-A-YU.....   | 60.....   | 3-10.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #44).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (15)-A-YU.....   | 65.....   | 3-21.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #47).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle and Los Angeles.             |
| (16)-A-YU.....   | 69.....   | 3-24.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #50).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (17)-A-YU.....   | 73.....   | 3-27.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #53).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| 7-A.....         | 75.....   | 3-28.....  | Re trip to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.                                  |
| (18)-B-YU.....   | 85.....   | 4-8.....   | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                     |
| [26] (19)-A-YU.. | 63*?..... | 4-9.....   | Re Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #63).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.               |
| (20)-A-YU.....   | 90.....   | 4-14.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #64).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (21)-A-YU.....   | 92.....   | 4-15.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #65).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (22)-A-YU.....   | 93.....   | 4-17.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #65).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| 8-B.....         | 96*.....  | 4-21.....  | Re stopping in port of eldest son of President ROOSEVELT. (to the Minister #67).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.                |
| (23)-A-YU.....   | 97.....   | 4-21.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #68).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.             |
| 9-A.....         | 100.....  | 4-24.....  | Re transferring of telegram regarding movements of U. S. Fleet.<br>Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.                |
| (24)-A-YU.....   | 180.....  | 4-28.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #69).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.             |
| (25)-B-YU.....   | 104*..... | 4-29.....  | Re transport WASHINGTON.<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.                                                                 |
| [27] (26)-A-YU.. | 109.....  | 5-1.....   | Re seizure of German(s) by British warship. (to the Minister #75).<br>Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle. |
| (27)-A-YU.....   | 110.....  | 5-6.....   | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #76).                                                                         |
| (28)-A-YU.....   | 113.....  | 5-12.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #78).                                                                         |
| (29)-B-YU.....   | 115*..... | 5-14.....  | Re arrival of B-17 bombers. (to the Minister #80).                                                                                       |

## 1096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

| (Code ? No.)       | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                                           |
|--------------------|-----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (30)-A-YU.....     | 116.....  | 5-16.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #81).                                                                                              |
| (31)-B-YU.....     | 119.....  | 5-22.....  | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #84).                                                                                         |
| (32)-A-YU.....     | 122.....  | 5-28.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #86).                                                                                              |
| 10-A.....          | 125.....  | 5-29.....  | Re check-up and reporting of names of U. S. warships. Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.                                                 |
| (33)-YU-A.....     | 130.....  | 6-3.....   | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #91).                                                                                              |
| (34)-B-YU.....     | 134*..... | 6-7.....   | Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. Re trip to Washington by Admiral KIMMEL and visit to the mainland by the Fleet. (to the Minister #94). |
| (35)-A-YU.....     | 138.....  | 6-13.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #97).                                                                                              |
| [8] (36)-B-YU..... | 140*..... | 6-13.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle. Re arrival in port of U. S. Army transport PRESIDENT PIERCE. (to the Minister #99).                     |
| (37)-A-YU.....     | 148.....  | 6-23.....  | Dispatched to: San Francisco and Manila. Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #106).                                                       |
| 11-A.....          | 157.....  | 7-1.....   | Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. Re stoppage of sending of code(s).                                                         |
| 12-A.....          | 160.....  | 7-5.....   | Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle. Re survey of assets of Japanese residing within the United States.                                     |
| 13-A.....          | 171.....  | 7-14.....  | Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #123).                                                                                                |
| 14-B.....          | 174*..... | 7-15.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re commencement of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet Union. (to the Minister #125).                   |
| 15-A.....          | 180.....  | 7-21.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #129).                                                                |
| 16-A.....          | 188.....  | 7-28.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re entry into port of Japanese vessel. (to the Minister #135).                                                   |
| 17-A.....          | 190.....  | 7-29.....  | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #137).                                                                                                          |
| 18-C.....          | 191.....  | 7-29.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco. Re entry into U. S. port of Japanese vessel(s). (to the Minister #138).                                         |
| [29] 19-C.....     | 196*..... | 7-31.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU. (to San Francisco #18).                                                  |
| 20-A.....          | 197.....  | 8-1.....   | Re entry into and embarkation from port of the ASAMA MARU. (to the Minister #143).                                                                            |
| 21-A.....          | 206.....  | 8-4.....   | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #145).                                                                                             |
| 22-A.....          | 208.....  | 8-6.....   | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re transferring of telegram(s). (telegram from the Minister #66).                                                |
| 23-A.....          | 211.....  | 8-8.....   | Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #148).                                                                                                |
| 24-A.....          | 220.....  | 8-18.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #153).                                                                                                       |
| 25-A.....          | 221.....  | 8-19.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Local Japanese situation. (to the Minister #164).                                                                |
| 26-A.....          | 222.....  | 8-21.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Ambassador #48).                                                         |
| 27-B.....          | 226*..... | 8-28.....  | Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco. Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #156).                                             |
| 28-A.....          | 230.....  | 9-2.....   | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #160).                                                |
| [30] 29-A.....     | 231.....  | 9-3.....   | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re HAYAKAWA. (to the Ambassador #51).                                                                            |
| 30-B.....          | 232*..... | 9-3.....   | Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco. Re HAYAKAWA. (from the Ambassador #29).                                                                            |
| 31-A.....          | 237.....  | 9-6.....   | Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #163).                                                  |
| 32-A.....          | 239.....  | 9-9.....   | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re mail matter to Japan. (to the Minister #164).                                                                 |
| 33-A.....          | 241.....  | 9-13.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re stopping in port of French warship. (to the Minister #166).                                                   |
| 34-A.....          | 242.....  | 9-13.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re propaganda pamphlets of fifth columnists against Japan. (to the Minister #167).                               |
| 35-A.....          | 243.....  | 9-15.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re transfer of official telegrams sent to this Consulate. (to the Minister #168).                                |
| 36-A.....          | 244.....  | 9-15.....  | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #169).                                                   |
|                    |           |            | Dispatched to Ambassador and San Francisco.                                                                                                                   |

## MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

| (Code ? No.) | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                                             |
|--------------|----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 37-A         | 250      | 9-22       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #172)                                                                                   |
| [31] 38-A    | 251      | 9-22       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re departure of French vessel. (to the Minister #173)                                           |
| 39-A         | 253      | 9-24       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re problem of shipping communication. Japan-United States. (to the Minister #175)               |
| 40-B         | 256*     | 9-29       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re question of fishing boats owned by Japanese. (to the Minister #177)                          |
| 41-A         | 257      | 9-29       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #178)                                                |
| 42-A         | 258      | 9-28       | Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #179)                                                                                                |
| 43-A         | 260      | 10-1       | Re problem of Japanese Language Schools. (to the Minister #181)                                                                                 |
| 44-B         | 262*     | 10-2       | Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats. (to the Minister #183)                                                                              |
| 45-A         | 263      | 10-2       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re transportation of British soldiers by American vessels. (to the Minister #184)               |
| 46-A         | 265      | 10-6       | Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Vancouver.<br>Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #186)                     |
| 47-A         | 267      | 10-13      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #188)                                |
| [32] 48-A    | 268      | 10-15      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re going to the United States of Chinese airmen. (to the Minister #189)                         |
| 49-A         | 271      | 10-17      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re payment of boat fare in Japan. (to the Minister #191)                                        |
| 50-A         | 273      | 10-20      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #192)                                       |
| 51-B         | 274*     | 10-22      | Re passengers of the TAIYO MARU. (to San Francisco #23)                                                                                         |
| 52           | 275*     | 10-22      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and Minister.<br>Re number of passengers on TAIYO MARU. Telegram transferred. (from the Minister #99)                 |
| 53           | 276*     | 10-22      | Transfer telegram re departure from Yokohama of the TAIYO MARU. (from the Minister #100)                                                        |
| 54-A         | 283      | 10-24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #194)                                                                            |
| 55-A         | 289      | 10-28      | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #199)                                                                                             |
| 56-A         | 298      | 11-1       | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re suspension of loading of mail matter on TAIYO MARU. (to the Ambassador #71)                  |
| 57-A         | 300      | 11-1       | Dispatched to: Minister, San Francisco and Seattle.<br>Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier. (to the Ambassador #73)                     |
| [33] 58-A    | 301      | 11-4       | Dispatched to: Minister, San Francisco and Seattle.<br>Re delay in sailing of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #204)                                |
| 59-A         | 303      | 11-4       | Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU (to the Minister #205)                                                                                |
| 60-B         | 305*     | 11-6       | Re departure of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #206)                                                                                              |
| 61-A1        | 314      | 11-8       | Dispatched to: San Francisco and Seattle.<br>Re according of convenience in clearance to TAIYO MARU and two other ships. (to the Minister #211) |
| 62-A         | 315      | 11-10      | Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #212)                                                                                             |
| 63-(C)       | 320*     | 11-12      | Dispatched to: U. S., and San Francisco.<br>Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #216)                                             |
| 64-C         | 323      | 11-13      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to San Francisco #28)                                       |
| 65-A         | 324      | 11-13      | Dispatched to: Minister and Ambassador.<br>From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #218)                                                       |
| 66-A         | 325      | 11-14      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #219)                                                                                |
| 67-A         | 329      | 11-18      | Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.<br>Revenues connected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #221)                       |
| 68-A         | 330      | 11-18      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #222)                                                                                |
| [34] 69-A    | 331*     | 11-18      | Re suspension of announcement of arrival and departure of ships. (to the Minister #223)                                                         |
| 70-A         | 334      | 11-19      | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #226)                                                                                |
| 71-A         | 353      | 11-29      | BK. (?) (to the Minister #240)                                                                                                                  |
| 72-A         | 361      | 12-3       | Re sending of traveling expenses of family (families). (to the Minister #246)                                                                   |
| 73-A         | 366*     | 12-5       | Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #251)                                                      |

End of matching of telegrams.



# 1098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## TO NEW YORK

| (Code ? No.)    | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                          |
|-----------------|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| [35] 1-(B)..... | 2.....    | 1-6.....   | Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship.                        |
| 2-A.....        | 210.....  | 8-7.....   | Re telegram to the Specie Bank.                              |
| 3-B.....        | 302*..... | 11-4.....  | Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA. |
| 3-B.....        | 302*..... | 11-4.....  | Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA. |
| 4-B.....        | 304.....  | 11-5.....  | Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA. |

## TO THE AMBASSADOR

|                    |           |           |                                                                                                            |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [36] (1)-YU-B..... | 5.....    | 1-7.....  | Movements of the U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #3)                                                          |
| 1-B.....           | 10.....   | 1-11..... | Interview with Rear Admiral KIMMEL, newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief. (to the Minister #7)               |
| (2)-YU-B.....      | 11.....   | 1-13..... | Movements of the U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #8)                                                          |
| 2-B.....           | 22.....   | 1-24..... | ? (To Minister #17)                                                                                        |
| 3-B.....           | 25.....   | 1-28..... | Re registration of families and servants of officials of foreign government with the State Department.     |
| 4-B.....           | 33.....   | 2-1.....  | Re expected time (date) of arrival in office of Ambassador NOMURA.                                         |
| 5-B.....           | 35.....   | 2-1.....  | Re names of Ambassador NOMURA's staff.                                                                     |
| 6-B.....           | 36.....   | 2-1.....  | Re reporting to Commander-in-Chief KIMMEL of new appointment.                                              |
| 7-B.....           | 41.....   | 2-18..... | Re measure for freezing of foreign assets in the United States.                                            |
| (3)-B-YU.....      | 42.....   | 2-20..... | Re designation of naval defense area in Kaneohe Bay. (to the Minister #28)                                 |
| (4)-YU-B.....      | 46.....   | 2-26..... | Re explanations of the Minister in the Diet.                                                               |
| 8-B.....           | 47.....   | 2-26..... | Re date when Consul-General KITA will start for his new post. (from the Minister #10—telegram relayed).    |
| [37] 9-B.....      | 51.....   | 3-1.....  | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #36)                                       |
| 10-B.....          | 58*.....  | 3-6.....  | Re correction of telegram. (to the Minister #42)                                                           |
| 11-B.....          | 61.....   | 3-11..... | Re request for refundment of advances.                                                                     |
| 12-B.....          | 62*?..... | 3-14..... | Re report of arrival at post of Consul-General KITA. (to the Minister #45)                                 |
| (5)-B-YU.....      | 66*.....  | 3-21..... | Re visit to New Zealand of U. S. warship(s).                                                               |
| 13-A.....          | 79.....   | 4-2.....  | Re inquiry of name of Consulate to which telegraphic code was transferred.                                 |
| 14-B.....          | 87.....   | 4-10..... | Re investigation of code type KETSU telegram(s).                                                           |
| 15-A.....          | 88.....   | 4-10..... | Re easy clearance of courier MORI.                                                                         |
| 16-A.....          | 103.....  | 4-28..... | Re entry into port of British warship. (to the Minister #70)                                               |
| 17-A.....          | 111.....  | 5-7.....  | Local general situation. (to the Minister #77)                                                             |
| (6)-A-YU.....      | 118.....  | 5-21..... | General situation. (to the Minister #83)                                                                   |
| 18-B.....          | 120*..... | 5-23..... | Re stopping in port of Minister of Land of New Zealand. (to the Minister #85)                              |
| 7-B-YU.....        | 123*..... | 5-27..... | Re departure of the TRADE WIND. (to the Minister #87)                                                      |
| 19-A.....          | 130.....  | 6-3.....  | Re movements of the U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #91)                                        |
| [38] 20-A.....     | 131.....  | 6-4.....  | Re reply to date of sending of official message (s).                                                       |
| 21-B.....          | 134*..... | 6-7.....  | Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the visit of the Fleet to the Mainland. (to the Minister #94) |
| (8)-A-YU.....      | 139.....  | 6-13..... | Local general situation. (to the Minister #98)                                                             |
| 22-A.....          | 141.....  | 6-14..... | Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #100)                                    |
| 23-A.....          | 142.....  | 6-16..... | Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #101)                                    |
| 24-B.....          | 143*..... | 6-16..... | Re closure of German Consulates in the United States. (to the Minister #102)                               |
| 25-B.....          | 144*..... | 6-17..... | Re coming here of the MEIJI University baseball team. (on request of N. Y. K.)                             |
| 26-A.....          | 146.....  | 6-20..... | Talks with Italian Consul. (to the Minister #104)                                                          |
| (9)-B-YU.....      | 147*..... | 6-23..... | Re stopping in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS. (to the Minister #105)                                            |
| (10)-B-YU.....     | 149*..... | 6-26..... | Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.                                                                               |
| 27-A.....          | 150.....  | 6-27..... | Re arrival in port of Commander TATIBANA.                                                                  |
| 28-B.....          | 155*..... | 6-30..... | Re closure of German Consulate (s). (to the Minister #112)                                                 |
| 29-A.....          | 156.....  | 7-1.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #113)                                           |
| [39] 30-A.....     | 158.....  | 7-2.....  | Re regular foreign text publications for oversea propaganda use.                                           |
| (31)-B.....        | 159*..... | 7-3.....  | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #114)                                      |
| 32-A.....          | 161.....  | 7-7.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #115)                                                     |
| 33-B.....          | 163*..... | 7-8.....  | Re participation of American flyers in the Chinese Air Force. (to the Minister #117)                       |
| 34-C.....          | 167.....  | 7-11..... | Telegram of thanks for Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.                                                              |
| 35-A.....          | 170.....  | 7-14..... | Re instructions for returning the Imperial Portrait. (to the Minister #122)                                |
| 36-A.....          | 172.....  | 7-15..... | Re request for transfer of telegram(s).                                                                    |
| 37-B.....          | 173.....  | 7-15..... | Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc. (to the Minister #124)                                               |
| 38-A.....          | 176.....  | 7-17..... | Re status of employees.                                                                                    |

## TO THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| (Code ? No.)   | File No.  | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                   |
|----------------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 39-(A).....    | 178.....  | 7-18.....  | Re request for transfer of telegrams.                                                                 |
| 40-C.....      | 183.....  | 7-24.....  | Re registration of officials and employees of foreign Governments.                                    |
| 41-A.....      | 184.....  | 7-24.....  | Re returning of the Imperial Portrait.                                                                |
| 42-B.....      | 187*..... | 7-26.....  | Re arrival of Under-secretary of the Navy and Freeze Administrator. (to the Minister #134)            |
| 43-B.....      | 192*..... | 7-30.....  | Effect of the enforcement of the Freeze Order on the resident Japanese. (to the Minister #139)        |
| [40] 44-B..... | 194*..... | 7-30.....  | Re exemption of Chinese diplomats and Consulates from application of Freeze Order.                    |
| 45-A.....      | 205.....  | 8-2.....   | Re re-sending of telegram.                                                                            |
| 46-A.....      | 207*..... | 8-5.....   | Re incorporation of the Coast Guard within the Navy. (to the Minister #146)                           |
| 47-A.....      | 213.....  | 8-12.....  | Re bank "balance" of official funds, etc.                                                             |
| 48-A.....      | 222.....  | 8-21.....  | Re movements of U. S. warships.                                                                       |
| 49-A.....      | 225.....  | 8-27.....  | Re treatment of the Japanese residents in the U. S. by Americans. (to the Minister #155)              |
| 50-B.....      | 229*..... | 9-2.....   | Re passing through of American airplane "pilots". (to the Minister #159)                              |
| 51-A.....      | 230.....  | 9-3.....   | Re HAYAKAWA                                                                                           |
| 52-A.....      | 233.....  | 9-3.....   | Re HAYAKAWA                                                                                           |
| 53-A.....      | 235.....  | 9-5.....   | Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago. (to the Minister #162)                                  |
| 54-A.....      | 247.....  | 9-17.....  | Re reporting of names of Consulate staff members in regard to the Freeze Order.                       |
| 55-B.....      | 248*..... | 9-18.....  | Re drawing up a name-list under arrangement for the easing of the credit freeze order.                |
| 56-A.....      | 249.....  | 9-19.....  | Military information. (to the Minister #171)                                                          |
| [41] 57-A..... | 255.....  | 9-27.....  | Re correction of telegram numbers.                                                                    |
| 58-B.....      | 264*..... | 10-4.....  | Re measure for time of war. (to Minister #185)                                                        |
| 59-B.....      | 266*..... | 10-10..... | Re conversation of Delegate KING. (to the Minister #187).                                             |
| 60-A.....      | 277.....  | 10-22..... | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                         |
| 61-B.....      | 279*..... | 10-24..... | Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA. (from the Minister #101—telegram relayed.) |
| 62-A.....      | 280.....  | 10-24..... | Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA.                                            |
| 63-A.....      | 281.....  | 10-24..... | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                         |
| 64-A.....      | 282.....  | 10-24..... | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                         |
| 65-A.....      | 285*..... | 10-25..... | Re report on assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff.                                            |
| 66-A 1.....    | 286.....  | 10-25..... | Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance of Consulate members.                                    |
| 67-A.....      | 290.....  | 10-28..... | Re correction of telegram numbers.                                                                    |
| 68-A.....      | 293.....  | 10-29..... | Re physical examination of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.                                        |
| 69-A.....      | 296.....  | 10-30..... | Re notification of receipt of telegram. (in connection with courier KUGA.)                            |
| 70-A.....      | 297.....  | 11-1.....  | Re allowance for this Consulate members.                                                              |
| [42] 71-A..... | 298.....  | 11-1.....  | Re suspension of loading of mail matter on board the TAIYO MARU.                                      |
| 72-B.....      | 299*..... | 11-1.....  | Re arrival of the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #203)                                                  |
| 73-A.....      | 300.....  | 11-1.....  | Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier.                                                          |
| 74-A.....      | 307.....  | 11-6.....  | Re investigation of people boarding the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #208)                            |
| 75-B.....      | 316*..... | 11-10..... | Re bounds of application of the Martial Law in Hawaii. (to the Minister #213)                         |
| 76.....        | 317.....  | .....      | Re number of passengers on the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #214)                                     |
| 77-A.....      | 319.....  | 11-11..... | Re easing of the freeze in Japanese governmental agencies in the U. S.                                |
| 78-B.....      | 321*..... | 11-12..... | Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.                                                           |
| 79-A.....      | 322.....  | 11-13..... | From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #217)                                                        |
| 80-A.....      | 326.....  | 11-14..... | Ambassador KURUSU's talk with NEWMAN.                                                                 |
| 81-A.....      | 343.....  | 11-25..... | Re representation of interests. (to the Minister #235.)                                               |
| 82-B.....      | 345*..... | 11-25..... | Re report of names of families of this Consulate's members.                                           |
| 83-A.....      | 354.....  | 12-1.....  | Re representation of interests.                                                                       |
| 84-A.....      | 369*..... | 12-6.....  | BK (to the Minister #254)                                                                             |

## TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPLENISHMENTS

|               |          |           |                                                                                        |
|---------------|----------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [43] 1-A..... | 76.....  | .....     | Re passport visa of WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE. (to the Minister #56)                      |
| 1-B.....      | 81.....  | 4-3.....  | Dispatched to: New Orleans.                                                            |
| 2-A.....      | 95.....  | 4-19..... | Re stopping in port of the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. (to the Minister #59). |
| 3-B.....      | 104..... | 4-29..... | Dispatched to: Manila.                                                                 |
| 4-B.....      | 105..... | 4-30..... | Re re-sending of telegram.                                                             |
|               |          |           | Dispatched to: Manila.                                                                 |
|               |          |           | Re transport WASHINGTON. (to the Minister #71)                                         |
|               |          |           | Dispatched to: Manila.                                                                 |
|               |          |           | Re going to Chungking of HENRY LUCE. (to the Minister #72)                             |
|               |          |           | Dispatched to: Manila.                                                                 |

# 1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPLENISHMENTS—Continued

| (Code ? No.)  | File No. | Date, 1941 | Synopsis of message                                                                                                      |
|---------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2-C.....      | 112..... | 5-12.....  | Re mourning on death of Representative YAMAJI.<br>Dispatched to: New Orleans.                                            |
| 1-B.....      | 126..... | 5-29.....  | Re passing through of MANUEL FOX. (to the Minister #89)<br>Dispatched to: Hongkong.                                      |
| 2-B.....      | 152..... | 6-28.....  | Re stopping in port of American on inspection tour to the Burma Road. (to the Minister #110)<br>Dispatched to: Hongkong. |
| MU-(C).....   | 215..... | 8-13.....  | Re expressing of condolence for death of Mrs. KA (or SO and SO).<br>Dispatched to: Canton.                               |
| MU-A.....     | 218..... | 8-16.....  | Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate.<br>Dispatched to: Canton.                                                           |
| MU-A.....     | 223..... | 8-22.....  | Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate.<br>Dispatched to: Canton.                                                           |
| [44] 1-B..... | 245..... | 9-17.....  | Re stopping in port of courier.<br>Dispatched to: Shanghai.                                                              |
| 2-B.....      | 246..... | 9-17.....  | From Secretary KIYOHARA.<br>Dispatched to: Shanghai.                                                                     |

TOP SECRET

Enclosure (B)

[1] Translation of form in which were recorded the incoming telegrams to the Consulate.

### INCOMING TELEGRAMS

Telegrams, Official Messages

Secret ----- Ordinary -----

No. -----

File No. -----

Dated ----- month ----- day

Received ----- month ----- day

From -----

To -----

Attached to:

Received ----- month ----- day

Subject: (gist of contents)

Channel of Disposition

To ----- month ----- day

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To: The Archives and Documents Section -----

Telegram Section (X)

Person in Charge: -----

Remarks: -----

[2]

### EXPLANATIONS

Types of Codes:

A ----- AN(GO)

B ----- RYAKU(GO)

C ----- HEI (ordinary)

Abbreviations:

CG ----- CONSUL GENERAL

ADS ----- ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION

TS ----- TELEGRAM SECTION

1. [2a] The letter GO is very similar to another letter, namely, REI, which may mean ORDER (in the sense of issued order), but since the letter—GO or

REI—may also be a designation of a certain type of code, this explanation is being attached for reference. This letter appears under columns entitled *TELEGRAM No. & CODE TYPE and CONTENTS*.

2. The word GOGAI is presumably a designation to the effect that the radio-gram does not belong to any one type of code for the word literally means "outside of number." However, the word may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

3. The word MU literally means nil or none, but this may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

## TOP SECRET

[9] FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                                                                         | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1-B .....                | 19       | 1/17       | Re granting of social allowances.                                                                                                                                                                | To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18. |
| 2-(A) .....              | 20       | 1/17       | Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.                                                                                                                                                             | To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18. |
| 3-B .....                | 26       | 1/24       | Re remittance of development (of intelligence) expenses.                                                                                                                                         | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24. |
| 4-B .....                | 27       | 1/24       | Re crew members connected with Japan-Russian (?) fishing industry. (to the Ambassador #37)                                                                                                       | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24. |
| 5-B .....                | 28       | 1/26       | Ditto. (to the Ambassador #38)                                                                                                                                                                   | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| 6-B .....                | 31       | 1/27       | Re invitation of Ambassador Nomura and his party.                                                                                                                                                | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| 7-B .....                | 32       | 1/27       | Re delivery of telegram to Ambassador Nomura.                                                                                                                                                    | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28. |
| 177-B .....              | 33       | 1/27       | Re expression of views by the Minister on the speech by Secretary "Hull" against Japan. (to the Ambassador #39)                                                                                  | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28. |
| 8-A .....                | 69       | 2/15       | Re collecting of information.                                                                                                                                                                    | To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/14. |
| 9-B .....                | 78       | 2/25       | Re crew members connected with Russo-Japanese (?) fishing.                                                                                                                                       | To the CG 2/25, to the TS 2/25. |
| 10-B .....               | 80       | 2/26       | Re date when Consul General Kita will start for his new post.                                                                                                                                    | To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/26. |
| [4] 11-B .....           | 82       | 2/27       | Re invitation to participate in the special festival of the Yasukuni Shrine to MASA NAKAMURA.                                                                                                    | To the CG 2/27, to the TS 2/27. |
| 12-B .....               | 83       | 3/1        | Re Consul General Kita's companion.                                                                                                                                                              | To the CG 3/1, to the TS 3/1.   |
| 13-B .....               | 91       | 3/8        | Re recrossing by CHINEI KANE-SHIRO.                                                                                                                                                              | To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.   |
| 14-B .....               | 90       | -----      | Re appointment of Secretary (TADASHI) MORIMURA to service in this Consulate.                                                                                                                     | To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.   |
| 584-A .....              | 94       | 3/10       | Re disposition of secret documents. (dated 3/10)                                                                                                                                                 | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11. |
| 15-B .....               | 111      | 3/18       | Re starting for new post of Secretary Morimura.                                                                                                                                                  | To the CG 3/18, to the TS 3/18. |
| 16-A .....               | 116      | 3/20       | Re granting of visa for transit to "WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE".                                                                                                                                     | To the CG 3/20, to the TS 3/21. |
| 619-A .....              | 117      | 3/22       | Re Greek vessel heading towards Japan.                                                                                                                                                           | To the CG 3/22, to the TS 3/22. |
| 17-A .....               | 119      | 3/25       | Re radiograms and secret documents to this Consulate carried by courier Mori.                                                                                                                    | To the CG 3/25, to the TS 3/25. |
| 18-C .....               | 120      | 3/25       | Re inquiry on boarding of ship by the Consul General's "cook."                                                                                                                                   | To the CG 3/25, to the TS 3/25. |
| 7-YUGO .....             | 127      | 3/27       | Re distribution of code type TSU and AN. (type GO #1 type 9) (dated 3/12)                                                                                                                        | To the CG 3/31, to the TS 4/1.  |
| 19-B .....               | 139      | 4/5        | Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.                                                                                                                                                   | To the CG 4/5, to the TS 4/5.   |
| 20-B .....               | 145      | 4/7        | Re verification expense of crewmen's registration.                                                                                                                                               | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.   |
| [6] 21-B .....           | 144      | 4/7        | Re request for contribution of article from Premier Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the magazine commemorating the completion of the Memorial Hall of the Japanese Hospital of Honolulu. | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.   |
| 814-ANGO .....           | 148      | 4/10       | Re departure of Panamanian vessel towards Japan. (to Britain #123)                                                                                                                               | To the CG 4/10, to the TS 4/10. |
| 819-RYAKUGO .....        | 152      | 4/11       | Re stopping in port of courier Secretary FUKUDA and his party.                                                                                                                                   | To the CG 4/11, to the TS 4/12. |

# 1102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                  | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 22-A .....               | 151 (12) | 4/11       | Re simplifying procedure for expatriation from Japanese nationality.                                                      | To the CG 4/11, to the TS 4/12. |
| 23-B .....               | 162      | 4/18       | Re remittance of allowances for rent.                                                                                     | To the CG 4/28, to the TS 4/19. |
| 24-C .....               | 163      | 9/18       | Re expatriation notices in official gazette.                                                                              | To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19. |
| 11-B-YUGO .....          | 164      | 4/18       | Re supplementary addition of RYAKUGO (code?) to transferred telegram no. E.                                               | To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19. |
| 25-B .....               | 179      | dated 4/28 | Re notice of expatriation of HISAO NAKAZAWA in the official gazette.                                                      | To the CG 4/28, to the TS 4/28. |
| 26-B .....               | 180      | 4/30       | Re crew members connected with Russo-Japanese(?) fishing. (to the Ambassador #186) (dated 4/30)                           | To the CG 4/30, to the TS 5/1.  |
| 963-ANGO .....           | 181      | dated 4/30 | Re change of indicator words in request telegram. (Secret)                                                                | To the CG 4/30, to the TS 5/1.  |
| -C .....                 | 19       | 5/3        | Re notice of expatriation of ..... in the official gazette.                                                               | To the CG 5/3, to the TS 5/3.   |
| [6] 28-C .....           | 194      | 5/7        | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 5/7, to the TS 5/3.   |
| 29-C .....               | 199      | 5/12       | Ditto .....                                                                                                               | To the CG 5/12, to the TS 5/13. |
| 30-A .....               | 200      | 5/12       | Re purchase of OKUMA's house (or purchase of house by OKUMA).                                                             | To the CG 5/12, to the TS 5/13. |
| (17)-AN-YUGO .....       | 198      | 5/10       | Re method for use of telegraphic code type TSU. (dated 4/12)                                                              | To the CG 5/13, to the TS ..... |
| 1058-ANGO .....          | 201      | 5/14       | Re abstinence from speeches disadvantageous to the Axis.                                                                  | To the CG 5/14, to the TS 5/14. |
| 31-C .....               | 208      | 5/21       | Re expatriation notice in the official gazette.                                                                           | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22. |
| 32-B .....               | 211      | 5/22       | Re transmission of lodging expenses for TSUKIKAWA by wire.                                                                | To the CG 5/22, to the TS 5/22. |
| 33-C .....               | 213      | 5/24       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 5/24, to the TS 5/24. |
| 34-B .....               | 226      | 5/29       | Re trip to Hawaii by the Meiji University baseball team.                                                                  | To the CG 5/29, to the TS 5/29. |
| 35-C .....               | 225      | 5/29       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 5/29, to the TS 5/29. |
| 36-A .....               | 227      | 5/30       | Re transmission by wire of this Consulate's expenses for the development of intelligence for this year.                   | To the CG 5/30, to the TS 5/31. |
| 37-C .....               | 228      | 5/31       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 5/31, to the TS 5/31. |
| 38-C .....               | 230      | 6/2        | Ditto .....                                                                                                               | To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/2.   |
| 39-C .....               | 238      | 6/5        | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/5.   |
| 40-C .....               | 243      | 6/7        | Ditto .....                                                                                                               | To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/7.   |
| [7] 41-A .....           | 246      | 6/9        | Re subsidy to the "Pan-Pacific Union". (dated 6/9)                                                                        | To the CG 6/9, to the TS 7/9.   |
| 1211-ANGO .....          | 247      | 6/9        | Re establishment of propaganda organ of the League of Nations (from Hankow #186)                                          | To the CG 6/9, to the TS 6/10.  |
| 42-C .....               | 250      | 6/11       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 6/12, to the TS 6/12. |
| 43-C .....               | 254      | 6/13       | Ditto .....                                                                                                               | To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/13. |
| 44-B .....               | 266      | 6/21       | Ditto .....                                                                                                               | To the CG 6/21, to the TS 6/21. |
| 45-(C) .....             | 282      | 6/25       | Re expatriation .....                                                                                                     | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |
| 46-A .....               | 284      | 6/27       | Re investigation of the true facts surrounding discovery of the mutiny plot of the crew on the battleship "Pennsylvania." | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27. |
| 47-B .....               | 289      | 6/28       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                                                               | To the CG 6/28, to the TS 6/30. |
| 1399-ANGO .....          | 300      | 7/3        | Re putting into force the telegraphic code type "TA."                                                                     | To the CG 7/3, to the TS 7/3.   |
| 48-C .....               | 301      | 7/4        | Notice of expatriation .....                                                                                              | To the CG 7/4, to the TS 7/6.   |
| 49-A .....               | 302      | 7/4        | Message from the NYK .....                                                                                                | To the CG 7/5, to the TS 7/5.   |
| 50-B .....               | 312      | 7/10       | Re resending of radiogram .....                                                                                           | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10. |
| 51-C .....               | 313      | 7/10       | Notice of expatriation .....                                                                                              | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10. |

# PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

1103

FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                          | Disposition                          |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 52-C.....                | 321      | 7/12       | Notice of expatriation.....                                                       | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14.      |
| [8] 53-B.....            | 322      | 7/12       | Re transmission by wire of salaries(?) for foreign diplomatic establishments.     | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14.      |
| 54-C.....                | 325      | 7/15       | Re expatriation notice.....                                                       | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/15.      |
| 55-A.....                | 329      | 7/16       | Re return of the Imperial portrait.....                                           | To the CG 7/16, to the TS 7/16.      |
| 56-A.....                | 331-330  | 7/16       | Re report of gathering of local information.                                      | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17.      |
| 57-B.....                | 336      | 7/17       | Re arrival in port of courier OSHIO.....                                          | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18.      |
| 58-C.....                | 344      | 7/21       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                       | To the CG 7/21, to the TS 7/21.      |
| 59-C.....                | 352      | 7/24       | Ditto.....                                                                        | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/26.      |
| 1631-ANGO.....           | 395      | 7/28       | Re issuing of instructions on entry into port of Japanese vessels.                | To the CG 7/28, to the TS 7/26 (28?) |
| 60-A.....                | 394      | 7/28       | Re returning of the portraits of the three Imperial Majesties.                    | To the CG 7/28, to the TS 7/29.      |
| 61-A.....                | 404      | 7/29       | Re..... the secret #2 type UNNUN.                                                 | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/29.      |
| 62-C.....                | 409      | 7/30       | Notice of expatriation.....                                                       | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 7/30.      |
| 63-A.....                | 419      | 7/31       | Re courier OSHIO.....                                                             | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.       |
| 64-C.....                | 420      | 7/31       | Expatriation notice in official gazette.                                          | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.       |
| 65.....                  | 432      | 8/2        | Re calling at "Honolulu" of Tatuta Maru.                                          | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.        |
| [9] 66-A.....            | 450      | 8/6        | Re sailing of the Tatuta Maru directly to Japan.                                  | To the CG 8/6, to the TS 8/8.        |
| 67-C.....                | 451      | 8/6        | Re expatriation notice.....                                                       | To the CG 8/6, to the TS 8/8.        |
| 68-A.....                | 457      | 8/8        | Re visa for passing through to the Britisher, McBain.                             | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/8.        |
| 69-C.....                | 459      | 8/9        | Expatriation notice.....                                                          | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/9.        |
| -A.....                  | 460      | 8/9        | Request telegram from the Yokohama Specie Bank dated Aug. 9.                      | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/9.        |
| 70-C.....                | 469      | 8/13       | Expatriation notice.....                                                          | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.      |
| 71-A.....                | 470      | 8/13       | Re loan from the Specie Bank.....                                                 | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.      |
| 1836-ANGO.....           | 477      | 8/16       | Re movements of foreign warships.....                                             | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/19.      |
| 72-B.....                | 486      | 8/22       | Re request for permission for inspection tour within the jurisdiction.            | To the CG 8/22, to the TS 8/22.      |
| 73-A.....                | 492      | 8/26       | Request telegram from Specie Bank.....                                            | To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27.      |
| 74-C.....                | 496      | 8/28       | Re expatriation notice.....                                                       | To the CG 8/28, to the TS 8/28.      |
| 75-A.....                | 498      | 8/29       | Re telegraphic code.....                                                          | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 9/5.       |
| 76-A.....                | 497      | 8/29       | (Special telegram type GO, no. 1907) Re loans from Specie Bank to this Consulate. | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29.      |
| 1906-ANGO.....           | 499      | ---        | Re survey pertaining to Domei broadcasts.                                         | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29.      |
| 77-A.....                | 502      | 8/30       | Re telegraphic code.....                                                          | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30.      |
| [10] 78-A.....           | 507      | 9/1        | Re movements and whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet.                                  | To the CG 9/1, to the TS 9/2.        |
| 79-A.....                | 516      | 9/5        | Request telegram from Specie Bank.....                                            | To the CG 9/5, to the TS 9/5.        |
| 80-C.....                | 524      | 9/10       | Expatriation notice in the official gazette.                                      | To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/11.      |
| 81-A.....                | 534      | 9/12       | From OGAWA.....                                                                   | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/13.      |
| 82-A.....                | 558      | 9/24       | Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.....                                                        | To the CG 9/24, to the TS 9/25.      |
| 83-A.....                | 559      | 9/24       | Re report of movements of U. S. Fleet.....                                        | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/25.      |
| 84-(C).....              | 561      | 9/25       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                       | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.      |
| 85-(C).....              | 578      | 9/30       | Ditto.....                                                                        | To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30.      |
| 86-A.....                | 579      | 10/1       | Re financial report.....                                                          | To the CG 10/1, to the TS 10/2.      |
| 87-B.....                | 582      | 10/2       | Re contents of baggage directed to this Consulate.                                | To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/2.      |
| 88-C.....                | 586      | 10/3       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                       | To the CG 10/4, to the TS 10/6.      |

# 1104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                     | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 89-C.....                | 600      | 10/9       | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                  | To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.   |
| 90-C.....                | 604      | 10/11      | Ditto.....                                                                   | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| 91-B.....                | 612      | 10/14      | Re return to Japan of TSUYOKO AYUZA WA.                                      | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| 92-C.....                | 613      | 10/14      | Expatriation notice.....                                                     | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| 2179-RYAKUGO.....        | 622      | 10/15      | Re advance of expenses for sojourn to Secretary MAEDA.                       | To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15. |
| [11] 93-C.....           | 625      | 10/16      | Expatriation notice in official gazette..                                    | To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17. |
| 94-B.....                | 654      | 10/20      | Re landing of Secretary MAEDA.....                                           | To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21. |
| 95-A.....                | 656      | 10/20      | Re relaying (of message) to Secretary MAEDA.                                 | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 96-A.....                | 660      | 10/21      | Re surveillance of movements of "NEWMAN".                                    | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 97-A.....                | 661      | 10/21      | Re reports of forcible detention of "LEO SIROTA".                            | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 98-B.....                | 671      | 10/22      | Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary TOKUNAGA.                          | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 99-B.....                | 672      | 10/22      | Re number of passengers on the Taiyo Maru.                                   | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 100-B.....               | 673      | 10/22      | Re departure of Taiyo Maru from Yokohama.                                    | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 101-B.....               | 680      | 10/24      | Re clearance of baggage entrusted in care of Consul Iwanaga.                 | To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25. |
| 102-B.....               | 690      | 10/15      | Re expatriation notice.....                                                  | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 103-?.....               | 691      | 10/25      | Re investigation of whether the aircraft carrier "Yorktown" is there or not. | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 2231-RYAKUGO.....        | 693      | 10/27      | Re delay in arrival of Taiyo Maru.....                                       | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27. |
| 104-AN-RYO.....          | 694      | 10/27      | Re issuing of entry visa to "NEWMAN".                                        | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27. |
| 105-AN-RYO.....          | 698      | 10/28      | Re issuing of visa to the American "CRICHTON COLVIN".                        | To the CG 10/28, to the TS 10/28. |
| 106-C.....               | 702      | 10/29      | Expatriation notice.....                                                     | To the CG 10/29, to the TS 10/29. |
| [18] 107-C.....          | 708      | 10/31      | Re expatriation notice in official gazette.                                  | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| 018-A.....               | 707      | 10/31      | Re transmission of (message?) to REISAN (REI #3).                            | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| 2264-RYAKUGO.....        | 724      | 11/5       | Re according of conveniences to Ambassador KURUSU.                           | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.   |
| 109-C.....               | 761      | 11/12      | Expatriation notice.....                                                     | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14. |
| 2318-A.....              | 762      | 11/12      | Re according of conveniences to the "Argentine" Ambassador.                  | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14. |
| 110-B.....               | 765      | 11/14      | Re easing of the Freeze Order.....                                           | To the 11/14, to the TS 11/14.    |
| 111-A.....               | 771      | 11/15      | Re reports pertaining to warships and ships.                                 | To the 11/15, to the TS 11/19.    |
| 112-A.....               | 778      | 11/17      | Re letter(s) sent through Consul IWANAGA.                                    | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/17. |
| 113-A.....               | 783      | 11/18      | Re reports on movements of U. S. warships and ships.                         | To the CG 11/19 to the TS 11/19.  |
| 114-A.....               | 789      | 11/20      | Re location of Fleet Training Base....                                       | To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21. |
| 115-C.....               | 800      | 11/22      | Expatriation notice in official gazette..                                    | To the CG 11/22, to the TS 11/24. |
| 2378-ANGO.....           | 801      | .....      | Re reports on matters pertaining to finance.                                 | To the CG 11/22, to the TS 11/24. |
| 116-C.....               | 804      | 11/24      | Expatriation notice in official gazette..                                    | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 117-(C).....             | 807      | 11/26      | Ditto.....                                                                   | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| 118-A.....               | 827      | 11/28      | Re disposal of ANGO (code).....                                              | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| 119-A.....               | 828      | 11/28      | Re reports of movements of U. S. warships and ships.                         | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| [15] 2420-1-ANGO.....    | 834      | 11/29      | Re reply telegram as to names of employees and number in their families.     | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 120-C.....               | 835      | 11/29      | Expatriation notice.....                                                     | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 2422-ANGO.....           | 836      | 11/29      | Re reports of entrance and exit and other movements of warships and ships.   | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 121-A.....               | 843      | .....      | Re representation of interests.....                                          | To the CG 11/30, to the TS 12/1.  |

# PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

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## FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                 | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 122-C.....               | 844      | 12/1       | Expatriation notice.....                                 | To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/1. |
| 2422-GOAN.....           | 845      | 12/1       | Re entrance and exit and movement of warships and ships. | To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/1. |
| 2437-ANGO.....           | 846      | 12/1       | Re personal affairs of Consular staff....                | To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/2. |
| 2445-ANGO.....           | 848      | 12/2       | Re destruction by fire of code books...                  | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/2. |
| 123-A.....               | 849      | 12/2       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.....                         | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/3. |
| 2461-ANGO.....           | 851      | 12/3       | Re ANGO FUGO (Ango code or cryptographic code).          | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/3. |
| 124-B.....               | 852      | 12/3       | Re sending of families' travelling expenses.             | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/3. |
| 125-B.....               | 858      | 12/4       | Re payment of year-end bonuses to employees.             | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4. |
| 126-A.....               | 857      | 12/4       | Request telegram.....                                    | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4. |
| 2466-ANGO.....           | 856      | 12/4       | Re return to Japan of families (of Consulate staff?).    | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4. |
| 128-A.....               | 863      | 12/7       | Re reports of movements, etc., of warships and ships.    | To the CG 12/6, to the TS 12/6. |
| 127-C.....               | 862      | .....      | Expatriation.....                                        | To the CG 12/6, to the TS 12/6. |

[14]

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR

|                     |     |      |                                                                                                                                                             |                                 |
|---------------------|-----|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 315-YUANGO.....     | 1   | 1/6  | Re exchange visas between Japanese and Russians.<br>(dated 12/20)                                                                                           | To the CG 1/7, to the TS 1/7.   |
| 2-ANGO.....         | 27  | 1/18 | Re method of exit (from Japan?) of American citizens to Japanese descent.<br>(from the Minister #25)                                                        | To the CG 1/18, to the TS 1/18. |
| 1-B.....            | 38  | 1/29 | Re entry of nationality of dual citizens.                                                                                                                   | To the CG 129, to the TS 1/30.  |
| 2-B.....            | 46  | 2/1  | Re inquiry of names of Ambassador •NOMURA'S party.                                                                                                          | To the CG 2/1, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 6-RYAKUGO.....      | 51  | 1/4  | Newspaper reports concerning forcible detention of Greek vessel.<br>(from Los Angeles to the Minister #18)                                                  | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 7-RYAKUGO.....      | 52  | 2/4  | Re denial of rumors of forcible detention of Greek vessel.<br>(from the Minister #53)                                                                       | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 22-RYAKUGO.....     | 70  | 2/14 | Re arrival at post of Ambassador NOMURA.                                                                                                                    | To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/17. |
| 3-A.....            | 79  | 2/25 | Re bill for freezing foreign credits in the United States.                                                                                                  | To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/26. |
| 6-ANYUGO.....       | 95  | 3/10 | Re gathering of military information in U. S. and Canada.<br>(from the Minister #73)<br>(dated 2/18)                                                        | To the CG 3/11, to the TS 3/13. |
| 8-ANYUGO.....       | 96  | 3/10 | Re handling of visas for foreigners coming to Japan.<br>(to the Minister #109)<br>(dated 2/25)                                                              | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| [15] 25-HEIGO.....  | 102 | 3/11 | Re visit of Minister MATSUOKA to Germany and Italy.<br>(from the Minister GO-#599)                                                                          | To the CG 3/11, to the TS 3/12. |
| 26-RYAKUGO.....     | 104 | 3/12 | Re official tour of Europe by Minister MATSUOKA and the assumption of superintending of foreign Minister's duties by KONOYE.<br>(from the Minister GO-#629) | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| 27-ANGO.....        | 105 | 3/13 | Re telegraphic code.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#633)                                                                                                     | To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/13. |
| 28-ANGO.....        | 106 | 3/13 | Re visas of Netherlander(s).<br>(from the Minister GO-#643)                                                                                                 | To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/13. |
| 29-ANGO.....        | 109 | 3/14 | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.....<br>(to the Minister #34)                                                                                                   | To the CG 3/14, to the TS 3/17. |
| 20-YU-GO-RYAKU..... | 108 | 3/14 | Tenor of arguments concerning the Far Eastern problem.<br>(to the Minister #29)<br>(dated 3/6)                                                              | To the CG 3/14, to the TS 3/17. |
| 4-B.....            | 110 | 3/15 | Re transmission by wire of advances:                                                                                                                        | To the CG 3/15, to the TS 3/17. |
| 30-RYAKU-YUGO.....  | 114 | 3/19 | Tenor of press comments on Minister Matsuoka's visit to Europe.<br>(to the Minister #36)<br>(dated 3/14)                                                    | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19. |



# 1106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type     | File No.          | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                | Disposition                     |
|------------------------------|-------------------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 31-RYAKU-YUGO.....           | 118               | 3/24       | Re regulations for survey of Japanese assets abroad.<br>(from the Minister GO-#702)                                     | To the CG 3/24, to the TS 3/24. |
| 33-RYAKU-YU.....             | 121               | 3/26       | Comments on the President's speech.<br>(to the Minister #39)<br>(dated 3/19)                                            | To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27. |
| 24-YUGO.....                 | 129               | 4/2        | Re text of report of "LOWREY".....<br>(to the Minister #41)<br>(dated 3/24)                                             | To the CG 4/2, to the TS 4/3.   |
| [16] 33-ANGO.....            | 130               | 4/2        | Re movements of the U. S. Fleet.....<br>(to the Minister #46)                                                           | To the CG 4/2, to the TS 4/3.   |
| 25-ANGO-YU.....              | 133               | 4/3        | Re reporting of limits of aid to Britain..<br>(dated 3/28)                                                              | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/4.   |
| 35-RYAKUGO.....              | 136               | 4/4        | Re change of Minister.....<br>(from the Minister #786)                                                                  | To the CG 4/4, to the TS 4/5.   |
| 32-ANGO.....                 | 137               | 4/4        | Re informative telegrams.....<br>(from the Minister #758)                                                               | To the CG 4/4, to the TS 4/5.   |
| 36-ANGO.....                 | 138               | 4/4        | Re method of new use of TSUGO (HAGI).<br>(from the Minister GO-#779)<br>(*TSUGO means code type TSU)                    | To the CG 4/5, to the TS 4/5.   |
| 37-ANGO.....                 | 140, 141          | 4/5        | Greater East Asia reports.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#759)                                                           | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.   |
| 38-ANGO.....                 | 142, 143          | 4/5        | Information on Europe and America..<br>(from the Minister GO-#760)                                                      | To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.   |
| GOGAI-A (outside of code-A). | 146               | 4/7        | Re indicator words and number of words of telegram(s).                                                                  | To the CG 4/8, to the TS 4/8.   |
| 41-RYAKUGO.....              | 155               | 4/14       | Re signing of the neutrality pact between Russia and Japan.<br>(from the Minister GO-#833)                              | To the CG 4/14, to the TS 4/15. |
| 42-ANGO.....                 | 161               | 4/16       | Re continuation of voyage of Panamanian vessel to Japan.<br>(to the Minister #60)                                       | To the CG 4/17, to the TS 4/19. |
| 52 (5?)—B.....               | 165               | 4/18       | Re granting of holiday on Grand Festival of Yasukuni Shrine.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#72).                           | To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19. |
| 24-A.....                    | 166               | 4/9        | Movements of U. S. Fleet.....<br>(to the Minister #61)                                                                  | To the CG 4/19, to the TS 4/21. |
| 44-RYAKUGO.....              | 171               | 4/22       | Re return to Japan of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, etc.<br>(from the Minister GO-#927)                                    | To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/22. |
| [17] 30-RYAKU-YU-GO.         | 109               | 4/21       | Tenor of the press.....<br>(to the Minister #55)<br>(dated 4/12)                                                        | To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/23. |
| KETSU-RYAKU-YUGO             | 170               | 4/21       | Tenor of press concerning conclusion of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.<br>(to the Minister #57)<br>(dated 4/15)        | To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/23. |
| 46-RYAKUGO.....              | 176               | 4/26       | Re completion of ratification of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.                                                        | To the CG 4/26, to the TS 4/26. |
| 45-ANGO.....                 | 177               | 4/26       | Re intelligence strategy versus the U. S.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#82)<br>(from the Minister #180)                   | To the CG 4/26, to the TS 4/28. |
| 37-RYAKU-YU-GO.....          | 178               | 4/27       | Tenor of press in regard to conclusion of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.<br>(dated 4/21)                               | To the CG 4/27, to the TS 4/28. |
| 48-ANGO.....                 | 183, 184 (215)    | 4/30       | Greater East Asia reports.....<br>NI-(1); NI-(2)<br>(from the Minister GO-#960)                                         | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/2.   |
| 49-ANGO.....                 | 185, 186 187, 188 | 4/30       | Second reports from Europe and America.<br>(from the Minister GO-#959)                                                  | To the CG 5/2, to the TS 5/3.   |
| 52-ANGO.....                 | 193               | 5/5        | Re seizure of German(s) on board American ship by British warship.<br>(to the Minister #69)<br>(dated 5/2)              | To the CG 5/6, to the TS 5/7.   |
| 59-RYAKU-YU-GO.....          | 202               | 5/19       | Tenor of press concerning U. S. aid to Britain and American-Japanese relations.<br>(to the Minister #70)<br>(dated 5/6) | To the CG 5/19, to the TS 5/19. |
| [18] 42-RYAKU-YU-GO.         | 204               | 5/19       | Re strikes in munitions factories.<br>(dated 5/13).                                                                     | To the CG 5/19, to the TS 5/19. |
| 56-RYAKUGO.....              | 205               | 5/19       | Re enforcement of trade control regulations.<br>(from the Ambassador—Minister?—GO-#1064).                               | To the CG 5/19, to the TS 5/20. |
| 43-AN-YU-GO.....             | 208               | 5/19       | Re introduction of bill to control foreign language schools.<br>(to the Minister #74)<br>(dated 5/14)                   | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22. |

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.             | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                   | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 61-ANGO.....             | 215, 217<br>221, 216 | 5/27       | Third reports from Europe.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#1125)<br>(dated 5/26)                                                             | To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28. |
| 60-ANGO.....             | 218, 219<br>220.     | 5/27       | Greater East Asia reports.....<br>(from the Minister #1124)<br>(dated 5/26)                                                                | To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28. |
| 62-ANGO.....             | 222                  | 5/27       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.<br>(to the Minister #84)                                                                            | To the CG 5/28, to the TS 5/28. |
| 67-ANGO.....             | 239, 240             | 6/4        | Re introduction of bill to regulate foreign language schools.<br>(to the Minister #90)                                                     | To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/7.   |
| 44-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 236                  | 6/4        | Re function of the export control bureau.<br>(to the Minister #78)<br>(dated 5/20)                                                         | To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/6.   |
| 68-ANGO.....             | 241                  | 6/4        | Re receipt transit, degree of reliability of intelligence telegrams.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#116)<br>(from the Minister #1480)         | To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/6.   |
| 51-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 237                  | 6/4        | Tenor of the press in regard to the President's speech.<br>(to the Minister #88)<br>(dated 5/29)                                           | To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/6.   |
| [19] 69-ANGO.....        | 248                  | 6/10       | Re mutual exemption of passport visa fees between Japan and Italy.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1302)                                         | To the CG 6/10, to the TS 6/10. |
| 70-ANGO.....             | 251, 252,<br>253     | 6/11       | Re suspension of use of temporary terms in naval code book S, and formulation of temporary terminology #6.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1217) | To the CG 6/11, to the TS 6/13. |
| 53-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 255                  | 6/12       | Re requisitioning of U. S. ships.....<br>(to the Minister #92)<br>(dated 6/5)                                                              | To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/13. |
| 72-ANGO.....             | 257(8)               | 6/16       | Re enrollment of class #2 of the HEI-SHIKAN (a school?)<br>(from the Minister #65)                                                         | To the CG 6/16, to the TS 6/17. |
| 74-ANGO.....             | 260                  | 6/17       | Re prohibition of Germans from leaving the country.<br>(to the Ambassador #24)                                                             | To the CG 6/17, to the TS 6/18. |
| 79-RYAKUGO.....          | 268                  | 6/23       | Re outbreak of war between Germany and Russia.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1293)                                                             | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23. |
| 77-ANGO.....             | 269                  | 6/23       | Re transmitted telegram #28.....<br>(freezing of foreign capital)<br>(Ambassador #29)                                                      | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23. |
| 81-ANGO.....             | 271                  | 6/23       | Re press guidance policy in regard to the Russo-German War.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1293)                                                | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23. |
| 83-RYAKUGO.....          | 274                  | 6/23       | Re regulations relative to the application of the foreign capital freeze order.<br>(to the Ambassador #30)                                 | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24. |
| 76-RYAKUGO.....          | 275                  | 6/23       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Ambassador #28)                                                                                                      | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24. |
| [20] 78-ANGO.....        | 273                  | 6/21       | Re inspection of mail matter.....<br>(to the Minister #104)                                                                                | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |
| 84-ANGO.....             | 281                  | 6/25       | Re form of coded radiogram of director(?).<br>(from the Minister GO-#1308)                                                                 | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |
| 80-ANGO.....             | 276                  | 6/23       | Re change of ANGO code.....<br>(cryptic code)<br>(from the Minister GO-#1295)                                                              | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |
| 82-ANGO.....             | 272                  | 6/23       | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister CP-#1305)                                                                                                 | To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26. |
| 55-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 283                  | 6/26       | Re tenor of press in regard to the incident of the "ROBIN MOOR".<br>(to the Minister #100)                                                 | To the CG 6/26, to the TS 6/27. |
| 88-RYAKUGO.....          | 285                  | .....      | Re strikes of machinists in ship-building industries in San Francisco.<br>(to the Minister #108)                                           | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27. |
| 89-RYAKUGO.....          | 286                  | 6/27       | Re reply telegram concerning total amount of uncollected loans.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1329)                                            | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27. |
| 90-RYAKUGO.....          | 287                  | 6/27       | Re according of conveniences to HARUJI TAHARA, director of the Overseas Japanese Central Society.<br>(from the Minister #71)               | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/30. |
| 66-ANGO.....             | 291                  | 6/28       | Re handling of visa for the British.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#1161)<br>(dated 6/22)                                                   | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 6/30. |

# 1108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.   | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                  | Disposition                     |
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| 91-ANGO.....             | 292, 293   | 6/28       | Re ANGO code (cryptic code).....<br>(from the Minister #1166)                                                             | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 6/30. |
| 86-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 294<br>295 | 6/30       | Outbreak of the Russo-German war and the tenor of the press.<br>(to the Minister #105)                                    | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 7/2.  |
| [#1] 94-ANGO.....        | 303        | 7/3        | Re survey of number of visa granted for transit through Japan.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1381)                            | To the CG 7/4, to the TS 7/8.   |
| 6-C.....                 | 304        | 7/5        | Re arrival in port of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.                                                                              | To the CG 7/5, to the TS 7/7.   |
| 7-B.....                 | 308        | 7/9        | Re giving a message to courier TAKI (or TAGI).                                                                            | To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.  |
| 95-ANGO.....             | 307        | 7/8        | Greater East Asia reports (re visit to Japan by Wang Chin-wel and party).<br>(from the Minister GO-#1406)                 | To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.  |
| 8-A.....                 | 310        | 7/9        | Re survey of assets of Japanese residing in U. S.                                                                         | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10. |
| 9-A.....                 | 316        | 7/10       | Re transferring of telegram pertaining to movements of U. S. Fleet.                                                       | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10. |
| 97-ANGO.....             | 317        | 7/10       | U. S. Navy.....<br>(to the Minister #122)                                                                                 | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/14. |
| 100-ANGO.....            | 323        | 7/12       | Re freezing of Japanese credits in the U. S.                                                                              | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14. |
| 98-ANGO.....             | 318        | 7/11       | Re steps for preparation for emergency situation.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1366)                                         | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/15. |
| 99-ANGO.....             | 319        | 7/11       | Re before and after measures on financial matters to be taken in case of emergency.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1367)       | To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/15. |
| 101-ANGO.....            | 328        | 7/14       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.....<br>(to the minister #123)                                                                | To the CG 7/14, to the TS 7/16. |
| 102-HEIGO.....           | 333        | 7/16       | Re resignation en bloc of the KONOYE Cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1526)                                             | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17. |
| [#2] 103-HEIGO.....      | 337        | 7/18       | Re issuance of Imperial command to Premier KONOYE to form another cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1539)                | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18. |
| 104-ANGO.....            | 338        | 7/18       | Re rigidifying of supervision of telegraph and telephone.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1525)                                 | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/21. |
| 107-HEIGO.....           | 340        | 7/19       | Re appointment of Foreign Minister TOYOTA.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1550)                                                | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 108-HEIGO.....           | 341        | 7/19       | Re installation of new cabinet with ceremony.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1551)                                             | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 109-ANGO.....            | 342        | 7/19       | Re Cabinet shift and Japanese foreign policy.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1560)                                             | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 110-ANGO.....            | 243        | 7/19       | Re correction in telegram.<br>(from the Minister GOGAI)                                                                   | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 57-YUGO.....             | 339        | 7/19       | Tenor of press.....<br>(to the Minister #119)                                                                             | To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21. |
| 111-RYAKUGO.....         | 345        | 7/21       | Political change in Japan and the tenor of the press.                                                                     | To the CG 7/21, to the TS 7/22. |
| 113-ANGO.....            | 354        | 7/24       | Re Tatuta Maru.....<br>(to the Minister #123)                                                                             | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/25. |
| 115-ANGO.....            | 361        | 7/25       | Re controlling of Japanese shipping...<br>(from the Minister #98)                                                         | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25. |
| 118-ANGO.....            | 365        | 7/25       | Re wiring instructions to Japanese vessel(s).<br>(to the Minister?—#138)                                                  | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25. |
| 114-ANGO.....            | 362        | 7/24       | Re TAKIZO MATSUMOTO.....<br>(from the Minister?—#92)                                                                      | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 116-ANGO.....            | 370        | 7/25       | Re situation of entrance into and departure from port of Japanese ships.<br>(to the Minister #135)                        | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| [#3] 121-ANGO.....       | 390        | 7/29       | Re entrance of Japanese vessels into American ports.<br>(to the Minister #140)                                            | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 120-ANGO.....            | 375        | 7/26       | Re arrival in Hawaii of Undersecretary of the Navy "FORRESTAL."<br>(to the Minister #139)                                 | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 122-ANGO.....            | 397        | 7/26       | Re developments up to conclusion of arrangements for mutual defense of French Indo-China.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1598) | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30. |
| 124-ANGO.....            | 407, 408   | 7/29       | Re war situation.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#1642)                                                                     | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30. |

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| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                   | Disposition                     |
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| 128-HEIGO.....           | 412      | 7/30       | Summary of the regulations controlling trade with foreigners.<br>(Minister GO-#1657)                                       | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 127-HEIGO.....           | 413      | 7/30       | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1656)                   | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 131-ANGO.....            | 433      | 8/1        | Re postponement of arrival in port of Asama Maru.<br>(to the Minister #148)                                                | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 135-RYAKUGO.....         | 434      | 8/2        | Re seizure of goods on TATUTA MARU.                                                                                        | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 136-ANGO.....            | 441      | 8/3        | Re the third KOKURA MARU.....<br>(to the Minister #152)                                                                    | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 138-RYAKUGO.....         | 442      | 8/4        | Re departure from San Francisco of the TATUTA MARU.<br>(to the Minister #153)                                              | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 137-HEIGO.....           | 443      | 8/4        | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1732)                   | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| [84] 132-GO-RYAKU.....   | 430      | 8/4        | Re manner of enforcement of the freeze order.<br>(to the Minister #151)                                                    | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 140-ANGO.....            | 445      | 8/4        | Re TATUTA MARU.....<br>(to the Minister #154)                                                                              | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 143-ANGO.....            | 447      | 8/4        | Re method of investigation of bank examiner.<br>(to the Minister #157)                                                     | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 146-ANGO.....            | 453      | 8/5        | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #159)                                                              | To the CG 8/5, to the TS 8/8.   |
| 144-ANGO.....            | 453, 454 | 9/6        | Re naval code book.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#1738)                                                                    | To the CG 8/7, to the TS 8/8.   |
| 148-ANGO.....            | 458      | 8/8        | Re decrease of telegraphic matter and shortening of the contents.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1766)                          | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/9.   |
| 153-ANGO.....            | 464      | 8/9        | Re British battleship "WARSPITE".<br>(from the Minister #108)                                                              | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.  |
| 154-ANGO.....            | 465      | 8/9        | Re cash held in this Consulate.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#1781)                                                        | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.  |
| 156-HEIGO.....           | 473      | 8/15       | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1818)                   | To the CG 8/15, to the TS 8/20. |
| 158-ANGO.....            | 473      | 8/11       | Re amendment of regulations pertaining to entry into and sojourn in country by foreigners.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1819) | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/18. |
| 59-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 478      | 8/15       | Drift of argument regarding Japan-U. S. relations.<br>(to the Minister #164)<br>(dated 8/12)                               | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/20. |
| [26] 164-ANGO.....       | 479, 480 | 8/18       | Re condition of the Japanese residents in San Francisco.                                                                   | To the CG 8/18.                 |
| 60-YU-GO-RYAKU.....      | 489      | 8/23       | Tenor of press in regard to joint declaration by Britain and the U. S.<br>(to the Minister #168)<br>(dated 8/15)           | To the CG 8/23, to the TS 8/27. |
| 174-RYAKUGO.....         | 493      | 8/25       | Re revision of passport visas and passage certification regulations.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1820)                       | To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27. |
| 10-A.....                | 511      | 9/2        | Re arrival at post of newly-appointed "Bishop SWEENEY" of the "Catholic" parish.                                           | To the CG 9/2, to the TS 9/5.   |
| 61-AN-YU-GO.....         | 514      | 9/4        | Re method of enforcement of the freeze order.<br>(to the Minister #181)<br>(dated 8/25)                                    | To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.   |
| 62-AN-YU-GO.....         | 515      | 9/4        | Re treatment of Japanese residing in U. S. by America.<br>(to the Minister #182)<br>(dated 8/25)                           | To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.   |
| KETSU-A.....             | 517      | 9/5        | Movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #195)                                                                 | To the CG 9/5, to the TS 9/8.   |
| 191-ANGO.....            | 518      | 9/6        | Re applicants for class #2 of the HEISHIKAN (a school?)                                                                    | To the CG 9/6, to the TS 9/8.   |
| 10-C (11).....           | 522      | 9/8        | Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners.<br>(from the Minister GO-#1656)                   | To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.   |
| 194-ANGO.....            | 523      | 9/8        | Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHIKAN (a school?)<br>(to the Minister #200)                                              | To the CG 9/9, to the TS 9/9.   |
| 12-B.....                | 525      | 9/10       | Re stopping in port of courier KUGA..                                                                                      | To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10. |

# 1110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.        | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                         | Disposition                       |
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| [261] 195-ANGO.....      | 527             | -----      | Re forwarding of mail matter between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #206)                                                                   | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/15.   |
| 200-ANGO.....            | 537             | 9/13       | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.<br>(to the Minister #211)                                                                                 | To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/15.   |
| 63-YU-GO-RYAKU.....      | 538             | 9/15       | Tenor of press in regard to the "message" to the President from Premier Konoye.<br>(to the Minister #190)<br>(dated 8/30)                        | To the CG 9/15, to the TS 9/16.   |
| 202-ANGO.....            | 545             | 9/17       | Re transmission of letters (documents, records, or notes),<br>(to the Minister #214)                                                             | To the CG 9/18, to the TS 9/18.   |
| 218-ANGO.....            | 549             | 9/20       | Japan-U. S. ship communication problem.<br>(from the Minister #126)                                                                              | To the CG 9/21, to the TS 9/23.   |
| 209-ANGO.....            | 550             | 9/20       | Re revision in handling of urgent telegrams.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2040)                                                                     | To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/24.   |
| 211-ANGO.....            | 555, 556        | 9/22       | Japan-U. S. ship communication problem.<br>(to the Minister #220)                                                                                | To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/24.   |
| 295-ANGO.....            | 566             | 9/26       | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #127)                                                                           | To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/30.   |
| 216-ANGO.....            | 570             | 9/26       | Re carrying out of diplomatic policy....<br>(from the Minister GO-#2077)                                                                         | To the CG 9/28, to the TS 9/30.   |
| 66-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 577             | 9/29       | Re expansion of Far Eastern aerial route by Pan-American Airways.<br>(to the Minister #224)                                                      | To the CG 9/29, to the TS 10/2.   |
| [27] 220-AN-TOKU-GO..... | 581             | 10/1       | Re inspection of baggage, etc., when leaving country.<br>(from the Minister #406)                                                                | To the CG 10/1, to the TS 10/2.   |
| 222-ANGO.....            | 584             | 10/2       | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #230)                                                                                    | To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/4.   |
| 214-GO-AN.....           | 585             | 10/9       | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #231)                                                                                    | To the CG 10/3, to the TS 10/4.   |
| 225-RYAKUGO.....         | 589             | 10/4       | Re official announcement of temporary postal control order.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2121)                                                      | To the CG 10/6, to the TS 10/6.   |
| 226-HEIGO.....           | 590             | 10/7       | Re special festival of the Yasukuni Shrine.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2129)                                                                      | To the CG 10/7, to the TS 10/8.   |
| 228-ANGO.....            | 592             | 10/7       | Re distribution of propaganda "pamphlets" with aim to alienate Japan from Germany.<br>(to the Minister #234)                                     | To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/8.   |
| 230-ANGO.....            | 593, 594        | 10/8       | Greater East Asia reports.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#2130)                                                                                   | To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/9.   |
| 232-RYAKUGO.....         | 595, 596<br>603 | 10/10      | Presidential message regarding amendment of the neutrality act, and tenor of press regarding Japan-U. S. negotiations.<br>(to the Minister #235) | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| 234-ANGO.....            | 614, 620        | 10/13      | Re problem of Japan-America ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #136)                                                                      | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/15. |
| 237-ANGO.....            | 621             | 10/14      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #237)                                                                                                             | To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15. |
| 238-ANGO.....            | 623             | 10/15      | Re sailing of the TATUTA MARU..<br>(from the Minister #139)                                                                                      | To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15. |
| 239-ANGO.....            | 624             | 10/15      | Re problem of Japan-America ship communication.                                                                                                  | To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17. |
| [28] (7)-A 12.....       | 627, 626        | 10/16      | Problem of Japan-America ship communication.<br>(from the Minister, to various Consulates, GO-#237)                                              | To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17. |
| 241-HEIGO.....           | 633             | 10/16      | Re resignation en masse of KONOYE Cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2190)                                                                       | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 242-HEIGO.....           | 634             | 10/16      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister GO-#2191)                                                                                                       | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 243-RYAKUGO.....         | 637             | 10/16      | Re number of passengers on TATUTA MARU.<br>(from the Minister #142)                                                                              | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/16. |
| 245-HEIGO.....           | 638             | 10/17      | Re issuance of Imperial command (for formation of Cabinet?) to War Minister TOJO.<br>(from the Minister (GO-#2195)                               | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 246-RYAKUGO.....         | 639             | 10/17      | Re withdrawal of Ambassador(s) to the Soviet Union from Moscow.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2149)                                                  | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/18. |

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| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                               | Disposition                       |
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| 252-HEIGO .....          | 646      | 10/18      | Re installation of Minister TOGO...<br>(from the Minister GO-#2196)                    | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 253-HEIGO .....          | 647      | -----      | Re completed selection of members of the TOJO Cabinet.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2197) | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 249-ANGO .....           | 651      | 10/17      | Japan-America ship communication problem.                                              | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 245-ANGO .....           | 652      | 10/17      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #245)                                                        | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 247-ANGO .....           | 649-650  | 10/17      | Japan-America ship communication problem.<br>(from the Minister #145)                  | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| [29] 255-ANGO .....      | 658      | 10/20      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #146)                                                      | to the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 258-ANGO .....           | 663, 664 | 10/21      | Ditto<br>(from the Minister #150)                                                      | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| 259-ANGO .....           | 665      | 10/21      | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #252)                                                        | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| 261-ANGO .....           | 668      | 10/21      | Re method of interpreting telegrams.<br>(to the Ambassador #335)                       | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 257-ANGO .....           | 666      | 10/22      | Japan-America ship communication problem.<br>(to the Ambassador #72)                   | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22. |
| 260-ANGO .....           | 669      | 10/21      | Re carrying of American dollar bills.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#310)                 | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/21. |
| 262-ANGO .....           | 676      | 10/22      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #254)     | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/24. |
| 13-B .....               | 677      | 10/23      | Re passengers boarding TAIYO MARU.                                                     | To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/24. |
| 264-ANGO .....           | 678      | -----      | Japan-America ship communication problem.<br>(to the Minister #255)                    | To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/24. |
| 265-ANGO .....           | 684      | 10/24      | Re going to the U. S. of members of the Chungking air force.<br>(to the Minister #258) | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 266-ANGO .....           | 687      | 10/24      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(from the Minister #154)   | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 267-ANGO .....           | 695      | 10/26      | Re progress of warship construction, etc.<br>(to the Minister #260)                    | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27. |
| [30] 268-AN-(1)-GO ..... | 697      | 10/27      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(from the Minister #159)   | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28. |
| 68-RYAKU-YU-GO .....     | 701      | 10/29      | Tenor of press on change of Cabinet.<br>(to the Minister #249)                         | To the CG 10/29, to the TS 10/30. |
| 273-RYAKUGO .....        | 716      | 11/2       | Re departure of TATUTA MARU.<br>(to the Minister #269)                                 | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 275-ANGO .....           | 717, 718 | 11/2       | Re mail matter to be loaded on TATUTA MARU.<br>(to the Minister #201)                  | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 274-ANGO .....           | 719      | 11/2       | Problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #200)        | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 278-AMGO .....           | 729      | 11/5       | Re departure of British cruiser.<br>(to the Minister #278)                             | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/7.   |
| 280-ANGO .....           | 732      | 11/7       | Re simplifying of expatriation.<br>(to the Minister #280)                              | To the CG 11/7, to the TS 11/10.  |
| 281-ANGO .....           | 738      | 11/8       | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #282)     | To the CG 11/8, to the TS 11/11.  |
| 69-RYAKU-YU-GO .....     | 743      | 11/10      | Tenor of press on trip to U. S. by Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(to the Minister #280)        | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 283-ANGO .....           | 740      | 11/10      | Problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #287)        | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10. |
| 14-A .....               | 752      | 11/12      | Re transmission of message to Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from the Minister #168)           | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 284-ANGO .....           | 755      | 11/12      | Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(from the Minister #169)   | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| [31] 285-ANGO .....      | 767, 768 | 11/12      | Greater East Asia report #5.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2292)                           | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/17. |
| 287-ANGO .....           | 769, 766 | 11/12      | European and American reports #5.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2291)                      | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| 292-ANGO .....           | 773      | 11/14      | Problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S.<br>(to the Minister #292)        | To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/17. |

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## FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                    | Disposition                       |
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| 290-ANGO.....            | 774, 775 | 11/18      | Condition of progress of warship construction and national defense plans. (to the Minister #289)            | To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/17. |
| 201-ANGO.....            | 772      | 11/18      | Re decision on basic plans for adjustment of relations between Japan and U. S. (from the Minister GO-#2313) | To the CG 11/13, to the TS 11/19. |
| GOGAI-A.....             | 780      | 11/17      | Re interpretation of telegram(s).....                                                                       | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/19. |
| 297-ANGO.....            | 791      | 11/19      | Re overseas broadcast in case of crisis in Japan's foreign policy. (from the Minister GO-#2353)             | To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/21. |
| 298-ANGO.....            | 794      | 11/19      | Re movements of British warships..... (to the Minister #300)                                                | To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/24. |
| 302-RYAKUGO.....         | 805      | 11/25      | Re extension of time of anti-Comintern pact. (from the Minister GO-#2389)                                   | To the CG 11/25, to the TS 11/25. |
| 305-HEIGO.....           | 811      | 11/26      | Re demise of Princess YOSHIKO, wife of the deceased Prince KAYA. (from the Minister GO-#2406)               | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| [52] 303-ANGO.....       | 812      | 11/25      | Re Japanese employed locally and second generation employees not on regular staff. (to the Minister #304)   | To the CG 11/25, to the TS 11/25. |
| 71-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 813      | 11/26      | Re severance of diplomatic relations with Japan by "IRAQ," (from the Ambassador #1181) (dated 11/24)        | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| 307-ANGO.....            | 818-821  | 11/27      | Re method of telegraphing in connection with the situation. (from the Minister GO-#2409)                    | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| 310-ANGO.....            | 829      | 11/28      | Re Japan-America negotiations. (from the Minister GO-#2416)                                                 | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| 315-ANGO.....            | 837      | 11/29      | Re reply telegram in regard to foreign merchantmen and warships. (from the Minister GO-#2431)               | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 313-ANGO.....            | 833      | 11/28      | Re vessels requisitioned by the U. S. Army and the Navy. (to the Minister #317)                             | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 318-ANGO.....            | 847      | 12/1       | Re arrival and departure and movements of warships. (to the Minister #316)                                  | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/2.   |
| 321-RYAKUGO.....         | 855      | 12/3       | Re number of attendants of families of members of the Consulate wishing to board the TATUTA MARU.           | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.   |
| 70-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 860      | 12/5       | Tenor of press..... (dated 11/19)                                                                           | To the CG 12/5, to the TS 12/6.   |

[55]

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO

|                      |    |      |                                                                                                                           |                                 |
|----------------------|----|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 218-YU-GO-RYAKU..... | 2  | 1/6  | Tenor of American press..... (to the Minister #312) (dated 12/20)                                                         | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 2-YU-GO-RYAKU.....   | 11 | 1/18 | Re alien registration..... (to the Ambassador #1) (dated 1/7)                                                             | To the CG 1/13, to the TS 1/14. |
| 1-B.....             | 14 | 1/14 | Re tour of the country by the "Subaru Show" troupe. (dated 1/16)                                                          | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 4-RYAKUGO.....       | 15 | 1/15 | Re settling on wearing of every day clothes for various functions. (from the Ambassador GO-#1) (from the Minister GO-#68) | To the CG 1/15, to the TS 1/15. |
| 5-AN-YU-GO.....      | 16 | 1/16 | Re U. S. warships..... (to the Minister #3) (dated 1/6)                                                                   | To the CG 1/16, to the TS 1/17. |
| 2-A.....             | 22 | 1/22 | Re method of leaving country of American citizens of Japanese parentage. (to the Minister #11)                            | To the CG 1/22, to the TS 1/23. |
| 2-RYAKU-YU-GO.....   | 43 | 1/30 | Re refusal of American freighters to be chartered by Russia. (to the Minister #10) (dated 1/21)                           | To the CG 1/30, to the TS 2/4.  |
| 3-C.....             | 44 | 1/31 | Re holding of reception for Ambassador NOMURA in San Francisco.                                                           | To the CG 1/31, to the TS 2/4.  |
| 4-RYAKU-YU-GO.....   | 47 | 2/1  | Tenor of press in regard to the Minister's speech in the Diet. (to the Minister #13) (dated 1/24)                         | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.   |

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                                                         | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| [34] 7-ANGO-----         | 58       | 2/4        | Re request for expenses for development of intelligence.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#15)<br>(from the Minister #45)                                                              | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.   |
| -HEI-YU-GO..             | 55       | 2/5        | Re mediation in border controversy between Thailand and French Indo-China.<br>(from the Minister GO-#155)<br>(dated 1/25)                                                        | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| -RYAKU-YU..              | 54       | 2/5        | Ditto-----<br>(from the Minister GO-#154)<br>(dated 1/25)                                                                                                                        | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| 10-ANGO-----             | 57       | 2/5        | Re policy of intelligence work against the U. S.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#13)<br>(from the Minister #43)                                                                      | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| 9-ANGO-----              | 58       | 2/5        | Main points concerning establishment of intelligence organ against the U. S.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#14)<br>(from the Minister #44)                                          | To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.   |
| 10-AN-YU-GO-----         | 61       | 2/6        | Re careful selection of matters to be telegraphed and making concise the wording of the telegrams.<br>(from the Ambassador KETSU)<br>(from the Minister GO-#185)<br>(dated 1/30) | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 11-AN-YU-GO-----         | 62       | 2/6        | Re sending by wire of expenses for the development of intelligence.<br>(from the Minister GO-#138)<br>(dated 1/23)                                                               | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 13-ANGO-----             | 63       | 2/7        | Re alteration of method for using temporary terminology in naval code book 8.<br>(from the Minister GO-#242)                                                                     | To the CG 2/7, to the TS 2/10.  |
| [35] 14-RYAKU-YU-GO      | 64       | 2/10       | Tenor of press in regard to Minister's speech in the Diet.<br>(to the Minister #16)                                                                                              | To the CG 2/10, to the TS 2/12. |
| 14-ANGO-----             | 65       | 2/10       | Regulating of resident Japanese.<br>(from the Minister #19)                                                                                                                      | To the CG 2/10, to the TS 2/12. |
| 16-ANGO-----             | 71       | 2/15       | Press accounts regarding the Far Eastern situation.<br>(from the Minister GO-#310)                                                                                               | To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/17. |
| 17-A-----                | 72       | 2/17       | Re handling of visa for foreigners visiting Japan.<br>(from the Minister GO-#300)                                                                                                | To the CG 2/17, to the TS 2/18. |
| 15-RYAKU-YU-GO-----      | 74       | 2/20       | Tenor of press on arrival of Ambassador NOMURA at his post.<br>(to the Minister #22)<br>(dated 2/10)                                                                             | To the CG 2/20 to the TS 2/24.  |
| 18-ANGO-----             | 75, 76   | 2/21       | Re telegraphic code.<br>(from the Minister GO-#367)                                                                                                                              | To the CG 2/21, to the TS 2/24. |
| 19-RYAKUGO-----          | 77       | 2/21       | Re refraining from making official tours within the year.<br>(from the Ambassador KETSUGO)<br>(from the Minister GO-#365)                                                        | To the CG 2/21, to the TS 2/24. |
| 19-RYAKU-YU-GO-----      | 81       | 2/26       | Re movements of U. S. Fleet.<br>(to the Minister #24)<br>(dated 2/15)                                                                                                            | To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/27. |
| 20-RYAKU-YU-GO-----      | 88       | 3/6        | Tenor of press in regard to Japan's southward move question.<br>(to the Minister #27)<br>(dated 2/21)                                                                            | To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/7.   |
| 21-RYAKU-YU-GO-----      | 87       | 3/6        | Re the "embargo" problem.<br>(dated 2/24)                                                                                                                                        | To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/7.   |
| 23-A-----                | 97       | 3/10       | Re disposition of secret documents.<br>(from the Minister GO-#584)                                                                                                               | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11. |
| [36] 24-----             | 98       | 2/10       | Re passport visa fees.<br>(from the Ambassador GO-#30)<br>(from the Minister GO-#555)                                                                                            | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11. |
| 4-B-----                 | 103      | 3/12       | Re returning of advances<br>(to San Francisco #4)                                                                                                                                | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| 11-AN-YU-GO-----         | 115      | 3/19       | Re investigation of the trend of the U. S.<br>(from the Minister #112)<br>(dated 3/8)                                                                                            | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/21. |
| 55-ANGO-----             | 126      | 3/27       | Re reporting of bounds of aid to Britain.<br>(from the Minister #111)                                                                                                            | To the CG 3/27, to the TS 3/28. |



# 1114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                 | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 5-A.....                 | 128      | 3/29       | Re telegraphic code kept in the Consulate General in "Chicago." (from Chicago GO-#3) (to the Minister #8)                | To the CG 3/29,                 |
| 6-A.....                 | 147      | 4/9        | Re easy clearance of courier MORI....                                                                                    | To the CG 4/9, to the TS 4/10.  |
| 15-AN-YU-GO.....         | 157      | 4/16       | Re number of Japanese registered and number enlisted. (to the Minister #195) (dated 4/1)                                 | To the CG 4/16, to the TS 4/18. |
| 7-A.....                 | 175      | 4/24       | Re easy clearance of courier MORI....                                                                                    | To the CG 4/24, to the TS 4/26. |
| 96-ANGO.....             | 207, 206 | 5/20       | Re issuing of visa for direct transit to Russian(s). (from the Minister GO-#2337) (to Vladivostok and New York GO-#1086) | To the CG 5/20, to the TS 5/20. |
| 21-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 209      | 5/20       | Re enforcement of system of sanctioning transit export (?) via America. (to the Minister #275) (dated 5/7)               | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22. |
| [37] 103-ANGO.....       | 212      | 5/22       | Re issuing of visa for direct transit to Russian(s) (from the Minister #246) (to New York and Vladivostok, GO-#1103)     | To the CG 5/22, to the TS 5/22. |
| 22-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 214      | 5/26       | Re situation in the U. S. as regards the European war. (GO-#88) (dated 5/12)                                             | To the CG 5/26, to the TS 5/28. |
| 106-ANGO.....            | 224      | 5/28       | Re movements of the U. S. Fleet..... (to Panama #15)                                                                     | To the CG 5/28, to the TS 5/29. |
| 114-ANGO.....            | 229      | 5/31       | Re notification of Japanese shipping in regard to suspension of use of temporary terminology #S. (dated 5/31)            | To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/6.   |
| 8-A.....                 | 234      | 6/3        | Re reference to date official messages were dispatched.                                                                  | To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/4.   |
| 21-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 235      | 6/4        | Re enforcement of system of sanctioning transit export (?) via U. S. (to the Minister #288) (dated 5/20)                 | To the CG 6/4, to the TS 6/5.   |
| 117-RYAKUGO.....         | 244      | 6/7        | Re method of seizure of foreign merchantmen. (to the Minister #373) (dated 6/7)                                          | To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/7.   |
| 118-RYAKUGO.....         | 245      | 6/7        | Ditto..... (to the Minister #374) (special telegram)                                                                     | To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/9.   |
| 125-ANGO.....            | 256      | 6/13       | Re arrival in Japan of Wang Chin-Wei. (from the Minister #1251)                                                          | To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/16. |
| 128-ANGO.....            | 261      | 6/18       | Re giving strict warning for observance of secrecy of this Consulate and related agencies.                               | To the CG 6/18, to the TS 6/18. |
| [38] 132-RYAKUGO.....    | 262      | 6/19       | Re promulgation of detailed regulations, item 402, pertaining to expatriation. (to the Minister #411)                    | To the CG 6/19, to the TS 6/20. |
| 2-B.....                 | 265      | 6/20       | Re refusal of visa for Meiji University baseball team. (to the Minister #413)                                            | To the CG 6/20, to the TS 6/21. |
| 10-(A).....              | 280      | 6/23       | Re delivering of message to Commander TATIBANA on Nitta Maru.                                                            | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/24. |
| 11-A.....                | 277      | 6/23       | Re Commander TATIBANA.....                                                                                               | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24. |
| 12-A.....                | 278, 279 | 6/23       | Ditto.....                                                                                                               | To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/26. |
| 144-ANGO.....            | 288      | 6/27       | Re regular publications for use in development (of intelligence?) and propaganda.                                        | To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/30. |
| 148-ANGO.....            | 290      | 6/28       | Re question of closing Japanese Consulates in the U. S. (to the Minister #437)                                           | To the CG 6/28, to the TS 6/30. |
| 149-RYAKUGO.....         | 297      | 6/30       | Re concentration of sale of British goods and British-controlled currency. (from the Minister GO-#1198) (dated 6/26)     | To the CG 6/30, to the TS 7/2.  |
| 142-RYAKUGO-(1).....     | 298      | 7/2        | Restopping in port of Lt. Commander (or Major) OKADA and Engineer First Lieutenant YAMADA.                               | To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.   |

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.  | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                          | Disposition                           |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 153-RYAKUGO-(1).....     | 299       | 7/1        | Re gathering of telephone directories and name directories.                                                                       | To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.         |
| 156-ANGO.....            | 311       | 7/9        | Re returning the Imperial portrait.... (from the Minister #481)                                                                   | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| [39] 158-ANGO.....       | 314       | 7/9        | Re report of assets of Japanese nationals and commercial firms in the U. S. (to the Minister #487)                                | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| 26-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 309       | 7/9        | Re concentration of sale of foreign goods. (from the Minister GO-#1276)                                                           | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.       |
| 165-ANGO.....            | 324       | 7/14       | -----                                                                                                                             | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/15.       |
| 168-RYAKUGO.....         | 326       | 7/15       | Re extension of time limit for reporting foreign assets.                                                                          | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/16.       |
| 13-A.....                | 335       | 7/17       | Re resending of telegram(s).....                                                                                                  | To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18.       |
| 177-HEIGO.....           | 346       | 7/22       | Re registration of foreign government officials and employees.                                                                    | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/22.       |
| 178-ANGO.....            | 347-349   | 7/22       | U. S. attitude towards Japan..... (to the Minister #548)                                                                          | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/23.       |
| 179-ANGO.....            | 350       | -----      | Re Consulates on West Coast..... (to the Minister #549)                                                                           | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/24.       |
| 180-GO-RYAKU.....        | 351       | 7/23       | Steps to be taken by U. S. government in case of occupation of French Indo-China by Japanese troops. (to the Minister #551)       | To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/23.       |
| 183-ANGO.....            | 355 (359) | 7/24       | Re problem of closure of Consulates... (1) (2) (to the Minister KETSUGO)                                                          | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/24.       |
| 182-RYAKUGO.....         | 356       | 7/24       | Tenor of press in regard to the French Indo-China problem. (to the Minister #561)                                                 | To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/25.       |
| [40] 183-HEIGO.....      | 357, 358  | 7/24       | Re official announcement of procedure for overruling assumption(?) of expatriation. (to the Minister #562)                        | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 184-HEIGO.....           | 360       | -----      | ... ? ... in regard to public announcement of retaliatory measures against Japan by the President. (to the Minister #568)         | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 187-ANGO.....            | 363       | 7/25       | Re date of announcement of freeze order against Japan. (to the Minister #573)                                                     | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 189-HEIGO.....           | 369       | 7/25       | Re announcement of freeze order against Japan. (Minister #576)                                                                    | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/26.       |
| 192-(HEI)-GO.....        | 371       | 7/25       | Amendment to regulations..... (Minister #579)                                                                                     | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 190-(HEI)-GO.....        | 372       | 7/25       | Writ. Re freeze order..... (Minister #577)                                                                                        | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/26.       |
| 191-(HEI)-GO.....        | 373       | 7/25       | Ditto. Revised Presidential order.... (Minister #578)                                                                             | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.       |
| 185-ANGO.....            | 364       | 7/25       | Re surveillance of U. S. warships passing through the Panama Canal. (to Panama #22)                                               | To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/26 (29?). |
| 196-RYAKUGO.....         | 376       | 7/26       | Re exemption provisions of the freeze order. (to the Minister #586)                                                               | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.       |
| 188-ANGO.....            | 368       | 7/25       | Re holding of assets of the various Consulates (and other Japanese governmental agencies?) in the Embassy. (to the Minister #575) | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.       |
| 193-ANGO.....            | 376       | 7/26       | Re telegraphic code.....                                                                                                          | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.       |
| [41] 186-GO.....         | 366       | 7/26       | Re application of the Freeze Order to Germany and German nationals. (to the Minister #569)                                        | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/26.       |
| 195-RYAKUGO.....         | 377       | 7/26       | Gist of the Presidential "statement" on promulgation of the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #585)                                  | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.       |
| 186-ANGO (2).....        | 367       | 7/25       | Re application of the Freeze Order to German citizens in general. (to the Minister #569)                                          | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.       |
| -HEIGO.....              | 378-389   | -----      | General license No. 11..... (to the Minister #588) (Special telegram #11?)                                                        | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.       |
| 194-ANGO.....            | 391, 392  | 7/26       | Home policy of Finance Commissioner NISHIYAMA in regard to freezing of Japanese credit. (to the Minister #583)                    | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29        |

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## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.             | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                  | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 198-ANGO.....            | 393, 388             | 7/26       | Re evacuation of resident Japanese....<br>(to the Minister #587)                                          | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29. |
| 197-ANGO.....            | 399, 400             | 7/26       | Re moving into French Indo-China and propagandizing Japan's foreign policy.<br>(from the Minister #1587)  | To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/30. |
| 201-ANGO.....            | 402                  | 7/28       | Re exit from and entry into port of shipping.<br>(to the Minister #593)                                   | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30. |
| 200-ANGO.....            | 401, 403<br>405, 406 | 7/28       | Re public opinion in the U. S. associated with the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #590)                | To the CG 7/29, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 202-ANGO.....            | 410                  | 7/30       | Re reply concerning "balance" in bank of government funds.                                                | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| [42] 205-ANGO.....       | 411                  | 7/30       | Re entry into port of Japanese vessel.<br>(to the Minister #613)                                          | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 206-RYAKUGO.....         | 416                  | 7/30       | Re shipment.....<br>(to the Minister #616)                                                                | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 204-ANGO.....            | 418                  | 7/31       | Re shipment on Japanese vessels.<br>(to the Minister #661)                                                | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 207-ANGO.....            | 421                  | 7/31       | Ditto<br>(to the Minister #619)                                                                           | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.  |
| KETSU-B.....             | 423                  | 7/31       | Re specification of main licensed list of articles.<br>(from the Minister #431)                           | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.  |
| 201-ANGO.....            | 424                  | 7/31       | Re counter-measure against the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #621)                                    | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 7/31. |
| 209-ANGO.....            | 425                  | 7/31       | Re American currency bonds held by Japanese residing in U. S.<br>(to the Minister #619)                   | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/4.  |
| 208-ANGO.....            | 426, 427<br>428      | 7/31       | Re counter-move towards U. S.-Japan relations.<br>(to the Minister #618)                                  | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/4.  |
| 214-ANGO.....            | 431                  | 8/1        | Re baggage on TATUTA MARU....<br>(to the Minister #630)                                                   | To the CG 8/1, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 218-ANGO.....            | 447                  | 8/7        | Re shipment on Japanese vessels.....<br>(to the Minister #637)                                            | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 219-ANGO.....            | 437                  | 8/2        | Re oil embargo act.....<br>(to the Minister #638)                                                         | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 430                  | 8/2        | Re exit from and entry into port of Japanese shipping.<br>(to the Minister #632)                          | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| [43] 220-ANGO.....       | 436                  | 8/2        | Re ASAMA MARU.....<br>(to the Minister #639)                                                              | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 212-ANGO.....            | 435                  | 8/2        | Re problem of shipment on TATUTA MARU and HEIAN MARU.<br>(to the Minister #636)                           | To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.   |
| 215-ANGO.....            | 438                  | 8/4        | Re effect of the Freeze Order on finances of foreign diplomatic establishments.<br>(to the Minister #631) | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 444, 446             | 8/4        | Re problem of shipment on TATUTA MARU.<br>(from the Minister #442)                                        | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 224-ANGO.....            | 448                  | 8/4        | Re oil embargo act.....<br>(to the Minister #647)                                                         | To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.   |
| 233-ANGO.....            | 461                  | 8/8        | Re application of the Freeze Order to diplomatic and consular officials.<br>(to the Minister #670)        | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/9.   |
|                          | 462                  | 8/8        | Re evacuation of resident Japanese....<br>(from the Minister #453)                                        | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/11.  |
| 14-A.....                | 463                  | 8/9        | Re reply telegram in regard "balance" in bank of government funds.                                        | To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.  |
| KETSU-A.....             | 471                  | 8/13       | Talks (?) of "MOORE" concerning observations on the U. S.-Japan situation.                                | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/14. |
| -ANGO.....               | 475, 476             | 8/16       | Re counter-measures towards U. S.-Japan relations.<br>(from the Minister #475)                            | To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/18. |
| 15-C.....                | 481                  | 8/18       | Re forwarding of exequatur from U. S. President to Consul-General KITA.                                   | To the CG 8/18, to the TS 8/20. |
| 245-ANGO.....            | 483                  | 8/18       | Re allotment of "running expenses"....<br>(to the Minister #712)                                          | To the CG 8/19, to the TS 8/20. |
| [44] 16-A.....           | 484                  | 8/19       | Re movements of U. S. warships.....                                                                       | To the CG 8/19, to the TS 8/21. |
| 250-ANGO.....            | 487, 488             | 8/22       | Re U. S. treatment of Japanese nationals residing in the U. S.<br>(from the Minister #489)                | To the CG 8/22, to the TS 8/28. |
| 255-ANGO.....            | 490                  | 8/25       | Re problem of evacuation of resident Japanese.<br>(to the Minister #742)                                  | To the CG 8/25, to the TS 8/27. |

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.      | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                              | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 254-ANGO.....            | 491, 494      | 8/26       | Re enforcement of the Freeze Order...<br>(to the Minister #741)                                                                                       | To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27. |
| 256-ANGO.....            | 495           | 8/26       | Re drawing on allowances.....<br>(to the Minister #743)                                                                                               | To the CG 8/27, to the TS 8/27. |
| 29-B.....                | 500           | 8/29       | Re KIYOSHI MAYAKAWA, Japanese government official.                                                                                                    | To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29. |
| 257-RYAKUGO.....         | 501           | 8/29       | Re method of disposal of mail matter to U. S. in Japan.<br>(to the Minister #755)                                                                     | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30. |
| -A.....                  | 504, 505      | 8/30       | Re evacuation of resident Japanese....<br>(from the Minister #516)                                                                                    | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 9/2.  |
| 258-ANGO.....            | 506, 508      | 8/30       | Re writing of Representative KASAI concerning U. S.-Japan relations.<br>(to the Minister #760)                                                        | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 9/2.  |
| GOGAI-A.....             | 509           | 9/1        | Re correction of telegram.....<br>(to the Minister #GOGAI)<br>(re writing of articles by Representative KASAI)                                        | To the CG 9/1, to the TS 9/2.   |
| 18-A.....                | 510           | 9/2        | Re stopping in port of courier.....                                                                                                                   | To the CG 9/3, to the TS 9/5.   |
| 262-ANGO.....            | 519           | 9/6        | Re registration of wealth by Japanese nationals and commercial firms in the U. S.<br>(to the Minister #787)                                           | To the CG 9/6, to the TS 9/9.   |
| [45] KETSU-B.....        | 520           | 9/6        | Re mail matter to Japan.....<br>(from Mexico GO-#86)                                                                                                  | To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 521           | -----      | Re method of forwarding mail matter to the U. S. followed in Japan.<br>(from the Minister #541)                                                       | To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.   |
| KATSU-ANGO.....          | 528           | 9/11       | Re evacuation of resident Japanese....<br>(from the Minister #555)                                                                                    | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/13. |
| 272-ANGO.....            | 529-533       | 9/10       | Re mutual cancellation of frozen credit towards computation of government funds.                                                                      | To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/15. |
| KETSU-A.....             | 535           | 9/13       | Re transmission of radiograms addressed to this Consulate.<br>(from the Minister #552)                                                                | To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/15. |
| 19-A.....                | 536           | 9/13       | Re delivery of documents.....<br>(to San Francisco #41)                                                                                               | To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/19. |
| KETSU-B.....             | 543           | 9/16       | Re arrangement for alleviation of Freeze Order between Japan and the U. S.<br>(from the Minister #566)                                                | To the CG 9/16, to the TS 9/18. |
| KETSU-A.....             | 542           | 9/16       | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #567)                                                                                                                | To the CG 9/16, to the TS 9/18. |
| 278-RYAKUGO.....         | 544           | 9/17       | Re drawing up of name-list based on arrangement for alleviation of the Freeze Order.                                                                  | To the CG 9/17, to the TS 9/18. |
| 277-ANGO.....            | 546           | 9/17       | Re arrangement for alleviation of the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #820)                                                                         | To the CG 9/17, to the TS 9/18. |
| 279-ANGO.....            | 547           | 9/17       | Re President Roosevelt's speech.....<br>(to the Minister #316, gist (?))                                                                              | To the CG 9/18, to the TS 9/18. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 548           | 9/19       | Re method for replenishment government funds (estimate?) following arrangement for alleviation of the freezing of credit.<br>(from the Minister #575) | To the CG 9/19, to the TS 9/23. |
| [46] 283-(AN)-GO.....    | 552           | 9/19       | Re extension of time limit for reporting foreign assets<br>(to the Minister #833)                                                                     | To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/23. |
| METSU-A.....             | 553           | 9/23       | Re arrangement for easing of the credit freeze<br>(from the Minister #578)                                                                            | To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/23. |
| 285-ANGO.....            | 557           | 9/22       | Re alleviation of the credit freeze.....<br>(to the Minister #840)                                                                                    | To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/25. |
| 287-ANGO.....            | 560           | 9/24       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #?)                                                                                                                    | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26. |
| 288-ANGO.....            | 562, 563      | 9/25       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #848)                                                                                                                  | To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 564, 567, 568 | 9/26       | Re evacuation of the resident Japanese.<br>(from the Minister #596)                                                                                   | To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/27. |
| 291-ANGO.....            | 565           | 9/26       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #854)                                                                                                                  | To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/27. |
| (20)-A.....              | 571           | 9/27       | Re inquiry in regard to receipt of telegram.                                                                                                          | To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30. |
| 292-ANGO.....            | 569, 572      | 9/26       | Re arrangement for alleviation of the credit freeze.<br>(to the Minister #855)                                                                        | To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30. |
| 293-ANGO.....            | 573, 574      | 9/27       | Japan-U. S. ship communication problem<br>(to the Minister #864)                                                                                      | To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30. |
| -ANGO.....               | 575           | -----      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #610)                                                                                                                | To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30. |

# 1118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 296-ANGO.....            | 580      | 9/30       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #875)                                                                    | To the CG 9/30, to the TS 10/2.   |
| 297-RYAKUGO.....         | 583      | 10/2       | Re fees of freeze-affected nationals to banks of deposits<br>(to the Minister #888)                     | To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/2.   |
| [47] KETSU-ANGO.....     | 587, 588 | 10/3       | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #631).                                 | To the CG 10/4, to the TS 10/6.   |
| 300-RYAKUGO.....         | 591      | 10/7       | Re amendment of nationality laws with object of nullifying dual citizenship.<br>(to the Minister #905). | To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/8.   |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 599      | 10/8       | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #910).                                | To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.   |
| KETSU-HEIGO.....         | 597, 598 | 10/8       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #911).                                                                   | To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.   |
| 303-HEIGO.....           | 601      | 10/9       | Re amendment of nationality laws with object of nullifying dual citizenship.<br>(to the Minister #913). | To the CG 10/10, to the TS 10/10. |
| 309-ANGO.....            | 602      | 10/10      | Re entry permit.<br>(to the Minister #922).                                                             | To the CG 10/10, to the TS 10/11. |
| KETSU-HEIGO.....         | 605      | -----      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #653).                                 | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| KETSU-B.....             | 606      | 10/11      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #652).                                                                 | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 607      | 10/11      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #651).                                                                 | To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13. |
| 305-ANGO.....            | 608, 609 | 10/11      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #926).                                   | To the CG 10/13, to the TS 10/13. |
| KETSU-RYAKUGO.....       | 617      | 10/14      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #6607).                                                                | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| KETSU.....               | 615, 616 | 10/14      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #661).                                                                 | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| [48] —ANGO.....          | 618, 619 | 10/13      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #938)                                                                    | To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14. |
| —ANGO.....               | 629      | 10/16      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #951)                                                                    | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 323-RYAKUGO.....         | 631      | 10/16      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.                                                              | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 310-ANGO.....            | 628      | 10/16      | Re carrying of American dollar bills.<br>(from the Minister #670)                                       | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 322-A.....               | 635      | 10/17      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #953)                                    | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 325-(HEI)-GO.....        | 636      | 10/17      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #956)<br>(separate telegram)                                             | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 326-GO.....              | 640      | 10/17      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #963)                                                                    | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 328-RYAKUGO.....         | 641      | 10/17      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #684)                                  | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 327-ANGO.....            | 642, 643 | 10/18      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #683)                                                                  | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/20. |
| 325-ANGO.....            | 644      | 10/17      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #685)                                                                  | To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21. |
| 381-ANGO.....            | 645      | 10/18      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #969)                                                                    | To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21. |
| 330-ANGO.....            | 653      | 10/16      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #687)                                                                  | To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21. |
| 332-ANGO.....            | 657      | 10/20      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #971)                                    | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 655      | 10/20      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #688)                                                                  | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| [49] KETSU-ANGO.....     | 667      | 10/21      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #695)                                                                  | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| 336-ANGO.....            | 674, 675 | 10/22      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #982)                                                                    | To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/23. |
| 21-A.....                | 679      | 10/23      | Ditto.....                                                                                              | To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/25. |
| 340-ANGO.....            | 681      | 10/24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #705)                               | To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25. |
| 341-ANGO.....            | 683      | 10/24      | Ditto.....                                                                                              | To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25. |
| 342-ANGO.....            | 689      | 10/24      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #990)                                                                    | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |



## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                          | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| KETSU-A-----             | 686      | 10/24      | Re results of the Japanese overseas broadcasts.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2222)                   | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 22-A-----                | 696      | 10/27      | Re inquiry concerning receipt of telegram.                                                        | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28. |
| (23)-B-----              | 698      | 10/27      | Re credit report of this Consulate and Consulate staff.                                           | To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28. |
| (24)-A-----              | 703      | 10/30      | Re inquiry as to whether articles were entrusted to courier KUGA or not.                          | To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/29. |
| 347-ANGO-----            | 704, 705 | 10/29      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1011)                          | To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/30. |
| 348-ANGO-----            | 706      | 10/30      | Re report of foreign assets.<br>(to the Minister #1015)                                           | To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/31. |
| KETSU-ANGO-----          | 709      | 10/31      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #715)                            | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| [50] 349-ANGO-----       | 710      | -----      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1018)                             | To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31. |
| 355-ANGO-----            | 712      | 11/1       | Re alleviation of freeze affecting our governmental agencies in the U. S.                         | To the CT 11/1, to the TS 11/4.   |
| (25)-A-----              | 714, 713 | 11/2       | Re mail matter to be loaded on TAI-YO MARU, and Consul IWAN-AGA.                                  | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/2.   |
| (26)-A-----              | 720      | 11/4       | Ditto-----                                                                                        | To the CG 11/4, to the TS 11/4.   |
| (27)-B-----              | 727      | 11/5       | Re tax exemption and clearance of souvenir gifts presented to former honorary Consul.             | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/6.   |
| 352-ANGO-----            | 721      | 11/4       | Re disapproval of loading of mail matter.<br>(to the Minister #1033)                              | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/6.   |
| KETSU-ANGO-----          | 722      | 11/4       | Ditto-----<br>(from the Minister #728)                                                            | to the TS 11/6.                   |
| 328-ANGO-----            | 728      | 11/5       | Re report of foreign assets-----                                                                  | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/7.   |
| (28)-B-----              | 730      | 11/6       | Re allowance for members of this Consulate.                                                       | To the CG 11/6, to the TS 11/7.   |
| KETSU-ANGO-----          | 737      | 11/8       | Re alleviation of freeze affecting our governmental agencies in the U. S.<br>(Minister #749)      | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11. |
| 356-RYAKUGO-----         | 744      | 11/10      | Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.                                                       | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 355-ANGO-----            | 745      | 11/10      | Re alleviation of credit freeze.<br>(to the Minister #1067)                                       | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12. |
| 358-ANGO-----            | 753      | 11/12      | Re delivery of message to Ambassador KURUSU.                                                      | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/12. |
| [51] GOGAI-A-----        | 754      | 11/12      | Re interpretation of telegrams-----                                                               | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| 359-ANGO-----            | 756      | 11/12      | Re easing of the Freeze Order-----                                                                | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| KETSU-(C)-----           | 758      | 11/12      | Ditto-----<br>(from the Minister #761)                                                            | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| KETSU-A-----             | 759      | 11/12      | Ditto-----<br>(to the Minister #1081)                                                             | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| (28)-A-----              | 757      | 11/12      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order.<br>(from the Minister #744)                                   | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15. |
| 357-ANGO-----            | 746-749  | 11/11      | Re present situation in the U. S.-----                                                            | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| 362-ANGO-----            | 763      | 11/13      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order-----                                                           | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| KETSU-B-----             | 764      | 11/13      | Ditto-----                                                                                        | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15. |
| 29-B-----                | 776      | 11/15      | Re resume of contents of bill for defense of Hawaii and "PUERTO RICO."<br>(to the Minister #1101) | To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/15. |
| 364-ANGO-----            | 777      | 11/15      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order-----                                                           | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/17. |
| 367-RYAKUGO-----         | 779      | 11/17      | Re registration of real property belonging to Consulates in the U. S.                             | To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/19. |
| 368-ANGO-----            | 781      | 11/17      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1120)                          | To the CG 11/18, to the TS 11/19. |
| KETSU-ANGO-----          | 782      | 11/17      | Ditto-----<br>(from the Minister #786)                                                            | To the CG 11/18, to the TS 11/19. |
| [52] 369-HEIGO-----      | 784      | 11/18      | Telegram of thanks from Ambassador KURUSU.                                                        | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19. |
| KETSU-A-----             | 785      | -----      | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #791)                            | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19. |

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## FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.      | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                    | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 370-RYAKUGO.....         | 786, 787      | 11/18      | Re enforcement of regulations pertaining to restriction and ban of leaving and entering country.<br>(to the Minister #1127) | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19. |
| 372-1?-ANGO.....         | 790           | 11/19      | Re alleviation of the Freeze Order.....                                                                                     | To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/21. |
| 371-1?-ANGO.....         | 792, 793      | 11/19      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #1151)                                                                                       | To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 795           | 11/21      | Re reporting of developments of Japan-U. S. negotiations.<br>(to the Minister #1145)                                        | To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21. |
| 375-ANGO.....            | 802           | -----      | Re reply on names and competence of members of Consulate, etc.                                                              | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 376-ANGO.....            | 803           | 11/23      | Re personal affairs of members of the Consulate.<br>(to the Minister #1162)                                                 | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 374-ANGO.....            | 797, 798, 799 | 11/23      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1152)                                                    | To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24. |
| 399-ANGO.....            | 806           | 11/25      | Ditto.....<br>(to San Francisco #66)                                                                                        | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| 380-ANGO.....            | 809           | 11/25      | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #1168)                                                                                       | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| 388-ANGO.....            | 810           | 11/25      | Re application for permit to leave country.<br>(to the Minister #1182)                                                      | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26. |
| [53] 377-ANGO.....       | 808           | 11/25      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #819, #820)                                             | To the CG 11/26, to the TS 12/1.  |
| KETSU-RYAKUGO.....       | 815           | 11/26      | Re TATUTA MARU's schedule.....<br>(from the Minister #838)                                                                  | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 383-RYAKUGO.....         | 814           | 11/26      | Separate telegram.<br>Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #1181)                              | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 12/1.  |
| KETSU-A.....             | 817           | 11/26      | Re boarding of TATUTA MARU.....<br>(from the Minister #837)                                                                 | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| 384-ANGO.....            | 822, 823      | 11/27      | Re U. S. regulations permitting leaving and entering of country.<br>(to the Minister? #1201)                                | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| KETSU-ANGO.....          | 824, 825      | 11/27      | Present condition of Japan-U. S. negotiations.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2416)                                              | To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28. |
| 223-GO-AN.....           | 826           | 8/4        | Re investigation and reporting of movements of warships.                                                                    | To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28. |
| 387-ANGO.....            | 830           | 11/28      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(Minister #1211)                                                           | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| KETSU-A.....             | 831, 832      | 11/26      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #839)                                                                                      | To the 11/29, to the TS 12/1.     |
| KETSU-A.....             | 839           | 11/28      | Ditto.....<br>(from the Minister #846)                                                                                      | To the 11/29, to the TS 12/1.     |
| KETSU-A.....             | 840, 841      | 11/29      | Re disposition of American currency bonds.<br>(from the Minister #850)                                                      | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| KETSU-A.....             | 842           | 11/26      | Re entrusting of rights and interests in the U. S.<br>(from the Minister GO-#2403)                                          | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| [54] KETSU-A.....        | 850           | 12/2       | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister #870)                                                      | To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/8.   |
| KETSU-B.....             | 854           | 12/8       | Re transmission by wire of secret expenses for third period and temporarily increased amount.                               | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.   |

## FROM: SEATTLE

|                     |    |      |                                                                                |                                 |
|---------------------|----|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| [55] 161-AN-YU-GO.. | 4  | 1/8  | Re movements of U. S. warships.....<br>(to the Minister #198)<br>(dated 12/24) | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 1-AN-YU-GO.....     | 10 | 1/13 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #1)<br>(dated 1/3)                              | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 2-AN-YU-GO.....     | 12 | 1/14 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #2)<br>(dated 1/6)                              | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 3-AN-YU-GO.....     | 17 | 1/16 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #3)<br>(dated 1/8)                              | To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18. |

## FROM: SEATTLE—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                             | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 4-AN-YU-GO.....          | 25       | 1/23       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #4)<br>(dated 1/16)                                                                   | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24.   |
| 5-AN-YU-GO.....          | 41       | 1/31       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #5)<br>(dated 1/21)                                                                   | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.     |
| 7-AN-YU-GO.....          | 49       | 2/7        | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #7)<br>(dated 1/24)                                                                   | To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.     |
| 9-AN-YU-GO.....          | 56       | 2/5        | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #9)<br>(dated 1/25)                                                                   | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.     |
| 12-AN-YU-GO.....         | 68       | 2/12       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #11)<br>(dated 1/25)                                                                  | To the CG 2/13, to the TS 2/13.   |
| 13-AN-YU-GO.....         | 73       | 2/19       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #13)<br>(dated 2/10)                                                                  | To the CG 2/19, to the TS 2/19.   |
| [56] 14-AN-YU-CO.....    | 84       | 3/5        | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #14)<br>(dated 2/24)                                                                  | To the CG 3/5, to the TS 3/6.     |
| 1-A.....                 | 89       | 3/6        | Ditto.....                                                                                                           | To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/6.     |
| 15-AN-YU-GO.....         | 92       | 3/8        | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #15)<br>(dated 2/26)                                                                  | To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.     |
| 16-AN-YU-GO.....         | 100      | 3/10       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #16)<br>(dated 3/4)                                                                   | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13.   |
| 19-AN-YU-GO.....         | 122      | 3/20       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #20)<br>(dated 7/20)                                                                  | To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27.   |
| 18-AN-YU-GO.....         | 124      | 3/27       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #18)<br>(dated 3/17)                                                                  | To the CG 3/28, to the TS 3/28.   |
| 21-AN-YU-GO.....         | 149      | 4/10       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #23)<br>(dated 4/1)                                                                   | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/15.   |
| 22-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 150      | 4/10       | Re calling attention to enforcement of Nationality Laws.<br>(to the Minister #24)<br>(dated 4/2)                     | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/15.   |
| 23-AN-YU-GO.....         | 172      | 4/23       | Re movement of U. S. warships<br>(to the Minister #26)<br>(dated 4/10)                                               | To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24.   |
| 24-AN-YU-GO.....         | 174      | 4/23       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #29)<br>(dated 4/16)                                                                  | To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24.   |
| 2-A.....                 | 182      | 4/30       | Re U. S. Navy<br>(to the Minister #36)                                                                               | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/1.     |
| [57] 3-A.....            | 231      | 6/2        | Re U. S. Navy<br>(to the Minister #36)                                                                               | To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/3.     |
| 37-AN-YU-GO.....         | 249      | 6/30       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #51)<br>(dated 5/28)                                                                  | To the CG 6/10, to the TS 6/12.   |
| 42-AN-YU-GO.....         | 296      | 6/30       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #56)<br>(dated 6/23)                                                                  | To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.     |
| 66-RYAKUGO.....          | 662      | 10/28      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(from the Minister GO #2206)                                        | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22. |
| 70-ANGO.....             | 692      | 10/24      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Ambassador #34)                                             | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 73-ANGO.....             | 715      | 11/2       | Re registration of property<br>(to the Ambassador #39)                                                               | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| 75-ANGO.....             | 725      | 11/5       | Re sailing of the HIKAWA MARU<br>(to the Minister #158)                                                              | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.   |
| 78-ANGO.....             | 738      | 11/8       | Re Japan shipping communication<br>(to the Minister #162)                                                            | To the CG 11/8, to the TS 11/11.  |
| 79-ANGO.....             | 739      | 11/8       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #166)                                                                                 | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11. |
| 81-ANGO.....             | 750      | 11/10      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #166)                                              | To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14. |
| 83-ANGO.....             | 770      | 11/14      | Re adoption of the message associated with the situation by the Council of the League of Organizations of "Seattle." | To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/17. |
| 85-ANGO.....             | 796      | 11/20      | Re problem of Japan-U. S. shipping communication.<br>(to the Minister #175)                                          | To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/24. |



# 1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[58]

## FROM: NEW YORK

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No.        | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                         | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|-----------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2-RAKUGO.....            | 35              | 1/27       | Re restrictions of parcel post to Japan..                                                                        | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28.   |
| 3-RAKUGO.....            | 40              | 1/30       | Ditto.....                                                                                                       | To the CG 1/30, to the TS 1/30.   |
| 1-A.....                 | 154             | 4/12       | Re verbal message to Secretary FUKUSHIMA.                                                                        | To the CG 4/12, to the TS 4/15.   |
| 52-ANGO.....             | 414, 415<br>417 | 7/30       | Re counter-measures against the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #372)                                          | To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.    |
| 54-ANGO.....             | 449             | 8/5        | Re withholding of the cryptograph of the Yokohama Specie Bank branch.                                            | To the CG 8/5, to the TS 8/6.     |
| 57-ANGO.....             | 455, 546        | 8/8        | Re manner of evacuation of the resident Japanese.<br>(to the Minister #391)                                      | To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/8.     |
| 60-ANGO.....             | 466, 467<br>468 | 8/13       | Re manner of evacuation of the resident Japanese.<br>(to the Minister #401)                                      | To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.   |
| 67-ANGO.....             | 485             | 8/20       | Re counter-measures against the Freeze Order.<br>(to the Minister #414)                                          | To the CG 8/20, to the TS 8/20.   |
| 18-ANGO.....             | 512, 513        | 9/4        | Re cryptographic code.<br>(from the Minister GO-1907)                                                            | To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.     |
| 83-ANGO.....             | 685             | 10/24      | Re steps for payment of boat fare for passengers on requisitioned ships in Japan.<br>(to the Minister #487)      | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 96-ANGO.....             | 711             | 10/31      | Re report of foreign assets.<br>(to the Minister #88)                                                            | To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.   |
| [59] 2-B.....            | 726             | 11/5       | Re resending of telegram advising of dates of arrival and departure of Secretary TOKUNAGA and wife.              | To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.   |
| 88-ANGO.....             | 733             | 11/8       | Re procedure for foreigners to depart from Japan.<br>(to the Minister #496)                                      | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11. |
| 89-ANGO.....             | 734, 735        | 11/8       | Ditto.<br>(from the Minister #234)                                                                               | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11. |
| 90-ANGO.....             | 816             | 11/26      | Re evacuation of Japanese commercial firms and employes of branch banks in the U. S.<br>(from the Minister #242) | To the CG 11/27.                  |
| 91-ANGO.....             | 838             | -----      | Re cancellation of portion of Freeze Order.                                                                      | To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.  |
| 94-ANGO.....             | 853             | 12/3       | Ditto.<br>(from the Minister #271)                                                                               | To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.   |
| 96-ANGO.....             | 861             | 12/5       | Ditto.<br>(to the Minister #535)                                                                                 | To the CG 12/5, to the TS 12/6.   |

[60]

## FROM: FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

|                  |     |      |                                                                                                                                         |                                 |
|------------------|-----|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 29-AN-YU-GO..... | 6   | 1/7  | Re movements of U. S. warships.<br>(to the Minister #474)<br>(dated 12/23)<br>(from Manila)                                             | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 48-AN-YU-GO..... | 8   | 1/10 | Re naval planes of the U. S.<br>(to the Minister #466)<br>(dated 12/14)                                                                 | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 28-AN-YU-GO..... | 9   | 1/10 | Ditto.<br>(to the Minister #470)<br>(dated 12/16)                                                                                       | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 1-B.....         | 50  | 2/1  | Re Greek ship, "ELENE S. ENBILICOS".                                                                                                    | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 2-ANGO.....      | 66  | 2/12 | Re method of leaving country for American citizens of Japanese parentage.<br>(to the Minister #2)<br>(dated 1/31)<br>(from New Orleans) | To the CG 2/12, to the TS 2/12. |
| 4-AN-YU-GO.....  | 101 | 3/10 | Re telegraphic code in possession of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."<br>(to the Minister #4)<br>(dated 3/4)<br>(from New Orleans)       | To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13. |
| 1-HEI-YU-GO..... | 112 | 3/19 | Re opening of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."<br>(to the Minister #1)<br>(dated 3/7)<br>(from Houston)                                  | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19. |

## FROM; FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                            | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2-HEI-YU-GO.....         | 113      | 3/19       | Re district under jurisdiction of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON." (from the Minister #1) (dated 3/8) (from Houston) | To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19. |
| [61] 1.....              | 153      | 4/11       | Re sending of hard "tennis balls" (from Peking)                                                                     | To the CG 4/12, to the TS 4/12. |
| MU-B.....                | 156      | 4/15       | Re departure of the Panamanian ship to Japan. (from Britain)                                                        | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/17. |
| 11-ANGO.....             | 167      | 4/19       | Re stopping in port of the American, "BOB COOK." (to the Minister #222) (from Manila)                               | To the CG 4/19, to the TS 4/21. |
| 1-ANGO.....              | 168      | 4/20       | Re resending of telegram (from Manila)                                                                              | To the CG 4/21, to the TS 4/21. |
| 4-HEI-YU-GO.....         | 195      | 5/8        | Re new "Address" of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON." (dated 4/25) (from Houston)                                     | To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.   |
| 1-B.....                 | 305      | 7/7        | Re interpretation of telegram(s) (from Ambassador to Britain)                                                       | To the CG 7/8, to the TS 7/10.  |
| No number-A.....         | 306      | 7/7        | Delivering message to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU. (separate telegram)                                                    | To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.  |
| -A.....                  | 474      | 8/15       | Symbol for the Consulate head (from Canton)                                                                         | To the CG 8/15.                 |
| -A.....                  | 482      | 8/15       | Symbol for the Consulate head (from Canton)                                                                         | To the CG 8/19.                 |
| 9-AN-YU-GO.....          | 539      | 9/15       | Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHI-KAN (a school?). (to the Minister #36) (dated 9/10) (from Vancouver)           | To the CG 9/15, to the TS 9/16. |
| GOGAI-C.....             | 731      | 11/7       | Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister GOGAI) (from Manila)                                            | To the CG 11/7, to the TS 11/8. |

[62]

## FROM: LOS ANGELES

|                     |     |      |                                                                                                        |                                 |
|---------------------|-----|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 105-AN-YU-GO.....   | 3   | 1/6  | Re movements of U. S. warships (to the Minister #220) (dated 12/23)                                    | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 106-AN-YU-GO.....   | 5   | 1/6  | Ditto (to the Minister #221) (dated 12/27)                                                             | To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.   |
| 107-RYAKU-YU-GO.... | 7   | 1/7  | Re sending of representatives of the Patriotic Women's Society. (to the Minister #222)                 | To the CG 1/9, to the TS 1/10.  |
| 1-AN-YU-GO.....     | 13  | 1/14 | Movements of U. S. warships (dated 1/6)                                                                | To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15. |
| 1-(C).....          | 18  | 1/16 | Re visit to the U. S. by the "Subaru Show" troupe.                                                     | To the CG 1/16, to the TS 1/17. |
| 4-AN-YU-GO.....     | 24  | 1/23 | Re movements of the U. S. warships (to the Minister #7) (dated 1/13)                                   | To the CG 1/23, to the TS 1/24. |
| 5-AN-YU-GO.....     | 42  | 1/30 | Ditto (to the Minister #9) (dated 1/21)                                                                | To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.   |
| 10-RYAKU-YU-GO....  | 59  | 2/6  | Re parcel post to Japan (to the Minister #14) (dated 1/26)                                             | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 11-AN-YU-GO.....    | 60  | 2/6  | Re movements of the U. S. Navy (to the Minister #15) (dated 1/27)                                      | To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.   |
| 2-AN-YU-GO.....     | 23  | 1/23 | Re problem of evacuation of the Japanese residents in the U. S. (to the Minister #4) (dated 1/10)      | To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/25. |
| [63] 13-AN-YU-GO... | 67  | 2/12 | Movements of U. S. Navy (to the Minister #17) (dated 2/1)                                              | To the CG 2/12, to the TS 2/13. |
| 2-A.....            | 85  | 3/5  | Ditto                                                                                                  | To the CG 3/5, to the TS 3/6.   |
| 15-AN-YU-GO.....    | 125 | 3/27 | Ditto (to the Minister #33)                                                                            | To the CG 3/28, to the TS 3/28. |
| 16-AN-YU-GO.....    | 132 | 4/3  | Re visit to the U. S. by the Representatives, YAMAJI and SHIMIZU. (from the Minister #25) (dated 3/26) | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/4.   |

# 1124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: LOS ANGELES—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                                                                                 | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 17-RYAKU-YU-GO.....      | 133      | 4/3        | Re visit to the U. S. by delegates of the Japan Christian Federation.<br>(to the Minister #34)<br>(dated 3/26)                                                           | To the CG 4/3 to the TS 4/4.    |
| 18-AN-YU-GO.....         | 159      | 4/15       | Movements of the U. S. Navy.....<br>(to the Minister #38)<br>(dated 4/5)                                                                                                 | To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/18. |
| 20-AN-YU-GO.....         | 173      | 4/23       | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #44)<br>(dated 4/12)                                                                                                                      | To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24. |
| 9-A.....                 | 190      | 5/1        | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #59)<br>(dated 5/1)                                                                                                                       | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/3.   |
| 23-AN-YU-GO.....         | 196      | 5/8        | Re participation of delegates of the Japan Christian Federation at the special conference of the American Christian Federation.<br>(to the Minister #53)<br>(dated 4/26) | To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.   |

[64]

## FROM: PORTLAND

|                     |     |       |                                                                                                              |                                   |
|---------------------|-----|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2-ANGO.....         | 197 | 5/28  | Re movements of the U. S. Navy.....<br>(to the Minister #66)                                                 | To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.     |
| 4-A.....            | 232 | 6/2   | Ditto.....                                                                                                   | To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.     |
| 7-ANGO.....         | 233 | 6/2   | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #83)                                                                          | To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.     |
| 5-B.....            | 259 | 6/17  | Re greeting courier YAMAZAKI at pier.                                                                        | To the CG 6/17, to the TS 6/17.   |
| 32-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 263 | 6/19  | Re strike by the employees of the "NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane Company.<br>(to the Minister #87)<br>(dated 6/6) | To the CG 6/20, to the TS 6/21.   |
| 33-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 264 | 6/15  | Re strike by the employees of the "NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane Company.<br>(to the Minister #92)<br>(dated 6/9) | To the CG 6/19, to the TS 6/21.   |
| 34-RYAKU-YU-GO..... | 270 | 6/23  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #95)<br>(dated 6/11)                                                          | To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/24.   |
| 6-A.....            | 315 | 7/9   | Re survey of assets of Japanese people living on the mainland U. S.                                          | To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.   |
| 11-ANGO.....        | 327 | 7/15  | Re movements of U. S. Warships.....<br>(to the Minister #112)                                                | To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/18.   |
| 7-A.....            | 334 | 7/17  | Re resending of telegram(s).....                                                                             | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/18.   |
| 36-ANGO.....        | 529 | 9/10  | Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.<br>(to the Minister #176)                                          | To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10.   |
| [65] 44-ANGO.....   | 554 | 9/20  | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #190)                                                                         | To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/24.   |
| 47-ANGO.....        | 610 | 10/13 | Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.<br>(to the Minister #201)                                         | To the CG 10/13, to the TS 10/13. |
| 49-RYAKUGO.....     | 630 | 10/16 | Re notices of attainment of military age for year 1942.<br>(to the Minister #200)                            | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17. |
| 50-ANGO.....        | 632 | 10/17 | Ditto.....<br>(Minister #94)                                                                                 | To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20. |
| 62-ANGO.....        | 659 | 10/20 | Movements of U. S. warships and ships.<br>(to the Minister #205)                                             | To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21. |
| 65-ANGO.....        | 684 | 10/24 | Re investigation of Japanese associations by the F. B. I.<br>(to the Minister #207)                          | To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27. |
| 67-ANGO.....        | 700 | 10/28 | Ditto.....<br>(to the Minister #209)                                                                         | To the CG 10/28, to the TS 10/29. |
| 60-ANGO.....        | 723 | 11/4  | Re simplifying of procedure for expatriation.<br>(to the Minister #214)                                      | To the CG 11/4, to the TS 11/7.   |
| 313-ANGO.....       | 833 | 11/29 | Re ships requisitioned by the U. S. Army and the Navy.<br>(to the Minister #317)                             | To the CG 11/29.                  |
| 71-RYAKUGO.....     | 859 | 12/4  | Re procedure for expatriation.....<br>(from the Minister #110)                                               | To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/5.   |

[66]

## FROM: MISCELLANEOUS PLACES

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                               | Disposition                     |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| -(C)-----                | 29       | 1/26       | Re reception dinner for Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA, KAMAKURA MARU)                                  | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| -C-----                  | 30       | 1/27       | Re delivery of message from Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)                            | To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27. |
| -C-----                  | 36       | 1/28       | Ditto.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)                                                                    | To the CG 1/28, to the TS 1/28. |
| -(C)-----                | 27       | 1/29       | Re inquiry on functions for Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Secretary OKUMURA)                                             | To the CG 1/29, to the TS 1/30. |
| -C-----                  | 39       | 1/29       | Re reply as to functions for Ambassador NOMURA.                                                                        | To the CG 1/29, to the TS 1/30. |
| -C-----                  | 45       | 2/1        | Telegram of thanks from Ambassador NOMURA.<br>(from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)                                | To the 2/1, to the TS 2/4.      |
| -C-----                  | 86       | 3/6        | Telegram of thanks.<br>(from Secretary MIYAZAKI on Yawata Maru)                                                        | To the 3/6, to the TS 3/6.      |
| -(C)-----                | 93       | 3/8        | Re printing of English name-cards for Consul General KITA.<br>(from Consul General KITA on TATUTA MARU)<br>(dated 3/9) | To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/10. |
| -(C)-----                | 107      | 3/13       | Re stopping in port of Ambassador TOMII.<br>(from Consul General KITA on Tatuta Maru)                                  | To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/14. |
| [67] -(C)-----           | 123      | 3/26       | Re reporting on time of arrival at post of Secretary MORIMURA.<br>(from Secretary MORIMURA on Nitta Maru)              | To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27. |
| -(C)-----                | 131      | 4/3        | Reply telegram from Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from Ambassador KURUSU on Tatuta Maru)                                      | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/3.   |
| -C-----                  | 136      | 4/3        | Re arrival in port of MASABUMI NAKAMURA.<br>(from MASABUMI NAKAMURA on Kamakura Maru)                                  | To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/3.   |
| -C-----                  | 160      | 4/17       | Re arrival in port of SHIMIZU and YAMAGI.<br>(from SHIMIZU and YAMAGI on Yawata Maru)                                  | To the CG 4/17, to the TS 4/18. |
| -(C)-----                | 189      | 5/1        | Re boarding of ship by HANA KUSANOBU.<br>(from the Kamakura Maru)                                                      | To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/1.   |
|                          | 210      | 5/20       | Re calling at port of Representative SHIMIZU.<br>(from Representative SHIMIZU on Asama Maru)                           | To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22. |
| -(C)-----                | 223      | 5/27       | Telegram of greeting.<br>(from Minister YAMAGATA on Tatuta Maru)                                                       | To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28. |
| -C-----                  | 242      | 6/6        | Re inquiry on completion of draft deferment procedure.                                                                 | To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/7.   |
| -C-----                  | 267      | 6/21       | Re stopping in port of Representative TAKAMI.<br>(from Representative TAKAMI on Kamakura Maru)                         | To the CG 6/21, to the TS 6/23. |
| -C-----                  | 320      | 7/12       | Telegram of thanks from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.<br>(from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU on Kamakura Maru)                        | To the CG 7/11, to the TS 7/14. |
| [68] -C-----             | 332      | 7/17       | Re stopping in port of Major (or Lt. Commander) YANO.<br>(from Major YANO on Tatuta Maru)                              | To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17. |
| -A-----                  | 422      | 7/31       | Re purchase of superior grade seed and shoots of "pineapple."<br>(from Head of the Foreign Affairs Section, Formosa)   | To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.  |
| -C-----                  | 503      | 8/30       | Re changing of broadcasting wave length to Hawaii.<br>(from Japan Broadcasting Company)                                | To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30. |

# 1126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## FROM: MISCELLANEOUS—Continued

| Telegram No. & Code Type | File No. | Date Rec'd | Contents                                                                                                           | Disposition                       |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| -(C).....                | 576      | 9/29       | Re request in regard to departure of Professor Lee Sireta.<br>(from Professor NORISUGI of the Tokyo Music Academy) | To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30.   |
| -(C).....                | 611      | 10/12      | Re sending of divorce papers.....<br>(from YASUKO KANDA, Tokyo)                                                    | To the CG 10/12, to the TS 10/18. |
| -X.....                  | 648      | 10/19      | Re replenishment of fuel oil of TATUTA MARU.                                                                       | To the CG 10/19, to the TS 10/21. |
|                          | 688      | 10/25      | Re changing of broadcasting cycle.....<br>(from Tokyo Japanese Broadcasting)                                       | To the CG 10/25.                  |
| GOGAI.....               | 731      | 11/7       | Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU<br>(from Manila)                                                                 | To the CG 11/7.                   |
| -C.....                  | 741      | 11/9       | Re stopping in port of Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from Secretary YUKI at Midway)                                       | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10. |
| -C.....                  | 742      | 11/10      | Re stopping in port of Ambassador KURUSU.<br>(from Ambassador KURUSU at Midway)                                    | To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10. |
| -(C).....                | 751      | 11/12      | Ditto.....<br>(dated 11/11)                                                                                        | to the TS 11/12.                  |

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 63

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12.  
Serial 09330.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations  
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet  
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking

planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: CinC Atlantic Fleet  
CinC Asiatic Fleet

CinC File No.  
381-5/0398

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
At Sea, Hawaiian Area, March 12, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Command-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) CNC Conf. ltr. file Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of 15 Feb. 1941.

1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

H. E. KIMMEL.

# 1128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

C-N20-12/ND14

20 MARCH 1941

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO Classified ltr serial 010230 of February 17, 1941.

1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.

(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.

(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels on short notice.

(c) Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.

2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to Pearl Harbor.

3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installation of baffles for moorings in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: to  
CINCPACIFIC  
BUORD

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
Washington, June 13, 1945.

Op-30C1-AJ  
(SC)N20-12  
Serial 055730  
*Confidential*

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commandant, First Naval District  
The Commandant, Third Naval District  
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District  
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District  
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District  
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District  
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District  
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District  
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District  
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District  
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District  
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District  
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District  
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to: CinCpac  
CinClant  
CinCaf  
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon  
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport  
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo  
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa  
BuOrd  
Op-12

A16/ND14/(16)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

Serial 086W

*Secret*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Blocking Pearl Harbor Channel.

Reference: (a) Com-14 Conf. ltr. C-A16/H3/ND14(0800) of August 10, 1941.

1. In view of anti-submarine defenses approved for and now in process of installation at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the Commander-in-Chief does not desire to reopen the question of anti-submarine nets thereat.

2. With reference to laying defensive mine fields off those harbors, it is believed there is insufficient prospect of commensurate return for the restricted maneuverability and risks involved to our own ships.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has noted with approval the action initiated toward obtaining suitable radar for protection of channel entrance. He would like to see this matter vigorously prosecuted. Please keep him informed as to progress.

4. WPL-46 assigns salvage in these waters as a task for the forces afloat, assisted by such facilities as the shore establishment may be able to provide. Organization and assembly of equipment is now in process under Commander Base Force. It is requested that the results of the study and inventory referred to in paragraph (3) of reference (a) be made available to Commander Base Force and that, if and when necessity arises, appropriate local facilities and technical facilities be furnished him.

H. E. KIMMEL.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 64

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, Feb. 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring



# 1130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37-mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37-mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

[s] HENRY L. STIMSON,  
*Secretary of War.*

## MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FEBRUARY 13, 1941.

Op-30B3-AJ  
(SC)A7-2(2)/FFI  
D-27446  
Secret

From: Director, Naval Districts Division

To: Director, War Plans Division

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar ltr. of Feb. 7, 1941, to SecNav.)

1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

[s] Alex Sharp  
ALEX SHARP

(Pencil Notation: Done 015712 of 11 Feb. M.)

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 65

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of Cincpac Secret ltr. dated 7 August 1941, Serial 069W, Subject: Organization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the Mandated Islands, and copy of Enclosure (A) thereto.

are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

R. E. Keeton  
R. E. KEETON

By direction of the Commander in Chief,  
U. S. Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Cincpac File No.  
Serial 069W  
*Secret*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 7, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force.  
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.  
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.  
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.  
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.  
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.  
Commander Battleship Divisions One and Two.  
Commander Carrier Division One.  
Commander Destroyer Flotilla One.  
Commander Scouting Force.  
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.  
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.  
Commander Cruiser Divisions Three, Five and Six.  
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.  
Commander Base Force.  
Commander Patrol Wing Two.  
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.  
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Organization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the Mandated Islands.

Reference: (a) Cincpac Secret ltr. A16/ (021W) of April 4, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Information on subject matters as of August 4, 1941.

1. Information furnished herewith is the best available, but by virtue of its very nature is subject to omissions and other inaccuracies.

2. This letter supersedes reference (a), which together with its enclosure is to be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. C. Crosley,  
P. C. CROSLLEY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

-----  
Enclosure A

[1]

AUGUST 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM:

- (A) ORANGE Naval Organization—FLEETS.
- (B) Material Installations in MANDATES.
- (C) Probable Forces, Naval and others, in MANDATES.
- (C) Summary of Activities in MANDATES.

(A) ORANGE NAVAL ORGANIZATION—FLEETS

COMBINED FLEET

BB MUTSU (F)

FIRST FLEET

BB MUTSU (F)

BATDIV 1  
(BB) MUTSU (F)  
(BB) NAGATO

BATDIV 2  
(BB) ISE (F)  
(BB) HYUGA  
(BB) FUSO

BATDIV 3  
(BB) HIEI (F)  
(BB) KIRISHIMA  
(BB) KONGO  
(BB) HARUNA

CRUDIV 6  
(CA) AOBA (F)  
(CA) KAKO  
(CA) FURUTAKA  
(CA) KINUGASA

DESRON ONE

(CL) ABUKUMA (F)

DESDIV 6  
IKAZUCHI  
INAZUMA  
SAZANAMI  
AKEBONO  
9-21  
(1700-36-6-5''  
9-21'') 3  
3

DESDIV 7  
AKATSUKI  
OBORO  
USHIO  
HIBIKI  
(Same as  
Desdiv 6)

DESDIV 21  
HATSUHARU  
NENOH  
HATSUSHIMO  
WAKABA  
(1368-36-5-5''  
9-21'') 3  
3

DESDIV 22  
ARIAKE  
YUGURE  
SHIRATSUYU  
SHIGURE  
(1368-36-5-5''  
8-21'') 3  
2

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[2]

## DESRON 3

(CL) SENDAI (F)

### DESDIV 11

FUBUKI  
SHIRAYUKI  
HATSUYUKI

(Same as  
Desdiv 6)

### CARDIV 3

(CV) HOSHO  
(CV) RYUJO  
(CV) SHOKAKU .. ?

### DESDIV 12

MURAKUMO  
SHINONOME  
SHIRAKUMO

(Same as  
Divdiv 6)

### DESDIV 4

HAKAZE  
AKIKAZE  
TACHIKAZE  
HOKAZE

### DESDIV 19

ISO NAMI  
URANAMI  
SHIKINAMI  
AYANAMI

(Same as  
Desdiv 6)

### DESDIV 20

AMAGIRI  
ASAGIRI  
YUGIRI  
SAGIRI

(Same as  
Desdiv 6)

### AIRRON 7

(AV) CHIYODA  
(AV) MIZUHO  
(AV) CHITOSE

(1270-34-4-4.7-6-21'')

4 3

## SECOND FLEET

(CA) TAKAO (F)

### CRUDIV 4

(CA) TAKAO  
(CA) ATAGO  
(CA) CHOKAI  
(CA) MAYA

### CRUDIV 5

(CA) MACHI  
(CA) HAGURO  
(CA) MYOKO

### CRUDIV 7 # @

(CA) KUMANO (F)  
(CA) SUZUYA  
(CA) MIKUMA  
(CA) MOGAMI

### CRUDIV 8

(CA) TONE  
(CA) CHIKUMA

## DESRON 2

(CL) JINTSU (F)

### DESDIV 8

ASASHIO  
OSHIO  
MICHISHIO  
ARASHIO

(1500-36-6-5''  
8-21'' 3

2

### DESDIV 15

OYASHIO  
HAYASHIO  
NATSUSHIO  
KUROSHIO

(Same as  
Desdiv 8)

### DESDIV 16

HATSUKAZE  
YUKIKAZE  
AMATSUKAZE  
ISOKAZE

(Same as  
Desdiv 8)

### DESDIV 18

KASUMI  
ARARE  
KAGERO  
SHIRANUI

(Same as  
Desdiv 8)

[3]

## DESRON 4

(CL) NAKA (F)

### DESDIV 2

MURASAME  
YUDACHI  
HARUSAME  
SAMIDARE

(1368-36-5-5''  
8-21'' 3

2

### DESDIV 4

(Cardiv 3—  
Plane Guard—  
First Fleet)

### DESDIV 9

ASAGUMO  
NATSUGUMO  
YAMAGUMO  
MINEGUMO

(1500-36-6-5''  
8-21'' 3

2

### DESDIV 24

UMIKAZE  
KAWAKAZE  
SUZUKAZE  
YAMAKAZE

(Same as  
Desdiv 2)

## COMMANDER CARDIVS

(CV) AKAGI (F)

### CARDIV 1

(CV) KAGA  
(SHOKAKU?)

### DESDIV 3

SHIOKAZE  
HOKAZE  
(1270-34-4-4.7  
0-21'' 4

3

### CARDIV 2 # @

(CV) SORYU  
(CV) HIRYU

### DESDIV 23 # @

KIKUTSUKI  
MIKAZUKI  
MOCHIZUKI  
YUZUKI

(1315-34-4-4.7''  
6-21'' 4

2

1st BASE FORCE SQUADRON #

| <u>DEFENSE DIVI-<br/>SION 1</u>                 | <u>MINESWEEP<br/>DIV. 1</u>    | <u>MINE SWEEP<br/>DIV. 21</u>   | <u>GUN BOAT DIVI-<br/>SION 1</u>                    |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| (CM) SHIRATAKA<br>(CM) HATSUTAKA<br>(CM) AOTAKA | Mine Sweep #1<br>Mine Sweep #2 | Mine Sweep #7<br>Mine Sweep #12 | 6 Special gunboats<br>(Converted Mer-<br>chantmen?) |
| <u>S. C. DIV. 1</u><br>?                        | <u>S. C. DIV 11</u><br>?       | <u>S. C. DIV. 21</u><br>?       | <u>S. C. DIV. 31</u><br>?                           |
| Special Transports                              | KATSURIKI (F)                  |                                 |                                                     |

# Now formed into Third Fleet (operating with South China Fleet in Hainan--Indo-China area).

@ Expected to rejoin SECOND FLEET about 10 August 1941.

[4]

THIRD FLEET

(Formed from units of 2nd Fleet and South China Fleet—became active in June-July, 1940 . . . . . evidently specially organized for SOUTHWARD EXPANSION operations—INDO-CHINA—etc.)

(CL) NAGARA (F) (ex-So. China Fleet)  
(CL) or (CM) KUNASHIRI (?)

CRUDIV 7 (ex-2nd Fleet)

(CA) KUMANO  
(CA) SUZUYA  
(CA) MIKUMA  
(CA) MOGAMI

DESRON 5

(CL) NATORI (F) (ex-So. China Fleet)

DESDIV 5

ASAKAZE  
HARUKAZE  
MATSUKAZE

HATAKAZE (Same as Desdiv 4)

(1315-34  $\frac{4-4.7-6-21''}{4 \quad 2}$ )

DESDIV 12 (?)

SATSUKI  
MINATSUKI  
FUMITSUKI  
NAGATSUKI

CARDIV 2 (ex-2nd Fleet)

(CV) SORYU  
(CV) HIRYU

DESRON 23

KIKUTSUKI  
MIKATSUKI  
MOCHITSUKI  
YUZUKI (Same as Desdiv 12)

1st BASE FORCE SQUADRON (ex-2nd Fleet)

| <u>Defence Div. 1</u>                           | <u>Mine Sweep Div. 1</u>      | <u>Mine Sweep Div. 21</u>     | <u>Gunboat Div. 1</u>                            |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| (CM) SHIRATAKA<br>(CM) HATSUTAKA<br>(CM) AOTAKA | M. S. #1<br>M. S. #2          | M. S. #7<br>M. S. #12         | 6 Special gunboats<br>(ex-merchant ma-<br>rine?) |
| <u>Subchaser Div. 1</u><br>?                    | <u>Subchaser Div. 11</u><br>? | <u>Subchaser Div. 21</u><br>? | <u>Subchaser Div. 31</u><br>?                    |

Special Transports

AIRRON SIX

(AV) NOTORO  
(XAV) KAMIKAWA MARU  
(XAV) . . . . . MARU

plus shore based aircraft ex-TAKAO, ex-OITA, ex-GENZAN, ex-TAIHOKU and South China Air Forces.

# 1134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[5]

## FOURTH (MANDATE) FLEET

(CL) KASHIMA (F)

CRUDIV 18  
(CL) KASHIMA  
TENRYU  
TATSUTA

AIRRON 24  
(AVS) KAMOI (F)  
(XAVS) ----- MARU  
4th AIR CORPS  
5th AIR CORPS  
11th AIR CORPS  
16th AIR CORPS

MINE LAYER DIV. 19  
(CM) OKINOSHIMA  
(CM) TOKIWA

DESRON 6

(CL) YUBARI (F)

DESDIV 29

OITE  
HAYATE  
ASANAGI  
YUNAGI (same as Desdiv 4)

DESDIV 30

MUTSUKI  
KISARAGI  
YAYOI  
UZUKI (Same as Desdiv 4)

SUBRON 7

(AS) JINGEI (F)

SUBDIV 26

Ro 60  
Ro 61  
Ro 62

SUBDIV 27

Ro 65  
Ro 66  
Ro 67

SUBDIV 33

Ro 63  
Ro 64  
Ro 68

3rd BASE FORCE (HQ-PALAO)  
----- MARU (F)

3rd DEFENCE DIVISION  
15 Special gunboats operating with Sub-  
marine Division (four submarines at-  
tached)

Included in above is: S. C. Div. 55

----- MARU  
----- MARU  
----- MARU  
----- MARU

7th AIR SQUADRON (PALAO?)  
3rd DEFENSE FORCE (PALAO)

5th BASE FORCE (HQ-Saipan)  
SHOEI MARU (F) (5644-1937)

S. C. Div. 56

(ODD) KASHI (F)  
4th DEFENSE DIV.

4th DEFENCE FORCE  
(Truk and outlying Islands)  
5th DEFENCE DIV.  
5th DEFENCE FORCE  
(SAIPAN area)  
8th GUNBOAT DIVISION  
8th AIRCRAFT SQUADRON  
7th BASE FORCE (HO-JALUIT)  
TAKUNAN MARU (F)

16th MINE SWEEP DIV.  
NAGATA MARU  
IKUTA MARU  
CHOKAI MARU  
DAIDO MARU  
6th DEFENCE DIVISION  
6th DEFENCE FORCE  
(JALUIT and outlying Islands)  
----- AIRCRAFT SQUADRON

[6]

## SIXTH FLEET

17th MINE LAYER DIVISION (may be now assigned THIRD FLEET)

(CM) ITUKUSHIMA

(CM) YAEYAMA

|                 |                 |                 |          |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------|
| SUBRON 1        |                 | SUBRON 2        |          |
| SUBDIV 1        | SUBDIV 2        | (AS) CHOGEI (F) | SUBDIV 8 |
| (CL) KATORI (F) | (AS) TAIGEI (F) |                 |          |
| I-9             | I-18            | I-1             | I-4      |
| I-15            | I-19            | I-2             | I-5      |
| I-16            | I-20            | I-3             | I-6      |
| I-17            |                 | I-7             |          |

SUBRON 3

|                |           |               |            |
|----------------|-----------|---------------|------------|
| (CL) ISUZU (F) |           | (CL) KINU (F) |            |
| SURDIV 11      | SUBDIV 12 | SUBDIV 20     | SUBDIV 13  |
| I-74           | I-8       | I-71          | (SM) I-123 |
| I-75           | I-10      | I-72          | (SM) I-124 |
|                | I-69      | I-73          | (SM) I-122 |
|                | I-70      |               |            |

SUBRON 5

|               |           |                   |           |
|---------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|
| (CL) YURA (F) |           | (AS) KARASAKI (F) |           |
| SUBDIV 28     | SUBDIV 29 | SUBDIV 30         | SUBDIV 21 |
| I-59          | I-61      | I-65              | I-23      |
| I-60          | I-62      | I-68              | I-24      |
|               | I-64      | I-67 (rep. lost)  |           |
|               |           | (may be I-68)     |           |

SUBRON 10

|                   |           |                   |  |
|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|--|
| (AS) KARASAKI (F) |           | (AS) KARASAKI (F) |  |
| SUBDIV 18         | SUBDIV 19 | SUBDIV 21         |  |
| I-53              | I-56      | I-23              |  |
| I-54              | I-57      | I-24              |  |
| I-55              | I-58      |                   |  |

[7]

COMMANDER COMBINED AIR FORCES

NOTE: For characteristics of ORANGE planes, armament, etc., see Tables in FATU—  
Report of Air Operations, Summary #12-41(S) dated 2 June 1941.)

6th AIRCRAFT WING

**AIRRON 24**  
(Now with 4th Fleet)  
(AV) KAMOI  
(XAV) ----- MARU  
**1st COMBINED AIR FORCE**  
(Hdqtrs. TAKAO)  
TAKAO AIR GROUP (FORMOSA)  
TOKO AIR GROUP ( " )  
TAICHU AIR STATION ( " )  
KAGI AIR STATION ( " )  
NAHA AIR GROUP (Loochoos)  
OITA AIR GROUP (Kyushu)  
KANOKA AIR GROUP ( " )  
plus other Shore Groups  
Misc. "Tenders"  
(DD) MINEKAZE (comm. guard)

**AIRRON 6**  
(Now assigned 3rd Fleet)  
(AV) NOTORO  
(XAV) KAMIKAWA MARU  
(XAV) ----- MARU  
**2nd COMBINED AIR FORCE**  
(Hdqtrs. SHANGHAI)  
12th AIR CORPS  
(Mixed groups—5 squadrons VF  
(15/Sq.) and 2 (light) Bomber  
squadrons (12/Sq.)).  
13th AIR CORPS  
(3 squadrons Heavy Bombard-  
ment (12/Sq.) plus reserve of  
3/Sq. plus 2 Sq. VF.  
SHANGHAI-HANKOW-ICHANG  
(DD) OKIKAZE (comm. guard)

3rd COMBINED AIR FORCE

(Hdqtrs. SANCHAU Is. (S. China))  
16th AIR CORPS (Same as 13th)  
Part of 14th at HOIHOW, HAINAN-  
SANCHAU IS. AND HANOI (F.I.C.)  
Part of 16th at SANYA, HAINAN  
and HAIPHONG (F.I.C.)

[8]

JAPANESE FLEET IN CHINA WATERS

FIRST (CHINA) FLEET  
(OCA) IZUMO (F)

**11th Squadron**  
PG ATAKA PR ATAMI  
PR SETA PR FUTAMI  
PR KATADA PR FUSHIMI  
PR HIRA PR SUMIDA  
PR HOZU PR HASHIDATE  
PR ----- ? PR UJI

**10th AIRCRAFT SQUADRON**  
HANKOW BASE FORCE  
KIUKIANG BASE FORCE

SECOND (CHINA) FLEET

**1st Squadron**  
(CA) ASHIGARA (F)  
(CL) NAGARA (now assigned THIRD FLEET)

**14th Squadron**  
(PG) SAGA Mine Sweeper #17  
----- ? Mine Sweeper #18  
**DESRON 5** (now assigned THIRD FLEET)  
(CL) NATORI (F)

**DESRON 5** **DESRON 12**  
ASAKAZE SATSUKI  
HARUKAZE MINATSUKI  
MATSUKAZE FUMITSUKI  
HATAKAZE NAGATSUKI

**1st TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON**

OTORI  
HAYABUSA  
HIYODORI  
KASASAGI

[9]

**15th DEFENCE DIVISION**  
**AMOY BASE FORCE**

**16th DEFENCE DIVISION** **CANTON BASE FORCE**  
**HAINAN ISLAND BASE FORCE**

Special Service Ships:  
Four from YOKOSUKA  
Eight from SASEBO  
One from MAIZURU

**THIRD (CHINA) FLEET**

**12th DIVISION**

(OCA) IWATE

MANRI (?) MARU

**11th TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON**

KIJI  
KARI  
SAGI  
HATO

**1st GUNBOAT DIVISION**

**13th GUNBOAT DIVISION**

**SHANGHAI BASE FORCE**

(ODD) KURI  
TSUGA  
HASU

**SHANGHAI HARBOR DEPT.**  
**SPECIAL LANDING FORCES**

**21st TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON**

CHIDORI  
MANAZURU  
HATSUKARI  
TOMOZURU

**2nd GUNBOAT DIVISION**

NIHONKAI MARU (F)

**14th GUNBOAT DIVISION**

**TSINGTAO BASE FORCE**

**NANKING BASE FORCE**

**AIR CORPS**

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## HIGH NORTH FLEET

There are at least eight to ten men-of-war and three or four naval auxiliaries in the High North Fleet. This Force operates in the KURILES-KAMCHATKA, HOKKAIDO-SAGHALIEN, and Northern HONSHU areas. It is apparent that the Headquarters for this Force is at OMINATO. There has been some air activity in connection with the operations of this Fleet, probably by shore-based seaplane squadrons in the above areas.

[10]

### Summation

|          | Total No. | 1st Flt | 2nd Flt | 3rd Flt | 4th Flt | 6th Flt | 1st China Fleet | 2nd China Fleet | 3rd China Fleet | Total | Attached to Naval Districts, inactive or at Navy Yards |
|----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| BB.....  | 10.       | 9       |         |         |         |         |                 |                 |                 | 9     | 1                                                      |
| CA.....  | 18.       | 4       | 9       | 4       |         |         |                 | 1               |                 | 18    | 0                                                      |
| CL#..... | 19.       | 2       | 2       | 2       | 4       | 4       |                 |                 |                 | 14    | 5                                                      |
| DD#..... | 96.       | 34      | 30      | 12      | 8       |         |                 |                 |                 | 84    | 12                                                     |
| SS#..... | 47.       |         |         |         |         | 43      |                 |                 |                 | 43    | 4                                                      |
| ss#..... | 25.       |         |         |         | 9       |         |                 |                 |                 | 9     | 16                                                     |
| CV.....  | 8.        | 3       | 2       | 2       |         |         |                 |                 |                 | 7     | 1                                                      |
| AV.....  | 5.        | 3       |         | 1       | 1       |         |                 |                 |                 | 5     | 0                                                      |
| XAV..... | 7.        |         |         | 2       | 2       |         |                 |                 |                 | 4     | ?                                                      |
| CM.....  | 8.        |         |         | 4       | 2       | 2       |                 |                 |                 | 9     | 0                                                      |
| AS.....  | 6.        |         |         |         | 1       | 3       |                 |                 |                 | 4     | 2                                                      |

# Numbers include some OCL, ODD, OSS and oss.

[11] The above organization is believed to be quite accurate but attention is invited to the fact that ORANGE may (and probably will) regroup Fleets or units of Fleets into special Task Forces (or new Fleets) for special operations or to meet given conditions; for example: when ORANGE wanted to make a show of force in connection with its benevolent mediation in the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Dispute during the latter part of January 1941, a special reinforcement unit was sent from the FIRST and SECOND FLEETS to the SOUTH CHINA FLEET. This unit consisted of CRUDIV 7 (4 CA), DESRON 1 (1 CL-16 DD), CARDIV 2 (2 CV-1 DESRON), 1 AV and 1 or more XAV. The THIRD FLEET was actually organized in April 1941, but did not operate as such until the political situation permitted the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Base question to be forced in June-July 1941. It is of interest to note that the reinforcement of the SOUTH CHINA FLEET in January was a "Rehearsal Run" for the organization of the THIRD FLEET. Although the submarines were organized and operated in a separate Fleet (6th), they have also been split to operate with the 1st and 2nd FLEETS as well. The inclusion of the 3 COMBINED AIR FORCES into the 6th FLEET substantiates past reports of Joint Maneuvers of Submarines and Air Force with stress on their cooperation in Fleet Problems and Exercises.

[12]

### (B) MATERIAL INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATES

For many years Japan has effectively prevented observation of activities in the MANDATED ISLANDS. However, it is known that as a result of extensive hydrographic and meteorological surveys, considerable expansion and improvements have been completed in harbor development, "commercial" air facilities, communications and meteorological establishments in the principal islands (JALUIT, PONAPE, KUSAIE, TRUK, PALAO, and SAIPAN). Since late in 1940 ORANGE Naval and Air Operations in this area have increased and some forty to forty-five naval auxiliaries (cargo, transport, supply, and tankers ----- ex-merchant marine) now make continuous shuttle trips to the MANDATES with personnel, material, equipment and supplies. (Places marked # below have been destination for these vessels). The "Material Installations" are listed below to bring up to date the information reported in ONI-49, "Extracts from the Japanese Monograph 1939", pages 127.01 to 127.24 inclusive.

*Marshall Islands*

**JALUIT #** (Installations on JARBOR IS., IMIEJI IS. (EMIDJ IS.) and ENYBOR IS.)

(JARBOR IS.)

Naval Radio Station.  
High Frequency R. D. F.  
Meteorological Station.  
Naval Inspector Jaluit.  
6th Defence Force Headquarters ("Jaluit Detached Force").  
6th Defence Division (Base Force) Headquarters.  
Bases and trunnions for 6" guns are mounted along the Marine Parade (probably 3).  
A battery of 4.7 inch field pieces.  
Several mobile (pneumatic tired trucks) Searchlights, 10 inch (projector) diameter, 1500 candle power.  
Machine guns and A. A. guns. Latter mounted on trailers, towed by Diesel tractors.  
Barracks for garrison of 500 men (1940).  
Estimate 1000 Army troops arrived in February, 1941.  
Lookout towers.  
Civil Engineering Section.  
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.  
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.  
Gasoline and oil tanks above ground (camouflaged)—1 mile South of JARBOR on reef formerly called "American Town".  
Coal Briquette Stowage.  
Deep water wharf and smaller jetties.  
Branch Office 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.  
Branch Office 4th Supply Department.  
#3 Branch Military Post Office.

[13] Two landing fields each with hanger capable of handling medium sized planes; adjacent buildings camouflaged. (Jaluit based Fighters and/or carrier planes).  
Mitsubishi Machine Shop situated between two air fields.  
Power plant (Diesel) for shop and airfields.  
Detachment of 6th Defence Force.

**JALUIT**

(IMIEJI IS. (EMIDJ IS.))

Naval Radio Station.  
Seaplane base at East Point (reference to IMIEJI BASE).  
Air Corps here.  
Civil Engineering Section.  
Ordnance Officer(s) attached.  
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.  
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.  
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.  
Detachment of 6th Defence Force.

**WOTJE #**

Naval Radio station.  
Meteorological station.  
Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("WOTJE Detached Force").  
Fortified (reported).  
Lookout towers.  
Landing Field (completed 1937—ONI 49). (Air Corps here; June 1941).  
Civil Engineer Section.  
Ordnance Officers attached.  
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.  
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.  
Detachment from Yokosuka Navy Yard.  
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.  
"Oil tanks".  
Deep water wharf.  
Branch Office—4th Supply Department.  
Branch 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.



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### **MALOELAP #—(TAROA IS.)**

Naval radio station.

Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("TAROA Detached Force").

"TAROA BASE".

Lookout towers.

Landing field under construction (1940).

Civil Engineering Section.

Ordnance Officers attached.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

"Storage plant".

Sanitary Corps in charge of Medical Officer.

### **[14] KWAJELIN # (establishment on both KWAJELIN and RUOTTO (ROI IS.))**

Naval Radio Stations (on KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).

"RUOTTO BASE". Air activity—June 1941.

Detachments of 6th Defence Force (on KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).

Shore Batteries of 6th Defence Force on KWAJELIN.

Shore Batteries of 6th Defence Force on RUOTTO.

Civil Engineering Section (RUOTTO).

Ordnance Officers attached (four or more).

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers (KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).

Detachments from YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers (KWAJELIN and RUOTTO)

### **ENIWETOK #**

Naval Radio Station.

Meteorological Station.

Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("ENIWETOK Detached Force").

Fortified (reported).

1935—"Building in progress—submarine base?".

Landing Field here (?).

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (One also on MERIREN IS. (PARRY IS.)).

Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.

### **POKAAKKU (TAONGI IS.)**

Naval Radio Station.

### **BIKINI**

Fortifications?

Earmarked for ORANGE Base?

### **RONGELAP #**

Naval Radio Station.

"Earmarked for ORANGE Base".

Actually used by ORANGE during maneuvers in past.

### **RONGERIK**

Naval Radio Station (reported).

### **UTIRIK**

Naval Radio Station.

Meteorological Station.

Naval personnel reported here.

### **WOTTO**

Naval Radio Station (reported).

### **[15] UJAE**

Naval Radio Station.

**MAJURO** (Used by Von Spee in 1914)

Naval Radio (?)

Naval personnel here.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

**EBON #**

Naval Radio (?)  
Naval personnel reported here.  
"BASE"----(?)

**MILLE**

Naval Radio Station.  
Naval personnel reported here.  
ORANGE considers MILLE extremely important.

*Carolines*

**UJELANG #**

Naval Radio Station.  
Meteorological Station.

**KUSAIE #**

Naval Radio Station.  
R. D. F. (reported).  
Meteorological Station.  
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.  
Submarine Base (?) (reported).  
Fortified (at least two gun emplacements reported).  
Lookout towers (day and night sentry watch).  
Land Plane field (reported).  
Seaplane operating base (reported).  
Mine and torpedo storage (reported).  
At least two Ordnance officers connected with work underway at KUSAIE.

**PINGELAP #**

Naval Radio Station.  
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

**[16] SATAWAN**

Used by ORANGE SS in 1932.

**MORTLOCK**

Naval Radio Station.  
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

**PONAPE #**

Naval Radio Station.  
R. D. F. reported.  
Meteorological Station.  
Detachment of 4th Defence Force ("PONAPE Detached Force").  
Army troops reported arrived here in February, 1941—estimated 1000 divided between PONAPE and TRUK.  
Fortified.  
"Air Field  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile South of the town . . . another base reported on tip of JOKAJ Island.  
Seaplane Facilities . . . "Air Base".  
11th Air Corps.  
Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).  
Civil Engineering Section.  
At least two ordnance officers attached.  
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (Active on LANGAR Is.).  
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.  
Oil storage (reported).  
Branch Office, Military Stores (Munitions) Department.  
Branch Office, 4th Supply Department.  
4th Branch Military Post Office.

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### TRUK #

Naval Radio Station.

R. D. F. reported.

Meteorological Station.

Headquarters 4th Defence Force.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force (TRUK Detached Force").

"#70 BASE" (probably Air Base).

Army troops arrived here February, 1941—estimated 1000 divided between TRUK and PONAPE.

Fortified.

Land plane field on TOL Is . . . another at South end of DUBLON IS.

Air Corps arrived TRUK (June 1941).

Seaplane facilities.

Mine and Torpedo storage reported.

"Prepared for mine defence".

Mandate Headquarters 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

[17] Civil Engineer Section.

Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.

Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.

Oil storage (reported).

Mandate Headquarters 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Dept.

Branch Office 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Dept.

Mandate Headquarters 4th Supply Dept.

Branch Office 4th Supply Dept.

Mandate Headquarters of Military Post Offices.

PULUWAT # (PULOOT) (ENDERBY)

Naval Radio Station.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

LOLO #

Naval Radio Station.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

LANOTREK # (SWEDE)

Naval Radio.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

(Naval) "AIR BASE".

WOLEAI #

Naval Radio Station.

Reported earmarked for Seaplane base.

ULITHI #

Naval Radio Station.

Advance Fleet anchorage.

FAIS

"Commercial" Radio Station (JPF).

SOROL.

Naval Radio Station.

"Landing field in operation" reported.

[18] YAP #

Naval Radio Station.

Meteorological Station.

Naval personnel reported here.

Reported fortified.

Land plane field near GAGIL, (reported).

Has been extensively used as seaplane operating base.

Ex-YOKOHAMA Air Corps (?).

Civil Engineering Section.

Branch of the 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

PALAO # (includes PALAO—PELELIU—etc.).

Naval Radio Stations (at least three).

H. F. ---- R. D. F.

Combined Radio and Signal Section.

Meteorological Station.

Headquarters 3rd Defence Division (Base Force).

Headquarters 3rd Defence Force.

Detachment of 3rd Defence Force.

Resident Naval Officer (Mandate Naval Headquarters).  
 Estimated 5000 Army troops arrived PALAO in February, 1941.  
 Army resident officers—liaison with Navy.  
 Observation tower or Battery Control station and artillery emplacements under construction on west side of BABELTHUAP Island (several 6" guns unloaded from transports).  
 All lighthouses believed used as Observation Posts or Battery Control stations.  
 Batteries believed emplaced near each lighthouse.  
 "Aircraft Detecting Device mounted on high hill at East end of KOROR Island.  
 Ammunition Storage to South of high hill on KOROR Island.  
 Barracks and Battery emplacements on PELELIU Island.  
 Barracks on West end of KOROR Island and at Southeast corner of BABELTHUAP Island.  
 Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on ARAKABESAN Island.  
 Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on PELELIU Island.  
 Naval Base on PELELIU Island.  
 "Fighting Plane Wing—PELELIU".  
 4th Air Corps.-----16th Seaplane Squadron.  
 4th Aircraft Technical Section.  
 Ex-CHITOSE Air Corps. (The 4th Air Corps?).  
 Mine and Torpedo storages (reported).  
 Civil Engineer Section.  
 At least four Ordnance Officers attached.  
 Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.  
 Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.  
 Detachment from KURE Navy Yard.

[19] Branch 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.  
 Branch of 4th Supply Department.  
 Oil storage ("considerable") on S. W. side of MALAKAL Island.  
 Advance Fleet Anchorage at KOSSOL Passage.  
 Submarine Base (?) reported under construction on NGAJANGEL Is.  
 Branch Hydrographic Office  
 #2 Branch Military Post Office.

**HELEN REEF #**  
 Naval Radio Station.  
 Meteorological Station.  
 "Helen Reef Seaplane Base".  
 Construction activity observed.

**TOBI # (LORD NORTH)**  
 Naval Radio.  
 Five oil tanks observed.

**GREENWICH # (KAPINGAMARANGI)**  
 Naval Radio Station.  
 Detachment of 4th Defense Force.

*Bonin Island (Ogasawara Group) (not in Mandates).*

**CHICHIGIMA #**  
 Naval Radio Station.  
 HF—R. D. F. Station.  
 Army Garrison.  
 Fortified.  
 Naval Air Station (seaplane operating base).  
 Mine Storage (reported).  
 Civil Engineer Section.

*Marcus Island # (Minamitorishima) (not in Mandates)*

Naval Radio Station.  
 R. D. F. Station (?).  
 Meteorological Station.  
 "Marcus Island Detached Force".  
 "Marcus Island Base".  
 Land plane field (?) . . . (!)

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[20]

### *Marianas Islands*

#### **URACAS**

Land plane field (?) (reported).

#### **MAUG**

Seaplane (?) and Submarine Base (?) (reported).

Has been used for seaplane and submarine operations.

Fortified (reported).

Oil Storage (reported).

#### **PAGAN #**

Naval Radio Station.

A temporary air field here has been used by carrier planes.

Civil Engineering Section.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

#### **SAIPAN #**

Naval Radio Station.

H. F.—R. D. F. Station.

Meteorological Station.

Fortified—heavy guns—AA guns—searchlights—(reported).

Combined Lookout Stations and Shore Battery (control) Establishments, (at GARAPAN, NAFUTAN, LAULAU, FINA SUSU, MANIAGAHA (Is.) and others).

Army garrison—barracks—storehouses.

Fifth Defence Division (Base Force) Headquarters.

Fifth Defence Force Headquarters.

Detachment of Fifth Defence Force.

Saipan Naval Air Station—landplane field at ASLITO.

Seaplane facilities.

Fifth Air Corps (ex-KISARAZU Landplane Squadron(s) included?).

Fifth Aircraft Technical Department.

Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).

Civil Engineering Section.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

Detachment from KURE Navy Yard.

Oil Storage reported.

Deep water wharf.

Branch of 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

**SAIPAN SUPPLY DEPARTMENT.**

Branch of 4th Supply Department.

#1 Branch Military Post Office.

#### **[21] TENIAN #**

Naval Radio Station.

"Combined Lookout and Shore Battery (control) Stations".

Fortified.

Detachment of 5th Defence Force.

Civil Engineering Section.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Ordnance Officer(s) attached.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

#### **ROTA**

Naval Radio Station.

Fortified (reported).

Defence works underway (reported).

Submarine Base (?) (reported).

#### **[22] C. PROBABLE FORCES, NAVAL AND OTHERS IN MANDATES**

(a) **FOURTH ("Mandate") FLEET.** (See Section A).

(b) **Naval Forces Ashore:**

3rd Defence Force (Headquarters PALAO).

5th Defence Force (Headquarters SAIPAN).

Detachment of 5th Defence Force on TENIAN and probably other Islands of MARIANAS (See Section B).

4th Defence Force (Headquarters TRUK).

Detachments of 4th Defence Force on outlying islands of Eastern and Central CAROLINES (See Section B).

6th Defence Force (Headquarters JALUIT).

Detachments of 6th Defence Force on outlying islands of MARSHALLS (See Section B).

(c) Army Forces Ashore:

On PALAO, SAIPAN, TRUK, PONAPE, JALUIT (See Section B).

(d) Navy Yard Detachments (labor and production (See Section B).  
Civil Engineer Detachments " " " (See Section B).

(e) Naval Air Forces:

Considerable activity. Exact composition and numbers not definite. The following table is constructed as a result of an analysis of fragmentary reports of varying degrees of reliability:

*Airron 24*

|               | Kamoi<br>(AV) |     | Maru<br>(XAV) |     | 4th-16th<br>Air<br>(Palao) |     | 5th-8th<br>Air<br>(Saipan) |     | 11th Air<br>(Ponape) |     | —th Air<br>(Truk?) |     | —th Air<br>(Jaluit) |     | Total |     |
|---------------|---------------|-----|---------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|----------------------|-----|--------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|-------|-----|
|               | Sq.           | No. | Sq.           | No. | Sq.                        | No. | Sq.                        | No. | Sq.                  | No. | Sq.                | No. | Sq.                 | No. | Sq.   | No. |
| VF.....       |               |     |               |     | 2                          | 24  | 1                          | 12  |                      |     |                    |     | 1                   | 12  |       |     |
| VOS.....      | 1             | 10  | 1             | 12  | 1                          | 12  | 1                          | 12  |                      |     | 1                  | 12  |                     |     |       |     |
| VSB.....      |               |     |               |     |                            |     |                            |     | 1                    | 12  |                    |     | 1                   | 12  |       |     |
| VTB.....      |               |     |               |     | 1                          | 12  |                            |     |                      |     | 1                  | 12  |                     |     |       |     |
| VB (hy.)..... |               |     |               |     | 1                          | 12  | 1                          | 12  | 1                    | 12  |                    |     | 1                   | 12  |       |     |
| VPB.....      |               |     |               |     | 2                          | 16  | 1                          | 12  | 1                    | 8   | 1                  | 8   | 2                   | 16  |       |     |
| Total.....    | 1             | 10  | 1             | 12  | 7                          | 76  | 4                          | 48  | 3                    | 32  | 3                  | 32  | 5                   | 52  | 24    | 262 |

When present work on expansion and construction of land plane bases is completed it is believed that ORANGE will use these for Type 96/97 twin engine land-plane, long range bombers and for fighters. These will be flown out to these bases in such numbers as to cope with a given situation.

[23]

#### D. ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS IN THE MANDATES

When BLUE held Fleet XXI, the ORANGE FOURTH FLEET took up stations in the Eastern Mandates and intensified its radio intercept activities in conjunction with ORANGE trans-Pacific naval tankers. In late August—early September, 1940, ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandated areas using the Air arm (carrier and shore-based planes) and Submarine Force to search for, locate, and attack a hypothetical enemy Force (represented by the FOURTH FLEET) advancing to the West from the vicinity of the Northern Gilberts. The general defence line seemed to be PONAPE—TRUK but details or conclusions of the exercises are not known. It may be significant that on the next Fleet reorganization, December, 1940, a separate SUBMARINE (SIXTH) FLEET was formed (See Section A).

ORANGE's decision to speed up the militarization was apparently reached concurrently with the signing of the Tri-Parte Pact, as movements of naval reserve auxiliaries (taken over from the Merchant Marine) to the Mandates became apparent thereafter. Since late in nineteen forty this movement of personnel, materials and supplies has progressively increased until in July, 1941, there were approximately forty to forty-five ships constantly engaged in round trips between ORANGE mainland and the Mandates. An analysis shows about sixty-five per cent of this shipping is destined for the Eastern CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

Considerable air activity has been in evidence at SAIPAN, PALAO, TRUK, PONAPE and in the JALUIT area. Foreign steamers nearing these areas have been subjected to aircraft observations and close scrutiny by Patrol Planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy landplane bombers have made reconnaissance flights over the GILBERT ISLANDS (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU).

## DISCUSSION OF SHORE ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

During the early months of 1941, evidence has shown that an Administrative Organization has been set up for control and expansion of the military developments of the Mandates. This Mandate Organization is taking the line parallel to but separate from the parent organization, YOKOSUKA Administration chain, previously in control. While PALAO has always been the MANDATE Administrative center (and may continue to be) the focus of SUPPLY, CIVIL ENGINEERING and MUNITIONS Administration in the Mandates is now centered at TRUK.

An increase in the number of CIVIL ENGINEER Detachments on the various Islands has been very noticeable and while some are distinctly Detachments of the YOKOSUKA Civil Engineering Section, others are separately and distinctly Detachments of the FOURTH Civil Engineering Section which almost invariably has detachments on the same islands as the YOKOSUKA Branch Detachments. The Headquarters of the FOURTH CIVIL ENGINEERS was formed at KURE in November 1940 and moved to YOKOSUKA the latter part of January 1941, and thence to the Mandates about 20 February. Accompanying it were the 4th MILITARY STORES (MUNITIONS) and the 4th SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION which also have branch offices on the principal islands of the MANDATES.

The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th DEFENCE DIVISIONS (BASE FORCES) have a Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remains ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the Command or of the Flagship. Each DEFENCE DIVISION contains a DEFENCE FORCE which in the case of the 4th and 6th is divided into DETACHED FORCES on the islands in the vicinity of the Command's Headquarters. Close cooperation has been noted between the DEFENCE FORCES and the Aircraft activities at their home bases.

The 3rd DEFENCE DIVISION has four submarines attached, possibly old boats of the "Ro" type. It may be ORANGE intention to similarly organize the other DEFENCE DIVISIONS.

During late May 1941 ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandates in connection with the dispatch of a part of the COMBINED AIR FORCE to that area (indoctrinal training?). The RYUJO (and possibly the HIRYU) and about half of the SUBMARINE FLEET also took part in this exercise. It is believed that the FOURTH FLEET acted as an "Enemy Fleet" attempting to penetrate into the MARSHALLS, with the AIR FORCES plus the SUBMARINE FLEET attempting to intercept them. It was reported that the ORANGE strategic high frequency Direction Finder net was active in this Phase, funnelling information to the AIR and SUBMARINE FORCES on a common chain via SAIPAN and there is some evidence that these Forces were under a unified command. After visits at WOTJE, KWAJELIN, and JALUIT the additional forces returned to their normal operating units at the end of June.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 66

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

## HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached document consisting of the following:

Copy of Map of Pearl Harbor, showing the "Ships Moored 0755, 7 December 1941"

is a true and correct photographic copy of the document in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

[SEAL]

R. E. Keeton,  
R. E. KEETON.

By direction of the  
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,  
and Pacific Ocean Areas.

(Two copies of the map referred to *supra*, showing "Ships Moored 0755, 7 December 1941," at Pearl Harbor will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 253 and 254, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 67

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT

COMMANDANT, NAVY 128

c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

6 JUNE 1945.

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of the record of telephone communications "In and Out" dated  
December 7, 1941

are true and correct typewritten copies of the documents in the official files of  
the United States Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

This organization has no official seal.

J. S. Harper,  
J. S. HARPER,  
Captain, U. S. Navy.

RECORD TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS IN AND OUT

DECEMBER 7, 1941.

From

|         |                                                                                                                                                                   |
|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| HEEIA   | YUNE 8 at 357 (Rec. of 178) at 1040. YUNE 8 is COMCARDIV3.                                                                                                        |
| CINCPAC | 2 CARRIERS, 8 ESCORTS, AND 3 TROOP SHIPS 40 MILES SOUTH OF BARBERS POINT. (Time 1050). Arrangements being made to get direct telephone connection to Radio Heeia. |
| HEEIA   | HEEIA informed that RMO truck is on its way out and for them not to send their truck in. (1245).                                                                  |
| HEEIA   | MU'' HE SARA // HAHO on 4780 BRG 186 (1240—Time) (Believed Sub)                                                                                                   |
| CINCPAC | MU'' HE SARA // HAHO on 4580 BRG 181 (Time 1240) (Believed Sub)                                                                                                   |
| CINCPAC | MEN BLUE OVERHAULS RED MARKING LANDING AROUND BARBERS (1255) PARACHUTE TROOPS LANDING. SHIP 4 MILES OFF BARBERS.                                                  |
| CINCPAC | ENEMY SHIP FOUR MILES SOUTH BARBERS POINT. ENEMY LANDING ON NORTH SHORE ALSO PARACHUTE TROOPS LANDING NORTH SHORE—BLUE OVERHAUL, RED EMBLEMS.                     |
| HEEIA   | Intercepted msg to RER18 (F5L from CSQ PART ENEMY TRANSPORTS 4 MILES OFF BARBERS POINT ATTACK                                                                     |
| HEEIA   | KANURE (Appears to O. T. C.) on 6581—BRG 183 (time 1200)                                                                                                          |
| HEEIA   | SISO on 7033—BRG 167½ (time 1200)                                                                                                                                 |
| HEEIA   | UNKNOWN on 458—low frequency channel.                                                                                                                             |
| HEEIA   | VOICE on 4450 (time 1200)                                                                                                                                         |
| RDOLAB  | REPORTS HAS SEVERAL RECEIVERS READY FOR USE (time 1310)                                                                                                           |
| KANEOHE | REPORTS (UNAUTHENTICATED) CAPTURED CHART SHOWS POINT 223°—90 MILES FROM FORD ISLAND. (time abt 1130)                                                              |
| CINCPAC | ENEMY SAMPAN ABOUT LAND AT AMMUNITION DEPOT. ENEMY LANDING PARTY LANDING AT NANAKOULI. FRIENDLY PLANE FIRING ON THEM (time 1330)                                  |
| BAYS    | ADMIRAL THEOBALD HAS REPORTED TO AID COM-14 (time 1410)                                                                                                           |
| BAYS    | DOBBIN HAS JAPANESE PRISONERS ABOARD. MEN APPROACHED DOBBIN BY BOAT. PRISONER BELIEVED OFF SUBMARINE. (time 1410)                                                 |



# 1146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEEIA KASO seems to be TASK FORCE COMMANDER  
 " KANURE is probably Commander in the Air  
 " KANURE sez at 1235 (Local Time) "I HAVE FUEL FOR  
 10 MINUTES)."  
 " KANURE sez at 1240 "I WILL FLY AS LONG AS I HAVE  
 FUEL".  
 " SOMEONE ON 7033 AT 1247 SAID "HAVE NOT BE  
 OPPOSED".  
 " SAME FREQUENCY BELIEVE SINIRE FROM SISO AT  
 1250 "WHAT IS YOUR COURSE?"  
 " RUSI8 AND YUNE8 believed to be COMMANDER  
 CARRIERS.  
 " SUTI2 believed to be a CARRIER.  
 " SISORE is either another COMDR IN THE AIR or COMDR  
 TRANSPORT GROUP.  
 " SISO is BOSS OF SISORE.

DECEMBER 7, 1941.

## RECORD OF INFORMATION IN AND OUT

DISPATCH 072330 SENT COM14 TO DUTCH HARBOR,  
 SAMOA AND MIDWAY (YKBZY). GIVING DOPE UP  
 TO 1200.

OPNS JAPANESE VOICE ON 15425 KC. Time 1510  
 U. S. S. MAKUA Departed for Honuapo Dec. 6th due day-  
 light 8th. Then to Hilo and San Francisco.

HEEIA NAT17 (RF7) Bearing 240-080 (This morning at 0537 on  
 5995 kcs 9HK DE RF7 RF7 SOS SOS SOS SOS  
 JAPS ATTACKED OAHU

WAILUPE ON 5560 MASEØ Bearing 300.  
 On 5370 at 0709 REYA7 bearing 303 (2020 Zone 10½)  
 Relay to HEEIA—From: COM4—To: ALL DISTRICT  
 ACTIVITIES BE PREPARED FOR AIR RAID AT  
 DAWN . . . . (Delivered 2110).

" " 5370 at 0715 TIFUØ Bearing 300. (2045 Zone 10½).  
 " " 5370 at 0721 MISØ9 Bearing 300. (2051 Zone 10½).  
 Mr. Lagle measured crystal—3820.

COMMOFFICE Coast Guard sez—Strong CW sending MO's on 500 Kcs and  
 using calls NPS and M9U. . . .  
 " " On 4330 at 0750 8EFU Bearing 255 (2120 Zone 10½).  
 Lt. Slonim—Nothing on 9500—2230 . . . Keep listening.  
 Tokio Broadcast—from Lt. Slonim . . . Attacked Shanghai  
 and Singapore.  
 Landing at Ma-  
 laya.  
 Great damage at  
 Philippines.  
 Attacked Hong-  
 kong Twice.  
 Destroyed back-  
 bone of Amer-  
 ican Fleet.  
 Do damage to  
 themselves.

WAILUPE TO: COM14 From Capt. Mayfield Naval Intelligence via  
 Thru Comm Commercial Pacific Cable . . . M I D W A Y BEING  
 Office. BOMBED.

COMM OFFICE On 4900 at 0938 RISU8 Bearing 305. (2308 Zone 10½).  
 Very Strong Signal . . .

COMM OFFICE On 5370 at 0945 TIFUØ Bearing 301. (2315 Zone 10½).  
 THESE BEARINGS COMING FROM LUALUALEI  
 THROUGH WAILUPE.

DECEMBER 7, 1941.

## RECORD OF INFORMATION IN AND OUT

|             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| COMM OFFICE | On 5290 at 0950 RAYU4 Bearing 301 (2320 Zone 10½).                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| HEEIA       | SIEHI on 6385 (Sub. Freq.) at 125/305 at (1020 GCT)<br>(1150 LOCAL)                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| COM. OF.    | MSG FROM COMDESDIV 80 TO ALL SHIPS AND STATIONS "SHIP PREVIOUSLY HEADING NW IS AN UNIDENTIFIED CRUISER" ALSO "CRUISER PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IS ON COURSE 330" "UNKNOWN SHIP CHANGED COURSE TO EAST". "IDENTIFIED AS FRIENDLY". (10½-1045) (1215 HST). |
| COM. OF.    | MSG FROM MIDWAY TO WAILUPE (READDRESSED BY WAILUPE TO ALL STATIONS ON THIS CIRCUIT "HANGER TO GO. THIS MAY BE NNE OF NQM                                                                                                                            |
| HEEIA       | 4627 KENERAYOHATU—weak signals Time 1240 HST)                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| CXK         | 6400 FUNIØ BEARING 300 Time 1035 GCT)                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| CXK         | 6400 HEME3 BEARING 298 Time 1038 GCT)                                                                                                                                                                                                               |

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 68

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

December 8, 1941.

## REPORT OF PRISONER NUMBER ONE

Detailed information concerning this report will be submitted today. Preliminary report indicates the prisoner a Japanese Sub-Lieutenant, aged twenty-four years. Was pulled out of the water off Bellows Field this morning. Was taken prisoner by the Army and is held at Fort Shafter by Colonel Fielder. The officer refused to talk concerning the enemy's composition or disposition and at the present time the only information present is as follows:

1. He swam ashore from a reef one mile off Bellows Field.
2. He and another officer were the only members of a two-man submarine. The reason for his capture was that he was sneaking up on what he thought to be a capital ship and in order to navigate he had to open the hatch of the submarine—whereupon water came into the hatch and swamped the motor. He thereupon drifted upon the reef. This officer was Captain and Navigator. The other officer has not been recovered. Information indicates that there are more of these small submarines in the vicinity and that they were brought here from some type of a mother ship. The prisoner did state that he had to navigate a distance of a hundred miles before running aground upon the reef. At the time of his capture the officer wore a stop watch around his neck which stopped running at 0210. It is not known whether this is GCT or LCT. Although he did not give the enemy's forces or disposition he stated that so far as he knew the attack was a disappointment in that they expected a paralyzing blow to our fleet.
3. In accordance with the samuri code this prisoner has requested that he only be allowed to commit suicide.

It is evident that the officer appreciated the treatment afforded him by the naval questioners to that of the Army, and it is felt that with proper handling, further information *might* be derived from this officer.

Respectfully,

E. T. LAYTON.

## FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

District Intelligence Office

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel

*Honolulu, Hawaii, December 8, 1941.*

CHC/MB

Memorandum for: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

1. Young, adult Japanese male—muscular build, cropped black hair—apparently in perfect health. Gave his age as 24, sub-Lieutenant in the Japanese Navy and a graduate of the Imperial Naval Academy.

2. He was without clothing of any kind, and seated in a chair wrapped in an army blanket. Before questioning was started it was learned that this prisoner was taken on the beach at Bellows Field. That he had swum ashore and had around his neck, on a lanyard, a stop watch which had salt water inside of it. The watch was stopped at 0210. The watch was inscribed on the reverse in Japanese characters—translated as follows: "Watch 2ND clock, Type 1, Navy #296. Movement No. 3346171." This man stated that he was an officer of the Japanese Navy and gave his name as KAZUO SAKAMAKI of Okayama Prefecture. He had been one of a crew of two in a submarine which had run ashore on a reef approximately one mile off Bellows Field. He stated that he was the Commanding Officer of the submarine and the navigator and that his shipmate was the engineer—entire crew consisted of himself and one shipmate. He admitted that the submarine was of a small type which operated from a mother ship but refused to give the name or tonnage of the mother ship or the distance at sea of his disembarkation from the mother ship. When questioned as to whether the submarine was diesel or electric propelled he refused to answer. He stated that he had navigated "more than a hundred miles" when asked if the distance were as much as one hundred miles. Too much credence should not be placed in this answer as he obviously realized he was being pumped. He stated that he wished to commit suicide and had not done so at the time of landing on shore because of the possibility which remained of making his escape and rejoining the Japanese Navy. He stated that he had now been disgraced and did not want his name or his ship information sent back to Japan. When complimented on the success of which his Naval comrades had made their attack, he stated that it had been much less successful than they had anticipated. We expressed surprise at this and he was asked what they originally expected to accomplish, he replied, in effect, a knock-out blow to your Navy.

3. He stated that off Bellows Field this morning he had been approaching a capital ship but that the darkness was so complete that he was forced to open his conning tower and stand in in the open hatch while running half submerged towards his target. As a result of the maneuver in the choppy sea, he shipped a great deal of water down the hatch which crippled his motor and this motor failure resulted, of course, in the loss of control of the submarine and his being dashed into a reef over one mile from Bellows Field. He and his fellow officer stripped, dived into the ocean and attempted to swim ashore. He stated that he last saw his shipmate in the heavy surf. He admitted the possibility that the Navy might examine the submarine, which had run on the reef (because he was not aware that Naval planes had subsequently bombed and sunk his submarine). He stated that there were no papers in the submarine and admitted that this type of submarine represented essentially a sort of enlarged variation of a one man torpedo. He stated "My greatest mistake was being captured. This is the first time I have failed. Please do not advise Japan about this. Please kill me." During the course of this questioning, which was begun by the aid of two competent interpreters, it developed that this young officer had some knowledge of English, which he at first did not disclose. Later on he explained his inexpertness in this language by saying that, while in the middle school, he had studied English, but in the Academy, in expectation of duty in the China Seas, he had selected Chinese.

4. A drawing of a petty officer's Navy Pilot's insignia was made by him and he explained the significance of the various details of this device.

5. There remains the possibility, if the Naval authorities so desire, that this submarine may yet be located and raised for examination of mechanical details, etc.

C. H. C.

In Reply  
Refer To:

## SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR

U. S. S. ARGONAUT, Flagship

Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

December 8, 1941.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay.

1. The submarine when first sighted was about six hundred yards from the beach, off the end of the run-way at Bellows Field. At the time of my arrival at the Field, three Navy Utility planes were engaged in dropping what appeared to be either twenty-five or fifty pound bombs, the bombs being dropped in pairs. No direct hits were made and out of about twelve bombs dropped six appeared to land within fifty feet of the submarine. After the bombing the submarine did not appear to have been damaged or to have altered its position.

2. The pilot who first sighted the submarine was interviewed and stated that when he picked it up there was a large oil slick around its stern, also its position had not changed any since the first sighting of it.

3. The operations officer at Bellows Field sent me up in a plane to get a clear view of the submarine and I was able to come within one hundred feet of it. The color was dull black with no distinguishing marks, between thirty and forty feet in length, and about four feet in breadth. There was a small periscope projecting about three feet from what appeared to be periscope shears. The contour followed the general line of all submarines and there was a basket like projection on the bow. At the time, the submarine was down by the stern with the bow and periscope shears coming out of water from time to time due to the action of the waves. Judging from the location of the bomb hits on the coral bottom, which could be seen from the plane, the submarine appeared to be drifting in towards the beach.

4. It is believed that with the minimum amount of effort, the submarine can be towed in and beached.

R. L. RUTTER,  
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

To a Commanding Officer:  
From Japanese Naval Officer  
KAZUO SAKAMAKI

I thank you for the kindly visit of yesterday. Now I will write down your requests of yesterday in Japanese. Please pardon my poor writing and composition.

## 1. BRIEF PERSONAL HISTORY

In August 1940 I was graduated from the Naval Academy and became a midshipman. In April of this year I was commissioned a sub-lieutenant in the navy, my present rank.

## 2. RECORD OF BATTLE

Your honorable "have" country instituted an economic blockade of Japan, a "have not" country, refusing to sell us oil, cotton and the like, until we had no choice but natural collapse. Because of this we began diplomatic negotiations with your country, but these ended in failure. Therefore, with a friend, I set out for Pearl Harbor with the purpose of sinking a battleship, but due to-----accident, although we were able to reach the mouth of the harbor by creeping underneath your bombs falling like rain, since the-----accident was fatal to the submarine, we determined to proceed without hesitation on the surface of the water, and dashing into the harbor, and climbing the gang-way ladder, hoped to leap onto the deck and die simultaneously with blowing up the enemy warship just as in olden times, during the Mongol invasion, our Tsuyu Kawano lowered the mast and boarded the enemy ship with it. However, because of the-----accident suffered at the harbor mouth, we struck a reef which given ten seconds we would have safely cleared. My first stratagem had failed. With this difference of ten seconds the fate was decided and one of the warships of your country was saved.

Seeing the success of our sister submarines and the splendid achievements of our air force, I left the mouth of the harbor, compelled to do so due to my submarine being disabled. Later, finally being unable to do anything with the submarine, I swam through the ocean and reached an enemy airport. Due to

## 1150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

my exhaustion, I was captured without having time to even fight. And thus my sad fate began.

Due entirely to my inexpert navigation and strategy, my honor as a soldier has fallen to the ground. Thus I betrayed the expectations of our 100,000,000 (people) and became a sad prisoner of war disloyal to my country.

5. The talk I had with an understanding naval officer in the home of an army man in "Honolulu" was very pleasant. Because I thought about the trouble I would cause your country later on, and because I was unable to endure my shame, committing suicide or being shot to death became impossible, and thus began my sad life as a prisoner of war. Now that things have come to such a pass, I have started the life of a peaceful Japanese naval officer abiding by the rules of international law.

In olden times, Hakui and Shukusei of China, refusing to eat millet of a foreign land, went into the mountains and ate grass (?) until they starved, but I, since I began eating your country's bread, have thought what a cause for shame and sorrow it is.

Although I have caused you much annoyance, I have done things right along according to righteousness. However, such incidents as that which happened yesterday which is from the standpoint of your country a sad thing has been continued. My righteousness has made scores of men of your country withdraw all day long with their guns pointed at me and made them afraid, but as a result of this, I must face a death which to me is not too pleasing.

My willingness to die need not be mentioned; to be killed by one of your bullets of your country shall make me very happy. I pray for your country's lasting military success.

An uprighteous pistol has been aimed at me. This is my end. Good-bye.

4. To the Japanese people, especially to officers like ourselves, becoming a prisoner of war is inexcusable. Of course, whether or not there is a record of the incident or not, I will commit suicide upon my return to my native land. Even though we are unarmed, to bite with teeth and fight to the last is the Japanese spirit.

I pray that my death will forgive me for all my failures and I pray that my spirit will be enshrined at the Yasukuni (Shrine).

Please forward the following to the Japanese Navy Department.

### LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

Although I plunged into the mouth of the harbor, and although I struck terror in the hearts (of the people of the islands?) I arrived at a situation wherein I could do nothing. For this I have no excuse to make. I do not desire to grasp this opportunity of being a prisoner of war. I am about to die after fighting for righteousness till the very end as an officer of the Japanese Navy.

Banzai for his Imperial Majesty.

Showa 16th year (1941), 14th day (Month omitted)

KAZUO SAKAMAKI,  
*Naval Sub-lieutenant*

### POEM COMPOSED AMONG THE ENEMY (ON THE UNFORTUNATE DAY THAT I BECAME A PRISONER OF WAR)

When cherry blossoms fall,  
Let them fall!  
Drenched are the its branches and leaves  
With the sorrow of today!

5. I like best "DOWN THE TORPEDO" and "AMONG THE SHOTS THROUGH THE MARGARET". I experienced all these things in this current battle which is the goal of all naval men's ambition, and I manifested the Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit). Last night, again scores of bayonets and muzzles were pointed at me from the front door and from the window and from above my head. However, righteousness won. And although as a result of this a regrettable situation came about, I hope that all would be forgiven with my death. On the eve of my "fairly death" lamenting the many sacrifices of your country due to my "call of righteousness". I earnestly hope that this will be clearly understood, that supreme desire and joy in dying as a soldier by your country's bullets.

I appreciate your many kindness shown me up to now, and I pray for your success in the war.

Respectfully,

KAZUO SAKAMAKI.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 69

Confidential  
Vol. 1, No. 48  
11 June 1945

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

## WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

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Cover Page: Two Coronados of VPB-13, operating from the USS KENNETH WHITING, downed this MAVIS on 10 May in a 17-mile running battle near Fukue Shima, west of Kyushu.

Enclosures: Data Table—Japanese Combat Aircraft.

Count of Operational Aircraft.

Known Your Enemy: Japanese Antitank Warfare.

Two Maps: Japanese Defense Installations on Iwo Jima as plotted from P. I. reports and ground study.

[1]

## UNEASINESS IN JAPAN

With Okinawa about to be written off, Japan took stock of the situation last week and found the outlook grim. There was a tinge of desperation in various Tokyo announcements as spokesmen sought to condition the public for an expected invasion of the homeland. Like the nervous sleeper in the flat below, Japan sits up nights waiting for the other shoe to drop.

The Japanese public has been told by no less than Premier Suzuki that Okinawa was to be the decisive battle, that Japan itself might rise or fall on the outcome

<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and refer to pages of original exhibit.

of the battle in the Ryukyus. Newspapers and commentators were quick to echo the spirit of his fright talk. When the Naha-Shuri defense line was broken, the Japanese public must have known that a decisive phase was at hand. There was Okinawa all but lost; there was the ubiquitous Third Fleet hammering at Kyushu; there was the 11th Army Air Force raiding the northern Kurile Islands, and over all were the B-29s with the power to pick a city and obliterate it.

Tension mounted in Tokyo, or what was left of it. There was the publicly-aired conviction that the next Allied operation would be against the home islands. While the Tokyo Radio talked of elaborate underground structures for "a long war", the Japanese military took the wraps off "the home defense team" of pilots and aircraft. Carrier pilots of the Third Fleet suddenly found they had to beat off "a sky full of Japanese planes", manned by crack pilots who apparently had been saved up for some such final showing. Moreover, U. S. airmen reported the expert Jap flyers were coming up with new fighters which outperformed American Corsairs. (Identity of this new Japanese fighter plane has not been established, but elsewhere in this issue is a discussion of a possible new enemy plane recently shot down over Okinawa.)

Tokyo talked, too, of converting remnants of the Imperial Fleet into a suicide fleet or suicide units. English language broadcasts were beamed to North America pointing out that the recent shakeup in the Japanese Navy was calculated to put that arm on a suicide basis under new commanders who had originated and were versed in suicide tactics. There was even talk of converting the free balloon experiment into a direful threat to the U. S. mainland by means of suicide pilots. Propagandists said the pilotless balloons had demonstrated that such bags could get to the West Coast in 100 hours, so now the Japanese would send them over with pilots to spot targets for bombs in the balloons. Still other propagandists broadcast elaborate descriptions of vast underground fortifications and supply areas in the homeland which, they said, would introduce "a new kind of underground warfare."

It was all reminiscent of Germany's promises to her people of unlimited "secret weapons" before the end of the war in Europe.

Meanwhile, B-29s poured relentless destruction on Japan's principal cities in a terrible, methodical order. Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe—down the Tokaido line with train-like regularity and then back again, went the Superforts. On 5 June they were over Kobe, the end of the line, and two days later they were back at Osaka for the second time in a week. The Kobe raid was the 15th incendiary raid on the Empire. In the subsequent raid on Osaka HE bombs were mixed with 2,500 tons of incendiaries. The HE was aimed at Osaka Arsenal, Japan's largest. Before the Osaka raid, it was computed that a total area of nearly 90 square miles has been burned out or blasted to rubble in Japan's six major cities.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Aerial view of Tokyo showing damage effected through incendiary raids.
2. Aerial view of Osaka showing damage effected through incendiary raids.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 255, and 256, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[2]

#### UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT

From Air Group 9 come gun camera photographs of a possible new Japanese fighter which was shot down on 5 May over Okinawa. This aircraft was first reported to be a GEORGE but an examination of the photos shows that its only GEORGE-like features are general wing shape and twin gun installations. Features not characteristic of GEORGE 11 are:

- Long nose.
- Low wing and excessively long fillets.
- Narrow but tall fuselage aft of fillets.
- Full length rudder similar to TONY's.
- Notched out tail plane with fairly short chord.

While it is reported that the new version of GEORGE has a low wing, there has been no indication that the fuselage and empennage would be redesigned or

that the engine would be set farther forward. GEORGE 11 presents a very stubby, heavy appearance. The aircraft pictured here gives that impression only in side view because of the depth of fuselage; its narrowness from above, if fillets are discounted, is almost like OSCAR. The tail wheel appears to be non-retractable since no cover plates are visible.

Two conclusions may be drawn: (1) that the aircraft is the new GEORGE 21 which seems unlikely for the reasons stated, and (2) that it is a new type Navy fighter hitherto unphotographed—perhaps SAM 11.

(Two photographs, each showing two separate views, of an unidentified Japanese plane over Okinawa, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 257 and 258, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[5]

## NEW AIR COMMANDS IDENTIFIED

Identification of two important new Japanese air commands, the 6th Air Army and the 1st Mobile Base Air Force, has been made through recently captured documents.

Prior to the Okinawa campaign, only five air armies were known to exist. Several items recovered on Okinawa, however, mentioned the 6th Air Army. A "Very Secret" order, dated 6 February 1945, issued by the 19th Air Sector Command gave the jurisdiction of the new Army. (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. B-18,287.) The order states:

"Imperial headquarters will plan the execution of Ten Air Operation in the East China Sea area as a joint Army-Navy function. The 6th Air Army, chiefly, will carry out aerial operations north of Okinawa (including Okinawa) and the 8th Air Division, generally, will carry out operations south of Okinawa (Okinawa included)."

Since it is known that an air army is a high echelon of command with a tactical and administrative responsibility over a large area, it is presumed that the jurisdiction of the new army also includes Kyushu. The 8th Air Division is based on Formosa. The Ten ("Sky") operation is apparently the name applied to the air defense of Okinawa and the Ryukyu area.

Japanese air armies previously identified include the 1st in the Empire, 2nd in Manchuria, 3rd in Southeast Asia, 4th in Southwest Pacific, and 5th in China.

Mention of the 1st Mobile Base Air Force (Kido Kichi Kokubutai) and its number designation, 1KFGB was found in a notebook on Okinawa. (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. B-18,066.) A Base Air Force is the tactical equivalent of a Navy Air Fleet and operates under the CinC, Combined Fleet. The area covered by the 1st Mobile Base Air Force and its equivalent administrative air fleet is not known, but it is presumed to be an important sector of the Japanese homeland defense.

[6]

## JAPANESE FIGHTER DIRECTION

A description of Japanese fighter director methods, as they existed in April 1944, was captured on Luzon (ADVATIS Translation No. 74, ATIS Current Translations No. 156, 21 March 1945). Particularly interesting is the dependence of the Japanese on reconnaissance planes—which should make good targets—and on a constant speed and course of the attacking planes.

The physical system is not unlike our own shore-based system in basic respects. Various radars reports to a control station which we would call a filter center. At this location plots are displayed and evaluated and action is taken. (Apparently each radar reports bearing and range from itself and does not convert to a common reference point; nor does it appear to use any sort of "grid" system.) The Japanese have an organization designated an "Intelligence squad" which would compare to our intercept team. One sketch indicates that D/F equipment is used in some manner for tracking their own intercepting aircraft.

Numerous references in the document indicate that Japanese radar bearing and range discrimination are not reliable. Furthermore, the enemy does not seem to have any search radar which is dependable for altitude determination on incoming raids.

To compensate for shortcomings in bearing, range and altitude from their radar, scouting planes are sent out initially to contact our raids. These scouts shadow



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and report position, type, strength, altitude, etc., as an aid to directing the intercepting group. This would suggest the conclusion that our raids frequently will be spotted by Japanese reconnaissance planes, which will act as shadows and not as attacking units. The reconnaissance planes represent an important cog in the intercept system.

Due to the time element required in the filter center, the method of radio relay, and the fact that mechanical methods are utilized for computation of vectors, much time is wasted; time lag in plot is an obvious conclusion. All computation is on the premise that the "enemy raids" will remain on almost constant course and speed. This suggests that a few diversionary raids with marked changes in course and speed might create confusion in Japanese intercepts.

After their intercepting aircraft are given the initial "vector" and "range" on the "point of encounter" (intercept position), the subsequent changes in vector seem to be given in a manner similar to our clock-code method; e. g., "03.10" equals "right front ten kilometers."

(Copies of two photographs, each reflecting six views, of a Japanese "George" 11-Fighter, Interim Model, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 259 and 260, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[11]

### DEMOLITION SQUADS IN SALLYs

On 24 May six SALLYs carried Japanese "commandos" to Yontan airfield, Okinawa, in attempts to destroy U. S. aircraft and installations. The planes attempted wheels-up, power-off landings, but all except one which landed on the airfield, crashed and burned killing their occupants before any damage could be done. All planes were SALLY 2s, fitted with Type 100 1450 hp engines, the Army counterpart of the Kasei 11.

None of the six aircraft carried guns or armor plate or, as far as could be determined, radio gear. The top turrets had been removed and pieces of corrugated roofing, beaten flat, were nailed to boards 1 by 6 inches and tied over the turret hole with rope to inside structural members. Such aircraft maintenance as could be observed was extremely poor. Screws were cross-threaded or not screwed completely into place or were left out altogether. Ill-fitting pieces of fairing, apparently from other planes of the same model, had been forced into place. Much patchwork was noted and tires were considerably worn. In two of the planes were found small pieces of cardboard, 2 by 10 inches. Around the cardboard were wound five sizes of plain soldering wire, small pieces of which could be cut off and used as substitutes for burned-out fuses. Fuse boxes had some regular fuses installed and some short pieces of wire as substitutes, a possible indication of a shortage of fuses. Flare release racks were found on two aircraft, the flares doubtless being intended for use in the landings. One light smoke bomb was found, probably to be used to hide the raiders, once they were landed.

Extra bomb bay fuel tanks of approximately 130-gallon capacity were found in all the crashed aircraft. It is not clear why these would be needed, since SALLY's

(Photographs appearing at this point in the Exhibit include:

1. Two views of the Japanese plane, "Sally 2", one showing a tail section after attempted landing on Yontan airfield, Okinawa, and the other showing a plan after "wheels-up" landing on Yontan airfield.
2. View of a Japanese "Sally 2" plane after "wheels-up" landing on Yontan airfield.
3. Two views showing wreckage of two more "Sally 2s" near Yontan airfield.

The foregoing photographs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 261, 262, and 263, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

normal range (at 75 per cent Vmax) without them is approximately 1200 miles, and from the nature of the operation it would not seem that a return trip for

the planes was anticipated. Oil tanks on one aircraft were only one-quarter full, indicating that the engines were badly worn or that the tanks were intentionally not filled in order to save oil.

The pilot of the one SALLY that landed most nearly intact is believed to have been inexperienced for these reasons: The automatic pilot was in operation and had never been turned off; controls were operational and functioned satisfactorily at the time of inspection, but the pilot had made a poor attempt at leveling off before landing, thereby striking the runway hard and injuring some of his passengers; main line switches and magneto switches were still on at the time of inspection.

The entire operation against Yontan airfield was in the familiar suicide tradition, a move of desperation, neither well-planned nor well-executed. It was not successful even if measured objectively in terms of physical damage done for losses taken.

(An aerial view of destruction wrought by American carrier based planes on Kanoya airfield will be found reproduced as Item No. 264. EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### DUMMY AIRCRAFT

Increased use of dummy aircraft on Japanese homeland fields is evident in many recent reconnaissance photographs. Photographs of three fields are reproduced here to illustrate the trend and to show some of the more obvious differences between the dummies and the real aircraft.

In spite of the painstaking care the Japanese have taken, the dummies look flimsy at best. They seem to warp and twist out of shape, either because of our gunfire or the elements. They are irregular and not precise enough to fool the eye when studied in photographs. Their very construction defeats their purpose, since the three-dimensional effect of solidity and strong shadow is weak. On the other hand, when these dummies are covered with camouflage netting the general effect can be attained and is more convincing.

To give a good idea of the lengths to which the Japanese have gone in the construction of dummy aircraft, a selection of typical drawings is published here. The original drawings were a part of two complete sets of blueprints captured on Okinawa (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 43). The dummies depicted are probably intended to represent NATE, SONIA and SALLY. How many other types of planes have been drawn or constructed is not now known. Several mediocre imitations of FRANK were spotted around Yontan Field on Okinawa (photos in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 43).

Construction of dummies follows a pattern, not unlike stage scenery. The main members are of cedar and are comparable in size to our structural lumber. The lighter bracing and stiffeners are of common pine. All are nailed and spiked in place in a designated order. Structurally, the designs are only fair, as evidenced by their disintegration. Over this rough framework platform is woven the finish "basket". The coarseness of this weave allows the sun to penetrate and thereby to soften shadows cast on the ground. This is particularly noticeable in the Kanoya photograph. The "undercarriage", while elaborate for the SALLY and SONIA types, even including wooden wheels, consists generally of simple posts. Sometimes gasoline drums are used as supports, in much the same manner as they are beneath wrecked aircraft used as decoys.

(The following photographs appear at this point in the Exhibit:

1. Aerial photograph of Kanoya airfield.
2. Aerial photograph of Kikuchi airfield, Kyushu.
3. Aerial photograph of a Japanese airfield showing camouflaged dummy planes.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 265, 266, and 267, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Three rendered sketches have been prepared from these Japanese drawings. Conventional shadows have been cast in an effort to show how these dummies would appear from the air. Gasoline drums have been drawn into each sketch to give scale. The shapes of the "aircraft" are true to the types imitated, but dummies seen to date have fallen far short of the shapes intended in the drawings.

Certain observations are pertinent. Though dummies to date have been flimsy,

are not faithful copies of the drawings, do not cast strong shadows and disintegrate under gunfire, they nevertheless look enough like the real thing from altitude under combat conditions. When covered with camouflage netting they are particularly hard to distinguish from operational aircraft. A recent report based on reconnaissance for mid-May (Report No. 659, InterpRon Two of 28 May 1945) shows that a total of 139 dummies are present on ten fields in Kyushu and Honshu, not including the large number shown in the Kanoya photograph. While these aircraft may be easy to distinguish on a photograph with a high power glass, they present a difficult spotting problem to pilots under combat conditions. For that reason, effort will be made in the future to publish any information on the subject which may be helpful in exposing to air personnel the Japanese use of dummy aircraft.

At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Sketch of dummy Japanese plane, a "Sally."
2. Two sketches of dummy Japanese planes, a "Nate" and a "Sally."
3. Sketches showing captured drawings for construction of "Sally" dummies.
4. Sketches showing captured drawings for construction of "Nate" and "Sonia" dummies.
5. TAIC model photos of a "Baka," primarily a Japanese glider and secondarily a powered plane, being released from a Japanese "Betty" and of a "Baka" in flight.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 268 through 272, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### FURTHER ANALYSIS OF BAKA'S PERFORMANCE

Detailed analysis by TAIC of the aerodynamic characteristics of BAKA has led to a revision of the theoretical range, speed and glide angle estimates. BAKA is primarily a glider and *secondarily* a powered plane. The rockets greatly increase its speed for a short time, but cause only a slight range increase over its maximum glide range. Maximum horizontal range when released at 27,000 feet is 55 miles. Fifty-two of these miles would be travelled at a glide speed of 229 mph and at a glide angle of 5°35'; during the other three miles, the use of rockets would accelerate the speed to 535 mph in level flight. At a 50° or greater diving angle, maximum speed would be 618 mph. Whether the rockets were used at the beginning or the end of the run, or, whether they were used to climb would not appreciably affect the maximum range.

Against ships protected by heavy armor, presumably the rockets would be used at the end of the run in a torpedo approach, the pilot attempting to score a hit close to the water line. If launched from a distance, however, BAKA would be vulnerable to attack by fighters before reaching a position to complete effectively its own attack. Lacking maneuverability, BAKA could take but little evasive action in its unpowered glide and its only method of escape would be to fire one or more of its rockets. In this event, the increased velocity secured from the rocket would dissipate before BAKA could reach its target and its final terminal velocity would be substantially decreased.

Destruction of the parent aircraft is *extremely important* inasmuch as special fuselage modifications are necessary, and the available supply of adaptable parent aircraft controls the number of BAKAs that can be launched.

The accompanying range graph can be used to ascertain the estimated theoretical range of BAKA when launched from any determined altitude. It is not believed practical that release of BAKA will be made at altitudes in excess of 20,000 feet, so that the maximum practical range remains approximately 35 miles.

(A graph showing an estimation of the range of "Baka" will be found reproduced as Item No. 273, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

### AIRFIELD DAMAGE REPAIR

Extensive damage inflicted upon Japanese airfields by U. S. bombers has led the enemy to issue special orders for the repair and camouflage of the damage. In addition, signals have been arranged to indicate to returning enemy pilots which of the damaged portions have actually been repaired and which have been merely camouflaged.

A Staff Order of the Fourth Air Division, dated 8 September 1944 and recently captured on Okinawa (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item B-17564-F) states that every effort must be made to repair bomb damage but, if it cannot be repaired before morning, it should be camouflaged. An accompanying diagram, reproduced below, illustrates the use of signal panels to indicate camouflaged damage and the location of repaired portions of a typical strip.

A complete translation of the document follows:

"1. All bomb damage to runways by air raids should be repaired if at all possible, overnight.

"2. When the above is impossible, at least a part of the runway should be repaired by the next morning and made serviceable.

"3. Unrepaired bomb damage on runways should be camouflaged by dawn, using camouflage nets and other available materials. Camouflage should convince enemy aerial reconnaissance that the previous day's damage has been completely repaired. Speedy repair should then be undertaken. However, damage repair should not be delayed for purposes of camouflage.

"4. Partial repair described in Item 2 and 3 above should be marked off according to the attached diagram. Red signal panels are placed next to camouflaged bomb damage and facing the repaired runway area. Panels are placed so that the sides of one will be parallel to those of the others."

(A diagram illustrating the use of signal panels to indicate camouflaged damage and the location of repaired portions of a typical strip, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 274, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

### OXYGEN GENERATING APPARATUS

The oxygen generating apparatus now used in FRANK, NICK and other Japanese Army aircraft delivers an unusually large amount of oxygen for its low weight and will not explode if struck by shrapnel or bullets. In these respects it is much superior to conventional oxygen storage installations.

An examination of the equipment discloses that its main components are three generator tubes with individual filter attachments, the enclosing container and the immediate tubing and the necessary electrical connections.

The generator tube is of thin sheet iron or steel construction, plated with rust-proof metal, with soldered side and end plate seams. A socket and suitable electrical contact is provided at its lower end, while the smaller but similarly constructed filter cylinder is soldered in its insert recess at the opposite end. Overall dimensions are: generator length 1 foot 6 $\frac{1}{2}$  inches; overall length including filter 2 feet 3 $\frac{3}{4}$  inches; generator diameter 3 $\frac{1}{2}$  inches; filter diameter 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  inches.

The oxygen-producing material is a mixture of potassium chlorate ( $\text{KClO}_3$ ), iron, iron oxide and asbestos fiber. The action of the generator is initiated by an electric current heating a chrome-iron resistance wire, about which is wrapped a paper fuze. The fuze in turn ignites a fuze train which finally ignites the main compound. The mixture of constituents in contact with the fuze is richer in iron and iron oxide than is the remainder of the compound. Oxygen is produced by the heat-decomposition of the  $\text{KClO}_3$ . The iron oxide is a catalyst which allows the reaction to occur at a lower temperature, and the iron metal may act both as a heat source in reaction with the oxygen produced and as a catalyst.

(A front view of an oxygen generating apparatus with one cylinder missing will be found reproduced as Item No. 275, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The enclosing container for the generator components is constructed of what seems to be aluminum alloy. The components of the case (back panel, doors and base) are apparently formed by a die-stamping process. At the time of the stamping, cooling perforations of about  $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch diameter are formed, spaced

at about 1½ inches between centers. Overall dimensions are: length 1 foot 8¾ inches; width 1 foot ¼ inch; depth 5¼ inches. Assembly consists of a back panel to which is riveted a base or socket holding section.

Two outward-swinging doors are hinged on each side of the back plate above the base, and are fitted with two bar-and-lever type latches. Other constructional details may be ascertained from photographs. An instruction plate with wiring and tubing diagram is secured to the front of the base.

The gross weight of the equipment (three generator-filter tubes, the container, and part of the tubing) is 25 pounds 4½ ounces. Each tube has a duration of 75 minutes, according to the attached nameplate. No volumetric computations have yet been made but it is believed that the generator delivers ample oxygen for any altitude the airplane may operate. An idea of duration per unit weight may be gained from the results of the quotient of time of delivery over weight, which shows that the equipment delivers 8.95 minutes of O<sub>2</sub> per pound of apparatus. Two disadvantages of the unit are that the generator reaction, once started, cannot be stopped. This, in turn, often necessitates by-passing a large amount of oxygen at lower altitudes. The long duration of oxygen production is apparently intended to counteract this.

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear two views on a plate captioned "Shades of Darius Green," including:

1. View of an oxygen generating apparatus.
2. View of a Japanese aircraft, a photograph of which was capture on Okinawa.

The foregoing will be found reproduced as Item No. 276, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### JAPANESE ELECTRIC TORPEDO

A Japanese electric "wakeless" torpedo, with a possible range greater than any other electrically-driven type known, has been recovered on Saipan.

Only incomplete information is available on the weapon, designated as Type 92, Mod. 1. On the example recovered and examined by MEIU No. 4, the warhead was missing and numerous parts which would have given additional indications of the torpedo's operation and capabilities had been removed, possibly by souvenir hunters.

(A photograph of a Type 92, Model I Japanese Torpedo will be found reproduced as Item No. 277, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The range dial on the weapon is calibrated from 0 to 14000. Although the unit of measurement is not given, it is presumed to be meters, inasmuch as that unit of measurement has always been used by the Japanese to indicate range. If that is the case on this weapon, the maximum setting would give the torpedo a range almost twice as great as any other electric torpedo extant. This maximum range can probably be achieved only at a much reduced speed, however. At the estimated maximum speed of 28 knots, it is believed the torpedo would have an effective range of approximately 3000 yards.

The weapon is apparently modeled after the German G7E electric torpedo. Without the warhead, it is 19 feet, 1¾ inches long, and 21 inches in diameter. It has two batteries of 52 cells each and each cell has a voltage of 2.05. The batteries are 62 inches long, 14¾ inches wide, and 10 inches high. The motor is driven by direct current. Twin propellers, turning in opposite directions stabilize the torpedo during its run. Four tail vanes with horizontal and vertical rudders are mounted on the trailing end. No information is available on the type of warhead or explosive device used, or on the type of submarine capable of carrying the torpedo. As far as is known, the torpedo has not yet been used in combat by the Japanese.

(A photograph showing two views of a Japanese torpedo, one being of the tail and after body, and the other of the interior of the battery compartment will be found reproduced as Item No. 278, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## VARIATION IN SCS

(Various views of the Japanese Type E Model Vessel referred to as "Sugar Charlie Sugar" and mentioned *infra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 279, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Photographs above are among the first received showing details of the standard economy Type E (mod) Sugar Charlie Sugar with foremast centered on the foredeck and a thin mainmast on the afterdeck. Shown below is a recent good photograph of the Type E (mod) with masts at forecastle and bridge. The two mast arrangements constitute the major variations found on this economy type. In other respects details of the two ships illustrated are very similar but among minor variations which may be observed in the future are placement of lifeboats and size of stack.

The foremast-centered variation of SCS can be distinguished from the larger (2300-ton) three-hatch Sugar Charlie Love by the position of the foremast with respect to hatches. At most, a mast can serve two hatches. If centered, it can serve the entire foredeck, which can have but two hatches—as on a Sugar Charlie Sugar. If the mast is forward of center it can serve only a part of the foredeck and a third hatch must be present—as on a Sugar Charlie Love. (See opposite page.)

(The following photographs appear at this point in the Exhibit:

1. View of a Japanese vessel referred to as "Sugar Charlie Sugar" with foremast at forecastle.
2. Photographs of two types of Japanese cargo vessels referred to as "Sugar Charlie Love" and "Fox Tare Dog."

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 280 and 281, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## I-24, MIDGET SUB CARRIER

The sketch below, reproduced from a drawing by a prisoner who served aboard the Japanese submarine I-24, illustrates how a midget submarine was transported to Pearl Harbor for the sneak attack of 7 December 1941. Other midgets were transported similarly for attacks on Sidney, Australia, and in the Solomons area. In the two years the POW was aboard, from April 1941 to May 1943, seven midget submarines were launched from the I-24. The prisoner's disclosures are contained in ONI Digest of Information from Prisoner of War Sources.

The smaller craft was carried on the main deck abaft the conning tower and was secured to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps, the POW said. One of the clamps was released from within the midget, the rest from within the mother sub. No unusual difficulty was experienced in maintaining trim when diving with the small craft aboard.

Due to the limited range of the small subs, return to the "mother" ship was not planned, and was not accomplished in any of the seven instances. Crews of the midgets were expected to scuttle their boats after accomplishing their missions, and save themselves if possible.

(A sketch showing a Japanese submarine I-24 carrying a midget submarine will be found reproduced as Item No. 282, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## CAMOUFLAGE VS PHOTO INTERPRETATION ON IWO JIMA

Pre-invasion photo interpretation of installations on Iwo Jima compared favorably with later ground studies of the island in areas where vegetation was sparse. In wooded areas, among pandanus trees and in heavy scrub growth, installations frequently were impossible to see and many which were not sheltered by natural growth were so well camouflaged it was impossible to determine whether an object was a military installation or a natural ground formation.

Along the barren beaches of the southern isthmus, interpretation of aerial photographs was comparatively easy, although dummy positions, revealed after-

ward by ground study, were so well constructed they were difficult to distinguish from the authentic.

Near the airfields, 500 to 800 yards from the beaches, blockhouses, covered artillery and large pillboxes, were observed and correctly interrupted. Smaller pillboxes and mortar emplacement, often as effective against our forces as the larger installations, could not be observed in photographs. Even on the ground frequently they could not be spotted from more than 15 yards' distance. Many of the smaller pillboxes used an effective camouflage of wire netting covered with brush over the fire lanes.

Interpretation of antiaircraft defense was more than 95 per cent accurate even though all these positions were well camouflaged. One of the few errors was the classification of a six-gun heavy AA battery, as automatic AA. The average diameter of revetments for this heavy gun battery was slightly less than 16 feet. The revetment of a nearby twin-mount automatic AA battery was slightly more than 15 feet. Nets and brush across the revetments obscured characteristics so that positive identification of either battery was impossible.

Approximately 30 percent of the casemated coast artillery and field artillery positions were observed in aerial photographs before heavy gunfire blasted away

(At this point in the Exhibit two items appear, as follows:

1. Photograph showing Japanese camouflage of a pillbox and a spigot mortar position.
2. Five views showing various types of Japanese camouflage technique.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 283 and 284, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

vegetation concealing other positions which allowed for a greater percentage of correct interpretation. Natural vegetation was used extensively on all positions. Camouflage discipline as evaluated from photographs was excellent during construction of positions. Materials used for covering blended into the surrounding terrain and vegetation, while earth from excavations was planted with grass to obliterate traces of military activity. Heavy coast defense guns and field artillery were well concealed under trees.

Emplacements for machine guns and 150-mm mortars have similar characteristics. Consequently, a few of the latter were interpreted as machine gun positions. Small mortar or rocket emplacements were unobserved in photographs.

CINCPAC-CINPOA Bulletin No. 136-45, concerning a ground study of the defense installations of Iwo Jima, points out the limitations of excellent vertical photographs. The two maps enclosed with this issue of "Weekly Intelligence" show (1) a plot of defense installations on Iwo as determined from photo interpretation on D-15, and (2) positions plotted from a ground study of the island.

A review of aerial photographs, supplemented by a ground study knowledge of the island, disclosed most of the larger installations, such as the CD guns at the East Boat Basin. These casemates were discovered by comparing changes in the ground noted in successive sorties dated from 15 June 1944 to 4 February 1945, listed in Supplement to Defense Installations of Iwo Jima, CINCPAC-CINPOA Bulletin No. 137-45.

Despite excellent camouflage and camouflage discipline, stereo pairs revealed the height of the concrete position in which the CD gun was emplaced. The photographs taught photo interpreters not to rely solely on the best sortie of a strategic area, but to study thoroughly all differences in terrain as revealed at different dates. It is of utmost importance that aerial photographs of strategic areas be obtained at an early date and at frequent intervals thereafter for comparative studies. Low stereo obliques of beach areas were excellent in uncovering camouflaged beach positions.

Operational maps, including contours and terrain features, were made from aerial photographs where there were discrepancies occasioned by absence of ground control. The extremely rugged terrain was not portrayed on the contours of the situation map. Depth of draws and ravines was hidden by tall trees, and stereo comparagraphs could not determine heights beneath this vegetation. This resulted in little more than a general picture of the terrain for unit commanders. These limitations serve to point out the need for vectographs or some type of three-dimensional picture covering the area assigned to each tactical commander.

(At this point in the Exhibit two photographs appear, as follows:

1. Photograph showing Casemated CD Guns over East Boat Basin, Iwo Jima.
2. Photograph showing U. S. Marines blowing up a cave harboring Japanese snipers on Okinawa.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 285 and 286, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[33]

#### OKINAWA DEFENSE DOCTRINE

The situation facing U. S. troops poised for assault against Okinawa appeared to be a formidable one. From seven to eight possible centers of resistance were believed disposed within the immediate area of the proposed zone of action. Photographs revealed prepared defenses around Katchin Hanto on the east side of the island sufficient to indicate a regimental position.

But an agreeable surprise was in store for us. By the evening of the initial landing day our forces were approximately two days ahead of schedule. Fortifications overlooking the Hagushi beaches had been abandoned. Yontan airfield, reputed to be one of the best in the Pacific, had been left practically intact. Antiaircraft emplacements either had dummy guns or were empty. In a sense, the enemy handed U. S. troops their primary objective on a silver platter.

This new "tactical reasoning" on the part of the Japanese could not be explained immediately. However, a recent report from the III Phil Corps clarifies the enemy's failure to oppose our landing.

In previous operations, it is pointed out, the enemy defended his important beach areas and airfields with the utmost tenacity, withdrawing to a final defensive line only when he was driven from his forward positions. On Okinawa the Japanese were forced to deviate from such a course because they had insufficient troops available for defense of the island. Consequently, the enemy chose the more important military installations to defend, leaving the others to be destroyed by his retreating forces.

"It is definitely known," the report asserts, "that the Japanese high command issued orders to the forces in the Yontan-Katena area to destroy the airfields should we initiate a landing in that sector. The force was then to join the 62nd Division for a defense of southern Okinawa.

"This indicates that the enemy did not intend to make a concerted stand in the Yontan-Katena area. Instead, he chose the narrow approaches to southern Okinawa where he could concentrate all his defenses in depth and employ the minimum force necessary to halt a further advance. The extensive network of dummy and unoccupied positions in the area further substantiates such plans."

A captured document sheds additional light on the Japanese tactical plan for the defense of other islands in the Nansei Shoto. The document refers to the "Okinawan Type of Defense" as the plan to be followed.

"From an analysis of this document," the report points out, "it would appear that the so called 'Okinawan Type of Defense' is a definite tactical plan or scheme of defense approved by the Japanese High Command. Its primary purpose is the conservation of manpower. Important beach areas and even airfields are temporarily abandoned while the main defense line is held in force.

"This main defense line is organized in depth and makes maximum use of terrain consistent with the size of the force and frontage to be held. It is so designed to enable the defenders to fight a long 'war of attrition', denying the invader use of [34] captured installations."

The enemy's appreciation of terrain and tactical use of weapons on Okinawa was excellent, the report states. First line defenses were prepared on forward slopes where automatic weapons were emplaced. Flat trajectory fire was utilized to its maximum extent. During bombardment the Japanese moved back to prepared defenses on the reverse slope, reoccupying forward positions when the bombardment lifted.

When forced from forward positions, the enemy withdrew to the crest of ridges, from which plunging fire was delivered on advancing troops. Once dislodged from the ridges, he continued his defense in fortified positions on reverse slopes.



Other Japanese tactics, it is pointed out, differed little from those encountered on previous operations. They included night infiltrations, raiding parties, wire cutting and miscellaneous harassing actions.

"The term 'organization' is complimentary to enemy units encountered by the III Corps," the report states. "Miscellaneous air and ground units were thrown together in last-minute confusion and in practically no instance did they carry out the duties assigned them. The lone exception to this was the organized resistance on Motobu Peninsula."

According to the report, Japanese equipment was lacking in quantity. This is substantiated by a 32nd Army order of 23 March 1945 to the 1st Special Infantry Regiment which read: "In view of the limited amount of equipment available, each unit will utilize what it already possesses and devise methods to increase its supply of equipment."

Consistent with the order were various POW statements referring to bamboo spears and hand grenades as the only weapons issued many of the labor troops. These poorly equipped labor units, according to POWs, were nicknamed the Bimbo Butai, or "Poor Unit."

The Japanese made extensive use of Okinawa natives in various branches of the service, and it is assumed that all able-bodied Okinawans were subject to service as reservists.

A captured dispatch dated September 1944, written by the commanding officer of the 24th Division, states: "Reservists can be employed as army troops and with their main strength carry on diversionary (raiding) warfare. They also can be employed to work in rear areas as replacements for front line troops, or in such duties as collecting intelligence, security, guarding and liaison. Care should be taken that the execution of these (training) plans will not seriously interfere with making a livelihood. Such things as arms and uniforms are not specially provided Guard Units (reservists). Therefore, the commanders will use available equipment."

(Two sketches made from a document captured on Okinawa, revealing the organization of "fire points" will be found reproduced as Item No. 287, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### [36] ENEMY CRITICISMS OF OWN ARTILLERY MANEUVERS

Weakness in their own artillery training were described in a Japanese critique of maneuvers held on Iwo Jima before the Allied landings. Details were set forth in a document captured on the island and translated as CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 4569.

Colonel Kaido, who commanded the island's artillery group which was made up of several units of various organizations, presided at the critique, and outlined shortcomings in training as revealed in the maneuvers.

Principal criticism was directed at gun crews who were satisfied to drop shells or barrages merely in an enemy area, and did not score direct hits on the target. Crews were warned that the ammunition supply for the defense of the island was small and there was little hope for replenishment; therefore, they must perfect their work so that they hit every target.

Faulty firing preparations were responsible for their inability to hit desired targets, the critique stated. In many cases calculation of firing data was incorrect and corrections were inaccurate, obstructions to aiming instruments were not cleared away, sighting and aligning points were improperly chosen, and guns which should have fired in battery frequently missed the signal and fired singly. Furthermore, mortar base plates were not firmly embedded, it was said.

Another weakness mentioned in the document was the poor discipline shown officers and men alike during maneuvers. Incidents were brought to light in which gun crews received orders from battery commanders and then acted independently in carrying them out. Liaison suffered because subordinates refused to obey orders from superiors, and many of the officers "lacked spiritual power and bravery, and were unsatisfactory in dress, physical bearing and command."

Several gun squad leaders were unsatisfactory, failing to exhibit proper leadership. Others were said to have stood around their guns like spectators while firing was in progress.

In other instances, squad leaders made errors in firing because they had failed to establish liaison with the platoon commanders. Some squad leaders failed completely to give firing orders, did not understand the method of handling the

gun or how to change from direct to indirect sighting, nor could they direct the fire of the gun or properly designate targets to be brought under fire.

In the Japanese Army, a noncommissioned officer in charge of artillery observation has many duties. Primarily, he must be able to take over the duties of the fire control platoon commander, or even the company commander. He must reconnoiter the enemy situation, calculate some of the firing data, and spot artillery bursts.

Personnel performing this function during the Iwo maneuvers lacked experience and most of them were unaware of their duties. Observation suffered. During actual firing of problems, reports were sent in from observers concerning enemy targets and spotting of bursts without any previous check by noncoms in charge.

[37] Signal NCOs received their share of blame in the critique: "Most of them just stood around as onlookers, leaving liaison to subordinates. They were inexperienced, deficient in their sense of responsibilities, and did not understand their duties."

If a hitch occurs in Japanese artillery liaison, it is the duty of the Signal NCO to go to the scene and take charge. In event of a complete breakdown, he must re-establish contact by previously-arranged methods.

Attached NCOs without specific duties must be given work such as forwarding reports and acting as messengers. They should not, says the report, be allowed just to "sit around putting logs on the fire."

Apparently platoon leaders spent considerable time in dugouts receiving orders from company commanders by telephone or messenger and transmitting the orders to subordinates in a like manner. It was noted that too many of them failed to acquaint themselves with the targets, reconnoiter objectives and determine methods of fire. They delegated these responsibilities to the noncoms. They lacked knowledge of the various duties of the NCOs and many of them knew little of the equipment they were using.

Additional drill on command and technique of fire, was threatened for those officers who "do not call out the sensing of bursts, who deliberate over what to call the sensing, who issue commands slowly, make mistakes in commands, bury themselves in handbooks and firing tables, or busy themselves looking through telescopes".

(A photograph of an open site for a Type I 47 mm. Antitank Gun recovered on Iwo Jima will be found reproduced as Item No. 288, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[38]

#### WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT

*Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 25 May 1945 to and including 1 June 1945*

Sorties herein listed will be screened for duplicating coverage before distribution is affected.

\*Prints only received.

#### JAPAN

*Oto Beto:* Good vertical and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated

| V/O          | F. L.                               | Alt.    | Sortie No.                                                              | Jicpoa #                      | Date taken |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|
| Tri Met..... | 153.1 mm.<br>153.7 mm.<br>154.5 mm. | 26,700' | Terrain Shoreline<br>1PRS-5MF48-1TV<br>1PRS-5MF48-1RO<br>1PRS-5MF48-1LO | 17806-4<br>17807-4<br>17808-4 | 5/27       |
| Tri Met..... | 153.1 mm.<br>153.7 mm.<br>154.5 mm. | 25,000' | Fukue<br>1PRS-5MF51-TV<br>1PRS-5MF51-RO<br>1PRS-5MF51-LO                | 17809-5<br>17810-5<br>17811-5 | 4/1        |
| V.....       | 24"                                 | 25,000' | 1PRS-5MF51-IV                                                           | 17852-6                       | 4/1        |

## 1164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## JAPAN—Continued

Honshu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

| V/O        | F. L.     | Alt.    | Sortie No.                  | Jicpoa #  | Date taken |
|------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------------|-----------|------------|
|            |           |         | Nagoya                      |           |            |
| Tri Met    | 154.2 mm. | 31,000' | 3PR-5M216-1V-21BC           | 17473-809 | 5/17       |
|            | 152.0 mm. |         | 3PR-5M216-1R-21BC           | 17474-809 |            |
|            | 152.0 mm. |         | 3PR-5M216-1L-21BC           | 17475-809 |            |
| V          | 24"       | 31,000' | 3PR-5M216-2-21BC            | 17476-810 | 5/17       |
| Split Vert | 40"       | 31,000' | 3PR-5M216-3R-21BC           | 17477-811 | 5/17       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M216-3L-21BC           | 17478-811 |            |
|            |           |         | Shoda Shima; Osaka          |           |            |
| Tri Met    | 154.3 mm. | 32,000' | 3PR-5M217-1V-21BC           | 17479-812 | 5/17       |
|            | 152.7 mm. |         | 3PR-5M217-1R-21BC           | 17480-812 |            |
|            | 153.1 mm. |         | 3PR-5M217-1L-21BC           | 17481-812 |            |
| V          | 24"       | 32,000' | Kobe; Osaka                 |           |            |
| Split Vert | 40"       | 32,000' | 3PR-5M217-2-21BC            | 17482-813 | 5/17       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M217-3R-21-BC          | 17483-814 | 5/17       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M217-3L-21BC           | 17484-814 |            |
|            |           |         | Numazu; Tokyo               |           |            |
| Tri Met    | 154.2 mm. | 32,000' | 3PR-5M219-1V-21BC           | 17503-815 | 5/17       |
|            | 153.1 mm. |         | 3PR-5M219-1R-21BC           | 17504-815 |            |
|            | 154.6 mm. |         | 3PR-5M219-1L-21BC           | 17505-815 |            |
| V          | 24"       | 32,000' | 3PR-5M219-2-21BC            | 17506-816 | 5/17       |
|            |           |         | Kushimoto Tomo              |           |            |
| Tri Met    | 152.3 mm. | 31,000' | 3PR-5M220-1V-21BC           | 17507-817 | 5/17       |
|            | 152.6 mm. |         | 3PR-5M220-1R-21BC           | 17508-817 |            |
|            | 153.1 mm. |         | 3PR-5M220-1L-21BC           | 17509-817 |            |
| V          | 24"       | 31,000' | 3PR-5M220-2-21BC            | 17510-818 | 5/17       |
| Split Vert | 40"       | 31,000' | 3PR-5M220-3R-21BC           | 17511-819 | 5/17       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M220-3L-21BC           | 17512-819 |            |
|            |           |         | Yokkaichi; Nagoya           |           |            |
| Tri Met    | 151.9 mm. | 31,600' | 3PR-5M223-1V-21BC           | 17532-826 | 5/18       |
|            | 153.7 mm. |         | 3PR-5M223-1R-21BC           | 17533-826 |            |
|            | 154.0 mm. |         | 3PR-5M223-1L-21BC           | 17534-826 |            |
| V          | 24"       | 31,600' | Yokuska; Nagoya             |           |            |
| Split Vert | 40"       | 31,600' | 3PR-5M223-2-21BC            | 17535-827 | 5/18       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M223-3R-21BC           | 17536-828 | 5/18       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M223-3L-21BC           | 17537-828 |            |
|            |           |         | Hiratsuka; Chigasaki        |           |            |
| Tri Met    | 153.0 mm. | 32,500' | 3PR-5M221-1V-21BC           | 17513-820 | 5/18       |
|            | 153.9 mm. |         | 3PR-5M221-1R-21BC           | 17514-820 |            |
|            | 153.0 mm. |         | 3PR-5M221-1L-21BC           | 17515-820 |            |
| V          | 24"       | 32,500' | 3PR-5M221-2-21BC            | 17516-821 | 5/18       |
| Split Vert | 40"       | 32,500' | 3PR-5M221-3R-21BC           | 17517-822 | 5/18       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M221-3L-21BC           | 17518-822 |            |
|            |           |         | Kuwana; Nagoya              |           |            |
| Tri Met    | 153.0 mm. | 30,000' | 3PR-5M222-1V-21BC           | 17519-823 | 5/18       |
|            | 154.8 mm. |         | 3PR-5M222-1R-21BC           | 17520-823 |            |
|            | 153.6 mm. |         | 3PR-5M222-1L-21BC           | 17521-823 |            |
| V          | 24"       | 30,000' | 3PR-5M222-3-21BC            | 17522-824 | 5/18       |
| Split Vert | 40"       | 30,000' | 3PR-5M222-3R-21BC           | 17523-825 | 5/18       |
|            |           |         | 3PR-5M222-3L-21BC           | 17524-825 |            |
|            |           |         | Hitachi                     |           |            |
| V          | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M96-76V-21BC               | 17663-829 | 4/2        |
| V          | 24"       | 12,000' | 5M96-78V-21BC               | 17664-830 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 11,500' | 5M96-51V-21BC (Shisuoka)    | 17666-832 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 11,330' | 5M96-27V-21BC (Hitachi A/C) | 17667-833 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 12,100' | 5M96-26V-21BC (Shisuoka)    | 17668-834 | 4/2        |
|            |           |         | Hitachi (A/C)               |           |            |
| V          | 12"       | 10,900' | 5M96-1V-21BC                | 17669-835 | 4/2        |
| V          | 24"       | 10,500' | 5M96-2V-21BC                | 17670-836 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 10,500' | 5M96-4V-21BC                | 17671-837 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 12,500' | 5M96-201V-21BC              | 17672-838 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 12,500' | 5M96-202V-21BC              | 17673-839 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,000' | 5M96-203V-21BC              | 17674-840 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M96-204V-21BC              | 17675-841 | 4/2        |
| V          | 6"        | 11,500' | 5M96-28V-21BC               | 17676-842 | 4/2        |
| V          | 24"       | 14,000' | 5M96-101V-21BC              | 17677-843 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 14,000' | 5M96-104V-21BC              | 17679-845 | 4/2        |
| V          | 24"       | 13,500' | 5M96-105V-21BC              | 17680-846 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-106V-21BC              | 17681-847 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-108V-21BC              | 17689-849 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-112V-21BC              | 17690-850 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-113V-21BC              | 17691-851 | 4/2        |
| V          | 6"        | 13,500' | 5M96-114V-21BC              | 17692-852 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-117V-21BC              | 17694-854 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 14,000' | 5M96-119V-21BC              | 17695-855 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,450' | 5M96-120V-21BC              | 17696-856 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-214V-21BC              | 17697-857 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-213V-21BC              | 17698-858 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,300' | 5M96-212V-21BC              | 17699-859 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,000' | 5M96-211V-21BC              | 17700-860 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,500' | 5M96-210V-21BC              | 17701-861 | 4/2        |
| V          | 12"       | 13,400' | 5M96-208V-21BC              | 17702-862 | 4/2        |

## JAPAN—Continued

Honsha: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated—Continued

| V/O | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.                  | Jicpoa #  | Date taken |
|-----|-------|---------|-----------------------------|-----------|------------|
|     |       |         | Hitachi (A/C)               |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 13,000' | 5M96-207V-21BC              | 17703-863 | 4/24       |
| V   | 12"   | 13,000' | 5M96-206V-21BC              | 17704-864 | 4/24       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,300' | 5M96-205V-21BC              | 17705-865 | 4/24       |
|     |       |         | A/C Prop. Plant             |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 22,000' | 5M126-110V-21BC             | 17920-866 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 22,000' | 5M126-111V-21BC             | 17921-867 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 22,000' | 5M126-112V-21BC (Toyabaski) | 17922-868 | 4/30       |
|     |       |         | A/C Prop. Plant             |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 21,000' | 5M126-113V-21BC             | 17923-869 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 21,000' | 5M126-114V-21BC             | 17924-870 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 21,000' | 5M126-116V-21BC             | 17925-871 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 21,000' | 5M126-115V-21BC             | 17926-872 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 21,000' | 5M126-118V-21BC (Hanamatsu) | 17927-873 | 5/1        |
|     |       |         | A/C Prop. Plant             |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 21,000' | 5M126-117V-21BC             | 17928-874 | 4/30       |
|     |       |         | Tachikawa                   |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 20,000' | 5M126-101V-21BC             | 17929-875 | 4/30       |
| V   | 6"    | 20,000' | 5M126-102V-21BC             | 17930-876 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 20,000' | 5M126-103V-21BC             | 17931-877 | 4/30       |
|     |       |         | A/C Prop. Plant             |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 21,000' | 5M126-104V-21BC             | 17932-878 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 21,000' | 5M126-105V-21BC             | 17933-879 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 21,000' | 5M126-107V-21BC             | 17934-880 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 22,000' | 5M126-108V-21BC             | 17935-881 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 22,000' | 5M126-109V-21BC             | 17936-882 | 4/30       |
|     |       |         | Hamamatsu                   |           |            |
| V   | 24"   | 19,700' | 5M126-51V-21BC              | 17938-884 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 20,600' | 5M126-26V-21BC              | 17940-886 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 20,600' | 5M126-27V-21BC              | 17941-887 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 19,000' | 5M126-1V-21BC               | 17942-888 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 19,000' | 5M126-2V-21BC               | 17943-889 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 18,200' | 5M126-80V-21BC              | 17945-891 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,500' | 5M126-81V-21BC              | 17946-892 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 18,000' | 5M126-82V-21BC              | 17947-893 | 4/30       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,500' | 5M126-79V-21BC              | 17948-894 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 18,300' | 5M126-76V-21BC              | 17949-895 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 18,050' | 5M126-78V-21BC              | 17950-896 | 4/30       |
| V   | 24"   | 18,200' | 5M126-77V-21BC              | 17951-897 | 4/30       |

Isu Shichito: Good vertical and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

|            |          |         |                                                      |          |      |
|------------|----------|---------|------------------------------------------------------|----------|------|
| TV         | 153.0 mm | 32,500' | Torishima<br>3PR-5M221-1V-21BC                       | 17528-20 | 5/18 |
| V          | 24"      | 32,500' | O-Shima; Sumisu-Jima<br>3PR-5M221-2-21BC             | 17529-21 | 5/18 |
| Split Vert | 40"      | 32,500' | Sumisu-Jima; Torishima; O-Shima<br>3PR-5M221-3R-21BC | 17530-22 | 5/18 |
|            |          |         | 3PR-5M221-3L-21BC                                    | 17531-22 |      |

Koshiki Retto: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

|   |          |         |              |          |      |
|---|----------|---------|--------------|----------|------|
| V | 24"      | 20,000' | VD5-149A     | 17602-1  | 5/13 |
| V | 24"      | 20,000' | VD5-149B (1) | 17603-2A | 5/13 |
| V | 24"      | 20,000' | VD5-149B (2) | 17603-2B | 5/13 |
| V | 153.3 mm | 20,000' | VD5-149D     | 17604-3  | 5/13 |
| O | 24"      | 20,000' | VD5-149E     | 17605-4  | 5/13 |

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

|            |          |         |                            |           |      |
|------------|----------|---------|----------------------------|-----------|------|
| Tri        | 152.3 mm | 31,000' | Jaeki<br>3PR-5M220-1V-21BC | 17497-499 | 5/17 |
| Met        | 152.6 mm |         | 3PR-5M220-1R-21BC          | 17498-499 |      |
|            | 153.1 mm |         | 3PR-5M220-1L-21BC          | 17499-499 |      |
| V          | 24"      | 31,000' | 3PR-5M220-2-21BC           | 17500-500 | 5/17 |
| Split Vert | 40"      | 31,000' | 3PR-5M220-3R-21BC          | 17501-501 | 5/17 |
|            |          |         | 3PR-5M220-3L-21BC          | 17502-501 |      |
|            |          |         | Kokubu A/F                 |           |      |
| V          | 12"      | 16,000' | 5M80-21BC-101V             | 17538-502 | 4/18 |
| V          | 12"      | 16,000' | 5M80-21BC-102V             | 17539-503 | 4/18 |
| V          | 12"      | 16,000' | 5M80-21BC-103V             | 17540-504 | 4/18 |
| V          | 24"      | 16,500' | 5M80-21BC-104V             | 17541-505 | 4/18 |
| V          | 12"      | 17,000' | 5M80-21BC-105V             | 17542-506 | 4/18 |
| V          | 24"      | 16,000' | 5M80-21BC-106V             | 17543-507 | 4/18 |
| V          | 24"      | 16,000' | 5M80-21BC-108V             | 17545-509 | 4/18 |
| V          | 24"      | 16,000' | 5M80-21BC-109V             | 17546-510 | 4/18 |



## 1166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## JAPAN—Continued

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated—Continued

| V/O  | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.                | Jicopa #  | Date taken |
|------|-------|---------|---------------------------|-----------|------------|
| [59] |       |         | Nittagabara A/F           |           |            |
| V    | 24"   | 18,000' | 5M81-21BC-207V            | 17547-511 | 4/18       |
| V    | 12"   | 18,000' | 5M81-21BC-206V            | 17548-512 | 4/18       |
| V    | 12"   | 18,000' | 5M81-21BC-205V            | 17549-513 | 4/18       |
| V    | 24"   | 18,000' | 5M81-21BC-204V            | 17550-514 | 4/18       |
| V    | 24"   | 18,000' | 5M81-21BC-203V            | 17551-515 | 4/18       |
| V    | 12"   | 18,000' | 5M81-21BC-202V            | 17552-516 | 4/18       |
| V    |       |         | 5M81-21BC-201V            | 17553-517 | 4/18       |
|      |       |         | Oita                      |           |            |
| V    | 24"   | 15,500' | 5M82-77V-21BC             | 17554-518 | 4/20       |
| V    | 24"   | 15,500' | 5M82-76V-21BC             | 17555-519 | 4/20       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,275' | 5M82-78V-21BC             | 17556-520 | 4/20       |
| V    | 12"   | 14,200' | 5M82-54V-21BC             | 17557-521 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 14,490' | 5M82-53V-21BC             | 17558-522 | 4/21       |
| V    |       |         | 5M82-52V-21BC             | 17559-523 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 14,300' | 5M82-51V-21BC             | 17560-524 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,000' | 5M82-79V-21BC             | 17561-525 | 4/20       |
| V    | 12"   | 14,990' | 5M82-55V-21BC             | 17562-526 | 4/21       |
|      |       |         | Kanoya                    |           |            |
| V    | 12"   | 16,700' | 5M83-113V-21BC            | 17563-527 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 17,000' | 5M83-112V-21BC            | 17564-528 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M83-111V-21BC            | 17565-529 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 17,000' | 5M83-108V-21BC            | 17567-531 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 16,550' | 5M83-107V-21BC            | 17568-532 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 16,000' | 5M83-105V-21BC            | 17570-534 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M83-104V-21BC            | 17571-535 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M83-102V-21BC            | 17572-536 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M83-101V-21BC            | 17573-537 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 17,000' | 5M84-211V-21BC            | 17574-538 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M84-210V-21BC            | 17575-539 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M84-209V-21BC            | 17576-540 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M84-208V-21BC            | 17577-541 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M84-207V-21BC            | 17578-542 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 16,000' | 5M84-206V-21BC            | 17579-543 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,400' | 5M84-205V-21BC            | 17580-544 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,050' | 5M84-204V-21BC            | 17581-545 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M84-203V-21BC            | 17582-546 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 17,350' | 5M84-202V-21BC            | 17583-547 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 17,100' | 5M84-201V-21BC            | 17584-548 | 4/21       |
|      |       |         | USA A/F                   |           |            |
| V    | 12"   | 15,800' | 5M85-77V-21BC             | 17585-549 | 4/20       |
| V    | 24"   | 15,000' | 5M85-78V-21BC             | 17586-550 | 4/20       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,800' | 5M85-76V-21BC             | 17587-551 | 4/20       |
| V    | 12"   | 14,000' | 5M85-1V-21BC              | 17589-553 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 14,500' | 5M85-2V-21BC              | 17590-554 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,300' | 5M85-4V-21BC              | 17591-555 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 14,500' | 5M85-6V-21BC              | 17593-557 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 14,500' | 5M85-5V-21BC              | 17594-558 | 4/21       |
|      |       |         | Kushiro                   |           |            |
| V    | 24"   | 17,000' | 5M87-201V-21BC            | 17595-559 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 17,000' | 5M87-202V-21BC            | 17596-560 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M87-203V-21BC            | 17597-561 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M87-204V-21BC            | 17598-562 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M87-205V-21BC            | 17599-563 | 4/21       |
| V    | 24"   | 16,000' | 5M87-206V-21BC            | 17600-564 | 4/21       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,800' | 5M87-207V-21BC            | 17601-565 | 4/21       |
|      |       |         | Kanoya A/F                |           |            |
| V    | 12"   | 15,200' | 5M95-101V-21BC            | 17634-566 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,200' | 5M95-102V-21BC            | 17635-567 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,000' | 5M95-103V-21BC            | 17636-568 | 4/22       |
| V    | 24"   | 15,000' | 5M95-105V-21BC            | 17638-570 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,400' | 5M95-106V-21BC            | 17639-571 | 4/22       |
| V    | 24"   | 15,500' | 5M95-108V-21BC            | 17640-572 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 15,300' | 5M95-112V-21BC            | 17643-575 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M95-114V-21BC            | 17644-576 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M95-115V-21BC            | 17645-577 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M95-116V-21BC            | 17646-578 | 4/22       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M105-201V-21BC (Kushira) | 17710-579 | 4/26       |
|      |       |         | Kanoya                    |           |            |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M104-202V-21BC           | 17711-580 | 4/26       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M104-201V-21BC           | 17712-581 | 4/26       |
| V    | 12"   | 6,500'  | 5M104-204V-21BC           | 17713-582 | 4/26       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M104-203V-21BC           | 17714-583 | 4/26       |
|      |       |         | Kokuba                    |           |            |
| V    | 12"   | 24,300' | 5M106-201V-21BC           | 17715-584 | 4/26       |
| V    | 6"    | 16,500' | 5M106-202V-21BC           | 17716-585 | 4/26       |
| V    | 12"   | 25,000' | 5M106-203V-21BC           | 17717-586 | 4/26       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M106-204V-21BC           | 17718-587 | 4/26       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,800' | 5M106-205V-21BC           | 17719-588 | 4/26       |
| V    | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M106-206V-21BC           | 17720-589 | 4/26       |

## JAPAN—Continued

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-verticle coverage of areas indicated—Continued

| V/O | F. L. | Alt.    | Sortie No.                    | Jicpoa #  | Date taken |
|-----|-------|---------|-------------------------------|-----------|------------|
|     |       |         | Isumi A/F                     |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 16,120' | 5M108-52V-21BC                | 17721-590 | 4/27       |
| V   | 6"    | 16,000' | 5M108-51V-21BC                | 17722-591 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 16,000' | 5M108-53V-21BC                | 17723-592 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 17,000' | 5M108-80V-21BC                | 17725-594 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 16,700' | 5M108-77V-21BC                | 17726-595 | 4/27       |
|     |       |         | Kokubu                        |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 10,000' | 5M110-111V-21BC               | 17727-596 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 11,000' | 5M110-109V-21BC               | 17728-597 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M110-108V-21BC               | 17729-598 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M110-106V-21BC               | 17731-600 | 4/27       |
| V   | 6"    | 11,000' | 5M110-105V-21BC               | 17732-601 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M110-103V-21BC               | 17734-603 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 11,000' | 5M110-102V-21BC               | 17735-604 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 10,000' | 5M110-101V-21BC               | 17736-605 | 4/27       |
|     |       |         | USA A/F                       |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 22,000' | 5M97-6V-21BC                  | 17737-606 | 4/26       |
| V   | 12"   | 22,200' | 5M97-7V-21BC                  | 17738-607 | 4/26       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M97-5V-21BC                  | 17739-608 | 4/26       |
| V   | 6"    | 25,200' | 5M97-2V-21BC                  | 17740-609 | 4/26       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M111-107V-21BC (Kokubu)      | 17741-610 | 4/27       |
|     |       |         | Miyakonojo                    |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M111-104V-21BC               | 17742-611 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M111-103V-21BC               | 17743-612 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M111-101V-21BC               | 17744-613 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 14,500' | 5M103-101V-21BC (Miyasaki)    | 17746-615 | 4/26       |
| V   | 12"   | 14,000' | 5M102-105V-21BC (Nittagahara) | 17747-616 | 4/26       |
|     |       |         | Kanoya A/F                    |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M112-201V-21BC               | 17748-617 | 4/26       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,200' | 5M112-202V-21BC               | 17749-618 | 4/26       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,020' | 5M112-204V-21BC               | 17750-619 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M112-206V-21BC               | 17751-620 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M112-205V-21BC               | 17752-621 | 4/26       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,300' | 5M112-203V-21BC               | 17753-622 | 4/27       |
|     |       |         | Kushira A/F                   |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 16,000' | 5M113-201V-21BC               | 17754-623 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 14,360' | 5M113-202V-21BC               | 17755-624 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M113-203V-21BC               | 17756-625 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 15,000' | 5M113-204V-21BC               | 17757-626 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 15,000' | 5M113-206V-21BC               | 17758-627 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 15,000' | 5M113-205V-21BC               | 17759-628 | 4/27       |
|     |       |         | Isumi A/F                     |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 16,200' | 5M114-82V-21BC                | 17760-629 | 4/28       |
| V   | 24"   | 17,100' | 5M114-78V-21BC                | 17761-630 | 4/28       |
| V   | 24"   | 16,400' | 5M114-81V-21BC                | 17762-631 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,400' | 5M114-79V-21BC                | 17763-632 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,200' | 5M114-76V-21BC                | 17764-633 | 4/28       |
| V   | 24"   | 16,390' | 5M114-80V-21BC                | 17765-634 | 4/28       |
| V   | 24"   | 17,200' | 5M114-77V-21BC                | 17766-635 | 4/28       |
|     |       |         | Miyasaki A/F                  |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 12,000' | 5M115-53V-21BC                | 17773-638 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,000' | 5M115-52V-21BC                | 17774-639 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,700' | 5M115-51V-21BC                | 17775-640 | 4/28       |
|     |       |         | Kokubu                        |           |            |
| V   | 24"   | 12,500' | 5M116-105V-21BC               | 17776-641 | 4/28       |
| V   | 24"   | 12,000' | 5M116-104V-21BC               | 17778-643 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,000' | 5M116-103V-21BC               | 17779-644 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,000' | 5M116-102V-21BC               | 17780-645 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,000' | 5M116-101V-21BC               | 17781-646 | 4/28       |
| V   | 24"   | 12,000' | 5M116-106V-21BC               | 17782-647 | 4/28       |
|     |       |         | Miyasaki A/F                  |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 13,000' | 5M109-28V-21BC                | 17783-648 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,800' | 5M109-30V-21BC                | 17784-649 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 12,790' | 5M109-26V-21BC                | 17785-650 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,000' | 5M109-4V-21BC                 | 17786-651 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 12,000' | 5M109-3V-21BC                 | 17787-652 | 4/27       |
| V   | 12"   | 12,000' | 5M109-1V-21BC                 | 17789-654 | 4/27       |
| V   | 6"    | 13,000' | 5PPM109-27V-21BC              | 17790-655 | 4/27       |
| V   | 24"   | 15,800' | 5M109-29V-21BC                | 17791-656 | 4/27       |
|     |       |         | Miyakanojo                    |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 11,500' | 5M117-110V-21BC               | 17792-657 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M117-102V-21BC               | 17798-663 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 11,000' | 5M117-101V-21BC               | 17799-664 | 4/28       |
|     |       |         | Kanoya                        |           |            |
| V   | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M118-208V-21BC               | 17800-665 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 16,500' | 5M118-207V-21BC               | 17801-666 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 15,300' | 5M118-206V-21BC               | 17802-667 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M118-205V-21BC               | 17867-668 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M118-204V-21BC               | 17868-669 | 4/28       |
| V   | 12"   | 17,000' | 5M118-203V-21BC               | 17869-670 | 4/28       |



## 1168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## JAPAN--Continued

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated--Continued

| V/O  | F. L.     | Alt.    | Sortie No.                | Jicpoa #  | Date taken |
|------|-----------|---------|---------------------------|-----------|------------|
|      |           |         | Kanoya                    |           |            |
| V    | 12"       | 16,500' | 5M118-202V-21BC           | 17870-671 | 4/28       |
| V    | 12"       | 17,000' | 5M118-201V-21BC           | 17871-672 | 4/28       |
| V    | 12"       | 17,000' | 5M118-209V-21BC           | 17872-673 | 4/28       |
|      |           |         | Kushira                   |           |            |
| V    | 12"       | 17,000' | 5M119-205V-21BC           | 17873-674 | 4/28       |
| V    | 12"       | 16,500' | 5M119-201V-21BC           | 17874-675 | 4/28       |
| V    | 12"       | 16,500' | 5M119-203V-21BC           | 17875-676 | 4/28       |
| V    | 12"       | 16,580' | 5M119-202V-21BC           | 17876-677 | 4/28       |
| V    | 12"       | 17,000' | 5M119-204V-21BC           | 17877-678 | 4/28       |
|      |           |         | Miyazaki                  |           |            |
| V    | 6"        | 15,000' | 5M120-5V-21BC             | 17878-679 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 15,000' | 5M120-4V-21BC             | 17879-680 | 4/29       |
| V    | 6"        | 15,000' | 5M120-3V-21BC             | 17880-681 | 4/29       |
| V    | 24"       | 15,500' | 5M120-2V-21BC             | 17881-682 | 4/29       |
| V    | 24"       | 15,000' | 5M121-30V-21BC            | 17883-684 | 4/29       |
| V    | 6"        | 15,500' | 5M121-31V-21BC            | 17884-685 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 16,200' | 5M121-28V-21BC            | 17885-686 | 4/29       |
| V    | 24"       |         | 5M121-27V-21BC            | 17886-687 | 4/29       |
|      |           |         | Miyakonojo                |           |            |
| V    | 24"       | 15,000' | 5M121-26-21BC             | 17887-688 | 4/29       |
| V    | 24"       | 15,775' | 5M121-29V-21BC            | 17888-689 | 4/29       |
|      |           |         | Kokubu                    |           |            |
| V    | 24"       | 12,000' | 5M122-101V-21BC           | 17889-690 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M122-102V-21BC           | 17890-691 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M122-103V-21BC           | 17891-692 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M122-104V-21BC           | 17892-693 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M122-105V-21BC           | 17893-694 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M122-106V-21BC           | 17894-695 | 4/29       |
| V    | 24"       | 12,000' | 5M122-107V-21BC           | 17895-696 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 12,000' | 5M122-108V-21BC           | 17896-697 | 4/29       |
| [40] |           |         | Kanoya                    |           |            |
| V    | 12"       | 18,000' | 5M124-204V-21BC           | 17898-699 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 18,600' | 5M124-203V-21BC           | 17899-700 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 18,000' | 5M124-202V-21BC           | 17900-701 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 18,500' | 5M124-201V-21BC           | 17901-702 | 4/29       |
|      |           |         | Kushira                   |           |            |
| V    | 12"       | 18,000' | 5M125-204V-21BC           | 17902-703 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 17,000' | 5M125-203V-21BC           | 17903-704 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 17,400' | 5M125-202V-21BC           | 17905-706 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 18,100' | 5M125-205V-21BC           | 17906-707 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 17,000' | 5M125-201V-21BC           | 17919-708 | 4/29       |
|      |           |         | Kanoya                    |           |            |
| V    | 12"       | 14,000' | 5M123-107V-21BC           | 17952-709 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 14,000' | 5M123-105V-21BC           | 17954-711 | 4/29       |
| V    | 6"        | 14,000' | 5M123-104V-21BC           | 17955-712 | 4/29       |
| V    | 6"        | 14,000' | 5M123-103V-21BC           | 17956-713 | 4/29       |
| V    | 12"       | 14,000' | 5M123-102V-21BC           | 17957-714 | 4/29       |
| V    | 24"       |         | 5M123-101V-21BC           | 17958-715 | 4/29       |
| V    | 153.4 mm. | 15,000' | CV12-785 (SW Kyushu)      | 17937-716 | 5/12       |
| V    | 24"       | 13,000' | CV12-788 (Kanoya)         | 17966-717 | 5/12       |
| V    | 24"       | 12,000' | CV12-783 (Isuni)          | 17967-718 | 5/12       |
| V    | 152.3 mm. | 15,000' | CV12-788V (SW Kyushu)     | 17968-719 | 5/12       |
| V    | 24"       | 15,000' | CV12-800 (Kanoya A/F)     | 17969-720 | 5/12       |
| O    | 24"       | 13,000' | CV12-811 (Kumanoto)       | 17970-721 | 5/14       |
| V    | 24"       | 13,000' | CV12-812 (Tachiari)       | 17971-722 | 5/14       |
| V    | 24"       | 11,400' | CV12-816 (Kumanoto)       | 17972-723 | 5/14       |
| V/O  | 8 1/4"    | Var     | CV12-781 (Kanoya A/F)     | 17987-731 | 5/13       |
| V    | 152.3 mm. | 15,000' | CV12-790V (SW Kyushu)     | 17988-732 | 5/13       |
| O    | 152.6 mm. | 15,000' | CV12-790P (SW Kyushu)     | 17989-732 | 5/13       |
| V    | 24"       | 13,000' | CV12-793 (Kanoya)         | 17990-733 | 5/13       |
| V/O  | 24"       | 11,000' | CV12-795 (Saeki S/P Base) | 17991-734 | 5/13       |
|      |           |         | SW Kyushu                 |           |            |
| O    | 24"       | 1,000'  | CV12-805                  | 17992-735 | 5/14       |
| V    | 12"       | 10,000' | CV12-807                  | 17993-736 | 5/14       |
| V    | 152.3 mm. | 10,000' | CV12-813                  | 17994-737 | 5/14       |
| V    | 12"       | 10,000' | CV12-820                  | 17995-738 | 5/14       |
| O    |           | Var     | CVL29-74                  | 17996-739 | 5/15       |
|      |           |         | Ariake Wan                |           |            |
| O    | 24"       | 900'    | CVL26-97A                 | 17997-740 | 5/13       |
| O    | 24"       | 1,000'  | CVL26-98A                 | 17998-741 | 5/13       |
|      |           |         | Tozau to Tomitak          |           |            |
| O    | 24"       | 1,000'  | CVL26-988                 | 17999-742 | 5/13       |
|      |           |         | Nakatsu-Nobeoka           |           |            |
| V    | 24"       | 11,800' | CV15-66                   | 18000-743 | 5/14       |

## JAPAN—Continued

Shikoku: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

| V/O        | F. L.    | Alt.    | Sortie No.                           | Jicpoa # | Date taken |
|------------|----------|---------|--------------------------------------|----------|------------|
| Tri Met    | 152.3 mm | 31,000' | Matsuyama; Muya<br>3PR-5M220-1V-21BC | 17491-75 | 5/17       |
|            | 152.6 mm |         | 3PR-5M220-1R-21BC                    | 17942-75 |            |
|            | 153.1 mm |         | 3PR-5M220-1L-21BC                    | 17493-75 |            |
| V          | 24"      | 31,000' | 3PR-5M220-2-21BC                     | 17494-76 | 5/17       |
| Split Vert | 40"      | 31,000' | 3PR-5M220-3R-21BC                    | 17495-77 | 5/17       |
|            |          |         | 3PR-5M220-3L-21BC                    | 17496-77 |            |
| Tri Met    | 153.0 mm | 30,000' | Murto; Kokutu<br>3PR-5M222-1V-21BC   | 17525-78 | 5/18       |
|            | 154.8 mm |         | 3PR-5M222-1R-21BC                    | 17526-78 |            |
|            | 153.6 mm |         | 3PR-5M222-1L-21BC                    | 17527-78 |            |
| V          | 24"      | 13,000' | CV20-166A (Matsuyama A/F)            | 18003-79 | 5/14       |
| V          | 24"      | 13,000' | CV12-819 (Kochi A/F)                 | 18004-80 | 5/14       |

Tsu Shima: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

|            |          |         |                            |          |      |
|------------|----------|---------|----------------------------|----------|------|
| V          | 24"      | 15,000' | 1PRS-5MF45-2V (Cape Ko)    | 17817-13 | 3/24 |
| V          | 24"      | 23,800' | 1PRS-5MF46-V (Shimond Is.) | 17818-14 | 3/26 |
|            |          |         | Tsushima Island            |          |      |
| Tri Met    | 153.0 mm | 23,800' | 1PRS-5MF46-1TV             | 17819-15 | 3/26 |
|            | 152.6 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF46-1RO             | 17820-15 |      |
|            | 153.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF46-1LO             | 17821-15 |      |
| V          | 40"      | 23,800' | 1PRS-5MF46-LV              | 17822-16 | 3/26 |
|            |          |         | Tsushima                   |          |      |
| Tri Met    | 153.1 mm | 26,700' | 1PRS-5MF48-1TV             | 17823-17 | 3/27 |
|            | 153.7 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF48-1RO             | 17824-17 |      |
|            | 154.5 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF48-1LO             | 17825-17 |      |
| Tri Met    | 153.1 mm | 26,700' | 1PRS-5MF51-TV              | 17826-18 | 4/1  |
|            | 153.7 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF51-RO              | 17827-18 |      |
|            | 154.5 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF51-LO              | 17828-18 |      |
| V          | 24"      | 25,000' | Shipping—Tsushima Island   |          |      |
|            |          |         | 1PRS-5MF51-2V              | 17849-19 | 4/1  |
| Split Vert | 40"      | 25,000' | Tsushima Island            |          |      |
|            |          |         | 1PRS-5MF51-RV              | 17850-20 | 4/1  |
|            |          |         | 1PRS-5MF51-LV              | 17851-20 |      |

CHINA: Good trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated

|         |          |         |                                             |           |      |
|---------|----------|---------|---------------------------------------------|-----------|------|
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 16,500' | Halikiang to Faichuanche<br>468BG-5MF28-TV  | 17613-922 | 2/14 |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 468BG-5MF28-RO                              | 17614-922 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 468BG-5MF28-LO                              | 17615-922 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.1 mm | 21,000' | Miuchiatun to Lintsaiheng<br>1PRS-5MF33-2TV | 17616-923 | 2/22 |
|         | 153.7 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF33-2RO                              | 17617-923 |      |
|         | 154.5 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF33-2LO                              | 17618-923 |      |
| Tri Met | 154.2 mm | 31,000' | Tsingtao; Hotse; Haiyang<br>1PRS-5MF40-TV   | 17619-924 | 3/9  |
|         | 153.8 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF40-RO                               | 17620-924 |      |
|         | 154.8 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF40-LO                               | 17621-924 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 21,200' | Tangshan; Chinghsien<br>1PRS-5MF41-1TV      | 17622-925 | 3/9  |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF41-1RO                              | 17623-925 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF41-1LO                              | 17624-925 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 21,000' | Suning; Shupu; Linghsien<br>1PRS-5MF41-2TV  | 17625-926 | 3/9  |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF41-2RO                              | 17626-926 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF41-2LO                              | 17627-926 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 21,000' | Chiyang; Taokowchen<br>1PRS-5MF41-3TV       | 17628-927 | 3/9  |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF41-3RO                              | 17629-927 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF41-3LO                              | 17630-927 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 27,200' | Liushuchwang; Yuanping<br>1PRS-5MF43-1TV    | 17647-928 | 3/16 |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF43-1RO                              | 17648-928 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF43-1LO                              | 17649-928 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 27,500' | Hsien; Nampotsum<br>1PRS-5MF43-2TV          | 17650-929 | 3/16 |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF43-2RO                              | 17651-929 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF43-2LO                              | 17652-929 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 13,500' | Yencheng to Shangtang<br>1PRS-5MF44-TV      | 17653-930 | 3/22 |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF44-RO                               | 17654-930 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF44-LO                               | 17655-930 |      |
| Tri Met | 153.0 mm | 15,000' | Taiyuan; Paoting; Fenyang<br>1PRS-5MF47-TV  | 17829-931 | 3/27 |
|         | 154.2 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF47-RO                               | 17830-931 |      |
|         | 154.0 mm |         | 1PRS-5MF47-LO                               | 17656-931 |      |



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## CHINA: Good trimetrogen coverage of area indicated—Continued

| V/O          | F. L.      | Alt.    | Sortie No.                  | Jicpoa #  | Date taken |
|--------------|------------|---------|-----------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Tri Met..... | 153.1 mm.. | 15,000' | Tai San; Shsinyang          |           |            |
|              | 153.7 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF48-1TV.....         | 17657-932 | 3/27       |
|              | 154.8 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF48-1RO.....         | 17658-932 |            |
|              |            |         | 1PRS-5MF48-1LO.....         | 17659-932 |            |
| Tri Met..... | 153.1 mm.. | 16,000' | Hsu-I to Taitzu Mt.         |           |            |
|              | 153.7 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF48-2TV.....         | 17660-933 | 3/27       |
|              | 154.5 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF48-2RO.....         | 17661-933 |            |
|              |            |         | 1PRS-5MF48-2LO.....         | 17662-933 |            |
| Tri Met..... | 153.0 mm.. | 14,500' | Shen-Men-Kou to Sna Liu Chi |           |            |
|              | 154.2 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF50-1TV.....         | 17682-934 | 3/30       |
|              | 154.0 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF50-1RO.....         | 17683-934 | 3/30       |
|              |            |         | 1PRS-5MF50-1LO.....         | 17684-934 | 3/30       |
| Tri Met..... | 153.0 mm.. | 14,500' | Ku Shih to Tanpoe           |           |            |
|              | 154.2 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF50-2TV.....         | 17685-935 | 3/30       |
|              | 154.0 mm.. |         | 1PRS-5MF50-2RO.....         | 17686-935 |            |
|              |            |         | 1PRS-5MF50-2LO.....         | 17687-935 |            |

## KOREA: Good vertical coverage of Kwan-Ni

|        |           |         |                  |          |     |
|--------|-----------|---------|------------------|----------|-----|
| V..... | 40''..... | 25,000' | 1PRS-5MF-RV..... | 17848-49 | 4/1 |
|--------|-----------|---------|------------------|----------|-----|

## MALAY STATES: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

|        |           |         |                                        |           |      |
|--------|-----------|---------|----------------------------------------|-----------|------|
| V..... | 24''..... | 26,000' | Singapore; Bakum<br>444BG-5MR60-V..... | 17812-137 | 4/13 |
|--------|-----------|---------|----------------------------------------|-----------|------|

## NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

### Lingga Archipelago: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

|        |           |         |                                                  |         |      |
|--------|-----------|---------|--------------------------------------------------|---------|------|
| V..... | 24''..... | 21,500' | Selat Boeja; Tempah Strait<br>468BG-5MR62-V..... | 17813-1 | 4/16 |
|--------|-----------|---------|--------------------------------------------------|---------|------|

### Thailand: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

|        |            |         |                                                      |           |      |
|--------|------------|---------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------|------|
| V..... | 154.0 mm.. | 25,000' | Ban Hland Khao; Ban Luk Jang<br>462BG-5MR45A-1V..... | 17706-146 | 4/10 |
| V..... | 154.0 mm.. | 25,000' | G. Phiphi<br>462BG-5MR45A-2V.....                    | 17707-147 | 4/10 |
| V..... | 152.7 mm.. | 25,000' | Dbu Rong Jang; Ban Vang Ban<br>462BG-5MR45A-3V.....  | 17708-148 | 4/10 |
| V..... | 152.7 mm.. | 25,000' | Banna G Muk<br>462BG-5MR45A-4V.....                  | 17709-149 | 4/10 |

## MANSEI SHOTO

### Amami O Shima: Good vertical partial coverage

|              |            |         |                               |           |      |
|--------------|------------|---------|-------------------------------|-----------|------|
| V.....       | 24''.....  | 15,000' | CV9-396A.....                 | 17853-90  | 5/17 |
| V.....       | 24''.....  | 12,000' | CV9-396C.....                 | 17854-91  | 5/17 |
| V.....       | 24''.....  | 9,700'  | CV9-399A.....                 | 17855-92  | 5/18 |
| V.....       | 24''.....  | 7,000'  | CV9-399F (Nazeko).....        | 17856-93  | 5/18 |
| V.....       | 24''.....  | 9,000'  | CV9-401 (Kakeroma Shima)..... | 17857-94  | 5/18 |
| V.....       | 12''.....  | 6,500'  | CV9-402.....                  | 17858-95  | 5/18 |
| V.....       | 154.0 mm.. |         | CV17-675A (Kakeroma).....     | 17859-96  | 5/7  |
| V.....       | 24''.....  |         | CV17-676P.....                | 17860-97  | 5/7  |
| V.....       | 24''.....  | 10,000' | 100 CVL26-1 (Honiya).....     | 17861-98  | 5/18 |
| V.....       | 12''.....  | 10,000' | 100 CVL26-2 (Koniya).....     | 17862-99  | 5/18 |
| V.....       | 24''.....  | Var.    | CVL27-78V.....                | 17863-100 | 5/18 |
| O.....       | 24''.....  | Var.    | CVL27-78O.....                | 17864-101 | 5/18 |
| [4] V/O..... | 155.0 mm.. | Var.    | CV20-821 (Seso Ko).....       | 17862-102 | 3/27 |

## MANSEI SHOTO—Continued

*Ishigaki*: Good vertical partial coverage

| V/O     | F. L.      | Alt.          | Sortie No.      | Jicpoa #       | Date |
|---------|------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|------|
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 10,000' ..... | CVE28-57A ..... | 18737-59 ..... | 4/29 |

CORRECTION: Previously reported under Miyako as Jicpoa No. 16737-102 in Bulletin No. 46, dated 28 May 1945. This number is hereby cancelled

*Kikaiga*: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

|         |            |               |                          |          |      |
|---------|------------|---------------|--------------------------|----------|------|
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 9,500' .....  | CV9-398A .....           | 17803-68 | 5/17 |
| O ..... | 24'' ..... | 2,500' .....  | CV10-458 (Wan A/F) ..... | 17804-69 | 5/10 |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 7,000' .....  | CV12-769 (Wan A/F) ..... | 17959-70 | 4/20 |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 12,000' ..... | CV12-771 (Wan A/F) ..... | 17960-71 | 4/20 |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 13,000' ..... | CV12-775 .....           | 17961-72 | 4/20 |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 12,000' ..... | CV9-399E (Wan A/F) ..... | 18001-73 | 5/18 |

*Koshiki Retto*: Good vertical partial coverage

|         |                |               |                |         |      |
|---------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------|------|
| V ..... | 153.4 mm ..... | 20,000' ..... | VD5-149C ..... | 17805-5 | 5/13 |
|---------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------|------|

*Minami Daijo*: Good vertical partial coverage

|         |                |               |                               |          |      |
|---------|----------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|------|
| V ..... | 24'' .....     | 7,000' .....  | CV12-766 .....                | 17814-23 | 4/17 |
| V ..... | 153.4 mm ..... |               | CV12-767 .....                | 17815-23 | 4/17 |
| V ..... | 154.1 mm ..... | 5,000' .....  | CV124-174 (Minami Jima) ..... | 17963-25 | 4/21 |
| V ..... | 12'' .....     | 10,000' ..... | CV12-764 (Minami Jima) .....  | 17964-26 | 4/17 |

*Osumi Gunto*: Good vertical and oblique coverage of Kuchinoyarabu

|           |                |              |                |          |     |
|-----------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------|-----|
| V/O ..... | 155.0 mm ..... | 4,300' ..... | CV20-106 ..... | 17973-35 | 4/2 |
|-----------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------|-----|

*Tokara Gunto*: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

|         |            |               |                                |         |      |
|---------|------------|---------------|--------------------------------|---------|------|
|         |            |               | Takara Shima                   |         |      |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 14,500' ..... | CV9-396B .....                 | 17974-4 | 5/17 |
| V ..... | 12'' ..... | 6,500' .....  | CV9-397A .....                 | 17975-5 | 5/17 |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 6,300' .....  | CV9-399B (Yokoate Shima) ..... | 17976-6 | 5/18 |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 9,000' .....  | CV9-399C (Takara Shima) .....  | 17977-7 | 5/18 |
| V ..... | 24'' ..... | 11,000' ..... | CV9-399D (Ko-Takara) .....     | 17978-8 | 5/18 |
| V ..... | 12'' ..... | 6,300' .....  | CV9-400 (Takara) .....         | 17979-9 | 5/18 |

*Tokuno*: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

|         |               |               |                |          |      |
|---------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------|------|
|         |               |               | Tokuno A/F     |          |      |
| O ..... | 24'' .....    | 2,000' .....  | CV10-455 ..... | 17767-81 | 5/10 |
| V ..... | 24'' .....    | 10,000' ..... | CV9-398B ..... | 17768-82 | 5/17 |
| V ..... | 8 1/4'' ..... | 2,400' .....  | CV20-129 ..... | 17769-83 | 4/20 |
| O ..... | 15'' .....    |               | CV20-138 ..... | 17770-84 |      |

# 1172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## WEEKLY PHOTO DISTRIBUTION

Following sorties were given general distribution during week of 28 May to 3 June 1945 and have been previously listed in "Weekly Coverage Report":

| Locality                  | Sortie No.             | Jicpos No.   |
|---------------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| JAPAN—Honshu.....         | 3PR-5M113-2-21BC.....  | 14597-519    |
|                           | 3PR-5M78-3L-21BC.....  | 13767-341    |
|                           | 3PR-5M78-3R-21BC.....  | 13766-341    |
|                           | 3PR-5M78-2-21BC.....   | 13765-340    |
|                           | 3PR-5M78-1V-21BC.....  | 13762-339    |
| —Kyushu.....              | 3PR-5M147-3.....       | 15615-282    |
|                           | 3PR-5M147-3.....       | 15616-282    |
|                           | 3PR-5M147-2.....       | 15614-281    |
|                           | 3PR-5M117-3R-21BC..... | 14682-190    |
|                           | 3PR-5M117-2-21BC.....  | 14681-189    |
|                           | 3PR-5M121-3R-21BC..... | 14885-204    |
|                           | 3PR-5M121-3L-21BC..... | 14886-204    |
|                           | 40BG-4MR7.....         | 12008-68 (V) |
|                           | 3PR-5M103-3L-21BC..... | 14517-173    |
|                           | 3PR-5M103-3R-21BC..... | 14516-173    |
|                           | 3PR-5M103-2-21BC.....  | 14515-172    |
| KOHEA.....                | 462BG-5MF21-TV1.....   | 13553-6      |
|                           | 462BG-5MF21-RO.....    | 13554-6      |
|                           | 462BG-5MF21-LO.....    | 13555-6      |
| MANSEI SHOTO—Kikaiga..... | VD5-102A.....          | 16304-36     |
|                           | VD5-102B.....          | 16305-37     |
| —Tokuno.....              | CV38-18.....           | 17172-70     |

(A photograph showing the use by Japanese of assorted materials to camouflage a landing craft will be found reproduced as Item No. 289, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[42]

### FLAK OVER JAPAN

During the first ten months of sustained air operations over Japan antiaircraft fire, while considerable, did not prove as extensive as had been anticipated. As a result of greater concentration of fire power and increasing experience, however, the enemy AA is already improving in both accuracy and intensity.

An analysis of operations extending into May 1945 reports that over cities and industrial areas the fire seemed to come principally from heavy AA guns. Defenses in those areas apparently were designed to combat heavy bombers operating at high altitudes. Airfield defenses, however, in anticipation of low-flying attacks by lighter aircraft, have been characterized by a preponderance of medium and light AA weapons.

Search and fire control radar have been employed with varying success. Accurate tracking by searchlights has been reported in several instances by B-29s. On some occasions, however, after picking up targets and passing them for several seconds successfully from light to light, the searchlight defenses seem to become confused. In other instances, pick-ups were made only after searching, probably indicating the use of sound locators rather than radar. Most accurate of the searchlights were those aboard ships in Tokyo Bay.

Planes illuminated by searchlights were fired upon; those which were not illuminated usually escaped attack. Apparently AA batteries at night are restricted to firing at lighted targets, although it is known that gun-laying radar sometimes is used. Such radar is generally employed with heavy batteries in industrial or other built-up areas. Comparatively poor results with such fire indicate either inferior performance of equipment or effective radar counter measures on the part of attacking aircraft.

The Japanese early warning system is based on the ubiquitous picket boat, land-based radar and visual observation station. Detection by boat crews apparently is either visual or aural, with the warning to the home islands being CW (continuous wave) or by voice, if urgent. Picket boats are generally well equipped with AA medium and light weapons.

In addition to the normal land-based defenses, Japanese are employing various types of supplementary weapons. In harbor cities, ship-based AA usually contributes to the defense of the area. In such cases, the volume, and generally the accuracy and range of AA fire is increased greatly. Vari-colored bursts are generally indications of naval AA fire. Rockets, "balls of fire", phosphorous

projectiles, balloons towed by aircraft, and other novel devices have been used, but none of these has resulted in any appreciable damage to attacking planes.

More complete analysis of Japanese AA defenses and the operational significance of such defenses have been published in Flak Intelligence Memorandum No. 6, entitled "Flak Over Japan". (CINCPAC-CINCPAO Bulletin No. 127-45).

[43]

#### AA FIRING BY HEAVY NAVAL GUNS

Additional evidence that the Japanese are employing the heavy guns of battleships and cruisers as antiaircraft weapons is contained in a notebook captured and translated as CINCPAC-CINCPAO Item No. 12,170. The use of such guns for AA purposes has been reported previously by naval aviators who have encountered major units of the Japanese fleet.

In late December operations one of our patrol bombers picked up the enemy task force which had shelled Mindoro the day before. With radar control, the bomber let down through the overcast to within eight miles of the Japanese force and broke out on its starboard beam. The task force showed little concern until the plane got within six miles, when each enemy unit started evasive action and began to circle. At this time, two of the larger ships favored the aircraft with one-half broadside each from their main batteries. No purely antiaircraft guns were fired from the force, just these tremendous broadsides of service ammunition. The search plane went off about 75 miles and returned, this time getting to within five miles before the ships broke formation and started evasive circling. Once again, the ships fired a broadside at the one aircraft in the distance. Although the air crew kept a sharp lookout, they could see no bursts, possibly because of the low visibility.

Naval fliers who attacked and sank the Japanese battleship YAMATO in April reported that antiaircraft salvos were fired at them by the main batteries of that vessel. Although the U. S. pilots reported heavy explosions nearby they suffered no damage.

The notebook captured on Saipan reflects the content of a lecture delivered by a Warrant Officer at the Mie Naval Air Group. According to the student who penned the notes: "Each and every type of naval gun is used for antiaircraft firing, including the heaviest weapons on our battleships." Initially, percussion-fuzed projectiles were used in an effort to bring down hostile aircraft, but the obvious ineffectiveness of such shells prompted the development of a special time-fuzed projectile. The notes mention the "Komochi Dan" shell as an example of this type round.

The student made no claims as to the actual ranges at which the heavy guns conduct AA fire, but listed the following classes of ships, showing calibers and ranges:

|                  |                    |               |
|------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| 36 cm (14.1 in.) | ISE Class (BB-XCV) | 35,000 meters |
| 20 cm ( 7.8 in.) | NACHI Class (CA)   | 27,800 meters |

Of these ships, two of the ISE Class, the ISE and the HYUGA, and two NACHI Class cruisers remain.

The student had little to say about methods of fire control except for a vague reference that "the first step in firing is to set the sight for a range of 10,000 meters." This is thought to refer to local control sighting apparatus. The notes add that "four rounds per gun are available for firing at an airplane flying in to bomb and since the NACHI has ten guns, forty rounds can be fired. However, since this will not bring the plane down, we use a method of firing now to bring the planes [44] within a barrage." Just how this is accomplished is not indicated, but in the absence of AA directors, barrage fire is the only feasible type of fire control to be employed by such guns.

In the case of the patrol bomber the ships may have been attempting to "bring the planes within a barrage," as discussed in the notes, either with service ammunition or perhaps with shrapnel rounds which burst far beyond the target aircraft.

The employment of main batteries, particularly of cruisers and destroyers, against aircraft is certainly practicable provided proper time-fuzed high explosive or shrapnel projectiles are developed. So far, this Japanese unorthodox use of main batteries has not proved very effective against our aircraft. It has startled air crews who suddenly find themselves among flak bursts while still miles from the nearest source of AA fire.

## AIR COMBAT NOTES

In a recent night interception, a BETTY was observed without exhaust patterns, indicating that the Japanese may have developed an effective exhaust flame damper. Another BETTY vectored by two F6Fs demonstrated excellent evasive action by spiraling in dives, changing air speed radically, changing course and using cloud cover. At the same time, the enemy confused the radar scope by effectively dispensing "window". The armor and damage control were good, judging from the plane's ability to evade fighters, even after taking damaging hits.

Jettisoning of burning objects by Japanese night fighters, presumably to create the illusion of a "plane destroyed", has been reported. By the use of such tactics, the Japanese apparently hope to escape or maneuver for a more favorable attack position. Such deception is not new with the Japanese. As early as 1943, it was reported that enemy pilots, under attack by U. S. interceptors would dive and, at the same time, release black smoke from the nacelle to create the illusion of a fatal hit.

A ZEKE hit several times in a recent action continued straight ahead on the water, without taking evasive action. An F4U following saw the ZEKE strike the water four or five times, each time bouncing up and regaining flying speed. Finally the F4U scored hits and exploded the ZEKE.

An Avenger pilot on a night patrol over Okinawa spotted a bogie, and diving, expended all his ammunition without success. Not wishing to lose his prey, the Avenger pilot turned, engaged the enemy with rockets, and shot the wing off the Jap plane. Two of three rockets fired scored.

[45]

## 11TH YEAR TYPE 12CM CD GUN

Eleventh Year Type 12 cm coast defense guns encountered on Luzon and Iwo Jima are believed similar to other types of 12 cm dual purpose and coast defense guns used by the Japanese. Many of these have been naval guns converted for use on land.

The bore characteristics of the 11th year type are identical to those of the 3rd year type 12 cm 45 caliber coast defense gun. Both have a maximum range of approximately 13,000 yards and a maximum muzzle velocity of about 2,090 feet per second when fired with a full propellant charge. Semi-fixed ammunition is used. Besides the HE projectiles with time fuzes recovered, documents mention a "Star" and practice projectile. Fuzes prescribed include the 5th year type nose fuze modification 1, a Type 92 fuze, and another 30 second time fuze.

The recoil tubes, two above and one below the barrel in contrast to the usual three above, simplify identification of the weapon. The breech block, although of the familiar hand-operated horizontal sliding type, does not pass all the way across the breech ring. The slot in the rear of the breech ring is cut in keyhole shape. This saves weight but increases the difficulty of loading.

The gun is of the built-up type with uniform right-hand rifling. It is mounted on a rectangular upper carriage. Its conical base sometimes may be imbedded in a rock foundation. Elevation control is on the left of the piece and traverse on the right with appropriate scales on the sides of the gun. Both the elevation and traverse operators were provided with 15 power, 4-degree sights and had speaking tubes for communication. Besides the normal range scale, a range correction scale is at the left of the piece. It is believed an operator is employed for each, with the elevation handwheel operator normally firing the gun. Firing also may be accomplished by a lanyard attached to the right side of the breech block.

(At this point in the Exhibit, there appears a photograph of a front view of a Japanese 45-caliber Post Defense Gun on Luzon. This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 290, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The guns recovered on Luzon were manufactured in March 1944 by the Sasebo Naval Ordnance Depot, and it is possible that these 11th Year Type weapons were made to replace the well-known 3rd Year Type 12 cm CD guns.

Both on Iwo Jima and on Luzon, the guns were found in casemated positions and could not be elevated above 25 or 30 degrees. The fields of fire were limited by the firing slits to about 60°. On Luzon the emplacements were oval-shaped, 15 feet wide and 30 feet long, and constructed of coconut logs covered by earth.

On Iwo the emplacements were concrete casemates. Information on this weapon has been collated from reports of Iwo Jima observers, from the 5250th TIC Company and from Item B-3833 which appeared in CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translations and Interrogations No. 25.

Condensed data on the gun follows:

|                                       |                |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|
| Bore diameter.....                    | 120 mm.        |
| Overall length of gun.....            | 18 ft. 3¼ in.  |
| Length of tube.....                   | 17 ft. 3¾ in.  |
| Length of rifling.....                | 14 ft. 8½ in.  |
| Number of lands.....                  | 36             |
| Length of upper recoil cylinders..... | 4 ft. 7 in.    |
| Length of lower recoil cylinder.....  | 2 ft. 5¼ in.   |
| Max. elevation (scale reading).....   | 50 degrees     |
| Max. depression (scale reading).....  | 10 degrees     |
| Transverse.....                       | 350 degrees    |
| Diameter of lower carriage.....       | 4 ft. 2 in.    |
| Height of gun.....                    | 6 ft. 11 in.   |
| Maximum muzzle velocity.....          | 2,090 ft. sec. |
| Maximum range.....                    | 13,000 yds.    |

(Two views showing the mechanism of a Japanese 11th Year Type 12 cm. Gun located on Iwo Jima will be found reproduced as Item No. 291, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### RIFLE GRENADE LAUNCHER

(A photograph of a large Spigot-type Grenade Launcher will be found reproduced as Item No. 292, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

A new, spigot-type rifle grenade launcher which is slightly larger (27 mm. in diameter) than the previously encountered type has been recovered in the Philippines.

This launcher may be used with both 6.5 mm. and 7.7 mm. rifles. From its measurements it was found by the 5250th TIC Company that Type 3 high explosive and incendiary rifle grenades might be fired from this launcher. It is likely that the smoke rifle grenade and Type 91 grenade with spigot attachment also may be fired. (For description of grenades see CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin 135-45, Japanese Grenades).

The new launcher differs also in method of attachment to the rifle. To attach, the knurled sleeve is unscrewed to allow the two prongs of the adapter to slide and catch on the rear of the front sight mount. The sleeve is then tightened, locking the prongs in position behind the sight mount. Two smaller projections fit around the bayonet lug to increase stability.

(A photograph of a Japanese Improvised Armored Car captured in the Philippines will be found reproduced as Item No. 293, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#### PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

Production of intelligence material in support of an operation invariably strains available printing and reproduction resources. An intelligence activity cannot be judged solely on the quantity of output, nor are there any figures that would represent the total efforts of all hands. The figures here presented are only for the maps produced by Army Engineers and distributed through JICPOA, and the JICPOA production of photographic prints and printed intelligence material. When it is realized that in the periods considered, much more material was originated and distributed by other agencies, the magnitude of the task can be appreciated.

Assault maps, bombardment charts and air support maps produced in the Central Pacific Area since the Gilbert Islands operation in November 1943 totaled 8,375,776 sheets weighing 354.2 tons. The volume for each operation has risen steadily, from 8.7 tons of material for the Gilberts to 121 tons for the Okinawa campaign. Tonnages prepared in this area alone for each major Pacific operation are shown in an accompanying graph. It should be borne in

mind that much additional material in this category, such as air target and shore bombardment charts, was prepared elsewhere.

Printed and mimeographed material in the year beginning 1 June 1944 amounted to 72,909,000 sheets weighing 729 tons. (The standard printed sheet such as that used in "Weekly Intelligence" carries a total of eight pages—four on each side; mimeographed sheets carry two pages). Peak printing load for the year was during the week of 27 January, when 5,200,000 sheets were printed.

The greatest production increase was in the photographic field. The number of contact print turned out jumped from 59,365 in the first quarter of 1943 to an estimated 3,000,000 (weighing 78.75 tons) for the second quarter of 1945. The principal increase occurred after inauguration of aerial reconnaissance flights over Japan and nearby areas, with resultant preparation of mosaics.

(At this point in the Exhibit, three items appear as follows:

1. Two graphs, one illustrating quarterly production of contact print photographs and the other illustrating production of maps and charts for major Pacific operations.
2. A graph illustrating the monthly production of printed and mimeographed intelligence material for the Central Pacific area, 1 June 1944 to 31 May 1945.
3. A photograph showing fire bombs being dropped from B-29's on Yokohama.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 294, 295, and 296, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

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#### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 70

MESSAGES ENCODED AND RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEC. 1941

"PA."

27 JAN. 42.

From: Chengoai Thia #010.

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

Ho ku hei [OB] koku kyō [WH an fu an] how shun [EY] no tai gun wa ka shu  
tokoro ni shite

hei ka wo tai keisatsu tai wo a in se ya ku 1 man sū FIUM 1 bu wa 21st [pi ru  
ma] ga wa e shin shi tsu se ru ga te pan no han ge ki VV a hi koku kyō sen ni  
hi ki ka he shi tai ji tsū. Ma ta sei bu koku kyō [mei sa ta ya] dō i pi 8 wa 22nd  
IK AU MI JE NI YO RJ

te ki no kū ba ku wo u ke shoku on zei kun 1 i kei gi.

HARADA.

(in bad shape)

Kieru

The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to PIRUMA. At ME-SATAYA they were bombed by the enemy.

"LA."

15 JAN. 1942.

From: Foreign Minister #001.

To: Ryōji Hanoi.

Kaku nen ki shi shu 1475 nikan (chi) (new para)

Kin 3 sen 3 hyaku jū en | na ri | kan pi | wa ta shi | ki ri | hi | yori zō ga ku  
den sō su —

Togo.

NOTE: (No copy of coded mes. on hand. Obtained from Army).

Re your (claim?) of last year 1475 I am telegraphing increased amt of 3310 yen gov't expenses from private fund.

Togo.

From: Harada

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

1. The lower classes who were rounded-up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Thailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanized, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

28 Jan. 1942.

"PA" (Army)

From: Harada #012 (Re your msg. #431).

To: Foreign Minister—Tokio.

1. kon kai | ken kyo | no | ka kyū | wa | en shō | ha | no | kyo tō ni | shite  
sa ku | kon | shikirimi | ryū gen hi go | wo | ru fu | shi | su pa i | kō i  
no | kō | na ru kakawara (zu) | tai ga wa wa | hō nin | shi zen | ta ru  
mono | na ri | (new Para)

2. fu ryō | ka kyō | no | ni jū | koku se ki | na | mon dai | to ni | ta ra zu |  
nyō | te ki | kō i sha | wa | na pi to ta ri to mo gen zen | torishima (ri) | wo | yō  
su | i wan ya | kō nichi ka ni mi VT koku | se ru tai jin (zen chi en ma i shi  
FULW | (mi tsu pi shi | shutsu | chō in | son po n) | no | goto (ki) | wo | ko  
ma ma ni surn wa. | a ku | rei | wo | no ko su | mono | na ru | niyori shu kai |  
ei tai ko (sei ma i gyō mi A— | mi | tsu pi | shi | to to | tokoro | hi ki | a ri)  
no | rei | ba | ku | wo | on tsu te | tsu i kyū | surn | yo tel | na ri | on rin pyo tel i.

HARADA.

28 JAN. '42.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo #038 (Re yr msg. #061).

To: Minister, Saigon.

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including \* \* \* to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on 19 January I desire (these) details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal entry into Singapore (This day will be published by the information bureau).

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of the imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime minister's broadcast (#43) tell stories to the children.

(b) Have Shinto & Budhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies by junior organization. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets military contests, military music. (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades.

Togo.

28 Jan. 1942.

"LA" (Army)

From: Foreign Minister Tokio. #038 (Re yr msg. #061.)

To: Koshi Saigon. (Re My Circular #590 (f).)

January 19th ji kan kai gi | ni te | Singapore | kan ra ku no sai | nioi (te)  
ke shu sen shō | shu ku ga | gyō | ji | ji tsu shi yō kō ke tsu tel se rue | to ko ro |  
sono SYD | IB | UL gu no | tōri | ni | tsuki | o | fukumi | o ki no | ue | hi tsu yō | ko  
sai wa shikaru be ku shi dō serarota shi (new para)

1. gyō ji no ji tsu shi wa | Singapore nyū jō su ki kōshi hi ni kagi (ri) (ki hi  
wa jō hō | kyo ku | yori ha tsu pi yō | su) hi ho tsu da de ni shū rwō | seshimu  
ru ko to (new para)



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2. kan ra ku | no hi yori | nyū jō | shi ki tō hi da de kaku ko ni koku ki | o |  
kei yō | su ru | ko to (new para)

Nyū jō | shu ki | tō hi wa (1) shō go o ki shi zen koku min wa zai sho nu  
te ei rei narabini | kō gun ko ta me ki neu o | sa sa ge | sōri - - daijin | no kan |  
wa hō sō go no ban 43 shō ni shō wa shi (ro) jiu ja | ji in to wa | kan ra ku |  
hō koku sai (ta te ma tsu ru tsu ge ru) oyobi sen su kan su i ki gan sai | o o ko  
nai (ha) kan kō sho ga ku kō. sho dan tai tō | nioi (te) wa. | shu ku ga | shi ki | o |  
o ko nō ho ka kō gun i | ka zo ku no i mon . jin ja | san pa i . bu dō | tai i ku | tai  
kai . kō en kai . bu sō . on ga ku kō shin . cho chi ku sono ta koku sa ku kyō ryo  
ku | no ji tsu sen o te ki | gi | ji tsu shi | su ru | ko to (new para)

Na o | shu ku ga gyō | ji ji tsu | shi ni a ta ri | te wa zō san o so gai shi . shi  
zai | o | ran pi | shi | bō kū ni kyo ge ke | o | shō seshimu ru ko to | o | sa ku  
ru | shu shi yori | nai chi | ni | oi (te) wa | chō chin | gyō re tsu . ha ta | gyō  
re tsu | tō wa | o ko na wa za ru | ko to | to | na ru o ru | to ko ro | China | man  
shū | ni | oi (te) | wa | chi hō to ku shu | ji jō | ni ō ji | o | ma tsu ri | sa wa gi | ni |  
o chi i ra za ru gen do | nioi (te) | kan kei | ki kan | to | kyō zi | no | ue | te ki gi | so  
chi | serare | sashitsukae | na shi —

Togo.

000 26 JAN 42.

## HARADA

Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

000 Jan 26, p. m. (Army) "PA."

Gaimodaijin Tokyo.

· Too ti ka kyoo no fu ryoo bun si so zyuu kei hoo soo u ke u ri no a dc si  
tu no de ma kiden (dai . . . goo) to ba si si min wo sa wa ga se wo ru tokovo  
zyuu rai too ha no ei. Bei zin kon ke tu ka zo ku wa tai zin tosite i zen zyuu  
ni ki kyo si wo nyoo. Na ke ni no zen ki ka kyoo to renraku dan mo nt  
mono a ru mo yoo ni te poo tyoo zyoo hakarigata (si) za nitui (tewa) tai  
ga wa ni tyuu i si ke ri on zei syu tei i kei gi pe?

HARADA,  
Chiengoa.

"PA."

22 DEC. 1941.

From: Tokio (Army).

To: Shanghai #710.

Net 1947.

kiden (dai 842 gō) nikaishī (new Para)

Belgium tai shi kan ji gyō fu tei denpō (dainngō) V A F A V G I J G O K wa te  
ki ni taleuru nichī to dō yō no tariatsuka (1) suo na shi G I J U (go) sashitsukai  
na shi Belgium jin oyoki Belgium ken e ki nitaishi te wa nai chi ni olte wa  
tokubetsu no so chi mo to ri mo ra za ru mo China gen chi ni olte kimitsu (dai  
ungo) ho ji ma ta wa ken e ki ho zon no ken chi yori tokuni nan ra ka no so  
chi wo to ru no hi tsu yō a ru baai ni olte wa te ki koku ni okom jun ji  
toriatsuka (1) wa re (go) sashitsuka (e) na shi (New Para) nan dai Shanghai  
zai ho toshite shi kō kan chō chō ka kō e ten den se ri ni tsui (te wa) CQ10Q

From: Tokyo.

To: Shanghai #710.

1947.

In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling the Belgium Embassy's—despatch—in the same fashion as an enemy countries despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve — of your secret message — there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.

In relation to method handling banking, gold silver deposits etc.

"PA." (Army)

From: Pelping.

To: (No heading) #759.

31 Dec. 1941.

Kon a kai sen ni to mo mai China ni oite te ki koku gin kō. jū kei kei gin kō tō nitsui (tewa) sa shi wo sa e ta ru kin gin oyohi gin kō ken (ho jo ka narabi (ni) mi ha tsu kō ken wo (o) fuku (mi) mu) wa kaku chi RYYM (Tsinan) no to ku shu ji jō tsū mi niyori te sho bun suru koto na ku kon go ni okeru tei koku no zen pan te ki shi sa shuku to no kan ren ni oite sō gō te ki ken chi ni ta chi te kore wo wo hino ha i i no mo to ni FIGL (Manchukuo) niyori sho nyō suru mono to su (new Para) ki (Para)

1. sa shi mo sa e a ru kin gin oyobi gin kō ken wa sashitari gun no kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihow ga wa gin kō (shō kin wo yo tei su) ni yo nyū suru koto za

2. Migl 1. no kin gin oyobi gin den ken wa gen so ku toshite yo nyū sa ki gin kō wo shite wagahō ni yū ri ni un yō se shi nu ru mono to suru mo hitsuyō ni ō ji ko no yo nyū wo mi kai ri toshite sa shi GC sa e gin kō nitaishi ka shi tsu ke wo na su koto ma ta wa kan ri wo kai jo suru ta me yo nyū no ha rai tō do shi doku jō su koto wo mito (me) bu (su?) ru koto (new Para)

ō ku ra shō wa yō su re ba yo nyū sa ki gin kō nitaishi ryū ga nen sho (nen no ta me no nen kaku) wo kō fu suru koto (new Para)

3. gun wa kyaku kan ri tō wo gen chi kō a in kikau no chō ni i nin suru koto (new Para)

Migl ji mu nikanshi jū yō na ru monō wa chū ō no shi zu wo ma chi to kore rei wo ko no koto to shi nan yō suraba gen chi ni oite sho ri lin kai wo so shi ki pan koto (new Para)

—H kō ho ku shi gen gin no sho ben nitsui (tewa) te wa how ken to wa shutsu tsu ko RZ so chi wo to ru oyobi wo mito (me) wo shite ru mono to su gyaku ka u BN AMRI

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one months wages. And future matters will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between The Chung-King Bank and The Japanese Silver bank.

22 Dec. 1941.

"PA." (Army)

From: Tokio.

To: Net #1950.

China ni okern te ki koku gai kō kan (ryōji kan wo (o) fuku (mi) mu) oyobi wagahō ni oite ei gyō nai shi shū shoku wo yu ru sa zu | sono shū nyū no mi chi wo to ze tsu se shi me ta ka | te ki koku jin no sei ka tsu hi shi ben nikanshi te wa shu ju kan kei chō to kyō gi no kekka izure baai niyori te wa Nihow seifu ni oite yo san wo kei jō suru yō a ru koto to narube (ku) ki mo sashitari no so chi toshite wa betsuden (dai 2651go) ni yoru koto to se ru nitsui (tewa) migl niyori so chi serareta (shi) (Para)

2. yo kin zen bu wo 1 ka tsu [bu <hyō] shi yo kin na ki shun MJ ni mo kore niyori shi ben shi ya ru an mo kō ryo shi ta ru ga wagahō ga shi yū zai san wo sho bun shi ta ru | ka ta chi | wa kore wo sa ku ru yō a pa wo motte te be koku jin kan ni nin i ni sō go fu jo se shi mu ru yō go shi doku arita (shi) (new Para)

3. Wagahō su sa shi wo sa e ra re ta ru te ki koku no jū kei kei gin kō no na ma gin oyobi gin kō ken tō wa sa QI ni kō a in YY se tsu lin kai no (go) kettel su kore wo gun kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon ga gin gin kō ni yo nyū suru koto to na ha wo ru tokoro mi ka e ri ka wo u ku be ki te ki san yo nyū gin kō na ki chi ni oite wa migl son zai suru kō kan to renraku noue sho LD serareta (shi) CURB go. Rest garbled.

1180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

RECEIVED FROM U. S. ARMY—HONO.

Subsequent to 7 Dec. 1941 Copies of Their Translations

From: CHEFOO.  
To: TOKIO.  
SANO TORI.

(KYU BA) IO -- CHINA IO SE. PERU O -- GERMANY ITO SE ---- SE  
BELGIUM TO HAND. BELGIUM OHEHA BEGIN ENGLISH SPELL. S  
END ENGLISH O -- EN -- NI TONA. EGYPT KANKA HA -- MAN SYU KOKU  
KAI NI. MAN SYU KOKU NA I. RO TYO KA -- HA ENGLAND NI. FUTU  
KOKU ISEI. -- ONAHE. CHINA KATOHA. ARGENTINA GORU UN (NYU --  
NEA) NI IHA. NE -- NYU -- KYO - 1 NIIHA 1 (NYU ZI -- DO) NO 2 NI  
IHA. (NYU ZI RAN DO) NO 3 - I -- (-- KA -- GU A) I HENI. (RO SUTARI  
KAN) IHENI I (KO RON BIA) IHENI RE (HON DE YU RASU) KA SENA.  
URAGUAY NI IKA. NORWAY KANUGE RE NORWAY FU ZO KAN 1  
HYO KANA RE. (ARA SUKA) KARU EN.

#663 A

JAN 19.

From: TOKIO.  
To: SHANGHAI.

KIN HYAKU EN KIKAN ATE DENSO SU HARADA . . . SEI ESYU KO  
ARITASI  
#634 A

JAN. 19.

From: TOKIO.  
To: SHANGHAI.

JANUARY 20th GEN ZAI NIOI (TE) KE RUKI KAN HO KAN NO DENSIN  
FUGO SYO WA ZYU 4 NEN YU GO DAI 5 GO KUN REI NIYO (RI) DENPO  
ARITASI PA  
#635 A

From: ?  
To: TOKIO.  
ENGLAND NINITO

JAN. 21 1942.

KEI.NASEKA.

GERMANY NAOK NA HE.

BELGIUM -- INI SO IHA. ROITO. OIHE MO -- .

NANAHA ANA NARU -- RO -- K HESETO. POLAND KA -- HA GEN KA  
SEI. KAKA SEI SA --. KA HENAS -- RU -- KUN KE HE OHENA  
KORUKA. ///ø\*

CHINA HERU. RU SENUN YU -- HETO SEAKA TOKA

HOLLAND KANA OHE. ORU. IOSE.

TAI KOKU NAO.

CANADA ISE SEI ISE NI.

BAI SESEMI SENI ZI -- S NIRUNI.

MEXICO RU.

PERU NANA -- NARU HEO HEHE ARU I -- KAONI IKA

ONA I ISEHE. ISE RU. NINAI M NI NAHA.

BOLIVIA TONI.

EGYPT NISE

MAN SYU KOKU I O S INA.

SPECIAL CODE . . . TIHA OK IOI

(NIKARA GA) IHAO -- INOI

(KOSUTA RIKI) IHA OA IOI

SPEC. CODE . . . - O (C SI ZIGO HYO KA. ZEN -- YO -- O)

NYU 1 NE4) I NA HE I IHE HA.

SPEC. CODE . . . I NAHE KI HEHA PUN SPEC. CODE . . O TO

PARAGUY O TO

URAGUY I HENI MI HENA

PANAMA KATO -- S KANA HA (TOKU SIN BAN GO -- RON HASU ZI  
(SON DAI 1 KA -- NASA SU -- HYO DAI 2 KA TO OK KANAHA)

DENMARK RU SE (SONO TAFU ZOKU ISI -- 5 SATU)

NORWAY KAKU HANA -- KA HA HE FU ZO KU KANZI HYO KA HANA.  
KA HA HE.

(ARA SUKA) RUNI.

KASI -- IKA. ORU. TOE. TONI.  
 HI ZOKU -- NIKI. NINA  
 TUBAKI -- HETO. HENA.  
 KA -- DE -- RO HETO. HE NA  
 YANA GI -- HARU  
 Rest of msg lost due to station interference.

FROM: KALGAN.

1-20-42

To: TOKIO.

CANADA KARU HE

(KYU BA) KARU HE

PERU ISEO

HOLLAND O O

ENGLAND REPEAT INDICATOR NIKI NA ANIKI IIE LST  
 REPEATER

FRANCE KAKA HA

BELGIUM OHE IKO HENI

HUNGARY HATO

EGYPT HERU) ---- I IRU

TURKEY HA IHA UHA IO

CHINA KASEI

PORTUGAL KANASE

MAN SYU KOKU HEO

AGENTINA NII

SIAM NINA

(KORON BIA) REPEAT INDICATOR INA NAKI NAHE 2ND REPEATER

(NIKA RAGA) 2ND REPEATER

(KOSU TARIKA) 2ND REPEATER

(NYU GI NEA 1ST REPEATER

NYU ZI ZE RAN DO) 1ST REPEATER

(HON ZYU RAsu) KASEHA

(ARA SUKA) KAKA SE (IZYO KOKU HEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO  
 ZI)

#643

From: Chefoo.

To: Tokyo.

JAN 20.

As follows: (KYU BA) May mean emergency,—emergency code?—or may be the first in the list of names of countries appearing in this message.

The message is impossible to translate as it is. However, it should be taken in connection with #674A, which shows a similar list of names of countries with varying letter groups after them. We may have here a new code in use, or possibly the suggestion of new code groups to be used for the countries in future—the latter, however, seems pretty crude.

In connection with the former suggestion, should we not consider #635A, which seems to call for a new code to be put in use on January 20th., the date of this message?

RSS.

# 663 A

From: Kalgan.

To: Tokyo.

JAN 20.

(Kindly refer #635, #663, #674. Letter groups after names of countries seem to indicate that message is in connection with code.)

Groups in Parenthesis in this message are as follows:

Line 2. Cuba

Last line. Colombia

Second page:

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

New Guinea

New Zealand

Honduras

## 1182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Alaska KAKASE (In the above, that which follows names of countries are all in Kana)

1/23/42

# 643 A

FUNADA.

Canada—KARU HE

Cuba—KARU HE

Peru—ISEO

Holland—oo

England—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

France—KAKA HA

Belgium—OHE IKO HENI

Hungary—HATO

Egypt—. . . I IRU

Turkey—HA IHA UHA IO

China—KASEI

Portugal—KANASE

Manchukuo—HEO

Argentina—NII

SIAM—NINA

Columbia— INA NAKI NAHE

Nicaragua— " "

Costa Rica— " "

New Guinea—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

New Zealand—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

Honduras—KASEHA

Alaska—KAKA SE (IZYŌ KOKU MEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO ZI)

From Peiping #227 to Tokyo (Urgent).

MARCH 9.

Your wire No. 160 says, "Official Yoshihara of Kalgan has been ordered as from the 6th to take a post at DAIYA. Please have him leave immediately". Is this not a mistake? Please investigate and reply immediately.

1254 A

From Tokyo (Urgent) #174 to Peiping.

MARCH 9.

With regard to our wire #718 of last year.

1. Regarding the elevation of the status of Settlements, those who have MOSU SEI KOSHI (Note: Might not SEI, which follows MOSU in other parts of this message also, be something else, such as IDE? The only translation which would fit the context in any way would be "Voice" so that MOSU SEI KOSHI would be "sent in their voice" i.e., "reported") are as follows. If the arrangements of all the offices are completed, we expect to put the establishment (of elevation of status) into effect on the 1st of April. Although we have received reports direct from the chiefs of the branch offices of Paotao and KAISHUU, we should receive reports from KOOWA and JYONI, so please arrange to have these reports in first.

2. With regard to governmental orders; in the case of colonies only, it will be alright to put into effect the completion of organization, in line with previous experience, and after sufficient leadership.

3. With regard to the desires of making the Settlement Chief's position an honorary one, especially bear in mind the relationship with Article 69 of the Regulations of Establishment. SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. HOTEI (Settlement Chief System; however, honorary position)

2. KAISHUU (Council System) No report from JOSHUU Consul.

3. TAAKU (Council system) DENPOO Consul General has sent report.

However, no report regarding governmental order.

4. TYOOTEN (Council system) Report received from Tsinan Consul General.

5. KOOWA (Settlement Chief System, Salaried) No report concerning governmental order.

6. Paotao (Settlement Chief System, However, honorary) No report from KOOWA Consul General, therefore, also no report regarding governmental order.

1255 A

funada

MARCH 9.

From Peiping # 229 to Tokyo.  
Regarding your message # 157.

Because of the phenomenal rise in price of building materials, an additional amount of approximately Yen 10,113.70 (for building materials) Yen ----- 805.30; making a total appropriation\* of Yen 35,919.00 which will be necessary or else the work cannot be completed, we are informed by the workmen. This situation here makes the (increase) unavoidable. Wherefore, we request that the difference amounting to Yen 8,212.50 may be sent as a supplementary appropriation. In case this seems, upon consideration, difficult, we will have no recourse (here) but to reduce the amount (of the building) SPECIAL CODE.

# 1260 A

RSS

\*There seems to be something lack, or in error, in the figures, as they do not work out properly. The message does, however, indicate something of the difficulties being encountered by the New Order in a rapidly rising cost price.

MARCH 9.

From Peiping #220 to Tokyo.

Circ. #170 to Nanking. Shanghai.

With regard to our wire Extra No. 56.

The various offices concerned with the establishment of Settlements have carried out temporary enactment, and there being considerations to make in connection with this, it is desired that arrangements be made to MAI BIRO (?) the rules and regulations. Further the newly established Settlements are Paoting, Shanhaikwan, Tanshan, KOOWA, Paotao, Haichow, TYOTEN, Tangku, SINGOO, Chefoo and Kaifeng, totalling 11.

Further, the matters in the rules, which are short of those necessary towards putting the matter into effect, (which must be known with regard to putting the matter into effect) are 1. To put into effect on April First. 2. The book of names which is to be built up for the first (election) will be built up by the 15th of that month in accordance with the rules of February 1st, 1943. (In article 83 of tax regulations; the first period levy, 6 months from the end of July, of the business tax; those having paid income taxes for this period will have votes by virtue of their having paid a business tax. Therefore, ----- elections are not to be held ----- will be alright. 3. In respect to the establishment of colonies, the directors of the colonies will be appointed by the consuls and their period of service will be until there is an election which will take place in accordance with regulations. The question of whether or not these three points are necessary is being considered.

(NOTE: It is believed that SHOWA ZYUU 8 NEN, 1943 in above message might be a mistake for some previous year)

1261 A

funada

MARCH 10.

From Peiping #136 to Tokyo

Circ. #181 Tientsin

There being also a strong desire on the part of the military in this area, it has been decided that following the conference of the heads of legations and consulates (?), on the 18th. (only one day) at 9 am. a conference of consuls having charge of military affairs (Note: HEIJI which has been translated "military affairs" might also be translated "everyday affairs") will take place. Above for your information SPECIAL CODE. Further, Consuls, heads of branch offices and heads of dispatched offices (might be instead "Higher officials of consulates, branch offices and dispatched offices") will remain as they are. From . . . . office (s) it will be alright to dispatch consul (s) or Vice Consul (s) so kindly include this SPECIAL CODE.

1262 A

MARCH 11.

From Shanghai to Hankow

Extra

----- there has been no order as yet and (we) do not know when the order will be issued. Details will be sent by mail.

1263 A

funada

1184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 11.

From Tokyo (Urgent)

Circ. #455 to Tientsin. Taiyuan. Tatung. Hankon. Canton.  
With regard to No. 1, Our wire. A 3 GOKUHI (?)  
Send in immediately SPECIAL CODE. Further, SPECIAL CODE.  
1265 A

---

MARCH 11.

From Tokyo (Urgent) #019 to Shanghai Minister  
Re; my message No. 017

Temporary enactment documents from Hangchow and KAKOO are at hand.  
However, no requests as to governmental orders have arrived.  
1266 A

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MARCH 11.

From Tokyo (Urgent) #159 to Canton. Shanghai Minister  
Re your wire No. 169.

Concerning the enforcement of the Settlement Chief System, this is approved as of March 10th. Further, by way of assurance it is advised that there is a need for revision of the details of regulations for the enforcement of governmental orders.  
1267 A

---

funada

From Tokyo (Urgent) #032 to Peiping  
#183 to ?

MARCH 11.

Re: your wire No. 90

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect).  
1268 A

---

From Tokyo to Peiping.

MARCH 11.

Extra

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.

Regard your wire No. 175.

From Yosano to Harada.

The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received ----- in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire to ----- as has been done thus far.

1269 A

---

funada.

MARCH 11.

From Taiyuan Urgent #028 to Tokyo, Kalgan.

Your Circular #612, Paragraph 9.

Hashimoto is at present caring for the writing (secretarial work?) at the Settlement School, and the telegraphic work alone, and in April the new organization of the colony, official business, and the putting into operation of the new tax for the colony, are all pressing duties ----- If (in addition) this man is expected to DAIKOO (teach for another; become a substitute teacher ?), we expect that troubles not a few will arise concerning the completion of the official business. Further, this man's wife is at present pregnant and the doctor has forbidden travel before the end of May, which situation -- RU FUTU GAN this Interpreter (Hashimoto) will complete business connected with the Colony (organization) by the end of May, and completing that stage will be sent on to his new post in Kalgan early in June ----- regarding which, after an

examination of the situation, we ask that special consideration be given, and permission be given that the removal to his new post of this interpreter be postponed until the end of May.

#1270 A

RSS.

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo *Urgent*  
To Peiping Consul General

Regarding your message #221 (1259 A)

1- The Department Orders at present in force base the power of control in the settlements under enforcement regulation paragraph 5 (Paragraph 19 of the Law regarding the Duties of a Consul, applicable to occasions when decisions shall be made by a special order). But this section does not apply to subordinate consular offices and sub-stations.

2- Having said which, however, in colonies under the authority of a subordinate consular office or sub-station, there arise not a few circumstances in which unreasonable situations ----- with regard to the resident head. In such situations there is no other way but to act in the name of the head (consul) of the main consulate; so after consultation with the head (or heads) of the department, we wish to send you a further message regarding the practical method of handling such situations.

#1274 A

MARCH 12.

From Peiping #028 to Nanking Minister,

Upon the visit of your excellency, the Ambassador, to this place, the total of all expenses paid out was Yen 24,898.67, and the sum received was Yen 15,000. The balance of Yen 9,898.67 has been advanced and paid by this office, for which we request reimbursement by wire. Further, the receipted bills will go forward to you by air.

#1275 A

RSS

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo. #191 to Peking  
#021 to Shanghai Ambassador

With regard to Settlement Chief, Settlement System, and the selection of people (officers?) of the settlement and their treatment (salary, housing etc.), please bear in mind the following and instruct appropriately SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. The Settlement Chief system will be applicable only when an appropriate person is being obtained for the settlement. Therefore, the settlement chief will be thought of as a principle, and to hurry the selection of people for the settlement will be considered wrong.

2. The settlement chief, without regard for whether he is salaried or honorary, in connection with the business of the settlement, (based on the ----- restrictions of Article 69) will take full responsibility with respect to the failure of business. Therefore, a spare time settlement chief is wrong.

3. With respect to the Chief of the Settlement and the other leaders, the character, the insight, etc., will be considered seriously before selection; the treatment (same as above) also, it is considered, should not be considered merely from the budget but should be arranged from considerations of the status, (rank) of the settlement (set by the government) and the candidate himself (it is understood of course that the amount of payment made must not be too much). (Because of these considerations), the chief of the settlement, his assistants and directors and the treatment of these ---- should be, it is considered, arranged after your approval is given.

4. Further, with regard to Settlement Chiefs, their assistants, and directors, consideration is made of the future changes in personnel, and it is desired that arrangements be made in such a way that people will serve the settlements for long periods.

1276 A

funada



1186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo #163 to Canton.

Travel and other expenses to the amount of Yen 3,4 0.89 and being sent by wire to your excellency as agent.

ITEM: Travel expense for bring out the family of Consul Oozeki, Yen 171.50; Return expense to Japan of the family of Consul Kobayashi, Yen 145.30; Travel expense of Vice-Consul Uyeda to Nanking and Shanghai, Yen 1,051.00; Sato, going to his post, Yen 111.70; Expense of transferring Shiroto, Yen 167.00-----

# 1277 A

In the humble judgement of the translator, the balance of the message is not worth bothering about.

MARCH 12.

From Peiping #002 Nanking Minister; Circ. #185 Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao.

Regarding your circular #020.

In our area we are continuing under the organization of the Women's Defense Association, and have not set up a New Women's Organization as yet. The SHUU (Masses, popular) Women's Defense Association is a specialty of the Army, which is directing it, and goes on the principle that the president (of the association) should be the leading woman of the region, (here) the wife of the head of the Settlement being the president, and the wife of the Consul advisor.

# 1278 A

RSS.

MARCH 12.

From Shanghai # 489 cut in to Nanking, Peiping.

Following the recent sudden drop in emergency messages, the postal receipts from the sale of stamps, etc., and from all other sources up to the 10th (having fallen) a plan to limit (expenditures?) in the interests of thrift (economy) has been announced and will be put into effect immediately. (This information is given out after a conference with the Chief of the TAI KOO Communications Department, who is in the city on a trip).

# 1279 A

MARCH 12.

From Manchuli # 023 to Tokyo, Hsingking.

Although we fully understand that the matter of the arrangement for a train on the Soviet side for Ambassador Satoo and his entourage, who is to arrive here on the 19th and that same day enter the Soviet, is in the hands of the Home Office, we would appreciate a wire about the matter merely that we may have the information, in this office.

# 1280 A

From Tokyo # 036 to Harbin.

Although the matter raised in your ordinary wire of # 34 should be approved, should not the completion of the work be done according to the estimate for the building submitted last year? We desire to have the amount NOOJI(?) (definitely settled?).

# 1281 A

RSS.

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo #053 to Hankow.

Regarding your message HI number 154 of February 17th., the announcement of the regulations regarding promotion (or, advance in salary) was completed in our Out-bound message #18 of last December 31st.

#1282A

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo #182 to Hsingking Minister.

Regarding your message #169.

As travel for Government Officials appointed abroad - - - FOREIGN - - - - - MO KU --- Yen 8,200 special supplementation has been made, and will be sent in advance by wire. Kindly transfer Mutankiang's share (to that office).

#1283A

RSS.

MARCH 13.

From: Tokyo  
To: Hsingking Minister.  
Extra-numeral message.

To Communications Official Ogawa, from Nomura.

Replying to your extra-numeral message both of the gentlemen are going along with the Ambassador on his journey, and are expected to start today, the 13th, in the evening. After they have started we will communicate with you again.

#1286A

MARCH 13.

From Shanghai #065 to Canton; to Consul Kimura, in Hongkong from Sone.

With regard to your humble servant's message of the 10th. Ryuu Suu Ketsu (parenthesis is probably an explanation of how to write the name in Chinese characters) sends information that Ryuu Saku Min and others are to sail from Hongkong on the - - - - boat of the 15th. The Ryuu family have again and again asked that you would take the trouble to arrange it so that they could travel along on the same boat, so if that is possible, I beg you to take the trouble to make the arrangements.

#1287A

RSS.

MARCH 13,

From Nanking #002 to Peiping. Circ. #021 to Kalgan, Canton.

Regarding your Circ. #186 ( A ).

At present they are engaged in urging the - - - organization of a real Women's Defense Association in Naichi (Japan proper), but here, in general (we are proceeding) under the direction of this Office, the Chief of the Department of Military Affairs, The Defense Command, the Chief of Staff, the Commandment of Guards of the Navy, and the Chief of the Military police being advisors. Matters having to do with defense, and related to military matters, are first taken up by our office, with the military department involved, and then we proceed to guide them; this is the plan under which we are working.

#1288 A

MARCH 3

From: Tokyo.  
To: Hankow.

We desire that you send a message to Daiya.

#1289 A

RSS.

MARCH 9,

From Canton #195 to Tokyo. Circ. #069 to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.

Regarding my message #182.

In view of the fact that the Army authorities here report having recently received orders from headquarters (Tokyo), we have been pressing the study of a definite plan for caring for enemy aliens living, and causing them to do their cooking for themselves jointly, in order to reduce the cost of living, and we have been making preparations as far as was possible, to carry this out in accordance with your message of December last, 4th and following columns (or lines), and especially in accordance with column (or, line) 1 and the upper (or, former) part of column 4 (or, line 4). However, the Army's proposition is something approximating internment, which we feel is unfortunate (literally, not interesting). In general, we have expressed our opinion that enemy aliens (with the exception of those subject to exchange) should be encouraged of their own accord to form groups, and thus to bring down the expense of living for each individual. This is sent to keep you informed.

#1256 A

The above message seems to be connected with #1214 A.

## 1188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 10.

From Nanking Minister #266 to Tokyo; Cir. #146 to Hsingking, Canton, Hankow and 1 other.

Chunking Broadcast (8th).

1—The United States is dispatching a commission to New Delhi to offer encouragement in the matter of the protection of India and the construction of a route for transportation of supplies to China. This information comes from a source with direct contact with the White House.

2—The Chungking government has dispatched their Minister to Turkey, Choo I Shun (instructions how to write in Chinese characters) to Iran to conclude a treaty of commerce, and also to arrange for the exchange of ministers.

3—According to a dispatch from Angora, the former United States Ambassador to Moscow, Steinhart, called upon the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 7th., and the call lasted for more than an hour; moreover, - - - - - TAI MI, German Ambassador, is reported to be returning to his country for consultation with his government.

4—Chiang Kaishek held a long conference with the British Ambassador on the 7th.

5—After the arrival of the visiting commission, Chiang Kaishek will organize through the Burmese Cultural Society for the observance of a Burma Day, on the 8th., when the British Ambassador, Go Tetsu Jō, (Wu Tieh-cheng), Ō Bun Kō (Weng Wen-hao), and TIN KA FU (Chen Kuo-fu), are to broadcast to the Burmese people.

#1257 A

RSS.

MARCH 9.

From Peiping Minister #037 to Tokyo.

Peter Hansen, a citizen of Germany, resident here, (at present 62 years of age), in charge of the Yale students abroad of the Peking TOO SOO FU KO DOO HEI 6 ZYUU GOO believed to be the name of institution, Possible, P(eking U(niversity) M(edical) C(ollege) "with an average of about sixty students ?) has expressed the request that we confer with the Home Office and secure a visa that he may attend a meeting of the Yale Students Abroad, to be held in the building of the K. K. Laygold Company, Kyoobashi Ku, Tokyo City. We request that you will send us instructions in reply by wire.

#1258 A

MARCH 8.

From Peiping #221 to Tokyo.

Regarding my message # 220

In the case of the new organization of a settlement in any Consular area or subconsular area, the head of the mission has according to the fifth article of the rules, met with the consul and (carried out) the GAITOO JIKOO (literally, applicable items) appropriate items of the detailed regulations, and has been accustomed to appoint the members of the settlement governing body of their first meeting. There is some doubt here, however, as to whether this method of handling is acceptable, and so we request your wired instructions in reply.

# 1259 A

RSS.

MARCH 7.

From Nanking #276 to Peiping; Circ. #2450 to Tokyo. Hsingking. Canton.

Chunking Broadcast (10th).

1. Chiang Kai Shek spoke, in general, as follows at the gathering of CHU SUU KI NEN (CHU is probably for CHUGOKU to mean China, but it is not known what the SUU might be. KINEN denotes anniversary or memorial, but contact with several Chinese in Honolulu failed to produce any knowledge of an anniversary on the 9th.) on the 9th.

"During my visit of half a month in India, I received a hearty welcome from the Indian government and the Indian people. China and India are in agreement with each other (?) and are great countries. With the nobility and the leaders of India, I had meetings at which our hearts were opened and the people have been inspired into cooperating with each other mutually and without regard for party or faction. The Indian government too, has now decided to

fight. I hope that England will give political freedom to India and that the power of anti-aggression might be thus strengthened. The idea that India should be proud of China's 5 year fight has been conveyed to the Indian people, and a recognition of our country has been brought to them sufficiently. I believe firmly that should Japan invade India, India will have the ability to destroy Japan.

2. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chiang Kai Shek met the Minister from Holland and a (military) Attache (under said minister) and also the Australian Minister (Igston).

1264 A

Funada

MARCH 11.

From: Tokyo (Urgent) #082 to Peiping.  
#183 to ?

Re; your wire No. 90

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect).

1268 A

MARCH 11.

From Tokyo to Peiping.

Extra

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.

Regarding your wire No. 175.

From Yosano to Harada.

The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received ----- in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire to ----- as has been done thus far.

1269 A

Funada.

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo.

To: Hsingking Minister.

Regarding your extra-numeral message:  
(forwarding will be completed)

The wire was forwarded by the night of the 11th.

#1271 A

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo.

To: Harbin.

Regarding your extra-numeral message of the 7th:

Although we have made investigations here, as per your wire, there is no evidence of larceny.

#1272 A

MARCH 12''

From: Peiping. #186 Cir. to Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Kalgan.

Recently, in Japan proper, a union of all the women's organizations was carried out, and in every place a Women's Defense Organization have been set up, so that one imagines that the form of the new women's organization can be seen appearing. For the information of this office, we beg to trouble you to inform us by wire as to the system of controlling the new Women's Organization in your area.

#1273 A

RSS.

# 1190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 12.

From: Canton. #210 to Tokyo; Cir. #077 to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping.

Regarding your circular #181:

At noon today the resident Japanese of every class gathered at the Canton Jinja (shrine), and under the organization of the Resident Japanese Colony, reverence to the flag, bowing to the direction of the Imperial Palace, and prayer before the flag was followed by the reading of the Imperial Rescript by the Minister, a message of congratulation from the head of the advisory body of the Colony, greetings from a representative of the Army, and holy voices joined in the Banzai were had. Thus solemnly and splendidly was the second affair in celebration of victory carried out. China is involved in the celebration of the Old New Year through the 15th (of March), but (after that) a mass meeting of every class (of people) is planned to celebrate the second occasion of victory in the war.

#1284 A

MARCH 13.

From: Tokyo.

To: Peiping.

Extra-numeral. To Telegraphic official, Kato, from Nomura.

Your telegram and your volume have been respectfully read, but here we have been so upset by the events following the death of Onishi, and now the departure of Mr. Akiyama for the Soviet that I have been unable to carry out your wish. Please grant a little more time, much as I regret to ask for it.

#1285 A

RSS.

22 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Tokio.

To: Net #1950.

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one months wages. And future matter will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank. (rest garbled)

Decrypted Traffic.

31 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Peiping.

To: (No heading) #759.

Method handling banking; gold silver deposits, etc.

Decrypted Traffic.

22 DECEMBER 1942.

From: Tokio.

To: Shanghai.

Net #1947.

In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling the Belgium Embassy's-----despatch X----- in the same fashion as an enemy countries despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve - - - - of you secret message - - - - there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.

In relation to

Decrypted Traffic

JANUARY 26-PM- 000.

Gaimuajin Tokyo

Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

HARADA.

Decrypted Traffic

28 JANUARY 1942.

From: Foreign Minister Tokyo #038 (re your msg #061).  
To: Minister Saigon.

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including - - - - to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special Diet on 19 January I desire these details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal entry into Singapore (this day will be published by the Information Bureau)

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony—

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of Imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime Minister's broadcast #43 tell stories to the children.

(b) Have Shinto and Buddhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military music (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades/

Togo.

27 JAN 1942.

From: Chengoal Thia #010.  
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo.  
----- garbled) -----

The Tai Army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to Piruma - - - at Me - - Sataya they were bombed by the enemy.

HARADA.

28 JAN 1942.

From. Harada #012 (Re your msg #431).  
To: Foreign Minister—Tokio.

----- 1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Tailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Tallanders who have become Japanized, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

JAN 21.  
681 A

From: Canton.  
To: Naking, Peking, Shanghai.

Since the investment of Hongkong, our army has lost no time in using transports, and opening up transportation, although the permits were limited (at first) only to those who were actually engaged in carrying on the fighting, but from the 15th of this month, the Shirogane Maru, Guyo Mary and 6 other bottoms, scrapped ships of the Nai Ka - - - Transport Co., have been put into operation from the controlled territory, and the general populace and freights are being carried.

However, between this place (Canton) and Makao and between Hongkong and Makao, traffic has not yet been opened up.

## 1192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

603A

From: Tokio.

17 JAN 1942.

To: Hsingking.

. . . When we had an interview with the diplomatic representative (of Russia, the context shows,) on the 13th, (we said that) from the news which came to this office from a certain daily news agency, it was stated on the authority of a Chinese - - - telegram in November that an American vessel had been sunk as the result of striking a mine. The United States, after some difficulties, had ignored this matter, it was reported, but (we inquired) if he did not think was an American tanker: Also, we asked if there were absolutely no case of Russian vessels sinking after striking a mine. The diplomatic representative denied absolutely that there was any truth in the former statement; regarding the latter statement he said that last year - - - Government - - - A Soviet vessel struck a mine in Pita (Peter) Bay and received injuries, but was able to make port safely. Aside from this, there had been no cases of Soviet vessels striking mines, and this he wished received as his reply.

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17 JAN. 1942.

604 A

From: TOKYO.

To: HSINGKING.

. . . The Soviet newspapers are reporting on the 15th, under the caption "From the Progress of the Greater Asia Struggle" under date line of the 12th the public announcement of the United States that since the opening of hostilities that country has sunk 2 battleships, 3 cruiser, 5 destroyers, 1 gunboat, 1 minesweeper, 10 transports, 4 freight ships, total 29 ships. . . . The losses of the American Navy are reported to be 1 battleship, 3 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 1 target ship, total. . . . (All lost in the attack on Hawaii.)

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19 DEC. 1941.

131 A

From: PEKING.

To: NANKING, SHANGHAI, CANTON, HSINGKING.

News from Yen-an-Fu (Communist Headquarters)

. . . Chungkings broadcast (says that) taking example from the Axis strategy of attack, the Allies received the suggestion that an immediate attack upon Japan should be attempted. The Yen-an-Fu Kaiho Nippo (writes) already in point of fact we are Allies with Britian and the United States. The war against Japan is nothing more than a screen, this war merely offering an opportunity for the Anglo American front to develop another attack upon the Axis Powers, which is something we should find it important to realize at this time. Among the Axis Powers, the most important is Germany, and the harming of Germany is the main purpose of the world wide strategems. That is to say, taking advantage of the crisis in Germany is, as a craft (strategem) the expansion of the line of operations on the continent is most important. The importance of the war in the Pacific to the British and Americans is clear, and the Imperial Command for China in this connection is the pressing of war against aggressor nations regardless of consumption (of materials) and the overthrow of Hitler will be victory for China (?) so at the present time cooperation with the Allies plus the greater and greater extension of the polley of long time resistance, is the method of hastening the total victory of those opposed to the Axis Powers. . . . This is the attitude which the paper (Kaiho Nippo) explains.

---

19 DEC. 1941.

130A

From: Peking.

To: Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow.

Yenan-Fu report. . . .

The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party Kai Ho Niti To (Kaiho Jih Pao) in the editorial on the 13th said that Japan's purposes in the present war are to incite peoples of all of the South Seas areas in order to secure the resources (of that area), expel British and American Interests - - - act in union - - - Germany and Italy - - - to increase her power. Japan's southward advance is, at

the same time, the strengthening of the policy of encircling southwest China, and also of grabbing the Pacific, and is truly inseparable from the China Japanese war.

On this critical occasion you(?) must calmly build up a battle line of all anti-Japanese parties of the Pacific countries. All of China military forces must attack actively; together with this the 8th route army, and the new fourth army must open up Rokoho opposition, begin a counter action against border friction, stirring up the Chinese people of the South Seas against the Japanese. Make most important duty of stirring an anti-war feeling among the people of Formosa, and strengthening the plans toward carrying this out.

(Funada).

100 A

DEC. 18 0443.

From: Buenos Aires.

To: Tokyo.

Today the seventeenth all local papers carried the speech of the navy minister before the Diet in Tokyo, showing great respect. (In the report of American losses) 3 battleships, a mine layer, transport, (one each?) but in addition the loss of 1 aircraft carrier, which is in the present report, seems not to have been reported, so I ask your honorable inquiry into the matter.

/s/ HORIKIRI, Japanese Ambassador.

DEC. 16.

From: Nanking.

To: Tsingtao, Amoy, Hsingking, Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin.

... regarding the rejection by the British military in HongKong of the well intentioned advice (to surrender) on the 16th the special propaganda chief made the announcement; the rejection by British of the humane advice tendered by Japan lays upon the barbarous British the entire responsibility of the exposure of a million several hundred thousand compatriots to the horrors of war. Our compatriots (?) in Kongkong Yotai notice of subjugation compatriots . . . . in line with the - - - national policy we are pushing the plans in connection with the greater Asia war in a positive manner, and at this time we appeal to you people to strive from the protection of your Asiatic country and drive out (expunge) the humiliation of your country which has been practiced by the English for a hundred years. I earnestly desire that you will work for the revival of East Asia . . . along this line he gave out his interview.

DEC. 16

From: Tsinan.

To: Tientsin, Peking, Nanking.

... in the tactics employed against the harming of the road (railroad) by the local maintenance guild, all of the Chinese living within your area (our area?) have been commandeered, materials and domestic animals have as far as possible been confiscated, and everything possible has been carried out to prevent (coiling up—the word used of snakes coiling to spring). About a month and a half have passed since the beginning of these tactics and the efficacy--- carrying out was becoming evident, then the Japan Anglo-American war began and again there are evidences that the enemy in this area are beginning to crawl about again.

The army lines of communication - - - and the regular communication systems are constantly sabotaged (it is attempted). On the night of the 9th, 10 ri (25 miles, if Japanese "ri"; 39.30 kilometers. If Chinese "li" is intended, then the distance would be 6.54 kilometers). South of Daimon Station, on the Shimo Line, an attempt was made upon the roadbed (no harm was wrought); on the - - - Kosai Line, in the neighborhood of Senshu village a freight train was wrecked; and the like. The chief in charge of the line, and the guard have been warned that in case of trouble due to carelessness, they cannot escape punishment. According to - - - Okai Sen, in that section after the local police had applied appropriate encouragement (or pressure) the conduct of the Chinese, while not showing anything which could be definitely defined, has, nevertheless, steadily shown a tendency to trust more than formerly, with the arrival of the news of Japanese victories. This information is sent for your information.



# 1194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to Manchuli.

Ambassador Sato and entourage (Minister Morishima, secretaries Takeuchi and Yuhasih and 5 other people) are expected to arrive at your city at noon on the 19th and then enter Soviet Territory on the same day. Please arrange.

MARCH 2.

From. Shanghai to Tientsin, Peiping ?

The smallpox cases in this area during February (new cases) numbered 21 of which 11 were Japanese and the total of cases since the beginning of the year has come up to 50 of which Japanese are 27.

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to ?

The trend (or "indications") in 1 of your wire (\* . . .) approved (or "understood"). However, - - - (perhaps, "the wording of the wire leads to misunderstanding" and so please explain to - - - that the - - - is not higher than the starting point.

MARCH 2.

From: ? to Canton.

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been special code as from 2nd (first name "Selichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to Shanghai.

Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippel") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to ?

Special code with regard to hiring on the spot.

- - - (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, - - - have been decided.

MARCH 2.

From: ? to Canton.

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been SPECIAL CODE as from 2nd (first name "Selichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

1203 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Shanghai.

Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippel") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

1204 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to ?

SPECIAL CODE with regard to hiring on the spot

- - - - (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, - - - have been decided.

1205 A

funada

MARCH 2.

From Shanghai to Tokyo.

With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.

1206 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Paotao.

Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the the same basis as a special employee - - - if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen. please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.

1207

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Peiping.

Former SPECIAL CODE, Konji Hawegawa has been SPECIAL CODE as from February 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.

Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

funada

From Shanghai to Tokyo.

MARCH 2.

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MARCH 2.

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Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

funada

# 1196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From Tokio to Hsinking.

MARCH 2.

Because we find, after consultation with the War Department, that there is a necessity of reinvestigating Si Mei (perhaps names), please send back report on your examination along with papers relating to this affair.

1209 A

3-5-42  
Yamashiro

---

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.  
March 4, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1210-1224 for your information.  
For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER.  
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

---

From Canton to Tokyo.

MARCH 3.

Extra.

With regard to your wire (extra) (# . . .) of the 3rd.

Wire No. 71 from NAN DAI (perhaps "Southern Platform" i. e., "Southern Station") to this office should have been replied to in General Wire No. 48 of February 20th, but we are sending again by way of assurance.

1210 A

---

From Shanghai to Tokyo.

MARCH 3.

Extra.

From Takahashi to Telegraph Officer Akiyama; How is the (previous) question coming? Please reply as to progress made.

1211 A

---

From Canton to Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

With regard to taxation in China as assessed at the present time, it is thought that studies are being made in the central office. In this area, it has been decided, in view of the special situation here, that an agency for the purpose of studying this question, the China Tax Rates research committee would be formed through the advice of the SANSHOO (may be "Three Leaders'") meeting, with the local Chamber of Commerce and the league of Commodity Importers and Distributors as a center, and that this agency would be made an agency of inquiry (perhaps "on tax matters").

1212 A

funada.

---

From Amoy to Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

And with regard to your wire 1212 of last June.

Police Chief ----. TIN KAN. Policemen, Tadashi Harada, Eichi Taniguchi, Ankichi (?) Nakamura, SI JUN SEI (?) above are higher investigators. Police Chief RIN KEI (perhaps "position held concurrently") with that of Policeman. RYUU TEN SIN (?) (above ----) Chief of Police, Zempo Yamashita, Takashi Asakura, Ryuzoo Fukumoto (above Special Duties)

1213 A

funada.

---

From Canton to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, Swatow and Hoikow.

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wires Nos. 133 and 400.

Although the fact of our wire No. 173 is present (Although the information set forth in our wire No. 173 are true) and although we should (eventually) have to carry on in accordance with above (information), if a request (or "petition") has to be submitted every month with respect to facility in obtaining loans as dealt with in this question, it would mean an unending series of

repetitions. Thus, it is thought that one application (or "petition") should cover at least a period of about 6 months, in order that control and business may be facilitated.

Also with respect to the beginning of your wire No. 400: the proclamation on this question has been considered in this city since quite early - - - . The leadership and organization has been towards cutting down the living expenses of enemy citizens as much as possible, but if these enemy citizens are to continue as at present, to live separately and to live under conditions no different than previous to the war, we cannot hope to limit the living expenses of these people merely by means of leadership (encouragement). In our area, (therefore) a study is being made with regard to the advisability of housing all of the enemy nationals in a definite area, of having them live jointly and of them letting them cook and eat jointly. If this is possible, the living expenses of these people will fall 100 yen per head, or 500 yen for 5 people, as reported in our wire as aforementioned (" . . . ).

1214 A

funada

From: Canton.

MARCH 4.

To: Shanghai, Peiping, Tokio, Nanking.

The transition (or changes) as is now taking place is a matter of concern to us -- for the preservation of peace and ----. Therefore, measures to meet this should be immediately effected. Due to the disruption of trading on the authorized (legal) lists as well as with the under-cover transactions, it is necessary to strengthen control of the market as much as possible. Also to effect reforms in currency (20 (?), and to contrive measures of ----. Concrete measures will be effected in Davao in the near future.

Of course, it is doubtful whether the above remedial measures are more urgent than those concerning mobilization; however, locally measures will be taken to counteract violent economic changes from the tenth.

1215 A

From: Nanking.

MARCH 4.

To: Tokyo.

Please remit by cable the sum of 36,708.48 yen to cover costs of the following: 31,164.65 yen for steel fencing (including 65 yen for changes in construction) as per agreement; 5,538 yen 3 sen for young persimmon plants; and 80 sen to cover shortage for trees already paid for and transplanted.

1216

From: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

To: Hankow.

The proclamation (Number 7) announcing (taking FUTUROO) as an error for FUKOKU, announcing, proclaiming; which modifies the noun kokuj, proclamation—a not unusual tautology in Japanese). the setting up of a Branch office of the Greater Asia Bureau (in Hankow?) and the official opening of that branch office on the 28th., as well as the - - - - order Number 4 regarding the superintendent of this branch office, and the area of his authority (this area of authority being that suggested in your telegraphic message number 12), were officially published in the Government Gazette of March 4th. UN (no meaning can be assigned)—It is desired that you send a wire (in confirmation of this, or recognition of this ?) to the Greater Asia Bureau.

#1217A

From: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

To: Shanghai.

Regarding your telegram number 4:

Yen 7,811 are being advanced from the Incidental Actual Cost Fund for the price of implements and garments for Japanese fencing, including the hakama (a pleated skirt-like garment). Yen 2,627 will be sent forward by wire from the WA TASHIKIRI (which we interpret to be a fund from which payments can be made without voucher) for MEN SOMO (MEN=cotton; somekind of a cotton garment), Chinese clothing, and accessories. FUN (Is the character to divide, Chinese reading, used for STOP ?) (Cf. UN in previous message).

# 1198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Further, we desire a wired message giving detailed estimates on the basis of the various commodities, (in explanation) of your appended statement in your telegram giving a total for the loan fund of Yen 3,342.

# 1218 A

From: Canton.  
To: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

AA-, of this office, has never traveled to Sansootoo (which we presume to be a place name). Since the situation in that place is not clear to us, we desire to send En Kido, the official entrusted with such matters, at this time, on a two weeks trip (The exigencies of travel make such a time allowance necessary) to investigate the situation of the Japanese resident there, and of the schools and for this trip we ask your approval (REN RA E; not clear; possibly, "contact" (renraku) something.)?

# 1219 A

From: Peiping.  
To: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

(We have found this message practically undecipherable) Line 1--1 your wire number -- 57 and the same number 385 SOO (School RAI SA YOO KOKU subject) In regard to --RA Kai-- being, original document --Boo number in N--- GO PYU have do not have-- GI RYOO SERARURU TO -- KO -- next (or succeeding) message number --87 GOO TYOO -- and regular report regarding the residences, regarding -- FUN -- Within this month should be sent in.

# 1220 A

From: Tokyo.  
To: Shanghai.

MARCH 4.

Special employee and radio expert Uchida, who is employed in the fifth department of the Investigation Bureau, being about to depart by air route on the 4th, we desire to advance temporarily (or perhaps, he desires us to advance temporarily) the expenses for his stay here and the TIN HOO (?) of the purchase cost of supplies.

# 1221 A  
RSS

From: Tokyo.  
To: Nanking.

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wire No. 190.

Please wire contents of No. 1100 as that wire has been lost through fire. Further, No. 99 has already been approved by means of Return Regular (wire) No. 3800.

1222 A

From: Tokyo.  
To: Shanghai

MARCH 4.

188 bundles (rolls, or batches) of EKIN ZAI, (perhaps TEKKIN ZAI for "steel rods" or "steel building materials"), 10 tons and 298 kilograms have been shipped on Taiel Maru which left Moji on Feb. 27th. KOO SIN

1223 A

From: Shanghai.  
To: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

----your wire No. 1329 of last year.

As yet-----please-----after-----

1224 A

funada

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
March 6, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1225-1239 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,  
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo.

To: Holhow.

With regard to your wire No. 19:

Will send upon issuance of permits, 2 thousand 7 Yen each from Real Government Expenditure and 1655 Yen (each) from Special relief and control fund, Miscellaneous, as follows:

Vice Consul Hirata, Kikuchi, Kaneko (officials) (for 3 persons from Real Government Expenditure.

Three sets of equipment, their number and use as follows:

Reception room hat racks, 3.

Reception room long chair, 2. Out of three, one will be one used at present.

Inside Chair, 4, out of 6, 2 will be ones used at present.

Round table, 3.

Tea table, 3.

Dining table for dining room, 3.

Side board for dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desk for library, 3.

Chairs for Library, 3.

Bookshelves for Library, 3.

Miscellaneous shelf for living room, 3.

Inspector Fujii, Assistant Inspector Imai, and—Omura (for three people) from Miscellaneous Special Relief and Control Fund.

Following are three sets of equipment, their numbers and use.

Hat rack for reception room, 1, used by Inspector Fujii.

Long chair for reception room, 1, the one presently in use.

Inside chair, 2, same as above.

Round table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Tea table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Dining tables for dining room, 3.

Sideboards for dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desks for library, 3. Those being used presently.

Chairs for library, 3.

Bookshelves for library, 3.

Miscellaneous shelves for living room, 3.

1225 A

funada

From: Shanghai.

To: Canton, Tokyo.

MARCH 5.

Regarding the outgoing telegram from Consul Katagiri of Kiukiang to his excellency.

Umeda, Chief police, was enroute to Shanghai, changing his post of duty, when he received a telegram indicating an emergency (or sudden change) (in the condition of) his wife, and immediately turning back is now enroute again to Kiukiang. The lady, however, is not yet out of the critical state and requires nursing, so this office has received a telegram (requesting) the postponement of his shift of post for the present. The above circumstances seem unavoidable to us, so we request that you will take the necessary steps to secure especial permission.

# 1126 A

# 1200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.  
To: Kalgan.

MARCH 5.

Referring to your message number 127.

While (normally) the total cost of the repairing of the straw mats in the Consul's residence HAMA (MA = room, and this may refer to some special room in the residence) and also in the unoccupied residences should be paid (from headquarters), in other government offices (it is the custom) for the resident in the official residence to pay one quarter of the cost of the repairs and this we desire to have assessed. SPECIAL CODE Yen 506.62 and from the Police Outright Expenditure Fund Yen 2,209.21 SPECIAL CODE. Further, as regards the portion for the unoccupied residences, it will be made an especial grant this once only. Hereafter when a resident is assigned, the necessary repairs expense shall be defrayed from the appropriations for that purpose.

# 1227 A

# 1227 A  
RSS.

From: Tokyo.  
To: Swatow.

MARCH 5.

March salary and special allowance; His Excellency Yen 893.69; MAEJIMA SPECIAL CODE (is this not probably Vice-Consul, as in following message?) Yen 581.21; (including balance of February salary plus removal and family allowance); Yoshida, Yen 280.49; Kawasaki Yen 242.74; Total, Yen 1,908.13 which will be sent (by wire=the probable meaning of SPEC CODE) to your excellency as agent.

#1128 A

From: Tokyo.  
To: Amoy.

MARCH 5.

March salaries and special allowances to a total of Yen 3,582.06, will be sent by wire to your excellency as agent. ITEMS:

Your Excellency, Yen 1,220.38; Consul Mizumoto, Yen 772.49; Vice-Consul Imashiro, Yen 518.44; Gi- - - - -, 285.09; Tadashi Takahashi, and Aoki, each Yen 212.49; Sugihara, Yen 112.98 (Yen 2868 and his special allowance are earmarked for repayment); Moril, Yen 247.70. The end.

#1229 A  
RSS

From: Tokyo.  
To: Hsingking.

MARCH 5.

This message, number #1230 A, is so full of lacunae that any translation seems impossible. It is one of several such messages from Tokyo to the Hsingking Consulate, apprizing them of the news that is appearing in Russian papers. There also seems to be some report of an article in the Rome Times (if there is such a paper) regarding Soviet-Japanese relations, and something about the Soviet Consulate and staff in Japan. Unless the lacunae can be filled in somewhat, re-grouping would probably accomplish nothing.

#1230 A

From: Tokyo.  
To: Canton.

MARCH 6.

Extra numeral message.

Your messages number 44, number 53, and numbers 141 and 151 being missing, we desire a clear cut answer regarding them. (Or possibly an "explanatory answer").

# 1231 A

From Shanghai to Peiping. Tientsin. Toyko. Nanking

MARCH 6.

Collection of taxes at Shanghai KAI KAN (would probably mean "Association Hall" but it is thought that SHANGHAI KAI KAN is the name of an official building in Shanghai) for the month of February as follows, totalling 9363 Yuan, and amounting to 40 percent of amount for same period last year. (details will be sent by mail).

Tax collections 8169

Sur-taxes (assessments and SUISAI (probably, "collections of delinquent taxes"). 443

Special Sur-taxes (Imports and transfers) 731.

Tonnage taxes, 20

Total— 9363 (Please do not publish for outside purposes)

1232 A

From Peiping to Tokyo.

MARCH 6.

Although we have rented the Sanitation (or "Sanitary") KONSU (might be abbreviation of "KONSUTORAKUSHION" for "Construction" or "Constructions"), the repairs necessary throughout the houses in order to make them usable will take a long time, and therefore, although we have (or "there are") quite a few people who are being transferred here and are arriving with their families, the situation is such that there are no houses in which to place these people. Therefore, as a temporary measure (or "a measure to meet the immediate situation") the houses (mentioned) in temporary enactment of our wire No. 182, are necessary, and we ask that you send us the necessary amount for rentals after arranging for permission to rent said houses.

1233 A

funada

From Manchuli to Cut In Tokyo. HSINKING

MARCH 6.

ROZOHATUKII (the name of the German in question) a 48 (?) year old German National, who arrived in Manchuria from Berlin in December of 1939 and has been head of the - - - - - , a German transportation firm, here, wishes to evacuate to Daren together with his family (wife and 1 daughter or nine daughters). We find that the situation (political) is alright, and that (this person's records (?) are authentic, but would like to know if we may issue a visa (would like to know if you have any objections) to issuing) to him, (to them). Please reply immediately.

1234 A

From Shanghai to Canton

MARCH 6.

From Nakane to Vice Consul Ueda.

Matsumoto is at present holding an important (a necessary) post with the Funds Chief (chief of the department of capital) and gets at the present time a salary (a treatment) of about 700 yen per month. If he is to be raised to an assistantship in the near future, but cannot obtain more than he presently gets, it will be difficult to keep him on (prevail on him). So, in that case, will you search for another suitable man.

1235A

funada

From Tokyo to Canton.

MARCH 6.

We have already sent your wire No. 165 by means of our wire No. 139.

Regarding No. 167 we are now - - - - (probably "carying on consultation with - - - -")

Regarding No. 171, although there has been no - - - - (maybe "objections") from all the - - - - (maybe "department heads"), it is believed that the message has been wired to the assistants, (secretaries) of these (people).

1236 A

From Tokyo to Nanking.

MARCH 6.

There is a supply of 58 thousand yen to cover expenses of buying land for your office . . . The Minister (of cabinet) - - - - that plans be made within the year - - - - and a part of the land (for office buildings) be surveyed, and that enactment be carried out temporarily after proper investigation. Also, in this case - - - - the training room (or "area") - - - - the plan - - - - is desired.

1237 A

funada

From Tokyo to Nanking

MARCH 6.

Regarding your wire No. 36, will send after obtaining permit, - - - - (probably "1140 Yen") out of the fund for - - - - police offices under Consulates in China, as being the amount of expenses to the end of the year. . . .

1238 A



## 1202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From Tokyo to Shanghai

MARCH 6.

With regard to your wire Regular No. 463

The BAN NOO - - ("Bannoo" means omnipotent, Bannookayu, a cureall) according to our experience is not very efficient and goes out of commission very often, and so we have not been giving permits on it. It is difficult therefore to approve of it and ask that the 825 Yen be sent back.

1239 A

funada

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SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

MARCH 7, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1240-1253 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,  
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.  
MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Nanking.

March allowances for Shiotaki and Takemitsu, both special employees, is being sent by wire to your excellency as follows:

(1) Shiotaki's share, including the special allowance, Yen 1,062.50; (2) Takemitsu, - - - DOKU KIN (the statement of a sum of money, in Japanese, usually begins with the character KIN) Yen 544.36. Total Yen 1,606.86.

#1240 A

---

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Shanghai.

The plan is for Asakura to leave Kobe by the Taiyo Maru on the 17th, and everything connected with his landing, place to stay and the like is the responsibility of the Contact Department of your office.

#1241 A

---

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Nanking.

To Councillor Nakamura from Minister Nichidaka.

Mr. Yasouka will be busy throughout the entire year and will have no leisure until early next year, so he desires to resign from the position as a formality.

#1242 A  
RSS

---

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Kalgan.

KI SU FUTU (possibly, KIDEN or KISIN FUKU=Your reply wire) Regarding (your reply wire) #124:

SA -- POO SPECIAL CODE. (Can't do anything with it)  
Yen 6,000 Special Code. (Kin comes before and NARI after a statement of a sum of money, in Japanese).

Yen 6,000 from the Special Police Outright Expenditure Fund.

Yen 2,000 From the Outright Expenditure Fund of the Expense budget of the City Police (dep't ?) resident in the Consulate.

(KAN=official, KOO=public; indicate the general classifications in the Japanese governmental budget, we believe. MO KU we do not understand).

#1243 A

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.  
To: Shanghai.

We desire to have Secretary Shimoda, who is at present traveling in your area, return to duty in Shanghai immediately. Please wire us as to his date of sailing.

(The above does not sound right. We suspect that either the telegram was to be forwarded to another point under the Shanghai Consulate, and was sent from Tokyo at the request of the Shanghai Consul to adjust a difficult matter, or else "Shanghai" is in the wrong place and should modify "area", the purpose of the message being to have Shimoda return to duty in Tokyo).

#1244 A

MARCH 6.

From: Kalgan.  
To: Tokyo.

Regarding your message #72 of last year:

As we have rented house and land for the diplomatic officials resident abroad, we ask that you send one half year's rental, Yen 1,200, by wire.

#1245 A  
RSS

From Kalgan to Tokyo.  
And with regard to No. 33

MARCH 6.

Please send 3, AI BOO YEN (?) (3000 Yen) SPECIAL CODE the amount of expected shortage to the end of the year in SHUYOO HI (might be "housing", "expropriation" as in "land expropriation", "training").

1246 A

From Tokyo to Nanking.

MARCH 7.

Extra

As it is suspected that your wire No. 137 has not yet arrived, please send again. (Note: - - - happens to be UTAGAI)

1247 A

From Shanghai to Tokyo.

MARCH 7.

With regard to your wire (\* . . .) Extra.

Please make of our wire No. 244 KETSUGO (could be either "a missing number" or "a combination"). No. 3 from the Minister has not been sent because of a mistake here - - - it was sent on 7th of this month, (today).

1248 A

funada

From Peiping to Tokyo.

MARCH 7.

Extra

From Kato to Telegraph Officer Homura

I believe that you have KOOHAI (probably "seen", or "your attention has been 'drawn to'") our wire No. 216 (1) (2) (or "sections 1 and 2 of our wire No. 216") and the wire addressed you (2). It is especially requested that (the action mentioned) be carried out immediately.

1249 A

funada

From: Tokyo to Hsinking.

MARCH 7.

At the time of the (meeting) mentioned in our wire No. 89 (RUNOFU, name of a Russian representative) said that he had learned of the change of the Japanese Ambassador to Russia through a newspaper article (Red Party Organ dated 4th) and that Ambassador Sato (the newly appointed Ambassador), through having been Foreign Minister in the Hayashi (General Senjuro Hayashi, Premier Feb. to May 1937) cabinet, is well known to the Soviet Side. To this, I (this officer) said, that Ambassador Tatekawa (the previous Ambassador) had, because of ill health, been desirous of returning to Japan, that the Soviet Union knows that all of the Japanese Ambassadors to the Soviet Union in the past have been first class men of excellence (this clause is some-

## 1204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

what indefinite), that we believe that the Soviet Union well understands just where the purpose of the Japanese government lies, in having especially picked this new Ambassador who is a former Foreign Minister, a senior (old timer) in the diplomatic field, and who has a thorough knowledge of Soviet affairs, that we here, on this occasion, should calmly solve the various problems under discussion such as regular shipping schedules, TAIKA (might be "exchange", "freight accumulation" or "compensation"), petitions between Japan and Russia (?), Visas, and floating docks, and that another forward step would thus be taken in the friendship between the two countries. To this RUNOFU replied that he understood, and that everything will be done towards the solving of the problems as (his) ideas concerning them were the same as (I) had mentioned.

1250 A

funada

MARCH 7.

From: Tientsin to Nanking. Shanghai. Tokyo. Peiping. Thingtao and Tsinan

According to the Economic Weekly for the first week in March, the general situation, all commodities have a tendency of falling because of the effect on business of the doubt (distrust) of the rural (inland) areas. Cotton yarn and cloth opened with a tendency of being supported to some extent by the rural areas (probably "business inland") because of rapid and secret tendencies of speculators (?).

Rates falling: Dry goods, 44.60 Yen. Cotton Yarn (8 UMA 20 TE) 1.460 Yen. MEN FUN (perhaps "cotton waste" but from context, it is thought that this might be a mistake for MUGI FUN or MUGI KO, flour), the import of Shanghai powder (flour) is progressing smoothly, and as the CHUZAI KA (perhaps "stock here") settles down, and the movement of material stops because of low rates in the interior, the rates weaken - - - 25.903 Yen IJIRUSHI (?) 24.85 Yen. Sugar, a fall was seen because of the appearance of controlled commodities in the city towards the end of the previous week and the tendency of 1 JUN in the buying rate in the interior, Refined sugar, 235.80. Raw Sugar, 188.40. Peanuts, rates falling on both nuts and oil because of fall in Shanghai through lull in the year's exports. Nuts, 53.50 (highest on 6th) Oil, 104.90 (also highest on 6th)

1251 A

funada

Tokyo to Kalgan.

MARCH 7.

With regard to the application for a permit to establish the Association (perhaps "Corporation") of MU KYOO (perhaps a mistake for MOO KYOO, Mongolia) Engineering and Building Industries; this has been carried out temporarily in accordance with your wire, Regular No. 97 of the 5th of last month. Please reply on following points:

1. Is it necessary, in accordance with Article 34 of the Civil Law, to especially make of said corporation a Juridical Corporate Person?

2. Is it impossible to attain the objectives (of said corporation) under the rules and regulations presently followed by the League of Industries (mentioned above) (Note: Last probably means "League of Engineering and Industrial workers". Also, it might be more correct to say, in above first three lines, "the Inner Mongolia Engineering and Building Corporation")?

3. What were the characteristics of the League(s) of Mongolian Engineering and Construction companies in the past?

4. Will the League of this industry be abolished upon formation of above corporation?

5. It has been reported that the head of said corporation Fujishima arrived there and that the establishment of said corporation took place under the direction of your office; is this true? (Note The last might be a confirmation rather than a question)

1252 A

funada

From: Tokyo.

MARCH 7.

To: Hankow.

To Business Representative Takano, resident in Daiya.

The expense appropriations for your office for the current year are as follows below. These will be sent by wire to Consul General Tanaka (at Hankow?) and you are to receive them as delivered from that office. Within the organization (or, Foundation) Fund of Yen 8,000 you are to pay immediately for repairs and equipment (it being understood that expenditure for desks and desk chairs shall be according to the plan), this grant to be completely repaid within the current year.

Government expense, actual expense----- Yen 60.

Ditto, outright expense----- " 250.

Telegraphic expenses for a diplomatic office abroad, Yen 25. Expense for the Foundation of a diplomatic office abroad, Hankow office, Daiya branch office, and equipment fund, Yen 8,000.

Further, employees daily (wage) GEN 0 Yen. (Gen is probably an error for some figure) Typists within Yen 70, 11 may be employed. When appropriate people have been found, proceed on the basis of temporary action.

# 1253 A  
RSS

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 71

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPHA

War Dept Message 465 to Comgen Haw Dept—Paraphrase—Mailgram Secret Re 2B-24 planes for special photo mission X Pilots to be instructed to photograph Truk Island in Caroline group Jaluit in Marshall group X Visual reconnaissance to be made simultaneously X Information desired number and location of naval vessels including submarines airfields aircraft barracks guns and camps X Warn pilots island strongly fortified and manned X Reconnaissance and photography to be accomplished at high altitude X Do not circle or remain in vicinity X Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude X 2 pilots and copilots to be instructed confer with Admiral Kimmel on arrival at Honolulu for his advice X Suggest B-24 proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake, then Philippines by regular route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby if distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great X Best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit should be told pilots X When reach Philippines 2 copies of each photograph taken to be sent to General MacArthur, Admiral Hart Admiral Kimmel the Chief of Naval Operation and War Department X Insure that 2 B-24s fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure Honolulu.

Date: 8 November 41. Crypto-Group PL/MG CBO HRF Circ. No. 11-887

Originator:

WAR DEPT

MESSAGE 465

COM GEN HAW DEPT

Action:

COMGEN HAW DEPT

Information:

CINCPAC

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPHA

Mailgram—War Dept Message #466 to Comgen Haw Dept—Mailgram

Secret

PARAPHRASE

Secret

2 B-24s will depart United States for Philippines via usual route within 48 hours X Secret photographs made enroute from Wake to Moresby X Instructions covering photography and visual reconnaissance being sent in separate message movements pursuit squadrons from Honolulu to Midway and Wake contemplated X Squadrons to be ready immediately X Lack of space and

## 1206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

housing facilities at these points therefore personnel of these units should be held to an absolute minimum X Provide all troops with tentage X ClnCPac instructed by Navy Department giving additional instructions to ClnCPac and arrange for transfer units and their supply X Planes to be flown off carrier at destination X 30 days ammunition to be sent with planes X Two pursuit squadrons to be sent from United States to Hawaii as replacements as soon as possible.

Date: 28 November 41 Crypto-Group. PL/MG CBO HRF Cir. No. 11-888  
Originator:

War DEPT  
MESSAGE 466  
28 NOV 41  
COM GEN HAW DEPT

Action:  
COM GEN HAW DEPT

Information:  
CINCPAC

CLASSIFIED

INCOMING

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Add to War Dept. Msg. 465 of 26th Nov. Paraphrase Mailgram

"Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation".

Date: 29 Nov '41 Crypto-group Plain CBO FWR Circ. 11-887

Originator:

WAR DEPT  
28 NOV '41  
COM GEN HAW DEPT  
MESSAGE 465

Action:  
COM GEN HAW DEPT

Information:  
CINCPAC

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 72

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Grp. Ct.:

Date: 8 December 1941,

From: CINCPAC

To: COMBASEFOR

Info To:

NYD PEARL  
PENNSYLVANIA  
Classification: Conf.  
C. W. O.: 8

081055

Place 2 battle rafts outboard of each drydock caisson X One to be alongside and one about 100 feet out X To be in place by 0530.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt. (JG) A S Gordon  
A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

1207

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 8 December 1941

Grp. Ct.:

From: CINCPAC

Classification: Secret

To: OPNAV

C. W. O.: HRF

System: 18

First evidence of hostilities was presence of submarine in Pearl Harbor defense area at about 0715 local X There were only a few minutes warning of approach of aircraft which arrived at 0747 X Their first attacks against our aircraft on ground at Pearl Harbor Eva Kaneohe Hickam and Wheeler were so effective that practically none were immediately available except 10 VPB which were in air X Enemy carriers were not sighted but indications of at least 1 north and 1 south Oahu as there appeared to be 3 separate attacks ending about 0930 X Dive bombing and torpedoing most effective and in spite of magnificent and courageous work by gun crews not more than dozen enemy shot down including those by Army pursuits X Add to report of casualties Arizona blew up and most of her officers and men including Rear Admiral Kidd were lost X Floating drydock sunk X Personnel casualties estimated 2800 about one half dead X Attempted bombing of dock facilities in Honolulu killed about 200 civilians X No other damage from mines X Pearl channel is usable X In addition to ship based and planes in carriers about 30 VPB 15 Army pursuits and 13 Army bombers available X Lexington and 4 heavy cruisers from position east of Midway attempting to intercept southern carrier X Enterprise with other available light forces guarding against repetition of raid X Wake reports heavy damage from bombing by 30 planes X Guam reported being attacked by aircraft

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon

A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

081015

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 8 December 41.

Classification: Secret

From: CINCPAC

C. W. O.: HRF

To: COMTASKFOR 8 1 3 12

Crypto Grp.: 132 S

080532 GR 114

Recent radio intelligence indicated formation Japanese major units into two task groups X First group concentrated Indo China area X Second group plus 3 Kongos unaccounted for X Opnav opinion latter force or part attacked Pearl XX Composition second group follows 3 or 4 CA 2 or 4 CV 2 desrons of 2CL 28 DD 1 Subron of 9-12 subs and fast transport force-containing 20 ODD APS XX First fleet less seaplane tenders and 1 desron may be in support according Opnav.

Secret Certified to be a true copy

Lt (JG) A S Gordon

A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 7 December 1941.

Info To: ASP Hawaiian Area Com 14

From: CINCPAC

Grp. Ct. 21

To: COM 11

Classification: CON

080504

If NPM 26.1 goes off air rebroadcast message from 4205 kcs.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon

A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

1208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Date  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMTASKFOR 15.1  
COMTASKFOR 15.1  
~~080200~~

Info To:  
OPNAV  
CINCAF  
Classification: Secret  
System: 132-S

Classified Outgoing

War declared by Japan on Britain and United States X Taskforce 15.1 proceed direct San Francisco taskforce 15.5 proceed Sydney.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon  
A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at ~~080245~~  
Frequency LL

Secret

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Date: 8 Dec 1941.  
From: CINCPAC  
To: CTF 8  
~~080105~~

Classification: Conf

Classified Outgoing

No definite information yet available but indications are that enemy carriers may be both North and South of Oahu.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (Jg) F. R. Bunting  
Lt (JG) F. R. BUNTING, USNR.

Sent at ~~0110~~

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Date: 8 December 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
~~072354~~

To: CTF 8  
Classification: Conf

Classified Outgoing

Detroit Phoenix St Louis New Orleans 14 destroyers and 4 minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you X Also Minneapolis and 4 minelayers ordered to join from operating areas send ships to Pearl for fuel as necessary.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon  
A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE  
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Date: 7 Dec 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMTASKFOR 8

Info To:  
CTF 1  
CTF 3  
Grp. Ct.  
Classification: Conf.

Classified Outgoing

~~072332~~

Radio bearings indicate Akagi bearing 183 from Pearl another unit bearing 167

Certified to be a true copy:

Sent at ~~072332~~.

Lt (Jg) F. R. Bunting  
Lt. (Jg) F. R. BUNTING, USNR No 12-305

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

1209

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 7 December 41  
From: CINCPAC  
To: CTF 12  
CTF 3 AND 8

Grp. Ct.:  
Classification: Conf.  
Originator: 95.  
C. W. O. O.

972328

Cancel Midway Marine Flight  
Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (jg) A S Gordon  
A S GORDON Lt (jg) USNR  
12-394

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 7  
From: CINCPAC  
To: ASP HAWAIIAN AREA

Grp. Ct.:  
Classification: Conf  
C. W. O.: HO  
System: ROO

972245

If NPM Fox goes out guard harbor circuit  
Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (jg) A S Gordon  
A S GORDON Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 2258  
Frequency 4295

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

From: CINCPAC  
To: MINNEAPOLIS  
Info To:  
COMTASKFOR 8

Grp. Ct.  
Classification: Con  
Precedence: Prior  
System: RDO  
Crypto Grp.: 749

Use plane to search Sector 135 to 189 distant 159 miles from Pearl X  
Certified to be a true copy

Lt (jg) A. S. Gordon  
A. S. GORDON Lt (jg) USNR

972239 December 41

Serial No. 12-290

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: ASP HAWAIIAN AREA

Grp. Ct.  
Classification: Conf.  
System: RDO  
C. W. O.: HO

2228

Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point X Attack.

AR

Certified to be a true copy

Lt (jg) A. S. Gordon  
A. S. GORDON Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 2392  
Frequency 26.1



1210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 41  
From: CINCPAC  
To: ALL SHIPS PRESENT

Grp. Ct.  
Classification: Conf.

Z F5L 072217 CBQ TART O BT

All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable X Report Comtaskfor One in Detroit.

~~000~~ 2225 SN 7  
2562

Certified to be a true copy

W. C. Woods  
W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 2225  
Frequency 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 41  
From: COMBATFOR  
To: COMBATSHIPS

Grp. Ct.  
Classification: Con

2203 BT

Prepare available battleship planes for search and report to subbase when ready and Number X 2 California planes at Ford Island probably ready.

Certified to be a true copy

W. C. Woods  
W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 2211  
Frequency 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: December 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: All ships present  
Info to: COMTASKFORCE 8

Grp. Ct.  
Classification: Conf.  
O. W. O.: NL

Z 0F2 2132 00 Q 0GS O BT  
Urgent

All ships departing Pearl organize as Taskforce One undivided Combesbatfor assume command report Taskforce 8.

Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods  
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR.

Sent at 2135  
Frequency: 26.1

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

1211

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 41.  
From: CINCPAC  
To: All ships this circuit

Grp. Ct.:  
Classification: CONF  
System: RDO  
C. W. O.: NL

000 V F5L O BT

Urgent

Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from south.  
Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods  
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 2135  
Frequency: 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date 7 December 41  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMTASKFORCE 8  
008 V 0F2 BT

Grp. Ct.:  
Classification: CON

DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barbers point.  
Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods  
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 2116  
Frequency: 4205

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date 7 December 41  
From: COMBATFORCE  
To: Captain of Yard  
Navy Yard Adm Bldg.

Grp. Ct.:  
C. W. O. SA  
Crypto Grp.: LL  
System: LL

The California is on fire inside probably two tugs with fire equipment could save her.

Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods  
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 2112  
Frequency: Landline

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date 7 December 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMTASKFORCE ONE  
Z 0F2 2045 0G1 O BT  
Urgent

Grp. Ct.  
Classification: CONF

Do not send any more cruisers to sea.  
Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (JG) A. S. Gordon  
A. S. GORDON, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 2050  
Visual

1212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date 7 Dec 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: ASP  
Z 0825 08Q WING O BT  
Urgent

Grp. Ct.:  
Classification: Conf.

Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.  
Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (jg) F. R. Bunting  
LT (JG) F. R. BUNTING

Sent at . . . 2032  
Frequency . . . 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date 7 DEC 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMTASKFORCE 8  
Z 0816 08G O BT  
Urgent

Grp. Ct.:  
Classification: Conf.  
System: RADIO

Two enemy carriers reported 30 miles southwest Barbers Point.  
Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods  
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at . . . 2020  
Frequency . . . 4205

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified  
Outgoing

Date 7 Dec 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMTASKFORCE 8  
" 12  
" 3  
Z F5L 2012 XG2 08G 08G Y O-BT

Grp. Ct.:  
Classification: Conf C. W. O.: SA  
System: RADIO

Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching X some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X addressees operate as directed com Taskforce 8 to intercept and attack enemy composition enemy force unknown.

Certified to be a true copy:

Sent at . . . 2048  
Frequency . . 4205

Lt. (jg) F. R. Bunting  
Lt. (JG) F. R. BUNTING, USNR

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified  
Outgoing

Date 7 Dec 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMTASKFORCE ONE  
Z 0815 08G 08G O BT

Grp Ct.:  
Classification: Conf C. W. O.: SA  
System: Radio

Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers to see

and destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by all cruisers to join Halsey.  
Urgent.

Sent at . . . 1956 2005

Certified to be a true copy :

Lt. (jg) F. R. Bunting

Lt. (jg) F. R. BUNTING, USNR

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 73

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached document consisting of the following:  
Copy of Cincpac Secret ltr. dated 12 December 1941, file L11-1(1)/(50), Serial 02019, Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

is a true and correct photographic copy of the document in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.  
By direction of Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area.

R. E. Keeton,  
R. E. KEETON.

[1]

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 12, 1941.

L11-1(1)/(50) (02019)

*Secret*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

References:

- (a) Cincpac Secret Desp. 072244 of December 1941.
- (b) Cincpac Secret Desp. 081015 of December 1941.
- (c) Cincpac Secret Desp. 100220 of December 1941.
- (d) Cincpac Secret Desp. 102043 of December 1941.

1. The following report relative to damage sustained by ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from enemy attacks on 7 December 1941 is submitted. This amplifies reports submitted by references (a) to (d) inclusive:

(a) **BATTLESHIPS.**

**ARIZONA** sunk at berth as result of aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs which exploded forward magazines. Ship is considered to be a total wreck.

**CALIFORNIA** sunk at berth as a result of hits by two or more aircraft torpedoes; also received one large bomb hit amidships which caused serious fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

**NEVADA** damaged by heavy bombs, possibly mine in the channel and aircraft torpedoes. Beached across from hospital point to prevent sinking after an attempt to sortie. Batteries intact and manned though no power is on the ship. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

**OKLAHOMA** capsized at berth as a result of receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage will be made later.

**PENNSYLVANIA** slightly damaged by bomb hit, starboard side of boat deck while in drydock number 1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Repairs have been completed and ship is ready for service.

[2] **MARYLAND** damaged by bomb hit on forecastle and near miss. Ship was moved to the Navy Yard on 11 December and expected to be fully ready for service 13 December.

**TENNESSEE** received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not explode, but put 2 rammers out of commission. Also one bomb hit aft which

## 1214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

cracked one 14" gun. Heat from the ARIZONA fire melted and ignited paint in after portion of the second deck which was badly burned out. Ship is now heavily wedged to mooring by reason of the WEST VIRGINIA leaning against her. Steps are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of the TENNESSEE. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14 December ship will be ready for service less one 14" gun.

WEST VIRGINIA sunk at berth as result of four aircraft torpedoes and one bomb hit. There is considerable damage from fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

### (b) CRUISERS.

HELENA damaged by bomb hit at frame 30, starboard side, opening up side under armor belt for distance of about 50 feet. Number one and two fire rooms and forward engine room flooded. Ship is now in drydock #2 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to effect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended that ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.

HONOLULU damaged by near miss at approximately frame 40 port side. Hole approximately 20 feet by 6 feet underwater. Ship being docked in drydock #1 today and it is estimated that work will be completed to make her fully effective by 16 December.

[3] RALEIGH damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward half of machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated three decks and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock the RALEIGH following completion of the HONOLULU to effect underwater repairs to make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to make the ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor or a mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.

### (c) DESTROYERS.

CASSIN and DOWNES damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. CASSIN was damaged by fire and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on DOWNES. DOWNES appears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs to CASSIN will be forwarded later.

SHAW hit by bomb while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating drydock badly damaged by fire resulting from oil and powder. After part of ship not seriously damaged. Recommendations regarding repairs will be forwarded later.

### (d) AUXILIARY VESSELS.

OGLALA sunk by aircraft torpedo and near miss by bomb at ten-ton dock at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded at a later date.

UTAH damaged and capsized as a result of hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

CURTISS damaged by enemy plane out of control which flew into crane mast and by bomb which exploded damaging hangar space causing fire which destroyed all radio equipment. Ship is entirely seaworthy. Repairs are [4] proceeding and ship will be ready for operations less one amidships crane by 15 December.

VESTAL damaged by a bomb hit aft while at berth at Pearl Harbor, is undertaking repairs with own repair force. It is estimated that the ship will be fully ready as a repair ship by 17 December. Docking may not be required.

2. It is believed that the sinking of the OKLAHOMA, NEVADA, CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA is in large part due to the ships having been in condition XRAY. Had time been available to set condition ZED before receiving damage, progressive flooding might have been avoided.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:  
Buships  
Buord

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
*Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

Cincpac File No.

A16-3/(05)/

Serial

SECRET

1st Endorsement on Admiral Kimmel's A16-3/02088) dated December 21, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

1. Forwarded.

W. S. PYE.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
*Dec. 21, 1941.*

Cincpac File No.

A16-3(02088).

SECRET.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

3. Before the attacks were completed, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in accordance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with the planes remaining.

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and examination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and destroy the enemy forces.

5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise for the magnificent behaviour of our personnel. Specific cases deserving commendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence.

6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented herewith by enclosure (C).

7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as the remaining missing narratives have been received.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[1] Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A16-3/(02088)

*Pearl Harbor, T. H., Dec. 21, 1941.*

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Cincpac secret letter L11-1(1)(90) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941, to OpNav. Subject: Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From Japanese Attack 7 December 1941.
- (C) Supplementary partial report of damage to ships.
- (D) Disposition of our forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer

## 1216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: "*Enemy Air Raid—Not Drill*". Almost simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and straffing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.

2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to demobilize all planes.

(Enclosure D)

[1] PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 20, 1941.

### (A) DISPOSITION OF TASK FORCES

#### TASK FORCE ONE

|                                 |       |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| Batdive 2 and 4 (less COLORADO) | 5 BB  |
| Crudiv 9 (less BOISE)           | 4 CL  |
| Desrons 1 and 3 (less CLARK)    | 17 DD |
| RALEIGH                         | 1 OCL |
| OGLALA                          | 4 DM  |
| Mindiv 1 (overhaul)             | 1 OCM |

*Disposition:* In port. Returned 11/28 to remain until 12/13.

#### TASK FORCE TWO

|                           |       |
|---------------------------|-------|
| Batdiv 1                  | 3 BB  |
| Crudiv 5 (less PENSACOLA) | 3 CA  |
| Desrons 4 and 6           | 18 DD |
| DETROIT                   | 1 OCL |
| ENTERPRISE                | 1 CV  |
| Mindiv 2                  | 4 DM  |

*Disposition:* At sea as Task Force EIGHT

In Port

ENTERPRISE  
Desron 6  
Crudiv 5

Batdiv 1  
Desron 4  
DETROIT  
Mindiv 2

Position of Task Force EIGHT: 200 miles West of Pearl standing to eastward returning from landing VMF at Wake. Planes were in the air from 0618 to search sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles and then land at Ewa. These planes arrived during the attack and engaged the enemy aircraft.

#### TASK FORCE THREE

|                                   |       |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| Crudivs 4 and 6 (less LOUISVILLE) | 7 CA  |
| Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10)         | 5 DD  |
| Minron 2                          | 13 DM |
| LEXINGTON                         | 1 CV  |

[2] *Disposition:* At sea as Task Force TWELVE.

LEXINGTON.

Crudiv 4 less INDIANAPOLIS and LOUISVILLE plus ASTORIA.

Desron 5 less Desdiv 10.

Position (estimated): 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway and 300 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course to land Marine

VMSB's on Midway. When attack was made the Task Force was ordered to turn toward Pearl and later directed to intercept the enemy and destroy enemy carriers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 6 at Johnston exercising at landing exercises using landing boats. MINNEAPOLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea 3.W. of Oahu—normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port, with NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.

TASK FORCE SEVEN

|                        |     |
|------------------------|-----|
| At Midway.....         | 2SS |
| At Wake.....           | 2SS |
| At Mare Island.....    | 5SS |
| At San Diego.....      | 4SS |
| En route to Pearl..... | 4SS |
| At Pearl.....          | 5SS |
| PELIAS.....            | 1AS |

TASK FORCE NINE

|                                                                              |          |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| VP-21—At Midway. 7 searching 120-170.<br>1450 miles. 4 on 10 minutes notice. |          |
| VP-11—4 hours notice.....                                                    | 12       |
| VP-12—30 minutes notice.....                                                 | 6        |
| 4 hours notice.....                                                          | 5        |
| VP-14—In air (with depth charges).....                                       | 3        |
| 30 minutes notice.....                                                       | 3        |
| 4 hours notice.....                                                          | 4        |
| VP-22—4 hours notice.....                                                    | 12       |
| VP-23—4 hours notice.....                                                    | 11       |
| VP-24—4 in air conducting tactics with SS.....                               | 4        |
| on 30 minutes notice.....                                                    | 1        |
|                                                                              | <hr/> 72 |
| Overhauling.....                                                             | 9        |
|                                                                              | <hr/> 81 |

[3]

TANGIER—In port.  
CURTISS—In port.  
MCFARLAND  
HULBERT  
THORNTON

All planes on the ground on ready notice had been furnished with a search directive in the event that any contacts with surface forces were developed by the early morning search. This plan never became effective because damage to the planes prevented.

MARINE PLANES

|                                        |     |
|----------------------------------------|-----|
| VMF 221—Wake.....                      | --- |
| VMSB 231—Enroute Midway LEXINGTON..... | --- |
| VMSB 232—Ewa 4 hours notice.....       | 18  |
| VMJ 252—Ewa.....                       | 2   |

BASE FORCE

ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port.

Aircraft of Base Force

|             |                 |
|-------------|-----------------|
| VJ-1—9 J2F  | Pearl           |
| 9 JRS       | Pearl           |
| VJ-2—10 J2F | Pearl           |
| 4 PBV-1     | (2 at Johnston) |
| VJ-3—1 J2V  | Pearl           |
| 4 JRB       | at Maui         |
| 1 JRF       |                 |
| 2 BT        |                 |



## 1218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In addition the tenders (destroyer) DOBBIN and WHITNEY were in port and the submarine tender PELIAS.

The Task Forces shown herein, except EIGHT and TWELVE which were on special missions to improve war readiness of Wake and Midway, were in accordance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective since 30 April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941. The Task Forces were operating in accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet and the special tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels were assigned to Task Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their war missions and all training was conducted with that in mind.

(b) The Fleet was operating under the "security plan" originally issued on 15 February and revised on 14 October 1941. [4] This provided for the possibility of a declaration of war being preceded by:

- (a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (b) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area,
- (c) A combination of both.

The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in the operating areas, even to the point of having ready ammunition at the guns. Frequent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor in coordination with Army and distant activities to test the provisions of the security measures against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited recreation periods, and *since the intelligence information indicated complete security from any surprise air attack*, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port. At the time of the attack, however, provisions had been made and were in effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment, and all ships had armed patrols and careful routine inspections of the ships during the entire time in port. In the battleships, two machine guns were always manned and ready and two 5"/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 15 rounds of ammunition at each gun.

(c) In addition and as provided in the Security Plan, a daily search of all operating areas was conducted by planes of Patrol Wing TWO. This was an early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the general areas in which the Fleet would be operating during the day.

Such a search was being conducted on 7 December and planes on that search were in the air at the time of the attack. In addition, 4 planes were operating with the submarines in the training of intertype exercises for communication and recognition. They search the area toward Lahaina Roads on that morning.

(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance of a submarine close aboard the ANTARES returning from Canton Island and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was attacked by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the ANTARES. This was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a submarine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl during the last six months but no actual visual [5] contacts had been made. In addition, no attacks had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy Department had prohibited such attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When the international situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief directed ships to attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it was on this authority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of 7 December.

These submarine attacks were followed by a report from the Navy Signal Tower "Enemy air raid, this is not a drill" at about 0752. It will be noted that the attack occurred while the crews of ships were just finishing breakfast on Sunday morning.

The information regarding the air raid was sent to all Task Forces at 0800, followed by a despatch "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl" at 0812.

The effect of the surprise attack and the damage inflicted with damage to communications made it practically impossible to organize an air search except by the 7 PBY's in the air at the time.

(e) At 0817 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO to search for the enemy, and the PBY's in the air started to search. The 3 on the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 300 miles. The first plane started out at once.

The 4 PBY's operating with the submarine started search sector 245-285 to 300 miles out, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945.

No plane in those areas searched was anything. At 0830 Commander-in-Chief advised Task Force THREE, EIGHT and TWELVE to rendezvous as directed by Commander Task Force EIGHT and stated that instructions would be issued as soon as enemy was located.

(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the northward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1018 was received to indicate that an enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers were in sight. This was later corrected to say the [6] message should have been NOT in sight.

In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated "Captured enemy have marked positions, bearing 223-90 miles from Pearl Harbor." These marks in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.

This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhat south by west of Pearl. At 1020, 15 VSB from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barber's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could do so cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying the enemy.

(g) It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the forces on Oahu until the late morning. By about 1100, however, in addition to the 7 PBY's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes became serviceable they were started on the following searches:

Army—2 B-17

2 A-20A

3 B-18

3 B-17 095-165, 300 miles

Navy—4 planes VP-24, 245-275, 300 miles

2 planes VJ, 355-005, 300 miles.

3 planes VP-14, 295-350, 200 miles

4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles

#### *Battleship & Cruiser Planes*

6 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles

9 SBD, 330-030, 200 miles

6 J2F in westward sector

[7] The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and westward because of the belief that the major enemy attack force was in that direction. In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that they were able to search to the southward.

At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a report that the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in error because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.

At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 183° from Pearl and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward Jalint, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force

## 1220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TWELVE at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement toward Jalint.

No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120 just north of NIIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever reached the Commander-in-Chief.

From the chart later discovered from enemy planes shot down there is no indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the enemy carriers in this area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with our air forces in the area).

The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls, to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible too that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft.

[8] (h) At 0800 the positions of the ships at sea were approximately as follows:

|                   |   |          |
|-------------------|---|----------|
| Task Force TWELVE | — | 18-30 N  |
|                   |   | 168-40 W |
| Task Force EIGHT  | — | 20-50 N  |
|                   |   | 158-50 W |
| Task Force ONE    | — | 20-32 N  |
|                   |   | 159-45 W |

Task Force EIGHT was proceeding on course 170 at 17 knots. His position was in the area to the northwestward of Johnston Island. The cruiser planes searched to the northward of the island and the carrier planes in a south-easterly direction to a distance of 200 miles for the 0800 position.

In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area from Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes of Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220° from Pearl Harbor to a distance of 550 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.

By these searches practically the entire area in the Oahu-Midway-Johnston Island triangle was completely covered.

In addition, the available planes of Patwing TWO searched an area of 200 miles all around Oahu. It was not possible to extend this search further to seaward because of the small number of available planes.

(i) Because Task Force EIGHT was low in fuel, that Force entered Pearl Harbor after dark on 8 December, fueled, provisioned and took on ammunition and departed for sea before daylight on 9 December.

### 9 December

On 9 December the position of Task Force TWELVE was about 600 miles S. S. W. of Oahu proceeding toward the island. A 200 mile search was being conducted in the morning all around the carrier position during the morning and a 150 mile search along the line of the carrier course during the afternoon.

After departure from Pearl Harbor Task Force EIGHT proceeded to the northeastward from Oahu for search operations in that area.

Task Force ONE returned to port on 9 December.

[9] Using Oahu based planes the following search was conducted starting in the morning of 9 December:

|                      |           |             |
|----------------------|-----------|-------------|
| 300-010              | 500 miles | 10 VP       |
| 010-060              | 300 miles | 10 B-18     |
| 060-210              | 200 miles | 18 VSO      |
| 210-030              | 300 miles | 6 VJ        |
| and in the afternoon |           |             |
| 330-020              |           | 4 Army B-20 |

The sector to the southwest of Oahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes as mentioned before.

No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes.

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Dec 23, 1941.

A16-3/(05)/  
Serial 02100  
*Secret*

1st Endorsement on Admiral Kimmel's A16-3/(02088) dated December 21, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

1. Forwarded,

W. J. PYE.

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Dec 21 1941.

A16-3/(02088)  
*SECRET*

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To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

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- (B) Cincpac secret letter L11-1(1) (50) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941, to OpNav. Subject: Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From Japanese Attack 7 December 1941.
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- (D) Disposition of air forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sanpan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: "Enemy Air Raid—Not Drill". Almost simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and straffing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MOMAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.

2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to demobilize all planes.

3. Before the attacks were completed, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in accordance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with the planes remaining.

## 1222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and examination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and destroy the enemy forces.

5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise for the magnificent behavior of our personnel. Specific cases deserving commendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence.

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7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as the remaining missing narratives have been received.

H. E. KIMMEL.

The attached report (enclosure (A)) is compiled from the narrative reports received from each ship listed in the second column, in addition to the incoming and outgoing messages of the Commander-in-Chief's file and a few intelligence reports.

This is only a partial report as individual ship's reports are still being received. The report contains a few inaccuracies which when time permits, will be checked and verified and a corrected report submitted to the Department.

### NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OCCURRING DURING JAPANESE AIR RAID ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

0618

On the morning 7 Dec. Task Force 8 (ENTERPRISE, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, (Crudiv 5), DUNLAP, ELLOT, FANNING, BENHAM, GRIDLEY, MAURY, BALCH, (Desron 6) were returning to Pearl Harbor after completing mission vicinity Wake Island. From position approximately 215 miles West of Pearl routine scouting flight launched. Flight had orders to search ahead sector through 045-135° for distance 150 miles. These planes to proceed Pearl. Three planes also launched to establish inner air patrol.

0630 ANTARES

Arrived off Pearl Harbor, from Canton and Palmyra with 500 tons steel barge in tow. Sighted suspicious object 1500 yds. on stbd. quarter. Appeared to be small submarine but could not positively identify it. Accordingly notified inshore patrol ship, WARD, to investigate it.

0633 ANTARES

Observed Navy Patrol plane circle and drop 2 smoke pots near object.

0645 ANTARES

Observed WARD commence firing for 2 minutes. Patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charged object which disappeared.

0700 VP Squadron 24

Had four of the six PBV5 planes depart Pearl Harbor for scheduled training exercise in operating area C-5. One of the remaining two planes was out of commission for structural changes; the other in standby status for ready duty.

0700

Plane 14P-1 sank enemy sub. 1 mile off P. H. entrance. FORCES UNDER COMMAND OF PATWING TWO (COMTASKFOR 9) disposed as follows: Patron 21-Midway; Patron 11, 12, 14, Kaneohe; Patron 21, 22, 23, 24, Pearl Harbor. WRIGHT enroute from P.H. for Midway. Condition of readiness B-5. (50% aircraft on 4 hours notice). Specific duty assignments required 6 planes from Patron 14 24 and 12 to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. Total number of planes ready for flight or in the air in 4 hours or less: 72. At the time first bomb dropped 14 patrol aircraft were in the air (7 on search from Midway) 58 ready for flight in 4 hours or less. Nine undergoing repairs.

- 0735 PATRON 21 Patwing 2 staff duty officer received and decoded message 14P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor.
- 0740 PATRON 21 Staff duty officer C-C informed by CPW2 of patrol plane sinking report. Patwing 2 proceeded to draft a search plan.
- 0715 KEOSANQUA Began to receive tow from ANTARES. 0758.  
0728 HELM Underway from berth X-7 for deperming buoys at West Loch. All hands at special sea detail stations. Both boats manned and in the water with instructions to follow the ship to West Loch. All magnetic compasses and chronometers had been left in the BLUE preparatory to deperming.
- 0743 Local hostilities commenced with air raid on Pearl. Received message from plane #1 of VP14 to CTF 3 that plane had sunk one enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.
- 0745 AVOCET Moored at Berth F-1A, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb explosion and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars.
- TUCKER Nested alongside WHITNEY. 5" gun #3 could not be fired. All other guns and .50 cal. machine guns fired at attacking planes during all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel shot down three or four enemy planes.
- PATRON 11 Two planes in hangar—4 planes at south end of hangar—6 planes on ramp. As soon as raid started three rifles were manned immediately. Two machine guns manned in a plane being removed from the hangar. Machine gun position in plane abandoned and guns moved to safer position. Set up 2 machine gun nests near south end of hangar. Damage received: 7 planes burned; one wrecked; and four damaged but can be repaired. All hangar, office equipment, and stores destroyed.
- 0745 PATRON 12 Two planes moored in Kaneohe Bay, two in hangar and 8 on parking apron. Upon being attacked manned machine guns in planes, mounted machine guns in pits and used rifles. Observed second wave of horizontal bombers did not release bombs. Own losses—8 PBV-5's—planes completely destroyed, two severely damaged; two moderately damaged, all hangar, office equipment and stores destroyed.
- 0750 TRACY Moored port side to Berth 15, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, undergoing overhaul. PREBLE and CUMMINGS moored to starboard in that order. Ship totally disabled with main auxiliary machinery boilers and gun batteries dismantled.
- 0750 TAUTOG Observed enemy three plane formation of dive bombers over Alea fleet landing on southwest course. Enemy character not discovered until bombs were dropped.
- 0750 CALIFORNIA Sounded general quarters and set condition Zed. Lieutenant Commander M. N. Little, First Lieutenant, was S. O. P. on board and made preparations for getting underway.
- 0750 CASSIN's Commanding Officer observed about 100 feet away from starboard side of dry dock #1 at altitude of 100 feet an airplane with large red disks on bottom of wings. Sounded general quarters and made attempts to locate ammunition; part of 5" guns under overhaul. .50 calibre machine guns were unlimbered.
- 0750 PATRON 21 Drafting of CPW2 search plan completed.  
0750 OKLAHOMA (0750 or 0753) struck by 3 torpedoes on port side frames 25, 35-40 and 115. Ship heeled to port 45° meanwhile A. A. batteries manned and G. Q. executed. Rapid heeling of ship and oil and water on decks rendered service to guns ineffective.

## 1224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0750 CURTIS | Moored in berth X-22, condition X-RAY. Number 3 boiler steaming. Ship at G. Q. Ship straffed by fighter planes. Observed bomb hit on VP hangar at NAS. UTAH, RALEIGH and RICHMOND attacked by torpedoes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0750 PYRO   | Secured along West Loch dock, stbd. side to. Heard noise of low flying aircraft and explosion in Navy Yard area. Observed two low wing monoplanes about 100 feet above water head for PYRO's port beam. Planes zoomed clear of ship and was observed to be Japanese. Sounded General Quarters and prepared to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0752 AVOCET | Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with 3" A. A. battery. Hit Japanese plane which had just turned away after torpedoing CALIFORNIA. Plane burst into flames and crashed near Naval Hospital. Fired 144 rounds 3" 50 cal. and 1750 rounds .30 cal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0753 PRUITT | PRUITT reports 10 planes flying low, 200 ft., bombed Ford Island and blew up hangar.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0753 TERN   | Notified of attack and made preparation for getting underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0753 TRACY  | Observed BB's attacked from astern by about 10 dive bombers. Torpedo planes at about 100 feet approached from Easterly direction attacking BB's. TRACY O. O. D. saw dive bombers attack BB's (10 planes and Ford Is. from North). Attack followed by horizontal and dive bombers on same objective plus ships in dry dock. 1 dive bomber passed close enough to observe that it was a single engine by-plane probably type 94.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0754 GAMBLE | Heard explosions on Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0755 BAGLEY | Moored Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, berth B-22, repairs to starboard bilge keel. Sighted dive bombers in action over Hickam Field. They were believed at that time to be Army bombers. Shortly after this time enemy plane approached from the direction of Merry Point at about 30-40 feet altitude and dropped torpedo on OKLAHOMA and retired. Opened up with forward machine guns on attacking plane. Machine gun fire bagged 8th plane, it swerved and torpedo dropped and exploded in bank 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Plane finally downed in channel. Continued machine gunning enemy planes. 3 planes believed to have been shot down by BAGLEY. |
| BOBOLINK    | Observed about 12 dive bombers centering their attack south hangars of Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| BREESE      | Moored in berth D-3, Middle Loch, in nest with division order of ships from starboard U. S. S. RAMSAY, BREESE, MONTGOMERY, and GAMBLE. Observed bombing of old hangar on Ford Island. Sounded General Quarters, set Condition "A", and made preparations for getting under way. Sent boats to landing to pick up men.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| CACHALOT    | Moored at Berth #1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor undergoing scheduled overhaul.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| CASTOR      | Sounded general quarters. Ship berthed at Merry Point.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| CONYNGHAM   | Heading north moored starboard side to WHITNEY at berth X-8. REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELF-RIDGE outboard. Ship undergoing routine tender overhaul, receiving power from tender. Noted large fire on Ford Island and observed horizontal and dive bombing planes attacking. Sounded General Quarters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |

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|      | <b>DEWEY</b>      | Observed UTAH to be torpedoed and to list rapidly. DEWEY at nest, DesDiv ONE, with PHELPS alongside port side DOBBIN at X-2 under overhaul.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0755 | <b>DOLPHIN</b>    | Moored portside to Pier 4, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. Japanese aircraft delivered dive bomb and torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. Sounded General Quarters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|      | <b>HEIM</b>       | Turned into West Loch channel and headed up toward depurging buoys.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|      | <b>HENLEY</b>     | Through error in gangway watch in calling crew to quarters for muster at 0755, General Alarm was sounded instead of gas alarm as customary. Observed first torpedo plane attack on UTAH. Crew proceeded to Battle Stations while General Alarm sounded the second time. Set material condition AFIRM. Made preparations for getting underway. Opened fire on light bomber, altitude about 17,000 feet apparently steady on Northerly course; approaching from seaward and passing over Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|      | <b>HONOLULU</b>   | Moored port side to berth B21 Navy Yard, Pearl with U. S. S. St. LOUIS alongside stbd. side. Planes were seen diving on HICKAM FIELD. At the same time a wave of torpedo planes were seen approaching over fleet landing. Sounded general quarters and passed word "Enemy Air Raid". Ship prepared to get underway. A. A. batteries came into action gun by gun as they were manned. 50 caliber and 30 caliber M. G.'s fired on enemy torpedo planes attacking the BB's. From this time until raid ended 30 caliber, 50 caliber and 5"/25 A. A. guns fired at every available target. Service ammunition expended 2,800 rounds of 30 caliber, 4,500 of 50 caliber, 250 rounds of 5"/25 caliber.<br>12 two-seat low wing monoplanes flying low from Southeast dropped one torpedo at each battleship. Saw two planes destroyed.<br>18 low-wing dive bombers from Southeast. All bombed Hickam Field. |
|      | <b>MinDiv ONE</b> | Undergoing scheduled overhaul, moored in repair base. Guns and ammunition removed. Crews, except the watch on board, living in Navy Yard receiving barracks.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0755 | <b>MinDiv ONE</b> | Japanese planes were seen to attack the BB's. Men were sent to adjacent ships, NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO, and CUMMINGS, to assist in manning A.A. guns and handle ammunition. Meanwhile receiving barracks sent men (our) to other ships to assist in fighting fires or handling ammunition. These men reported to PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, and WHITNEY. Also in the Yard. Miner's Mates were sent to West Loch. 50 and 30 caliber MG's were reassembled and remounted and ammunition was obtained from NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO and Marine Barracks. These guns were used against the enemy making the later attacks. No ship of division suffered damage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|      | <b>PATTERSON</b>  | Moored at berth X-11, battle stations manned. Opened fire with main and 50 caliber batteries. The PATTERSON considered that at least one enemy plane was shot down. The plane Claimed by PATTERSON was one observed diving on CURTISS approaching from ahead at about 400 ft. altitude. Plane was seen to fall apart at same time shot was fired by #2 gun.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |



# 1226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
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| PHOENIX     | First attacking plane sighted from Signal Bridge attacking from north of Ford Island. Plane had all guns firing. Passed over stern of Raleigh and proceeded toward Ford Island Control Tower and dropped bomb.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| PREBLE      | On 7 December was undergoing Navy Yard overhaul at berth B-15 with no ammunition on board and the engineering plant dismantled. First attack on battleships began with about 20 torpedo planes. Planes were in low horizontal flight when observed and attacked from eastward. Enemy planes approached battleships to close range before releasing torpedoes.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| RALEIGH     | Commanding Officer felt dull explosion and looking out airport observed water boiling amidships. Received report that Japanese were attacking fleet. Sounded general quarters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| RAMAPO      | Both planes were successfully hoisted out by hand power. Doctor was directed to report to SOLACE. Damage repair party was sent to capsized UTAH to cut men out of hull. Sent Signal to send pontoon and a lighter alongside from BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as an outrigger. Torpedoes, minus warheads were pushed overboard and beached at Ford Island. A1 stanchions, boat skids and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Both anchors let go.                              |
| RAMSAY      | O. O. D. observed Japanese dive bomber come in close and drop couple of bombs. Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with A. A. Guns (3''). Motor Torpedo Boats on board also opened fire with machine guns. Order of attack observed to be dive bombers strafing, torpedo planes, dive bombers bombing, horizontal planes bombin.                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| REID        | Our personnel reported 3'' shell hit plane. No losses in personnel and no material damage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| SOLACE      | Moored at berth D-3 observed bomb land on western end of Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| SUMNER      | Observed unidentified planes attacking Ford Island. Received report of air raid, closed all watertight doors and ports, called away rescue parties; prepared hospital facilities and sent 2 motor launches with rescue parties to ARIZONA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| SWAN        | Was moored to the new dock at the southern end of the Submarine Base, port side to, bow to eastward. Armament is four 3'' 25 caliber A. A. guns, four 50 caliber machine guns, and one 5'' 51 caliber broadside.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| TAUTOG      | Sounded General Quarters. In Marine Railway, boiler upkeep. Observed bomb dropped on South ramp of Fleet Air Base.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0755        | Observed about 20 planes approaching on line of OAHU railroad tracks, and over Merry's point. Torpedoes were dropped from about 50 feet after submarine base pier was passed. Fourth plane in line and plane near end of line were shot down by this ship and HULBERT before torpedoes were dropped.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0755 VESTAL | A Japanese plane flew from North to South over a fish pond adjacent to water front resident of Lt. B. B. Black, U. S. N. R. on the East shore of Pearl City Peninsula. A long burst of machine gun fire was directed at the breakwater enclosing the fish pond, and a single fisherman wearing a white shirt was seen to run rapidly along the breakwater. This material is forwarded to indicate that enemy pilots were directing fire at individuals (civillans) at a considerable distance from any military military objectives. |
|             | Sounded General Quarters. Manned A. A. battery, 3'' A. A. and 5'' broadside and .30 cal. M. G.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

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|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| VIREO                  | Moored inboard at Coal Dock (seaward end) with TURKEY, BOBOLINK, and RAIL, outboard.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| WIDGEON                | No remarks except machine gun and rifle fire used against enemy. No losses or damage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| WEST VIRGINIA          | Passed word "Away fire and rescue party" followed by General Quarters. Two heavy shocks felt on hull of W. Va. apparently forward and on port side. Ship began to list rapidly to port. Another third heavy shock felt to port. Plane on top of turret 4 caught on fire. A heavy explosion occurred with about 20° list on ship to port. Central station directed to counter-flood. The following last explosion flashed a flame about 15 feet high occurred forward on ARIZONA. A second flash occurred on the ARIZONA higher than the foretop. Burning debris rained on quarter deck of W. Va. After the 2 ARIZONA explosions the W. VA. began to right itself when a large fire broke out amidships. Word received from central station to abandon ship. A wall of flame advancing toward the W. VA. and TENNESSEE from the ARIZONA. W. VA. personnel began to abandon ship as fire had grown out of control. Meanwhile magazines of W. VA. had been flooded. W. VA. personnel report to TENNESSEE. Remaining survivors ashore and elsewhere sent back to W. VA. to fight fire. Fire on W. VA. extinguished Monday afternoon. |
| 0756 BOBOLINK          | Ready duty status, moored at next end, of coal docks with VIREO and TURKEY inboard, RAIL outboard. Informed by gangway watch that Japanese planes were bombing us. Sounded general quarters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| GAMBLE                 | Wave of about 50 Japanese planes attacked battleships and Naval Air Station, Ford Island, planes flying at low altitudes about 500 feet over battleships from direction of Diamond Head, about 700 feet over Ford Island. Five successive waves of the attack of about 10 planes each.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| MinDiv TWO<br>THORNTON | Went to General Quarters and set condition "A". Reports attack by Japanese aircraft commenced; general alarm was sounded and all hands went to air defense stations. THORNTON moored port side to dock at berth S-1, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. Stations manned were as follows: Control, Machine gun Battery Control, Repair, and 4 .50 cal. machine guns, 3 .30 cal. Lewis machine guns. 3 .30 Browning automatic rifles, and 12 .30 cal. Springfield rifles.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0757                   | Ensign Chiles of JARVIS called Lieut. Ford and said "Someone is bombing us".                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| BREESE<br>CONYNGHAM    | Opened fire with .50 cal. machine guns. Observed Torpedo planes attacking RALEIGH, UTAH, and DETROIT from the West.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| DEWEY<br>HELENA        | Sounded general quarters. Moored at 1010 dock, berth 2, portside to dock, OGLALA alongside starboard side. Reported observed planes over Ford Island, 14,000 ft. altitude. Signaller on bridge with previous duty on Asiatic Station identified planes immediately. General alarm sounded and service ammunition broken out.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| HULL                   | General Quarters. Prepared to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0757 NEW ORLEANS       | Moored at berth 16, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor undergoing engine repairs, receiving power and light from dock. Sighted enemy planes dive bombing Ford Island; sounded G. Q.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0757 PENNSYLVANIA      | In dry dock #1. 3 propeller shafts removed. Destroyers CASSIN and DOWNES in dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Floating dock west of new dry dock adjoining PENNSYLVANIA occupied by SHAW.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |

# 1228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Cruiser HELENA and OGLALA at Berth B-2 (PENNSYLVANIA normal berth). CALIFORNIA in F-3, MD F-4 inboard, OKLAHOMA outboard; Berth F-6 TENNESSEE inboard WEST VIRGINIA outboard, F7 ARIZONA, F8 NEVADA. Machine guns in foremast manned and condition watch of A. A. personnel available. Ship receiving steam water and power from yard. Heard explosions on end of Ford Is. and realized an air raid in progress after 2nd explosion. Air defense sounded, followed by Gen. Qtrs. Set Condition YOKE.

0757 SUMNER Signal watch and quartermaster on bridge sighted ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard. Observed two explosions in Navy Yard. Sounded alarm.

0757 TREVER Mine Division FOUR moored at buoys D-7, bows towards Pearl City, in order from north: TREVER, WASMUTH, ZAND, and PERRY. Sounded general quarters at time when first bomb was dropped by Japanese on north side of Ford Island.

0757 WASMUTH WASMUTH reports first Japanese planes attacked. Went to General Quarters at once with all guns in action within 3 minutes. However, as ship was inside nest of four only two after guns could bear. Made all preparations for getting underway.

0757 PATRON 21 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. Message order broadcast to all ships present "AIR RAID P. H. X THIS IS NOT DRILL" (a similar message was sent by CinCPac).

0757 ZANE ZANE moored bow and stern in nest with Mine Division Four at buoys D-7; order from port to starboard; TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE and PERRY. First call to standby colors sounded. Signalmen on watch observed single Jap plane drop bomb from about 10000 feet on southern end Ford Island after approach from Northward. Sounded General Quarters; manned A. A. battery. Commenced firing with A. A. battery at all planes passing within reasonable distances. Made all preparations to get underway.

0758 ANTARES ANTARES heard explosion in P. H. and observed Japanese planes delivering attack.

0758 BAGLEY BAGLEY observed torpedo plane come in from direction of Merry Point between Navy Yard and Kuahua Island, 30 or 40 feet altitude, headed for OKLAHOMA. About 2 to 3 hundred yards from OKLAHOMA, plane dropped its torpedo and hit OKLAHOMA amidships. Sounded General Quarters and commenced firing. Hit fourth plane coming in which was seen to crash in channel off Officers Club landing. Machine gun fire on 8th plane made it swerve to left causing torpedo to drop and explode in bank about 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Number one machine gun downed plane in Navy Yard channel. Third torpedo plane hit by BAGLEY was observed headed for light cruisers HONOLULU and ST. LOUIS astern of BAGLEY. Plane went out of control, dropped its torpedo and seemed to hit I-head crane in Navy Yard. This was about the eleventh plane to come in. Next plane hit by BAGLEY came over dock but was downed with a short burst. Torpedo dropped in lumber pile and plane believed to have crashed on dock. Fifth plane brought down by BAGLEY came down on starboard side, nose directly up into air and spun into crash loosing its torpedo. Sixth plane brought down by BAGLEY was a dive bomber during second phase of attack and after torpedo attack. This plane was shot down by 5" gun and those from other ships.

0758 CUMMINGS CUMMINGS observed enemy planes making torpedo attack on BBs moored to East side Ford Island. Sounded General Quarters.

0758 GAMBLE Went to General Quarters, opened fire with .50 cal. machine guns on planes passing over nest at about 800 feet altitude. Set material condition affirm except for certain protected ammunition passages.

0758 JARVIS General Quarters sounded on JARVIS.

0758 HULBERT HULBERT sounded general quarters. Torpedo plane sighted heading west over east lock preparing to launch torpedo against battleship off Ford Island. HULBERT reports bringing down 1 Japanese torpedo plane by .50 cal. A. A. fire from berth S-3, Submarine Base.

0758 HULL Gangway watch opened fire with .45 caliber pistol on two (2) planes crossing bow within 50 yards.

0758 MUGFORD Moored port side to the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, berth No. 6, Navy Yard. U. S. S. JARVIS moored port side to MUGFORD. Attack started. Japanese planes dive on Ford Island. Several large bombs struck the sea plane landing ramps followed by explosions near hangars. Several Japanese planes came in low from southwest and released torpedoes which struck OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA. Enemy torpedo planes came in continuously from same direction and fired torpedoes at the BBs.

0758 REID REID went to General Quarters.

0758 RIGEI Ford Island attack by 10 dive bombers from North at 10,000 feet.

0758 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE attacked by enemy planes (Japanese), Oily water around stern burning. Canvas awning on stern on fire, Turret III. Smoke pouring into Repair I. Smoke so thick, cannot see. Repair I have man standby magazine flood, Turret III. All boats on fire. Fire in maintop, secondary aft. Fire in maintop seems to be out. WEST VIRGINIA's quarterdeck and planes on fire. Fire on Turret III. Could not get morphine out of doctor's room because it was unsafe; men report that room was too hot to go in and cut safe open. D-310 excessively hot—investigate. Squadron of planes diving on Navy Yard. Repair I, unit 3, abandoned station—too hot. Fire on topside seems to be under control. D-310-A is all right. Set Condition ZED in lower handling room of Turret III. OKLAHOMA seems to be capsizing. CALIFORNIA down by the stern. WEST VIRGINIA has pretty bad fire below Signal Bridge. TENNESSEE was hit twice, soon after attack began; one hit (bomb) on face of Turret II, and bomb hit on top of Turret III, penetrating.

0758 THORNTON THORNTON commenced firing with .50 cal. machine gun battery followed immediately by .30 cal. machine guns and .30 cal. rifles.

0759 GAMBLE GAMBLE opened fire with 3"/23 cal. AA guns, firing as planes came within range, fuses set 3 to 8 secs.

0759 HELM First enemy plane sighted in shallow dive over Ford Island, headed Northwest. Observed first bomb hit on hangar at southwest end of Ford Island. Called crew to General Quarters. Opened magazines and got ammunition to guns.

0759 JARVIS Lieut. Ford and Lieut. Johansen of JARVIS reach bridge. Jap torpedo planes coming in at 30 to 60 second intervals, approaching from Merry Point direction and attacking BBs.

0759 SUMNER Observed torpedo planes approach over S. E. Loch attacking BBs, circling Ford Island and flying off to south west.

# 1230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

0759 WHITNEY Observed air raid attack by Japanese air force and explosions on Ford Island. WHITNEY moored bow and stern to buoys X-8 and X-8x, 6 fathoms of water, supplying steam, electricity, fresh and flushing water to CONNYNGHAM, REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELFRIDGE, moored alongside to port.

0759 PELIAS PELIAS reports 9 dive bombers attacked out of direction of sun the Battleships. One broke off and dive bombed PENNSYLVANIA.

0800 - - - - Two officers from ship hiking in back of Alea witnessed attack. They stated later that 3 separate flights of planes appeared at 3 levels: low, medium and high from the north.

0800 VIERO C. O. VIERO heard an explosion. Immediately Japanese planes were seen, and General Quarters sounded.

0800 ANTARES ANTARES under machine gun fire. Topside hit by machine gun bullets. Bomb and shell fragments. Being unarmed no offensive tactics were possible. In order to avoid placing ship and personnel in jeopardy, authority was requested to enter Honolulu harbor.

0800 COMINBATFOR Comineraft in OGLALA observed enemy bomb fall seaward and Ford Island; no damage. The next bomb caused fires near waters. Flames flared up from structures southend of island. Next bomb fell alongside or on board 7 battleships moored at F-1 eastside of Ford Island. Jap planes flew between fifty and 100 feet of water, dropping 3 torpedos or mines in channel on line between OGLALA and seaward end of Ford Island.

Torpedo hit OGLALA and HELENA simultaneously. These ships were moored abreast of B-2 of ten ten dock OGLALA outboard. Both ships opened fire with A.A. battery. OGLALA signalled C-C possibility that mines had been dropped. Two contract tugs were hailed to haul OGLALA aft of HELENA. Submersible pumps for OGLALA were obtained from HELENA, but could not be used as no power was available. Observed one Jap plane shot down. Planes were strafing as well as bombing. Observed 4 battleships hit with bombs, fires broke out, and one battleship tured over. Enemy planes appeared to fly in groups of 6 to 10. NEVADA underway to clear channel, but apparently was struck by torpedo or mine. A minute later 2 bombs fell only one hit in the NEVADA. On 2nd attack observed bomb dropped on fwd part of PENNSYLVANIA in dry-dock. Flames appeared from two destroyers in the same dock. Observed another Jap plane fall in water. Observed bomb fall close to destroyers in floating drydock. Destroyer later caught on fire.

0800 CASSIN CASSIN saw another plane come down to about 75 feet on parallel course drydock #1. Plane dropped torpedo aimed at CALIFORNIA at range 200 yards.

0800 CASTOR CASTOR 3" A. A. and .30 cal. machine guns commenced firing against enemy torpedo planes, low and close aboard, and against dive bombers. Observed one enemy torpedo plane at about 500 to 700 yards range and 500 ft. altitude due aft of ship and heading across to Ford Island with parts of fuselage shot away. Plane grounded either on Ford Island or beyond. Removed covered lighter alongside with 450 aerial depth charges.

0800 DOLPHIN Machine guns and rifles manned and fired at enemy aircraft which were flying very low. Ready identification could be made by the large red balls on each

wing. Report received plane had been shot down and dove into channel off pier 3.

0800 BLUE UTAH torpedoed. General alarm was sounded, and word passed throughout the ship to man battle stations and prepare to get underway immediately.

0800 RIGEL RIGEL vicinity #1 dry dock and ten ten dock strafed and bombed by 15 dive bombers from South. Altitude 600 to 100 feet.

0800 WHITNEY WHITNEY sounded general quarters. First plane passed over ship low altitude, strafing with machine guns.

0800 HELM Torpedo planes sighted approaching from direction of Barber's Point. They passed over West Loch channel and dropped torpedoes either in North Channel or across the island. Targets for these planes appeared to be ships in berths F-9 to F-13. The planes came in low, and several strafed the ship. All bullets missed the ship by a few feet. No fire was opened, since the forward machine guns, which could bear, were covered with preservative grease and had to be cleaned before they could fire.

0800 HELM Backed engines and commenced maneuvering ship out of West Loch channel to head for entrance.

0800 JARVIS Ensign Greene OOD of JARVIS reported on bridge. Prior to this he had been directing activities around the quarterdeck. He was told to go to the after firing battery. Ensign Chiles was actively organizing the forward battery without orders. Ensign Fleece already on the director. Orders given to open fire.

0800 MUGFORD Commenced assembly of engineering plant which had been placed out of commission for yard overhaul. Connected fuel oil hose to yard line. 8,000 gallons total on board.

0800 PHOENIX Bombing attack on BBs. Plane markings, varied U. S. swastikas, and rising sun painted on fusilage.

0800 RALEIGH Opened fire with AA battery of 3"/50 cal. 1.1" and .50 cal. guns. Ship started to heel to port and received report that torpedo had struck #2 fireroom. #1 and 2 firerooms and forward engine-room completely flooded. Fire in #3 went out. Directed counter-flooding. As it appeared that ship would capsize, orders were given to jettison topside.

0800 RALEIGH Both planes successfully hoisted out by hand. Doctor was directed to report to SOLACE. Damage repair party was sent to capsized UTAH to cut men out of hull. Sent signal to send pontoons and lighter from alongside BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as outrigger. Torpedoes minus warheads were beached at Ford Island. All stanchions, boat skids, and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Anchors were let go.

Attacked by torpedo plane and bombing plane. Sounded General Quarters. Received severe underwater hit frame 84, portside. Followed by another hit which caused ship to list 15°. Passed word "all hands on deck". Not possible to repel attack as all ammunition was in magazines and secured. 5" and 1.1 guns covered with steel housing; .50 and .30 caliber machine guns dismounted and stowed below decks. Ship covered with two layers 6 by 12 timbers. Above conditions necessitated by UTAH being used by ships as bombing target during current operations. Received bomb explosion in port aircastle.

## 1232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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| 0801 PRUITT     | Reported OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA attacked from southerly direction. Number of torpedo planes attacked from southeast.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0801 NEVADA     | Observed enemy air attack. Sounded general quarters. Two machine guns forward and two aft had been already on continuous watch under the alert program.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0801 MUGFORD    | Sounded General Quarters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0801 SUMNER     | Saw dense smoke rising behind Kuahual Peninsula believed from ARIZONA, blazing oil floating down from line of BBs. Opened fire—#3 gun manned and commenced firing four minutes after the attack on Navy Yard was observed, and before any other gun in the vicinity had commenced firing. Made direct hit on and destroyed torpedo plane making approach on BBs.                                                                  |
| 0801 HELENA     | Opened fire. Hit by torpedo, range 500 yds., starboard side, approximately frame 75, 18 feet below water line. Four near misses from bombs received and one strafing attack with little damaged. Issued gas masks and protective clothing. Once gun opposition was in full swing, Japanese planes were noted to turn away from gunfire or keep at respectable altitude.                                                           |
| 0802 DEWEY      | Four .50 caliber machine guns fired at planes attacking battleships and Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0802 TREVER     | Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0802 NEVADA     | Opened fire with machine guns on enemy planes approaching on port beam. One plane brought down 100 yards of NEVADA's port quarter; one plane dropped torpedo which struck the NEVADA on port bow.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0802 PENNA.     | Attack by Torpedo planes from west and south, about 12 or 15. PENNA. reported as first ship opening fire on plane. After release of torpedoes three planes came in low from port beam strafing PENNA., though not affected. Bearing of torpedo attack and one enemy plane observed to burst into flames 2000 yds on stbd bow. Dive bombing attacks and torpedo attacks on Pearl Harbor, and dive bombing attacks on Hickam Field. |
| 0803 CUMMINGS   | After Machine Guns opened fire on Japanese torpedo planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0803 CALIFORNIA | Opened fire with machine guns and ready guns, on torpedo planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0803 SWAN       | Opened fire with 3" A. A. guns. All sea valves and hatches closed and commenced placing boilers in commission. Observed one direct hit with 3" gun—plane crashed beyond drydock area. No material damage suffered.                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0803 CACHELOT   | Enemy planes passed within range and arc of guns. Opened up with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0803 NEVADA     | NEVADA opened fire with 5" A. A. Members of crew claim both broadside scored direct hit on torpedo plane which disintegrated in midair.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0804 JARVIS     | Machine guns opened fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0804 WHITNEY    | Commenced firing with .50 cal. AA guns. Received signal to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |

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|------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0805 | MUGFORD     | Opened fire with .50 caliber MG's. Shot down Japanese plane, altitude 800 feet on the stbd. quarter, passing aft on stbd. hand. This plane had fired a torpedo at the U. S. S. OGLALA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0805 | TRACY       | Observed torpedo planes coming in from easterly direction and launching torpedoes at BBs at Ford Is. At first attack ship closed up as much as possible and broke out fighting equipment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0805 | NEW ORLEANS | Sighted enemy torpedo planes on port quarter, flying low across stern. Rifle fire and pistol fire opened from fantail as first planes flew by to launch torpedoes at battleships. Manned 1.1 battery and machine guns aft in time to fire at three or four enemy planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0805 | VESTAL      | Struck by two bombs. VESTAL moored to port side of ARIZONA B-F7. One bomb struck stbd. side fr. 44. Penetrated 3 decks, exploding in GSK stores, cutting fire main and electric cables in crew space. Hold set on fire and wrecked. Another bomb struck at fr. 110 on port side, passed through the shops and fuel oil tank. Bomb explosion forward damaged practically all stores. Heat of explosion necessitated flooding fwd. magazines. Material damaged consisted of 3 life rafts, 6 mooring lines, one gangway, port lenses and windows broken. |
| 0805 | VESTAL      | Opened fire, and shortly after A. A. breach jammed, blast from ARIZONA cleared gun station, killing one man. Fired with machine guns on enemy planes until they were withdrawn. Fired at torpedo plane which was seen to burst into flame and disappear over Ford Island. Following personnel damage was done: 9 dead, 7 missing, 19 in hospital.                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0805 | RIGEL       | BBs attacked from altitude 185 feet from southeast by 12 torpedo planes, 300 to 500 yard range.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0805 | HELM        | Opened fire with after machine guns at planes over main channel, followed shortly by forward machine guns firing at passing torpedo planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0805 | HULL        | #4 machine gun opened fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0805 | CURTISS     | Firing with 5'' local control and .50 cal. machine guns. Lighted off boilers 1, 2 and 4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0805 | UTAH        | Listed about 40° to port. Attacking planes strafed crew as ship was abandoned.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0805 | SUMNER      | Torpedo plane passed close aboard within 100 yards of SUMNER, stern on West course, altitude 75'. Levelled off for launching torpedo at BB. Struck by direct hit from sumner's #3 A. A. gun, range 300 yards. Plane disintegrated in smoke and sank in fragments. Torpedo believed sunk without exploding.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0805 | JARVIS      | 5'' opened fire. #3 gun believed to be the first 5'' gun in harbor to open fire..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0805 | BREESE      | Opened fire with 3'' A. A. guns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0805 | RAMSAY      | Sounded general quarters and opened fire with .50 cal and 3'' cal guns. RAMSAY liberty party returning in MONTGOMERY boat was strafed by torpedo planes which were observed to fire 3 torpedoes into UTAH and RALEIGH.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0805 | GAMBLE      | Mounted and commenced firing with .30 cal. machine guns on galley deck house.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0805 | BLUE        | Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns on Japanese planes diving on ships in harbor.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0805 | CASSIN      | Observed HELENA open fire followed by PENNSYLVANIA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0805 | CALIFORNIA  | Reported two torpedoes struck port side, frame 100, making 40 ft. long hole extending from first seam below armor belt to bilge keel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0806 | PHOENIX     | Made radio signal to ships of sector four "prepare to get underway".                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |



## 1234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|      |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
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| 0806 | PRUITT              | Observed Jap bomber shot down. ARIZONA listed sharply, smoke and flames.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0806 | BOBOLINK and TURKEY | commenced firing. Directed other boats in next to tie up to destroyer buoys adjacent to battle rafts in order to disperse.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0807 | BLUE                | Opened fire with 5"/38 caliber guns on Japanese planes. The engine room was ordered immediately to light off No. 2 boiler (#1 already steaming) and made all preparations for getting underway. Repair party cleared the ship for action, and made all preparations for slipping quickly from the mooring.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0807 | HELM                | Opened fire with 5" battery. No hits observed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0807 | HULL                | #1 5"/38 cal. opened fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0808 | CURTISS             | Sent Engine Room emergency underway signal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0807 | PHOENIX             | One plane burning in water at end of pipe—line astern of berth F-8.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0808 | CUMMINGS            | Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching over Navy Yard from southerly direction.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0808 | CONYNGHAM           | Opened fire with 5" gun and machine guns on attacking planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0808 | MUGFORD             | U. S. S. OKLAHOMA had capsized. W. VA. listed heavily to port, ARIZONA blew up.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0809 | WHITNEY             | Making preparations for getting underway. Supplies issued to destroyers alongside.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0809 | HULL                | #5 gun, 5"/38 cal. opened fire, followed by guns #2, #3, and #4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0810 | THORNTON            | First dive bombing attack ended.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0810 | CUMMINGS            | Commenced preparations for getting underway in accordance general signal. Opened fire main battery on dive bombers over BBs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0810 |                     | Enemy aircraft bomb struck hangar and aircraft parking space adjacent to VP-24 parking area. Ready plane suffered a severed wing spar. Plane was then machine gunned and caught fire. Fire was extinguished and plane has been repaired and is in service. Plane undergoing structural changes not damaged and is now operating. Personnel present mounted machine guns in available planes and opened fire on attacking planes. One low-winged biplane flying from across hangar 54 on course about 250 lost both wings.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0810 | NEW ORLEANS         | All batteries NEW ORLEANS except 8" battery in action. Area around berths 14-19 incl, subjected to dive bombing attack by approximately ten enemy planes. Attack turned away by combined fire of HONOLULU and NEW ORLEANS. Observed three bombs drop; one falling ahead of and another falling astern of the RIGEL. These failed to explode. Third bomb landed midway between RIGEL and NEW ORLEANS exploding and causing damage from flying fragments. During raid yard power failed or was cut off leaving vessel in darkness without power except auxiliary battery power. Heavy drain of machinery raising steam for getting underway exhausted auxiliary batteries so much that lighting was very dim and of practically no use. All work in engineering spaces, magazines and ammunition passageways conducted by flashlight. Hoists and guns worked by hand with consequent reduction of volume of fire. AA directors were off ship. |
| 0810 | UTAH                | Listed 80° to port mooring lines parting and two minutes later ship capsized. Ship abandoned.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0810 | UTAH                | Capsized. Salvage operations undertaken immediately in order to rescue entrapped personnel. 32 men thus rescued. Estimated number of torpedoes to hit ship about 5; no bombs were observed to have hit.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

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| 0810 | PHOENIX        | MG battery opened fire on attacking planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0810 | DEWEY          | Guns 1-2-3 and 5.5", no power on ship.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0810 | HELM           | Fire from port machine gun hit plane approaching from South. Plane observed to veer sharply, catch on fire and crash behind trees near Hickam Field. Damage to enemy:—1 plane shot down by machine gun fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0810 | CASSIN         | Observed Japanese plane crash over tree near hospital. Five high altitude, 12,000 ft, bombers passed overhead from forward aft and dropped large bombs. Observed OKLAHOMA roll over.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0810 | PRUITT         | Commenced making preparations to get underway. Lighted off four boilers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0810 | GAMBIE         | Opened fire with 5" guns on dive bombers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0810 | CALIFORNIA     | Commanding Officer, Captain M. S. Bennion mortally wounded.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0810 | W. VIRGINIA    | Set condition affirm. Commenced firing with 3" A. A. guns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0810 | WHITNEY        | Counted 6 or 7 torpedoes in OKLAHOMA. NEVADA, WEST VIRGINIA, and ARIZONA also torpedoed. Apparently, ARIZONA forward magazine exploded. Noted OGLALA torpedoed alongside HELENA at 10-10 dock.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0810 | JARVIS         | Opened fire with after machine guns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0810 | REID           | No material or personnel damage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0810 | WHITNEY        | Reports formation of high altitude planes came in from S. W. attacking battleships and Ford Island followed by another wave from the same direction. Torpedo planes were small and carried only one bomb. Dive bombers also small and carried but one bomb. At coal docks nested with 4 minesweepers. Opened fire with 3" A. A. 15 minutes after first bomb dropped on Pearl. Opened fire with .30 machine guns, rifles and pistols 20 minutes after first attack. A string of 20 bombs fell in channel astern. Shrapnel fell throughout ship. No material or personnel damage.   |
| 0810 | RAIL           | OGLALA listing to port. Attack started again. Heavy A. A. fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0812 | MUGFORD        | Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 9812 | Outgoing       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0812 | COMSECTOR FOUR | Sector 4 Prepare to get underway                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0812 | HULL           | All machine guns plus two automatic rifles on the bridge and one on after deck, firing.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0812 | RIGEL          | Torpedo planes attacked from S. E. at 500 feet and attacked BBs from altitude 125 feet, range 300 to 500 yards.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0812 |                | Task Force 8 received Message from CinC Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill. This time about coincided with expected arrival ENTERPRISE planes at Pearl. Task Force Comdr. first concerned that planes were assumed to be unfriendly by harbor defenses. It was not until subsequent dispatches were received that it was realized hostilities with Japan had begun. TF-8 operated in area South Kaula Rock for air attack should enemy be located North or South of Oahu. No authentic information available regarding location. Maintained combat and inner air patrols. |
| 0812 | SIGARD         | Undergoing overhaul in Navy Yard stbd side to PRUIT Berth 18. Ship totally disabled as to main and auxiliary machinery and gun battery. Observed Squadron of Japanese planes coming in from Southwest, diving from 5,000 feet on Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0813 | CONYNGHAM      | Observed attacking plane shot down by fire from nest. Plane crashed near CURTISS.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0813 | HELM           | Passed gate vessel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |

## 1236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

0815 - Aircraft in flight informed hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl. VP-24 directed to search sector 240-280 for carriers. Ten miles south of Barbers Point plane 24-VP-4 sighted unidentified submarine near force consisting of INDIANAPOLIS and 4 Destroyers. Submarine made crash dive and spot marked by float lights. Completed search through 200 miles and returned to Pearl.

0815 PENNA Reports NEVADA underway and about on PENNA stbd qtr. Distance about 600 yds when dive bombing attack observed approaching PENNA on port bow. 10 or 15 planes coming in succession just before reaching PENNA  $\frac{3}{4}$  planes appeared to swerve to left. Number of them dropping bombs at the NEV. 1 dive bomber dropped bomb on SHAW in floating dry dock and set it on fire. NEV observed to slowly swing around head to port broadside to channel, on fire fwd. Observed 2nd Group of enemy planes fly toward Hickam Field. VIREO opened fire expending 22 rounds 3" A. A. Ammunition.

0815 RIGEL Undergoing major repairs and conversion at Navy Yard. No motive power available. All power etc. from yard. Air attack began. As this vessel had no armament no offensive action could be taken. Accordingly rescue work was commenced on WEST VIRGINIA personnel. About 100 men (in track of burning oil) had been blown into the water. These were rescued first. The torpedo, bombing and machine gun assaults on the WEST VIRGINIA continued while the rescue operations progressed. One rescue boat was struck by bomb and sunk. Crew thrown into water. Moored B-13 Navy Yard undergoing major repairs. Services from Navy Yard.

0815 SICARD Set condition of readiness "AFFIRM". 2 fire parties were formed fore and aft.

0815 MUGFORD Shot down one enemy plane bearing astern making approach on battleship at altitude 20 feet off water. Plane crashed on Ford Island aflame, torpedo not launched.

0815 PHOENIX A. A. battery opened fire.

0815 CASSIN Observed another group of 5 high altitude bombers passed overhead and let loose bombs.

0815 PRUITT Observed 12 bombing planes in close "V" formation bombed (horizontal attack) from 10,000 feet from Southwest.

0815 JARVIS All guns and machine guns of JARVIS in action. MUGFORD noted to be delivering high volume of fire.

0815 SUMNER Checked fire.

0817 CINCPAC Directed Compatwing TWO locate enemy force.

0817 HELM Sighted conning tower of submarine to right of channel, Northward of buoy #1. Gave orders to open fire, pointer fire, but submarine submerged before guns could get on.

0818 CONYNGHAM Opened fire with remaining 5" guns at horizontal bombers passing overhead in direction of Schofield Barracks.

0820 TRACY Sent men to CUMMINGS to assist batteries and approximately 15 men to PENNA to fight fires.

0820 HELM Opened fire on submarine off Tripod Reef; no hits observed. Submarine appeared to be touching bottom on ledge of reef, and in line of breakers. Steering motor short circuited—bridge lost steering control.

0620 SICARD Was manned 2 .30 cal. M. G.s. Bombers began to attack ships at 1010 dock and battleships in vicinity of Ford Island. SICARD hits were observed on planes but no apparent damage was done.

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| 0620 | VESTAL     | Observed torpedo pass astern and hit ARIZONA. Simultaneously ARIZ received bomb hit followed by her forward magazine exploding. Latter started fires aft and amidship of VESTAL. Shortly after that, ARIZ observed to be settling and fuel oil between VESTAL and ARIZ ignited.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0820 | PYRO       | Opened fire on planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0820 | MUGFORD    | Opened fire with 5"/38 battery.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0820 | SUMNER     | Ship ready for getting underway. Members of broad-side gun crew and available engineers were armed with rifles and BAR's and stationed in upper works to act as snipers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0820 | CALIFORNIA | Torpedo struck port side, frame 47, making an irregular hole 27 x 32 ft., the top of which is 6 ft. below bottom of armor belt.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0820 | SOLACE     | Reports boat loads of casualties began to arrive. By this time all hospital supplies and facilities had been prepared for maximum service.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0820 | NEVADA     | Attack slackened.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0820 | REID       | Opened fire with after 5"/38 caliber on high altitude and dive bombers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0820 | WHITNEY    | Observed Japanese plane fall in flames north channel vicinity X-5.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0820 | CUMMINGS   | Lull in air attack; ceased firing. Lack of DC power prevented use of director. Sound powered telephone and local control used.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0820 | HULBERT    | Claims share in bringing down a bomber.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0821 | HELM       | Observed torpedo pass close under stern on a northerly course.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0825 | TRACY      | Ready to open fire with 3 .30 caliber.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0825 | MUGFORD    | Signal received that parachutists or wrecked pilots were landing in Hickam Field.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0825 | CALIFORNIA | Opened fire on horizontal bombers at 10,000 ft. with 5" guns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0825 | BREESE     | Received signal to get underway but being inside nest could not do so.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0825 | Outgoing   | To COMTASKGR 12 & COMTASKGR 8: Report position.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0825 | SUMNER     | Opened fire on ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard Dry Dock. These planes approached from cloud bank in South East. Heard terrific explosion in Navy Yard—vicinity of Dry Dock followed by dense cloud of smoke. Dive bomber passed 300 yards from SUMNER and DD's HULBERT and THORNTON, tail of plane ignited. Plane turned southward and disappeared over Halawa district. Observed six horizontal bombers approaching from southeast at 8,000 feet. Planes circled and approached Ford Island from Southwest and dropped bombs over DD's. Planes then circled to Southeast. One plane left it's formation, turned towards Navy Yard losing altitude rapidly, passed SUMNER at 400 feet altitude range 500 yards; was fired on by SUMNER. When over center Southeast Loch, plane began smoking and was lost in thick smoke over Navy Yard. It was a two-seater monoplane, gunner in rear seat protected by shield, orange disk on side just abaft rear cockpit. Planes crossing low ahead of nest to Northeast were taken under fire by CONYNGHAM and nest. One burst into flame and exploded in clump of trees in Alea Heights. |
| 0826 |            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0826 | BREESE     | Received report submarine was in harbor.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0827 | SICARD     | Cease firing, expended 300 rounds .30 cal. M.G. ammunition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0830 | PENNSY     | Lighted fires under #4 boiler.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0830 | CONYNGHAM  | Reports another plane diving toward Ford Island from Northeast shutdown by combined fire of the nest.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |

## 1238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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| 0830 | PENNA      | Reports about 5 high bombing attacks obs. to have passed over PENNA. one from port bow one from ahead one from ahead to stbd 2 from astern. Altitude about 2000 feet.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0830 | VIREO      | Brought down one enemy plane which landed in vicinity of Hickam Field. 400 rounds of .30 cal. M.G. ammunition expended. One personnel casualty to PRICE, Radioman, on telephone watch astern of vessel. PRICE returned to duty 10 December. No damage to vessel. Made ready to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0830 | VESTAL     | Prepared to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0830 | MUGFORD    | Five enemy planes in V formation passed directly overhead, making horizontal bombing attack.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0830 | SUMNER     | Checked fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0830 | RIGEL      | 15 Heavy bombers in 3-V formation 8 to 10 thousand feet from S. E. bombed BB's.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0830 | WHITNEY    | Issued ammunition and ordnance stores to destroyers alongside. Secured steam to destroyers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0830 | HELM       | Fired at enemy plane with forward machine guns. May have hit plane.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0830 | NEVADA     | Heavy bombing attack received.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0830 | HULL       | Two Vee's high level bombers (10,000 feet) directly overhead seen intermittently through the clouds. Opened fire with all guns. Formations broke up and dropped their bombs in cane field.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0830 | CALIFORNIA | Opened fire on Dive bombers with 5" and forward machine guns; shot down one enemy dive bomber which crashed in flames.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0830 | BREESE     | Sighted conning towers of two submarines in North channel but could not open fire because of interior berth. Observed MONAGHAN proceed down channel at full speed to ram leading submarine which had just fired torpedo at U. S. S. CURTIS but missed. U. S. S. MONAGHAN dropped 2 depth charges and submarine, about 250 ton type arose upside down and sank.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0830 | ZANE       | Sighted strange submarine 200 yards astern of MEDUSA moored in K-23. Guns would not bear as ZANE was inboard ship.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0830 | CASSIN     | Received signal from PENNSYLVANIA, Senior destroyer officer report on board.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0830 | HENLEY     | Underway from buoy X-11. Large bomb struck water 150 yards from port bow. Received signal "submarine in harbor". MACDONOUGH directly ahead made depth charge attack and cleared at high speed. HENLEY was third ship in sortie. After rounding Hospital Point, subjected to straffing attack by light bomber, coming up from astern and showing five distinct sources of machine gun fire from plane as plane passed ship. It was seen to crash offshore in a few minutes. Another light bomber approached from starboard at 2,000 feet and was taken under fire with another destroyer. Close burst forces plane to dive and it crashed into sea. |
| 0830 | DOWNES     | Open fire with 5-inch, on blocks. DOWNES struck on after deck house by bombs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0830 | RIGEL      | Captain returned on board. Bomb struck astern and midway between pliers 13 & 14. 150 small holes were blown into port quarter RIGEL. Above waterline.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0835 | CURTIS     | Ready to get underway. Sighted submarine periscope on starboard quarter, distance 700 yards. Opened fire on submarine.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0830 | REID       | First group of enemy planes taken under fire of REID with forward 5" and .50 caliber machine guns.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0830 | Outgoing   | To MPL RDO SAN DIEGO & MPM RDO WALLUPE: I must have instantaneous relay for my dispatches.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |

0830 COM-14 To NAS Pearl: Hostile Japanese air attack x Hickham Field bombed x stay clear this area as long as gas permits x keep in contact this station.

0832 CALIFORNIA Reported one enemy plane shot down over Ford Island.

0832 SICARD observed 4 flights horizontal bombers attacking battleships, followed by 8 torpedo bombers. OKLA-HOMA struck by several torpedoes, took heavy list to Stbd and capsized. ARIZONA struck by torpedoes and heavy bomb.

0832 PYRO Observed enemy planes crash and burst into flame towards Barbers Point. Pilots bailed out. Observed damage to ship which consisted of broken steam line; repaired by ship's force.

0835 SICARD Sent working party 20 men to CUMMINGS to handle ammunition, and 4 gunner's mates to NEW ORLEANS to assist her battery. 10 men previously detailed to PENNSYLVANIA to assist damage control.

0835 BOBOLINK Moved out of next and to first buoy. Observed Japanese plane crash near Hickam Field. Believe it result of minesweeper firing.

0835 PREBLE Reports first phase of attack completed.

0838 COM-14 To SHIPS PRESENT: Send boats to Ford Island.

0838 MUGFORD W. VA burning. ARIZONA on fire. Tugs trying to pull overturned OKLA clear. U. S. S. VESTAL clearing NEVADA.

0840 CALIFORNIA Shaken by 4 near bomb hits and splintered considerably by fragments.

0840 CURTIS Submarine surfaced and fired one torpedo up North channel toward destroyers. Conning tower hit twice by gun #3.

0843 CURTIS Ceased firing on submarine and observed MONAGHAN drop 2 depth charges. Air bubbles and slick appeared.

0840 CUMMINGS Opened fire to repel straffing attack. Glide bomber observed to veer away from ship with smoke trailing, passed over new boiler shop and disappeared in smoke.

0840 JARVIS Noted NEVADA underway and standing out. Dive bombed, hit several times and beached. SHAW hit and caught on fire in drydock. Two destroyers in drydock with PENNSYLVANIA hit.

0840 TREVER Ready for getting underway. TREVER could not clear because other ships astern were clearing buoys D-3 and D-4. Enemy plane brought down vicinity of Pearl City. Second plane brought down 200 yards off Beckoning Point.

0842 MUGFORD U. S. S. VESTAL clear of NEVADA.

0845 PHOENIX Ship ready to get underway.

0845 SICARD Observed attack broken off.

0845 VESTAL Observed ARIZONA quarterdeck awashed. With no steering gear VESTAL got underway while tug pulled her bow away from ARIZONA. Starting to list to Stbd VESTAL was maneuvered into position with South end of MCrews Point bearing 80° distance 910 yds.

0845 MUGFORD Executed signal to get underway to Task Forces One and Two. Tugs pulled OGLALA clear of HELENA.

0845 CALIFORNIA Commander Stone, executive officer, arrived and assumed command of CALIFORNIA. Combatfor returned on board.

0845 CACHALOT Dive bomb and straffing attacks made by enemy.

# 1240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|           |                         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|-----------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0845      | HULL                    | Second Attack. All attacks except one was broken up. One formation of three planes continued on. Two of these were shot down; one by USS DOBBIN and one by the next of ships. Two bombs landed astern of next, close to side of DOBBIN.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0845      | CASTOR                  | Ready to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0847      | BLUE                    | Underway upon execution of signal to get underway from berth X-7. Maintained fire on enemy planes with main battery and machine guns while steaming out of harbor. Four planes fired on with main battery were later seen to go down in smoke. It is claimed that two of these planes were definitely shot down by this vessel. One was seen to crash in field on Waipio Pena., and the second crashed into crane on stern of USS CURTISS. Two planes that dove over the ship were fired on by the .50 caliber machine guns. It is claimed that one of these planes, seen to crash near Pan American Dock, was shot down by this vessel. |
| 0850      | MUGFORD                 | W. VA. listed heavily to port.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0850      | ZANE                    | Reports MONAGHAN approached and depth charged submarine. Enemy plane brought down flying over nest, struck deperming station.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0850      | SUMNER                  | Dispatched ship's boats to Ford Island to assist in hauling ammunition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0850      | DOWNES                  | Hit again by bombs and set on fire. Abandoned ship.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0850      | COMDESFLOT 1            | To DESFLOT 1: Desdiv TWO establish Offshore patrol.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0351      | MUGFORD                 | Executed signal to get underway and sortie according to plan E-S.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0351      | COM-14                  | to Cincpac. Submarine reported in Pearl Harbor for Sector Commdrs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0854      | MUGFORD                 | Attacked started again from North.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0855      | CONYNTHAM               | Fired at plane straffing ahead and astern.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0855-1017 |                         | Underway from Buoy D-3 Middle Lock RAMSEY, BREESE, GAMBLE, and MONTGOMERY. Opened fire with AA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0855      | MUGFORD                 | NEVADA Underway. Dense smoke over Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0855      | PRUITT                  | A tanker was towed clear of Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0855      | WHITNEY                 | Observed about 10 planes made high altitude horizontal bombing.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0855      | USS RALPH TALBOT RAMSAY | Observed second air attack by Japanese bombing planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0855      |                         | Was moored bow to southward to buoy X-11 with PATTERSON to port and HENLEY to starboard.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0855      |                         | Underway proceeding out of harbor. Believe RAMSAY is responsible for shooting down plane with .50 cal. Assumed anti-submarine patrol on clearing channel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0857      | CTF 2                   | To all ships: Enemy submarine in North Channel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0859      | UNKNOWN                 | To Cincpac: Ten aircraft approaching Pearl Harbor from Southwest.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0900      | TRACY                   | Reports high altitude bombers passed overhead in several waves. One bomb fell in slip between stern of RIGEL and CUMMINGS at Berth 15.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0900      | MUGFORD                 | Attack started again from the South. Army planes taking off from HICKAM FIELD.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0900      | RIGEL                   | Executive Officer returned on board. Traffic congestion delayed all hands. The one exception to all hands was Lt. H. E. Morgan who did not return until 0800 next morning. Lt. Morgan's behavior is being investigated.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0900      | SICARD                  | Observed dive bombers from S. E. attack ships moored to Navy Yard docks, followed by waves of dive and horizontal bombers on ships at Ford Island and docks.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

0900 OGLALA Approaching 40° list to port. Ordered all hands abandon ship. Only gun crews and Cominbatfor remained.

0900 PHOENIX Formation of 11 planes passed over fleet on heading 070. Approximate altitude 10,000 feet. Planes appeared to be painted silver. Expended fifty rounds of 5". No apparent damage to planes. There were two flights of this nature. Time of second cannot be approximated. Expended fifty rounds of 5".

0900 HONOLULU Enemy bomber sighted flying directly towards this ship from direction Merry Point with an altitude of 1,000 feet. Was seen to swerve to its left, pass over the Navy Yard, smoking, losing altitude and appeared to crash near Naval Hospital. This plane was under the fire of several ships, including the port 5" and machine gun batteries of the HONOLULU. Damage to enemy observed, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21, Submarine Base, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21 BB. (Note: Damage listed above is at unknown times).

0900 TAUTOG Observed planes approaching in direction Hickam Field high in southwest and mostly obscured by clouds. App. 18 planes turned left over Hickam Field and made dive bombing attacks on ships in yard. Dive appeared slow and bombs released were very low. One plane observed out of control in flames. Scattered enemy planes observed until 1130. Most dive bombers appeared to drop two bombs each.

0900 CALIFORNIA One bomb, possibly 15" projectile with tail vanes, struck CALIFORNIA abreast casemate one, frame 59, penetrated to second deck and exploded rupturing forward and after bulkheads of A-611 and overhead into A-705. Armored hatch to machine shop badly sprung and couldn't be closed, resulting in serious fire.

0900 BREESE Projectile from BREESE 3" AA battery struck dive bomber which had just attacked CURTISS. Forward section of plane with motor landed on North side of Waipie Peninsula.

0900 RALPH TALBOT Underway. While enroute to entrance expended 150 rounds 5"/38 cal. and 1500 rounds .50 cal. Observed two planes crash and another start to smoke badly. Two enemy planes dove low over bridge and was hit by our .50 cal machine guns. Plane crashed along shore Pearl City abeam of us. Used after 5" guns to fire on plane attacking CURTISS.

0900 DEWEY Second wave attack started by light bombers lasting 10 minutes under fire by DWEY throughout attack.

0900 PATTERSON Underway and stood out of harbor. No damage sustained by PATTERSON.

0900 SOLACE Ship underway and shifted from Berth X4 to Berth X13. No material or personnel damage to ship proper.

0900 BOBOLINK Observed suspicious sign of Japanese submarine and signalled to destroyers, but signal apparently not seen.

0900 BOBOLINK Observed three flights of high altitude bombers approaching from due south to north. 7 planes in each flight, altitude about 17,000 feet. One flight dropped bombs on Hickam, second flight passed directly over coal docks and dropped bombs further up in yard; third flight passed over West Lock, one plane dropping bombs near entrance while others maintained course and dropped them beyond Ford Island.



## 1242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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|------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0900                   | RALEIGH      | Dive bomber attack came in which was met with warm reception. One bomb hit ship a glancing blow going through carpenter shop and oil tank, piercing the skin below water line and finally detonating on bottom of harbor. Plane machine gunned ship also. Steam raised in 3 and 4 firerooms and pumps started. Five bombing planes under fire were observed to crash close aboard. |
| 0900                   | HONOLULU     | 5 high altitude bombers, 12 to 15,000 feet appeared. 5 high altitude bombers from South, 12 to 15,000 feet. All bombed Pearl Harbor and Ford Island Area.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0900                   | RIGEL        | 15 dive bombers 6 to 10 thousand feet from N. attacked DDs and NEVADA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0900                   | SOLACE       | Got underway and shifted from Berth X-4, near BOBBIN and destroyers to berth X-13 in the clear. Made boat trips to WEST VIRGINIA to bring back casualties.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0900                   | DOBBIN       | Fired upon enemy plane headed astern of ship. Plane crashed upon trees in Navy Yard.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0900                   | OGLALA       | Capsized along 10-10 deck.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0900-<br>0900-<br>0915 | PHOENIX      | Dive bombing attack on ships berth northern side of Ford Island. Attack was made at about 30° angle, opposed with AA and MG batteries. Expended 20 rounds of 5". One plane disintegrated by DD fire.                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0900-<br>0930          | PHOENIX      | Effected periodic fire on planes delivering low-level bombing attack on navy yard and ships berth there.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0901                   | CUMMINGS     | Observed twelve scattered planes over Ford Island; air raid resumed. Opened fire with main battery on horizontal bombers approaching over Navy Yard industrial section.                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0902                   | MUGFORD      | Formation of planes sighted to South. Decks of ARIZONA and W. VA. level with water. Dense smoke pouring from NEVADA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0903                   | DOLPHIN      | Reports another attack from higher altitude.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0903                   | Outgoing     | To MIDWAY: Pearl Harbor bombed no indication direction attack take off attempt locate Japanese Forces.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0903                   | Outgoing     | To WAKE: Pearl bombed by Japanese be on alert.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0905                   | CURTISS      | Obs. 1 of 3 planes pulling out of dive was hit by CURTISS and crashed into #1 crane. Tank exploded and plane burned on Boat Deck.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0905                   | SUMNER       | Fired on wave of dive bombers approaching Navy Yard. Dive bombers also attacked HICKAM FIELD and BB. No hits, when firing on latter planes. Observed light dive bomber with conspicuous red tail zig-zag over Navy Yard as if observing casualties at end of phase.                                                                                                                |
| 0905                   | TRACY        | Attack by approximately 10 dive bombers from direction of the sun, which indicated drydock as objective. Group of 6, 3, and 9 planes observed at altitude of 8 to 10,000 feet. Bomb seen to fall between berths 13 and 15 in slip. TRACY gig damaged by fragmentation; no casualties.                                                                                              |
| 0905                   | PREBLE       | Observed about 30 dive bombers make second attack in twin-motored monoplanes. Observed one bomb fall in slip 25 yards on starboard quarter. Observed a bomb fall astern of HONOLULU in berth B-21. Observed numerous bombs fall in vicinity of drydock area.                                                                                                                       |
| 0905                   | WHITNEY      | Observed one Japanese plane fall down in flames on hilltop, bearing northeast, true.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0906                   | PENNSYLVANIA | The second attack coming in slightly on port bow dropped bombs on ships in drydock. One heavy bomb hit the destroyer DOWNES in dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA, and one hit dock approximately                                                                                                                                                                                          |

abreast frame 20 while one hit the boat deck of the **PENNSYLVANIA** a few feet abaft gun #7. This bomb passed through boat deck and detonated in #5 gun #9 casemate. Fifth bomb believed to have struck water outside of dock. Observed plane crash in hospital grounds. Observers claim to have destroyed six enemy planes. Consider two hit by **PENNSYLVANIA**.

0906 **MUGFORD** Japanese planes diving at Ford Island from south-east. **NEVADA** standing down south channel.

0907 **PRUITT** Observed straffing and light bombing attack, plus heavy horizontal bombing attack from about 10,000 feet made on ships and Ford Island. One bomb hit close to stern of **RIGEL**.

0907 **PENNSYLVANIA** Bomb hit on dock and cut yard power, subsequently power on the ship was taken from storage batteries, meanwhile, firemain pressure cut off.

0907 Outgoing **ALL HANDS**: Cease firing on B17's attempting to land at Hickam.

0908 **CONYNGHAM** Reports one plane attacking on starboard bow shot down by nest and crashed in Pearl City.

0908 Com 14  
to ASP Do not fire on our planes coming in.

0908 **NEVADA** Attack slackened.

0909 **MUGFORD** Bomb dropped some 400 yards on **MUGFORD** port bow. Ship in repair basin hit.

0910 **PERRY** Mine Division **FOUR** underway at intervals and stood out to take off shore patrol duty.

0910 SecNav to Alnav **Execute WPL FORTY SIX** against Japan.

0910 Dive bombers attacked ships at Pier 19; bombs fell in water ahead and astern within 25 yds. of **CUMMINGS**.

0910 **DOBBIN** Attacked by 3 enemy planes. 3 bombs dropped—all near misses. Fragments struck stern of ship injuring #4 3" AA gun crew. 3 killed, 2 injured. Damage: small holes through decks, bulkheads, booms, #1 **MWB** hull damaged beyond repair.

0910 **BLUE** Passed channel entrance buoys, and set course 120 true. Proceeded to sector three to patrol station.

0910 **RIGEL** 10 to 12 dive bombers from S. attacked ships in Repair Basin with bombs and mach. guns.

0910 **PHOENIX** Second bombing attack on **BB**. Expended sixty rounds of 5". After planes came out of dive and turned towards berth C-6, planes were brought under fire of **MG** battery.

0910 **VESTAL** Anchored in 35' of water. Soundings and draft readings showed ship settling at and listing to stbd. Draft aft increased to 27', list  $6\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ . C. O. **Vestal** decided to ground ship.

0912 **CURTISS** Reports group of planes under heavy fire attacked. During attack one bomb hit stern mooring buoy. 1 fell short, one over, one hit ship starboard side of boat deck, passed through Carpenter Shop and Radio Repair Shop, entered Hangar and detonated on Main Deck. Explosion destroyed bulk heads, deck, etc., within radius of 30 feet. Equipment destroyed in Hangar, Handling Room etc. One plane shot down 1000 yards on port bow and 1500 yards on port beam. Another plane shot on port beam landing in water off Pan-Air dock. One plane reported crashed in cane field astern and one forward of ship.

0910 **CONYNGHAM** Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching from ahead and from direction of Schofield.

0910 **THORNTON** Second wave dive bombing attack commenced and ended at 0917. Throughout the entire period there was horizontal bombing in various Pearl Harbor areas.

# 1244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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| 0911 | MUGFORD  | Horizontal Japanese bombers passed overhead. Observed dive bombers approach from port bow, altitude 5,000 feet and release bombs. Bombs landed on concrete dock 12' from ship's side amidships. Penetrated dock exploding underneath and jaring ship. Heavy black smoke coming from SHAW in floating drydock.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0912 | PYRO     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0912 | MUGFORD  | NEVADA stopped south side of south channel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0913 | MUGFORD  | Attack completed. No damage. No casualties sustained by this ship.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0913 | PREBLE   | Large explosion on DOWNES.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0915 |          | Small enemy fighter approached ship from astern in medium glide and dropped two bombs, which exploded in water about 50 yards off port bow and 20 yards of starboard bow. After machine guns opened fire but did not hit plane. Shock shorted relay to steering (which had just been repaired) and damaged gyro rotor. Choke coils, tubes and resistors in sound gear burned out, echo ranging inoperative. Seems below waterline on starboard side forward sprung. A-15, A-301, A-401, and A-402 flooded. These compartments closed off and pumped out during afternoon. F'S smoke generators jumped track, breaking air line connection.                                                                                                                                         |
| 0915 | HELM     | Captain Bunkley returned to CALIFORNIA and assumed command.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0915 | NEVADA   | 5" AA battery fired on enemy planes to eastward. NEVADA suffered at least 6 bomb hits and one torpedo hit.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0915 | MUGFORD  | Thick black smoke coming from drydock.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0915 | TRACY    | Commanding Officer returned aboard and found 2 .50 cal. mach. guns mounted and ready. 2 dive bombers attacked out of the gun. 1 plane pulling out over sub. base and flying low over building 155 crashed in flames in vicinity of hospital point after salvo by CUMMINGS. Plane appeared to be a type 95 dive bomber, planes appeared to be at about 3,000 feet to seaward of Hickam, were 18 planes in formation type V.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0917 | PRUITT   | Observed low flying pursuit planes strafing with machine gun fire on ships moored in the vicinity of Berth 18. Observers on this ship believe many high altitude horizontal bombs either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area where they could not be observed. An indeterminate number of fighters took part in the raid, with approximately 30 bombers. Approaches were made on a steady course and all horizontal bombing was made in close formation at about 10,000 feet. The four cruisers and light minelayers in the Navy Yard were strafed several times by low flying planes but not a single bomb appeared to have been aimed at those ships. Small caliber fire of minelayers brought down one Japanese plane. Cleared nest and proceeded down channel. |
| 0917 | BREESE   | CUMMINGS fired on a light bomber. Plane observed smoking heavily as it flew out of sight to southwestward.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0920 |          | Observed low winged dive bombers from South to Southeast, 400 feet pullout. Two bombers bombed industrial and drydock areas. One bomb, (clearly visible on its descent, 250 lbs), passed through edge of concrete dock, angle of descent 45°, and exploded underwater between ship and dock.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0920 | HONOLULU | Damage to HONOLULU: oil tanks various, decks bulged in magazines, various leaks sprung and decks slightly fuddled, power lease to turret #2 grounded, turret #1 partially grounded, mercury thrown out of gyros, fore and aft, range finders, main battery de-ranged fore and aft.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

|         |              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|---------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0920    |              | More Japanese planes from northwest.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0920    | CONINGHAM    | Opened fire on plane diving from port side of nest. No personnel or material damage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0920    | PENNSYLVANIA | Flooding of drydock commenced. Both destroyers heavily on fire. Fire being transmitted to fire on water and dock which set fire to paint on starboard side of PENNSYLVANIA. No hose available for fighting fire on DOWNES, available hose being used on CASSIN.                                         |
| 0921    | Outgoing     | ALL HANDS: Reported that enemy ships have red dot on bottom of fuselage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0921    | Outgoing     | COMBATFOR: TO ALL SHIPS PRESENT: Get underway immediately.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0923    | MUGFORD      | PATTERSON standing out.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0923    | Outgoing     | COMBATFOR TO COMCRUBATFOR: Cruisers proceed as soon as possible.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|         | Landline     | Send over boats to capsized battleship.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0924    | Received     | COMSUBSCOFOR TO COMSUBDIV 43: Assume service ammunition readiness condition ONE be prepared to attack on information furnished later.                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0924    | Received     | Com 14: All planes approaching from Fox George and Easy.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0925    | CALIFORNIA   | plane 205 capsized and sunk while being removed to avoid gasoline fire hazard.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0925    | WASMUTH      | Reports second phase of attack as glide bombers and torpedo planes approached from westerly direction. Scored hits on several planes and shot down one plane which crashed on Walpio Peninsula near Middle Loch. This plane should be credited to James Patrick Hannon, seaman first class, U. S. Navy. |
| 0925    | GAMBLE       | One Japanese plane shot down by AA fire, falling in water on port beam about 1,000 yards away from ship. Believed shot down by ROBERTS, W. L., BM-2c, USS GAMBLE port machine gunner (#2 machine gun) .50 cal., and JOOS, H. W., GM-3c., USS GAMBLE (#1 machine gun) starboard.                         |
| 0925    | MUGFORD      | White smoke pouring from amidships on ARIZONA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0926    | Outgoing     | CTF 1: Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers to sea and destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by all cruisers to join Halsey.                                                                                                                                            |
| Unknown |              | Fire at will.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0927    | Received     | COM 14: Aircraft coming from Barbers Point 20 or 30 miles. Flash: Enemy planes appear to be massing around Easy. Enemy planes coming from Wheeler Field.                                                                                                                                                |
| 0927    | CURTISS      | After engine room out of commission and evacuated.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 0927    | Received     | RDO SANFRANCISCO to AS: USAT CYNTHIA OLSEN sent distress reports enemy submarine Lat. 33 R 42 N Long 145 R 29 W.                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0928    | MUGFORD      | Shot down enemy plane after it pulled out from dive on port bow. Altitude 200 feet. With forward 50 caliber M. G. The plane was a dive bomber.                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0928    | Received     | COMAIRBATFOR TO CINCPAC: 220P planes to arrive Pearl about 0820.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0930    | MUGFORD      | OGLALA going over to port. Personnel abandoned ship and getting on dock.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0930    | Received     | COMSUBSCOFOR TO THRESHER, GUDGEON & LITCHFIELD: Assume service ammunition readiness condition ONE x remain in present position x report position.                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0930    | Received     | CURTISS TO CINCPAC: Unable to sortie because of damage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|         |              | After OGLALA sank her crew were pooled out and sent to various units of the Fleet to assist ships in maintaining their batteries.                                                                                                                                                                       |

## 1246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|      |              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0930 | GAMBLE       | Got underway and cleared mooring buoy. Reports Division commenced getting underway. U. S. S. BREESE underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0930 |              | Enemy planes strafed CASTOR and NEOSHO. Detailed men to handle NEOSHO lines astern of CASTOR.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0930 | TREVER       | Underway, standing out of entrance. Observed PERRY fire at submarine and MONAGHAN ramming and dropping depth charge.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0930 | TENNESSEE    | Observed enemy planes coming in on port beam. WEST VIRGINIA gangway still burning.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0930 | HELM         | Shifted steering motor power to diesel generator; regained bridge control of steering.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 0930 | CALIFORNIA   | Fire broke out on main deck, starboard side of "F" Division compartment and casemates 3, 5, and 7.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0930 | BREESE       | Lookout reported periscope off Coal Docks but could not be observed from bridge, or pickup by supersonics.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0930 | DOBBIN       | Reports attacks appeared to have been discontinued.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0930 | WHITNEY      | Reports second air attack completed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0930 | PENNSYLVANIA | Explosions on destroyers commenced, in floating drydock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 0932 | WASMUTH      | Underway following TREVER on orders from Lt. Comdr. L. M. LeHardy, CO ZANE and S. O. P. Min div 4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0933 | Received     | COM 14: Flash: planes coming in from George.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0935 | Received     | RALEIGH TO CINCPAC: Two fire rooms and engine room and stern compt. flooded x damage under control at present x unable to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0935 | Received     | CHICAGO to CRUSCOR: Japanese submarines reported inside and outside Pearl.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0935 | Received     | ARMY HDQTRS: Flash: Fishing boat 1 mile off Hanakuli.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0936 | Received     | CPW 2 to CPW 1: We are being attacked by 15 Japanese planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0936 | CURTISS      | Fire under control.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0937 | WASMUTH      | Lieut. J. W. Leverton, Jr., USN, Executive Officer, reported aboard and relieved Lt. (jg) J. R. Grey, USN, who had been in command until this time.                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0937 | Received     | ARMY HDQTRS REPORTS: Friendly aircraft coming from toward Barbers Point 20 or 30 planes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0937 | GAMBLE       | Japanese planes attacked near main channel entrance.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 0937 | MUGFORD      | Explosion on destroyer ahead of the U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA in drydock.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0938 | MUGFORD      | Japanese subs reported inside and outside of Pearl Harbor.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0940 | WASMUTH      | Lt. Comdr. D. M. Agnew, USN, CO U. S. S. TREVER reported aboard. Proceeded out of Pearl Harbor and took up patrol off entrance.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0940 | BAGLEY       | Ship underway from dock. Material damage: Broken windows and light globes and glasses on reduction gears causing loss of lubricating oil. Personnel damage: 4 men slightly injured.                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 0940 | TENNESSEE    | Reports wounded being removed from the WEST VIRGINIA. OKLAHOMA upside down. Bow blown away on ARIZONA. Destroyers getting underway on other side of Ford Island. Fire either on ARGONNE or dock. Air attack coming in on starboard bow. WEST VIRGINIA on fire from turret 1 to bow. Flames up as high as foretop. Fire on port quarter (oil on water). |
| 0940 | BAGLEY       | Underway from dock and proceeded around north side Ford Island under belief that other channel was blocked. Because of defective bilge keel, ship was ordered to patrol off shore area and did not accompany Task Force 8. No damage to ship.                                                                                                          |

|      |              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0040 | NEVADA       | Grounded off Hospital Point.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0041 | PENNSYLVANIA | Observed warheads on DOWNES explode covering area with debris. Section of torpedo tube, weighing about 1,000 lbs. landed on PENNSYLVANIA fore-castle. Fire brought under control before serious damage resulted. CASSIN rolled over on DOWNES. It was noted by everyone participating in action that after an hour or more heavy thirst was experienced requiring considerable drinking water. This confirms the necessity of having water at all battle stations.                                                                                                                                            |
| 0042 | BREESE       | Cleared channel entrance with degaussing gear cut in and took station as offshore patrol in section 3.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0042 | Received     | COM 14 To ASP & NAVSHORE ACTIVITIES: Brief concentrations reported 25 miles south by south east of Barbers Point x not definite.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0042 | MUGFORD      | BAGLEY underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0043 | TERN         | Underway from alongside deck to pick up survivors in harbor. Received 47 survivors.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0045 | DEWEY        | Third wave of attack started by dive bombers. DOBBIN and Desdiv One were target with 3 or 4 planes attacking. One bomb hit close aboard starboard quarter and one hit water between HULL and DEWEY astern. No damage, Guns 1 and 2 firing when not blanked by DOBBIN. It is believed that Desdiv ONE destroyed two planes. Ammunition expended: 76 rounds 5'', 1300 rounds .50 cal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0045 | CACHALOT     | Joined in fire against enemy bombers. No damage received. Nearest enemy bomb dropped 20' off starboard quarter and did not explode. Nearest torpedo passed 100 yards astern.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 0045 | MUGFORD      | OGALA capsized to port.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 0046 | MUGFORD      | Japanese planes in from SW low.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 0047 | MUGFORD      | HONOLULU underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0048 | TENNESSEE    | Observed planes coming in on starboard bow; did not know whether enemy or friendly. Ship will not get underway until further orders. Engineering Department, stand by. Destroyer, from Navy Yard, getting underway. Unidentified ship in Pearl Harbor down by stern.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0950 | VESTAL       | Grounded.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 0950 | BLUE         | Good sound contact on submarine. Maneuvered to attack and dropped four depth charges. Regained sound contact on same submarine. Dropped two depth charges. Investigated and observed large oil slick and air bubbles rising to surface. It is felt that this submarine was definitely sunk. Obtained third contact on a submarine that was apparently headed for ST. LOUIS, which was at the time heading out on course approximately 150 true, at high speed. Two depth charges dropped, and upon return noticed large oil slick on surface. It is claimed that one, and possibly two, submarines were sunk. |
| 0950 | Outgoing     | Two enemy carriers reported 30 miles southwest Barbers Point. (Sent to CTF 8).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0951 | TENNESSEE    | Reports lighter alongside starboard beam on fire (ammunition lighter, top blown out, can see no ammunition on it).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0951 | Received     | COM 14 TO ASP: Two planes seen dropping heavy charges off harbor entrance which did not explode; think they are mines.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 0952 | Outgoing     | Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0954 | TENNESSEE    | Observed bow of MARYLAND on fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0954 | Received     | SOPA SANDIEGO TO ASP HAWAIIAN AREA: Los Angeles Harbor Air Defense Plan Number ONE effective.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

# 1248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|         |                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|---------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Unknown | SIGNAL TOWER   | The following ships have left Pearl Harbor<br>DALE ST LOUIS<br>HENLEY PHELPS<br>RAMSEY WASMUTH<br>PATTERSON MONTGOMERY                                                                                                                                     |
| 0955    | GAMBLE         | Temporarily anchored, astern of USS MEDUSA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0955    | TENNESSEE      | Still playing fire hose on ammunition lighter. Fire seems to be under control.                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 0955    | MUGFORD        | Commenced receiving fuel oil from the yard line. PERRY and GAMBLE standing out.                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 0956    | TENNESSEE      | Observed SOLACE getting underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 0957    | MUGFORD        | CALIFORNIA listing to port.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 0958    | MUGFORD        | BB's order to remain in port.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 0958    | TENNESSEE      | Observed fire on bow of MARYLAND was under control. Superstructure on WEST VIRGINIA on fire—4 or 5 men trapped, trying to escape by crane. Fire (oil and water) at stern of TENNESSEE was out. Fire very close to D-310-M.                                 |
| 1000    | CUMMINGS       | Opened fire to repel horizontal bombing attack from the southward. One horizontal bomber observed to lose its wing. CUMMINGS gun captain #4 claimed a hit.                                                                                                 |
| 1000    | WHITNEY        | WHITNEY reports REID and SELFRIDGE underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1002    | CALIFORNIA     | Oil fire on surface of water enveloped ship starting many fires, particularly intense one on forecastle. Captain Bunkley, with approval of Commander Battle Force ordered ship to be abandoned temporarily due to enveloping oil fire on surface of water. |
| 1002    | TENNESSEE      | Flood D-310-M (D-306-M and D-312-M also flooded, not isolated).                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1003    | MUGFORD        | Japanese planes reported dropping mines in channel.                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1005    | GAMBLE         | Underway proceeding out of channel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1005    | FT. SHAFTER    | Some heavy bombs dropped at entrance of Pearl Harbor did not explode. Think they are mines.                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1005    | SOPA San Diego | To ASP SAN DIEGO: San Diego Harbor Air Defense Plan Number ONE effective.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 1005    | MUGFORD        | U. S. S. SHAW in floating dry-dock exploded. Main engines and two boilers of MUGFORD ready to get underway.                                                                                                                                                |
| 1008    | TENNESSEE      | Observed ARIZONA aflame all over.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1010    | UNKNOWN        | To RDO WAILUPE: This vessel and 4 DM in Southwest S2 two enemy carriers in sight. (Rec'd by phone.)                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1010    | REID           | REID got underway on 4 boilers. No damage or casualties.                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1010    | PHOENIX        | Got underway, but returned to Berth C-6 on receiving orders not to sortie.                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1010    | SUMNER         | Fired two rounds at bomber on port beam, altitude 8,000—no hits. Also fired 50-caliber machine guns, two and four.                                                                                                                                         |
| 1010    | TENNESSEE      | Observed planes approaching from starboard beam; did not come in.                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1011    | OPW 2          | To DENT: Report CPW 2 for duty.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1013    | MUGFORD        | U. S. B. SCHLEY and ALLEN ready to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| UNKNOWN | VP-24          | To CPW 2: Right man of war Lat. 21.10 Long 160. 16 course 090 degrees.                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| UNKNOWN | USCG 400       | To OG RDO STATION: Report immediately to Commander Honolulu Base.                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1014    | Com 14         | Was Lualualei NAD damaged.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1015    | GTF 9          | To COMPATRON 21: Seareu Sector 000 to 300 Japanese Carriers.                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1015    | GAMBLE         | Shifted .30 cal. A. A. machine guns to top of pilot house on fire control platform.                                                                                                                                                                        |

|      |              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1018 | CINOPAC      | To CTF 8, 12, 8: Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching X. Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X. Addressees operate as directed Com Task Force 8 to intercept and attack enemy composition enemy force unknown.                                                                                             |
| 1018 | CTF 8        | Is Ford Island available reserve and rearm carrier planes in case necessity.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1020 | TENNESSEE    | TENNESSEE reports ARIZONA looks as if she is on the bottom. Word passed for the 5th division to lay aft to relieve fire party.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 1020 | Ginspac      | To CTF One: Do not send any more cruisers to Sea.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1020 | CTG 1.9      | To All Air Coms Patwing 1 & 2. Observe approach Doctrine when near Oahu.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1020 | MUGFORD      | U. S. S. JARVIS cleared starboard side.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1020 |              | Attack group of 15 VSB's with 1,000 lb. bombs each dispatched to position 30 miles south Barber's Point where numerous reports had been received of enemy carriers and other forces; no contact. CincO informed Comtaskfor EIGHT depended on Pearl Harbor for scouting information. This in order maintain carrier striking group in readiness. |
| 1021 | GAMBLE       | Cleared channel entrance. Eight depth charges were armed and the ship commenced offshore and anti-submarine patrol off Pearl Harbor entrance.                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1022 | MUGFORD      | Navy MTB standing out.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1023 | WASMUTH      | Dropped one depth charge on suspicious water, setting 200 feet, results negative.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1023 | MUGFORD      | Floating dry-dock sinking.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1024 | TENNESSEE    | TENNESSEE reports Torpedo boats leaving harbor.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1027 | TENNESSEE    | TENNESSEE reports people coming from WEST VIRGINIA on board TENNESSEE by way of a five inch gun.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1027 | MUGFORD      | A transport and CUMMINGS underway standing out.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1028 | NAS PEARL    | To CTF 8: Your 2023 Affirmative. (Ref: Is Ford Island available reserve and rearm carrier planes in case necessity).                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1028 | PENNSYLVANIA | Power on ship taken on two generators.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1030 | CASTOR       | CASTOR transferred ammunition to NEOSHO for use of that vessel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1030 | ARMY HDQTS   | Two enemy coming in 30 miles south of affirm 28.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1030 | HENLEY       | Visual signal from TREVER reported the HENLEY'S captain and executive officer on board that vessel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1030 | BLUE         | Upon completion of attacks, BLUE screened ST. LOUIS.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1030 | SICARD       | SICARD observed attack break off. Mustered crew, no injuries or casualties.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1030 | PHOENIX      | Got underway and started out north of channel. Received message from TENNESSEE from CINCPAC "Do not Sortie". Turned around in channel and started back to berth C-6. On receipt of orders from Comcrubatfor proceeded via south channel and completed sortie and joined Comtaskfor ONE.                                                         |
| 1030 | MUGFORD      | Fuel oil barge moored starboard quarter.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1030 | PENNSYLVANIA | Sent motor launches to West Lock for more ammunition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1031 | UNKNOWN      | This vessel and 4 DM in southwest S2 NO enemy carriers in sight.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1032 | TENNESSEE    | TENNESSEE observes ARIZONA abandoning ship. Repair II reports all C&R soundings normal. Repair IV reports all soundings normal. Repair III reports all soundings normal. Pull circuit L28 at aft. Distribution Board. Mr. Teague says hatches cannot be opened from inside wardroom country—too hot.                                            |



# 1250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|         |              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
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| 1032    | SIGNAL TOWER | To CINCPAC: These ships underway but have not cleared the entrance yet: DETROIT—JARVIS—PERRY—NEW ORLEANS—GAMBLE—CHEW.                                                                                                             |
| 1033    | COMBATSHIPS  | Be ready to repel repeated air attacks.                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1033    | CTF3, CTF8   | To ASP: Submarines reported 10 miles south Barber's Point.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1033    | TENNESSEE    | TENNESSEE 6° down by stern from flooding of D-306, D-312-M.                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1036    | TENNESSEE    | Unit 2, Repair I, combatting fire in W. R. Country. Dead men forward of conning tower, sent stretcher party.                                                                                                                      |
| 1036    | WASMUTH      | Dropped sound depth charge on suspicious water, setting 200 feet, bearing 217°, distance 3.4 miles from Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. Brought up large quantities of oil, but no wreckage.                                         |
| 1040    |              | June 8 bearing (bilateral) 357° or 178° T from HEEIA. June 8 in COMCARDIVS (AKAGI).                                                                                                                                               |
| 1040    | Comdesron 3  | Underway accordance signal from tower, and oral orders. Joined antisub patrol operating off entrance. Made two sound contacts; dropped 3 and 2 depth charges. Oil observed on water but no conclusive evidence of submarine loss. |
| 1040    | COMBASEFOR   | To Cominron 2: Sweep South channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic and moored mines.                                                                                                                                          |
| 1040    | MUGFORD      | Commenced receiving fuel from oil barge in addition to oil from yard line.                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1040    | TRACY        | TRACY reported CUMMINGS underway after returning all TRACY men. 10 men sent to help fight fire in CALIFORNIA.                                                                                                                     |
| 1042    | Combatfor    | To Cap't. NYD: The CALIFORNIA is on fire inside. Probably two tugs with fire equipment could save her.                                                                                                                            |
| 1045    | DOWNES       | Fire on CASSIN brought under control.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1046    | COMBATSHIPS  | To BATSHIPS IN COMPANY: All battleships send pilots and aviation personnel to Ford Island immediately.                                                                                                                            |
| 1046    | CTF8         | DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barber's Point.                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1048    | TENNESSEE    | To CINCPAC: TENNESSEE 30% damage. CALIFORNIA has been sunk. Doubtful—checking.                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1050    | TERN         | Proceeded to put out fire on USS ARIZONA. Shifted over to WEST VIRGINIA by orders from MARYLAND.                                                                                                                                  |
| 1051    | CPW 1        | To Plane 2 VP14: Search sector 310 to 320. Take due caution.                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Unknown | CTF 8        | To CINCPAC: CINCPAC 2012 Acknowledge.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1053    | MINNEAPOLIS  | To CINCPAC: MINNEAPOLIS center area VICTOR ONE.                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1055    | CTF 8        | To CINCPAC: Am depending on Pearl for scouting information.                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1055    | CTF 8        | CTF 8 launched six VCS to search sector 000-045° to 150 miles.                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1055    | SUMNER       | Fired two rounds 3" at plane dead ahead, altitude 8,000. No hits. Fired all 50 caliber.                                                                                                                                           |
| 1056    | MUGFORD      | Japanese planes attacking from North. (Note: These are apparently friendly planes.)                                                                                                                                               |
| 1058    | MUGFORD      | Numerous explosions from WEST VIRGINIA and ARIZONA                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1058    | TENNESSEE    | Observed Naval Air Station planes in air.                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1058    | PATRON 23    | To CPW ONE: Investigating suspicious vessel 21 00, 159 59.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1100    | TRACY        | Japanese have definitely withdrawn.                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1100    | COM 14       | To NAS PEARL, CPW2: Hawaiian Air Force contemplates moving headquarters. MUX lines will be kept in commission,                                                                                                                    |

UNKNOWN COMBASKFOR, COMINRON TWO to COM 14: Sweep South channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic and moored mines.

1100 TENNESSEE Repair II told to open drain valve and core valves in GSK. Valves to Sick Bay. Enemy plane coming in on bow. All hands not engaged in fighting fire, seek cover.

1100 HELM Sound listening watch heard screws on starboard quarter. Ship circled for attack but lost contact. No depth charges dropped.

1100 SIGARD Observed horizontal bombing attack.

1100 MUGFORD Fire appeared to be under control on NEVADA.

1103 TENNESSEE Observed destroyer putting to sea, (other side of Ford Island). Gasoline stowage filled with CO<sub>2</sub>.

1103 VP23 #11 To CPW2: Ships investigated 2 subs unknown nationality course 271 submerged on my approach.

1105 NAS Kaneohe To CINCPAC: Ship nationality unknown 10 miles off Kahana Point.

1105 To ASP: Info CTFS: All ships departing Pearl organize as TASKFORCE ONE UNDIVIDED Comdesbatfor assume comand report CTF 8.

1105 To ASP this Circuit: Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from South.

1108 BRESEE Received report Motor Torpedo Boat sighted periscope.

1108 ST. LOUIS To CINCPAC: Formed attack group ST. LOUIS, LAMSON, PHELPS, I am proceeding to locate ENEMY.

1108 CPW 2 To PATRON 23: Empty tanker no guns showing identity unknown lat. 21 00, Long. 259 59.

1110 NYD OPERATIONS To CINCPAC: NYD Operations reports another air raid expected within twenty minutes.

1110 SICARD Observed horizontal diving attack completed.

1115 NORTHAMPTON Two NORTHAMPTON planes launched to conduct search 150 miles to the north.

1115 BRESEE BRESEE dropped 2 depth charges on spot indicated with no apparent results. Bearings: Barber's Point 297° (t), and Hickam Tower 357° (t).

1118 NAS Kaneohe Bay to CINCPAC: Ship nationality unknown 10 miles off Kahana Point.

1121 TENNESSEE 2° list to port.

1121 TENNESSEE To CINCPAC: Damage 00% to TENNESSEE: WEST VIRGINIA sunk. Note: Correction WEST VIRGINIA for CALIFORNIA. Correction 00% instead of 30% for TENNESSEE.

1125 SUMNER. Fired four rounds 3'' at plane crossing ahead from starboard, altitude 6,000 feet, no hits. Fired 50 caliber machine guns No. 1 and 2.

1128 CPW 2 TO VP 14 #1, VF14 # 3: STAY OUT.

1130 WHITNEY Received orders to remain at anchor.

1130 HENLEY Picked up captain and executive officer from TREVER. No losses or damage experienced by HENLEY.

1130 PATRON 24, CPW 2 to CPW 2, CTF 3: Eight men of war Lat. 21 10, Long. 160 16, course 090 degrees.

1130 TENNESSEE Bridge steering telegraph out (being repaired). Sending planes from Hickam Field.

1132 MUGFORD Horizontal bombers approaching from port (Jap).

1132 ST. LOUIS To COMDESRON 1: What is your position?

1133 SIGARD Observed another horizontal bombing raid.

1135 SIGARD Observed bombers withdrawal. No material damaged and no personnel casualties.

1135 SUMNER Fired 11 rounds 3'' at formation of five bombers crossing ahead from port—no hits. Fired all machine guns.

1135 CSD 43 To Comsubsoofor: Point 21 54—Point 56 12.

## 1252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|      |              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1135 | TENNESSEE    | Sighted two planes bearing 270°.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1135 | BREESE       | Picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity. Dropped 2 depth charges and oil slick with debris appeared. 2nd attack was made with 4 deep-set charges to make certain but no additional results appeared. Meanwhile destroyers in vicinity dropped additional charges.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 1135 | NORTHAMPTON  | Approximately 15 miles west of Kauai. Section attacked by enemy single seat monoplane, engagement lasting about 20 minutes. Enemy plane made total of seven attacks diving from above and side; all recoveries were made above or to the side of the scouting section. On all diving attacks presented an exceptionally good target as he squashed down toward the section. Apparent enemy speed 275 miles or better. Enemy plane broke out in smoke and departed. Search continued until completed. |
| 1136 | MUGFORD      | U. S. Navy planes taking off from Ford Island.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1136 | TENNESSEE    | Observed light cruiser putting out to sea. Turning engines over to keep fire on water away from ship.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1137 | COMBATSHIPS  | To CTF1: MINNEAPOLIS 2DMs center southern boundary. VICTOR ONE Course 105 speed 15/UKX CAB6.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1139 | OTF 9        | TO VP24 Planes #1, #2, #3, #5, #11, CPW2: Search to 200 miles.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1139 | CTF8         | TO CINCPAC: TF8 flying colors bearing 184 distance 22 from Kaula Rock at 1115.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1140 | MUGFORD      | Japanese planes on starboard beam.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1140 | RDG Wallupe  | To all Stations This Circuit: Guam attacked.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1140 | DESBATFOR    | To CTF8: Int posit desig zero George eight.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1140 | NORTHAMPTON  | NORTHAMPTON plane engaged enemy fighter. This was not known to Comtaskfor 8 until 8 December.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1141 | COMBATFOR    | To COMBATSHIPS: Prepare available battleship planes for search and report to subbase when ready and number. 2 CALIFORNIA planes at Ford Island probably ready.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1142 | Com 14       | To Cinopas: Submarine due south Aloha Tower 4 miles has been bombed. Surface covered with oil slick.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1144 | COMBASEFOR   | To COMINRON 2: Designate two DMs sweep approaches to Pearl magnetic mines.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1145 | COMCRUBATFOR | To CINCPAC: Have no ships in sector 4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1146 |              | ANTARES moored to B-5A Honolulu.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1146 | PATWING      | To Unknown: Enemy troops landing on north shore, Blue coveralls with red emblems.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1150 | COM 14       | To Cinopas: Parachutists are landing at Barber's Point.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 1152 | CPW 1        | To Cinopas, CPW2: 3 planes security patrol patrol 14 are searching assigned sector. All planes have depth charges aboard.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1153 | COMCARDIV 1  | To Cinopas: SARATOGA ready depart San Diego 0900 tomorrow Monday x escorting ships so far as known have not been designated. Request instructions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1155 |              | To ASP: All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable x report OTF 1 in DETROIT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1156 | TENNESSEE    | Observed Army fortresses in the air. Believe enemy planes and submarines lying in channel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1159 | MUGFORD      | The end of period during which ship maintained 50 caliber and 5" fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1200 |              | Location of Forces 1200, 7 December, 1941.<br>T. F. 8 ENTERPRISE 21-30, 160-55.<br>T. F. 12 LEXINGTON 23-50, 171-15.<br>Subdiv 43 (3 SS) 80 Miles East, coming ready.<br>GUDEON C-5 Ready.<br>THRESHER & LITCHFIELD 80 Miles West empty.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

T. F. 1 and 2 less 8 in Pearl.  
T. F. 3 less 12 areas.  
Task F 3 rendezvousing with MINNEAPOLIS and  
20Ms southern boundary V1 Course 105.

1200 GWIN To Comdesbatfor: Reporting for duty with LAMSON  
and PHELPS. I am proceeding to South to locate and  
attack enemy carrier.

1200 BOBOLINK Received orders from Combasefor to sweep Pearl  
Harbor with TURKEY.

1200 ST. LOUIS To Comerusoofor: Reporting for duty with LAMSON  
and PHELPS. I am proceeding south to locate and  
attack enemy carrier.

1201 COMPATWING To Compatron 24: Have search for assign sector 300  
miles am returning.

1202 CTF 8 To CINCPAC: Your 2100 refers Task Force 8 with 13  
ships x request all units be notified.

1204 BAMBLE Established sound contact with submarine and dropped  
three depth charges. Position bearing 168 T from  
Diamond Head light, distance 2.5 miles.

1205 MUGFORD Discontinued fueling. 115000 gallons on board.

1205 Comdesbatfor To Comdesflot ONE: About nine thirty witnessed  
MONAGHAN sink enemy submarine by ramming and  
depth charges. Excellent piece of work.

1205 SIGNAL TOWER About 0930 witnessed MONAGHAN sink enemy sub.  
by ramming and depth charges. Excellent piece of  
work. Believe RALEIGH accounted for three planes.

1205 Com 11 To KENNISON: Submarine reported twenty miles  
bearing 235 from Pt. Loma investigate.

1205 Com 14 All lights extinguished except control lights.

1209 MUGFORD Oil barge cleared starboard side.

1209 COMBATSHIPS To Cinpac: Design cast desig king baker jig.

1209 Combatships To Cruisers and Destroyers: Sortie in accordance  
until plan indicated.

1210 TENNESSEE Draft of ship (internal): Fwd. 34'6"; Aft. 35'10 1/4";  
Mean, 35'4 1/2". Enemy transport reported 40 miles  
off Barber's Point. Parachute troops landing on  
Barber's Point (later proved false). After Battle  
Dressing Station send stretcher party to left gun,  
turret III, and remove casualties. Three planes on  
starboard beam coming this way (do not know  
whether enemy or not). Said planes flying low; ap-  
parently, turning away. Organize a crew of about  
30 men to relieve men of Turret IV who are fighting  
fire on water.

1213 SOLACE To Com 14: Expedite your boat all tannic acid, tannic  
acid jelley, pectric acid, tetanus antitoxin, gas gan-  
grene combined serum, morphine sulphate, morphine  
syretts, sutures, needles, hypo needles and adhesive  
type can be spared.

1214 MUGFORD Underway. Standing out in channel.

1215 HELM Rejoined DETROIT. Ceased patrolling.

1217 CTF 9 To PW 24, 23, 19: Search to 300 miles.

1221 RDO WAILUPE To all stations: Nine unidentified aircraft over Guam.

1225 BOBOLINK Moored alongside coal dock to take wire aboard.

1228 CINCPAC To ASP Hawaiian Area: If NPM fox goes out guard  
harbor circuit.

1228 Combatships To Cinpac: PENNSYLVANIA dive bomb hit star-  
board side grame 86 drydock now flooded. MARY-  
LAND down by the head forward, bomb hit, 50 caliber  
magazines flooded. TENNESSEE fire in wardroom  
country. OKLAHOMA capsized. WEST VIRGINIA  
sunk but upright. CALIFORNIA down by the head  
and heavy list to port—probably on bottom. ARI-  
ZONA sunk. NEVADA beached off Hospital Point.

Unknown CPW 2 To VP23: Search to 200 miles any instructions.

1229 SIGNAL TOWER THORNTON is underway and standing out.

# 1254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|         |                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|---------|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1230    | CURTISS        | To Cincpac: Unable to sortie because of damage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1230    | MUGFORD        | Japanese plane crashed on beach of HICKAM FIELD. (Note) It is believed the ship observed this at this time; (wreckage). not that the crash occurred at this time.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1216    | SIGNAL TOWER   | These ships have cleared Pearl Harbor Channel:<br>DALE                      WASMUTH              MONTGOMERY<br>HENLEY                  RAMSAY                WORDEN<br>PATTERSON              ST LOUIS              CUMMINGS<br>PHOENIS                DETROIT                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1219    | Combatships    | To Com 14: Serious oil fire alongside W. Va. _____                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1223    | CTF 8          | TENNESSEE and MARYLAND send fire boats.<br>To Cincpac: 21 VSB from ENTERPRISE should have landed Ford Island about 0830. Request information.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1223    | Rdo Wallupe    | To ASP: Air alarm standby.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1230    | TENNESSEE      | Secure all fresh water, except galley and drinking.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1230    | ---            | While GAMBLE conducting depth charge attack off Diamond Head, received three despatches from CinC addressed to ASP. Ships ordered to attack transports reported four miles off Barber's Point. All vessels having departed Pearl Harbor organized as Task Force ONE to report to CTF 8 Task Force ONE ordered to take course West after clearing harbor and to report position, composition, and speed. GAMBLE continued with depth charge attack until contact was lost then proceeded to Barber's Point where no transports were found. Continued westward. |
| 1232    | CINCPAC        | To ASP: Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point. Attack.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1235    | CTF 12         | To: CTF 3 & 8: Cancel Midway Marine flight.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1240    | MU* HE SARA    | HAHO on 4780 BRG 186 (Believed Submarine).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1240    | MU* HE SARA    | HAHO on 4580 BRG (Believed Submarine).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1300    | KANURE         | Appears to be O. T. C. on 6581 BRG. 183.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1300    | SISO           | On 7033 BRG 167 1/2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1300    | KASO           | Seems to be Task Force Commander.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1300    | KANURE         | is probably Commander in the Air.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1235    | CTF 12         | To Cincpac: Is Midway Marine flight cancelled.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1235    | MUGFORD        | Passed entrance to channel. Four 50 cal. and four 5"/38 cal guns during the entire period 0809 to 1159 whenever any planes came within range and bearing maintained fire.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1235    | COMBATSHIPS    | To Combatfor: Combatships in Maryland.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1235    | RALEIGH        | To Cincpac: Two fire rooms and engine room and stern compt. flooded. Damage under control at present. Unable to get underway.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1244    | Plane 12, VP23 | To CPW2: Approaching 300 able to search more gas 700 25 I request instructions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1245    | TENNESSEE      | Planes on port bow (do not know whether enemy or not)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1246    | --             | CALIFORNIA sinking fast, stern underwater. Close all topside hatches, as turrets will be fired. (Did not). Gun four port reported Hoist #22, 5"/51, in B-510 was damaged. Powder can be sent up, but is slowed. Draft of ship, FWD: 34'9". Magazine temperature of Turret I-84°                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1246    | WP OFF. 14ND   | High altitude bombing attack coming in over Diamond Head.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Unknown | Cincpac        | To Rdo San Diego: Receive me on 26.1, transmit on 30.6 (cable to Navy radio San Diego) Via Globe.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1247    | CURTISS        | To CPW2: All of our transmitters are out.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1247    | Combatships    | To COLORADO: If vessels are not longer in service will furnish men and officers to ships in service to man complete anti-aircraft batteries for continuous watch.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1248    | Combasefor     | To Cominron TWO: Designate two DMs sweep approach to Pearl magnetic mines.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |

|         |                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|---------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1255    | GAMBLE            | Proceeded on course 270T at 20 knots to join friendly forces upon receipt of orders from Cincpac.                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1300    | ST LOUIS          | To Comdesbatfor: ST LOUIS, BLUE, LAMBON, PHELPS posit Lat 20.51 Long 158, course 275, speed 25K.                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Unknown | Cincpac           | To CTF 8: Your 2206 only nine arrived.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 1258    | MTB SQUAD         | Out guarding 3445 voice sqdn. Comdrs. PT20, PT22, PT23, PT24. At dock guarding 3445 voice PT21. On dock at crane no power PT26, PT28. Aboard RAMAPO underway PT27, PT29, PT30, PT42.                                                                                                                    |
| 1258    | Com 14            | Four Japanese transports off Barbers Point.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1300    | RALEIGH           | Reports tugs SUNNADIN and AVOCET came alongside and furnished light and power. One torpedo ran between bow of RALEIGH and stern of DETROIT and apparently sank in shoal water at Ford Island without exploding. The following planes were destroyed, in which it is considered the RALEIGH contributed: |
|         |                   | 1- Bomber flying over stern stbd to port crashed on deck of CURTISS.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|         |                   | 2- Plane flew over bow from stbd to port and crashed near Pearl City.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|         |                   | 3- Plane flying north on our stbd beam crashed in water between DOBBIN and BALTIMORE.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|         |                   | 4- Plane off our stern flying over air station was hit by 3" shell and blown to pieces in air.                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|         |                   | 5- Plane flying across our stern had tail blown off and fell over Pearl City.                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1300    | Comdesbatfor      | Own DD reports no enemy vessels off Barbers Point.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1300    | CTF 1             | At 1300 join DETROIT course 210 speed 18 from point 51. (Action to ST. LOUIS)                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1300    | RAMSEY            | Jap ship four miles from Barbers Point. Two sampans further out. Parachute troops landing on North shore. (reported by VJ plane)                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1301    | CPW 2             | Search sector 220 to 230. Return. (Action to 12-VP23)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Unknown | Comtrainron EIGHT | ANTARES docked pier five afirm Honolulu. Struck by several machine gun bullets but no damage to material or personnel.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 1302    | Cincpac           | To CTF 8: Radio bearings indicate AKAGI bearing 183 from Pearl another unit bearing 167°.                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1303    | CPW 2             | To Comscoron 6: Reported Jap rendezvous 223° 90 miles from Ford Island. Search to 200 miles sector 235 to 215.                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1305    | NAS Kanoeha       | Captured enemy chart has marked positions bearing 223 distant 90 miles from Pearl Harbor.                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1309    | Signal Tower      | DETROIT and PHOENIX are near Barbers Point. Signal Tower sees no transports.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1310    | Combasefor        | To Comtrainron 6, Com 14, Cominron 2; Sweep channel from East Lock to entrance magnetic and moored mines.                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1312    | HULBERT           | Army reports that four enemy transports off Barbers Point.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 1312    | ST LOUIS          | Am proceeding with three destroyers to attack Barbers Point. Speed two five position lat. 21-57 long. 158-03.                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1313    | Combatships       | To NAS Pearl: For Capt. Bode CALIFORNIA urgently needs AA ammunition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1317    | Rdo Wallupe       | Signals intercepted and bearing true north believed to be enemy carrier by character of transmission.                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1319    | FRANK             | By phone: Enemy sampan about to land at Naval ammunition Depot.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| ----    | FRANK             | Enemy landing party off shore Nanakuli. Friendly planes firing at them.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| ----    | FRANK             | Op-1 Southeast enemy and friendly planes in dog-fight.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 1322    | —                 | Enemy naval attack coming in towards Barbers Point. Present position nine miles.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |

# 1256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|      |             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1322 | Opanav      | To Mardet Tientsin, Com15, Mardet AM Emb, Peiping Astnavatt Shanghai, Rdo Wake, Navatt Chungking, Jonnstonis, Rdo Guam, Palmyra, Com16, Rdo Tutulla, HOPKINS: This confirms air raid by Japan on Oahu at 1800 today followed by declaration of war by Japan against US and Great Britain                                                                                                    |
| 1323 | HELENA      | To Comerubatfor: Due contamination feed water cannot maintain underway status longer than 8 hours. During this time speed limited to 10 kts. Ready this condition on one hour notice F power for fire control limited to two diesel generators. View condition and to effect repairs recommend letting fires under all boilers die out.                                                     |
| 1324 | CTF 8       | UPSN Junction Task Force One and Eight. Propose send Crudly FIVE to Pearl for fuel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1328 | MINNEAPOLIS | Your 072234 (Cincpac's) complying. Ref. #12-299 Use plane to search sector 135 to 180 distance 154 miles from Pearl.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| ---- | CINCPAC     | To CFT 8: DETROIT, PHOENIX, ST LOUIS, NEW ORLEANS fourteen destroyers and four minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you. Also MINNEAPOLIS and four minelayers ordered join from operating areas send ships to Pearl for fuel                                                                                                                                                  |
| 1330 |             | Reports—7632 kes (M) following calls:—SIME; SISO; KASHO; SUREMO; SAMORE; Sends following type of to . . .095.45 085.42                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1337 |             | Bearing on SISO—170 S5.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1341 |             | Bearing on SAMORE—165                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1344 |             | Report following msg. . . KIBC to SIME Nr. 1 SIME 354.56                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1345 |             | Reports SISO (Good bearing) 7632 (M) 337                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1330 | —           | BOBOLINK's orders to sweep channel changed to sweeping approaches to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor. Arriving off Pearl it appeared all ships there were engaged in sweeping.                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1331 | CTF 1       | To Cincpac: Task Force ONE proceeding off Barbers Point Notify Army.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1333 | CPW 1       | To OPW 2: Request instructions for dawn patrol upon their return.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 1337 | CTF 3       | To CTF 8: My force INDIANAPOLIS and 5 DMS. INDIANAPOLIS proceeding from JOHNSTON Island course 054 speed 25. Dog Mike Sail directed proceed Pearl for fuel and rejoin later.                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1340 | TENNESSEE   | Plane coming in on starboard beam. (Proved to be friendly).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1345 | —           | CTF 8 launched 9 VSB's to cover sector 110-200T to 175 miles. One of latter reported contact with surface forces believed enemy including a carrier in position Lat. 20-32 Long. 158-16 and cruiser Lat. 20-32 Long. 158-40. Scout reported being attacked by VF's. No further radio contact established with scout. Scout landed later at Kaneohe, reports believed to have been in error. |
| 1348 | VIREO       | Received orders to report to Combasefor thence to West Loch to bring up 5", 3", and .50 M. G. Ammunition for CALIFORNIA.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 1351 |             | Reports SISO calling SAMORE S5 bearing 337 Very loud signal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1353 |             | Reports bearing SAREMU bearing 337.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1354 |             | Reports bearing SUREMU 165.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|      |             | Following bearings: 7632 kes (M) 0036—SUSU S5 340                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|      |             | 7632 (M) 0040—SYME 336                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|      |             | Following bearings: 7632 (M) 0054—bearing SISO 338 S. 8                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|      |             | 7050 (M) 0055—bearing SISO 338.5 S. 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

**KANURE** **KANURE** sez at 1235 (Local Time) "I HAVE FUEL FOR 10 MINUTES"

**KANURE 1410** at 1240 "I WILL FLY AS LONG AS I HAVE FUEL". Someone on 7033 at 1247 said "HAVE NOT BE OPPOSED."

**SAME FREQUENCY BELIEVE SINIRE FROM "SISO" at 1250 "WHAT IS YOUR COURSE".**

**RUS18 and YUNES** believed to be Commander Carriers.

**SUT12** believed to be a Carrier.

**SISORE** is either another Comdr in the Air or Comdr Transport Group.

**SISO** is Boss of **SISORE**.

No further bearings of radio intelligence of the Striking Force until following day 8 December 1941.

**TRANSMISSION:**

**1450** **SIME 010.01 I—HA●NKIARIYA**

**ANSWER:**

**2 HA●NKAIARI**

**1410 —** **BEARINGS—SAREMU 338. S. 4 on 7632 kes (M)**

**WASMUTH** rigges twin, ship moored minesweep with **USS ZANE**, 400 fathoms of wire between ships, depressers at 5 fathoms, no floats. At 1547 entered Pearl Harbor entrance channel and swept up channel to gate vessel, where wire parted. At 1620 anchored off Coal Dock and retrieved sweep gear. At 1628 underway. At 1635 the Captain returned aboard, Lieutenant Commander Agnew, USN, left and joined **TREVER**. Returned off harbor entrance and resumed patrol in company with **Mindiv 4**.

**1412 GAMBLE** Sighted sampan bearing 320 T.

**1415 TENNESSEE** Set condition **ZED** from Turret III, second deck, aft. Repair I, Unit 2, lending out fire hose to play water on **WEST VIRGINIA**. Received report that one of our destroyers sank Jap submarine.

**1426 BOBOLINK** Passed sweep wire to **TURKEY** and commenced sweeping off Honolulu Harbor.

**1435 GAMBLE** Slowed to investigate but did not search. Sampan position approximately 4 miles south of Barbers Point.

**1455 VIREO** While waiting for arrival of ammunition, towed ammunition lighter with 14' powder away from deck to decrease menace of explosion. Delivered ammunition to **ARGONNE**.

**1500 TENNESSEE** Report states that Wake Island had been bombed by 30 bombers. Ens. Kable still alive. Hudgell dead; also Miller and Adams.

**1600 MIDWAY** Via Commercial Cable . . . "On 7073 . . . SISO 246 . . . Fair . . . SIME 245 Poor NAS Midway" Plane language **SASO V SAREMU #3 . . . A FU''- KUMA YORI 150 to "30 MAIRU NEN 200 1115 . . .**

**1505 DEWEY** Underway and standing out of harbor.

**1550 BOBOLINK** Received orders from Commander Base Force to report 1010 dock immediately.

**1551 TENNESSEE** Repair 4.—All outboard voids normal. All soundings normal. Received report that **PENNSYLVANIA** had been hit while in drydock. No. 2 machine gun repaired and in commission again.

**1552 — —** CTF 12 given orders by CTF 8 to intercept and destroy possible enemy carriers operating south coast of Oahu. It was assumed after attacks enemy carriers would withdraw via Jaulit.

**1626 GAMBLE** Sighted smoke bomb off port bow.



## 1258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|      |                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1628 | TENNESSEE                   | Open up wardroom country and sleepy hollow. Fire on WEST VIRGINIA seems to be under control. Repair I cut off # 32 vent system; smoke coming down.                                                                                                                |
| 1630 | n— —                        | Task Force ONE just ordered by CTF 8 proceed and attack.                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1631 | GAMBLE                      | Reports submarine surfaced.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1632 | GAMBLE                      | Fired one shot 4" gun and missed, short and to the left. Submarine displayed U. S. Colors, and ceased firing. Submarine submerged and fired recognition red smoke bomb.                                                                                           |
| 1640 | BOBOLINK                    | While off dock 1010, received orders to assist NEVADA. Orders changed to go alongside CALIFORNIA.                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1642 | — —                         | Attack group of 16 VF, 18 VTB's and 4 VSB smokers launched by Comtaskforce EIGHT with no results. (VTB planes armed with torpedoes recovered after dark.) Six VF planes proceeded Pearl mistaken for unfriendly and four shot down.                               |
| 1647 | GAMBLE                      | Proceed west.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1647 | TENNESSEE                   | Told forward Battle Dressing Station to send doctor and stretcher party to WEST VIRGINIA bridge to get Captain. Ship astern (ARIZONA) blew up. Two planes bearing 350°.                                                                                           |
| 1655 | WHITNEY                     | Reports CASE left from alongside.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1659 | TENNESSEE                   | Engines ahead 1/3. Repairs 2 and 4; — send 2 rescue breathers each, and spare oxygen bottles to starboard side of WEST VIRGINIA quarterdeck.                                                                                                                      |
| 1703 | TENNESSEE                   | Word received to stop main engines. Delivered 6 gas masks to WEST VIRGINIA.                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1705 | WHITNEY                     | Reports TUCKER left from alongside.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1730 | BOBOLINK                    | Moored alongside WIDGEON next to CALIFORNIA for salvage purposes.                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1732 | CAMBLE                      | Sighted ENTERPRISE and exchanged calls. Instructed by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force to join ENTERPRISE.                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1736 | --                          | Comairbatfor ordered GAMBLE to join that vessel as part of AS Screen.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1740 | BOBOLINK                    | Commenced pumping to continue thought the night.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 1744 | GAMBLE                      | Joined ENTERPRISE and took station as third ship with two other plane guard destroyers.                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 0755 | PELIAS<br>(Insert on p. 12) | Moored at Berths S-11 and 12, Submarine Base, reports first attack was indicated by sound of machine gun fire directed at single engine Jap torpedo plane flying low over ship's bow. The plane launched a torpedo at ARIZONA which seen later burst into flames. |
| 1755 | TENNESSEE                   | Plane bearing 345. Plane signalled with red light; did not understand meaning of signal.                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1800 | PENNSYLVANIA                | Reports complete replacement of ammunition effected.                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 1823 | TENNESSEE                   | Observed plane bearing about 300.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1833 | TENNESSEE                   | Plane bearing about 345 (Running lights on; believed friendly).                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 1835 | TENNESSEE                   | Plane on port beam; running lights on.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1837 | TENNESSEE                   | Plane coming in from dead ahead; bright lights on it.                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1838 | TENNESSEE                   | Plane bearing about 245.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 1855 | TENNESSEE                   | ENTERPRISE planes approaching Cahu.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1900 | TENNESSEE                   | Plane bearing from dead ahead; running lights burning.                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1953 | TENNESSEE                   | Word passed over loudspeaker "All men having hammocks in port hammock nettings remove them, and stow same inboard."                                                                                                                                               |
| 2100 | TRACY                       | Reports friendly planes with running lights were by AA batteries, but TRACY did not fire.                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 2100 | TRACY                       | Moored alongside CALIFORNIA and commenced salvage work.                                                                                                                                                                                                           |

2100 SICARD

Observed 3 lighted planes, altitude 5000 approaching FORD ISLAND from South NEW ORLEANS challenged without success and opened. Other ships followed too. SICARD checked fire considering planes were friendly. Other ships continued firing.

2110 VIREO

Observed AA fire opened and planes shot down. Aviator fell astern of VIREO, was rescued and identified from ENTERPRISE. Dispatch was sent to inform control that ENTERPRISE planes were in air.

(Enclosure B)

Cincpac File No.  
L11-1(1)/(50) (02019)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 12, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

References:

- (a) Cincpac Secret Desp. 072244 of December 1941.
- (b) Cincpac Secret Desp. 081015 of December 1941.
- (c) Cincpac Secret Desp. 100220 of December 1941.
- (d) Cincpac Secret Desp. 102043 of December 1941.

1. The following report relative to damage sustained by ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from enemy attacks on 7 December 1941 is submitted. This amplifies reports submitted by references (a) to (d) inclusive:

(a) **BATTLESHIPS.**

**ARIZONA** sunk at berth as result of aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs which exploded forward magazines. Ship is considered to be a total wreck.

**CALIFORNIA** sunk at berth as a result of hits by two or more aircraft torpedoes; also received one large bomb hit amidships which caused serious fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

**NEVADA** damaged by heavy bombs, possibly mine in the channel and aircraft torpedoes. Beached across from hospital point to prevent sinking after an attempt to sortie. Batteries intact and manned though no power is on the ship. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

**OKLAHOMA** capsized at berth as a result of receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage will be made later.

**PENNSYLVANIA** slightly damaged by bomb hit, starboard side of boat deck while in drydock number 1, Navy Yard Pearl Harbor. Repairs have been completed and ship is ready for service.

**MARYLAND** damaged by bomb hit on forecandle and near mls. Ship was moved to the Navy Yard on 11 December and is expected to be fully ready for service 13 December.

**TENNESSEE** received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not explode, but put 8 rammers out of commission. Also one bomb hit aft which cracked one 14" gun. Heat from the **ARIZONA** fire melted and ignited paint in after portion of the second deck which was badly burned out. Ship is now heavily wedged to mooring by reason of the **WEST VIRGINIA** leaning against her. Steps are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of the **TENNESSEE**. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14 December ship will be ready for service less one 14" gun.

**WEST VIRGINIA** sunk at berth as result of four aircraft torpedoes and one bomb hit. There is considerable damage from fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

(b) **CRUISER.**

**HELENA** damaged by bomb hit at frame 50, starboard side, opening up side under armor belt for distance of about 30 feet. Number one and two fire rooms and forward engine room flooded. Ship is now in drydock #8, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, to effect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended that ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.

## 1260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

**HONOLULU** damaged by near miss at approximately frame 40 port side. Hole approximately 20 feet by 6 feet underwater. Ship being docked in drydock #1 today and it is estimated that work will be completed to make her fully effective by 16 December.

**RALEIGH** damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward half of machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated three decks and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock the **RALEIGH** following completion of the **HONOLULU** to effect underwater repairs to make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to make the ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor or a mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.

### (c) DESTROYERS.

**CASSIN** and **DOWNES** damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ahead of **PENNSYLVANIA**. Bomb hit **DOWNES** exploding her torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. **CASSIN** was damaged by fire and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on **DOWNES**. **DOWNES** appears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recommendation regarding salvage and repairs to **CASSIN** will be forwarded later.

**SHAW** hit by bomb while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating drydock badly damaged by fire resulting from oil and powder. After part of ship not seriously damaged. Recommendations regarding repairs will be forwarded later.

### (d) AUXILIARY VESSELS.

**UGLALA** sunk by aircraft torpedo and near miss by bomb at ten-ten dock at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded at a later date.

**UTAH** damaged and capsized as a result of hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

**CURTISS** damaged by enemy plane out of control which flew into crane mast and by bomb which exploded damaging hangar space causing fire which destroyed all radio equipment. Ship is entirely seaworthy. Repairs are proceeding and ship will be ready for operations less one midships crane by 18 December.

**VESTAL** damaged by a bomb hit aft while at berth at Pearl Harbor is undertaking repairs with one repair force. It is estimated that the ship will be fully ready as a repair ship by 17 December. Docking may not be required.

2. It is believed that the sinking of the **OKLAHOMA**, **NEVADA**, **CALIFORNIA** and **WEST VIRGINIA** is in large part due to the ships having been in condition **XRAY**. Had time been available to set condition **ZED** before receiving damage, progressive flooding might have been avoided.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Buships  
Buord

(Enclosure C)

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. **PENNSYLVANIA**, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 21, 1941.

### *Summary of damage sustained by ships of Pacific Fleet from enemy attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941*

| Ship            | Damage incurred and cause                                                                                                                      | Repairs proceeding and proposed                                                                                                      |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ARIZONA.....    | Sunk at berth. Aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs exploding forward magazines.                                                                 | Propose caisson the ship and make recommendation thereafter.                                                                         |
| CALIFORNIA..... | Sunk at berth. Two or more aircraft torpedoes and one large bomb hit amidships causing fire. Part of A. A. battery still manned and available. | Propose caisson ship, repair to make watertight and return to mainland for complete repairs. (Tow).                                  |
| MARYLAND.....   | Bomb hit frame 14, penetrated and exploded, holing shell, decks and bulkheads forward of fr. 24.                                               | NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy. Decks, bulkheads to be completed at NYPH.                                                    |
| NEVADA.....     | Heavy bombs, aircraft torpedoes and possibly a mine in channel. Beached across from Hospital Pt. AA batteries still manned and available.      | Propose float ship (caisson may not be required), repair to make watertight and return to mainland yard for complete repairs. (Tow). |

*Summary of damage sustained by ships of Pacific Fleet from enemy attacks at Pearl Harbor, December 1941—Continued*

| Ship               | Damage incurred and cause                                                                                                                                                   | Repairs proceeding and proposed                                                                                                               |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| OKLAHOMA.....      | Capsized at berth. Three or more aircraft torpedoes.                                                                                                                        | Propose right and float ship (caisson may not be required) repair to make watertight and return to mainland yard for complete repairs. (Two). |
| PENNSYLVANIA.....  | Bomb hit starboard side boat deck.....                                                                                                                                      | Repairs completed.                                                                                                                            |
| TENNESSEE.....     | One heavy bomb (dud) through turret top. One medium bomb aft cracked 14" gun. Fire aft 2nd deck due to heat from ARIZONA. Electrical circuits 2nd deck aft damaged by fire. | NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy and habitable. NYPS complete habilitation, renew 14" gun, and watertight integrity.                    |
| WEST VIRGINIA..... | Sunk at berth. Four aircraft torpedoes and one heavy bomb hit. Considerable damage by fire.                                                                                 | Propose caisson ship. Repair to make watertight and return to mainland for complete repairs. (Two).                                           |
| HELENA.....        | Forward fire and engine rooms flooded by aircraft torpedo. Some machinery badly damaged.                                                                                    | NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy. Propose return to NYMI for complete repairs. (Two shafts).                                            |
| HONOLULU.....      | Bomb. Near miss frame 40, port. Flooded five magazines and handling room II turret. Damaged electrical circuits in flooded spaces.                                          | NYPH proceeding with complete repairs.                                                                                                        |
| RALEIGH.....       | One aircraft torpedo, and small bomb (dud) which penetrated three decks and ship's side aft. Forward engine room and forward firerooms flooded and damaged.                 | NYPH to make repairs to make seaworthy when HONOLULU is undocked. Propose return to NYMI (on 2 shafts) for complete repairs.                  |
| CASSIN.....        | Drydock No. 1 ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her torpedo warheads and causing serious fire. CASSIN knocked off blocks and fell over on DOWNES.            | Propose upright, patch and float out CASSIN for possible repairs to return to full or limited service. Further recommendations later.         |
| DOWNES.....        |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                               |
| SHAW.....          | Bombed while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating dock badly damaged by fire.                                                                      | Propose float and reconstruct forward part—return to mainland yard for complete repairs, possibly under own power.                            |
| OGLALA.....        | Sunk by aircraft torpedo and possibly near miss by bomb.                                                                                                                    | Salvage doubtful. Recommendation later.                                                                                                       |
| UTAH.....          | Capsized and sunk by aircraft torpedoes.                                                                                                                                    | Recommendations re salvage and repairs later.                                                                                                 |
| CURTISS.....       | Enemy plane out of control flew into crane mast. One bomb exploded in hangar space. All radio equipment destroyed. Ship entirely seaworthy.                                 | NYPH, replace radio and effect necessary repairs to hangar space.                                                                             |
| VESTAL.....        | Bomb hit aft, holing shell. Beached....                                                                                                                                     | Repairs proceeding by own repair force. May not require docking.                                                                              |

(Enclosure D)

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 20, 1941.

(A) DISPOSITION OF TASK FORCES

TASK FORCE ONE

Batdivs 2 and 4 (less COLORADO)..... 5 BB  
 Crudiv 9 (less BOISE)..... 4 CL  
 Desrons 1 and 3 (less CLARK)..... 17 DD  
 RALEIGH..... 1 OCL  
 OGLALA..... 1 OCM  
 Mindiv 1 (overhaul)..... 4 DM

*Disposition:* In port. Returned 11/28 to remain until 12/13.

TASK FORCE TWO

Batdiv 1..... 3 BB  
 Crudiv 5 (less PENSACOLA)..... 3 CA  
 Desrons 4 and 6..... 18 DD  
 DETROIT..... 1 OCL  
 ENTERPRISE..... 1 CV  
 Mindiv 2..... 4 DM

# 1262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

**Disposition: At sea as Task Force EIGHT**

|                   |                |
|-------------------|----------------|
| <b>ENTERPRISE</b> | <b>In Port</b> |
| Desron 6          | Batdiv 1       |
| Crudiv 5          | Desron 4       |
|                   | <b>DETROIT</b> |
|                   | Mindiv 2       |

Position of Task Force EIGHT: 200 miles West of Pearl standing to eastward returning from landing VMP at Wake. Planes were in the air from 0618 to search sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles and then land at Ewa. These planes arrived during the attack and engaged the enemy aircraft.

## TASK FORCE THREE

|                                        |       |
|----------------------------------------|-------|
| Crudivs 4 and 6 (less LOUISVILLE)..... | 7 CA  |
| Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10).....         | 5 DD  |
| Minron 2.....                          | 13 DM |
| LEXINGTON.....                         | 1 CV  |

**Disposition: At sea as Task Force TWELVE**

LEXINGTON

Gradiv 4 less INDIANAPOLIS and LOUISVILLE plus ASTORIA

Desron 5 less Desdiv 10

Position (estimated): 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway and 300 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course to land Marine VMSB's on Midway. When attack was made the Task Force was ordered to turn toward Pearl and later directed to intercept the enemy and destroy enemy carriers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 6 at Johnston exercising at landing exercises using landing boats, MINNEAPOLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea S.W. of Oahu—normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port, with NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.

## TASK FORCE SEVEN

|                        |     |
|------------------------|-----|
| At Midway.....         | 288 |
| At Wake.....           | 288 |
| At Mare Island.....    | 588 |
| At San Diego.....      | 488 |
| En route to Pearl..... | 488 |
| At pearl.....          | 588 |
| PELIAS.....            | 1AS |

## TASK FORCE NINE

|                                                                          |       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| VP-21—At Midway. 7 searching 120-170, 450 miles. 4 on 10 minutes notice. |       |
| VP-11—4 hours notice.....                                                | 12    |
| VP-12—30 minutes notice.....                                             | 6     |
| 4 hours notice.....                                                      | 5     |
| VP-14—In air (with depth charges).....                                   | 3     |
| 30 minutes notice.....                                                   | 3     |
| 4 hours notice.....                                                      | 4     |
| VP-22—4 hours notice.....                                                | 12    |
| VP-23—4 hours notice.....                                                | 11    |
| VP-24—4 in air conducting tactics with SS.....                           | 4     |
| On 30 minutes notice.....                                                | 1     |
|                                                                          | <hr/> |
|                                                                          | 72    |
| Overhauling.....                                                         | 9     |
|                                                                          | <hr/> |
|                                                                          | 81    |

TANGIER—In port.

CURTISS—In port.

MCFARLAND

HULBERT

THORNTON

All planes on the ground on ready notice had been furnished with a search directive in the event that any contacts with surface forces were developed by the early morning search. This plan never became effective because damage to the planes prevented.

**MARINE PLANES**

|          |                           |    |
|----------|---------------------------|----|
| VMF 221  | —Wake                     |    |
| VM3B 231 | —Enroute Midway LEXINGTON |    |
| VM3B 232 | —Ewa 4 hours notice       | 18 |
| VMJ 252  | —Ewa                      | 2  |

**BASE FORCE**

**ARGONNE**, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port.  
Aircraft of Base Force

|         |       |                 |
|---------|-------|-----------------|
| VJ-1-9  | J2F   | Pearl           |
| 9       | JRS   | Pearl           |
| VJ-2-10 | J2F   | Pearl           |
| 4       | PBY-1 | (2 at Johnston) |
| VJ-3-1  | J2V   | Pearl           |
| 4       | JRB   | at Main         |
| 1       | JRF   |                 |
| 2       | BT    |                 |

In addition the tenders (destroyer) **DOBBIN** and **WHITNEY** were in port and the submarine tender **PELLAS**.

The Task Forces shown herein, except **EIGHT** and **TWELVE** which were on special missions to improve war readiness of **Wake** and **Midway**, were in accordance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective since 30 April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941. The Task Forces were operating in accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet and the special tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels were assigned to Task Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their war missions and all training was conducted with that in mind.

(b) The Fleet was operating under the "security plan" originally issued on 15 February and revised on 14 October 1941. This provided for the possibility of a declaration of war being preceded by:

- (a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (b) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
- (c) A combination of both.

The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in the operating areas, even to the point of having ready ammunition at the guns. Frequent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor in coordination with Army and distant activities to test the provisions of the security measures against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited recreation periods, and since the intelligence information indicated complete security from any surprise air attack, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port. At the time of the attack, however, provisions had been made and were in effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment, and all ships had armed patrols and careful routine inspections of the ships during the entire time in port. In the battleships, two machine guns were always manned and ready and two 5-/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 15 rounds of ammunition at each gun.

(c) In addition and as provided in the Security Plan, a daily search of all operating areas was conducted by planes of Patrol Wing TWO. This was an early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the general areas in which the Fleet would be operating during the day.

Such a search was being conducted on 7 December and planes on that search were in the air at the time of the attack. In addition, 4 planes were operating with the submarines in the training of intertype exercises for communication and recognition. They searched the area toward Lahaina Roads on that morning.

(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance of a submarine close aboard the **ANTARES** returning from Canton Island and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was attacked by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the **ANTARES**. This was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a submarine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl during the last six months but no actual visual contacts had been made. In addition, no attacks had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy Department had

prohibited such attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When the international situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief directed ships to attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it was on this authority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of 7 December.

These submarine attacks were followed by a report from the Navy Signal Tower "Enemy air raid, this is not a drill" at about 0752. It will be noted that the attack occurred while the crews of ships were just finishing breakfast on Sunday morning.

The information regarding the air raid was sent to all Task Forces at 0800, followed by a despatch "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl" at 0812.

The effect of the surprise attack and the damage inflicted with damage to communications made it practically impossible to organize an air search except by the 7 PBY's in the air at the time.

(e) At 0817 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO to search for the enemy, and the PBY's in the air started to search. The 3 on the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 300 miles. The first plane started out at once.

The 4 PBY's, operating with the submarines started search sector 245-285 to 300 miles out, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945.

No plane in these areas searched saw anything. At 0830 Commander-in-Chief advised Task Force THREE, EIGHT and TWELVE to rendezvous as directed by Commander Task Force EIGHT and stated that instructions would be issued as soon as enemy was located.

(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the northward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers were in sight. This was later corrected to say the message should have been *NOT* in sight.

In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated "Captured enemy have marked positions, bearing 223-90 miles from Pearl Harbor". These marks in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.

This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhere west by south of Pearl. At 1020, 15 V-19 from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barbor's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could do so cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying the enemy.

(g) It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the forces on Oahu until the late morning. By about 1100, however, in addition to the 7PBY's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes became serviceable they were started on the following searches:

Army—2 B-17

2 A-20A

3 B-18

3 B-17, 095-165, 300 miles

Navy—4 planes VP-24, 245-275, 300 miles.

2 planes VJ, 355-005, 300 miles

3 planes VP-14, 295-350, 200 miles

4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles

*Battleship & Cruiser Planes*

6 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles  
9 SBD, 330-030, 200 miles  
6 J2F in westward sector

The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and westward because of the belief that the major enemy attack force was in that direction. In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that they were able to search to the southward.

At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a report that the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in error because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.

At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 189° from Pearl and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward Jalint, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force Twelve at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement toward Jalint.

No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120 just north of NIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever reached the Commander-in-Chief.

From the chart later discovered from enemy planes shot down there is no indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the enemy carriers in this area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with our air forces in the area).

The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls, to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible too that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft.

(h) At 0800 the positions of the ships at sea were approximately as follows:

Task Force TWELVE—18-30N, 168-40 W.

Task Force EIGHT—20-50 N, 158-50 W.

Task Force ONE—20-32 N, 159-45 W.

Task Force TWELVE was proceeding on course 170 at 17 knots. His position was in the area to the northwestward of Johnston Island. The cruiser planes searched to the northward of the island and the carrier planes in a southeasterly direction to a distance of 200 miles for the 0800 position.

In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area from Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes of Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220° from Pearl Harbor to a distance of 550 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.

By these searches practically the entire area in the Oahu-Midway-Johnston Island triangle was completely covered.

In addition, the available planes of Patwing TWO searched an area of 200 miles all around Oahu. It was not possible to extend this search further to seaward because of the small number of available planes.

(i) Because Task Force EIGHT was low in fuel, that Force entered Pearl Harbor after dark on 8 December, fueled, provisioned and took on ammunition and departed for sea before daylight on 9 December.

*9 December*

On 9 December the position of Task Force TWELVE was about 600 miles S.S.W. of Oahu proceeding toward the island. A 200 mile search was being conducted



# 1266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

in the morning all around the carrier position during the morning and a 150-mile search along the line of the carrier course during the afternoon.

After departure from Pearl Harbor Task Force EIGHT proceeded to the northeastward from Oahu for search operations in that area.

Task Force ONE returned to port on 9 December.

## U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Using Oahu based planes the following search was conducted starting in the morning of 9 December:

300-010 500 miles 10 VP  
010-060 300 miles 10 B-18  
060-210 200 miles 18 VSO  
210-030 300 miles 6 VJ  
and in the afternoon  
330-020 4 Army B-20

The sector to the southwest of Oahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes as mentioned before.

No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes.

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 74

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 3 February, 1942.

*Confidential*

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Diary for period 7 December to 1 January.

Reference: (a) Conf. desp. 032307 dated 3 January, 1942 from CinCPac to Com14.

Enclosure: (A) Three copies of subject diary.

1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. This diary has been compiled from the logs and reports submitted by various district activities. In certain instances, reports of individuals have been quoted not because their opinions or remarks are considered of special value, but in order to give an insight to the reactions of the personnel concerned.

C. C. BLOCH.

*Confidential*

## WAR DIARY OF FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT FOR PERIOD 7 DECEMBER TO 1 JANUARY

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| 25. Actions Against Submarines—Summary of                                                   | 43                |

<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and refer to pages of original exhibit.

[1] WAR DIARY OF FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT FOR PERIOD 7 DECEMBER  
TO 1 JANUARY

*Preliminary Action on 7 December:*

The first indication of an enemy force was the sighting of a submarine periscope at 0350 by the U. S. S. CONDOR, engaged in minesweeping close to the entrance buoys of the Pearl Harbor channel.

After verification, the CONDOR reported the situation by blinker to the guard ship, U. S. S. WARD. The submarine was seen to turn inshore and head in a westerly direction toward Barbers Point.

The WARD's log reports that general quarters was sounded at 0408 and search was made for the unidentified submarine. The ship secured from general quarters at 0435 and continued on patrol of the Pearl Harbor entrance.

The initial positive contact occurred at 0637 when the WARD sighted the conning tower and periscope of a submarine apparently headed for Pearl Harbor, trailing the U. S. S. ANTARES.

The WARD started an attack at 0640, bearing down on the submarine while increasing speed from 5 to 25 knots. She opened fire at 0645 with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The first shot, at a range of 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower. The second shot, fired at a range of 50 yards or [2] less from No. 3 gun, scored a direct hit at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. The submarine was observed to heel over to starboard and start to sink and, after running into the WARD's depth charge barrage, went down in 1,200 feet of water. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface where the depth charges exploded.

A despatch by voice transmission was sent to the commandant at 0654 stating: We have attacked, fired upon and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area."

This message was reported delivered to the district duty officer, Lieutenant Commander Harold Kaminski, at 0712. He immediately notified the chief of staff, Captain J. B. Earle, who informed the commandant.

Lieutenant Commander Kaminski notified the duty officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715 and also notified Commander Charles B. Momsen, war plans officer for the district.

The commandant ordered the ready duty destroyer (Monaghan) sent out. At 0737 a despatch was sent to the WARD, asking verification of the report and details of the attack.

Following the WARD'S message and prior to the Japanese air raid, no other reports were received at headquarters to indicate or verify the enemy's presence.

Within a few minutes after the raid started, the commandant arrived at headquarters and took charge. Orders issued were: [3] "Close all navy yard gates to traffic. Have the Captain of the Yard detail fire parties. Notify marines to make all men available to assist in fighting fires. Notify marines to bring in from Salt Lake camp all available marines. Notify yard to flood drydocks. Make arrangements for civilian workmen to be rounded up and brought to the yard to assist in damage control. Notify hospital to establish emergency measures for caring for killed and wounded."

*The Air Raid:*

The air raid on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field area started at 0755, according to most observers. Some reports indicate the end of the raid came about 0940, although apparently there were enemy planes active as late as 1130, Captain H. F. Bruns, the district public works officer, stating in his report that the raid lasted until approximately 1130. (NOTE: Residents on Milhau sighted two planes between 1300 and 1400 flying over that island. One crashed and the other flew on West. Presumably these planes had left Oahu after 1200).

The district supply officer, Captain John J. Gaffney, reported the final attack was over by 0940. His summary follows:

"The heavy pall of smoke from burning fuel oil afforded not only a point of aim for the dive bombing attack which came about 0920 but somewhat obscured vision. A seaplane hangar was on [4] fire at Ford Island and the floating drydock with the SHAW appeared to be burning. The all directional bombing attack came shortly after the NEVADA cleared the dredge opposite Fox-1 where three hits halted the NEVADA in the channel. She dropped one anchor, backed on it, came over in the direction of the floating dock and finally moved over to Waipio Point. A hit in Drydock No. 1 struck the DOWNES and another

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hit of a smaller bomb was made on the PENNSYLVANIA. The Japanese pressed home the dive bombing well under 600 feet. Wing and fuselage marking were clearly visible. Their maneuverings to avoid collisions were noteworthy. The attack concentrated over the NEVADA which was underway in the channel and evidently every effort was directed toward sinking her in the channel. This attack was over by 0940. . . "

First Lieutenant J. S. O'Halloran, duty officer, 3rd Defense Battalion, F. M. F., stated in his report: "At about 0940, after about one hour and 45 minutes after the attack started, the air was clear of enemy aircraft."

Commander Harry R. Hayes, USN (Ret.), directed by Captain C. C. Baughman, captain of the yard, to a station on the signal tower to handle, insofar as possible, the movements of ships and other craft in the harbor, stated: "The attack on the NEVADA apparently ended the raid on Pearl Harbor, but for some time enemy aircraft were observed bombing Hickam Field. . . ."

[5] Captain Baughman, in a summary of events obtained from personnel under him, stated that at 0855 the NEVADA got underway and stood down South Channel. This summary further reported that at "0910 enemy dive bombers attacked Hickam Field, the PENNSYLVANIA, CASSIN, DOWNES, SHAW and NEVADA, the last named ship being in the South Channel opposite YFD-2 (the floating drydock). The three destroyers were set on fire and minor damage was inflicted on the PENNSYLVANIA. The NEVADA was badly damaged and lost way, and with the assistance of tugs was grounded on Waipio peninsula southeast of Beckoning Point."

The captain of the yard's summary placed the end of the raid at 0920.

In line with some observations that the air raid occurred in three waves of planes is the report of Russel B. Smith, radioman 3rd class, in the U.S.S. NEVADA, who was later assigned to duty at the Luualualei radio station. Smith was blown from his ship during the attack in the south channel and swam ashore.

His report follows in part:

"I proceeded to the bridge during the lull after the first attack. From there the ARIZONA was plainly visible, a mass of flames. Her after turrets and mainmast were all that could be seen, the rest was a mass of flames. We cast off lines and started to get underway. As we passed the battle line, I saw the OKLAHOMA completely capsized and the rest of the damaged battleships, some burning fiercely. There were several other ships underway in the harbor.

[6] "As we neared the floating drydock the second attack began. Our anti-aircraft guns again went into action. Suddenly there was a deafening roar. Smoke and debris was flying everywhere. Shortly after another bomb struck, setting the ship on fire.

"The next thing I remember is the cold water hitting me in the face. I was near the drydock, which was burning fiercely, and quite a distance from shore. The life preserver that I had securely strapped on was gone. After reaching shore, I and several other men who had swam ashore started for the naval hospital. At this time the third attack came but the Jap planes were kept off by the antiaircraft fire."

### *Sequence and Type of Attacks:*

Reports received by the commandant indicate the following sequence of attack:

1. Attack on the naval air station, Ford Island, and Hickam Field. This started about 0755 and consisted of dive bombing and strafing.
2. Attack on major units of the fleet, launched by torpedo plane and dive bombers and accompanied by strafing.
3. Attack on area by horizontal bombing from high altitude. This is reported to have occurred about 0815.
4. A second high altitude bombing attack apparently carried out immediately before the final intensive dive bombing attack and after a lull of approximately 15 minutes in the raid.
5. Dive bombing and strafing attack launched about 0910.

### *[7] Number of Planes Involved:*

Reports indicate that approximately 150 planes attacked army and navy activities on Oahu.

Marine corps observers reported that approximately 30 planes participated in the first attack on Pearl Harbor. Other reports stated that up to 50 planes engaged in the initial attack on the Pearl Harbor area, including approximately 20 torpedo planes.

Personnel on the signal tower estimated 30 dive bombers took part in the final intensive bombing attack. The smallest estimate was 18.

On the high altitude bombing, reports of the number of planes observed varied from five to 18, and altitudes were estimated 10,000 and 16,000 feet.

Between 0745 and 0800 an estimated total of 75 planes were sighted by personnel at Lualualei radio station, approaching the station from the west and turning sharply in the direction of Pearl Harbor and Barbers Point upon reaching a position near the shore line. One observer stated that he counted 75 planes. These planes returned on this course some time later, observers reported.

W. L. Waltrous, chief radioman, stated that about 0745 he observed a large flight of planes proceeding toward Pearl Harbor. "Upon reaching a point directly abeam of the radio station, it appeared that a formation of 15 to 20 planes detached themselves from the main flight and turned left. They proceeded [8] directly over the radio station at an altitude of approximately 2,000 feet, in the general direction of Wheeler field."

An observe at the Lualualei naval ammunition depot, according to a report submitted by Captain J. S. Dowell, inspector of ordnance in charge, stated:

"Near 0800 while motorized patrol was being relieved I counted 25 bombers in groups of five flying very high. They proceeded straight over the mountains on the Nanakuli side of the depot headed in the direction of Pearl Harbor. There were also two units of fighter planes, about five in each. They were flying lower than the bombers, about the height of the mountains, in a straight line one behind the other. One group headed for Pohakea pass toward Schofield; the other circled over the depot near the mountains and then headed over Ponakea pass."

Captain Dowell also reported that at West Loch "at 0850, enemy planes were observed leaving Pearl Harbor evidently en route to Ewa mooring mast, passing close to West Loch. Planes observed were approximately 60 to 70 in number . . ."

The officer in charge at Camp Andrews, Nanakuli, reported a flight of 64 planes passed over the camp about 0730 headed toward Pearl Harbor.

Other observations of plane approaches were submitted as follows:

Lieutenant Commander R. B. Norris, C-V(L), then an [9] employee of RCA Communications, Inc., at Kahuku radio station, reported that "at approximately 0740 . . . I observed a group of planes flying at very high altitude approach Kahuku Point in a course from north due south. It is estimated that 20 or 22 planes were in this group . . . Low clouds made it impossible to see the entire group at any one moment . . . The planes were soon out of visible range but still heading due south after passing over the radio station."

A civilian at Mokuleia reported observing a flight of 32 planes coming in over water from the direction of Kahuku Point between 0800 and 0815 and heading directly towards Schofield. Observer reported that the count of 32 was verified by a resident of Wai'alua.

A man on duty at the direction finder unit at Lualualei reported that he observed "Several formations" at about 0900 heading toward Pearl Harbor from the northwest. "There were at least 55 planes that I was able to count, flying in groups of fives . . . Their height was such that it was almost impossible to see them."

According to this observer, another group of seven, flying at the same altitude but further out from the other groups, turned seaward and circled back over land, heading over the reservation in the direction of Wheeler field.

#### [10] *Attacks at Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Ewa Field:*

Almost simultaneously with the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked Kaneohe Bay naval air station. Ewa field at Barbers Point was subjected to enemy strafing.

Commander H. M. Martin, commanding officer of the naval air station, Kaneohe Bay, reported that two attacks were executed at that base.

The initial attack started about 0750, with about a squadron of planes coming down very low in shallow dives and strafing with incendiary bullets. This attack lasted 10 to 15 minutes and was followed after a 25 minute interval by bombing and strafing by another squadron of planes, similar to our BT's. Bombs of 100 pounds were dropped, apparently high explosive in type but some of them probably incendiary because of the resulting fires. The majority of casualties resulted from this attack, the men being struck by machine gun fire and bomb fragments.

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Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting to either launch their planes or trying to save those planes not yet damaged. During this attack which also lasted 10 to 15 minutes, the antiaircraft fire was considerably augmented by machine guns rigged on the planes and on temporary mounts, and one of the enemy planes was shot down on the station. Another crashed in Kailua bay.

### [11] *Damage:*

Captain H. F. Bruns, district public works officer, following a survey after the raid, reported:

"There was no serious damage to any navy shore structures except at Ford Island and Kaneohe. It was plain that ships and planes were the objectives of the attackers. By concentrating even briefly on shore structures the attackers could have caused extensive damage, particularly by an incendiary attack on the oil tanks and other inflammable objects."

With the exception of Hangar No. 6 and its surrounding parking area, very little major damage was done to the naval air station, Pearl Harbor. The hangar was apparently set on fire as a result of a bomb explosion immediately to the east and the resultant explosive action of nearby patrol planes which were ignited by the same explosion. There were about five bomb hits in the vicinity of the hangar, the largest producing a crater approximately 20 feet in diameter and seven feet deep. The northeast quarter of the hangar was badly gutted by fire but relatively minor damage was done to structural steel.

Fresh water service to Ford Island from the navy yard was cut off. The U. S. S. ARIZONA at mooring Pox-7 settled on the 12 inch main, crushing it, and the six inch temporary line to the south end of the island was broken at the navy yard side as a result of bombing. Service was restored by installing a new 16 inch main from Hospital Point.

[12] At the Kaneohe naval air station, Hangar No. 2 was set on fire during the first attack and severe damage resulted, although the structure was deemed salvageable. The seaplane warming up platform was also damaged by bomb hits.

### *Public Works Department Activities:*

Action taken by the public works department at the time of the raid was based on the department's acceptance that its function was to maintain essential services—power, water and communications, to furnish transportation as required, to protect against fires and to remedy structural damage.

In a description of activities of the public works department during the attack, Captain Bruns said:

"As rapidly as officers reported, they were despatched to various locations for specific jobs of surveillance and fire fighting. Civilian workers went to their regular jobs, unless otherwise directed. Sizeable forces were sent to both tank farms. The contractors at Kuahua were quickly organized to meet emergency calls, and men and equipment were despatched to points of need in the navy yard area. Repeated inspections were made to locate possible fires. The drydock contractors organized workers to get the Gantry crane clear of the fire between the drydocks and to make the new drydock ready for service as quickly as possible.

"The public works department through its own and contractors' [13] personnel gave assistance in restoring water main to Ford Island, restoring power and communication services in navy yard, furnishing trucks for the transportation of wounded and for other purposes, withdrawing dredges to prevent blocking of channel, establishing watcher services for administration building, arranging burials and providing graves, and answering distress calls generally."

### *Action by Yard Fire Department and Yard Craft:*

In the navy yard, the fire department was first called to Building 367, near the hospital, to extinguish a fire caused by the crash of a Japanese plane. Later the department answered a call to extinguish the fire in Drydock No. 1 where the CASSIN and DOWNES were burning. The major part of the yard fire fighting equipment was used in controlling this fire and preventing its spread to the PENNSYLVANIA. The fire in the floating drydock was also combatted.

Yard craft engaged in fighting fires on fleet units, assisted in picking up survivors and in getting ships underway.

*Action Reported by* \_\_\_\_\_

Immediately upon the first raid by hostile planes, all sentry posts were doubled and the remainder of the command present were alerted. Those alerted stood by under arms under cover as a mobile reserve for emergency employment. These men were soon assigned to various situations.

[14] The defense battallions immediately went into action with antiaircraft machine guns with telling effect. Two gun batteries were emplaced in the navy yard but were not ready for action until ammunition could be trucked from the naval ammunition depot. They were ready at 1100.

All motor transportation was pooled for general use and was active throughout the day. Among the services rendered was assistance in collecting and hauling casualties from the waterfront to the naval hospital.

One set of barracks (100 man type), the Noncommissioned Officers' Club and the Post Exchange were vacated and prepared for caring for casualties. The medical officers set up an operating and dressing room in the Post Exchange.

The three general messes were thrown open and served food, on a 24 hour basis, to all comers. It is estimated that during the first 24 hours about 6,000 meals were served to civilian workmen of the navy yard. That service was discontinued only after the food supply at the regular established eating places could be replenished.

*Care of Fleet Personnel:*

At the Yard Receiving Station, immediate steps were taken to account for survivors and emergency hospital units were established in new barrack buildings and Navy Arena. Fleet pooling activity centered at this station. Emergency rations, stores, [15] bedding and clothing were issued to survivors of sunken ships. Preparations were made for serving meals on a 24 hour basis. Rations were prepared and served to over 8,000 personnel.

All available spaces, including the Navy Arena and barracks buildings under construction were converted into emergency living quarters. All chief petty officers' rooms were converted into officers' quarters.

Between December 12 and 31 all housing facilities were occupied to the fullest degree, and an overflow of from 1,500 to 2,500 men was accommodated in the arena, the number varying with the arrival and subsequent assignment to duties of drafts from the mainland.

*Medical Department Activities:*

The district medical officer, Captain R. E. Stoops, reported 686 non-fatal casualties were received for treatment at regular navy medical department establishments, at civilian establishments and emergency wards established during the crisis.

In the disposition of the dead, utmost care was taken in the matter of identification.

A total of 313 dead were brought to the naval hospital on December 7. The following day, it became evident that the problem of burial would be much greater than originally contemplated. Additional land for a new navy plot was obtained [16] in Oahu cemetery, and a 25 acre site for a new naval cemetery was selected between North and South Halawa streams at Red Hill.

The following is a summary of interments made during the period from December 7 to 31, inclusive:

|                                                    |     |
|----------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Service personnel interred at Oahu cemetery_____   | 328 |
| Service personnel interred at Halawa cemetery_____ | 204 |
| Service personnel interred at Kaneohe Bay_____     | 18  |

550

Japanese service personnel buried total 18.

Of our service personnel, 293 were unidentified, but at least some of these were expected to be identified following receipt of Forms "N" in their cases at the Navy Department.

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## Casualties among Fourteenth Naval District personnel.

|                                      | Officers |         | Enlisted men |         |
|--------------------------------------|----------|---------|--------------|---------|
|                                      | Dead     | Wounded | Dead         | Wounded |
| Navy Yard.....                       |          | 1       |              | 3       |
| Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor..... |          | 7       |              | 43      |
| Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.....      |          |         | 1            | 4       |
| Naval Ammunition Depot.....          |          |         |              | 10      |
| Naval Hospital.....                  |          |         | 1            | 1       |
| Total.....                           | 0        | 8       | 2            | 61      |

A total of 273 casualty patients were evacuated to the mainland.

### [17] *Diary of Industrial Department:*

*December 7, 1941.*—The following vessels were at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, on this date in berths indicated:

| Vessel                      | Berth                | Severe damage      | Vessel                 | Berth                   | Severe damage |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|
| USS SOTOYOMO.....           | Docked YFD-2         | Yes                | YSD-27.....            | B-11.....               | No            |
| USS SHAW.....               | DD-1.....            | Yes                | YW-10.....             | B-11.....               | No            |
| USS DOWNES.....             | DD-1.....            | Yes                | USS RAMAPO.....        | B-12.....               | No            |
| USS CASSIN.....             | DD-1.....            | Yes                | [18] USS RIGEL.....    | B-13.....               | No            |
| USS PENNSYLVANIA.....       | DD-1.....            | No                 | YO-447.....            | B-14.....               | No            |
| USS CACHALOT.....           | B-1.....             | No                 | USS TRACY.....         | B-15.....               | No            |
| USS HELENA.....             | B-2.....             | No                 | USS PREBLE.....        | B-15.....               | No            |
| USS OGLALA.....             | B-3.....             | Sunk near end 1010 | USS CUMMINGS.....      | B-15.....               | No            |
| USS TERN.....               | End 1010.....        | No                 | YO-43.....             | B-15-16.....            | No            |
| YO-30.....                  | End 1010.....        | No                 | USS NEW ORLEANS.....   | B-16.....               | No            |
| USS ARGONNE.....            | 4.....               | No                 | USS SAN FRANCISCO..... | B-17.....               | No            |
| 150-ton Floating Crane..... | 5.....               | No                 | USS FRUITT.....        | B-18.....               | No            |
| USS SACRAMENTO.....         | 6.....               | No                 | USS SICARD.....        | B-18.....               | No            |
| USS MUGFORD.....            | B-6.....             | No                 | USS ONTARIO.....       | B-18.....               | No            |
| USS JARVIS.....             | B-6.....             | No                 | USS SCHLEY.....        | B-20.....               | No            |
| USS SWAN.....               | Marine Rail-way..... | No                 | USS GREBE.....         | B-20.....               | No            |
| YT-3.....                   | B-9.....             | No                 | USS HONOLULU.....      | B-21.....               | No            |
|                             |                      |                    | USS ST. LOUIS.....     | B-21.....               | No            |
|                             |                      |                    | USS BAGLEY.....        | End East Quay Pier..... | No            |

The following named vessels left the Navy Yard on this date:

|               |            |
|---------------|------------|
| USS ST. LOUIS | USS RAMAPO |
| USS CUMMINGS  | USS SWAN   |
| USS JARVIS    | USS TERN   |
| USS MUGFORD   |            |

[19] *December 8, 1941.*—Yard forces initiated repairs to damages caused in the December 7th raid, and assisted in restoring a supply of fresh water to Ford Island, both fresh water pipe lines to Ford Island having been destroyed. Arrangements were made for Yard Public Works organization and equipment to assist to the fullest practicable extent in ships' salvage operations.

USS ALLEN arrived at B-6.

*December 9, 1941.*—Emergency electrical supply from Navy Yard power plant was furnished to Hickam Field and the Section Base. Made preliminary survey for air raid requirements for Yard personnel. Construction begun for shelters by personnel of Shop 70 and contractors' force. Sandbags placed for protection of office personnel, electric power transformer substations and communication centers.

*December 10, 1941.*—USS ALLEN departed.

USS CROW departed.

USS MARYLAND arrived.

YO-43 departed.

USS SWAN arrived.

The USS HELENA was docked in DD-2. This is the first vessel docked in this new dock which was completed approximately one year in advance of the contract date.

[20] December 11, 1941.—USS SWAN departed.

December 12, 1941.—New 25-ton crane was moved from erection tracks to permanent rails, around DD-2.

USS PENNSYLVANIA departed.

USS AYLWIN arrived, docked on Marine Railway, undocked and departed.

USS NARWHAL arrived.

December 13, 1941.—USS NEW ORLEANS departed.

USS SACRAMENTO departed.

YC-477 departed.

USS HONOLULU docked in DD-1.

USS DOLPHIN arrived, docked in Marine Railway.

USS McDONOUGH arrived.

USS PHELPS arrived.

USS THORNTON arrived.

USS INDIANAPOLIS arrived.

December 14, 1941.—USS DOLPHIN undocked and departed.

USS SAN FRANCISCO departed.

[21] USS HOVEY arrived and departed.

USS CHANDLER arrived and departed.

December 15, 1941.—USS MUGFORD arrived and docked in Marine Railway.

December 16, 1941.—USS MUGFORD undocked and departed.

USS TENNESSEE arrived.

USS KAULA arrived.

Night inspection made of exterior lighting and shop blackout conditions by Admiral Furlong, the Captain of the Yard, the Manager, and the Production Officer.

December 17, 1941.—Repairs to crane rail on east side of DD #1 and to 15-ton crane were completed. Received permission from Commanding Officer, Hickam Field, to use area in Hickam Field between Hickam Gate and main Yard Gate for stowage.

USS SOUTHARD arrived and docked on Marine Railway.

December 18, 1941.—USS SOUTHARD undocked and departed.

USS CRELE departed.

Contractors started work in earnest on DD #4.

YSD-27 completed and placed in service.

[22] December 19, 1941.—New 25-ton traveling crane at Repair Basin completed.

USS SHAW docked on Marine Railway.

USS CURTISS arrived.

USS MONAGHAN arrived and departed.

USS BREESE arrived and departed.

USS SEMINOLE arrived and departed.

December 20, 1941.—Work begun to repair and place into operation the 1,000,000 gallon concrete underground reservoir in rear of Administration Building at present unused.

USS SCHLEY departed.

USS CHANDLER arrived and departed.

USS CRAVEN arrived.

USS PENNSYLVANIA departed. This vessel had re-entered the Yard on 12 December, 1941.

USS MARYLAND departed.

USS TENNESSEE departed.

Yard help requested by Base Force salvage party on USS CASSIN, DOWNES and OGLALA.

December 21, 1941.—Yard Public Works initiated work at Coaling Basin to provide space for inflammables.

[23] USS CHEW arrived.

USS RAIL arrived.

Base Force took over salvage work on USS OGLALA and NEVADA.

Draft of workmen from mainland received via USS LURLINE.



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|                   | Help-<br>ers | Journey-<br>men |                        | Help-<br>ers | Journey-<br>men |
|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Blacksmiths.....  | 3            | 1               | Riggers.....           | 2            | 0               |
| Electricians..... | 3            | 4               | Sheetmetal worker..... | 14           | 5               |
| Machinists.....   | 11           | 9               | Shipfitter.....        | 5            | 6               |
| Molder.....       | 1            | 0               | Welder, Elec.....      | 0            | 4               |
| Pipefitters.....  | 2            | 2               |                        |              |                 |

and 88 classified laborers—total]167 men.

*December 22, 1941.*—USS CHEW departed.

USS BOGGS arrived.

USS NARWHAL departed.

*December 23, 1941.*—USS BOGGS departed.

USS WARD arrived.

USS TROUT arrived.

USS RALEIGH arrived.

[24] USS THORNTON departed.

USS SONOMA arrived.

*December 24, 1941.*—USS SHAW undocked from Marine Railway.

USS CACHALOT departed.

*December 25, 1941.*—Rear Admiral William R. Furlong, USN, assumed duties as Commandant of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and assistant to the district commandant, in accordance with competent orders.

USS TRACY docked on Marine Railway.

USS HOPKINS arrived.

USS PHOENIX arrived.

USS WARD departed.

*December 26, 1941.*—USS SCHLEY arrived.

USS NARWHAL arrived.

YF-24C arrived.

*December 27, 1941.*—USS CURTISS departed.

*December 28, 1941.*—USS CRAVEN departed.

[25] USS HOPKINS departed.

USS ALLEN arrived.

The 50-ton floating derrick Havslide was damaged, a hole being punched in her bottom by projection from the CALIFORNIA, alongside which she was working.

*December 29, 1941.*—Work completed on inflammable storage at Coal Basin.

USS FARRAGUT arrived.

USS RENHAM arrived.

USS ELLET arrived.

USS COCKATOO arrived.

*December 30, 1941.*—USS PHOENIX departed.

USS CHEW arrived.

USS FARRAGUT departed.

USS SALT LAKE CITY arrived.

*December 31, 1941.*—USS HELENA undocked from DD #2.

During this month the Yard force has been engaged for twenty-four hours each day in herculean efforts to salvage materials and repair vessels and their units damaged during the raid of 7 December. In addition, the regular work load has been properly [26] carried on and expedited wherever possible. Arrivals of vessels entered in this diary indicate arrivals for work to be accomplished; departures indicate completion of the work and release of availability. Base Force Salvage parties, the Mobile Repair Unit and the Navy Yard have pulled together to accomplish a common result.

Authenticated—

/s/ C. S. GILLETTE,  
Captain U. S. N.

## Notes on activities of the Base Force Salvage organization:

Base Force Salvage was organized under the Commander base force with Commander J. M. Steel, USN, officer-in-charge. Senior Salvage Engineer, Lieutenant Commander C. L. Curtis, USNR, was in immediate charge of salvage operations.

A temporary office was established, north of Building No. 129, and the first vessels assigned to this unit for salvage were the USS CASEIN, DORNES, SHAW and OGLALA.

Both the MARYLAND and TENNESSEE were delivered to the Navy Yard and study and preparation were made for ultimate salvage of the CALIFORNIA, UTAH, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, OKLAHOMA, the floating drydock and a Japanese submarine off Ford Island.

On December 17, the USS VESTAL was floated and the USS RALEIGH was ready for delivery to the yard. Removal of equipment from the [27] WEST VIRGINIA was underway. The OGLALA and NEVADA were surveyed for refloating and this work started.

On December 18 pumping operations and repair work were started on YFD-2.

On December 23, the organization had seven diving units in operation. The Mobile Repair Unit consisting of more than 20 officers and 1,000 men reported for duty this date.

#### *Pearl Harbor water area defense activities:*

Captain H. D. Bode, USN, reported for duty as Assistant to the Captain of the Yard on December 10 and was assigned as defense officer in connection with defenses of the Pearl Harbor water area.

A study was made of defense requirements with view to immediate and rapid procurement of defensive material. A Pearl Harbor inner harbor patrol was put in operation. Arrangements were made for use of motor torpedo boats and ready attack destroyer in the harbor patrol organization, and for regular routine sweeping of the harbor by special equipment (magnetic and acoustic). Plan for harbor patrol was established by Naval Base Defense Order No. 11, dated December 26, 1941.

Arrangements were made to expedite the manufacture of antitorpedo nets of yard design. Installation of Light Indicator Net was started and this was placed in operation December 27. Establish [28] ment of 16 observation stations for mine watch was outlined and a start was made on installation of temporary control lines for range entrance lights and outer channel buoys.

Manufacture of special type floating solid steel curtain of interlocking pile sheeting was completed for Drydock No. 2 and cofferdam of Drydock No. 3.

#### *District Material Report:*

A total of 31 small yachts and sampans were acquired during the period of 7 December to 31 December 1941 for use as district craft. Such craft have been assigned to Commander Inshore Patrol for inshore patrol, Captain of the Yard for harbor patrol and Commander Base Force for salvage and supply facilities.

The following eight vessels were partially converted during this period: C. G. 400, C. G. 403, XYP-161, XYP-166, XYP-155, C. G. 196, XYP-157 and XYP-14-14.

During the period of this report the shipyard and drydock facilities of the Inter-Island Drydock Co., Ltd., the Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., and Young Brothers, Ltd., have been available to the district for the repair and conversion of district craft. The Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., shipyard has experienced some labor shortage which has limited the facilities to the conversion program of sampans with deferment of small contractors tugs and barges. No improvement in this labor condition is likely as long [29] as other defense contracts are in progress. The work load and productive force at the Inter-Island Drydock Co., Ltd., is satisfactory. Drydock facilities at Young Brothers, Ltd., are in use. The size of the dock and lack of repair facilities limits the availability for other craft.

#### *Supply Department Activities:*

After the attack on the fleet, arrangements were made to distribute food and clothing to certain focal points, namely: For Island, for the crews of certain battleships, to the Arena, the Receiving Station, the Officers' Club, the Marine Barracks and the Naval Hospital.

The first week of the war was a period of continuous demand for emergency issues of clothing, food, mattresses, blankets, ordnance material, lumber, sand bags, flash lights, batteries and innumerable ship materials. Issues and deliveries of these items were expedited, but a firm check on the requiring activities was made to justify quantities requisitioned.

Replenishment and augmentation of all critical items were immediately started after the outbreak of war. Shipments of fresh and dry provisions, steel, clothing,

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lumber, cots, helmets, small arms, burlap sand bags, bedding, salvage gear, etc., were requested of the west coast yards and the Navy Department.

[30] At the end of the first week, practically all of the business of the supply department had been returned to normal, although accelerated, channels of supply.

### *Communication Activities:*

First action taken was the transmission of air raid warning by NPM on all of its circuits, done immediately by direction of the District Communication Officer who was notified of the raid by the communication watch officer at the navy yard.

The high power TAW transmitter at Lualualei had been shut down by previous arrangement to repair radio towers and shift the general power transformers. This transmitter was restored to full commission with power from the Hawaiian Electric Co., by 0949. The high frequency transmitters were placed on auxiliary operation without interruption.

Radio communication and radio control between the navy yard, radio Wailupe and Lualualei, and from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to Lualualei were established by low power sets so that there was no serious interruption of radio communications on any circuit from the Fourteenth Naval District.

There were many cases of interruptions to telephone communications caused by damage to cables.

[31] All radio control activities were transferred from Radio Wailupe into bombproof building No. 2 and Radio Wahiawa by December 17 without interruption of communications.

The activities of the District Combat Intelligence Unit at Radio Heela have been transferred to Radio Wailupe pending further transfer to Radio Wahiawa.

Additional telephone facilities have been installed to meet the sudden increase of demand and to provide alternate communication channels.

Arrangements for emergency communications, using auxiliary power units and facilities of the commercial communication companies, have been completed.

Two telephone trunks and one teletype circuit between the Harbor Control Post and Aliamanu Crater were completed by January 1, 1942, and the laying of a 100 pair cable to connect the navy yard and the Salt Lake area was underway at maximum speed.

### *Port Director's Report:*

The following Army, Navy, N. T. S., and commercial vessel movements were effected:

#### December 7, 1941:

S. S. JAGERSFONTEIN arrived Honolulu 0930.

U. S. S. ANTARES arrived Honolulu at 0945.

U. S. S. NAVAJO arrived Honolulu at 1400.

#### [32] December 8, 1941:

S. S. MANINI arrived at 0700 from Vancouver, B. C.

S. S. PAT DOHENY (TKR) arrived Honolulu at 0730.

S. S. MALAMA arrived Honolulu at 0830 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Honolulu at 1630 from Hickam.

#### December 9, 1941:

S. S. LANSING arrived Honolulu at 0730 from New Guinea.

U. S. S. ANTARES shifted from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor at 0935.

S. S. MAKAWELI arrived Honolulu at 1425 from Pacific Coast.

#### December 10, 1941:

U. S. S. ROBIN arrived Honolulu at 1100 from Palmyra.

U. S. S. ROBIN shifted from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor at 1245

S. S. WEIMEA arrived Honolulu at 1245 from San Francisco.

S. S. ROSEVILLE (Norwegian) arrived Honolulu at 1530 from Los Angeles Harbor.

U. S. C. & Geodetic Survey EXPLORER arrived Honolulu at 1545 from sea.

S. S. PRUSA arrived Honolulu at 1800 from Manila.

#### December 11, 1941:

S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Honolulu 1155 from San Francisco.

S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Honolulu at 1915 from sea.

#### December 12, 1941:

S. S. PORTLAND arrived Honolulu at 1400 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. HALEAKALA sailed Honolulu at 1145 for Kahului.

S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Honolulu at 1330 from sea.

S. S. ADMIRAL CHASE arrived Honolulu 1500 from Vancouver, B. C.

December 13, 1941:

- S. S. LANSING sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Vancouver, B. C.
- S. S. PYRO sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. HALEAKALA sailed Honolulu at 1830 for Kahului.
- S. S. COAST MERCHANT arrived Honolulu at 1400 from Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. REGULUS arrived Honolulu at 1000 from Midway Island.

December 14, 1941:

- S. S. HAWAII sailed from Honolulu at 1600 for Port Allen.
- S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Kahului at 0600 from Honolulu.
- [33] 0615 report received that U. S. S. TREVOR was standing by torpedoed merchantman. Position 043° true 29 miles from Makapu Point.
- 0615 report received that S. S. PYRO attacked but not damaged at 0350 by submarine. Position 334° true 85 miles from Barbers Point.
- 0645—U. S. S. TREVOR reported picking up survivors from Norwegian steamer HEOUGH.
- 0650—U. S. S. TREVOR reported standing in Honolulu, berth Pier 6, with HEOUGH survivors.

December 15, 1941:

- S. S. HALHAKALA sailed from Kahului at 0500 for Christmas Is.
- S. S. CASTOR sailed from Pearl Harbor at 0830 for Honolulu.
- S. S. CASTOR arrived Honolulu at 1228 from Pearl Harbor.
- S. S. HAWAII arrived Port Allen at 0600 from Honolulu.
- U. S. A. T. IRVIN L. HUNT arrived Honolulu at 1242 from Manila.

December 16, 1941:

- S. S. HAWAII sailed from Port Allen at 1600 for Honolulu.
- S. S. MANINI sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Wellington, New Zealand.
- S. S. MALAMA sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Wellington, New Zealand.
- S. S. RUSA sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Panama Canal.
- S. S. PAT DOHENEY sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MAKAWELI sailed from Honolulu at 1760 for Kahului.
- S. S. ADMIRAL CHASE sailed Honolulu at 1200 for Sydney, Australia.
- S. S. PERMANENTE sailed Honolulu at 1200 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. KAULA arrived Honolulu at 0900 from Palmyra Island.
- S. S. HUMUULA arrived Honolulu at 0900 from Christmas Island.
- U. S. A. T. N. L. SCOTT arrived Honolulu at 1600 from Manila, P. I.
- S. S. PRES. COOLIDGE arrived Honolulu at 1600 from Manila, P. I.
- S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Honolulu at (?) from Pacific Coast.

December 17, 1941:

- S. S. MAUNALEI sailed Honolulu at 1730 for Kahului.
- S. S. MALIKO sailed Kahului at 1900 for Hilo.
- S. S. HAWAII arrived Honolulu 0730 from Port Allen.
- S. S. MAKAWELI arrived Kahului at 130 from Honolulu.

[34] December 18, 1941:

- U. S. S. CASTOR sailed Honolulu at 1430 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. JUPITER sailed Pearl Harbor at 1430 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MEMPHIS CITY sailed Hilo at 2000 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. HUALALAI sailed Hilo at 1700 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. SEPULGA arrived Pearl Harbor at 1100 from Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Kahului at 0600 from Honolulu.
- S. S. MALIKO arrived Hilo at 0600 from Kahului.
- S. S. LAKE FRANCIS arrived Honolulu at 0922 from Christmas Is.

December 19, 1941:

- S. S. LAKE FRANCIS sailed Honolulu at 1348 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. RAMAPO sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. LILOA sailed Port Allen at 1345 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. KOHALA sailed Ahukini at 1530 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. A. T. N. L. SCOTT sailed Honolulu at 1120 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. PRES. COOLIDGE sailed Honolulu at 1125 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. PROCYON arrived Pearl Harbor at 1045 from Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MAPELE arrived Honolulu at 1000 from New Zealand.
- S. S. ORTOLAN arrived Pearl Harbor at 1700.
- S. S. HUALALAI arrived Honolulu at 1000 from Hilo.

December 20, 1941:

- S. S. JAGERSFONTEIN sailed Honolulu at 1120 for Batvia.
- S. S. MONTGOMERY CITY sailed Honolulu at 1600 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. A. T. IRVIN L. HUNT sailed Honolulu at 1630 for Pacific Coast.

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S. S. MAUNALEI sailed Kahului at 1800 for Hilo.

S. S. MAPELE sailed Honolulu at 1600 for Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS arrived Pearl Harbor at 1000 from vicinity Wake Island. Last port departure Johnston.

December 21, 1941:

S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Honolulu at 1500 for Kahului.

U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS sailed Pearl Harbor at 0630 for Honolulu.

S. S. KAILUA sailed Hilo at 1100 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. MALIKO sailed Hilo at 1100 for Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS arrived Honolulu at 0800 from Pearl Harbor.

S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Hilo at 0600 for Kahului.

[35] Dawn—30 survivors from S. S. LAHAINA arrived Maui and reported vessel attacked by shell fire from surfaced submarine on afternoon of December 11th. Ship sank December 12th. All the ship's crew cleared the ship; four men died on way to Maui; survivors returned to Oahu December 30, 1941 by plane.

December 22, 1941:

S. S. MAKAWELI sailed Kahului at 0625 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Kahului at 0700 from Honolulu.

December 23, 1941:

S. S. MAKUA sailed Honolulu at 1755 from Ahukini.

U. S. S. LITCHFIELD arrived Pearl Harbor 1330 from sea.

December 24, 1941:

S. S. HAWAII sailed Honolulu 0720 for Kaunakakai.

S. S. HAWAII sailed Kaunakakai at 1330 for Kahului.

S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Kahului at 1730 for Hilo.

U. S. SUMNER sailed Pearl Harbor at 0800 for sea.

S. S. HUMUULA sailed Honolulu 0832 for sea.

U. S. S. DOLPHIN and 1 destroyer sailed Pearl Harbor for sea at 0930.

U. S. S. ALDEBARAN arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. HARRIS arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. ABINE arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. A. T. TASKER BLISS arrived Honolulu at 1325 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. PLATTE arrived Honolulu at 1330 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. PRES. GARFIELD arrived Honolulu at 1335 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. HERCULES arrived Pearl Harbor at 1730 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. HAWAII arrived Kaunakakai at 1130 from Honolulu.

S. S. MAKUA arrived Ahukini at 0730 from Honolulu.

U. S. S. GREYLING and U. S. S. LITCHFIELD arrived Pearl Harbor at 1400 from sea.

December 25, 1941:

U. S. S. PROCYON sailed Pearl Harbor at 0700 for Honolulu.

S. S. HAWAII sailed Kahului at 1657 for Hilo.

U. S. S. PROCYON arrived Honolulu at 0740 from Pearl Harbor.

S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Hilo at 0700 from Kahului.

[36] December 26, 1941:

S. S. LURLINE sailed Honolulu 1045 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. MATSONIA sailed Honolulu at 1015 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. MONTEREY sailed Honolulu at 1038 for Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. SABINE sailed Pearl Harbor at 0642 for Honolulu.

U. S. S. PLATTE sailed Honolulu at 0755 for Pearl Harbor.

S. S. HAMAKUA arrived Honolulu at 0955 from sea.

U. S. S. SABINE arrived at Honolulu at 0755 from Pearl Harbor.

U. S. S. PLATTE arrived Pearl Harbor at 0835 from Honolulu.

S. S. HAWAII arrived Hilo at 0600 from Kahului.

S. S. BIRMINGHAM CITY arrived Honolulu at 1215 from Panama Canal.

December 27, 1941:

S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK sailed Honolulu at 1725 for Port Allen.

S. S. MAKUA sailed Ahukini at 0830 for Kahului.

Twelve (12) survivors picked up off Oahu reported S. S. MANINI torpedoed December 17, 1941, at 1840 A. S. T. (0504 G. C. T. 18 December), position 18°35'N, 156°13'W. Ship sank in six minutes. Two life boats put over. December 29, 1941, 19 more survivors picked up by U. S. S. PATERSON, west of Oahu, making 31 survivors in all.

**December 28, 1941:**

U. S. S. SABINE sailed Honolulu at 1528 for Pacific Coast.  
 U. S. S. NEOSHO sailed Pearl Harbor at 1600 for sea.  
 U. S. S. CURTISS sailed Pearl Harbor at 1600 for Pacific Coast.  
 S. S. HAWAII sailed Hilo at 1830 for Kahului.  
 S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Hilo at 1830 for Kahului.  
 S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK sailed Port Allen at 1700 for Honolulu.  
 S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Port Allen at 0700 from Honolulu.  
 S. S. MAKUA arrived Kahului at 0745 from Ahukini.  
 S. S. ARTHUR FOSS and two barges arrived Honolulu at 1500 from Wake Island.

1000—thirteen (13) survivors from S. S. PRUSA arrived Honolulu and reported vessel sunk at 0536, 18 December, 1941,—120 miles south of southern point Hawaii. Nine (9) missing.

**December 29, 1941:**

S. S. HAWAII sailed Kahului (Time not available) for Kaunakakai.  
 S. S. HAWAII sailed Kaunakakai (Time not available) for Honolulu.  
 S. S. HAWAII arrived Kahului at 0700 from Hilo.  
 S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Kahului at 0700 from Hilo.  
 S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Honolulu at 0630 from Port Allen.  
 S. S. HAWAII arrived Kaunakakai at 1100 from Kahului.

**[37] December 30, 1941:**

U. S. S. HERCULES sailed Pearl Harbor at 0715 for Honolulu.  
 S. S. PRES. GARFIELD sailed Honolulu at 1036 for Pacific Coast.  
 U. S. A. T. TASKER BLISS sailed Honolulu at 1043 for Pacific Coast.  
 U. S. PROCYON sailed Honolulu at 1010 for Pacific Coast.  
 U. S. S. HARRIS sailed Pearl Harbor at 0930 for Pacific Coast.  
 U. S. S. THRESHER sailed Pearl Harbor at 0930 for sea.  
 U. S. S. HERCULES arrived Honolulu at 0830 from Pearl Harbor.  
 U. S. S. TRITON arrived Pearl Harbor at 1830 from sea.  
 S. S. HAWAII arrived Honolulu at 0715 from Kaunakakai.  
 U. S. S. WALNUT (C. G. S.) arrived Honolulu at 0700 from sea.

**December 31, 1941:**

S. S. HAMAKUA sailed Honolulu at 1752 for Nawiliwili.  
 S. S. HUALALAI sailed Honolulu at 1743 for Kahului.  
 S. S. BIRMINGHAM CITY sailed Honolulu at 1740 for Kahului.  
 S. S. NIAGARA arrived Pearl Harbor at 1200 from sea.

/s/ M. R. DEX.

Activities of District Intelligence Office and Office of the Cable and Radio Censor:  
 At 0830 December 7, the order was given to have all Intelligence personnel on active duty report to their stations immediately.

Orders were given to mobilize all Naval Reserve Intelligence personnel and to establish censorship of cable and overseas radio.

Appropriate Intelligence reports (including interrogation of Japanese lieutenant captured from small submarine stranded in Waimanalo Bay and examination of various documents and equipment from crashed Japanese planes) have been submitted to proper [38] authorities including the U. S. Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, Combat Intelligence Officer, local representatives of the Military Intelligence Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

During the period 7 to 31 December, 1941, the District Intelligence Service in collaboration with the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division conducted investigations of many rumors and reports concerning alleged parachutists, signals, lights, poisoned water, unexploded bombs, etc., and assisted the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division in rounding up suspects and collecting unauthorized radios and firearms.

At 1100 December 7, censorship was established and a ban clamped down on all incoming and outgoing cables, radiograms and trans-Pacific telephone calls. On December 8, after rules for censorship and requirements of messages were issued to operating companies and to the Field Censors, regular censorship and release of all traffic were begun at 1300.

Tentative trans-Pacific telephone censorship regulations were issued to the public on December 19.

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## Personnel Office Report:

The following information on officer and enlisted personnel. [39] is submitted for the period of 7 December to 31 December, 1941:

### Officer Personnel

|                                                                                            |           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Officers of the Naval Reserve called to active duty in the Fourteenth Naval District ----- | 44        |
| Officers of the Retired List, USN, called to active duty -----                             | 1         |
|                                                                                            | <hr/> 45  |
| Officers received in District from mainland for permanent duty -----                       | 39        |
| Officers received in District for temporary duty from Pacific Fleet Pool -----             | 115       |
|                                                                                            | <hr/> 154 |

### Enlisted Personnel

|                                                                             |          |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Number of new enlistments in Naval Reserve -----                            | 25       |
| Retired men called to active duty -----                                     | 3        |
| Fleet Reserves called to active duty -----                                  | 0        |
| Naval Reserves called to active duty -----                                  | 43       |
|                                                                             | <hr/> 46 |
| Total number of enlisted men called to active duty during this period ----- | 46       |

### Action at Wake:

Enemy activity started with a bombing attack by 24 twin-engined land planes on December 8. Almost daily attacks were made by Japanese aircraft until the island was finally overwhelmed by aerial and surface attack on December 22. A surface raid was also carried out on December 11. Enemy losses reported include one light cruiser, four destroyers, a gunboat, a submarine and more than 12 planes.

### [40] Action at Midway:

The only enemy activity against Midway was a surface raid on December 8 in which two cruisers and two destroyers are reported to have participated. Shore batteries registered three 3 inch hits on one of the destroyers and two 5 inch hits on a cruiser. A total of 14 casualties including two dead resulted from enemy shelling.

A curtailment of contract work was proposed under the existing situation and plans made to eliminate projects which would require a long time for completion to a usable stage. It was proposed to stop work temporarily on the submarine base buildings and modify other projects to suit immediate needs. It was further proposed to reduce the contractors' force 50 per cent, leaving a total of 770 workers.

### Action at Johnston:

Initial action against Johnston was a star shelling by a submarine on December 12, followed by other surface raids on December 15, 21 and 22. The December 15 raid saw an enemy light cruiser fire 10 salvos at 9,000 yards range. The power house was destroyed and the stills and boilers were badly damaged. Since the enemy ceased fire about 10 minutes after and at a time when the island was well lighted by an oil fire, it was believed that Johnston shore batteries came close to their mark.

[41] A star shelling, probably by a submarine, occurred on December 21, this action ceasing after fire was returned by shore battery. On December 22, a submarine shelled Sand Island and destroyed the CAA homing tower. The 5 inch battery on Johnston fired 10 salvos with each gun at 7,000 yards range before the submarine submerged.

In a directive on December 13, it was specified that a sufficient force of civilians was to be kept at the island to operate all of the power plants and continue with a program as follows: Complete gasoline tanks to a usable stage, complete a runway 2,500 feet in length, construct bachelor officers' quarters and the dispensary, construct temporary magazine as necessary and splinter proof shelters, construct an emergency sewage system and a salt water system, a power plant

and distribution system and a radar installation. A total of 270 civilian employees was estimated as necessary for the outlined work.

On December 25, the commandant directed that the resident officer in charge and facilities of the contractors' organization be placed at the disposal of the commanding officer of the air station for necessary defense and protection measures in the present emergency.

The program was to include shelters and protection around key structures.

After taking care of emergency items, the contractors' force [42] was to complete personnel buildings and services. Temporary storage for ammunition, gasoline and other supplies, the runway and all essential items were to be completed at the earliest possible date to permit evacuation of civilian employees and make room for military personnel. The permanent bombproof shelter and communication center were not to be built as originally planned. Scattered splinter proof shelters would be substituted as needed.

The foregoing was altered the following day by a directive that Johnston was to retain the least number of employees—not to exceed 200—to complete the essential defense structures including the runway to 2,500 feet length and to operate mechanical equipment. The least skilled and the nonessential trades would be evacuated first, and the military force would assist with unskilled labor as necessary after evacuation.

Of a total of 307 contractors' employees, 110 were evacuated by the end of the month.

#### *Action at Palmyra:*

There was no enemy activity against Palmyra until December 24 when the air station was shelled by a submarine at about 3,000 yards range. Six rounds fired registered one hit on the U. S. Engineer Department Dredge Sacramento, causing only minor damage.

All of the island's batteries were in Condition 1 before the action. The submarine submerged after a five inch shore battery fired two star shells and 12 navy common A. P. shells. No hits were observed.

[43] Change of the construction program as required by existing conditions was directed.

Palmyra was to maintain the minimum number of civilian employees—not over 250—needed to complete structures and essential defense measures, operate mechanical equipment as well as the dredge and other plant. The island was to provide a 5,000 foot runway together with emergency defenses.

On December 31, the naval air station reported its radar was in commission.

#### *Summary of Actions Against Submarines:*

A total of 52 depth charge attacks on submarine contact were reported by district forces during the period of this diary.

Reports were received from the USS WARD, USS CHEW, USS SCHLEY, USS COCKATOO and USCG TANAY.

Enemy submarine activity in the operating areas of these forces was materially curtailed, giving some tangible evidence of the effect of the attacks.

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#### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 75

#### 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT

#### OFFICE OF COMMANDANT

% Fleet Post Office, SAN FRANCISCO, California

7 JUNE 1945.

C-A12-1/ND14  
Serial 08093

#### *Confidential*

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

Subject: War Diaries of 7 December 1941—Extracts from.

Enclosures:

(A) Extract from War Diary, 14ND Naval Base Defense Force.

(B) Extract from War Diary of OinC, Net & Boom Defenses, 14ND.



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(C) Extract from War Diary of USS CONDOR.

(D) Extract from War Diary of USS WARD.

1. Pursuant to the verbal request of Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR, Enclosures (A), (B), (C) and (D) are forwarded herewith.

H. E. Overesch,  
H. E. OVERESCH,  
Chief of Staff.

(Enclosure A)

## EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE

*Sunday, December 7, 1941*

- 0654 U. S. S. WARD transmitted the following message to Com14:  
"We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the Defensive Sea Area."  
0712 Message decoded and delivered to Duty Officer, Lt. Comdr. Kaminski.  
0713 Duty Officer notified Chief of Staff, who notified Commandant.  
0715 Duty Officer notified Commander in Chief's Duty Officer.  
0718 Duty Officer notified Commander Momsen, War Plans Officer.  
0720 Duty Officer notified Ensign Logan to report for duty.  
0725 Commander Momsen called Duty Officer and had ready duty destroyer ordered to proceed as soon as possible to the assistance of the WARD.  
0735 Honolulu gate ordered closed.  
Certified a true copy:

Geo. H. Simpson,  
GEO. H. SIMPSON,  
Aide to the Commandant, 14th Naval District.

JUNE 6, 1945.

(Enclosure B)

## EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY OF OFFICER IN CHARGE, NET & BOOM DEFENSES, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT. KEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISTRICT ORDER No. 2-42.

*Sunday, December 7, 1941*

### DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

- 1145 Assumed the duty December 6, 1941.  
" Routine duties.  
0712 Received despatch from USS WARD . . . "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area". Upon receipt of despatch, immediately endeavored to raise Commandant's Aide and could not contact him. Called and contacted CINCPAC duty officer and read him the despatch. Sent message to ready duty DD, USS MAHAN "Get underway immediately and contact USS Ward in defensive sea area". Instructed Communication Office to send copy of the last message to the USS WARD for information. Called Chief of Staff Captain Earle, notifying him of WARD's message. He requested confirmation from WARD. Relayed to WARD.  
0720 Called War Plans Officer, Comdr. Momsen, and was ordered to call Ensign Logan. Logan arrived 0725 (approximately).  
0725 Received following message from USS WARD "We have intercepted a sampan—we are escorting this sampan into Honolulu—please inform Coast Guard to send cutter for relieve us of sampan".

Certified a true copy:

GEO. H. SIMPSON,  
Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

JUNE 6, 1945.

(Enclosure C)

EXTRACT FROM THE WAR DIARY OF THE USS CONDOR (AMc#14) OF DECEMBER 1941

*December 7, 1941*

- 0210-0445 Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor.  
0342 Sighted periscope of a submerged submarine. Following diagram illustrates contact:

(The diagram referred to, *supra*, illustrating contact with a Japanese submarine by the USS WARD on 7 December 1941 at 0342 will be found reproduced as Item No. 297, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Submarine when first sighted was approximately 100 feet away on the port bow on a collision course with the CONDOR but turned sharply to the left. The following message was sent by yardarm blinker to the U. S. S. WARD, "Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots." About five minutes later the WARD requested by radio further information concerning the submarine. Information concerning the course was given and the WARD continued search while this vessel continued on its assigned mission. The submarine was not sighted again.

Certified a true copy:

GEO. H. SIMPSON,  
*Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*

[Stamped:] 6 Jun 1945.

(Enclosure D)

EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY, U. S. S. WARD

*December 7, 1941*

0 to 4

Steaming singly under boiler #1 and #2 on Channel Entrance patrol off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds to maintain position with standard speed 15 knots, 187 r. p. m.

- 0200 U. S. S. CORSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood out of Pearl Harbor and commenced mine sweeping operations.

4 to 8

- 0405 Received following visual message from U. S. S. CONDOR: "HAVE SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE".

- 0408 Sounded General Quarters.

- 0443 Secured from General Quarters.

- 0520 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "SUBS COURSE WAS 020 MAGNETIC AND WAS HEAD-ING FOR ENTRANCE BUOYS".

- 0525 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood in channel.

- 0527 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBMARINE". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION".

- 0534 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPORT OF SUBMARINE. WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH. NOTIFY IF YOU RECEIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION".

- 0605 Exchanged calls with U. S. S. ANTARES.

- 0640 Sighted unidentified submarine 1 point off starboard bow. Sounded General Quarters. All engines ahead full, course 125° T and pgc, 118 psc.  
0645 Commenced firing on submarine. Fired two salvos. Observed second salvo to be direct hit on enemy submarine conning tower. Commenced depth charge attack.

- 0646 Ceased firing and ceased depth charge attack.

## 1284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0648 Stopped sampan number 248 (32A453) in vicinity of attack and notified Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.
- 0654 By radio to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".
- 0703 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack.
- 0705 Commenced depth charge attack.
- 0706 Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern. Ceased depth charge attack.

Certified a true copy:

Geo. H. Simpson,  
Geo. H. SIMPSON,

*Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*

JUNE 6, 1945

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### OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

ND14/N&B/A16-3/RWO

*Confidential*

FEBRUARY 14, 1942.

From: The Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Via: Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: War Diary of the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses.

Reference: (a) District Order 2-42.

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), subject War Diary is herewith submitted.

J. H. Hoefer,  
J. H. HOEFER,  
*By direction.*

*First Endorsement*

ND14/ISP/A16-3/RWO

INSHORE PATROL,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
February 14, 1942.

From: Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Forwarded.

J. W. Rogers,  
J. W. ROGERS,  
*By direction.*

WAR DIARY OF OFFICER IN CHARGE, NET & BOOM DEFENSES FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Kept in accordance with District Order No. 2-42

*Sunday December 7 1941*

#### DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

1145 Assumed the duty December 6, 1941.

" Routine duties.

0712 Received despatch from USS WARD. . . "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area". Upon receipt of despatch, immediately endeavored to raise Commandant's Aide and could not contact him. Called and contacted CINCPAC duty officer and read him the despatch. Sent message to ready duty DD, USS MAHAN "Get underway immediately and contact USS WARD in defensive sea area". Instructed Communication Office to send copy of the last message to the USS WARD for information. Called Chief of Staff Captain Earle, notifying him of WARD'S message. He requested confirmation from WARD. Relayed to WARD.

0720 Called War Plans Officer, Comdr. Momsen, and was ordered to call Ensign Logan. Logan arrived 0725 (approximately).

- 0725 Received following message from USS WARD "We have intercepted a sampan—we are escorting this sampan into Honolulu—please inform Coast Guard to send cutter for relieve us of sampan".
- 0726 Called Coast Guard. Could not contact an officer but was informed by Communications Office (14ND) that Coast Guard had received WARD'S second message simultaneously. Comdr. Momsen arrived Operations Office a few minutes after Ensign Logan.
- 9728 Started to call all department heads, after arranging with telephone office to keep lines open.
- 0755 At approximately 0755 (but not later) heard a plane approaching from south. I saw it from southerly lanai of Administration Bldg. and could discern Rising Sun insignia of Japan under the wings. Plane was joined shortly by others with some insignia on it. They were the dive bomber type. Bombs were dropped and the first attack was on. Tried to reach the YNG 17 by telephone. Unable to get through. Continued calling YNG 17 without being able to make contact. Made telephone contact with YNG 17 at approximately 0830 and ordered Ensign Eastman to close the A/T and A/B immediately. About this time there was a slight lull in the attack, followed by a much heavier and concentrated attack, and I believe that it was in this attack that the formations of torpedo planes came in over PEARL HARBOR. It was during this attack that our defensive firing was increasing perceptibly. Noise was deafening. This attack lasted much longer than the first.

Captain Earle, Chief of Staff, arrived during this second attack. Endeavored to close HONOLULU A/T and A/B. Had considerable difficulty in getting through. Finally, Lt. Ottley's home was called and was informed that he had departed for the Control Station of the HONOLULU Net and Boom. Tried to reach him there without success. During this period the third attack began. Defensive firing exceedingly heavy, bombing likewise.

The Commandant and his Aide arrived during the third attack.

Fires from Hickam Field and 10-10 dock were raging. Everything was obscured by smoke. It was impossible to use the phone during this time because of noise. This attack appeared to me to be the heaviest and longest. After the third attack subsided, contact was made with the Officer in Charge, HONOLULU Net Operating Station, and he was ordered to close the HONOLULU Net and Boom immediately. Was later informed by Mr. Ottley that the Mess Hall at Sand Island had been bombed and one man injured, but that they were still able to operate.

Capt. Finlay, Senior Coast Guard Officer, had assumed his duties as Captain of the Port (HONOLULU) and was in direct administrative charge of the HONOLULU Net and Boom.

Commandant's Aide for Aviation arrived during the last attack.

There followed a lull, followed by what I considered a relatively light attack.

Shortly thereafter the attacks ceased.

Simultaneously with the events listed above the following occurred on December 1941.

Communications with YNG 17 and the Section Base were out. To become informed of the conditions of the gate vessel, the PEARL HARBOR Net & Boom Operating Crew, and of Net & Boom vessels at the Section Base, Ensign John H. Hofer went to the foregoing and subsequently arranged to have additional weapons, ammunition gas mask and helmets delivered to them.

Enlisted personnel was not adequate for the war time operation of the Net & Boom Defenses. Follow up requests for personnel requirements previously submitted were made to District Personnel Officer.

Study was given to the obtaining of standby winches for the HONOLULU Net & Boom, and for the PEARL HARBOR Net & Boom.

Routine Duties.

H. KAMINSKI  
Lt. Comdr. D-V (G) USNR

Monday, December 8, 1941

1. In accordance with previously formulated plans, action was taken to provide war time ordnance, for all Net and Boom Stations and vessels. Requests were made to the District Ordnance Officer.

## 1286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2. An underwater inspection was requested to made of the Pearl Harbor anti-torpedo net and anti-motorboat boom (by divers to be obtained from ComBaseFor) for the purpose of determining whether the Nets had been directly penetrated or disturbed during or prior to the attack of the 7th. This inspection, conducted on the 12th of December, revealed that the nets had not been penetrated and substantiated the belief that the Japanese submarine known to be in Pearl Harbor, entered in the wake of our own AMc's, Sunday a. m., December 7th.

3. A recommendation was submitted to the Captain of the Yard to cancel the system of visual signals now in effect for denoting the opened and closed status of the Pearl Harbor Net and Boom. This was approved.

Tuesday, December 9, 1941

1. Enlisted personnel urgently needed in Net and Boom operating forces were obtained from the Emergency Fleet Personnel office. Additional personnel requests were submitted to District Personnel office to complete operating forces.

2. The attack of Dec. 7th, re-opened the subject of the unprotected areas existing under the Pearl Harbor Net and Boom. The conventional A/T Net stipulated for this installation by BuOrd extends to a depth of 35' only, and was designed primarily for torpedo protection. There is a section directly under the main gate of approximately 350' ranging in depth from 45' to 82' (dredged for a damaged ship channel), and the possibility of a submarine passing through this section undetected is realized. Pending the receipt of reliable information or directives it is not deemed advisable to make any immediate changes in the Net and Boom. However changes will be made as soon as advisable.

3. The District Ordnance Superintendent advised that two 50 cal. machine guns would shortly be made available for Net and Boom defenses. It is intended to place one on the YNg 17 and one on the YN 47.

Wednesday, December 10, 1941

1. A study was made and action was taken to provide emergency standby opening and closing wires for the Nets and Booms at both Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. This wire will be available for immediate use in case of damage to wire now in use.

2. In view of the questionable reliability of the temporary winches installed for operation of the Nets and Booms at Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. The Bureau of Ordnance was requested by despatch to expedite shipment of the regular Bureau of Yards and Docks winches. In anticipation of the delay expected in the shipping of the regular winches alternate means of opening and closing the gates in case of breakdown were established as follows:—

### HONOLULU A/T AND A/B:—PIER 1 WINCH STATION (CLOSING STATION)

|                 |   |                   |                                       |
|-----------------|---|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Emergency means | { | #1 equipment----- | temporary installation, diesel winch. |
|                 |   | #2 equipment----- | YN47, COCKENCE                        |
|                 |   | #3 equipment----- | Army truck M                          |

### SAND ISLAND WINCH STATION (OPENING STATION)

|                 |   |                   |                                           |
|-----------------|---|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Emergency means | { | #1 equipment----- | original installation, two diesel winches |
|                 |   | #2 equipment----- | YN47, COCKENCE                            |
|                 |   | #3 equipment----- | Army tractors M                           |

### PEARL HARBOR A/T AND A/B GATE VESSEL (CLOSING) STATION

|                 |   |                   |                   |
|-----------------|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| Emergency means | { | #1 equipment----- | starboard winches |
|                 |   | #2 equipment----- | port winches      |
|                 |   | #3 equipment----- | YN56, WAPELLO     |
|                 |   | #4 equipment----- | YN2, YN7, YN53    |

### FORT WEAVER WINCH STATION (OPENING)

|                 |   |                   |                                          |
|-----------------|---|-------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Emergency means | { | #1 equipment----- | temporarily installed two diesel winches |
|                 |   | #2 equipment----- | YN56, WAPELLO                            |
|                 |   | #3 equipment----- | YN2, YN7, YN53                           |
|                 |   | #3 equipment----- | Army tractors M                          |

M Arrangements were made with the Army officers concerned for the use of this equipment in event of a breakdown of equipment temporarily installed.

Thursday, December 11, 1941

1. Commander Base Force designated staff officer Lieutenant Commander RAINES to assist in the preparation of tentative plans, and also in the installation for aerial torpedo net protection of ships, berths, and drydocks in Pearl Harbor. Working in cooperation with the Public Works Department, improvised materials were envisioned as being temporarily necessary for this work. Arrangements were made to obtain sheet piling, re-inforcing rods welded to fencing, and target rafts to augment the relatively meagre quantity of regular A/T nets and appurtenances now available at the Net Depot. Work commenced on this project and the wire fencing separating Pearl Harbor Navy Yard was removed for this purpose.

2. The baffle in front of the YNg 17, which serves as torpedo protection for that part of the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B which otherwise would be unprotected, was moved in closer to the YNg 17, in view of the data received regarding the midget Japanese submarine which washed ashore at Waimanolo Bay.

Action was taken to provide a direct phone from the YNg 17 to the Captain of the Yard's office.

Friday, December 12, 1941

1. A study was made of the feasibility of manufacturing torpedo net grommets in the Navy Yard, so as to make available as soon as possible the large amount of net that will be needed for protection of capitol ships in Pearl Harbor. To this end a canvass was made of the following local firms with the intention of securing whatever wire could be used for this job: Honolulu Iron Works; Theo H. Davies & Co. Ltd., Oahu Junk Co., American Factors, and the local utility companies. Samples of some of this wire that could be obtained were delivered to the District Chemical laboratory for measuring tensile strength and ascertaining chemical composition. Reports received later revealed that this wire would be unsatisfactory for the job, it being much too low in carbon content to afford suitable wire for manufacturing A/A net grommets.

2. Plans were made to lower the inner A/T and A/B net at Pearl to within 2 feet of the bottom of the channel. This is to be done as soon as additional net is received from the mainland.

Saturday, December 13, 1941

1. Detailed soundings and the taking of profile data was completed for the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B for the purpose of providing working information as to how to best lower the nets to protect the space created by the dredging of the damaged ship channel. The problem is attributable to the fact that the depths of water under the nets when in a closed position is greater than the depths of water under the nets when in an open position. This condition prohibits the lengthening of all the nets to the deepest depths because if this were done, the nets would then become fouled on the bottom when opened because of the lesser depths existing as stated afore. To overcome this problem a recommendation was made to fill in, with dredged materials, the hole directly under the center of the net to a depth of approximately 45'. This recommendation was opposed because of the lesser depths which would then exist in the damaged ship channel. A further study is being made of the afore problem.

Sunday, December 14, 1941

1. Plans were made to install a light indicator net at the site of the old anti-boat log boom in Pearl Harbor channel. Operating personnel, officers and men, equipment and supplies, were arranged for.

2. The Bureau of Ordnance was despatched to ship by Clipper material needed for this installation.

Monday, December 14, 1941

1. Work continued on the organization of the Light Indicator Net Station.

2. Captain Bode, U.S.N., assisting the Captain of the Yard, discussed plans for protecting ships, berths, and drydocks in Pearl Harbor. A study will be made of materials needed, and BuOrd will be despatched to ship same as soon as possible.

## 1288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

**Tuesday, December 16, 1941**

1. In preparation for the installation of the Light Indicator Net, the old anti-boat log boom was removed to the Net Depot quay wall and later stored ashore.
2. An inspection was made of part of the midget Japanese submarine now at the Submarine Base. Available information indicates that it would be extremely precarious, if not impossible, for an underwater craft of this type to directly penetrate or even go under the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B when the gate was closed, without advertising its presence.

**Wednesday, December 17 1941**

1. Routine administration.

**Thursday, December 18 1941**

1. In consonance with ONI reports relative to attempted attacks on British Net and Boom Defenses, consideration was given to the installing of large searchlights at Net and Boom stations. Approval was granted by BuShips to install 12" searchlights on the YNg 17 and at the Honolulu Net Operating Station. This will be done at once.

**Friday, December 19, 1941**

1. Installation plans were completed for the Light Indicator Net. The Net Depot will commence assembling the Net today, using these plans for reference.
2. Arrangements were made to equip the YN 7 with electric power transmission wire so as to enable her to supply current to the YNg 17 in event of power failure in the gate vessel.

**Saturday, December 20, 1941**

1. Routine Administration.

**Sunday, December 21, 1941**

1. The ground moorings for the Indicator Net were layed this date.
2. Indicator Net panels were assembled and brailled up to conform to bottom soundings. This Net will be installed December 22 and December 23rd. Indicator floats were shipped by clipper.

**Monday, December 22, 1941**

1. Routine Administration.

**Tuesday, December 23, 1941**

1. Study is being made of the practicability of installing a Light Indicator Net to the seaward (bault) line (main gate section) of the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B. If the study reveals this expediency to be practical, then the opening now afforded by the damaged ship channel to attacking underwater craft will be closed. This study is being conducted in conjunction with the study of the feasibility and advisability of installing an anti-submarine net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor channel.

**Wednesday, December 24, 1941**

1. Routine Administration.

**Thursday, December 25, 1941**

1. Routine Administration.

**Friday, December 26, 1941**

1. Routine Administration.

**Saturday, December 27, 1941**

1. In accordance with District policy, Net and Boom vessels completed strip ship plans.

Sunday, December 28, 1941

1. In light of expanded Net and Boom operations, a complete revision of Net and Boom enlisted personnel was submitted to District Personnel Officer for forwarding to the Bureau of Navigation.

Monday, December 29, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Tuesday, December 30, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Wednesday, December 31, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

U. S. S. WARD,  
Hawaiian Area, February 4, 1942.

DD139/A12-1 (870)

Confidential

From: Commanding Officer.

To: Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Subject: War Diary.

Reference: (a) District Order No. 2-42, Jan. 5, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) War Diary of U. S. S. WARD for month of December, 1941.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in Reference (a) there is submitted herewith War Diary of the U. S. S. WARD, in triplicate, for the month of December, 1941.

W. W. OUTERBRIDGE.

WAR DIARY

December 7, 1941

0 to 4:

Steaming singly under boiler #1 and #2 on Channel Entrance Patrol off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds to maintain position with standard speed 15 knots, 137 r. p. m.

0200 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood out of Pearl Harbor and commenced mine sweeping operations.

4 to 8:

0405 Received following visual message from U. S. S. CONDOR: "HAVE SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE".

0403 Sounded General Quarters.

0443 Secured from General Quarters.

0520 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "SUBS COURSE WAS 020 MAGNETIC AND WAS HEADING FOR ENTRANCE BUOYS".

0525 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood in channel.

0527 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBMARINE". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION".

0534 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPORT OF SUBMARINE. WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH. NOTIFY IF YOU RECEIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION".

0605 Exchanged calls with U. S. S. ANTARES.

0640 Sighted unidentified submarine 1 point off starboard bow. Sounded General Quarters. All engines ahead full, course 125°T and pgc, 118 psc.

0645 Commenced firing on submarine. Fired two salvos. Observed second salvo to be direct hit on enemy submarine conning tower. Commenced depth charge attack.

0646 Ceased firing and ceased depth charge attack.

Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.

0648 Stopped sampan number 248 (32A453) in vicinity of attack and notified Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.



## 1290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0645 By radio to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".
- 0703 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack.
- 0705 Commenced depth charge attack.
- 0706 Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern. Ceased depth charge attack.
- 0736 From radio to Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and Coast Guard Station, Honolulu: "WE SIGHTED AND CAPTURED SAMPAN. WE ARE ESCORTING SAMPAN IN TO HONOLULU. PLEASE NOTIFY COAST GUARD TO RELIEVE US OF SAMPAN".
- 0754 Sighted squadrons of enemy planes approaching from Barber's Point heading for Pearl Harbor.
- 0755 Japanese planes commenced bombing attack on Pearl Harbor.

DD139/A16-3/(759)

U. S. S. WARD,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 13, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer.

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Via: (1) Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY.

(2) Commander Inshore Patrol.

Subject: Sinking of a Japanese Submarine by U. S. S. WARD.

1. While patrolling Pearl Harbor Entrance on Sunday, December 7, 1941, the U. S. S. WARD attacked an unidentified submarine in the Restricted Area off the Harbor.

The facts are as follows:

(1) At 0637 the Officer-of-the-deck said, "Captain come on the bridge". A conning tower with periscope of a submarine was visible. She was apparently heading for Pearl Harbor trailing the U. S. S. ANTARES. The ANTARES was standing toward the channel entrance towing a lighter.

(2) At 0640 the attack started. The WARD bore down on the submarine while accelerating from 5 to 25 knots.

(3) At 0645 the WARD opened fire with No. 1 and 3 guns and began dropping depth charges. One shot was fired from each gun. The shot from No. 1 gun missed, passing directly over the conning tower. The shot from No. 3 gun fired at a range of 50 yards or less struck the submarine at the waterline which was the junction of the hull and conning tower. Damage was seen by several members of the crew. This was a square positive hit. There was no evidence of ricochet. The submarine was seen to heel over to starboard. The projectile was not seen to explode outside the hull of the submarine. There was no splash of any size that might result from an explosion or ricochet.

(4) Immediately after being hit the submarine appeared to slow and sink. She ran into our depth charge barrage and appeared to be directly over an exploding charge. The depth charges were set for 100 feet.

(5) The submarine sank in 1200 feet of water and could not be located with supersonic detector. There was a large amount of oil on the surface where the depth charges exploded.

(6) The attack was made at 0645 which was before Pearl Harbor was bombed by Japanese planes.

(7) A dispatch by voice transmission was sent to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District at 0645 which stated:

"WE HAVE ATTACKED, FIRED UPON, AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".

(8) The performance of duty by the officers and men during this attack was in accordance with the traditions of this service.

### PERTINENT INFORMATION

*Appearance of submarine:* Cylindrical tube about 80 feet long with small oval shaped conning tower. It had no deck. It was painted dark green and was covered with moss indicating that it had been at sea for a considerable period.

**Behavior during attack:** In spite of the five minute run from the time of sighting and time of attack, the submarine apparently did not see or detect the WARD. It was making from 8 to 10 knots and was apparently bent on following the ANTARES into port. Exact distances are not known but at the time of the first shot the range was not more than 100 yards and for the second shot the range was 50 yards or less. The submarine passed very close to our stern.

W. W. OUTERBRIDGE.

DD139/A16-3/(793)

U. S. S. WARD,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 23, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer.

To: Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY.

Subject: Attacks on Submarines, report of.

1. The following is a summary of attacks made upon submarines by this vessel between the dates of 7 and 17 December, 1941:

| Date     | Time | Summary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | No. of charges |
|----------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 12-7-41  | 0640 | Fired 2 shells at and dropped 4 depth charges on enemy submarine on surface. Sank submarine. See Commanding Officer, U. S. S. WARD Ltr. of 13 December 1941 to Commandant, 11th Naval District.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 4              |
| 12-7-41  | 0705 | Dropped 5 depth charges on sonic contact. Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern after attack.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 5              |
| 12-7-41  | 0840 | Dropped 2 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 2              |
| 12-7-41  | 1020 | Dropped 3 depth charges on sonic contact. Observed oil on surface. Dropped 2 more depth charges on sonic contact under oil slick. No further contact.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 5              |
| 12-7-41  | 1127 | Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Sighted heavy oil slick on surface after attack.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 4              |
| 12-8-41  | 0619 | Dropped 5 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown. Dropped 4 more charges on sonic contact after circling to verify first attack.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 9              |
| 12-8-41  | 0655 | Dropped 2 depth charges on sonic contact. Observed heavy oil slick on surface.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 2              |
| 12-8-41  | 1349 | Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 4              |
| 12-9-41  | 1158 | Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact indicated by smoke bomb from patrol plane. Circled for second attack. Dropped 6 more charges. Contacts were excellent. Large air bubble came to surface. Heavy oil slick in bombed area was seen. Planes also dropped depth charges.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 12             |
| 12-10-41 | 0033 | Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 4              |
| 12-10-41 | 1728 | Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Heavy oil on surface.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 6              |
| 12-10-41 | 2115 | Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 4              |
| 12-11-41 | 1514 | Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 4              |
| 12-11-41 | 1547 | Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Considerable oil on surface.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 6              |
| 12-11-41 | 1637 | Dropped 6 depth charges on plane indication and sonic contact. Heavy oil slick on surface.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 6              |
| 12-11-41 | 1920 | Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 6              |
| 12-16-41 | 2042 | Dropped 8 depth charges on sonic contact. Seventh charge brought up a large air bubble accompanied with a quantity of oil.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 8              |
| 12-17-41 | 1648 | Dropped 8 depth charges on patrol plane indication. Results unknown.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 8              |
| 12-17-41 | 2012 | Dropped 8 depth charges on sonic contact. Contact was made at 1500 yards. Ranging was not stopped in order to listen for screw noises. Bearing was practically steady. Sound operator reported that it might be a surface ship at 800 yards the ship was 15° wide. Contact was clear and positive. Went ahead full speed. At 200 yards slowed to 15 knots. 10 seconds later dropped 8 depth charges at 4 second intervals. Charges set alternately for 50 and 100 feet. The seventh charge sent up a double column of water in a "V" shape which rose 25 feet higher than any other column. All charges exploded. No contact could be made after the attack. | 8              |

/s/ W. W. OUTERBRIDGE.

December 7, 1941

8 to 12:

Steaming as before.

0800 Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

0809 Sighted oil pool. Under intermittent gunfire from unidentified guns at times during air attack, and bombed several times, no damage being sustained. At one time enemy fighter planes repulsed with machine guns.

0840 Dropped two more depth charges, continuing search with sound gear.

## 1292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0901 Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet commenced standing out of Pearl Harbor.  
1020 Made attack on enemy submarine, dropping three depth charges.  
1031 Dropped two depth charges on oil slick.  
1032 Steering gear jammed hard left.  
1035 Steering gear repaired.  
1127 Made contact with enemy submarine on sound gear. Dropped four depth charges. Sighted heavy oil slick on surface.  
1150 Made depth charge attack; none of charges exploded.  
12 to 16:  
No comment.  
16 to 20:  
No comment.  
20 to 24:  
Steaming as before.  
2110 Sighted anti-aircraft fire from Pearl Harbor. Sounded General Quarters.  
2130 Secured from General Quarters.

*December 8, 1941*

- 9 to 4:  
No comment.  
4 to 8:  
Steaming as before.  
0530 Sounded General Quarters.  
0610 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack, dropped four depth charges, no evidence of hits scored on enemy submarine.  
0645 Secured from General Quarters.  
0645 Established sound contact on enemy submarine and commenced attack, maneuvering on various courses and speeds conforming to attack; dropped two charges.  
0710 Returned to the position of attack sighted heavy oil slick.  
0742 Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet standing out of channel.  
8 to 12:  
No comment.  
12 to 16:  
Steaming as before.  
1240 U.S.S. ALLEN stood into Pearl Harbor.  
1349 Made contact on sound gear and attacked, dropping four depth charges.  
1513 U.S.S. THORNTON escorting U.S.S. TRESKER, stood into Pearl Harbor.  
16 to 20:  
Steaming as before.  
1648 U.S.S. ENTERPRISE stood in with Destroyer Screen.  
1710 U.S.S. PERRY stood out.  
1745 Made contact with submarine, maneuvered for attack, lost contact.  
20 to 24:  
No comment.

*December 9, 1941*

- 0 to 4:  
No comment.  
4 to 8:  
No comment.  
8 to 12:  
Steaming as before. Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.  
0940 U. S. S. PLUNGER, U. S. S. POMPANO, U. S. S. POLLACK and an unidentified submarine stood into Pearl Harbor.  
0943 U. S. S. LITCHFIELD stood in.  
1158 Spotted smoke bomb dropped from plane, sounded general quarters. Made contact with sound gear on object believed to be submarine, maneuvered on various courses and speeds conforming to attack and dropped six depth charges.  
12 to 16:  
1207 All engine ahead full. Made sound contact on enemy submarine, maneuvering on various courses conforming to attack. Dropped 6 depth charges.

1230 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol in South Western Section of Restricted Area.

16 to 20:

1610 Sounded general quarters in accordance with air raid warning from Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

1658 Secured from general quarters.

1740 Sounded general quarters, having contact on sound gear.

1747 Secured from general quarters.

1910 Established contact with enemy submarine. Sounded general quarters.

1916 All stations manned and ready for general quarters.

1943 Lost contact with submarine; secured from general quarters.

20 to 24:

2320 Sounded general quarters; proceeded to position off Ahua Point to investigate report that shore battery was being illuminated by light from small boat off shore.

2345 Completed thorough investigation which revealed nothing, returned to patrol.

2355 Secured from general quarters.

*December 10, 1941*

0 to 4:

Steaming under bollers number 1 and 2 on various courses and speeds maintaining patrol station in Southwestern Section of Restricted Area, Pearl Harbor, T. H., standard speed 15 knots (184 r. p. m.).

0029 Sounded general quarters.

0033 Commenced depth charge attack on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack. Dropped 4 depth charges.

0049 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.

0230 Observed U. S. S. TANEY commenced depth charge attack off starboard quarter, distance 700 yards.

0239 U. S. S. TANEY resumed patrol duties.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

No comment.

12 to 16:

No comment.

16 to 20:

1724 Sounded general quarters. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to search for enemy submarine.

1725 Definite sound contact established.

1728 Dropped 6 depth charges on contact bearing 188° 2.3 miles from number 1 entrance channel buoy.

1744 Secured from general quarters. Proceeded to investigate surface water at scene of attack and observed heavy oil slick.

20 to 24:

2110 Made contact with submarine; sounded general quarters.

2115 Made attack on submarine, dropping 4 depth charges.

2129 Secured from general quarters.

*December 11, 1941*

0 to 4:

No comment.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

No comment.

12 to 16:

Moored as before.

1400 Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY shifted to U. S. S. WARD.

1410 Underway pursuant to Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY orders, on various courses and speeds conforming with channel for Channel Entrance Patrol. Captain at the Conn, Navigator on the Bridge.

1455 U. S. S. WARD relieved U. S. S. RAMSAY of Channel Entrance Patrol, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1512 Made contact with submarine. Sounded general quarters.

## 1294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 1547 Made attack, dropping 6 depth charges. Inspected slick and found considerable oil in slick caused by attack.  
1550 Secured from general quarters.

16 to 20:

- 1637 Sighted smoke bombs dropped from U. S. Navy patrol bomber. Sounded general quarters. Made contact with sound gear on submerged object. Navy planes dropped depth bombs two points off starboard bow, distance 2000 yards. Made depth charge attack on submerged object, dropping 6 charges. Investigation revealed heavy oil slick on surface.  
1815 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.  
1920 Made sound contact on submerged object. Sounded general quarters. Made depth charge attack, dropping 6 depth charges.  
1940 Secured from general quarters.

20 to 24:

No comment.

*December 12, 1942*

No comment.

*December 13, 1942*

0 to 4:

- Steaming under bollers number 1 and 2, patrolling southwestern section of Prohibited Area off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet, various yard and district craft in vicinity; U. S. S. CHEW patrolling southeastern Prohibited Area. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds maintaining position, with standard speed 15 knots, 182 r. p. m. Ship darkened; condition 2 set.  
0220 In accordance with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District dispatch 1236 of December 11, 1941, proceeded to Channel Entrance to search for lighted vessel reported off entrance buoys. Found entrance and surrounding area clear.  
0255 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.  
4 to 8:  
0530 Held general quarters.  
0640 Secured from general quarters.  
0659 Heard propellor sounds on listening gear. Held general quarters.  
0706 Secured from general quarters.  
0715 U. S. S. WASMUTH, U. S. S. PERRY stood out.  
0735 Sighted body of Japanese aviator bearing 220° from channel entrance buoys, 2 miles distant.  
0748 Heavy cruiser stood in.

8 to 12:

- Steaming as before. Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.  
0915 Patrol Torpedo Boat stood out of channel, picked up body of Japanese flyer and stood in Pearl Harbor Channel.

12 to 16:

No comment.

16 to 20:

No comment.

20 to 24:

No comment.

*December 14, 1941*

0 to 4:

No comment.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

- Steaming as before.  
0800 Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.  
0816 Navy tanker stood in.  
0925 Sounded general quarters. Proceeded to East of Channel Entrance Buoys to search for reported submarine.

0958 Discovered body of Japanese Aviator bearing 207°T from Channel Entrance Buoys, 1¼ miles distant.

1015 Secured from general quarters.

1045 Various destroyers standing out preparatory to a Fleet Sortie

12 to 16:

No comment.

16 to 20:

No comment.

20 to 24:

No comment.

*December 15, 1941*

No comment.

*December 16, 1941*

0 to 4:

No comment.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

No comment.

12 to 16:

No comment.

16 to 20:

No comment.

20 to 24:

Steaming as before.

2037 Made sound contact with submarine.

2042 Sounded general quarters. Maneuvers on various courses and speeds conforming with attack, dropped 8 depth charges. Bubble from the seventh charge was large and of a dark color.

2050 Lay to in area of contact but could not renew contact.

2057 Secured from general quarters.

*December 17, 1941*

0 to 4:

No comment.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

No comment.

12 to 16:

No comment.

Steaming as before.

1635 Sounded general quarters and proceeded to smoke-bomb dropped by plane 4 miles south of Hickam Tower.

1640 Dropped 8 depth charges.

1648 Secured from general quarters.

20 to 24:

2002 Made sonic contact and sounded general quarters. Attacked, dropped 8 depth charges. Location of contact: 3.2 miles, bearing 231°T from Entrance Buoys.

2025 Secured from general quarters.

*December 18, 1941*

No comment.

*December 19, 1941*

No comment.

*December 20, 1941*

No comment.

*December 21, 1941*

No comment.

*December 22, 1941*

No comment.

*December 23, 1941*

No comment.

*December 24, 1941*

No comment.

# 1296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*December 25, 1941*

No comment.

*December 26, 1941*

No comment.

*December 27, 1941*

No comment.

*December 28, 1941*

No comment.

*December 29, 1941*

No comment.

*December 30, 1941*

No comment.

*December 31, 1941*

No comment.

USS CONDOR AMc #14

*December 7, 1941*

0210-0445: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor.

0342: Sighted periscope of a submerged submarine. Following diagram illustrates contact:

(The diagram referred to, *supra*, illustrating contact with a Japanese submarine by the USS WARD on 7 December 1941 at 0342, will be found reproduced as Item No. 298, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Submarine when first sighted was approximately 100 feet away on the port bow on a collision course with the CONDOR but turned sharply to the left. The following message was sent by yardarm blinker to the U. S. S. WARD, 'Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots.' About five minutes later the WARD requested by radio further information concerning the submarine. Information concerning the course was given and the WARD continued search while this vessel continued on its assigned mission. The submarine was not sighted again.

0758: General Quarters Sounded. (Moored at Section Base, Bishops Point.) Two .30 cal. machine guns were rigged and attacking Japanese Planes were fired on with no apparent results. Expended 50 rounds of .30 cal. ammunition.

0043-1015: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor.

1015: A Cruiser of the ST. LOUIS class evidently mistaking the Oropesa float of the CROSSBILL for a submarine turned sharply to the left and commenced firing at said float. In so doing she severed the magnetic cable of this ship approximately 100 yards from the out board end. The following diagram will serve to illustrate the situation:

(The diagram referred to, *supra*, illustrating attack by a U. S. cruiser on a float mistaken for a submarine, will be found reproduced as Item 299, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

1205-1230: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor.

2110: General Quarters Sounded. (Moored at side to Berth #12 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.) Expended 50 rounds .30 cal. ammunition.

2140: Secured from General Quarters.

2400: No casualties to Personnel.

*December 8, 1941*

0435: Sounded General Quarters. Air Raid Alarm. (Moored port side to Berth #12 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.)

0703: Secured from General Quarters. No action.

1010-1105: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to the Net.

*December 9, 1941*

- 1600: Sounded General Quarters. Standing by for an air raid. (Moored port side to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
- 1815: Secured from General Quarters. No Action.

*December 10, 1941*

- 0401: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
- 0520: Secured from General Quarters. No Action.
- 0721-0905: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

*December 11, 1941*

- 0705-0905: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

*December 12, 1941*

- 0325: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
- 0421: Secured from General Quarter. No Action.
- 0732-1025: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Honolulu and in channel to the Net.

*December 20, 1941*

- 0642-0900: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

*December 21, 1941*

- 0648-0855: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.
- 0927-1050: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance Bouys to Pearl Harbor.
- 1350: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side to USS REEDBIRD at Section Base, Bishops Point)
- 1412: Secured from General Quarters. No Action.

*December 22, 1941*

- 0632-0830: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to Net.
- 0905-1155: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to Net.

*December 23, 1941*

- 0705-1035: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to Net.

*December 24, 1941*

- 0710-1055: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

*December 25, 1941*

- 0655-1058: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

*December 26, 1941*

- 0623-0930: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.



# 1298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*December 27, 1941*

0628-0915: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

*December 28, 1941*

0618-1015: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

*December 29, 1941*

0623-0925: Swept for Moored Mines off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to the Net.

*December 30, 1941*

0618-1036: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to Net.

*December 31, 1941*

0623-1038: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

W. A. Wisler,  
W. A. WISLER,  
Commanding.  
Sn

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## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 76

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 4, 1942.

Cincpac File No.  
A16-3/PH/(11)  
Serial 040  
*Confidential*

*First Endorsement* on Com. 14 CA12-1/A16-3/ND14 (01531) of Dec. 30, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.  
Subject: Report on Battle of Pearl Harbor, 7 December, 1941.

1. Returned.
2. The statement contained in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) to the basic letter, regarding the CONDOR's sighting a periscope, at 0350, while sweeping off the channel entrance buoys, is information not previously reported to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. It is requested that the report be confirmed, if possible, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, advised what action if any was taken to inform either the Commandant or the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, in this case.

3. Return of all papers is requested.

C. W. NIMITZ.

C-A12-1/ND14  
(074)  
*Confidential*

JANUARY 7, 1942

*Second and* -----  
Con 14 C-A12-1/A16-3/  
MD14(01531) of Dec. 30 1941.

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.  
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
Subject: Report on battle of Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

1. Returned.

2. The information submitted in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) was taken from report of Commanding Officer of CONDOR dated 19 December 1941, and verified by extracts from Signal Log of WARD.

3. Statements by the Officer of the Deck, Ensign R. C. McCloy, USNR, R. C. Uttrick Qm. 2c USNR, and R. B. Chavez, Sea 1c, USNR (Helmsman), on watch aboard the CONDOR at the time, indicate the following:—At about 0350 on 7 December 1941 the CONDOR was conducting sweeping operations approximately 1½ miles south west of entrance buoys. The attention of Ensign McCloy was attracted to what, in the darkness, appeared to be a wave. After studying it momentarily, he called Uttrick and with further examination with binoculars they both were convinced that what they saw was the periscope of a submerged submarine. Chavez could make out a wake but no periscope. The best estimate of least distance from CONDOR to periscope at any time is about 50 yards.

4. The CONDOR at 0357 informed the WARD, Channel Entrance Patrol, by visual of this contact. The WARD immediately instituted a search for the submarine. At about 0650 she sank an unidentified submarine and made report as recorded in her file 759 of December 13, 1941.

5. No report was made to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, or to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, until the WARD had actually and definitely established contact with an unidentified submarine.

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 77

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

3 NOVEMBER 1941.

C-A16-1/A&N/ND14  
(01171)

*Confidential*

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

References: (a) CNO Confidential dispatch 152227 of October 1941.

(b) Letter of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 29 October 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (b).

1. It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).

2. Since the visit of Captain Mountbatten, R. N., who gave his views on this subject and the experiences of the British along parallel lines, this and allied matters have been under consideration by: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet; (b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; (c) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. On receipt of reference (a), a paraphrased copy of this dispatch was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; his comments in connection therewith are given in reference (b), enclosure (A).

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, accompanied by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has visited the underground chambers at Aliamanu Crater and had their functions explained in a brief way by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. If one or more of these chambers were to be assigned to the Navy, it is not apparent that any real benefit would be derived therefrom.

5. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, has offices ashore, as has Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. It appears certain that at the outbreak of hostilities, even though the Commander-in-Chief may return to his flagship, Commander Base Force will have to have offices ashore. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief has requested that suitable offices be constructed for the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Base Force, and Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefited by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that his best interests would be served by being in a building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

6. There has been established in this district a joint harbor control post; this

## 1300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

is located at District Headquarters. Here there are provisions for officers of the Coast Artillery, the Army Air corps, the Fleet Air Detachment, and the Submarine Force, all in addition to the district officers who work in connection with the local defense forces. So far as can be ascertained without actual experience in war, this post fulfills the requirements of the area.

7. In addition to the above, funds are available for and construction will soon be undertaken on a bomb-proof communication center adjacent to District Headquarters. Provision will have to be made in case of air raids for certain features of the harbor control post to occupy this bomb-proof shelter.

8. The Commandant feels that no delay is acceptable in providing for the present needs of the Commander-in-Chief. His needs are real and immediate. What should be done later in connection with a combined operating center can best be determined by actual experience.

C. C. Bloch.

C. C. BLOCH.

Advance copy to: Chief of Naval Operations (by clipper mail).

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 October, 1941.*

*Confidential*

Admiral C. C. BLOCH,

*Commandant, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

DEAR ADMIRAL BLOCH: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 21, 1941, file No. C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 (01101), with reference to a combined operating center and command post for Army and Navy functions in this Department.

While I am strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, I do not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building. There are strong strategic and tactical reasons why the various Army functions cannot be located together in the same structure. The different elements have distinct missions, and while it is necessary to establish close liaison and communications between these various Army headquarters, it is equally necessary that they be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. Also if the various Army headquarters were to be combined in one location, we would be confronted with technical problems involving communications to subordinate elements which would be extremely difficult to solve. From a security standpoint, I do not believe that this combination of Army activities would be advisable; a lucky hit effecting either the structure or communication would have a far greater adverse effect than a similar hit on one of the separate command posts.

The Army already has its command posts under construction and these will be completed in the near future. The Department command post is in the Aliamanu Crater, the 18th Bombardment Wing is on the southwest outer slopes of Aliamanu, and the Interceptor command post consisting of fighter planes, antiaircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service, is at Fort Shafter. The command post of the Hawaiian Air Force is also to be located at Fort Shafter. Communications facilities are now available to all these locations, and arrangements can easily be made to expand each into a combined operating center for the equivalent Army and Navy units. All of these structures are being built underground by tunneling methods; this requires a minimum of material. A combined operating center located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor would probably have to be a cut and cover type of structure and to afford the same protection that we now have in the tunnels, it would have to be very massive. Under present conditions securing the necessary materials would be difficult.

It is therefore suggested that instead of a single operating center, consideration be given to the construction of additional space for Navy units adjacent to the existing command posts of equivalent Army units. This suggestion would mean that the Navy structure for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, the Commandant 14th Naval District, and various fleet echelons would be located in the Aliamanu Crater, that the command post for Patwing two would be located adjacent to the Army command post for the 18th Wing, and that the Navy fighters could be located adjacent to the Army's interceptor command post.

and that space for the Navy Air Headquarters could be made available either adjacent to the headquarters of the Army Air Force, or with Patwing two.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington

(Du-Et)

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-12B-6  
(SC) A16-3(9)  
Doc. 37746  
Serial 01212

*Confidential*

FOURTH MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

From: The Director, War Plans Division.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Combined operating center from Army and Navy.  
References:

- (a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.
- (b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CR0190) and 292120 (CR0346) of December 1941.
- (c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.

2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.

3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

R. K. Turner.  
R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:  
Op-12B  
Op-14  
Op 30

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-30C-DG  
(SC) A16-3(9)  
Doc. 37746

MEMO FOR CAPTAIN READ

DECEMBER 31, 1941.

Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy (Ltr. from Com-14 to CNO via Cincpac C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 01171 of 11-3-41)

1. Rather than make the basic document appear more ridiculous than it now does, I am returning this informally.

2. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have entirely "missed the boat".

R. W. Cary  
R. W. CARY  
Room 1066

## 1302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Op-14/LJH  
(SC)A16-3(9)  
Serial 01114  
*Confidential*

5. In other words, if the duties of the Commandant at Pearl Harbor and the Commanding General at Fort Shafter, in Hawaii, are such that their local duties make it essential that they remain at the Navy Yard and with the troops, respectively, my answer is that there should be additional officers assigned specifically for the supreme command in Hawaii, and staff officers for Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications transferred to these officers, and that a protected location for their offices be provided. Certainly the importance of the broader duties is such that their efficiency should not be confused due to the local duties and routine.

S. C. HOOPER.

In reply to Initials and No.  
Op-14/LJH  
(SC)A16-3(9)  
Serial 01114

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, December 6, 1941.

*Confidential*

### *Second Memorandum Endorsement*

From : The Director, Radio Liaison Division.  
To : The Director, Naval Districts Division.  
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded.
2. Due to the many and complex facilities under the organization responsible for defense in any given land area bordering the ocean, the most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme command is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task, in direct and immediate touch with his staff, comprising intelligence, plans, operations, and communications.
3. Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that where component parts of the commands are interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one. If the duties of the Commanders beyond command and operation duties, i. e., training duties, materiel duties, and command of local units of their respective over-all commands, will interfere with the most efficient exercise of their primary duty, which is their higher duty in command of the over-all command, then the higher command should be relieved of detail duties (except for inspection for over-all efficiency) of the lower commands under him, and additional subordinate officers should be ordered to assume these duties. The two higher commands of the two services will then be free to choose together the joint operating center, with their respective staffs, without regard to the lower command duties.
4. Without opportunity for consultation and evaluation of the same information, it is not possible for two widely separated staffs to prepare efficiently decisions on complex matters of immediate urgency for the two opposite service commanders as well as if they have immediate access to one another. This is indisputable. Therefore, it should be accepted, and everything within reason subordinated to that principle, as the most efficient high command possible is necessary.

OP-12B-6  
(SC)A16-3(9)  
Doc. 37746  
Serial 01212  
*Confidential*

(Du-Et)

### *Fourth Memorandum Endorsement*

From : The Director, War Plans Division.  
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject : Combined operating center for Army and Navy.  
References :

- (a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.

(b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CRO190) and 292120 (CRO346) of December 1941.

(c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.

2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.

3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:

Op-12B

Op-14

Op-30

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-12B-7-My

(SC) A16-3(9)

Serial 0134212

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington

*Confidential—First Memorandum Endorsement*

NOVEMBER 18, 1941.

From : The Director, War Plans Division.

To : The Director, Naval Districts Division.

Via : The Director, Radio Liaison Division.

Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded for information, and for such recommendations and comment as desired.

2. An informal joint working committee has been formed to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. As the records of the conferences held by this committee are being maintained in this Division, it is requested that all papers, comment, and recommendations be returned.

R. K. Turner.

R. K. TURNER.

[2]

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

*Table of corrections*

| Change No. | Date of entry | Signature and rank of Officer Entering Change |
|------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------|
|            |               |                                               |
|            |               |                                               |
|            |               |                                               |
|            |               |                                               |

CONFIDENTIAL

Urdis 149400 to Budocks X Request consideration be given to construction of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii such as CincPac Comfourteen Comtrain Comsubfor Compatwing and parallel activities of Army X CNO considers concentration of Army and

## 1304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Navy activities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage for emergency operations X. Comment with recommendations including location and estimates of cost requested.

[Handwritten:] For Cdr Griswold—General Bd.

(This is a copy made from microfilm records.) 16 July 45.  
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
OPNAV 19-68

UNITED STATES FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

CinC File No.  
A1/A&N/(18)  
Serial 01810  
*Confidential*

*1st Endorsement*  
on Com-14 C-A16-1  
A&N/ND14 (01171)  
dated Nov. 3, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has given careful consideration to the question of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii. On its face, the proposition sounds attractive, but unless it can be shown that the advantages of such an establishment outweigh the disadvantages, its creation is not only unjustified, but may be undesirable.

2. The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war, are definitely different from those prevailing in Europe and which dictated the establishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet are considerably different—the operation of one being defensive and local while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.

3. On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages, among which are the following:

(a) A combined operating center would not relieve the necessity for local centers for individual forces and its communication system would be very complex. This complexity might well complicate, rather than simplify, the flow of orders and information.

(b) It might well result in over centralization for large scale operations and thus tend to deprive subordinates of necessary initiative.

(c) It would result in loss of contact, by virtue of physical separation from subordinate commanders, with those commanders and their activities. A location suitable for the Army is not suitable for the Navy and vice versa.

(d) There would be serious consequences if such a center or its communication system were damaged or destroyed.

(e) It would tie the respective commanders to an immobile post—with the post necessarily in an inactive area.

(f) It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks.

4. The above considerations primarily apply to a combined operating center for the Army and the Fleet. They are applicable, also, but in less degree, to the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Undoubtedly, there is need for close cooperation and liaison between those commanders, much of which is now provided for in current plans. The Harbor Command Post provides for liaison and joint control of shipping, identification of vessels, fire of coast artillery and related questions. Offensive air operates under unity of command by the Navy. Defensive air operates under unity of command by the Army. Command posts are in existence for the control of these operations and, as pointed out by General Short, it is very doubtful that a central command, superimposed on these separate and local command posts, would add much to cooperation. Nor would the disadvantages enumerated above be much reduced.

5. In view of the above, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii is not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. The recommendation of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in paragraph (1) is concurred in and it is further recommended that the construction of the building for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Submarines Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force be proceeded with without further delay.

H. E. Kimmel  
H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com-14.

---

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 78

From: Tokyo.

To: (Circular telegram)

7 December 1941

(Plain Japanese language using code names)

Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

*Note:* The above is the translation furnished the *President* and other high officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, one code word was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows:

"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States."

This omission, which was not discovered until January, 1944, does not appreciably change the information that was available at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941.

*Note:* The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944) is as follows:

"Relations between Japan and ----- are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States."

*Note:* See JD #6985.

Tokyo Circular #2494

ORIGINAL

SF DE JAH

S 7 DEC 41

621 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG

KOSHI PANAMA

URGENT 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO AKRUNITUKI HAT-TORI MINAMI KINENBUNGO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIK YUU DENPOO ARITASI STOP—TOGO

1208 S JP  
7630

S 387/7 8508 GR20

OBESE OVALS RPWMO RFNMO RTJMO RWFMO GNOME

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

---

Tokyo Circular #2494 DISTRIBUTION

SF D9 JAH S 7 DEC 41

622 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG KOSHI HAVANA

623 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI HONOLULU

624 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG RIYOJI NEWYORK

625 S TOKYO 22 7 8508 JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER

626 S TOKYO 22 7 8508 JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWAONT

(Same text and sign as our NR5651.)

1220 JP  
7630

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)



# 1306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Tokyo Circular #2494 DISTRIBUTION

SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41  
627 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SANFRANCISCO  
628 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI PORTLANDORE  
629 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SEATTLE  
630 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI NEWORLEANS LA  
631 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI CHICAGOILL  
632 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI LOSANGELESCAL  
(Same text and sign as our NR5651.)

1243 JP  
7630

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 79

(Exhibit No. 79 is a photostatic copy of Page 44 of a volume containing translations of files of operations orders, orders, memoranda, and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap CA NOCHI. This page will be found reproduced as Item No. 300. EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 80

SECRET

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 25 April 1941.

S-A16-1/A7-8(3)/ND14  
(0398)

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42.

Subject: Original 14ND-JCD-42.

References:

(a) WPL-42.

(b) FTP 155, Introduction, Chapter II.

Enclosures:

(A) Original 14ND-JCD-42, Reg. No. 19 including List of Effective Pages.

(B) Receipt and Destruction Form, in duplicate.

1. The Original 14ND-JCD-42 (Army Short Title HCF-41) is hereby promulgated to the officers on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-42, including those on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-13. It was signed and placed in effect by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District on 11 April 1941, to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved, in part or in whole, by either the War or Navy Departments.

2. This Original Plan, prepared in accordance with references (a) and (b), supersedes 14ND-JCD-13 (Army Short Title HCF-39) and will be handled as follows:

a. All holders of 14ND-JCD-13 remove and destroy by burning all pages now contained in 14ND-JCD-13.

b. Insert this letter and the pages of Enclosure (A) in their proper places in the old binder, if used, in accordance with the List of Effective Pages contained in Enclosure (A); new holders on the Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42 provide own binders.

c. Report receipt, destruction of superseded pages of 14ND-JCD-13 and check of contents on the form herewith, Enclosure (B). New holders report receipt and check of contents only.

3. a. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations and in the Registered Publication Manual.

b. This volume *shall not be carried in aircraft*, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage, as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

4. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM, OR COPY, PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

C. C. BLOCH.

*Naval message—Navy Department*

| Extension Number                                                                            | Addressees                                                      | Precedence                      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Drafter: ND14/N3-1(Y&D).<br>From: OPNAV.<br>Released by H. R. STARK.<br>Date: 15 Oct. 1941. | Asterisk (*) Mailgram Addressee:<br>For Action:<br>COMFOURTEEN. | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |
| TOR Code Room<br>Decoded by<br>Typed by<br>Routed by                                        | Information:<br>CINCPAC.                                        | Priority<br>Routine<br>Deferred |

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

152227 Oct 1941 NCR 425

If Operational  
Check Below



Originator fill in date and time: Date      Time      GCT  
On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text

[1]

SECRET

Register No. 19

FULL TITLE: JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SHORT TITLE: HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42

Under the provisions of AR 380-5 (paragraph 27) each recipient of this document will make return therefor on June 30, and December 31 of each year to the Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., except that recipient of this document serving with units of this Department will account for same by means of the memorandum receipt system as prescribed in letter, this headquarters, dated June 16, 1934, file No. AG 381 Misc. (Secret), Subject: Hawaiian Department War Plans.

Navy holders of this plan will make quarterly reports as noted on Navy Distribution List, page 3.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

*List of effective pages, 14ND-JCD-42*

| Subject Matter                 | Page Nos. <sup>1</sup> | Change in Effect |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| Com14 Secret Letr Serial       | i-ii                   | Original         |
| No. (0398) dated 25 April 1941 |                        |                  |
| List of Effective Pages        | iii                    | "                |
| Title Page                     | 1                      | "                |
| Table of Corrections           | 2                      | "                |
| Distribution List              | 3                      | "                |
| Table of Contents              | 4                      | "                |
| Body of Plan                   | 5-14<br>inclusive      | "                |

HCF-41-iii—Original, April 1941, 4ND-JCD-42.

<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

# 1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[3]

## Navy distribution list

| Official to whom issued                                        | Registered Numbers |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
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| Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....               | 22                 |
| Commander Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....             | 23                 |
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| Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....     | 25                 |
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| Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet..... | 31                 |
| Commander Patrol Wing Two.....                                 | 32                 |
| Commander Submarine Squadron Four.....                         | 33                 |
| Commander Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR.....                    | 34                 |
| †Commander Naval Air Station, PEARL HARBOR.....                | 35                 |
| †Commander Naval Air Station, KANEOHE.....                     | 36                 |
| †District Intelligence Officer.....                            | 37                 |
| †District Communication Officer.....                           | 38                 |
| Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR.....              | 39                 |
| †Inspector of Ordnance, NAD, OAHU.....                         | 40                 |

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† These holders will make quarterly reports to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who will in return report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Registered Publication Section. All others will make these reports to Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Annexes will be issued only to those holders concerned and will not be accounted for to the Registered Publication Section.

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<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[5]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.  
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
PEARL HARBOR NAVY YARD, T. H.,  
11 April 1941.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN  
DEPARTMENT, AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. **RESPONSIBILITY.** This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. **BASIS.** This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. **METHOD OF COORDINATION.** The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b.

4. **PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES.** The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40a page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1945).

5. **JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.** A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[6]

SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREAS

6. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** "The HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU".

It has been determined that the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU, LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILI POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

8. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

9. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of MIDWAY

ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

10. *HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the *HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER* approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for *PEARL HARBOR* and *KANEOHE*.

(1) *DEFENSIVE SEA AREA OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.* The Defensive Sea Area of the *HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER* includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at *OPANA POINT, MAUI, KAUAI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI, LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI*; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at *KAHUKU POINT, OAHU*, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—*HAWAIIAN D. S. A.*

(2) *PEARL HARBOR—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The *PEARL HARBOR—Defensive Sea Area* comprises—

The area of water in *PEARL HARBOR* lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in and about the entrance channel to [7] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the *PUULO A Naval Reservation*, a line bearing south true from *AHUA POINT LIGHT*, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from *AHUA POINT LIGHTHOUSE*. This area is given the short title—*PEARL D. S. A.*

(3) *KANEOHE BAY—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The *KANEOHE BAY—Defensive Sea Area* comprises:

All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true extending three miles from *KAOIO POINT*, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from *KAPOHO POINT*, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—*KANEOHE D. S. A.*

(4) *PALMYRA, KINGMAN REEF, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY, and WAKE DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* These defensive sea areas comprise:

Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. *OAHU DEFENSIVE COASTAL AREA.* The Defensive Coastal Area for *OAHU* comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:

*KEAHI POINT*—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.

*PUU KAPOLEI*—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.

*PUUIKI STATION*

*KAHUKU POINT* Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.

This area is given the short title—*OAHU D. C. A.*

### SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

#### *Tasks and Forces*

12. *CATEGORY OF DEFENSE.* Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, *RAINBOW* No. 1.

#### 14. *TASKS.*

a. *JOINT TASK.* To hold *OAHU* as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. *ARMY TASK.* To hold *OAHU* against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. *NAVY TASK.* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[8] 15. *FORCES.*

**a. ARMY FORCES.**

The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

**b. NAVAL FORCES.**

Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

**c. OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.**

(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

**d. CIVIL ORGANIZATION.** A CIVIL ORGANIZATION, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the TERRITORY OF HAWAII for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of the TERRITORY OF HAWAII in assisting the military and naval forces.

**SECTION IV—DECISIONS****16. GENERAL.**

**a.** The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

**b.** The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[9] **c.** The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the mobilization of man-power and material resources in the TERRITORY OF HAWAII and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

**d.** Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

**17. ARMY.** The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

**a.** The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

**b.** An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

**c.** Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

**d.** Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

**e.** Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

**f.** Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

**g.** Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

**h.** Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. e.

## 1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940".

[10] j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[11] l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counterespionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

### SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

#### 19. MOBILIZATION PLANS.

##### a. GENERAL.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the manpower and material resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

**b. ARMY PLANS.** The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for :—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[12] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.

(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (civil organization (Par. 15 *d.* above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on OAHU.

**c. NAVY PLANS.** The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for :

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

[13] (6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

#### SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time :

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This



# 1314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HCF-41 (JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,  
C. C. BLOCH,  
*Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,*  
*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*  
(Signed) Walter C. Short,  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieut. General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding, Hawaiian Department.*

[14]

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| Comdt 14th ND              | 18-44 |

## HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 81

Op-16-FE.  
(SC) A17-24(1).  
*Secret.*  
Serial 001434316.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.  
*Washington, 9 July 1945.*

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.

Subject: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

Reference: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning a further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the following dispatches, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

(a) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 4, 1941—Subject "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(b) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 10, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(c) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 18, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(d) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 25, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(e) FE-2 Memorandum dated December 1, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(f) Conf. Dispatch #012358 (April 1, 1941) from OpNav to ComAllNav Districts NY Wash. Governments of Guam and Samoa.

(g) Conf. Serial #27-41 (April 29, 1941) from FE to Op-16-F-2 Subject—"Japanese Navy Organizations Fleets" with two routing slips.

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that letters (a) to (e) are classified Secret, and (f) and (g) are Confidential. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.

James Forrestal.  
JAMES FORRESTAL.

Op-16-F-2

NOVEMBER 4, 1941.

## MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

(Note: See Op-16-F-2 ONI Serial #54-41, dated October 30, 1941 for the new organization of the Japanese Fleet.)

| <i>Fleets</i>             | <i>Locations</i>       |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| <i>First Fleet</i> -----  | In Kure-Saeki area (1) |
| BB-NAGATO-----            | In Kure-Saeki area (1) |
| BB-MUTSU-----             | " " " "                |
| BB-YAMASHIRO-----         | At Yokosuka            |
| BB-FUSO-----              | In Kure-Saeki area (1) |
| BB-ISE-----               | " " " "                |
| BB-HYUGA-----             | " " " "                |
| BB-HIYEI-----             | " " " "                |
| BB-KONGO-----             | At Maizuru             |
| BB-KIRISHIMA-----         | In Kure-Saeki area (1) |
| BB-HARUNA-----            | Undergoing repairs (2) |
| 10 BB-----                |                        |
| 4 CA-----                 | In Kure-Saeki area (3) |
| 2 CL-----                 | " " " "                |
| 27 DD-----                | " " " "                |
| <i>Second Fleet</i> ----- | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| 12 CA-----                | In Kure-Saeki area (3) |
| 1 CA-----                 | In Yokosuka (4)        |
| 2 CL-----                 | In Kure-Saeki area (3) |
| 28 DD-----                | " " " "                |
| <i>Third Fleet</i> -----  | Near Maizuru or Sasebo |
| 1 CL-----                 | Near Maizuru           |
| 4 CM-----                 | " "                    |
| 12 AM-----                | " "                    |
| 12 PC-----                | " "                    |
| 1 CL-----                 | Near Sasebo            |
| 12 DD-----                | " "                    |
| 1 AS-----                 | " "                    |
| 6 SS-----                 | " "                    |
| 2 CM-----                 | " "                    |
| 6 XPG-----                | " "                    |
| 46 AP or AK-----          | " "                    |
| <i>Fourth Fleet</i> ----- | Mandated Islands       |
| 4 CL-----                 | In Truk-Ponape area    |
| 8 DD-----                 | " " " "                |
| 1 AS-----                 | " " " "                |
| 3 SS-----                 | " " " "                |
| 8 XPG-----                | " " " "                |
| 8 AP or AK-----           | " " " "                |
| 2 CM-----                 | Near Saipan            |
| 1 DD-----                 | " "                    |
| 3 XPG-----                | " "                    |
| 11 AP or AK-----          | " "                    |
| 4 SS-----                 | " Palao                |
| 4 XPG-----                | " "                    |
| 17 AP or AK-----          | " "                    |
| 1 Survey Ship-----        | " Jaluit               |
| 1 AS-----                 | " "                    |
| 4 XAM-----                | " "                    |
| 3 PC-----                 | " "                    |
| 1 AP or AK-----           | " "                    |
| 1 CM-----                 | In home waters         |
| 7 SS-----                 | Near Sasebo            |
| 2 SS-----                 | Near Maizuru           |
| <i>Fifth Fleet</i>        |                        |
| 1 CL-----                 | Maizuru (6)            |

(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)

# 1316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

| <i>Fleets</i>                                   | <i>Locations</i>        |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <i>Sixth Fleet</i>                              | In Home waters          |
| 4 CL-----                                       | " " "                   |
| 2 AS-----                                       | " " "                   |
| 1 AP-----                                       | " " "                   |
| 42 SS-----                                      | " " "                   |
| <i>Carrier Fleet</i>                            | S. Kyushu-Takao         |
| CV-AKAGI-----                                   | S. Kyushu               |
| CV-KAGA-----                                    | "                       |
| CV-SORYU-----                                   | " (?)                   |
| CV-HIRYU-----                                   | "                       |
| CV-HOSHO-----                                   | "                       |
| CV-KORYU-----                                   | " (?)                   |
| CV-KASUGA-----                                  | " (?)                   |
| CV-RYUJO-----                                   | Takao area              |
| CV-ZUIKAKU-----                                 | " "                     |
| CV-SHOKAKU-----                                 | " "                     |
| 4 DD-----                                       | " "                     |
| 11 DD-----                                      | S. Kyushu               |
| <i>Combined Air Force</i>                       |                         |
| 4 AV-----                                       | Kure-Saeki area         |
| 1 AV-----                                       | Takao                   |
| 1 XAV-----                                      | "                       |
| 1 XAV-----                                      | Gulf of Tongkong        |
| 1 XAV-----                                      | Near Sasebo             |
| <i>Combined Fleet Train</i>                     | Scattered               |
| 4 AO-----                                       | In Kure-Saeki area      |
| 2 AO-----                                       | Maizuru                 |
| 1 AO-----                                       | Takao (8)               |
| 1 AO-----                                       | Near Yap (9)            |
| 1 AC-----                                       | " "                     |
| 1 AF-----                                       | Kure-Saeki area         |
| 2 AR-----                                       | " " "                   |
| 1 Ice Breaker-----                              | Saghalien               |
| 1 Target Ship-----                              | Kure-Saeki area         |
| <i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i>           |                         |
| 1 OCA-----                                      | Left Chefoo October 3rd |
| 1 PG-----                                       | Shanghai                |
| 3 DD-----                                       | "                       |
| <i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i> |                         |
| 4 PG-----                                       | Between Wuhu and Ichang |
| 10 PR-----                                      | " " " "                 |
| 1 AP-----                                       | " " " "                 |
| <i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>   |                         |
| 1 CA-----                                       | Sasebo                  |
| 1 CL-----                                       | Canton-Hongkong area    |
| 4 TB-----                                       | " " " (10)              |
| 1 PG-----                                       | " " " (10)              |
| 2 AM-----                                       | " " " (10)              |
| 13 Misc-----                                    | " " " "                 |
| <i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>   |                         |
| 1 OCA-----                                      | Tsingtao                |
| 1 DD-----                                       | "                       |
| 8 TB-----                                       | "                       |
| 1 AP-----                                       | "                       |
| <i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>             |                         |
| 1 CL-----                                       | French Indo-China coast |
| 1 CM-----                                       | " " " "                 |

## NOTES

(1) The Combined Fleet has been located somewhat more exactly than before, in the Kure-Saeki area. This includes the western portion of the Inland Sea, between the western parts of Honshu and Shikoku, and the northern part of Kyushu.

(2) Earlier in the year, the HARUNA was reported undergoing major repairs. Since the HARUNA has not been specifically mentioned among the active battleships for some time, it is believed that the ship is still undergoing repairs.

(3) It is believed that the various cruisers and destroyers in the Combined Fleet, which were formerly divided between Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, have now rejoined the main body of the Fleet in the Kure-Saeki area.

(4) The TAKAO (CA) is in dry-dock at Yokosuka.

(6) The Fifth Fleet has its flag in a light cruiser at Malzuru, but nothing else is known about the force as yet. It is possibly the nucleus of a Japan Sea Fleet.

(7) No new information concerning the location of individual submarines is at hand, so that the detailed survey given last week no longer holds good. However, certain units of the submarine fleet have been active in the Chichijima-Marcus-Saipan area, south and southeast of Honshu.

(8) The SATA has moved from Canton to Takao.

(9) The SHIRETOKO, previously reported in Jaluit, has moved near Yap.

(10) The detached torpedo boats and mine sweepers in the South China Fleet are believed to have rejoined the main force in the Hongkong area.

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Op-16-F-2

NOVEMBER 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations

| <i>Fleets</i>             | <i>Locations</i>       |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| <i>First Fleet</i> -----  | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| BB—NAGATO-----            | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| BB—MUTSU-----             | " " " "                |
| BB—YAMASHIRO-----         | At Yokosuka            |
| BB—FUSO-----              | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| BB—ISE-----               | " " " "                |
| BB—HYUGA-----             | " " " "                |
| BB—HIYEI-----             | " " " "                |
| BB—KONGO-----             | At Malzuru             |
| BB—KIRISHIMA-----         | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| BB—HARUNA-----            | Undergoing repairs     |
| 10 BB-----                |                        |
| 4 CA-----                 | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| 2 CL-----                 | " " " "                |
| 27 DD-----                | " " " "                |
| <i>Second Fleet</i> ----- | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| 12 CA-----                | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| 1 CA-----                 | In Yokosuka            |
| 2 CL-----                 | In Kure-Saeki area     |
| 28 DD-----                | " " " "                |
| <i>Third Fleet</i> -----  | Near Malzuru or Sasebo |
| 1 CL-----                 | Near Malzuru           |
| 4 CM-----                 | " "                    |
| 12 AM-----                | " "                    |
| 12 PC-----                | " "                    |
| 1 CL-----                 | Near Sasebo            |
| 12 DD-----                | " "                    |
| 1 AS-----                 | " "                    |
| 6 SS-----                 | " "                    |
| 2 CM-----                 | " "                    |
| 6 XPG-----                | " "                    |
| 46 AP or AK-----          | " "                    |

# 1318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

| <i>Fleets</i>                                         | <i>Locations</i>            |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Fourth Fleet</b>                                   | <b>Mandated Islands</b>     |
| 4 CL                                                  | In Truk-Ponape area         |
| 8 DD                                                  | " " " "                     |
| 1 AS                                                  | " " " "                     |
| 3 SS                                                  | " " " "                     |
| 6 XPG                                                 | " " " "                     |
| 8 AP or AK                                            | " " " "                     |
| 2 CM                                                  | Near Saipan                 |
| 1 DD                                                  | " "                         |
| 3 XPG                                                 | " "                         |
| 11 AP or AK                                           | " "                         |
| 4 SS                                                  | " Palao                     |
| 4 XPG                                                 | " "                         |
| 17 AP or AK                                           |                             |
| 1 Survey Ship                                         | " Jaluit                    |
| 1 AS                                                  | " "                         |
| 4 XAM                                                 | " "                         |
| 3 PC                                                  | " "                         |
| 1 AP or AK                                            | " "                         |
| 1 CM                                                  | In Home Waters              |
| 7 SS                                                  | Near Sasebo                 |
| 2 SS                                                  | Near Maizuru                |
| <b>Fifth Fleet</b>                                    |                             |
| 1 CL                                                  | Maizuru                     |
| (The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown) |                             |
| <b>Sixth Fleet</b>                                    |                             |
| 4 CL                                                  | In Home Waters              |
| 2 AS                                                  | " " "                       |
| 1 AP                                                  | " " "                       |
| 42 SS                                                 | " " "                       |
| <b>Carrier Fleet</b>                                  | S. Kyushu—Takao             |
| CV—AKAGI                                              | S. Kyushu                   |
| CV—KAGA                                               | "                           |
| CV—SORYU                                              | "                           |
| CV—HIRYU                                              | "                           |
| CV—HOSHO                                              | "                           |
| CV—KORYU                                              | "                           |
| CV—KASUGA                                             | "                           |
| CV—RYUJO                                              | Takao area                  |
| CV—ZUIKAKU                                            | Kure-Sasebo area (1)        |
| CV—SHOKAKU                                            | Takao area (?)              |
| 4 DD                                                  | " "                         |
| 11 DD                                                 | S. Kyushu                   |
| <b>Combined Air Force</b>                             |                             |
| 4 AV                                                  | Kure-Saeki area             |
| 1 AV                                                  | Sasebo-Kure area (1)        |
| 2 XAV                                                 | Sasebo-Kure area (2)        |
| 1 XAV                                                 | Saigon-Camranh Bay area (3) |
| <b>Combined Fleet Train</b>                           | Scattered                   |
| 4 AO                                                  | In Kure-Saeki area          |
| 2 AO                                                  | Maizuru                     |
| 1 AO                                                  | Takao                       |
| 1 AO                                                  | Near Yap                    |
| 1 AC                                                  | " "                         |
| 1 AF                                                  | Kure-Saeki area             |
| 2 AR                                                  | " " "                       |
| 1 Ice Breaker                                         | Saghalien                   |
| 1 Target Ship                                         | Kure-Saeki area             |
| <b>Japanese Naval Forces in China.</b>                |                             |
| 1 OCA                                                 | Left Chefoo October 3rd.    |
| 1 PC                                                  | Shanghai                    |
| 3 DD                                                  | "                           |
| <b>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</b>       |                             |
| 4 PC                                                  | Between Wuhu and Ichang     |
| 10 PR                                                 | " " " "                     |
| 1 AP                                                  | " " " "                     |

| <i>Fleets</i>                                 | <i>Locations</i>        |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i> |                         |
| 1 CA-----                                     | Sasebo                  |
| 1 CA-----                                     | Canton-Hongkong area    |
| 4 TB-----                                     | " " "                   |
| 1 PC-----                                     | " " "                   |
| 2 AM-----                                     | " " "                   |
| 13 Misc-----                                  | " " "                   |
| <i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i> |                         |
| 1 OCA-----                                    | Tsingtao                |
| 1 DD-----                                     | "                       |
| 8 TB-----                                     | "                       |
| 1 AP-----                                     | "                       |
| <i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>           |                         |
| 1 CL-----                                     | French Indo-China coast |
| 1 CM-----                                     | " " " "                 |

## NOTES

The fleets have remained in the same operating areas as previously reported. Several minor changes in the position of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders have been observed:

(1) The ZUIKAKU (CV) and the NOTORO (AV) have moved from the Formosan straits to the Dure-Sasebo area.

(2) Two auxiliary seaplane tenders are now in the Sasebo-Kure area. One of these was formerly in the Gulf of Tongking.

(3) The KENJO MARU (XAV) has moved south from Takao to the Saigon-Camranh Bay area.

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Op-16-F-2

NOVEMBER 18, 1941.

## MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

| <i>Fleets</i>             | <i>Locations</i>             |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>First Fleet</i> -----  | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| BB—NAGATO-----            | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| BB—MUTSU-----             | " " "                        |
| BB—YAMASHIRO-----         | At Yokosuka                  |
| BB—FUSO-----              | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| BB—ISE-----               | " " " "                      |
| BB—HYUGA-----             | " " " "                      |
| BB—HIYEI-----             | " " " "                      |
| BB—HONGO-----             | At Malzuru                   |
| BB—KIRISHIMA-----         | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| BB—HARUNA-----            | Undergoing repairs at Sasebo |
| 10 BB-----                |                              |
| 4 CA-----                 | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| 2 CL-----                 | " " " "                      |
| 27 DD-----                | " " " "                      |
| <i>Second Fleet</i> ----- | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| 11 CA-----                | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| 2 CA-----                 | In Yokosuka (1)              |
| 1 CL-----                 | In Kure-Saeki area           |
| 1 CL-----                 | In Yokosuka area (2)         |
| 28 DD-----                | In Kure-Saeki area           |

# 1320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

| <i>Fleets</i>                                         | <i>Locations</i>                   |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <i>Third Fleet</i> -----                              | Near Maizuru, Sasebo, and Bako (3) |
| 1 CL-----                                             | Near Maizuru                       |
| 4 CM-----                                             | " "                                |
| 12 AM-----                                            | " "                                |
| 12 PC-----                                            | " "                                |
| 1 CL-----                                             | Sailed Amoy Nov. 4th (3)           |
| 2 DD-----                                             | Near Sasebo (4)                    |
| 1 AS-----                                             | " "                                |
| 6 SS-----                                             | " "                                |
| 2 CM-----                                             | " "                                |
| 6 XPG-----                                            | " "                                |
| 46 AP or AK-----                                      | " "                                |
| 3 DD-----                                             | " Maizuru (4)                      |
| 7 DD-----                                             | " Bako-Takeo (4)                   |
| <i>Fourth Fleet</i> -----                             | Mandated Islands                   |
| 4 CL-----                                             | In Truk-Ponape area                |
| 3 DD-----                                             | " " " " (5)                        |
| 1 AS-----                                             | " " " "                            |
| 3 SS-----                                             | " " " "                            |
| 8 XPG-----                                            | " " " "                            |
| 8 AP or AK-----                                       | " " " "                            |
| 2 DD-----                                             | Near Saipan (5)                    |
| 2 CM-----                                             | " "                                |
| 1 DD-----                                             | " "                                |
| 3 XPG-----                                            | " "                                |
| 11 AP or AK-----                                      | " "                                |
| 4 SS-----                                             | " Palao                            |
| 4 XPG-----                                            | " "                                |
| 17 AP or AK-----                                      | " "                                |
| 1 Survey Ship-----                                    | " Juliet                           |
| 1 AS-----                                             | " "                                |
| 4 XAM-----                                            | " "                                |
| 3 PC-----                                             | " "                                |
| 1 AP or AK-----                                       | " "                                |
| 1 CM-----                                             | In home waters                     |
| 3 DD-----                                             | Near Sasebo                        |
| 7 SS-----                                             | " "                                |
| 2 SS-----                                             | Near Maizuru                       |
| <i>Fifth Fleet</i>                                    |                                    |
| 1 CL-----                                             | Yokosuka (6)                       |
| (The Composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown) |                                    |
| <i>Sixth Fleet</i>                                    |                                    |
| 2 CL-----                                             | Kure (7)                           |
| 2 OL-----                                             | Sasebo (7)                         |
| 1 AS-----                                             | Kure (7)                           |
| 1 AS-----                                             | In Home Waters (7)                 |
| 1 AP-----                                             | Yokosuka (7)                       |
| 7 SS-----                                             | Yokosuka (7)                       |
| 13 SS-----                                            | Kure                               |
| 22 SS-----                                            | In Home Waters                     |
| <i>Carrier Fleet</i> -----                            | S. Kyushu Takao                    |
| CV—AKAGI-----                                         | S. Kyushu                          |
| CV—KAGA-----                                          | "                                  |
| CV—SORYU-----                                         | "                                  |
| CV—HIRYU-----                                         | "                                  |
| CV—HOSHIO-----                                        | "                                  |
| CV—KORYU-----                                         | "                                  |
| CV—KASUGA-----                                        | "                                  |
| CV—RYUJO-----                                         | Kure (6)                           |
| CV—ZUIKAMU-----                                       | Kure-Sasebo area                   |
| CV—SHOKAKU-----                                       | Takao area (?)                     |
| 5 DD-----                                             | " "                                |
| 11 DD-----                                            | S. Kyushu                          |

| <i>Fleets</i>                                          | <i>Locations</i>        |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b><i>Combined Air Force</i></b>                       |                         |
| 4 AV-----                                              | Kure-Saeki area         |
| 1 AV-----                                              | Sasebo-Kure area        |
| 2 XAV-----                                             | Sasebo-Kure area        |
| 1 XAV-----                                             | Saigon-Camranh Bay area |
| <b><i>Combined Fleet Train</i></b>                     | Scattered               |
| 4 AO-----                                              | In Kure-Saeki area      |
| 1 AO-----                                              | Maizuru                 |
| 1 AO-----                                              | Takao                   |
| 1 AO-----                                              | Near Yap                |
| 1 AC-----                                              | " "                     |
| 1 AF-----                                              | Kure-Saeki area         |
| 2 AR-----                                              | " " "                   |
| 1 Ice Breaker-----                                     | Saghalien               |
| 1 Target Ship-----                                     | Kure-Saeki area         |
| <b><i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i></b>           |                         |
| 1 OCA-----                                             | Left Chafoo October 3rd |
| 1 PG-----                                              | Shanghai                |
| 3 DD-----                                              | "                       |
| <b><i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i></b> |                         |
| 4 PG-----                                              | Between Wuhu and Ichang |
| 10 PR-----                                             | " " " "                 |
| 1 AP-----                                              | " " " "                 |
| <b><i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i></b>   |                         |
| 1 CA-----                                              | Sasebo                  |
| 1 CL-----                                              | Foochow (9)             |
| 4 TB-----                                              | Canton-Hongkong area    |
| 1 PG-----                                              | " " "                   |
| 2 AM-----                                              | " " "                   |
| 13 Misc-----                                           | " " "                   |
| <b><i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i></b>   |                         |
| 1 OCA-----                                             | Tsingtao                |
| 1 DD-----                                              | "                       |
| 8 TB-----                                              | "                       |
| 1 AP-----                                              | "                       |
| <b><i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i></b>             |                         |
| 1 CL-----                                              | French Indo-China coast |
| 1 CM-----                                              | " " " "                 |

## NOTES

(1) The CHOKAI (CA) is in Yokosuka. The TAKAO is still in drydock at Yokosuka.

(2) The NAKA (CL), Flagship of Desron 4, is at Yokosuka. The destroyers in Desron 4 are still in the Kure-Saeki area.

(3) The NATORI, Flagship of Desron 5, sailed Amoy November 4th.

(4) Ten of the 12 destroyers in Desron 5, formerly at Sasebo, have been shifted—3 to Maizuru, and 7 to Bako.

(5) Three of the 8 destroyers in Desron 6, formerly in the Truk-Ponape area, have moved to Sasebo; and 2 to Salpan.

(6) The flagship of the Fifth Fleet, an unidentified CL, has moved from Maizuru to Yokosuka.

(7) Many of the units of the 6th Fleet have been located more exactly.

(8) The RYUJO has returned to Kure from Taiwan.

(9) The ISUZU (CL), temporary flagship of the 2nd (or South) China Expeditionary Fleet, has moved from Hongkong to Foochow.

## Distribution:

CNO—Copy No. 1

DNI—Copy No. 2

Op-12—Copy No. 3

Op-38W—Copy No. 4

O\*-16-F—Copy No. 5



# 1322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Op-16-F-2

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

## MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

| <i>Fleets</i>             | <i>Locations</i>     |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
| <i>First Fleet</i> -----  | Home Waters          |
| BB--NAGATO-----           | Near Kure (1)        |
| BB--MUTSU-----            | " "                  |
| BB--YAMASHIRO-----        | At Yokosuka          |
| BB--FUSO-----             | Near Kure            |
| BB--ISE-----              | " "                  |
| BB--HYUGA-----            | " "                  |
| BB--HIYEI-----            | Near Sasebo (2)      |
| BB--KONGO-----            | Near Maizuru         |
| BB--KIRISHIMA-----        | Near Kure            |
| BB--HARUNA-----           | " "                  |
| 10 BB-----                |                      |
| 3 CA-----                 | Near Kure (1)        |
| 1 CA-----                 | Near Sasebo (4)      |
| 2 CL-----                 | Near Kure (1)        |
| 27 DD-----                | " "                  |
| <i>Second Fleet</i> ----- | In Home Waters       |
| 11 CA-----                | Near Kure            |
| 1 CA-----                 | In Yokosuka (5)      |
| 1 CA-----                 | Near Sasebo (6)      |
| 1 CL-----                 | Near Kure            |
| 1 CL-----                 | Near Yokosuka        |
| 13 DD-----                | Near Yokosuka (7)    |
| 15 DD-----                | Near Kure (7)        |
| <i>Third Fleet</i> -----  | Sasebo and Bako area |
| 1 CL-----                 | Near Sasebo (8)      |
| 5 CM-----                 | " " (8)              |
| 12 AM-----                | " " (8)              |
| 12 PC-----                | " " (8)              |
| 4 DD-----                 | " " (8)              |
| 1 AS-----                 | " "                  |
| 6 SS-----                 | " "                  |
| 6 XPG-----                | " "                  |
| 46 AP or AK-----          | " "                  |
| 1 CL-----                 | Bias Bay (8)         |
| 7 DD-----                 | Near Bako            |
| 1 CM-----                 | " "                  |
| 1 DD-----                 | Near Maizuru         |
| <i>Fourth Fleet</i> ----- | Mandated Islands     |
| 4 CL-----                 | In Truk-Ponape area  |
| 3 DD-----                 | " " " "              |
| 1 AS-----                 | " " " "              |
| 9 SS-----                 | " " " " (9)          |
| 8 XPG-----                | " " " "              |
| 16 AP or AK-----          | " " " "              |
| 2 DD-----                 | Near Saipan (9)      |
| 1 SS-----                 | Near Saipan (9)      |
| 1 Survey Ship-----        | Near Saipan (9)      |
| 3 XPG-----                | " "                  |
| 17 AP or AK-----          | " "                  |
| 4 SS-----                 | " Palao              |
| 4 XPG-----                | " "                  |
| 30 AP or AK-----          | " " (9)              |
| 1 AS-----                 | " Jaluit             |
| 4 XAM-----                | " "                  |
| 3 PC-----                 | " "                  |
| 13 AP or AK-----          | " "                  |
| 1 CM-----                 | In Yokosuka          |
| 3 DD-----                 | Near Sasebo (8)      |
| 1 SS-----                 | At Maizuru (9)       |
| 1 SS-----                 | At Kure (9)          |

| <i>Fleets</i>                                   |                                                       | <i>Locations</i>                |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <i>Fifth Fleet</i>                              | 1 CL.....                                             | Chichijima (10)                 |
|                                                 | (The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown) |                                 |
| <i>Sixth Fleet</i>                              | 2 CL.....                                             | Near Kure                       |
|                                                 | 2 CL.....                                             | " Sasebo                        |
|                                                 | 1 AS.....                                             | " Kure                          |
|                                                 | 1 AS.....                                             | Sasebo                          |
|                                                 | 1 AP.....                                             | Yokosuka                        |
|                                                 | 7 SS.....                                             | Yokosuka                        |
|                                                 | 12 SS.....                                            | Kure                            |
|                                                 | 23 SS.....                                            | In Sasebo and other Home waters |
| <i>Carrier Fleet</i>                            | CV—AKAGI.....                                         | S. Kyushu                       |
|                                                 | CV—KAGA.....                                          | "                               |
|                                                 | CV—SORYU.....                                         | Kure (11)                       |
|                                                 | CV—HIRYU.....                                         | " (11)                          |
|                                                 | CV—HOSHO.....                                         | " (11)                          |
|                                                 | CV—KORYU.....                                         | S. Kyushu                       |
|                                                 | CV—KASUGA.....                                        | "                               |
|                                                 | CV—RYUJO.....                                         | Kure                            |
|                                                 | CV—ZUIKAKU.....                                       | Kure                            |
|                                                 | CV—SHOKAKU.....                                       | Kure (11)                       |
|                                                 | 10 DD.....                                            | S. Kyushu and Kure              |
|                                                 | 5 DD.....                                             | Yokosuka (11)                   |
| <i>Combined Air Force</i>                       | 4 AV.....                                             | Near Kure                       |
|                                                 | 1 AV.....                                             | Truk (12)                       |
|                                                 | 2 XAV.....                                            | Near Sasebo                     |
|                                                 | 1 XAV.....                                            | Saigon-Camranh Bay Area         |
| <i>Combined Fleet Train</i>                     | 2 AO.....                                             | Near Yokosuka (13)              |
|                                                 | 2 AO.....                                             | Near Kure                       |
|                                                 | 1 AO.....                                             | Near Sasebo (13)                |
|                                                 | 1 AO.....                                             | Near Malzuru                    |
|                                                 | 1 AO.....                                             | Near Saipan                     |
|                                                 | 1 AO.....                                             | Near Yap                        |
|                                                 | 1 AC.....                                             | Near Saipan (13)                |
|                                                 | 1 AF.....                                             | Near Yokosuka (13)              |
|                                                 | 2 AR.....                                             | Near Kure                       |
|                                                 | 1 Ice Breaker.....                                    | Saghalien                       |
|                                                 | 1 Target Ship.....                                    | Sasebo                          |
| <i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i>           | 1 OCA.....                                            | Shanghai (14)                   |
|                                                 | 1 PG.....                                             | Shanghai                        |
|                                                 | 3 DD.....                                             | "                               |
|                                                 | 7 AK or AP.....                                       | (15)                            |
| <i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i> | 4 PG.....                                             | Between Wuhu and Ichang         |
|                                                 | 10 PR.....                                            | " " " "                         |
|                                                 | 1 AP or AK.....                                       | " " " "                         |
| <i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>   | 1 CA.....                                             | Sasebo                          |
|                                                 | 1 CL.....                                             | Foochow                         |
|                                                 | 4 TB.....                                             | Canton-Hongkong area            |
|                                                 | 1 PG.....                                             | " " "                           |
|                                                 | 2 AM.....                                             | " " "                           |
|                                                 | 13 Misc.....                                          | " " "                           |
|                                                 | About 30 Ap or AK.....                                | South China coast (15)          |
| <i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>   | 1 OCA.....                                            | Tsingtao                        |
|                                                 | 1 DD.....                                             | "                               |
|                                                 | 1 TB.....                                             | "                               |
|                                                 | 1 AP.....                                             | Tsingtao                        |
| <i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>             | 1 CL.....                                             | French Indo-China coast         |
|                                                 | 1 CM.....                                             | " " " "                         |

# 1324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(1) The Kure area includes the whole Inland Sea area, together with the Saeki area, which controls the straits between Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku.

(2) The HIYEI (BB) has moved to Sasebo from the Kure area.

(3) The HARUNA (BB), formerly undergoing repairs at Sasebo, has rejoined the fleet as flagship of Batdiv. 3.

(4) The FURUTAKA (CA) is at Sasebo, separated from the other CO of the division which are near Kure.

(5) The TAKAO (CA) has left the drydock at Yokosuka, and rejoined 2nd Fleet units near Kure.

(6) The SUZUYA (CA) shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo area.

(7) The 13 of the 28 destroyers in the 2nd Fleet have been reported near Yokosuka. The other 15 are still near Kure.

(8) The Third Fleet has reduced the number of its units near Malzuru, and increased the number in the Formosan Straits. The NATORI, which sailed from Amoy on Nov. 4th, is now at anchor in Bias Bay.

(9) The Fourth Fleet has been augmented by the addition of 8 divisions of ex-merchantmen (about 32 ships). Increased activity has been noticed among other units of the Fourth Fleet, but except for the shift of 6 submarines to Truk, the total number of fighting ships in the Mandates has not been increased.

(10) The Fifth Fleet has moved from Yokosuka to Chichijima, with certain portions possibly near Marcus Island.

(11) The aircraft carriers SORYU, HIRYU, and HOSHO have moved from South Kyushu to the Kure area. The SHOKAKU has moved from Takao to Kure. The plane guard destroyers have shifted slightly.

(12) The KAMOI (AV) is near Truk.

(13) The Combined Fleet Train has made a number of minor shifts.

(14) The IZUMO is assumed to be in Shanghai.

(15) Ten transports left Shanghai between the 14th and 17th, with troops, supplied and landing boats; seven transports are still there. In addition, 17 transports, southbound, were sighted between Hongkong and Shanghai between the 10th and 14th. Over the week end, 18 transports sailed up the Pearl River, and 12 downstream.

## Distribution:

CNO—Copy No. 1

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Op-12—Copy No. 3

Op-38W—Copy No. 4

Op-16-F—Copy No. 4

Op-16-F-2

DECEMBER 1, 1941.

## MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

| <i>Fleets</i>       | <i>Locations</i>    |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>First Fleet</i>  | Home Waters         |
| BB—NAGATO.....      | Near Kure           |
| BB—MUTSU.....       | " "                 |
| BB—YAMASHIRO.....   | At Yokosuka         |
| BB—FUSO.....        | Near Kure           |
| BB—ISE.....         | " "                 |
| BB—HYUGA.....       | " "                 |
| BB—HIYEI.....       | Near Sasebo         |
| BB—KONGO.....       | Near Malzuru        |
| BB—KIRISHIMA.....   | Near Kure           |
| BB—HARUNA.....      | " "                 |
| 10 BB.....          |                     |
| 3 CA.....           | Near Kure           |
| 1 CA.....           | Near Sasebo         |
| 1 CL.....           | Near Kure (1)       |
| 1 CL.....           | Near Sasebo (1)     |
| 27 DD.....          | Near Kure           |
| <i>Second Fleet</i> | In Home Waters      |
| 10 CA.....          | Near Kure (2)       |
| 2 CA.....           | Near Sasebo (2)     |
| 1 CA.....           | Off Camranh Bay (3) |
| 1 CL.....           | Near Kure           |
| 1 CL.....           | Near Bako (4)       |
| 4 DD.....           | Near Yokosuka (4)   |
| 12 DD.....          | Near Kure (4)       |

| <i>Fleets</i>        | <i>Locations</i>                                      |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Third Fleet</i>   | Sasebo and Bako area                                  |
| 1 CL                 | Near Sasebo                                           |
| 5 CM                 | " "                                                   |
| 12 AM                | " "                                                   |
| 12 PC                | " "                                                   |
| 4 DD                 | " "                                                   |
| 1 AS                 | " "                                                   |
| 6 SS                 | " "                                                   |
| 6 XPG                | " "                                                   |
| 46 AP or AK          | " "                                                   |
| 1 CL                 | Bias Bay                                              |
| 1 CM                 | Near Bako                                             |
| 1 DD                 | Near Maizuru                                          |
| <i>Fourth Fleet</i>  | Mandated Islands                                      |
| 4 CL                 | In Truk-Ponape area                                   |
| 3 DD                 | " " " "                                               |
| 1 AS                 | " " " "                                               |
| 9 SS                 | " " " "                                               |
| 8 XPG                | " " " "                                               |
| 16 AP or AK          | " " " "                                               |
| 2 DD                 | Near Saipan                                           |
| 1 SS                 | " "                                                   |
| 1 Survey Ship        | " "                                                   |
| 3 XPG                | " "                                                   |
| 17 AP or AK          | " "                                                   |
| 4 SS                 | " Palao                                               |
| 4 XPG                | " "                                                   |
| 30 AP or AK          | " "                                                   |
| 1 AS                 | " Jaluit                                              |
| 4 XAM                | " "                                                   |
| 3 PC                 | " "                                                   |
| 13 AP or AK          | " "                                                   |
| 1 CM                 | In Yokosuka                                           |
| 3 DD                 | Near Sasebo                                           |
| 1 SS                 | At Maizuru                                            |
| 1 SS                 | At Kure                                               |
| <i>Fifth Fleet</i>   | Chichijima                                            |
| 1 CL                 | (The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown) |
| <i>Sixth Fleet</i>   |                                                       |
| 2 CL                 | Near Kure                                             |
| 2 CL                 | Near Sasebo                                           |
| 1 AS                 | Near Kure                                             |
| 1 AS                 | Sasebo                                                |
| 1 AP (XAS)           | Bako (5)                                              |
| 4 SS                 | Bako (5)                                              |
| 5 SS                 | Yokosuka (5)                                          |
| 12 SS                | Kure                                                  |
| 21 SS                | In Sasebo and other Home waters (5)                   |
| <i>Carrier Fleet</i> |                                                       |
| CV-AKAGI             | S. Kyushu                                             |
| CV-KAGA              | " "                                                   |
| CV-SORYU             | Kure                                                  |
| CV-HIRYU             | "                                                     |
| CV-HOSHO             | "                                                     |
| CV-KORYU             | S. Kyushu                                             |
| CV-KASUGA            | "                                                     |
| CV-RYUJO             | Kure                                                  |
| CV-ZUIKAKU           | "                                                     |
| CV-SHOKAKU           | "                                                     |
| 10 DD                | S. Kyushu and Kure<br>Yokosuka                        |

# 1326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

| <i>Fleets</i>                                   | <i>Locations</i>         |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>Combined Air Force</i>                       |                          |
| 3 AV-----                                       | Near Bako (6)            |
| 1 AV-----                                       | Near Kure (6)            |
| 1 AV-----                                       | Truk                     |
| 2 XAV-----                                      | Near Sasebo              |
| 1 XAV-----                                      | Saigon-Camranh Bay area  |
| <i>Combined Fleet Train</i>                     |                          |
| 2 AO-----                                       | Near Yokosuka            |
| 2 AO-----                                       | Near Kure                |
| 1 AO-----                                       | Near Sasebo              |
| 1 AO-----                                       | Near Matsuru             |
| 1 AO-----                                       | Near Saipan              |
| 1 AO-----                                       | Near Yap                 |
| 1 AC-----                                       | Near Saipan              |
| 1 AF-----                                       | Near Yokosuka            |
| 2 AR-----                                       | Near Kure                |
| 1 Ice Breaker-----                              | Saghalien                |
| 1 Target Ship-----                              | Sasebo                   |
| <i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i>           |                          |
| 1 OCA-----                                      | Shanghai                 |
| 1 PG-----                                       | Shanghai                 |
| 3 DD-----                                       | "                        |
| 7 AK or AP-----                                 | "                        |
| <i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i> |                          |
| 4 PG-----                                       | Between Wuhu and Ichang  |
| 10 PR-----                                      | " " " "                  |
| 1 AP or AK-----                                 | " " " "                  |
| <i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>   |                          |
| 1 CA-----                                       | Sasebo                   |
| 1 CL-----                                       | Foochow                  |
| 4 TB-----                                       | Canton-Hongkong area     |
| 1 PG-----                                       | " " "                    |
| 2 AM-----                                       | " " "                    |
| 13 Misc-----                                    | " " "                    |
| About 30 AP or AK-----                          | South China coast        |
| <i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>   |                          |
| 1 OCA-----                                      | Tsingtao                 |
| 1 DD-----                                       | "                        |
| 4 TB-----                                       | " (7)                    |
| 4 TB-----                                       | Canton-Hongkong area (7) |
| 1 AP-----                                       | Tsingtao                 |
| <i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>             |                          |
| 1 CL-----                                       | French Indo-China coast  |
| 1 CM-----                                       | " " " "                  |

## NOTES

- (1) (CL) SENDAI moved from Kure to Sasebo.
- (2) The ATAGO (CA), Flagship of the 2nd Fleet, has moved from Kure to Sasebo. Further southward movements are expected.
- (3) The CHOKAI (CA) has probably become flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, off Indo-China.
- (4) Desron 4, consisting of the NAKA (CL) and 12 DD have moved to Bako.
- (5) The NAGOYA MARU and the 4 Minelaying SS of Subron 6 (I-121-124) are now near Bako.
- (6) Airron 7 has moved from Kure to Bako.
- (7) At least one division of Torpedo Boats have moved to South China.

## Distribution:

- CNO—Copy No. 1
- DNI—Copy No. 2
- OP-12—Copy No. 5
- Op-38W—Copy No. 3
- OP-16-F—Copy No. 4

## CONFIDENTIAL

## Naval message—Navy Department

| Extension Number                                                                           | Addressees                                                                                   | Precedence                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Drafter</b><br><b>From:</b> OPNAV.<br><b>Released by</b><br><b>Date:</b> April 1, 1941. | <b>For Action:</b><br>COM ALL NAV DIS-<br>TRICTS, NY WASH<br>GOVERNORS OF<br>GUAM AND SAMOA. | <b>Priority</b><br><b>Routine</b><br><b>Deferred</b> |
| <b>TOR Coderoom</b><br><b>Decoded by</b><br><b>Paraphrased by</b>                          | <b>Information:</b>                                                                          | <b>Priority</b><br><b>Routine</b><br><b>Deferred</b> |

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

012358

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT

## TEXT

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Originator 10/11 File

ONI: 16 Copy, 16-A Copy, 16-B Copy, F-4, F-3, F-1.

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

## CONFIDENTIAL

[DO NOT DETACH—This slip is a part of permanent file record]

N. N. I. 122

## ROUTING SLIP

27-41

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

Subject: Organization of the Japanese Fleets (Op-16-F-2. ONI Serial, dated July 29, 1941).

Reference:

Date: July 30, 1941. File No.

| From Director of Naval Intelligence    | Room No. | To    |
|----------------------------------------|----------|-------|
| Secretary of the Navy.....             | 2046     | ----- |
| Under Secretary of the Navy.....       | 2054     | ----- |
| Assistant Secretary of the Navy.....   | 2030     | ----- |
| Chief, Naval Operations.....           | 2064     | (2)   |
| Assistant Chief, Naval Operations..... | 2064     | (1)   |
| Central Division.....                  | 2068     | ----- |
| Communication Liason.....              | 2613     | ----- |
| Communications.....                    | 2621     | ----- |
| Fleet Training.....                    | 2804     | ----- |
| Inspections.....                       | 3630     | ----- |
| Fleet Maintenance.....                 | 2610     | ----- |
| Naval Districts.....                   | 1057     | ----- |
| Ships' Movements.....                  | 2603     | ----- |
| War Plans.....                         | 2605     | ----- |
| Naval Reserve Policy.....              | 2616     | ----- |
| General Board.....                     | 2743     | ----- |
| Budget Officer.....                    | 2002     | ----- |
| Aeronautics.....                       | 2929     | ----- |
| Ships.....                             | 2208     | ----- |
| Hydrographic.....                      | 1027     | ----- |
| J. A. G.....                           | 2524     | ----- |
| Marine Corps.....                      | 3406     | ----- |
| M. & S.....                            | 1078     | ----- |
| Navigation.....                        | 3940     | ----- |
| Ordnance.....                          | 3139     | ----- |
| S. & A.....                            | 1007     | ----- |
| Y. & D.....                            | 2409     | ----- |
| Aeronautical Board.....                | 1907     | ----- |
| Office of Inventions.....              | 1516     | ----- |

# 1328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## CHECK ACTION REQUIRED

|          |                                           |
|----------|-------------------------------------------|
| (2)      | Information and return O. N. I. Room 4826 |
|          | Retain                                    |
| (1)      | Note, initial, and pass to next           |
|          | For comment and return                    |
|          | Necessary action or reply                 |
|          | Cognizance activity checked               |
|          | Information on which to base reply        |
| REMARKS: |                                           |

(At this point in the Exhibit, two items appear, as follows:

1. A copy of Naval Intelligence Division Routing Slip 27-41 dated 30 July 1941.
2. Navy Department Intelligence Report, Serial No. 27-41, dated 29 July 1941, relating to organization of the Japanese Fleet.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 301 and 302, EXHIBITS—ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

## COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMALOTO Isoroku, ClnC (Admiral)

MUTSU, Flagship

## FIRST FLEET

### Butdiv One

MUTSU (F)  
NAGATO  
YAMASHIRO

### Butdiv Two

FUSO (F)  
ISE  
NYUGA

### Butdiv Three

KONGO (F)  
NIYEI  
KIRISHIMA  
HARUMA

### Crutdiv Six

FURUTAKA  
KAKO  
AOBA  
KINUGASA

### Cardiv 3

ZUIKAKU  
SHOKAKU

### Desdiv 34

HAKAZE  
AKIKAZE  
YUKAZE  
TACHIKAZE

### Cardiv 5

RYUJO  
HOSHIO

### Desdiv

SHIMAKAZE  
SAWAKAZE  
YAKAZE  
NADAKAZE

### Cardiv 7

CHITOSE (F)  
CHIYODA  
MIZUHO

### Desron One

ABUKUMA (F)

### Desdiv 6

IKAZUCHI (F)  
SAZAMAMI  
INAZUMA  
HIBIKI

### Desdiv 7

OBORO (F)  
USHIO  
AKEBONO  
AKATSUKI

### Desdiv 21

NENOMI (F)  
MATSUMARU  
HATSUSHIMO  
WAKABA

### Desdiv 27

SHIRATSUYU (F)  
ARIAKE  
YUGURE  
SNIGURE

### Desron Three

SENDAI (F)

### Desdiv 11

FUBUKI (F)  
SHIRAYUKI  
MATSUYUKI

### Desdiv 12

SHIRAKUMO (F)  
SHINONOME  
USUGUMO

### Desdiv 19

SHIKINAMI (F)  
ISONAMI  
AYANAMI

### Desdiv 20

AMAGIRI (F)  
ASAGIRI  
YUGIRI  
SAGIRI

## COMBINED FLEET

## SECOND FLEET

KOGA Mineichi, CInC (Vice Admiral)

KAYA, Flagship

*Crudiv Four*

ATAGO  
TAKAO  
CHOKAI  
NAYA

*Crudiv Five*

NACHI (F)  
HAGURO  
MYOKO

*Crudiv Seven*

KUMANO (F)  
MOGAMI  
MIKUMA  
SUZUYA

*Crudiv Eight*

CHIKUMA (F)  
TONE

*Cardiv 1*

AKAGI (F)  
KAGA

*Desdiv 3*

HOKAZE  
SHIOKAZE  
NAMIKAZE  
NUMAKAZE

*Cardiv 2*

SORYU (F)  
MIRYU

*Desdiv 23*

UZUKI  
KIKUTSUKI  
MIKASUKI  
YUZUKI

*Desron Two*

JINTSU (F)

*Desdiv 8*

ASASHIO  
ARASHIO  
OSHIO  
MICHISHIO

*Desdiv 15*

KUROSHIO  
OYASHIO  
NATSUSHIO  
HAYASHIO

*Desdiv 16*

HATSUKAZE  
YUKIKAZE  
AMATSUKAZE  
TOKITSUKAZE

*Desdiv 18*

KASUMI  
ARARE  
KACERO  
SHIRANUHI

*Desron Four*

NAKA (F)

*Desdiv 2*

YUDACHI (F)  
MURASAME  
HARUSAME  
SAMIDARE

*Desdiv 1*

HAGIKAZE  
ARASHI  
ISOKAZE  
URAKAZE

*Desdiv 9*

ASAGUMO  
YAMAGUMO  
MINEGUMMO  
NATSUGURE

*Desdiv 24*

KAWAKAZE (F)  
YAMAKAZE  
SUZUKAZE  
UMIKAZE

## THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo, CInC (Vice Admiral)

NAGARA, Flagship

*Cardiv 6*

NOTORO  
KAMIKAWA MARU  
*Minelayer Div. 17*  
ITSUKUSHIMA  
YALYAMA  
KUMAJIRI

*Desron Five*

NATORI (F)

*Desdiv 5*

ASAKAZE  
HARUKAZE  
MATSUKAZE  
HATAKAZE

*Desdiv 27*

SATSUKI  
FUMITSUKI  
MINATSUKI  
NAGATSUKI

*1st Base Force**Guard Division 1*

SHIRATAKA  
AOTAKA  
HATSUTAKA

*Mine Sweeper Div. 1*

AM-1  
AM-2  
AM-3



# 1330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

|                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| AM-4                        | <i>Subchaser Division 11</i> |
| AM-5                        | PC-4                         |
| AM-6                        | PC-5                         |
| <i>Mine Sweeper Div. 21</i> | PC-6                         |
| AM-7                        | <i>Subchaser Division 21</i> |
| AM-8                        | PC-7                         |
| AM-9                        | PC-8                         |
| AM-10                       | PC-9                         |
| AM-11                       | <i>Subchaser Division 31</i> |
| AM-12                       | PC-10                        |
| <i>Gunboat Division 1</i>   | PC-11                        |
| Gunboats                    | PC-12                        |
| (Converted Fishing Vessels) | <i>27 or more Transports</i> |
| <i>Subchaser Squadron</i>   |                              |
| KATSURIKI                   |                              |
| <i>Subchaser Division 1</i> |                              |
| PC-1                        |                              |
| PC-2                        |                              |
| PC-3                        |                              |

## FOURTH FLEET

KATAGIRI Eikichi, CinC (Vice Admiral)

KASHIMA, Flagship

|                          |                                          |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| <i>Crudiv Eighteen</i>   | <i>Subdiv 33</i>                         |
| KASHIMA (F)              | RO-63                                    |
| TENRYU                   | RO-64                                    |
| TATSUTA                  | RO-68                                    |
| <i>Air Group 24</i>      | <i>3rd Base Force (At Palau)</i>         |
| KAMOI                    | <i>Guard Division 3</i>                  |
| 1—XAV                    | 15 XPG                                   |
| 2 VP—Squadrons           | <i>Subdiv 8</i>                          |
| <i>Desdiv 17</i>         | RO-56                                    |
| MINEKAZE                 | RO-57                                    |
| OKIKAZE                  | RO-58                                    |
| <i>Minelayer Div. 19</i> | RO-59                                    |
| TOKIWA                   | 10 Transports                            |
| OKINOSHEA                | <i>4th Base Force (At Truk)</i>          |
| <i>Desron Six</i>        | 9 Transports                             |
| TAMA                     | Air Group 7 (At Ponape)                  |
| <i>Desdiv 29</i>         | 2 Transports ( " " )                     |
| OITE                     | <i>5th Base Force (At Salpan)</i>        |
| HAYATE                   | <i>Guard Division 4</i>                  |
| ASAMAGI                  | (Composition unknown)                    |
| YUMAGI                   | <i>Guard Division 5</i>                  |
| <i>Desdiv 30</i>         | (Composition unknown)                    |
| KISARAGI                 | <i>Gunboat Division</i>                  |
| MUTSUKI                  | (Composition unknown)                    |
| YAYOI                    | <i>Air Group 8</i>                       |
| MOCHITSUKI               | 10 Transports                            |
| <i>Subron Seven</i>      | <i>6th Base Force (At Jaluit)</i>        |
| JINGEI (F)               | <i>Mine Sweeper Division (At Jaluit)</i> |
| <i>Subdiv 26</i>         | AM-13                                    |
| RO-60                    | AM-14                                    |
| RO-61                    | AM-15                                    |
| RO-62                    | AM-16                                    |
| <i>Subdiv 27</i>         | 13 Transports                            |
| RO-65                    | <i>Subchaser Div. 5 (In Mandates)</i>    |
| RO-66                    | PC-51                                    |
| RO-67                    | PC-52                                    |
|                          | PC-53                                    |

## SUBMARINE FLEET

## KATORI, Flagship

*Subron One*

KATORI (F)

TAIGEI

*Subdiv 1*

I-9

I-15

I-16

I-17

*Subdiv 2*

I-18

I-19

I-20

*Subron Two*

KITAGAMI (F)

*Subdiv 7*

I-1

I-2

I-3

I-7

*Subdiv 8*

I-4

I-5

I-6

*Subron Three*

ISUZU (F)

*Subdiv 11*

I-74

I-75

*Subdiv 12*

I-8

I-68

I-69

I-70

*Subdiv 20*

I-71

I-72

I-73

*Subron Five*

YURA (F)

*Subdiv 28*

I-59

I-60

*Subdiv 29*

I-61

I-62

I-64

*Subdiv 30*

I-65

I-66

*Subron Six*

KINU (F)

*Subdiv 9*

I-123

I-124

*Subdiv 13*

I-121

I-122

*Subron Ten*

KISO (F)

*Subdiv 18*

I-53

I-54

I-55

*Subdiv 19*

I-56

I-57

I-58

*Subdiv 21*

RO-33

RO-34

## TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

SATA  
TSURULI  
SHIRIYA  
IRO  
ONDONAYATOMO  
NARUTO  
NANIYA  
ASAHI  
AKASHIMUROTO  
OTOMARI  
SETTSU

# 1332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

SHIMADA Shigetaro, CInC (Admiral)

Izumo, Flagship

### *Shanghai Base Force*

*Desdiv 11*

KURI  
TSUGA  
HASU

### *Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section*

*Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai*

*Nanking Base Force*

*Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking*

CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OF

FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

1st China Expeditionary Fleet.

KOMATSU Teruhisa, CInC (Vice Admiral)

Uji, Flagship

*Patrol Division 11*

ATAKA  
SETA  
KATADA  
HIRA  
HOZU  
TOBA  
ATAMI  
FUTAMI  
FUSHIMI  
SUMIDA  
HASHIDATE

*Air Group 10*

*Hankow Base Force*

*Kiukiang Base Force*

### *SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OF*

*SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET*

2nd China Expeditionary Fleet

NIIMI Masahichi, CInC (Vice Admiral)

ASHIGARA, Flagship

*Cruidiv Fifteen*

ASHIGARA (F)

*Patrol Division 14*

SAGA

AM-17

AM-18

*Torpedo Boat Division 1*

OTORI

HAYABUSHA

HIYODORI

KASASAGI

*Guard Division 15*

Composition unknown

*Guard Division 16*

SHIMUSHU

*Canton Base Force*

*Amoy Base Force*

*Hainan Is. Base Force*

*13 Special Service Ships*

## NORTH CHINA FLEET, OR THIRD

### EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

### 3rd China Expeditionary Fleet

SHIMIZU, Mitsunami, CInC (Vice Admiral)

IWATE, Flagship

*Patrol Division 12*

IWATE (F)

MANRI MARU

*Torpedo Boat Division 11*

HATO

SAGI

KARI

KIJI

### *Torpedo Boat Division 21*

CHIDORI

MANAZURU

TOMOZURU

HATSUKARI

*Gunboat Division 2*

Composition unknown

*Gunboat Division 13*

Composition unknown

*Gunboat Division 14*

Composition unknown

*Tsingtao Base Force*